[Docs] [txt|pdf|xml|html] [Tracker] [WG] [Email] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Nits]

Versions: (draft-huitema-dnssd-prireq) 00

Network Working Group                                         C. Huitema
Internet-Draft                                      Private Octopus Inc.
Intended status: Informational                        September 30, 2018
Expires: April 3, 2019


                DNS-SD Privacy and Security Requirements
                       draft-ietf-dnssd-prireq-00

Abstract

   DNS-SD (DNS Service Discovery) normally discloses information about
   devices offering and requesting services.  This information includes
   host names, network parameters, and possibly a further description of
   the corresponding service instance.  Especially when mobile devices
   engage in DNS Service Discovery over Multicast DNS at a public
   hotspot, serious privacy problems arise.  We analyze the requirements
   of a privacy respecting discovery service.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 3, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of



Huitema                   Expires April 3, 2019                 [Page 1]


Internet-Draft         DNS-SD Privacy Requirements        September 2018


   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  DNS-SD Discovery Scenarios  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Private client and public server  . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  Private client and private server . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.3.  Wearable client and server  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.1.  Privacy Implication of Publishing Service Instance Names    7
     3.2.  Privacy Implication of Publishing Node Names  . . . . . .   7
     3.3.  Privacy Implication of Publishing Service Attributes  . .   8
     3.4.  Device Fingerprinting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.5.  Privacy Implication of Discovering Services . . . . . . .   9
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.1.  Authenticity, Integrity & Freshness . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.2.  Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.3.  Resistance to Dictionary Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.4.  Resistance to Denial-of-Service Attack  . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.5.  Resistance to Sender Impersonation  . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.6.  Sender Deniability  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   5.  Operational Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.1.  Power Management  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.2.  Protocol Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.3.  Secure Initialization and Trust Models  . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.4.  External Dependencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   7.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   8.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15

1.  Introduction

   DNS-SD [RFC6763] over mDNS [RFC6762] enables zero-configuration
   service discovery in local networks.  It is very convenient for
   users, but it requires the public exposure of the offering and
   requesting identities along with information about the offered and
   requested services.  Parts of the published information can seriously
   breach the user's privacy.  These privacy issues and potential
   solutions are discussed in [KW14a], [KW14b] and [K17].

   There are cases when nodes connected to a network want to provide or
   consume services without exposing their identity to the other parties
   connected to the same network.  Consider for example a traveler
   wanting to upload pictures from a phone to a laptop when connected to



Huitema                   Expires April 3, 2019                 [Page 2]


Internet-Draft         DNS-SD Privacy Requirements        September 2018


   the Wi-Fi network of an Internet cafe, or two travelers who want to
   share files between their laptops when waiting for their plane in an
   airport lounge.

   We expect that these exchanges will start with a discovery procedure
   using DNS-SD [RFC6763] over mDNS [RFC6762].  One of the devices will
   publish the availability of a service, such as a picture library or a
   file store in our examples.  The user of the other device will
   discover this service, and then connect to it.

   When analyzing these scenarios in Section 3, we find that the DNS-SD
   messages leak identifying information such as the instance name, the
   host name or service properties.

1.1.  Requirements

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.  DNS-SD Discovery Scenarios

   DNS-Based Service Discovery (DNS-SD) is defined in [RFC6763].  It
   allows nodes to publish the availability of an instance of a service
   by inserting specific records in the DNS ([RFC1033], [RFC1034],
   [RFC1035]) or by publishing these records locally using multicast DNS
   (mDNS) [RFC6762].  Available services are described using three types
   of records:

   PTR Record:  Associates a service type in the domain with an
      "instance" name of this service type.

   SRV Record:  Provides the node name, port number, priority and weight
      associated with the service instance, in conformance with
      [RFC2782].

   TXT Record:  Provides a set of attribute-value pairs describing
      specific properties of the service instance.

   In the remaining sections, we review common discovery scenarios
   provided by DNS-SD and discuss their privacy requirements.

2.1.  Private client and public server

   Perhaps the simplest private discovery scenario involves a single
   client connecting to a public server through a public network.  A
   common example would be a traveler using a publicly available printer
   in a business center, in an hotel or at an airport.



Huitema                   Expires April 3, 2019                 [Page 3]


Internet-Draft         DNS-SD Privacy Requirements        September 2018


                                        ( Taking notes:
                                        ( David is printing
                                        ( a document
                                         ~~~~~~~~~~~
                                                     o
            ___                                        o   ___
           /   \                                         _|___|_
           |   |                                          |* *|
            \_/      __                                    \_/
             |      / /   Discovery   +----------+          |
            /|\    /_/  <-----------> |  +----+  |         /|\
           / | \__/                   +--|    |--+        / | \
          /  |                           |____/          /  |  \
         /   |                                          /   |   \
            / \                                            / \
           /   \                                          /   \
          /     \                                        /     \
         /       \                                      /       \
        /         \                                    /         \


   In that scenario, the server is public and wants to be discovered,
   but the client is private.  The adversary will be listening to the
   network traffic, trying to identify the visitors' devices and their
   activity.  Identifying devices leads to identifying people, either
   just for tracking people or as a preliminary to targeted attacks.

   The requirement in that scenario is that the discovery activity
   should not disclose the identity of the client.

2.2.  Private client and private server

   The second private discovery scenario involves private client
   connecting to a private server.  A common example would be two people
   engaging in a collaborative application in a public place, such as
   for example an airport's lounge.















Huitema                   Expires April 3, 2019                 [Page 4]


Internet-Draft         DNS-SD Privacy Requirements        September 2018


                                           ( Taking notes:
                                           ( David is meeting
                                           ( with Stuart
                                             ~~~~~~~~~~~
                                                        o
            ___                               ___         o   ___
           /   \                             /   \          _|___|_
           |   |                             |   |           |* *|
            \_/      __               __      \_/             \_/
             |      / /   Discovery   \ \      |               |
            /|\    /_/  <----------->  \_\    /|\             /|\
           / | \__/                       \__/ | \           / | \
          /  |                                 |  \         /  |  \
         /   |                                 |   \       /   |   \
            / \                               / \             / \
           /   \                             /   \           /   \
          /     \                           /     \         /     \
         /       \                         /       \       /       \
        /         \                       /         \     /         \


   In that scenario, the collaborative application on one of the device
   will act as server, and the application on the other device will act
   as client.  The server wants to be discovered by the client, but has
   no desire to be discovered by anyone else.  The adversary will be
   listening to network traffic, attempting to discover the identity of
   devices as in the first scenario, and also attempting to discover the
   patterns of traffic, as these patterns reveal the business and social
   interactions between the owners of the devices.

   The requirement in that scenario is that the discovery activity
   should not disclose the identity of either the client or the server.

2.3.  Wearable client and server

   The third private discovery scenario involves wearable devices.  A
   typical example would be the watch on someone's wrist connecting to
   the phone in their pocket.













Huitema                   Expires April 3, 2019                 [Page 5]


Internet-Draft         DNS-SD Privacy Requirements        September 2018


                                        ( Taking notes:
                                        ( David' is here. His watch is
                                        ( talking to his phone
                                          ~~~~~~~~~~~
                                                      o
            ___                                         o  ___
           /   \                                         _|___|_
           |   |                                          |* *|
            \_/                                            \_/
             |     _/                                       |
            /|\   //                                       /|\
           / | \__/  ^                                    / | \
          /  |__     | Discovery                         /  |  \
         /   |\ \    v                                  /   |   \
            / \\_\                                         / \
           /   \                                          /   \
          /     \                                        /     \
         /       \                                      /       \
        /         \                                    /         \


   This third scenario is in many ways similar to the second scenario.
   It involves two devices, one acting as server and the other acting as
   client, and it leads to the same requirement that the discovery
   traffic not disclose the identity of either the client or the server.
   The main difference is that the devices are managed by a single
   owner, which can lead to different methods for establishing secure
   relations between the device.  There is also an added emphasis in
   hiding the type of devices that the person wears.

   In addition to tracking the identity of the owner of the devices, the
   adversary is interested by the characteristics of the devices, such
   as type, brand, and model.  Identifying the type of device can lead
   to further attacks, from theft to device specific hacking.  The
   combination of devices worn by the same person will also provide a
   "fingerprint" of the person, allowing identification.

3.  Privacy Considerations

   The discovery scenarios in Section Section 2 illustrate three
   separate privacy requirements that vary based on use case:

   1.  Client identity privacy: Client identities are not leaked during
       service discovery or use.

   2.  Multi-owner, mutual client and server identity privacy: Neither
       client nor server identities are leaked during service discovery
       or use.



Huitema                   Expires April 3, 2019                 [Page 6]


Internet-Draft         DNS-SD Privacy Requirements        September 2018


   3.  Single-owner, mutual client and server identity privacy:
       Identities of clients and servers owned and managed by the same
       application, device, or user are not leaked during service
       discovery or use.

   In the remaining subsections, we describe aspects of DNS-SD that make
   these requirements difficult to achieve in practice.

3.1.  Privacy Implication of Publishing Service Instance Names

   In the first phase of discovery, client obtain all PTR records
   associated with a service type in a given naming domain.  Each PTR
   record contains a Service Instance Name defined in Section 4 of
   [RFC6763]:

     Service Instance Name = <Instance> . <Service> . <Domain>

   The <Instance> portion of the Service Instance Name is meant to
   convey enough information for users of discovery clients to easily
   select the desired service instance.  Nodes that use DNS-SD over mDNS
   [RFC6762] in a mobile environment will rely on the specificity of the
   instance name to identify the desired service instance.  In our
   example of users wanting to upload pictures to a laptop in an
   Internet Cafe, the list of available service instances may look like:

   Alice's Images         . _imageStore._tcp . local
   Alice's Mobile Phone   . _presence._tcp   . local
   Alice's Notebook       . _presence._tcp   . local
   Bob's Notebook         . _presence._tcp   . local
   Carol's Notebook       . _presence._tcp   . local

   Alice will see the list on her phone and understand intuitively that
   she should pick the first item.  The discovery will "just work".

   However, DNS-SD/mDNS will reveal to anybody that Alice is currently
   visiting the Internet Cafe.  It further discloses the fact that she
   uses two devices, shares an image store, and uses a chat application
   supporting the _presence protocol on both of her devices.  She might
   currently chat with Bob or Carol, as they are also using a _presence
   supporting chat application.  This information is not just available
   to devices actively browsing for and offering services, but to
   anybody passively listening to the network traffic.

3.2.  Privacy Implication of Publishing Node Names

   The SRV records contain the DNS name of the node publishing the
   service.  Typical implementations construct this DNS name by
   concatenating the "host name" of the node with the name of the local



Huitema                   Expires April 3, 2019                 [Page 7]


Internet-Draft         DNS-SD Privacy Requirements        September 2018


   domain.  The privacy implications of this practice are reviewed in
   [RFC8117].  Depending on naming practices, the host name is either a
   strong identifier of the device, or at a minimum a partial
   identifier.  It enables tracking of both the device, and, by
   extension, the device's owner.

3.3.  Privacy Implication of Publishing Service Attributes

   The TXT record's attribute-value pairs contain information on the
   characteristics of the corresponding service instance.  This in turn
   reveals information about the devices that publish services.  The
   amount of information varies widely with the particular service and
   its implementation:

   o  Some attributes like the paper size available in a printer, are
      the same on many devices, and thus only provide limited
      information to a tracker.

   o  Attributes that have freeform values, such as the name of a
      directory, may reveal much more information.

   Combinations of attributes have more information power than specific
   attributes, and can potentially be used for "fingerprinting" a
   specific device.

   Information contained in TXT records does not only breach privacy by
   making devices trackable, but might directly contain private
   information about the user.  For instance the _presence service
   reveals the "chat status" to everyone in the same network.  Users
   might not be aware of that.

   Further, TXT records often contain version information about services
   allowing potential attackers to identify devices running exploit-
   prone versions of a certain service.

3.4.  Device Fingerprinting

   The combination of information published in DNS-SD has the potential
   to provide a "fingerprint" of a specific device.  Such information
   includes:

   o  List of services published by the device, which can be retrieved
      because the SRV records will point to the same host name.

   o  Specific attributes describing these services.

   o  Port numbers used by the services.




Huitema                   Expires April 3, 2019                 [Page 8]


Internet-Draft         DNS-SD Privacy Requirements        September 2018


   o  Priority and weight attributes in the SRV records.

   This combination of services and attributes will often be sufficient
   to identify the version of the software running on a device.  If a
   device publishes many services with rich sets of attributes, the
   combination may be sufficient to identify the specific device.

   A sometimes heard argument is that devices providing services can be
   identified by observing the local traffic, and that trying to hide
   the presence of the service is futile.  This argument, however, does
   not carry much weight because

   1.  Proving privacy at the discovery layer is of the essence for
       enabling automatically configured privacy-preserving network
       applications.  Application layer protocols are not forced to
       leverage the offered privacy, but if device tracking is not
       prevented at the deeper layers, including the service discovery
       layer, obfuscating a certain service's protocol at the
       application layer is futile.

   2.  Further, even if the application layer does not protect privacy,
       it is hard to record and analyse the unicast traffic (which most
       applications will generate) compared to just listening to the
       multicast messages sent by DNS-SD/mDNS.

   The same argument can be extended to say that the pattern of services
   offered by a device allows for fingerprinting the device.  This may
   or may not be true, since we can expect that services will be
   designed or updated to avoid leaking fingerprints.  In any case, the
   design of the discovery service should avoid making a bad situation
   worse, and should as much as possible avoid providing new
   fingerprinting information.

3.5.  Privacy Implication of Discovering Services

   The consumers of services engage in discovery, and in doing so reveal
   some information such as the list of services they are interested in
   and the domains in which they are looking for the services.  When the
   clients select specific instances of services, they reveal their
   preference for these instances.  This can be benign if the service
   type is very common, but it could be more problematic for sensitive
   services, such as for example some private messaging services.

   One way to protect clients would be to somehow encrypt the requested
   service types.  Of course, just as we noted in Section 3.4, traffic
   analysis can often reveal the service.





Huitema                   Expires April 3, 2019                 [Page 9]


Internet-Draft         DNS-SD Privacy Requirements        September 2018


4.  Security Considerations

   For each of the operations described above, we must also consider
   security threats we are concerned about.

4.1.  Authenticity, Integrity & Freshness

   Can we trust the information we receive?  Has it been modified in
   flight by an adversary?  Do we trust the source of the information?
   Is the source of information fresh, i.e., not replayed?  Freshness
   may or may not be required depending on whether the discovery process
   is meant to be online.  In some cases, publishing discovery
   information to a shared directory or registry, rather than to each
   online recipient through a broadcast channel, may suffice.

4.2.  Confidentiality

   Confidentiality is about restricting information access to only
   authorized individuals.  Ideally this should only be the appropriate
   trusted parties, though it can be challenging to define who are "the
   appropriate trusted parties."  In some uses cases, this may mean that
   only mutually authenticated and trusting clients and servers can read
   messages sent for one another.  The "Discover" operation in
   particular is often used to discover new entities that the device did
   not previously know about.  It may be tricky to work out how a device
   can have an established trust relationship with a new entity it has
   never previously communicated with.

4.3.  Resistance to Dictionary Attacks

   It can be tempting to use (publicly computable) hash functions to
   obscure sensitive identifiers.  This transforms a sensitive unique
   identifier such as an email address into a "scrambled" (but still
   unique) identifier.  Unfortunately simple solutions may be vulnerable
   to offline dictionary attacks.

4.4.  Resistance to Denial-of-Service Attack

   In any protocol where the receiver of messages has to perform
   cryptographic operations on those messages, there is a risk of a
   brute-force flooding attack causing the receiver to expend excessive
   amounts of CPU time (and battery power) just processing and
   discarding those messages.








Huitema                   Expires April 3, 2019                [Page 10]


Internet-Draft         DNS-SD Privacy Requirements        September 2018


4.5.  Resistance to Sender Impersonation

   Sender impersonation is an attack wherein messages such as service
   offers are forged by entities who do not possess the corresponding
   secret key material.  These attacks may be used to learn the identity
   of a communicating party, actively or passively.

4.6.  Sender Deniability

   Deniability of sender activity, e.g., of broadcasting a discovery
   request, may be desirable or necessary in some use cases.  This
   property ensures that eavesdroppers cannot prove senders issued a
   specific message destined for one or more peers.

5.  Operational Considerations

5.1.  Power Management

   Many modern devices, especially battery-powered devices, use power
   management techniques to conserve energy.  One such technique is for
   a device to transfer information about itself to a proxy, which will
   act on behalf of the device for some functions, while the device
   itself goes to sleep to reduce power consumption.  When the proxy
   determines that some action is required which only the device itself
   can perform, the proxy may have some way (such as Ethernet "Magic
   Packet") to wake the device.

   In many cases, the device may not trust the network proxy
   sufficiently to share all its confidential key material with the
   proxy.  This poses challenges for combining private discovery that
   relies on per-query cryptographic operations, with energy-saving
   techniques that rely on having (somewhat untrusted) network proxies
   answer queries on behalf of sleeping devices.

5.2.  Protocol Efficiency

   Creating a discovery protocol that has the desired security
   properties may result in a design that is not efficient.  To perform
   the necessary operations the protocol may need to send and receive a
   large number of network packets.  This may consume an unreasonable
   amount of network capacity (particularly problematic when it's shared
   wireless spectrum), cause an unnecessary level of power consumption
   (particularly problematic on battery devices) and may result in the
   discovery process being slow.

   It is a difficult challenge to design a discovery protocol that has
   the property of obscuring the details of what it is doing from




Huitema                   Expires April 3, 2019                [Page 11]


Internet-Draft         DNS-SD Privacy Requirements        September 2018


   unauthorized observers, while also managing to do that quickly and
   efficiently.

5.3.  Secure Initialization and Trust Models

   One of the challenges implicit in the preceding discussions is that
   whenever we discuss "trusted entities" versus "untrusted entities",
   there needs to be some way that trust is initially established, to
   convert an "untrusted entity" into a "trusted entity".

   One way to establish trust between two entities is to trust a third
   party to make that determination for us.  For example, the X.509
   certificates used by TLS and HTTPS web browsing are based on the
   model of trusting a third party to tell us who to trust.  There are
   some difficulties in using this model for establishing trust for
   service discovery uses.  If we want to print our tax returns or
   medical documents on "our" printer, then we need to know which
   printer on the network we can trust be be "our" printer.  All of the
   printers we discover on the network may be legitimate printers made
   by legitimate printer manufacturers, but not all of them are "our"
   printer.  A third-party certificate authority cannot tell us which
   one of the printers is ours.

   Another common way to establish a trust relationship is Trust On
   First Use (TOFU), as used by ssh.  The first usage is a Leap Of
   Faith, but after that public keys are exchanged and at least we can
   confirm that subsequent communications are with the same entity.  In
   today's world, where there may be attackers present even at that
   first use, it would be preferable to be able to establish a trust
   relationship without requiring an initial Leap Of Faith.

   Techniques now exist for securely establishing a trust relationship
   without requiring an initial Leap Of Faith.  Trust can be established
   securely using a short passphrase or PIN with cryptographic
   algorithms such as Secure Remote Password (SRP) [RFC5054] or a
   Password Authenticated Key Exchange like J-PAKE [RFC8236] using a
   Schnorr Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof [RFC8235].

   Such techniques require a user to enter the correct passphrase or PIN
   in order for the cryptographic algorithms to establish working
   communication.  This avoids the human tendency to simply press the
   "OK" button when asked if they want to do something on their
   electronic device.  It removes the human fallibility element from the
   equation, and avoids the human users inadvertently sabotaging their
   own security.

   Using these techniques, if a user tries to print their tax return on
   a printer they've never used before (even though the name looks



Huitema                   Expires April 3, 2019                [Page 12]


Internet-Draft         DNS-SD Privacy Requirements        September 2018


   right) they'll be prompted to enter a pairing PIN, and the user
   *cannot* ignore that warning.  They can't just press an "OK" button.
   They have to walk to the printer and read the displayed PIN and enter
   it.  And if the intended printer is not displaying a pairing PIN, or
   is displaying a different pairing PIN, that means the user may be
   being spoofed, and the connection will not succeed, and the failure
   will not reveal any secret information to the attacker.  As much as
   the human desires to "just give me an OK button to make it print"
   (and the attacker desires them to click that OK button too) the
   cryptographic algorithms do not give the user the ability to opt out
   of the security, and consequently do not give the attacker any way to
   persuade the user to opt out of the security protections.

5.4.  External Dependencies

   Trust establishment may depend on external, and optionally online,
   parties.  Systems which have such a dependency may be attacked by
   interfering with communication to external dependencies.  Where
   possible, such dependencies should be minimized.  Local trust models
   are best for secure initialization in the presence of active
   attackers.

6.  IANA Considerations

   This draft does not require any IANA action.

7.  Acknowledgments

   This draft incorporates many contributions from Stuart Cheshire and
   Chris Wood.

8.  Informative References

   [K17]      Kaiser, D., "Efficient Privacy-Preserving
              Configurationless Service Discovery Supporting Multi-Link
              Networks", 2017,
              <http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-0-422757>.

   [KW14a]    Kaiser, D. and M. Waldvogel, "Adding Privacy to Multicast
              DNS Service Discovery", DOI 10.1109/TrustCom.2014.107,
              2014, <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/
              articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=7011331>.

   [KW14b]    Kaiser, D. and M. Waldvogel, "Efficient Privacy Preserving
              Multicast DNS Service Discovery",
              DOI 10.1109/HPCC.2014.141, 2014,
              <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/
              articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=7056899>.



Huitema                   Expires April 3, 2019                [Page 13]


Internet-Draft         DNS-SD Privacy Requirements        September 2018


   [RFC1033]  Lottor, M., "Domain Administrators Operations Guide",
              RFC 1033, DOI 10.17487/RFC1033, November 1987,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1033>.

   [RFC1034]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
              STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>.

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
              November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2782]  Gulbrandsen, A., Vixie, P., and L. Esibov, "A DNS RR for
              specifying the location of services (DNS SRV)", RFC 2782,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2782, February 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2782>.

   [RFC5054]  Taylor, D., Wu, T., Mavrogiannopoulos, N., and T. Perrin,
              "Using the Secure Remote Password (SRP) Protocol for TLS
              Authentication", RFC 5054, DOI 10.17487/RFC5054, November
              2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5054>.

   [RFC6762]  Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "Multicast DNS", RFC 6762,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6762, February 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6762>.

   [RFC6763]  Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "DNS-Based Service
              Discovery", RFC 6763, DOI 10.17487/RFC6763, February 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6763>.

   [RFC8117]  Huitema, C., Thaler, D., and R. Winter, "Current Hostname
              Practice Considered Harmful", RFC 8117,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8117, March 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8117>.

   [RFC8235]  Hao, F., Ed., "Schnorr Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge
              Proof", RFC 8235, DOI 10.17487/RFC8235, September 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8235>.

   [RFC8236]  Hao, F., Ed., "J-PAKE: Password-Authenticated Key Exchange
              by Juggling", RFC 8236, DOI 10.17487/RFC8236, September
              2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8236>.




Huitema                   Expires April 3, 2019                [Page 14]


Internet-Draft         DNS-SD Privacy Requirements        September 2018


Author's Address

   Christian Huitema
   Private Octopus Inc.
   Friday Harbor, WA  98250
   U.S.A.

   Email: huitema@huitema.net
   URI:   http://privateoctopus.com/










































Huitema                   Expires April 3, 2019                [Page 15]


Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.127, available from https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/