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Versions: (draft-kh-dnsop-7706bis) 00 01 02 03 04

Network Working Group                                          W. Kumari
Internet-Draft                                                    Google
Updates: 7706 (if approved)                                   P. Hoffman
Intended status: Informational                                     ICANN
Expires: September 9, 2019                                 March 8, 2019


               Running a Root Server Local to a Resolver
                     draft-ietf-dnsop-7706bis-03

Abstract

   Some DNS recursive resolvers have longer-than-desired round-trip
   times to the closest DNS root server.  Some DNS recursive resolver
   operators want to prevent snooping of requests sent to DNS root
   servers by third parties.  Such resolvers can greatly decrease the
   round-trip time and prevent observation of requests by running a copy
   of the full root zone on the same server, such as on a loopback
   address.  This document shows how to start and maintain such a copy
   of the root zone that does not pose a threat to other users of the
   DNS, at the cost of adding some operational fragility for the
   operator.

   This draft will update RFC 7706.  See Section 1.1 for a list of
   topics that will be added in the update.

   [ Ed note: Text inside square brackets ([]) is additional background
   information, answers to freqently asked questions, general musings,
   etc.  They will be removed before publication.]

   [ This document is being collaborated on in Github at:
   https://github.com/wkumari/draft-kh-dnsop-7706bis.  The most recent
   version of the document, open issues, and so on should all be
   available there.  The authors gratefully accept pull requests. ]

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any




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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 9, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Updates from RFC 7706 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.2.  Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   2.  Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Operation of the Root Zone on the Local Server  . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Using the Root Zone Server on the Same Host . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Appendix A.  Current Sources of the Root Zone . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Appendix B.  Example Configurations of Common Implementations . .   9
     B.1.  Example Configuration: BIND 9.12  . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     B.2.  Example Configuration: Unbound 1.8  . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     B.3.  Example Configuration: BIND 9.14  . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     B.4.  Example Configuration: Unbound 1.9  . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     B.5.  Example Configuration: Knot Resolver  . . . . . . . . . .  12
     B.6.  Example Configuration: Microsoft Windows Server 2012  . .  12
   Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

1.  Introduction

   DNS recursive resolvers have to provide answers to all queries from
   their customers, even those for domain names that do not exist.  For
   each queried name that has a top-level domain (TLD) that is not in



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   the recursive resolver's cache, the resolver must send a query to a
   root server to get the information for that TLD, or to find out that
   the TLD does not exist.  Research shows that the vast majority of
   queries going to the root are for names that do not exist in the root
   zone because negative answers are sometimes cached for a much shorter
   period of time.

   Many of the queries from recursive resolvers to root servers get
   answers that are referrals to other servers.  Malicious third parties
   might be able to observe that traffic on the network between the
   recursive resolver and root servers.

   The primary goals of this design are to provide more reliable answers
   for queries to the root zone during network attacks, and to prevent
   queries and responses from being visible on the network.  This design
   will probably have little effect on getting faster responses to stub
   resolver for good queries on TLDs, because the TTL for most TLDs is
   usually long-lived (on the order of a day or two) and is thus usually
   already in the cache of the recursive resolver; the same is true for
   the TTL for negative answers from the root servers.  (Although the
   primary goal of the design is for serving the root zone, the method
   can be used for any zone.)

   This document describes a method for the operator of a recursive
   resolver to have a complete root zone locally, and to hide these
   queries from outsiders.  The basic idea is to create an up-to-date
   root zone server on the same host as the recursive server, and use
   that server when the recursive resolver looks up root information.
   The recursive resolver validates all responses from the root server
   on the same host, just as it would all responses from a remote root
   server.

   This design explicitly only allows the new root zone server to be run
   on the same server as the recursive resolver, in order to prevent the
   server from serving authoritative answers to any other system.
   Specifically, the root server on the local system MUST be configured
   to only answer queries from the resolvers on the same host, and MUST
   NOT answer queries from any other resolver.

   At the time that RFC 7706 was published, it was considered
   controversial: there was not consensus on whether this was a "best
   practice".  In fact, many people felt that it is an excessively risky
   practice because it introduced a new operational piece to local DNS
   operations where there was not one before.  Since then, the DNS
   operational community has largely shifted to believing that local
   serving of the root zone for an individual resolver is a reasonable
   practice.  The advantages listed above do not come free: if this new
   system does not work correctly, users can get bad data, or the entire



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   recursive resolution system might fail in ways that are hard to
   diagnose.

   This design uses authoritative name server software running on the
   same machine as the recursive resolver.  Thus, recursive resolver
   software such as BIND or modern versions of common open source
   recursive resolver software do not need to add new functionality, but
   other recursive resolver software might need to be able to talk to an
   authoritative server running on the same host.

   A different approach to solving some of the problems discussed in
   this document is described in [RFC8198].

1.1.  Updates from RFC 7706

   RFC 7706 explicitly required that the root server instance be run on
   the loopback interface of the host running the validating resolver.
   However, RFC 7706 also had examples of how to set up common software
   that did not use the loopback interface.  Thus, this document loosens
   the restriction on the interface but keeps the requirement that only
   systems running on that single host be able to query that root server
   instance.

   Removed the prohibition on distribution of recursive DNS servers
   including configurations for this design because some already do, and
   others have expressed an interest in doing so.

   Added the idea that a recursive resolver using this design might
   switch to using the normal (remote) root servers if the local root
   server fails.

   Refreshed the list of where one can get copies of the root zone.

   Added examples of other resolvers and updated the existing examples.

   [ This section will list all the changes from RFC 7706.  For this
   draft, it is also the list of changes that we will make in future
   versions of the daft. ]

   [ Make the use cases explicit.  Be clearer that a real use case is
   folks who are worried that root server unavailabilty due to DDoS
   against them is a reason some people would use the mechanisms here.
   ]

   [ Describe how slaving the root zone from root zone servers does not
   fully remove the reliance on the root servers being available.  ]

   [ Other new topics might go here. ]



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1.2.  Requirements Notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.  Requirements

   In order to implement the mechanism described in this document:

   o  The system MUST be able to validate a zone with DNSSEC [RFC4033].

   o  The system MUST have an up-to-date copy of the key used to sign
      the DNS root.

   o  The system MUST be able to retrieve a copy of the entire root zone
      (including all DNSSEC-related records).

   o  The system MUST be able to run an authoritative server for the
      root zone on the same host.  The root server instance MUST only
      respond to queries from the same host.  One way to assure not
      responding to queries from other hosts is to make the address of
      the authoritative server one of the loopback addresses (that is,
      an address in the range 127/8 for IPv4 or ::1 in IPv6).

   A corollary of the above list is that authoritative data in the root
   zone used on the local authoritative server MUST be identical to the
   same data in the root zone for the DNS.  It is possible to change the
   unsigned data (the glue records) in the copy of the root zone, but
   such changes could cause problems for the recursive server that
   accesses the local root zone, and therefore any changes to the glue
   records SHOULD NOT be made.

3.  Operation of the Root Zone on the Local Server

   The operation of an authoritative server for the root in the system
   described here can be done separately from the operation of the
   recursive resolver, or it might be part of the configuration of the
   recursive resolver system.

   The steps to set up the root zone are:

   1.  Retrieve a copy of the root zone.  (See Appendix A for some
       current locations of sources.)

   2.  Start the authoritative server with the root zone on an address
       on the host that is not in use.  For IPv4, this could be
       127.0.0.1, but if that address is in use, any address in 127/8 is



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       acceptable.  For IPv6, this would be ::1.  It can also be a
       publicly-visible address on the host, but only if the
       authoritative server software allows restricting the addresses
       that can access the authoritative server, and the software is
       configured to only allow access from addresses on this single
       host.

   The contents of the root zone MUST be refreshed using the timers from
   the SOA record in the root zone, as described in [RFC1035].  This
   inherently means that the contents of the local root zone will likely
   be a little behind those of the global root servers because those
   servers are updated when triggered by NOTIFY messages.

   If the contents of the root zone cannot be refreshed before the
   expire time in the SOA, the local root server MUST return a SERVFAIL
   error response for all queries sent to it until the zone can be
   successfully be set up again.  Because this would cause a recursive
   resolver on the same host that is relying on this root server to also
   fail, a resolver might be configured to immediatly switch to using
   other (non-local) root servers if the resolver receives a SERVFAIL
   response from a local root server.

   In the event that refreshing the contents of the root zone fails, the
   results can be disastrous.  For example, sometimes all the NS records
   for a TLD are changed in a short period of time (such as 2 days); if
   the refreshing of the local root zone is broken during that time, the
   recursive resolver will have bad data for the entire TLD zone.

   An administrator using the procedure in this document SHOULD have an
   automated method to check that the contents of the local root zone
   are being refreshed; this might be part of the resolver software.
   One way to do this is to have a separate process that periodically
   checks the SOA of the root zone from the local root zone and makes
   sure that it is changing.  At the time that this document is
   published, the SOA for the root zone is the digital representation of
   the current date with a two-digit counter appended, and the SOA is
   changed every day even if the contents of the root zone are
   unchanged.  For example, the SOA of the root zone on January 2, 2018
   was 2018010201.  A process can use this fact to create a check for
   the contents of the local root zone (using a program not specified in
   this document).

4.  Using the Root Zone Server on the Same Host

   A recursive resolver that wants to use a root zone server operating
   as described in Section 3 simply specifies the local address as the
   place to look when it is looking for information from the root.  All
   responses from the root server MUST be validated using DNSSEC.



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   Note that using this simplistic configuration will cause the
   recursive resolver to fail if the local root zone server fails.  A
   more robust configuration would cause the resolver to start using the
   normal remote root servers when the local root server fails (such as
   if it does not respond or gives SERVFAIL responses).

   See Appendix B for more discussion of this for specific software.

   To test the proper operation of the recursive resolver with the local
   root server, use a DNS client to send a query for the SOA of the root
   to the recursive server.  Make sure the response that comes back has
   the AA bit in the message header set to 0.

5.  Security Considerations

   A system that does not follow the DNSSEC-related requirements given
   in Section 2 can be fooled into giving bad responses in the same way
   as any recursive resolver that does not do DNSSEC validation on
   responses from a remote root server.  Anyone deploying the method
   described in this document should be familiar with the operational
   benefits and costs of deploying DNSSEC [RFC4033].

   As stated in Section 1, this design explicitly only allows the new
   root zone server to be run on the same host, answering queries only
   from resolvers on that host, in order to prevent the server from
   serving authoritative answers to any system other than the recursive
   resolver.  This has the security property of limiting damage to any
   other system that might try to rely on an altered copy of the root.

6.  References

6.1.  Normative References

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
              November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC4033]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
              RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4033>.





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6.2.  Informative References

   [Manning2013]
              Manning, W., "Client Based Naming", 2013,
              <http://www.sfc.wide.ad.jp/dissertation/bill_e.html>.

   [RFC8198]  Fujiwara, K., Kato, A., and W. Kumari, "Aggressive Use of
              DNSSEC-Validated Cache", RFC 8198, DOI 10.17487/RFC8198,
              July 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8198>.

Appendix A.  Current Sources of the Root Zone

   The root zone can be retrieved from anywhere as long as it comes with
   all the DNSSEC records needed for validation.  Currently, one can get
   the root zone from ICANN by zone transfer (AXFR) over TCP from DNS
   servers at xfr.lax.dns.icann.org and xfr.cjr.dns.icann.org.

   Currently, the root can also be retrieved by AXFR over TCP from the
   following root server operators:

   o  b.root-servers.net

   o  c.root-servers.net

   o  d.root-servers.net

   o  f.root-servers.net

   o  g.root-servers.net

   o  k.root-servers.net

   It is crucial to note that none of the above services are guaranteed
   to be available.  It is possible that ICANN or some of the root
   server operators will turn off the AXFR capability on the servers
   listed above.  Using AXFR over TCP to addresses that are likely to be
   anycast (as the ones above are) may conceivably have transfer
   problems due to anycast, but current practice shows that to be
   unlikely.

   To repeat the requirement from earlier in this document: if the
   contents of the zone cannot be refreshed before the expire time, the
   server MUST return a SERVFAIL error response for all queries until
   the zone can be successfully be set up again.







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Appendix B.  Example Configurations of Common Implementations

   This section shows fragments of configurations for some popular
   recursive server software that is believed to correctly implement the
   requirements given in this document.  The examples have been updated
   since the publication of RFC 7706.

   The IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in this section were checked recently by
   testing for AXFR over TCP from each address for the known single-
   letter names in the root-servers.net zone.

B.1.  Example Configuration: BIND 9.12

   BIND 9.12 acts both as a recursive resolver and an authoritative
   server.  Because of this, there is "fate-sharing" between the two
   servers in the following configuration.  That is, if the root server
   dies, it is likely that all of BIND is dead.

   Note that a future version of BIND will support a much more robust
   method for creating a local mirror of the root or other zones; see
   Appendix B.3.

   Using this configuration, queries for information in the root zone
   are returned with the AA bit not set.

   When slaving a zone, BIND 9.12 will treat zone data differently if
   the zone is slaved into a separate view (or a separate instance of
   the software) versus slaved into the same view or instance that is
   also performing the recursion.

   Validation:  When using separate views or separate instances, the DS
      records in the slaved zone will be validated as the zone data is
      accessed by the recursive server.  When using the same view, this
      validation does not occur for the slaved zone.

   Caching:  When using separate views or instances, the recursive
      server will cache all of the queries for the slaved zone, just as
      it would using the traditional "root hints" method.  Thus, as the
      zone in the other view or instance is refreshed or updated,
      changed information will not appear in the recursive server until
      the TTL of the old record times out.  Currently, the TTL for DS
      and delegation NS records is two days.  When using the same view,
      all zone data in the recursive server will be updated as soon as
      it receives its copy of the zone.







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   view root {
       match-destinations { 127.12.12.12; };
       zone "." {
           type slave;
           file "rootzone.db";
           notify no;
           masters {
               199.9.14.201;         # b.root-servers.net
               192.33.4.12;          # c.root-servers.net
               199.7.91.13;          # d.root-servers.net
               192.5.5.241;          # f.root-servers.net
               192.112.36.4;         # g.root-servers.net
               193.0.14.129;         # k.root-servers.net
               192.0.47.132;         # xfr.cjr.dns.icann.org
               192.0.32.132;         # xfr.lax.dns.icann.org
               2001:500:200::b;      # b.root-servers.net
               2001:500:2::c;        # c.root-servers.net
               2001:500:2d::d;       # d.root-servers.net
               2001:500:2f::f;       # f.root-servers.net
               2001:500:12::d0d;     # g.root-servers.net
               2001:7fd::1;          # k.root-servers.net
               2620:0:2830:202::132; # xfr.cjr.dns.icann.org
               2620:0:2d0:202::132;  # xfr.lax.dns.icann.org
           };
       };
   };

   view recursive {
       dnssec-validation auto;
       allow-recursion { any; };
       recursion yes;
       zone "." {
           type static-stub;
           server-addresses { 127.12.12.12; };
       };
   };

B.2.  Example Configuration: Unbound 1.8

   Similar to BIND, Unbound starting with version 1.8 can act both as a
   recursive resolver and an authoritative server.










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   auth-zone:
       name: "."
       master: 199.9.14.201         # b.root-servers.net
       master: 192.33.4.12          # c.root-servers.net
       master: 199.7.91.13          # d.root-servers.net
       master: 192.5.5.241          # f.root-servers.net
       master: 192.112.36.4         # g.root-servers.net
       master: 193.0.14.129         # k.root-servers.net
       master: 192.0.47.132         # xfr.cjr.dns.icann.org
       master: 192.0.32.132         # xfr.lax.dns.icann.org
       master: 2001:500:200::b      # b.root-servers.net
       master: 2001:500:2::c        # c.root-servers.net
       master: 2001:500:2d::d       # d.root-servers.net
       master: 2001:500:2f::f       # f.root-servers.net
       master: 2001:500:12::d0d     # g.root-servers.net
       master: 2001:7fd::1          # k.root-servers.net
       master: 2620:0:2830:202::132 # xfr.cjr.dns.icann.org
       master: 2620:0:2d0:202::132  # xfr.lax.dns.icann.org
       fallback-enabled: yes
       for-downstream: no
       for-upstream: yes

B.3.  Example Configuration: BIND 9.14

   BIND 9.14 (which, at the time of publication of this document is a
   future release) can set up a local mirror of the root zone with a
   small configuration option:

   zone "." {
       type mirror;
   };

   The simple "type mirror" configuration for the root zone works for
   the root zone because a default list of primary servers for the IANA
   root zone is built into BIND 9.14.  In order to set up mirroring of
   any other zone, an explicit list of primary servers needs to be
   provided.

   See the documentation for BIND 9.14 (when it is released) for more
   detail about how to use this simplified configuration

B.4.  Example Configuration: Unbound 1.9

   Recent versions of Unbound have a "auth-zone" feature that allows
   local mirroring of the root zone.  Configuration looks like:






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   auth-zone:
       name: "."
       master: "b.root-servers.net"
       master: "c.root-servers.net"
       master: "d.root-servers.net"
       master: "f.root-servers.net"
       master: "g.root-servers.net"
       master: "k.root-servers.net"
           fallback-enabled: yes
       for-downstream: no
       for-upstream: yes
       zonefile: "root.zone"

B.5.  Example Configuration: Knot Resolver

   Knot Resolver uses its "prefill" module to load the root zone
   information.  This is described at <https://knot-
   resolver.readthedocs.io/en/stable/modules.html#root-on-loopback-rfc-
   7706>.

B.6.  Example Configuration: Microsoft Windows Server 2012

   Windows Server 2012 contains a DNS server in the "DNS Manager"
   component.  When activated, that component acts as a recursive
   server.  DNS Manager can also act as an authoritative server.

   Using this configuration, queries for information in the root zone
   are returned with the AA bit set.

   The steps to configure DNS Manager to implement the requirements in
   this document are:

   1.  Launch the DNS Manager GUI.  This can be done from the command
       line ("dnsmgmt.msc") or from the Service Manager (the "DNS"
       command in the "Tools" menu).

   2.  In the hierarchy under the server on which the service is
       running, right-click on the "Forward Lookup Zones", and select
       "New Zone".  This brings up a succession of dialog boxes.

   3.  In the "Zone Type" dialog box, select "Secondary zone".

   4.  In the "Zone Name" dialog box, enter ".".

   5.  In the "Master DNS Servers" dialog box, enter
       "b.root-servers.net".  The system validates that it can do a zone
       transfer from that server.  (After this configuration is




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       completed, the DNS Manager will attempt to transfer from all of
       the root zone servers.)

   6.  In the "Completing the New Zone Wizard" dialog box, click
       "Finish".

   7.  Verify that the DNS Manager is acting as a recursive resolver.
       Right-click on the server name in the hierarchy, choosing the
       "Advanced" tab in the dialog box.  See that "Disable recursion
       (also disables forwarders)" is not selected, and that "Enable
       DNSSEC validation for remote responses" is selected.

Acknowledgements

   The authors fully acknowledge that running a copy of the root zone on
   the loopback address is not a new concept, and that we have chatted
   with many people about that idea over time.  For example, Bill
   Manning described a similar solution to the problems in his doctoral
   dissertation in 2013 [Manning2013].

   Evan Hunt contributed greatly to the logic in the requirements.
   Other significant contributors include Wouter Wijngaards, Tony Hain,
   Doug Barton, Greg Lindsay, and Akira Kato.  The authors also received
   many offline comments about making the document clear that this is
   just a description of a way to operate a root zone on the same host,
   and not a recommendation to do so.

   People who contributed to this update to RFC 7706 include: Florian
   Obser, nusenu, Wouter Wijngaards, [[ others go here ]].

Authors' Addresses

   Warren Kumari
   Google

   Email: Warren@kumari.net


   Paul Hoffman
   ICANN

   Email: paul.hoffman@icann.org









Kumari & Hoffman        Expires September 9, 2019              [Page 13]


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