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Versions: (draft-koch-dnsop-resolver-priming) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 RFC 8109

Network Working Group                                            P. Koch
Internet-Draft                                                  DENIC eG
Intended status: Best Current Practice                         M. Larson
Expires: July 16, 2016                                         Dyn, Inc.
                                                              P. Hoffman
                                                                   ICANN
                                                        January 13, 2016


            Initializing a DNS Resolver with Priming Queries
                  draft-ietf-dnsop-resolver-priming-06

Abstract

   This document describes the queries a DNS resolver can emit to
   initialize its cache.  The result is that the resolver gets both a
   current NS RRSet for the root zone and the necessary address
   information for reaching the root servers.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 16, 2016.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of



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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

1.  Introduction

   Recursive DNS resolvers need a starting point to resolve queries.
   [RFC1034] describes a common scenario for recursive resolvers: they
   begin with an empty cache and some configuration for finding the
   names and addresses of the DNS root servers.  [RFC1034] describes
   that configuration as a list of servers that will authoritative
   answers to queries about the root.  This has become a common
   implementation choice for recursive resolvers, and is the topic of
   this document.

   This document describes the steps needed for this common
   implementation choice.  Note that this is not the only way to start a
   recursive name server with an empty cache, but it is the only one
   described in [RFC1034].  Some implementers have chosen other
   directions, some of which work well and others of which fail
   (sometimes disastrously) under different conditions.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   This document only deals with recursive name servers (recursive
   resolvers, resolvers) for the IN class.

2.  Description of Priming

   As described in this document, priming is the act of finding the list
   of root servers from a configuration that lists some or all of the
   purported IP addresses of some or all of those root servers.  A
   recursive resolver starts with no information about the root servers,
   and ends up with a list of their names and their addresses.

   Priming is described in Sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 of [RFC1034].  The
   scenario used in that description, that of a recursive server that is
   also authoritative, is no longer as common.

   Currently, it is quite common for the configured list of IP addresses
   for the root server to be mostly complete and correct.  Note that
   this list (at least initially) comes from the vendor or distributor
   of the recursive server software.

   The list of root server operators and the domain name associated with
   each one has been stable since 1997.  However, there are address
   changes for the NS records for those root server operators, both for



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   IPv4 and IPv6 addresses.  However, research shows that after those
   addresses change, some resolvers never get the new addresses.
   Therefore, it is important that resolvers be able to cope with
   change, even without relying upon configuration updates to be applied
   by their operator.  This is the main reason that one needs to do
   priming instead of just going from a configured list to get a full
   and accurate list of root servers.

3.  Priming Queries

   A priming query is a DNS query that has a QNAME of "." and a QTYPE of
   NS, and is sent to one of the addresses in the configuration for the
   recursive resolver.  The priming query MAY be sent over UDP or TCP.
   If the query is sent over UDP, the source port SHOULD be randomly
   selected (see [RFC5452]).  The RD bit MAY be set to 0 or 1, although
   the meaning of it being set to 1 is undefined for priming queries.

   The recursive resolver SHOULD use EDNS0 [RFC6891] for priming queries
   and SHOULD announce and handle a reassembly size of at least 1024
   octets [RFC3226].  Doing so allows responses that cover the size of a
   full priming response (see Section 4.2).

3.1.  Repeating Priming Queries

   The recursive resolver SHOULD send a priming query only when it is
   needed.  This would be when the resolver starts with an empty cache,
   and when one or more of the NS records for the root servers has
   expired.  The recursive resolver SHOULD expire the NS records of the
   root servers according to the TTL values given in the priming
   response.

   If a priming query does not get a response within 2 seconds, the
   recursive resolver SHOULD retry with a different target address from
   the configuration.

3.2.  Target Selection

   In order to spread the load across all the root server operators, the
   recursive resolver SHOULD select the target for a priming query
   randomly from the list of addresses.  The recursive resolver might
   choose either IPv4 and IPv6 addresses based on its knowledge of
   whether the server on which it is running has adequate transit on
   either type of address.

   Note that this recommended method is not the only way to choose from
   the list in a recursive resolver's configuration.  Two other other
   common methods include picking the first from the list, and
   remembering which address in the list gave the fastest response



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   earlier and using that one.  There are probably other methods in use
   today.  However, the random method listed above is the one that is
   recommended for priming.

3.3.  DNSSEC with Priming Queries

   The resolver MAY set the DNSSEC OK [RFC4033] bit.  At the time this
   document is being published, there is little use to performing DNSSEC
   validation on the priming query because the "root-servers.net" zone
   is not signed, and so a man-in-the-middle attack on the priming query
   can result in malicious data in the responses.  However, if the
   "root-servers.net" zone is later signed, or if the root server
   operators choose a different zone to identify themselves and that
   zone is signed, having DNSSEC validation for the priming queries
   might be valuable.

4.  Priming Responses

   A priming query is a normal DNS query.  Thus, a root name server
   cannot distinguish a priming query from any other query for the root
   NS RRSet.  Thus, the root server's response will also be a normal DNS
   response.

4.1.  Expected Properties of the Priming Response

   The priming response is expected to have an RCODE of NOERROR, and to
   have the AA bit set.  Also, there should be an NS RRSet in the Answer
   section (because the NS RRSet originates from the root zone), an
   empty Authority section (because the NS RRSet already appears in the
   answer section) and an Additional section with A and/or AAAA RRSets
   for the root name servers pointed at by the NS RRSet.

   Resolver software SHOULD treat the response to the priming query as a
   normal DNS response, just as it would use any other data fed to its
   cache.  Resolver software SHOULD NOT expect exactly 13 NS RRs.

4.2.  Completeness of the Response

   There are currently 13 root servers.  Of those 13, all have one IPv4
   address, and 11 have an IPv6 address.  The combined size of all the A
   and AAAA RRSets is (13 * 16) + (11 * 32), or 560 bytes.  Not even
   counting the NS RRSet, this value exceeds the original 512 octet
   payload limit from [RFC1035].

   For an EDNS response, a resolver SHOULD consider the address
   information found in the Additional section complete for any
   particular server that appears at all.  Said another way: in an EDNS




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   response, if the additional section only has an A RRSet for a server,
   the resolver SHOULD assume that no AAAA RRSet exists.

   It is important to note that if the recursive resolver did not
   announce a reassembly size larger than 512 octets, this assumption is
   invalid.  Re-issuing of the priming query does not help with those
   root name servers that respond with a fixed order of addresses in the
   additional section.  Instead, the recursive resolver needs to to
   issue direct queries for A and AAAA RRSets for the remaining names.
   Currently, these RRSets would be authoritatively available from the
   root name servers.

5.  Security Considerations

   Spoofing a response to a priming query can be used to redirect all of
   the queries originating from a victim recursive resolver to one or
   more servers for the attacker.  Until the responses to priming
   queries are protected with DNSSEC, there is no definitive way to
   prevent such redirection.

6.  IANA Considerations

   None.

7.  Normative References

   [RFC1034]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
              STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>.

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
              November 1987, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/
              RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3226]  Gudmundsson, O., "DNSSEC and IPv6 A6 aware server/resolver
              message size requirements", RFC 3226, DOI 10.17487/
              RFC3226, December 2001,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3226>.

   [RFC4033]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC
              4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4033>.



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   [RFC5452]  Hubert, A. and R. van Mook, "Measures for Making DNS More
              Resilient against Forged Answers", RFC 5452, DOI 10.17487/
              RFC5452, January 2009,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5452>.

   [RFC6891]  Damas, J., Graff, M., and P. Vixie, "Extension Mechanisms
              for DNS (EDNS(0))", STD 75, RFC 6891, DOI 10.17487/
              RFC6891, April 2013,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6891>.

Appendix A.  Acknowledgements

   This document is the product of the DNSOP WG and benefitted from the
   reviews done there.

Authors' Addresses

   Peter Koch
   DENIC eG
   Kaiserstrasse 75-77
   Frankfurt  60329
   DE

   Phone: +49 69 27235 0
   Email: pk@DENIC.DE


   Matt Larson
   Dyn, Inc.
   150 Dow St
   Manchester, NH  03101
   USA

   Email: mlarson@dyn.com


   Paul Hoffman
   ICANN

   Email: paul.hoffman@icann.org











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