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DNSEXT Working Group                                        Yuji Kamite
INTERNET-DRAFT                                       NTT Communications
<draft-ietf-dnsext-tkey-renewal-mode-01.txt>            Masaya Nakayama
Expires: Nov. 11, 2002                          The University of Tokyo
                                                           May 11, 2002




                      TKEY Secret Key Renewal Mode


Status of this Memo

  This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all
  provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

  Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task
  Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that other
  groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.

  Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
  and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
  time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
  material or to cite them other than as ``work in progress.''

  The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
  http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt

  The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
  http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html


Abstract


   This document defines a new mode in TKEY [RFC2930] and proposes an
   atomic method for changing secret keys used for TSIG [RFC2845]
   periodically. Originally, TKEY provides methods of setting up shared
   secrets other than manual exchange, but it cannot control timing of
   key renewal very well though it can add or delete shared keys
   separately. This proposal is a systematical key renewal procedure
   intended for preventing signing DNS messages with old and non-safe
   keys permanently.







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INTERNET-DRAFT                                                  May 2002


                           Table of Contents


1  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
  1.1  Defined Words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
  1.2  New Format and Assigned Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
  1.3  Overview of Secret Key Renewal Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
2  Shared Secret Key Renewal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
  2.1  Key Usage Time Check  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
  2.2  Partial Revocation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
  2.3  Renewal Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
    2.3.1  Query for DH Exchange for Key Renewal . . . . . . . . . .   6
    2.3.2  Response for DH Exchange for Key Renewal  . . . . . . . .   8
  2.4  Key Adoption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
    2.4.1  Query for Key Adoption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
    2.4.2  Response for Key Adoption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
  2.5  Considerations about Non-compliant Hosts  . . . . . . . . . .  10
3  Secret Storage  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
4  Compulsory Key Revocation by Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
  4.1  Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
5  Special Considerations for Two Servers' Case  . . . . . . . . . .  12
  5.1  To Cope with Collisions of Renewal Requests . . . . . . . . .  12
6  Key Name Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
7  Example Usage of Secret Key Renewal Mode  . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
8  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
9  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
10 References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18























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1.  Introduction

   TSIG [RFC2845] provides DNS message integrity and the
   request/transaction authentication by means of message authentication
   codes (MAC). TSIG is a practical solution in view of calculation
   speed and availablity. However, TSIG does not have exchanging
   mechanism of shared secret keys between server and resolver, and
   administrators might have to exchange secret keys manually.  TKEY
   [RFC2930] is introduced to solve such problem and it can exchange
   secrets for TSIG via networks.

   In various modes of TKEY, a server and a resolver can add or delete a
   secret key be means of TKEY message exchange. However, the existing
   TKEY doesn't care fully about the management of keys which became too
   old, or dangerous after long time usage.

   It is ideal that the number of secret which a pair of hosts share
   should be limited only one, because having too many keys for the same
   purpose might not only be a burden to resolvers for managing and
   distinguishing according to servers to query, but also does not seem
   to be safe in terms of storage and protection against attackers.
   Moreover, perhaps holding old keys long time might give attackers
   chances to compromise by scrupulous calculation.

   Therefore, when a new shared secret is established by TKEY, the
   previous old secret should be revoked immediately. To accomplish
   this, DNS servers must support a protocol for key renewal. This
   document specifies procedure to refresh secret keys between two hosts
   which is defined within the framework of TKEY, and it is called "TKEY
   Secret Key Renewal Mode".

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119].


1.1.  Defined Words

   * Inception Time: Beginning of the shared secret key lifetime. This
   value is determined when the key is generated.

   * Expiry Limit: Time limit of the key's validity. This value is
   determined when a new key is generated. After Expiry Limit, server
   and client (resolver) must not authenticate TSIG signed with the key.
   Therefore, Renewal to the next key should be carried out before
   Expiry Limit.

   * Partial Revocation Time: Time when server judges the key is too old
   and must be updated. It must be between Inception Time and Expiry



Kamite, et. al.                                                 [Page 3]


INTERNET-DRAFT                                                  May 2002


   Limit.  This value is determined by server freely following its
   security policy. e.g., if the time from Inception to Partial
   Revocation is short, renewal will be carried out more often, which
   might be safer.

   * Revocation Time: Time when the key becomes invalid and can be
   removed. This value is not determined in advance because it is the
   actual time when revocation is completed.

   * Adoption Time: Time when the new key is adopted as the next key
   formally. After Adoption, the key is valid and server and client can
   generate or verify TSIG making use of it. Adoption Time also means
   the time when it becomes possible to remove the previous key, so
   Revocation and Adoption are usually done at the same time.


                  Partial
    Inception     Revocation    Revocation         Expiry Limit
     |                |              |             |
     |----------------|- - - - - - >>|- (revoked) -|
     |                |              |             |
    previous key      |      |       |
                             |- - - -|-------------------->> time
                             |       |               new key
                         Inception   Adoption


1.2.  New Format and Assigned Numbers

   TSIG
         ERROR = (PartialRevoke), to be defined

   TKEY
         Mode  = (DH exchange for key renewal), to be defined
                 For detailed format, see section 2.3.
         Mode  = (key adoption), to be defined
                 For detailed format, see section 2.4.


1.3.  Overview of Secret Key Renewal Mode

   When a server receives a query from a client signed with a TSIG key,
   It always checks if the present time is within the range of usage
   duration it considers safe. If it is judged that the key is too old,
   i.e. after Partial Revocation Time, the server comes to be in Partial
   Revocation state about the key.

   In this state, whenever a client sends a normal query (e.g., question



Kamite, et. al.                                                 [Page 4]


INTERNET-DRAFT                                                  May 2002


   about A RR) other than TKEY Renewal request with TSIG signed with the
   old key, the server returns an error message to notify that the time
   to renew has come.  This is called "PartialRevoke" error message.

   The client which got this error is able to notice that it is
   necessary to refresh the secret.  To make a new shared secret, it
   sends a TKEY Renewal request. In this process, Diffie-Hellman
   Exchange is used.  After new secret establishment, the client sends a
   TKEY Adoption request. If this is admitted by the server, the new key
   is formally adopted, and at the same time the corresponding old
   secret is invalidated. Then the client can send the first query again
   signed with the new key.

   Key renewal procedure is executed based on two phase commit
   mechanism. The first phase is the TKEY Renewal request and its
   response, which means preparatory confirmation for key update. The
   second phase is Adoption request and its response. If the server gets
   request and client receives the response successfully, they can
   finish renewal process. If any error happens and renewal process
   fails during these phases, client should roll back to the beginning
   of the first phase, and send TKEY Renewal request again. This
   rollback can be done until the Expiry Limit of the key.


2.  Shared Secret Key Renewal

   Suppose a server and a client agree to change their TSIG keys
   periodically. Key renewal procedure is defined between two hosts.

2.1.  Key Usage Time Check

   Whenever a server receives a query with TSIG and can find a key that
   is used for signing it, the server checks its Inception time, Partial
   Revocation time and Expiry Limit (this information is usually
   memorized by the server).

   When the present time is before Inception Time, the server MUST NOT
   verify TSIG with the key, and server acts the same way as when no
   valid key is found, following [RFC2845].

   When the present time is equal to Inception Time, or between
   Inception Time and Partial Revocation Time, the behavior of the
   server is the same as when a valid key is found, required in
   [RFC2845].

   When the present time is the same as the Partial Revocation Time, or
   between the Partial Revocation Time and Expiry Limit, the server
   comes to be in Partial Revocation state about the TSIG key and



Kamite, et. al.                                                 [Page 5]


INTERNET-DRAFT                                                  May 2002


   behaves according to the next section.

   When the present time is the same as the Expiry Time or after it, the
   server MUST NOT verify TSIG with the key, and returns error messages
   in the same way as when no valid key is found, following [RFC2845].


2.2.  Partial Revocation

   In Partial Revocation state, we say the server has partially revoked
   the key and the key has become a "partially revoked key".

   Server which has received queries signed with the partially revoked
   key MUST NOT answer them except when they are "DH exchange for key
   renewal" requests (See section 2.3.) or "key adoption" requests (See
   section 2.4.).  Instead, it returns TSIG error messages whose error
   codes are "PartialRevoke" (See section 9.)

   PartialRevoke error messages have the role to inform clients of the
   keys' partial revocation and urge them to send TKEY Renewal requests.
   These error responses MUST be signed with those partial revoked keys
   if the queries are signed with them. They are sent only when the keys
   used for queries' TSIG are found to be partially revoked. If the MAC
   of TSIG cannot be verified with the partially revoked keys, servers
   MUST NOT return PartialRevoke error with MAC, but should return
   another error such as "BADSIG" without MAC; in other words, a server
   informs its key's partial revocation only when the MAC in the
   received query is valid.


2.3.  Renewal Request

2.3.1.  Query for DH Exchange for Key Renewal

   If a client has received a PartialRevoke Error and authenticated the
   response based on TSIG MAC, it sends a TKEY query for Diffie-Hellman
   exchange for key renewal (in this document, we call it Renewal
   request, too.) to the server. The request MUST be signed with TSIG or
   SIG(0) [RFC2931] for authentication. The client can use the partial
   revoked key for TSIG.

   The request message has the structure given below.

     Question section's QNAME field is the same as the NAME filed of
     TKEY written below.

     In additional section, there is one KEY RR and one TKEY RR.  KEY RR
     is the client's Diffie-Hellman public key [RFC2539]. TKEY RR has



Kamite, et. al.                                                 [Page 6]


INTERNET-DRAFT                                                  May 2002


     the structure and values described below:

        Field        Type         Comment
        -------      ------       -------
        NAME         domain       used for a new key, see below
        TYPE         u_int16_t    (defined in [RFC2930])
        CLASS        u_int16_t    (defined in [RFC2930])
        TTL          u_int32_t    (defined in [RFC2930])
        RDLEN        u_int16_t    (defined in [RFC2930])
        RDATA:
         Algorithm:   domain       algorithm for a new key
         Inception:   u_int32_t    about the keying material
         Expiration:  u_int32_t    about the keying material
         Mode:        u_int16_t    "DH exchange for key renewal"
                                   see section 9.
         Error:       u_int16_t    see description below
         Key Size:    u_int16_t    see description below
         Key Data:    octet-stream
         Other Size:  u_int16_t    (defined in [RFC2930])
                                   size of other data
         Other Data:               newly defined: see description below


     Mode field of TKEY RR in the message stores the value of "DH
     exchange for key renewal". See section 9.

     For "NAME" field, both non-root and root name are allowed. It may
     be used for a new key's name in the same manner as [RFC2930] 2.1.
     "Algorithm" is the domain name for a new secret as a result of this
     key renewal message. It specifies the algorithm used with a newly
     produced key.

     "Inception" and "Expiration" are those requested for the keying
     material, that is, requested usage period of a new key.  "Key Data"
     is used as a random. This is provided in the same way as [RFC2930]
     4.1 in order to avoid always deriving the same keying material.
     "Error" is an extended RCODE which includes "PartialRevoke" value.
     See section 9.

     In DH exchange for key renewal mode, "Other Data" field has the
     structure given below. They describe attributes of the partially
     revoked key.

        in Other Data filed:

          Field          Type     Comment
          -------        ------   -------
          OldNAME        domain   name of the old key



Kamite, et. al.                                                 [Page 7]


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          OldAlgorithm   domain   algorithm of the old key


2.3.2.  Response for DH Exchange for Key Renewal

   The server which has received a "DH exchange for key renewal" TKEY
   request, it tries to verify TSIG or SIG(0) accompanying it. If the
   verified TSIG is signed with the partially revoked key, the request
   MUST be authenticated and accepted.

   If the partially revoked key indicated in the request TKEY's OldName
   field does not really exist at the server, or incompatible DH key is
   found in the request, "BADKEY" [RFC 2845] is given in Error Field.
   "FORMERR" is given if the query included no DH KEY.

   If there are no errors, the server processes a response according to
   Diffie-Hellman exchanged keying.  Details of response messages are
   below:

     In answer section, there is one TKEY RR. The TKEY RR shows the
     newly produced key's attributes such as a key name and algorithm.
     Its format is defined as a response of the previous key renewal
     request, so all values are equal to 2.3.1 except TKEY NAME, TKEY
     RDLEN, RDATA's Inception, Expiration, Key Size and Key Data as long
     as no error has occurred.

     "NAME" field specifies the name of newly produced key which the
     client will have to use.

     "Inception" field and "Expiration" field mean the period of the
     produced key usage. "Inception" should be set to be the time when
     the new key is actually generated or the time before it, and it
     will be regarded as Inception Time. "Expiration" is determined by
     the server, and it will be regarded as Expiry Limit.

     Once the server has decided Expiry Limit and returned a response,
     it should obey them as long as it can. In other words, they SHOULD
     NOT change time values for checking Expiry Limit in the future
     without any special reason (e.g., a security issue such as
     "Emergency Compulsory Revocation" described in section 8).

     Note that the Partial Revocation Time about a new key is not
     decided and informed based only on the client's request. The server
     can decide any value as long as it is between Inception and Expiry
     Limit. However, it is recommended that the period from Inception to
     Partial Revocation should be fixed as the server side's
     configuration or should be set the same as the corresponding old
     key's one.



Kamite, et. al.                                                 [Page 8]


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     TKEY Key Data is used as an additional nonce to avoid deriving the
     same keying material for the same pair of DH key, which is the same
     as [RFC2930] 4.1.

     If the TKEY error field is zero, The resolver supplied Diffie-
     Hellman KEY RR SHOULD be echoed in the additional section and a
     server Diffie-Hellman KEY RR will also be present in the answer
     section like [RFC2930] 4.1.

   At this moment, the server gets a new secret. However, it might
   receive another "DH exchange for key renewal" TKEY request whose
   OldName indicates the same partial revoked key. Mostly such messages
   originate in client's resending or rollback. In this case, the server
   processes Diffie-Hellman exchanged keying again and MUST replace the
   stored secret with the newest produced secret. The secret key
   produced before comes to be invalid and should be removed from
   memory.

   Even if client sends "DH exchange for key renewal" though the key
   described in OldName has not been partially revoked yet, server must
   do renewal processes.  But at the moment when the servers accepts
   such requests with valid authentication, it MUST forcibly consider
   the key is already partially revoked, that is, the key's Partial
   Revocation Time must be changed into the present time (i.e., the time
   when the server receives the request).


2.4.  Key Adoption

2.4.1.  Query for Key Adoption

   After receiving a TKEY Renewal answer, the client gets the same
   secret as the server. Then, it sends a TKEY Adoption request. The
   request's question section's QNAME field is the same as the NAME
   filed of TKEY written below. In additional section, there is one TKEY
   RR. TKEY RR has the structure and values described below.

     "NAME" field is the new key's name to be adopted which was already
     generated by Renewal message. "Algorithm" is its algorithm. "Incep-
     tion" means the key's Inception Time, and "Expiration" means Expiry
     Limit.

     "Mode" field is the value of "key adoption", which is defined
     newly. See section 9.

     "Other Data" field in Adoption has the same structure as that of
     "DH exchange for key renewal". "OldName" means the previous old
     key, and "OldAlogirthm" means its algorithm.



Kamite, et. al.                                                 [Page 9]


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   Key Adoption request MUST be signed with TSIG or SIG(0) for
   authentication. The client can sign TSIG with the previous key. Note
   that until Adoption is finished, the new next key is treated as
   invalid, thus it cannot be used for authentication immediately.


2.4.2.  Response for Key Adoption

   The server which has received Adoption request, it verifies TSIG or
   SIG(0) accompanying it. If the TSIG is signed with the partially
   revoked key and can be verified, the message MUST be authenticated.

   If the next new key indicated by the request TKEY's "NAME" is not
   really present at the server, BADNAME [RFC 2845] is given in Error
   Field and the error message is returned.

   If the next key really exists and it has not been adopted formally
   yet, the server confirms the previous key's existence indicated by
   the "OldName" field. If it succeeds, the server executes Adoption of
   the next key and Revocation of the previous key. Response message
   duplicates the request's TKEY RR with NoError, including "OldName"
   and "OldAlgorithm" that indicate the revoked key.

   If the next key exists but it is already adopted, the server returns
   a response message regardless of the substance of the request TKEY's
   "OldName". In this response, Response TKEY RR has the same data as
   the request's one except as to its "Other Data" that is changed into
   null (i.e., "Other Size" is zero), which is intended for telling the
   client that the previous key name was ignored, and the new key is
   already available.

   Client sometimes has to retry Adoption request. Suppose the client
   sent request signed with the partially revoked key, but its response
   did not return successfully (e.g., due to the drop of UDP packet).
   Client will probably retry Adoption request; however, the request
   will be refused in the form of TSIG "BADKEY" error because the
   previous key was already revoked. In this case, client should
   retransmit Adoption request signed with the next key, and expect a
   response which has null "Other Data" for confirming the completion of
   renewal.


2.5.  Considerations about Non-compliant Hosts

   Key Renewal requests and responses must be exchanged between hosts
   which can understand them and do proper processes. "PartialRevoke"
   error messages will be only ignored if they should be returned to
   non-compliant hosts.



Kamite, et. al.                                                [Page 10]


INTERNET-DRAFT                                                  May 2002


   Note that server does not inform actively the necessity of renewal to
   clients, but inform it as responses invoked by client's query.
   Server needs not care whether the "PartialRevoke" errors has reached
   client or not. If client has not received yet because of any reasons
   such as packet drops, it will resend the queries, and finally will be
   able to get "PartialRevoke" information.


3.  Secret Storage

   Every server should keep all secrets and attached information, e.g.
   Inception, Expiry Limit etc. safe to be able to recover from
   unexpected stop. To accomplish this, formally adopted keys should be
   memorized not only on memory, but also be stored in the form of some
   files. Make sure that this should be protected strongly not to be
   read by others. If possible, they should be stored in encrypted form.


4.  Compulsory Key Revocation by Server

   There is a rare but possible case that although servers have already
   partially revoked keys, clients do not try to send any renewal
   requests. If this state continues, in the future it will become the
   time of Expiry Limit. After Expiry Limit, the keys will be expired
   and completely removed, so this is called Compulsory Key Revocation
   by server.

   If Expiry Limit is too distant from the Partial Revocation Time, then
   even though very long time passes, clients will be able to refresh
   secrets only if they add TSIG signed with those old partially revoked
   keys into requests, which is not safe.

   On the other hand, if Expiry Limit is too close to Partial Revocation
   Time, perhaps clients might not be able to notice their keys' Partial
   Revocation by getting "PartialRevoke" errors.

   Therefore, servers should set proper Expiry Limit to their keys,
   considering both their keys' safety, and enough time for clients to
   send requests and process renewal.


4.1.  Example

   It might be ideal to provide both SIG(0) and TSIG as authentication
   methods. For example:

     A client and a server start SIG(0) authentication at first, to
     establish TSIG shared keys by means of "Query for Diffie-Hellman



Kamite, et. al.                                                [Page 11]


INTERNET-DRAFT                                                  May 2002


     Exchanged Keying" as described in [RFC 2930] 4.1. Once they get
     shared secret, they keep using TSIG for usual queries and
     responses. After a while the server returns a "ParitalRevoke" error
     and they begin a key renewal process. Both TSIG signed with
     partially revoked keys and SIG(0) are okay for authentication, but
     TSIG would be more easy to use considering calculation efficiency.

     If any troubles should happen such as client host's long suspension
     against expectation, the server will do compulsory revocation.
     After recovery if the client sends a key Renewal request to refresh
     the old key, it will fail because the key is removed from the
     server. So, the client will send "Query for Diffie-Hellman
     Exchanged Keying" with SIG(0) to make a new shared key again.


5.  Special Considerations for Two servers' Case

   This section refers to the case where both two hosts are DNS servers
   which can act as full resolvers as well. If one server (called Server
   A) comes to want to refresh a shared key (called "Key A-B"), it will
   await a TKEY Renewal request from the other server (called Server B).
   But perhaps Server A will have to send queries with TSIG immediately
   to Server B to resolve some queries if it is asked by other clients.

   At this time, Server A is allowed to send a Renewal request to Server
   B, if Server A finds the key to use now is too old and should be
   renewed. To provide this function, both servers should be able to
   receive and process key renewal request from each other if they agree
   to refresh their shared secret keys by DH exchange for key renewal
   procedures.

   Note that the initiative in key renewal belongs to Server A because
   it can notice the Partial Revocation Time and decide key renewal. If
   Server B has information about Partial Revocation Time as well, it
   can also decide for itself to send "DH exchange for key renewal" to
   Server A. But it is not essential for both two servers have
   information about key renewal timing.


5.1.  To Cope with Collisions of Renewal Requests

   At least one of two hosts which use "DH exchange for key renewal"
   must know their key renewal information such as Partial Revocation
   Time. It is okay that both hosts have it.

   Provided that both two servers know key renewal timing information,
   there is possibility for them to begin partial revocation and sending
   renewal requests to each other at the same time. Such collisions will



Kamite, et. al.                                                [Page 12]


INTERNET-DRAFT                                                  May 2002


   not happen so often because Renewal requests are usually invoked when
   hosts want to send queries, but it is possible.

   When one of two servers try to send Renewal requests, it must protect
   old secrets that it has partially revoked and prevent it from being
   refreshed by any requests from the other server (i.e., it must lock
   the old secret during the process of renewal). While the server is
   sending Renewal requests and waiting responses, it ignores the other
   server's Renewal requests.

   Therefore, servers might fail to change secrets by means of their own
   requests to others. After failure they will try to resend, but they
   should wait for random delays by the next retries. If they get any
   Renewal requests from others while they are waiting, their shared
   keys may be refreshed, then they do not need to send any Renewal
   requests now for themselves.


6.  Key Name Considerations

   Since both servers and clients have only to distinguish new secrets
   and old ones, keys' names do not need to be specified strictly. But
   it is recommended that some serial number or key generation time
   should be added to the name and that the names of keys between the
   same pair of hosts should have some common labels among their keys.
   For example, suppose A.example.com. and B.example.com. share the key
   "<serial number>.A.example.com.B.example.com." such as
   "10010.A.example.com.B.example.com.".  After key renewal, they change
   their secret and name into "10011.A.example.com.B.example.com."

   Servers and clients must be able to use keys properly according to
   servers to query. Because TSIG secret keys themselves do not have any
   particular IDs to be distinguished and would be identified by their
   names and algorithm, it must be understood correctly what keys are
   refreshed.


7.  Example Usage of Secret Key Renewal Mode

   This is an example of Renewal mode usage where a Server,
   server.example.com, and a Client, client.exmple.com have an initial
   shared secret key named "00.client.example.com.server.example.com".

     (1) The time values about key
     "00.client.example.com.server.example.com" was set as follows:
     Inception Time is at 6:00, Expiry Limit is at 11:00.





Kamite, et. al.                                                [Page 13]


INTERNET-DRAFT                                                  May 2002


     (2) At Server, a time value about renewal timing has been set too:
     Partial Revocation Time is at 8:00.

     (3) Suppose the present time is 7:00. If Client sends a query
     signed with key "00.client.example.com.server.example.com" to ask
     the IP address of "www.somedomain.com", finally it will get a
     proper answer from Server with valid TSIG (No Error).

     (4) At 9:00. Client sends a query signed with key
     "00.client.example.com.server.example.com" to ask the IP address of
     "www.otherdomain.com". But it will not get a proper answer from
     Server. The response does not have any IP address information about
     "www.otherdomain.com". Instead, it includes valid TSIG MAC signed
     with "00.client.example.com.server.example.com", and its Error Code
     indicates PartialRevoke.

     (5) At 9:01. Client sends a Renewal request to Server. This request
     is signed with key "00.client.example.com.server.example.com". It
     includes data such as:

      Question Section:
         QNAME = 01.client.example.com. (Client can set this freely)
         TYPE  = TKEY

      Additional Section:
         01.client.example.com. TKEY
          Algorithm    = hmac-md5-sig-alg.reg.int.
          Inception    = (value which means 8:55)
          Expiration   = (value which means 14:00)
          Mode         = (DH exchange for key renewal)
          OldName      = 00.client.example.com.server.example.com.
          OldAlgorithm = hmac-md5-sig-alg.reg.int.

      Additional Section also contains a KEY RR for DH and a TSIG RR.

     (6) As soon as Server receives this request, it verifies TSIG. It
     is signed with the partially revoked key
     "00.client.example.com.server.example.com". and Server accepts the
     request.  It creates a new key by Diffie-Hellman calculation and
     returns an answer which includes data such as:

      Answer Section:
         01.client.example.com.server.example.com. TKEY
          Algorithm    = hmac-md5-sig-alg.reg.int.
          Inception    = (value meaning 8:55)
          Expiration   = (value meaning 14:00)
          Mode         = (DH exchange for key renewal)
          OldName      = 00.client.example.com.server.example.com.



Kamite, et. al.                                                [Page 14]


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          OldAlgorithm = hmac-md5-sig-alg.reg.int.
      Answer Section also contains KEY RRs for DH.

      Additional Section also contains a TSIG RR.
     This response is signed with key
     "00.client.example.com.server.example.com" without error.

     At the same time, Server decides to set the Partial Revocation Time
     of this new key "01.client.example.com.server.example.com." as
     11:00.

     (7) Client gets the response and checks TSIG MAC, and calculates
     Diffie-Hellman. It will get a new key, and it has been named
     "01.client.example.com.server.example.com" by Server.

     (8) At 9:02. Client sends an Adoption request to Server. This
     request is signed with the previous key
     "00.client.example.com.server.example.com". It includes:

      Question Section:
         QNAME = 01.client.example.com.server.example.com.
         TYPE  = TKEY

      Additional Section:
         01.client.example.com.server.example.com. TKEY
          Algorithm    = hmac-md5-sig-alg.reg.int.
          Inception    = (value which means 8:55)
          Expiration   = (value which means 14:00)
          Mode         = (key adoption)
          OldName      = 00.client.example.com.server.example.com.
          OldAlgorithm = hmac-md5-sig-alg.reg.int.

     Additional Section also contains a TSIG RR.

     (9) Server verifies the query's TSIG. It is signed with the
     previous key and authenticated. It returns a response whose TKEY RR
     is the same as the request's one. The response is signed with key
     "00.client.example.com.server.example.com.". As soon as the
     response is sent, Server revokes and removes the previous key. At
     the same time, key "01.client.example.com.server.example.com." is
     validated.

     (10) Client acknowledges the success of Adoption by receiving the
     response.  Then, it will retry to send an original question about
     "www.otherdomain.com". It is signed with the adopted key
     "01.client.example.com.server.example.com", so Server authenticates
     it and returns an answer.




Kamite, et. al.                                                [Page 15]


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     (11) This key is used until 11:00. After that, it will be partially
     revoked again.


8.  Security Considerations

   This document considers about how to refresh shared secret. Secret
   changed by this method is used at servers in support of TSIG
   [RFC2845].

   [RFC 2104] says that current attacks to HMAC do not indicate a
   specific recommended frequency for key changes but periodic key
   refreshment is a fundamental security practice that helps against
   potential weaknesses of the function and keys, and limits the damage
   of an exposed key.  This TKEY secret key renewal mode provides the
   method of periodical key refreshment.

   TKEY Secret Key Renewal Mode forbids clients to send queries as long
   as they do not change old keys. This means that when keys become old,
   clients must spend rather lots of time to get answers they wanted
   originally because at first they must send key Renewal requests. Thus
   the usage period of secrets should be considered carefully based on
   both TKEY processing performance and security.

   This document specifies the procedure of periodical key renewal, but
   actually there is possibility for servers to have no choice other
   than revoking their secret keys immediately especially when the keys
   are found to be compromised by attackers. This is called "Emergency
   Compulsory Revocation". For example, suppose the original Expiry
   Limit was set at 15:00, Partial Revocation Time at 12:00 and
   Inception Time at 10:00.  if at 11:00 the key is found to be
   compromised, the server sets Expiry Limit forcibly to be 11:00 or
   before it.

   Consequently, once Compulsory Revocation (See section 4) is carried
   out, normal renewal process described in this document cannot be done
   any more as far as the key is concerned. But, after such accidents
   happened, the two hosts are able to establish secret keys and begin
   renewal procedure only if they have other (non-compromised) shared
   TSIG keys or safe SIG(0) keys for the authentication of initial
   secret establishment using Diffie-Hellman Exchanged Keying.


9.  IANA Considerations

   IANA needs to allocate a value for "DH exchange for key renewal" and
   "key adoption" in the mode filed of TKEY. It also needs to allocate a
   value for "PartialRevoke" from the extended RCODE space.



Kamite, et. al.                                                [Page 16]


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10.  References

[RFC2104]
     H. Krawczyk, M.Bellare, R. Canetti, "Keyed-Hashing for Message
     Authentication", RFC2104, February 1997.

[RFC2119]
     Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
     Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997.

[RFC2539]
     D. Eastlake 3rd, "Storage of Diffie-Hellman Keys in the Domain Name
     System (DNS)", RFC 2539, March 1999.

[RFC2845]
     Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake, D. and B.  Wellington,
     "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (TSIG)", RFC 2845,
     May 2000.

[RFC2930]
     D. Eastlake 3rd, ``Secret Key Establishment for DNS (TKEY RR)'',
     RFC 2930, September 2000.

[RFC2931]
     D. Eastlake 3rd, "DNS Request and Transaction Signatures (SIG(0)s
     )", RFC 2931, September 2000.

























Kamite, et. al.                                                [Page 17]


INTERNET-DRAFT                                                  May 2002


Authors' Addresses

   Yuji Kamite
   NTT Communications Corporation
   Tokyo Opera City Tower 21F,
   20-2, 3-chome, Nishi-Shinjuku, Shinjuku-ku,
   Tokyo, 163-1421, Japan.
   EMail: y.kamite@ntt.com


   Masaya Nakayama
   The University of Tokyo
   Information Technology Center,
   2-11-16 Yayoi, Bunkyo-ku,
   Tokyo, 113-8658, Japan.
   EMail: nakayama@nc.u-tokyo.ac.jp



































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