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DNS Security Working Group                              M. Padmaja Rao
INTERNET-DRAFT                                          Josyula R. Rao
<draft-ietf-dnssec-externalkeys-01.txt>                 IBM
Expires: December 1999

     Inter-operability of Secure Domain Name System with Other Key
                  Distribution Services

Status of This Document

     This document is an Internet-Draft and is NOT offered in accordance
     with Section 10 of RFC2026, and the author does not provide the
     IETF with any rights other than to publish as an Internet Draft.
     Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
     Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note the
     other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
     Drafts.

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M. Padmaja Rao                                                    [Page 1]


INTERNET-DRAFT  Inter-operability with Key Distribution Services  July 1999

Abstract

     There are several mechanisms for distributing public keys and
     certificates today. These distribution services publish certificates
     which contain cryptographic public keys. Clients that use any of
     these distribution services to retrieve certificates, require
     additional software for the retrieval, parsing and verification
     of these certificates. In this draft, we propose an alternate
     scheme that takes advantage of the Secure DNS infrastructure to
     distribute verified public keys obtained from other distribution
     services.

M. Padmaja Rao                                                    [Page 2]


INTERNET-DRAFT  Inter-operability with Key Distribution Services  July 1999

1. Introduction

     The X.500 Directory Services is the most commonly used mechanism
     for storing and distributing public key certificates today. The
     service assumes that the client has the ability to retrieve and
     process certificates in order to extract the public key. Typically,
     a directory access protocol such as LDAP is used for retrieving
     certificates. Next, an ASN.1 decoder is needed to decode the
     certificate. Other certificates such as those of the Certification
     Authority (CA) and the CA Certification Revocation List (CRL) need
     to be retrieved in order to verify the initial certificate. Finally,
     the certificate is parsed and verified. There are software packages
     available that provide part or all of the above functionality.

     In the current state of art, any cryptographic software requiring
     public keys from more than one distribution service needs to
     have special software that is geared for that particular
     distribution service.

     A direct and expedient way of distributing authenticated public keys
     using Secure DNS has been described in RFC 2535. In this scheme,
     a client on any computer that is connected to an IP network can
     retrieve an authenticated public key from the Secure DNS
     infrastructure. One of the merits of this scheme is that virtually
     all of the retrieval and authentication functionality is removed away
     from the client.

     Section 2 describes how verified public keys from other Key
     Distribution services can be injected into the Secure DNS
     infrastructure. The advantages of such a scheme are stated and a
     sample implementation is described.

M. Padmaja Rao                                                    [Page 3]


INTERNET-DRAFT  Inter-operability with Key Distribution Services  July 1999

2. Injecting verified keys into the Secure DNS infrastructure

2.1

     Verified public keys, from various Key Distribution Services,
     can be injected into the Secure DNS infrastructure by adding
     the following procedure as a preprocessor to the startup structure
     of any Domain Name Server in the Secure DNS infrastructure:

     1. Include pointers into the external Directory Servers that are
     authoritative for the certificate/keys that are to be distributed
     through the Secure DNS infrastructure.

     2. Have additional software to

            * Retrieve these certificates/keys and verify them.
            * Map these verified keys into KEY RRs and write them
              into DNS Zone Files.

     This software would require the following functionality: LDAP
     capable, ANS1/BER enabled and would need a minimal crypto
     libraries to perform signature verification.

     Once these keys are populated in the zone files, a signer
     program (implied in RFC 2535 ) can use these zone files to
     generate signatures for all the resource records sets.

     This processing can be performed offline and in batch mode
     (such as every night) so that there would be no impact on
     performance and the DNS database is kept current with verified
     public keys.

M. Padmaja Rao                                                    [Page 4]


INTERNET-DRAFT  Inter-operability with Key Distribution Services  July 1999

2.1.1 Additional Information

     This scheme does not require all zones/domains to publish their
     public keys in the Secure DNS system.  Zones/Domains that wish to
     publish their public keys from other Key Distribution Services in
     the Secure DNS system would have a policy stating so.

     For client cryptographic applications with a security policy
     that may require knowledge of the origin of the key, we propose
     that there be a modification to the KEY RR to indicate origin
     (X.509, PGP, SPKI, DNS  ...) of the public key that is stored in
     the KEY RR.

     Example:
        X.509   -> 1
        PGP     -> 2
        SPKI    -> 3
        DNS     -> 4
            ...

     This information would be very helpful to the end user application.
     Since the KEY RR as currently define in RFC 2535 has no space
     available to store this information, we would like to solicit input
     from the Secure DNS community on the storage of this information.

M. Padmaja Rao                                                    [Page 5]


INTERNET-DRAFT  Inter-operability with Key Distribution Services  July 1999


2.2 Advantages

     This scheme offers the following advantages to the cryptographic
     software that utilize public keys:

     1.  There will no longer be a need to retrieve different public
         keys from different key distribution services, each requiring
         special software.

     2.  There will no need to understand the different
         types of certificate/key formats.

     3.  There will be no need to verify the retrieved public keys.

2.3 Example of an Implementation

     We have implemented a prototype of this scheme. Our implementation
     uses X.500, a Directory System, which serves as a repository of
     X.509 certificates. X.509 contain the public keys that will be
     distributed using Secure DNS. Our sample zone is watson.ibm.com.
     Given that a zone has a policy to publish some of its principals
     public keys in its domain name space; a configuration file would
     exist for the Name Server preprocessor described in Section 2. A
     sample of such a configuration file is given below. This file would
     include a pointer to the X.500 server and also would include a list
     of DNS names of the principals that belong to its zone and whose
     X.509 verified public keys are to be published.

     External Keys Configuration File:

      +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
      +                                 +
      +                                 +
      + x500.watson.ibm.com             +
      +                                 +
      +    jane-green.watson.ibm.com    +
      +                                 +
      +    tom-blue.watson.ibm.com      +
      +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

M. Padmaja Rao                                                    [Page 6]


INTERNET-DRAFT  Inter-operability with Key Distribution Services  July 1999

     A functional depiction using a block diagram of the configuration
     and startup process of a single Secure Name Server in a Secure Domain
     Name System is given below. Here, the External Keys Resolver represents
     the additional software that we recommend be added to the Secure Name
     Server startup procedure. The External Key Resolver reads the
     configuration file and makes a connection using LDAP to the X.500
     server. It then maps the domain name, from the configuration file,
     into a distinguished name ( jane-green.watson.ibm.com -> /CN=Jane
     Green/DC=Green/DC=watson/DC=ibm/DC=com) as specified in RFC 2247. It
     performs the retrieval and verification of the certificate(s). It then
     maps the verified public keys into Key Resource Records and writes
     them into zone files.  The Signer program would take over and generate
     a set of signed zone files. The Name Server would be restarted using
     the new set of zone files.

     +-----------------------------------------+
     +   External Keys Configuration           +     ---------->
     +                    File                 +
     +-----------------------------------------+

             +-----------------------+
             + External Keys         +               ---------->
             +   Resolver            +
             +-----------------------+

         ++++++++++++++---------------------
         +  Zone Files |   New Zone Files  +         ----------->
         ++++++++++++++---------------------

                +++++++++++++++++++
                + Signer Program  +                  ----------->
                +++++++++++++++++++

                ++++++++++++++++++++++
                +  Signed Zone Files +               ----------->
                ++++++++++++++++++++++

                ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
                +    Secure  Name Server         +
                ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

M. Padmaja Rao                                                    [Page 7]


INTERNET-DRAFT  Inter-operability with Key Distribution Services  July 1999


References

     RFC 2247 S. Kille, M. Wahl, A. Grimstad, R. Huber, S. Sataluri,
     "Using Domains in LDAP/X.500 Distinguished Names", January 1998.

     RFC 2535, D. Eastlake, "Domain Name System Security Extensions",
     March 1999.

Acknowledgements

     We would like David Safford and Pau-Chen Chang for their valuable
     suggestions and comments.

Authors Addresses

     M. Padmaja Rao and Josyula R. Rao
     IBM Thomas J. Watson Research
     P.O. Box 704
     Yorktown Heights, NY 10510

     Telephone:     +1  914-784-7873
                    +1  914-784-6812
     Fax:           +1  914-784-6225
     email:         padma@watson.ibm.com, jrrao@watson.ibm.com

Expiration and File Name

     This draft expires  December 1999.

     Its file name is draft-ietf-dnssec-externalkeys-00.txt.

M. Padmaja Rao                                                    [Page 8]

Thank you.

Padmaja Rao


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