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Versions: (draft-kristoff-dnsop-dns-tcp-requirements) 00

Domain Name System Operations                                J. Kristoff
Internet-Draft                                         DePaul University
Intended status: Best Current Practice                        D. Wessels
Expires: December 22, 2017                                      Verisign
                                                           June 20, 2017

           DNS Transport over TCP - Operational Requirements


   This document encourages the practice of permitting DNS messages to
   be carried over TCP on the Internet.  It also describes some of the
   consequences of this behavior and the potential operational issues
   that can arise when this best common practice is not upheld.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 22, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Background  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Uneven Transport Usage and Preference . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  Waiting for Large Messages and Reliability  . . . . . . .   3
     2.3.  EDNS0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.4.  "Only Zone Tranfers Use TCP"  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  DNS over TCP Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Network and System Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  DNS over TCP Filtering Risks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.1.  DNS Wedgie  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.2.  DNS Root Zone KSK Rollover  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Appendix A.  Standards Related to DNS Transport over TCP  . . . .  10
     A.1.  TODO - additional, relevant RFCs  . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     A.2.  IETF RFC 7477 - Child-to-Parent Synchronization in DNS  .  11
     A.3.  IETF RFC 7766 - DNS Transport over TCP - Implementation
           Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     A.4.  IETF RFC 7828 - The edns-tcp-keepalive EDNS0 Option . . .  11
     A.5.  IETF RFC 7873 - Domain Name System (DNS) Cookies  . . . .  11
     A.6.  IETF RFC 7901 - CHAIN Query Requests in DNS . . . . . . .  11
     A.7.  IETF RFC 8027 - DNSSEC Roadblock Avoidance  . . . . . . .  12
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12

1.  Introduction

   DNS messages may be delivered using UDP or TCP communications.  While
   most DNS transactions are carried over UDP, some operators have been
   led to believe that any DNS over TCP traffic is unwanted or
   unnecessary for general DNS operation.  As usage and features have
   evolved, TCP transport has become increasingly important for correct
   and safe operation of the Internet DNS.  Reflecting modern usage, the
   DNS standards were recently updated to declare support for TCP is now
   a required part of the DNS implementation specifications in
   [RFC7766].  This document is the formal requirements equivalent for
   the operational community, encouraging operators to ensure DNS over
   TCP communications support is on par with DNS over UDP

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1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

2.  Background

2.1.  Uneven Transport Usage and Preference

   In the original suite of DNS specifications, [RFC1034] and [RFC1035]
   clearly specified that DNS messages could be carried in either UDP or
   TCP, but they also made clear a preference for UDP as the transport
   for queries in the general case.  As stated in [RFC1035]:

      "While virtual circuits can be used for any DNS activity,
      datagrams are preferred for queries due to their lower overhead
      and better performance."

   Another early, important, and influential document, [RFC1123],
   detailed the preference for UDP more explicitly:

      "DNS resolvers and recursive servers MUST support UDP, and SHOULD
      support TCP, for sending (non-zone-transfer) queries."

   and further stipulated:

      A name server MAY limit the resources it devotes to TCP queries,
      but it SHOULD NOT refuse to service a TCP query just because it
      would have succeeded with UDP.

   Culminating in [RFC1536], DNS over TCP came to be associated
   primarily with the zone transfer mechanism, while most DNS queries
   and responses were seen as the dominion of UDP.

2.2.  Waiting for Large Messages and Reliability

   As stipulated in the original specifications, DNS messages over UDP
   were restricted to a 512-byte message size.  However, even while
   [RFC1123] made a clear preference for UDP, it foresaw DNS over TCP
   becoming more popular in the future:

      "[...] it is also clear that some new DNS record types defined in
      the future will contain information exceeding the 512 byte limit
      that applies to UDP, and hence will require TCP.

   At least two new, widely anticipated developments were set to elevate
   the need for DNS over TCP transactions.  The first was dynamic

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   updates defined in [RFC2136] and the second was the set of extensions
   collectively known as DNSSEC originally specified in [RFC2541].  The
   former suggested "requestors who require an accurate response code
   must use TCP", while the later warned "[...] larger keys increase the
   size of KEY and SIG RRs.  This increases the chance of DNS UDP packet
   overflow and the possible necessity for using higher overhead TCP in

   Yet defying some expectations, DNS over TCP remained little used in
   real traffic across the Internet.  Dynamic updates saw little
   deployment between autonomous networks.  Around the time DNSSEC was
   first defined, another new feature affecting DNS over UDP helped
   solidify its dominance for message transactions.

2.3.  EDNS0

   In 1999 the IETF published the Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)
   in [RFC2671].  This document standardized a way for communicating DNS
   nodes to perform rudimentary capabilities negotiation.  One such
   capability written into the base specification and present in every
   ENDS0 compatible message is the value of the maximum UDP payload size
   the sender can support.  This unsigned 16-bit field specifies in
   bytes the maximum DNS MTU.  In practice, typical values are a subset
   of the 512 to 4096 byte range.  EDNS0 was rapidly and widely deployed
   over the next several years and numerous surveys have shown many
   systems currently support larger UDP MTUs [CASTRO2010], [NETALYZR]
   with EDNS0.

   The natural effect of EDNS0 deployment meant large DNS messages would
   be less reliant on TCP than they might otherwise have been.  While a
   nonneglible population of DNS systems lack EDNS0 or may still fall
   back to TCP for some transactions, DNS over TCP transactions remain a
   very small fraction of overall DNS traffic [VERISIGN].  Nevertheless,
   some average increase in DNS message size, the continued development
   of new DNS features and a denial of service mitigation technique (see
   Section 8) have suggested that DNS over TCP transactions are as
   important to the correct and safe operation of the Internet DNS as
   ever, if not more so.  Furthermore, there has been serious research
   that has suggested connection-oriented DNS transactions may provide
   security and privacy advantages over UDP transport [TDNS].  In fact,
   [RFC7858], a Standards Track document is just this sort of
   specification.  Therefore, it might be desirable for network
   operators to avoid artificially inhibiting the potential utility and
   advances in the DNS such as these.

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2.4.  "Only Zone Tranfers Use TCP"

   There are many in the DNS community who configure DNS over TCP
   services and expect DNS over TCP transactions to occur without
   interference.  However there has also been a long held belief by some
   operators, particularly for security-related reasons, that DNS over
   TCP services should be purposely limited or not provided at all
   [CHES94], [DJBDNS].  A popular meme has also held the imagination of
   some that DNS over TCP is only ever used for zone transfers and is
   generally unnecessary otherwise, with filtering all DNS over TCP
   traffic even described as a best practice.

   The position on restricting DNS over TCP had some justification given
   that historic implementations of DNS nameservers provided very little
   in the way of TCP connection management (for example see
   Section 6.1.2 of [RFC7766] for more details).  However modern
   standards and implementations are moving to align with the more
   sophisticated TCP management techniques employed by, for example,
   HTTP(S) servers and load balancers.

3.  DNS over TCP Requirements

   Section in [RFC1123] is updated: All general-purpose DNS
   servers MUST be able to service both UDP and TCP queries.

   o  Authoritative servers MUST service TCP queries so that they do not
      limit the size of responses to what fits in a single UDP packet.

   o  Recursive servers (or forwarders) MUST service TCP queries so that
      they do not prevent large responses from a TCP-capable server from
      reaching its TCP-capable clients.

   Regarding the choice of limiting the resources a server devotes to
   queries, Section in [RFC1123] also says:

      A name server MAY limit the resources it devotes to TCP queries,
      but it SHOULD NOT refuse to service a TCP query just because it
      would have succeeded with UDP.

   This requirement is hereby updated: A name server MAY limit the the
   resources it devotes to queries, but it MUST NOT refuse to service a
   query just because it would have succeeded with another transport

   DNS over TCP filtering is considered harmful in the general case.
   DNS resolver and server operators MUST provide DNS service over both
   UDP and TCP transports.  Likewise, network operators MUST allow DNS
   service over both UDP and TCP transports.  It must be acknowledged

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   that DNS over TCP service can pose operational challenges that are
   not present when running DNS over UDP alone.  However, it is the aim
   of this document to argue that the potential damage incurred by
   prohibiting DNS over TCP service is more detrimental to the continued
   utility and success of the DNS than when its usage is allowed.

4.  Network and System Considerations

   TODO: refer to IETF RFC 7766 connection handling discussion, various
   TCP hardening documents, network operator protocol and traffic best
   practices, etc.

5.  DNS over TCP Filtering Risks

   Networks that filter DNS over TCP risk losing access to significant
   or important pieces of the DNS name space.  For a variety of reasons
   a DNS answer may require a DNS over TCP query.  This may include
   large message sizes, lack of EDNS0 support, DDoS mitigation
   techniques, or perhaps some future capability that is as yet
   unforeseen will also demand TCP transport.

   Even if any or all particular answers have consistently been returned
   successfully with UDP in the past, this continued behavior cannot be
   guaranteed when DNS messages are exchanged between autonomous
   systems.  Therefore, filtering of DNS over TCP is considered harmful
   and contrary to the safe and successful operation of the Internet.
   This section enumerates some of the known risks we know about at the
   time of this writing when networks filter DNS over TCP.

5.1.  DNS Wedgie

   Networks that filter DNS over TCP may inadvertently cause problems
   for third party resolvers as experienced by [TOYAMA].  If for
   instance a resolver receives a truncated answer from a server, but if
   when the resolver resends the query using TCP and the TCP response
   never arrives, not only will full answer be unavailable, but the
   resolver will incur the full extent of TCP retransmissions and time
   outs.  This situation might place extreme strain on resolver
   resources.  If the nunber and frequency of these truncated answers
   are sufficiently high, we refer to the steady-state of lost resources
   as a result a "DNS" wedgie".  A DNS wedgie is often not easily or
   completely mitigated by the affected DNS resolver operator.

5.2.  DNS Root Zone KSK Rollover

   Recent plans for a new root zone DNSSEC KSK have highlighted a
   potential problem in retrieving the keys.[LEWIS]  Some packets in the
   KSK rollover process will be larger than 1280 bytes, the IPv6 minimum

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   MTU for links carrying IPv6 traffic.[RFC2460]  While studies have
   shown that problems due to fragment filtering or an inability to
   generate and receive these larger messages are negible, any DNS
   server that is unable to receive large DNS over UDP messages or
   perform DNS over TCP may experience severe disruption of DNS service
   if performing DNSSEC validation.

6.  Acknowledgements

   This document was initially motivated by feedback from students who
   pointed out that they were hearing contradictory information about
   filtering DNS over TCP messages.  Thanks in particular to a teaching
   colleague, JPL, who perhaps unknowingly encouraged the initial
   research into the differences of what the community has historically
   said and did.  Thanks to all the NANOG 63 attendees who provided
   feedback to an early talk on this subject.

   The following individuals provided an array of feedback to help
   improve this document: Sara Dickinson, Bob Harold, Tatuya Jinmei, and
   Paul Hoffman.  The authors are indebted to their contributions.  Any
   remaining errors or imperfections are the sole responsbility of the
   document authors.

7.  IANA Considerations

   This memo includes no request to IANA.

8.  Security Considerations

   Ironically, returning truncated DNS over UDP answers in order to
   induce a client query to switch to DNS over TCP has become a common
   response to source address spoofed, DNS denial-of-service attacks
   [RRL].  Historically, operators have been wary of TCP-based attacks,
   but in recent years, UDP-based flooding attacks have proven to be the
   most common protocol attack on the DNS.  Nevertheless, a high rate of
   short-lived DNS transactions over TCP may pose challenges.  While
   many operators have provided DNS over TCP service for many years
   without duress, past experience is no guarantee of future success.

   DNS over TCP is not unlike many other Internet TCP services.  TCP
   threats and many mitigation strategies have been well documented in a
   series of documents such as [RFC4953], [RFC4987], [RFC5927], and

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9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,

9.2.  Informative References

              Castro, S., Zhang, M., John, W., Wessels, D., and k.
              claffy, "Understanding and preparing for DNS evolution",

   [CHES94]   Cheswick, W. and S. Bellovin, "Firewalls and Internet
              Security: Repelling the Wily Hacker", 1994.

   [DJBDNS]   D.J. Bernstein, "When are TCP queries sent?", 2002,

   [LEWIS]    Lewis, E., "2017 DNSSEC KSK Rollover", RIPE 74 Budapest,
              Hungary, May 2017.

              Kreibich, C., Weaver, N., Nechaev, B., and V. Paxson,
              "Netalyzr: Illuminating The Edge Network", 2010.

   [RFC1034]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
              STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
              November 1987, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.

   [RFC1123]  Braden, R., Ed., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
              Application and Support", STD 3, RFC 1123,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC1123, October 1989,

   [RFC1536]  Kumar, A., Postel, J., Neuman, C., Danzig, P., and S.
              Miller, "Common DNS Implementation Errors and Suggested
              Fixes", RFC 1536, DOI 10.17487/RFC1536, October 1993,

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   [RFC2136]  Vixie, P., Ed., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y., and J. Bound,
              "Dynamic Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)",
              RFC 2136, DOI 10.17487/RFC2136, April 1997,

   [RFC2460]  Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
              (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, DOI 10.17487/RFC2460,
              December 1998, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2460>.

   [RFC2541]  Eastlake 3rd, D., "DNS Security Operational
              Considerations", RFC 2541, DOI 10.17487/RFC2541, March
              1999, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2541>.

   [RFC2671]  Vixie, P., "Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)",
              RFC 2671, DOI 10.17487/RFC2671, August 1999,

   [RFC4953]  Touch, J., "Defending TCP Against Spoofing Attacks",
              RFC 4953, DOI 10.17487/RFC4953, July 2007,

   [RFC4987]  Eddy, W., "TCP SYN Flooding Attacks and Common
              Mitigations", RFC 4987, DOI 10.17487/RFC4987, August 2007,

   [RFC5927]  Gont, F., "ICMP Attacks against TCP", RFC 5927,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5927, July 2010,

   [RFC5961]  Ramaiah, A., Stewart, R., and M. Dalal, "Improving TCP's
              Robustness to Blind In-Window Attacks", RFC 5961,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5961, August 2010,

   [RFC7477]  Hardaker, W., "Child-to-Parent Synchronization in DNS",
              RFC 7477, DOI 10.17487/RFC7477, March 2015,

   [RFC7766]  Dickinson, J., Dickinson, S., Bellis, R., Mankin, A., and
              D. Wessels, "DNS Transport over TCP - Implementation
              Requirements", RFC 7766, DOI 10.17487/RFC7766, March 2016,

   [RFC7828]  Wouters, P., Abley, J., Dickinson, S., and R. Bellis, "The
              edns-tcp-keepalive EDNS0 Option", RFC 7828,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7828, April 2016,

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   [RFC7858]  Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D.,
              and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport
              Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May
              2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>.

   [RFC7873]  Eastlake 3rd, D. and M. Andrews, "Domain Name System (DNS)
              Cookies", RFC 7873, DOI 10.17487/RFC7873, May 2016,

   [RFC7901]  Wouters, P., "CHAIN Query Requests in DNS", RFC 7901,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7901, June 2016,

   [RFC8027]  Hardaker, W., Gudmundsson, O., and S. Krishnaswamy,
              "DNSSEC Roadblock Avoidance", BCP 207, RFC 8027,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8027, November 2016,

   [RRL]      Vixie, P. and V. Schryver, "DNS Response Rate Limiting
              (DNS RRL)", ISC-TN 2012-1 Draft1, April 2012.

   [TDNS]     Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Wessels, D., Mankin, A., and N.
              Somaiya, "Connection-oriented DNS to Improve Privacy and
              Security", 2015.

   [TOYAMA]   Toyama, K., Ishibashi, K., Ishino, M., Yoshimura, C., and
              K. Fujiwara, "DNS Anomalies and Their Impacts on DNS Cache
              Servers", NANOG 32 Reston, VA USA, 2004.

              Thomas, M. and D. Wessels, "An Analysis of TCP Traffic in
              Root Server DITL Data", DNS-OARC 2014 Fall Workshop Los
              Angeles, 2014.

Appendix A.  Standards Related to DNS Transport over TCP

   This section enumerates all known IETF RFC documents that are
   currently of status standard, informational, best common practice or
   experimental and either implicitly or explicitly make assumptions or
   statements about the use of TCP as a transport for the DNS germane to
   this document.

A.1.  TODO - additional, relevant RFCs

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A.2.  IETF RFC 7477 - Child-to-Parent Synchronization in DNS

   This standards track document [RFC7477] specifies a RRType and
   protocol to signal and synchronize NS, A, and AAAA resource record
   changes from a child to parent zone.  Since this protocol may require
   multiple requests and responses, it recommends utilizing DNS over TCP
   to ensure the conversation takes place between a consistent pair of
   end nodes.

A.3.  IETF RFC 7766 - DNS Transport over TCP - Implementation

   The standards track document [RFC7766] might be considered the direct
   ancestor of this operational requirements document.  The
   implementation requirements document codifies mandatory support for
   DNS over TCP in compliant DNS software.

A.4.  IETF RFC 7828 - The edns-tcp-keepalive EDNS0 Option

   This standards track document [RFC7828] defines an EDNS0 option to
   negotiate an idle timeout value for long-lived DNS over TCP
   connections.  Consequently, this document is only applicable and
   relevant to DNS over TCP sessions and between implementations that
   support this option.

A.5.  IETF RFC 7873 - Domain Name System (DNS) Cookies

   This standards track document [RFC7873] describes an EDNS0 option to
   provide additional protection against query and answer forgery.  This
   specification mentions DNS over TCP as a reasonable fallback
   mechanism when DNS Cookies are not available.  The specification does
   make mention of DNS over TCP processing in two specific situations.
   In one, when a server receives only a client cookie in a request, the
   server should consider whether the request arrived over TCP and if
   so, it should consider accepting TCP as sufficient to authenticate
   the request and respond accordingly.  In another, when a client
   receives a BADCOOKIE reply using a fresh server cookie, the client
   should retry using TCP as the transport.

A.6.  IETF RFC 7901 - CHAIN Query Requests in DNS

   This experimental specification [RFC7901] describes an EDNS0 option
   that can be used by a security-aware validating resolver to request
   and obtain a complete DNSSEC validation path for any single query.
   This document requires the use of DNS over TCP or a source IP address
   verified transport mechanism such as EDNS-COOKIE.[RFC7873]

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A.7.  IETF RFC 8027 - DNSSEC Roadblock Avoidance

   This document [RFC8027] details observed problems with DNSSEC
   deployment and mitigation techniques.  Network traffic blocking and
   restrictions, including DNS over TCP messages, are highlighted as one
   reason for DNSSEC deployment issues.  While this document suggests
   these sorts of problems are due to "non-compliant infrastructure" and
   is of type BCP, the scope of the document is limited to detection and
   mitigation techniques to avoid so-called DNSSEC roadblocks.

Authors' Addresses

   John Kristoff
   DePaul University
   Chicago, IL  60604

   Phone: +1 312 493 0305
   Email: jtk@depaul.edu
   URI:   https://aharp.iorc.depaul.edu

   Duane Wessels
   12061 Bluemont Way
   Reston, VA  20190

   Phone: +1 703 948 3200
   Email: dwessels@verisign.com
   URI:   http://verisigninc.com

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