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Versions: (draft-wouters-sury-dnsop-algorithm-update) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10

dnsop                                                         P. Wouters
Internet-Draft                                                   Red Hat
Obsoletes: 6944 (if approved)                                    O. Sury
Intended status: Standards Track             Internet Systems Consortium
Expires: December 7, 2018                                   June 5, 2018


  Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage Guidance for DNSSEC
                  draft-ietf-dnsop-algorithm-update-01

Abstract

   The DNSSEC protocol makes use of various cryptographic algorithms in
   order to provide authentication of DNS data and proof of non-
   existence.  To ensure interoperability between DNS resolvers and DNS
   authoritative servers, it is necessary to specify a set of algorithm
   implementation requirements and usage guidance to ensure that there
   is at least one algorithm that all implementations support.  This
   document defines the current algorithm implementation requirements
   and usage guidance for DNSSEC.  This document obsoletes [RFC6944].

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 7, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect



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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Updating Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage
           Guidance  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.2.  Updating Algorithm Requirement Levels . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.3.  Document Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Algorithm Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  DNSKEY Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  DNSKEY Algorithm Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.3.  DS and CDS Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Operational Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9

1.  Introduction

   The DNSSEC signing algorithms are defined by various RFCs, including
   [RFC4034], [RFC5155], [RFC5702], [RFC5933], [RFC6605], [RFC8080].
   DNSSEC is used to provide authentication of data.  To ensure
   interoperability, a set of "mandatory-to-implement" DNSKEY algorithms
   are defined.  This document obsoletes [RFC6944].

1.1.  Updating Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage Guidance

   The field of cryptography evolves continuously.  New stronger
   algorithms appear and existing algorithms are found to be less secure
   then originally thought.  Therefore, algorithm implementation
   requirements and usage guidance need to be updated from time to time
   to reflect the new reality.  The choices for algorithms must be
   conservative to minimize the risk of algorithm compromise.

1.2.  Updating Algorithm Requirement Levels

   The mandatory-to-implement algorithm of tomorrow should already be
   available in most implementations of DNSSEC by the time it is made
   mandatory.  This document attempts to identify and introduce those



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   algorithms for future mandatory-to-implement status.  There is no
   guarantee that the algorithms in use today may become mandatory in
   the future.  Published algorithms are continuously subjected to
   cryptographic attack and may become too weak or could become
   completely broken before this document is updated.

   This document only provides recommendations for the mandatory-to-
   implement algorithms or algorithms too weak that are recommended not
   to be implemented.  As a result, any algorithm listed at the
   [DNSKEY-IANA] and [DS-IANA] registries not mentioned in this document
   MAY be implemented.  For clarification and consistency, an algorithm
   will be set to MAY only when it has been downgraded.

   Although this document updates the algorithms to keep the DNSSEC
   authentication secure over time, it also aims at providing
   recommendations so that DNSSEC implementations remain interoperable.
   DNSSEC interoperability is addressed by an incremental introduction
   or deprecation of algorithms.

   While [RFC2119] consider term SHOULD equivalent to RECOMMENDED, and
   term SHOULD NOT to NOT RECOMMENDED, the authors of this document has
   chosen to use terms RECOMMENDED and NOT RECOMMENDED, as it better
   reflects the recommendations for implementations.

   It is expected that deprecation of an algorithm is performed
   gradually.  This provides time for various implementations to update
   their implemented algorithms while remaining interoperable.  Unless
   there are strong security reasons, an algorithm is expected to be
   downgraded from MUST to NOT RECOMMENDED or MAY, instead of MUST NOT.
   Similarly, an algorithm that has not been mentioned as mandatory-to-
   implement is expected to be introduced with a RECOMMENDED instead of
   a MUST.

   Since the effects of using an unknown DNSKEY algorithm is for the
   zone to be treated as insecure, it is recommended that algorithms
   downgraded to NOT RECOMMENDED or below are no longer used by
   authoritative nameservers and DNSSEC signers to create new DNSKEY's.
   This will allow for algorithms to slowly become more unused over
   time.  Once deployment has reached a sufficiently low point these
   algorithms can finally be marked as MUST NOT so that recursive
   nameservers can remove support for these algorithms.

   Recursive nameservers are encouraged to keep support for all
   algorithms not marked as MUST NOT.







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1.3.  Document Audience

   The recommendations of this document mostly target DNSSEC
   implementers as implementations need to meet both high security
   expectations as well as high interoperability between various vendors
   and with different versions.  Interoperability requires a smooth move
   to more secure algorithms.  This may differ from a user point of view
   that may deploy and configure DNSSEC with only the safest algorithm.
   On the other hand, comments and recommendations from this document
   are also expected to be useful for such users.

2.  Conventions Used in This Document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3.  Algorithm Selection

3.1.  DNSKEY Algorithms

   Implemenation recommendations for DNSKEY algorithms [DNSKEY-IANA].

   +--------+--------------------+-----------------+-------------------+
   | Number | Mnemonics          | DNSSEC Signing  | DNSSEC Validation |
   +--------+--------------------+-----------------+-------------------+
   | 1      | RSAMD5             | MUST NOT        | MUST NOT          |
   | 3      | DSA                | MUST NOT        | MUST NOT          |
   | 5      | RSASHA1            | NOT RECOMMENDED | MUST              |
   | 6      | DSA-NSEC3-SHA1     | MUST NOT        | MUST NOT          |
   | 7      | RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 | NOT RECOMMENDED | MUST              |
   | 8      | RSASHA256          | MUST            | MUST              |
   | 10     | RSASHA512          | NOT RECOMMENDED | MUST              |
   | 12     | ECC-GOST           | MUST NOT        | MAY               |
   | 13     | ECDSAP256SHA256    | MUST            | MUST              |
   | 14     | ECDSAP384SHA384    | MAY             | RECOMMENDED       |
   | 15     | ED25519            | RECOMMENDED     | RECOMMENDED       |
   | 16     | ED448              | MAY             | RECOMMENDED       |
   +--------+--------------------+-----------------+-------------------+

   RSAMD5 is not widely deployed and there is an industry-wide trend to
   deprecate MD5 usage.

   RSASHA1 and RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 are widely deployed, although zones
   deploying it are recommended to switch to ECDSAP256SHA256 as there is
   an industry-wide trend to move to elliptic curve cryptography.
   RSASHA1 does not support NSEC3.  RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 can be used with
   or without NSEC3.



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   DSA and DSA-NSEC3-SHA1 are not widely deployed and vulnerable to
   private key compromise when generating signatures using a weak or
   compromised random number generator.

   RSASHA256 is in wide use and considered strong.

   RSASHA512 is NOT RECOMMENDED for DNSSEC Signing because it has not
   seen wide deployment, but there are some deployments hence DNSSEC
   Validation MUST implement RSASHA512 to ensure interoperability.
   There's isn't significant difference in cryptographics strength
   between RSASHA512 and RSASHA256, therefore it is discouraged to use
   RSASHA512, as it will only make deprecation of older algorithms
   harder.  People that want to use cryptographically stronger algorithm
   should switch to elliptic curve cryptography algorithms.

   ECC-GOST (GOST R 34.11-94) has been superseded by GOST R 34.11-2012
   in [RFC6986].  The GOST R 34.11-2012 hasn't been standardized for use
   in DNSSEC.

   ECDSAP256SHA256 provide more strength for signature size than
   RSASHA256 and RSASHA512 variants.  ECDSAP256SHA256 has been widely
   deployed and therefore it is now at MUST level for both validation
   and signing.  It is RECOMMENDED to use deterministic digital
   signature generation procedure of the ECDSA ([RFC6979]) when
   implementing ECDSAP256SHA256 (and ECDSAP384SHA384).

   ECDSAP384SHA384 share the same properties as ECDSAP256SHA256, but
   offers a modest security advantage over ECDSAP256SHA256 (192-bits of
   strength versus 128-bits).  For most applications of DNSSEC,
   ECDSAP256SHA256 should be satisfactory and robust for the foreseeable
   future, and is therefore recommended for signing.  While it is
   unlikely for a DNSSEC use case which requires 192-bit security
   strength to arise, ECDSA384SHA384 is provided for such applications
   and it MAY be used for signing in these cases.

   ED25519 and ED448 uses Edwards-curve Digital Security Algorithm
   (EdDSA).  There are three main advantages of the EdDSA algorithm: It
   does not require the use of a unique random number for each
   signature, there are no padding or truncation issues as with ECDSA,
   and it is more resilient to side-channel attacks.  Furthermore, EdDSA
   cryptography is less prone to implementation errors ([RFC8032],
   [RFC8080]).  It is expected that ED25519 will become the future
   RECOMMENDED default algorithm once there's enough support for this
   algorithm in the deployed DNSSEC validators.







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3.2.  DNSKEY Algorithm Recommendation

   Operation recommendation for new and existing deployments.

   Due to industry-wide trend to move to elliptic curve cryptography,
   the ECDSAP256SHA256 is RECOMMENDED to be used by new DNSSEC
   deployments, and users of RSA based algorithms SHOULD upgrade to
   ECDSAP256SHA256.

3.3.  DS and CDS Algorithms

   Recommendations for Delegation Signer Digest Algorithms [DNSKEY-IANA]
   These also apply to the CDS RRTYPE as specified in [RFC7344]

   +--------+-----------------+-------------------+-------------------+
   | Number | Mnemonics       | DNSSEC Delegation | DNSSEC Validation |
   +--------+-----------------+-------------------+-------------------+
   | 0      | NULL (CDS only) | MUST NOT [*]      | MUST NOT [*]      |
   | 1      | SHA-1           | MUST NOT          | MUST              |
   | 2      | SHA-256         | MUST              | MUST              |
   | 3      | GOST R 34.11-94 | MUST NOT          | MAY               |
   | 4      | SHA-384         | MAY               | RECOMMENDED       |
   +--------+-----------------+-------------------+-------------------+

   [*] - This is a special type of CDS record signaling removal of DS at
                          the parent in [RFC8078]

   NULL is a special case, see [RFC8078]

   SHA-1 is still in wide use for DS records, so validators MUST
   implement the validation, but it is disallowed to use SHA-1 to
   generate new DS records.  (See Operational Considerations for caveats
   when upgrading from SHA-1 to SHA-256 DS Algorithm.)

   SHA-256 is in wide use and considered strong.

   GOST R 34.11-94 has been deprecated by [RFC6986].

   SHA-384 share the same properties as SHA-256, but offers a modest
   security advantage over SHA-384 (384-bits of strength versus
   256-bits).  For most applications of DNSSEC, SHA-256 should be
   satisfactory and robust for the foreseeable future, and is therefore
   recommended for DS/CDS records.  While it is unlikely for a DNSSEC
   use case which requires 384-bit security strength to arise, SHA-384
   is provided for such applications and it MAY be used for generating
   DS/CDS records in these cases.





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4.  Security Considerations

   The security of cryptographic-based systems depends on both the
   strength of the cryptographic algorithms chosen and the strength of
   the keys used with those algorithms.  The security also depends on
   the engineering of the protocol used by the system to ensure that
   there are no non-cryptographic ways to bypass the security of the
   overall system.

   This document concerns itself with the selection of cryptographic
   algorithms for the use of DNSSEC, specifically with the selection of
   "mandatory-to-implement" algorithms.  The algorithms identified in
   this document as MUST or RECOMMENDED to implement are not known to be
   broken at the current time, and cryptographic research so far leads
   us to believe that they will likely remain secure into the
   foreseeable future.  However, this isn't necessarily forever and it
   is expected that new revisions of this document will be issued from
   time to time to reflect the current best practice in this area.

   Retiring an algorithm too soon would result in a signed zone with
   such an algorithm to be downgraded to the equivalent of an unsigned
   zone.  Therefore, algorithm deprecation must be done very slowly and
   only after careful consideration and measurements of its use.

5.  Operational Considerations

   DNSKEY algorithm rollover in a live zone is a complex process.  See
   [RFC6781] and [RFC7583] for guidelines on how to perform algorithm
   rollovers.

   DS algorithm rollover in a live zone is also a complex process.
   Upgrading algorithm at the same time as rolling the new KSK key will
   lead to DNSSEC validation failures, and users MUST upgrade the DS
   algorithm first before rolling the Key Signing Key.

6.  IANA Considerations

   This document makes no requests of IANA.

7.  Acknowledgements

   This document borrows text from RFC 4307 by Jeffrey I.  Schiller of
   the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and the 4307bis
   document by Yoav Nir, Tero Kivinen, Paul Wouters and Daniel Migault.
   Much of the original text has been copied verbatim.

   We wish to thank Michael Sinatra, Roland van Rijswijk-Deij, Olafur
   Gudmundsson and Paul Hoffman for their imminent feedback.



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   Kudos to Roy Arends for bringing the DS rollover issue to the
   daylight.

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

8.2.  Informative References

   [RFC4034]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
              RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4034>.

   [RFC5155]  Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS
              Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of
              Existence", RFC 5155, DOI 10.17487/RFC5155, March 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5155>.

   [RFC5702]  Jansen, J., "Use of SHA-2 Algorithms with RSA in DNSKEY
              and RRSIG Resource Records for DNSSEC", RFC 5702,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5702, October 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5702>.

   [RFC5933]  Dolmatov, V., Ed., Chuprina, A., and I. Ustinov, "Use of
              GOST Signature Algorithms in DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource
              Records for DNSSEC", RFC 5933, DOI 10.17487/RFC5933, July
              2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5933>.

   [RFC6605]  Hoffman, P. and W. Wijngaards, "Elliptic Curve Digital
              Signature Algorithm (DSA) for DNSSEC", RFC 6605,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6605, April 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6605>.

   [RFC6781]  Kolkman, O., Mekking, W., and R. Gieben, "DNSSEC
              Operational Practices, Version 2", RFC 6781,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6781, December 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6781>.

   [RFC6944]  Rose, S., "Applicability Statement: DNS Security (DNSSEC)
              DNSKEY Algorithm Implementation Status", RFC 6944,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6944, April 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6944>.



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   [RFC6979]  Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature
              Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
              Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10.17487/RFC6979, August
              2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6979>.

   [RFC6986]  Dolmatov, V., Ed. and A. Degtyarev, "GOST R 34.11-2012:
              Hash Function", RFC 6986, DOI 10.17487/RFC6986, August
              2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6986>.

   [RFC7344]  Kumari, W., Gudmundsson, O., and G. Barwood, "Automating
              DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance", RFC 7344,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7344, September 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7344>.

   [RFC7583]  Morris, S., Ihren, J., Dickinson, J., and W. Mekking,
              "DNSSEC Key Rollover Timing Considerations", RFC 7583,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7583, October 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7583>.

   [RFC8032]  Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
              Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.

   [RFC8078]  Gudmundsson, O. and P. Wouters, "Managing DS Records from
              the Parent via CDS/CDNSKEY", RFC 8078,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8078, March 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8078>.

   [RFC8080]  Sury, O. and R. Edmonds, "Edwards-Curve Digital Security
              Algorithm (EdDSA) for DNSSEC", RFC 8080,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8080, February 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8080>.

   [DNSKEY-IANA]
              "DNSKEY Algorithms", <http://www.iana.org/assignments/
              dns-sec-alg-numbers/dns-sec-alg-numbers.xhtml>.

   [DS-IANA]  "Delegation Signer Digest Algorithms",
              <http://www.iana.org/assignments/ds-rr-types/
              ds-rr-types.xhtml>.

Authors' Addresses








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   Paul Wouters
   Red Hat
   CA

   EMail: pwouters@redhat.com


   Ondrej Sury
   Internet Systems Consortium
   CZ

   EMail: ondrej@isc.org







































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