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DOTS                                                       T. Reddy, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                    McAfee
Intended status: Standards Track                       M. Boucadair, Ed.
Expires: June 21, 2018                                            Orange
                                                            K. Nishizuka
                                                      NTT Communications
                                                                  L. Xia
                                                                  Huawei
                                                                P. Patil
                                                                   Cisco
                                                            A. Mortensen
                                                    Arbor Networks, Inc.
                                                               N. Teague
                                                          Verisign, Inc.
                                                       December 18, 2017


Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel
                    draft-ietf-dots-data-channel-11

Abstract

   The document specifies a Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
   Signaling (DOTS) data channel used for bulk exchange of data not
   easily or appropriately communicated through the DOTS signal channel
   under attack conditions.

   This is a companion document to the DOTS signal channel
   specification.

Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)

   Please update these statements with the RFC number to be assigned to
   this document:

   o  "This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX;"

   o  "RFC XXXX: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling
      (DOTS) Data Channel";

   o  reference: RFC XXXX

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.





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   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on June 21, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Notational Conventions and Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  DOTS Data Channel: Design Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  DOTS Server(s) Discovery  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  DOTS Data Channel YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.1.  Identifier YANG Tree Structure  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.2.  Filter YANG Tree Structure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.3.  YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   6.  DOTS Identifiers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     6.1.  Create Identifiers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     6.2.  Retrieve Installed Identifiers  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     6.3.  Delete Identifiers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   7.  DOTS Filtering Rules  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     7.1.  Install Filtering Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     7.2.  Retrieve Installed Filtering Rules  . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     7.3.  Remove Filtering Rules  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     8.1.  DOTS Data Channel JSON Attribute Mappings Registry  . . .  23
       8.1.1.  Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24



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       8.1.2.  Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     8.2.  YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
   9.  Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
   10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
   11. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
   12. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
     12.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
     12.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30

1.  Introduction

   A distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack is an attempt to make
   machines or network resources unavailable to their intended users.
   In most cases, sufficient scale can be achieved by compromising
   enough end-hosts and using those infected hosts to perpetrate and
   amplify the attack.  The victim in such attack can be an application
   server, a router, a firewall, an entire network, etc.

   As discussed in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements], the lack of a common
   method to coordinate a real-time response among involved actors and
   network domains inhibits the speed and effectiveness of DDoS attack
   mitigation.  From that standpoint, DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS)
   [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture] defines an architecture enabling
   requests for DDoS attack mitigation, reducing attack impact, and
   contributing to more efficient defensive strategies.  To that aim,
   DOTS defines two channels: signal and data channels (Figure 1).

   +---------------+                                 +---------------+
   |               | <------- Signal Channel ------> |               |
   |  DOTS Client  |                                 |  DOTS Server  |
   |               | <=======  Data Channel  ======> |               |
   +---------------+                                 +---------------+

                          Figure 1: DOTS Channels

   The DOTS signal channel is used to convey that a network is under a
   DDoS attack to an upstream DOTS server so that appropriate mitigation
   actions are undertaken on the suspect traffic.  The DOTS signal
   channel is further elaborated in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel].

   The DOTS data channel is used for infrequent bulk data exchange
   between DOTS agents in the aim to significantly augment attack
   response coordination.  Section 2 of [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]
   identifies that the DOTS data channel is used to perform the
   following tasks:





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   o  Creating identifiers, such as names or aliases, for resources for
      which mitigation may be requested.

      A DOTS client may submit to its DOTS server a collection of
      prefixes which it would like to refer to by an alias when
      requesting mitigation.  The DOTS server can respond to this
      request with either a success or failure response (see Section 2
      in [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]).

      Refer to Section 6 for more details.

   o  Filter management, which enables a DOTS client to request the
      installation or removal of traffic filters, dropping or rate-
      limiting unwanted traffic, and permitting white-listed traffic.

      Sample use cases for populating black- or white-list filtering
      rules are detailed hereafter:

      *  If a network resource (DOTS client) detects a potential DDoS
         attack from a set of IP addresses, the DOTS client informs its
         servicing DOTS gateway of all suspect IP addresses that need to
         be blocked or black-listed for further investigation.  The DOTS
         client could also specify a list of protocols and port numbers
         in the black-list rule.

         The DOTS gateway in-turn propagates the black-listed IP
         addresses to a DOTS server which will undertake appropriate
         actions so that traffic from these IP addresses to the target
         network (specified by the DOTS client) is blocked.

      *  A network, that has partner sites from which only legitimate
         traffic arrives, may want to ensure that the traffic from these
         sites is not penalized during DDoS attacks.  The DOTS client
         uses the DOTS data channel to convey the white-listed IP
         prefixes of the partner sites to its DOTS server.

         The DOTS server uses this information to white-list flows from
         such IP prefixes reaching the network.

      Refer to Section 7 for more details.

2.  Notational Conventions and Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].





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   The reader should be familiar with the terms defined in
   [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture].

   The terminology for describing YANG data modules is defined in
   [RFC7950].  The meaning of the symbols in tree diagrams is defined in
   [I-D.ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams].

   For simplicity, all of the examples in this document use "/restconf"
   as the discovered RESTCONF API root path.  Many protocol header lines
   and message-body text within examples throughout the document are
   split into multiple lines for display purposes only.  When a line
   ends with backslash ('\') as the last character, the line is wrapped
   for display purposes.  It is to be considered to be joined to the
   next line by deleting the backslash, the following line break, and
   the leading whitespace of the next line.

3.  DOTS Data Channel: Design Overview

   Unlike the DOTS signal channel [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel], which
   must operate nominally even when confronted with signal degradation
   due to packets loss, the DOTS data channel is not expected to be
   constructed to deal with DDoS attack conditions.  The requirements
   for DOTS data channel protocol are documented in
   [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements].

   This specification does not require an order of contact nor the time
   interval between DOTS signal and data channel creations.  These
   considerations are implementation- and deployment-specific.

   As the primary function of the data channel is data exchange, a
   reliable transport is required in order for DOTS agents to detect
   data delivery success or failure.  This document uses RESTCONF
   [RFC8040] over TLS [RFC5246] over TCP as the DOTS data channel
   protocol (Figure 2).

      Note: RESTCONF is a protocol based on HTTP [RFC7230] to provide
      CRUD (create, read, update, delete) operations on a conceptual
      datastore containing YANG data.  Concretely, RESTCONF is used for
      configuring data defined in YANG version 1 [RFC6020] or YANG
      version 1.1 [RFC7950], using the datastore concepts defined in the
      Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) [RFC6241].  RESTCONF
      combines the simplicity of the HTTP protocol with the
      predictability and automation potential of a schema-driven API.
      RESTCONF offers a simple subset of NETCONF functionality and
      provides a simplified interface using REST-like API which
      addresses the needs of the DOTS data channel and hence an optimal
      choice.




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                           +-------------------+
                           | DOTS Data Channel |
                           +-------------------+
                           |      RESTCONF     |
                           +-------------------+
                           |        TLS        |
                           +-------------------+
                           |        TCP        |
                           +-------------------+
                           |        IP         |
                           +-------------------+

    Figure 2: Abstract Layering of DOTS Data Channel over RESTCONF over
                                    TLS

   The HTTP POST, PUT, PATCH, and DELETE methods are used to edit data
   resources represented by DOTS data channel YANG data modules.  These
   basic edit operations allow the DOTS data channel running
   configuration to be altered by a DOTS client.

   DOTS data channel configuration data and state data can be retrieved
   with the GET method.  An HTTP status-line header field is returned
   for each request to report success or failure for RESTCONF operations
   (Section 5.4 of [RFC8040]).

   The DOTS client performs the root resource discovery procedure
   discussed in Section 3.1 of [RFC8040] to determine the root of the
   RESTCONF API.  After discovering the RESTCONF API root, the DOTS
   client uses this value as the initial part of the path in the request
   URI, in any subsequent request to the DOTS server.  The DOTS server
   may support retrieval of the YANG modules it supports (Section 3.7 in
   [RFC8040]), for example, a DOTS client may use RESTCONF to retrieve
   the company proprietary YANG modules supported by the DOTS server.

   JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) [RFC7159] payload is used to
   propagate data channel specific payload messages that convey request
   parameters and response information such as errors.  This
   specification uses the encoding rules defined in [RFC7951] for
   representing DOTS data channel configuration data defined using YANG
   (Section 5) as JSON text.

   A DOTS client registers itself to its DOTS server(s) in order to set
   up DOTS data channel related configuration data and receive state
   data (i.e., non-configuration data) from the DOTS server(s).

   A single DOTS data channel between DOTS agents can be used to
   exchange multiple requests and multiple responses.  To reduce DOTS
   client and DOTS server workload, DOTS client SHOULD re-use the same



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   TLS session.  While the communication to the DOTS server is
   quiescent, the DOTS client MAY probe the server to ensure it has
   maintained cryptographic state.  Such probes can also keep alive
   firewall and/or NAT bindings.  A TLS heartbeat [RFC6520] verifies the
   DOTS server still has TLS state by returning a TLS message.

   In deployments where one or more translators (e.g., NAT44, NAT64,
   NPTv6) are enabled between the client's network and the DOTS server,
   DOTS data channel messages forwarded to a DOTS server must not
   include internal IP addresses/prefixes and/or port numbers; external
   addresses/prefixes and/or port numbers as assigned by the translator
   must be used instead.  This document does not make any recommendation
   about possible translator discovery mechanisms.  The following are
   some (non-exhaustive) deployment examples that may be considered:

   o  Port Control Protocol (PCP) [RFC6887] or Session Traversal
      Utilities for NAT (STUN) [RFC5389] may be used to retrieve the
      external addresses/prefixes and/or port numbers.  Information
      retrieved by means of PCP or STUN will be used to feed the DOTS
      data channel messages that will be sent to a DOTS server.

   o  A DOTS gateway may be co-located with the translator.  The DOTS
      gateway will need to update the DOTS messages, based upon the
      local translator's binding table.

   When a DOTS gateway is involved in DOTS data channel exchanges, the
   same considerations for manipulating 'client-identifier' parameter as
   specified in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] MUST be followed by DOTS
   agents.  This specification includes examples to illustrate sample
   messages without any 'client-identifier' parameter, messages with
   'client-identifier' parameter having one single value, and messages
   with 'client-identifier' parameter listing multiple values.

   A DOTS server may detect conflicting filtering requests from the same
   or distinct DOTS clients which belong to the same domain.  For
   example, a DOTS client would request to blacklist a prefix, while
   another DOTS client would request to whitelist that same prefix.  It
   is out of scope of this specification to recommend the behavior to
   follow for handling conflicting requests (e.g., reject all, reject
   the new request, notify an administrator for validation).  DOTS
   servers SHOULD support a configuration parameter to indicate the
   behavior to follow when a conflict is detected.  Section 7.1
   specifies the behavior when no instruction is supplied to a DOTS
   server.







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4.  DOTS Server(s) Discovery

   This document assumes that DOTS clients are provisioned with the
   reachability information of their DOTS server(s) using a variety of
   means (e.g., local configuration, or dynamic means such as DHCP).
   These means are out of scope of this document.

   Likewise, it is out of scope of this document to specify the behavior
   to follow by a DOTS client to place its requests (e.g., contact all
   servers, select one server among the list) when multiple DOTS servers
   are provisioned.

5.  DOTS Data Channel YANG Module

5.1.  Identifier YANG Tree Structure

   The YANG module (ietf-dots-data-channel) allows to create
   identifiers, such as names or aliases, for resources for which
   mitigation may be requested.  Such identifiers may be used in
   subsequent DOTS signal channel exchanges to refer more efficiently to
   the resources under attack.  The tree structure for DOTS identifiers
   is as follows:

       +--rw identifier
          +--rw client-identifier*   binary
          +--rw alias* [alias-name]
             +--rw alias-name           string
             +--rw target-prefix*       inet:ip-prefix
             +--rw target-port-range* [lower-port upper-port]
             |  +--rw lower-port    inet:port-number
             |  +--rw upper-port    inet:port-number
             +--rw target-protocol*     uint8
             +--rw target-fqdn*         inet:domain-name
             +--rw target-uri*          inet:uri

   This structure is aligned with [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel].

5.2.  Filter YANG Tree Structure

   This document augments the Access Control List (ACL) YANG module
   [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model] for managing DOTS filtering rules.  The
   notion of ACL is explained in Section 1 of
   [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model].

   Examples of ACL management in a DOTS context include, but not limited
   to:





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   o  Black-list management, which enables a DOTS client to inform a
      DOTS server about sources from which traffic should be suppressed.

   o  White-list management, which enables a DOTS client to inform a
      DOTS server about sources from which traffic should always be
      accepted.

   o  Filter management, which enables a DOTS client to request the
      installation or removal of traffic filters, dropping or rate-
      limiting unwanted traffic and permitting white-listed traffic.

   This document defines the DOTS Data Channel YANG to augment the
   "ietf-access-control-list" module to support filters based on the
   client identifier (client-identifier), to support rate-limit action
   (rate-limit), and to handle fragmented packets (fragments).

   Filtering fragments adds an additional layer of protection against a
   DoS attack that uses only non-initial fragments.  When there is only
   Layer 3 information in the ACL entry and the fragments keyword is
   present, for non-initial fragments matching the ACL entry, the deny
   or permit action associated with the ACL entry will be enforced and
   for initial or non-fragment matching the ACL entry, the next ACL
   entry will be processed.  When there is both Layer 3 and Layer 4
   information in the ACL entry and the fragments keyword is present,
   the ACL action is conservative for both permit and deny actions.  The
   actions are conservative to not accidentally deny a fragmented
   portion of a flow because the fragments do not contain sufficient
   information to match all of the filter attributes.  In the deny
   action case, instead of denying a non-initial fragment, the next ACL
   entry is processed.  In the permit case, it is assumed that the Layer
   4 information in the non-initial fragment, if available, matches the
   Layer 4 information in the ACL entry.

   The tree structure for DOTS filtering rules is as follows:

  augment /ietf-acl:access-lists:
    +--rw client-identifier*   binary
  augment /ietf-acl:access-lists/ietf-acl:acl/ietf-acl:aces/ietf-acl:ace/ietf-acl:actions:
    +--rw rate-limit?   decimal64
  augment /ietf-acl:access-lists/ietf-acl:acl/ietf-acl:aces/ietf-acl:ace/ietf-acl:matches/ietf-acl:ipv4-acl:
    +--rw fragments?   empty
  augment /ietf-acl:access-lists/ietf-acl:acl/ietf-acl:aces/ietf-acl:ace/ietf-acl:matches/ietf-acl:ipv6-acl:
    +--rw fragments?   empty
  augment /ietf-acl:access-lists:
    +--rw dots-acl-order
       +--rw acl-set* [set-name type]
          +--rw set-name    -> /ietf-acl:access-lists/acl/acl-name
          +--rw type        -> /ietf-acl:access-lists/acl/acl-type



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5.3.  YANG Module

  <CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-dots-data-channel@2017-12-18.yang"

  module ietf-dots-data-channel {
    yang-version 1.1;
    namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-data-channel";

    prefix "data-channel";

    import ietf-inet-types {prefix "inet";}
    import ietf-access-control-list {prefix "ietf-acl";}

    organization "IETF DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Working Group";

    contact
      "WG Web:   <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dots/>
       WG List:  <mailto:dots@ietf.org>

       Editor:  Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy
                <mailto:TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com>

       Editor:  Mohamed Boucadair
                <mailto:mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>

       Author:  Kaname Nishizuka
                <mailto:kaname@nttv6.jp>

       Author:  Liang Xia
                <mailto:frank.xialiang@huawei.com>

       Author:  Prashanth Patil
                <mailto:praspati@cisco.com>

       Author:  Andrew Mortensen
                <mailto:amortensen@arbor.net>

       Author:  Nik Teague
                <mailto:nteague@verisign.com>";

    description
      "This module contains YANG definition for configuring
       identifiers for resources and filtering rules using DOTS
       data channel.

       Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
       authors of the code.  All rights reserved.




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       Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
       without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
       to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License
       set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
       Relating to IETF Documents
       (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).

       This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
       the RFC itself for full legal notices.";

    revision 2017-12-18 {
      description
        "Initial revision.";
      reference
        "RFC XXXX: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
                   Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel";
    }

    container identifier {
      description "Top level container for identifiers";

      leaf-list client-identifier {
        type binary;
        description
          "A client identifier conveyed by a
           server-side DOTS gateway to a remote DOTS server.";
        reference
          "I-D.itef-dots-signal-channel: Distributed Denial-of-Service
                        Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel";
      }

      list alias {
        key alias-name;
        description
          "List of identifiers";

        leaf alias-name {
          type string;
          description "alias name";
        }

        leaf-list target-prefix {
          type inet:ip-prefix;
          description
            "IPv4 or IPv6 prefix identifying the target.";
        }

        list target-port-range {



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          key "lower-port upper-port";

          description
            "Port range. When only lower-port is
             present, it represents a single port.";

          leaf lower-port {
            type inet:port-number;
            mandatory true;
            description
              "Lower port number.";
          }

          leaf upper-port {
            type inet:port-number;
            must ". >= ../lower-port" {
               error-message
                 "The upper port number must be greater than
                  or equal to lower port number.";
            }
            description
              "Upper port number.";
          }
        }

        leaf-list target-protocol {
          type uint8;
          description
            "Identifies the target protocol number.

             The value '0' means 'all protocols'.

             Values are taken from the IANA protocol registry:
             https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/
             protocol-numbers.xhtml

             For example, 6 for a TCP or 17 for UDP.";
        }

        leaf-list target-fqdn {
          type inet:domain-name;
          description
            "FQDN identifying the target.";
        }

        leaf-list target-uri {
          type inet:uri;
          description



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            "URI identifying the target.";
        }
      }
    }

    augment "/ietf-acl:access-lists" {
      description
        "client-identifier parameter.";

      leaf-list client-identifier {
        type binary;
        description
          "A client identifier conveyed by a server-side DOTS
          gateway to a remote DOTS server.";
      }
    }

    augment "/ietf-acl:access-lists/ietf-acl:acl/ietf-acl:aces" +
            "/ietf-acl:ace/ietf-acl:actions" {
      description
        "rate-limit action";
      leaf rate-limit {
        when "/ietf-acl:access-lists/ietf-acl:acl/ietf-acl:aces/" +
             "ietf-acl:ace/ietf-acl:actions/" +
             "ietf-acl:forwarding = 'ietf-acl:accept'" {
        description
          "rate-limit valid only when accept action is used";
        }
        type decimal64 {
          fraction-digits 2;
        }
       description
         "rate-limit traffic";
       }
    }

    augment "/ietf-acl:access-lists/ietf-acl:acl/ietf-acl:aces" +
            "/ietf-acl:ace/ietf-acl:matches/ietf-acl:ipv4-acl" {
      description
        "Handle non-initial and initial fragments for IPv4 packets.";

      leaf fragments {
        type empty;
        description
          "Handle fragments.";
      }
    }




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    augment "/ietf-acl:access-lists/ietf-acl:acl/ietf-acl:aces" +
            "/ietf-acl:ace/ietf-acl:matches/ietf-acl:ipv6-acl" {
      description
        "Handle non-initial and initial fragments for IPv6 packets.";

      leaf fragments {
        type empty;
        description
          "Handle fragments.";
      }
    }

    augment "/ietf-acl:access-lists" {
      description
        "Handle ordering of ACLs from a DOTS client";

      container dots-acl-order {
        description
          "Enclosing container for ordering
           the ACLs from a DOTS client";

         list acl-set {
          key "set-name type";
          ordered-by user;
          description
            "List of ACLs";

          leaf set-name {
            type leafref {
              path "/ietf-acl:access-lists/ietf-acl:acl" +
                   "/ietf-acl:acl-name";
            }
            description
              "Reference to the ACL set name";
          }
           leaf type {
            type leafref {
              path "/ietf-acl:access-lists/ietf-acl:acl" +
                   "/ietf-acl:acl-type";
            }
            description
              "Reference to the ACL set type";
          }
        }
      }
    }
  }
   <CODE ENDS>



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6.  DOTS Identifiers

6.1.  Create Identifiers

   A POST request is used to create identifiers, such as names or
   aliases, for resources for which a mitigation may be requested.  Such
   identifiers may be used in subsequent DOTS signal channel exchanges
   to refer more efficiently to the resources under attack (Figure 3).

   DOTS clients within the same domain can create different aliases for
   the same resource.

    POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel HTTP/1.1
    Host: {host}:{port}
    Content-Type: "application/yang-data+json"
    {
     "ietf-dots-data-channel:identifier": {
       "client-identifier": [
            "string"
       ],
       "alias": [
         {
           "alias-name": "string",
           "target-prefix": [
             "string"
           ],
           "target-port-range": [
             {
               "lower-port": integer,
               "upper-port": integer
             }
           ],
           "target-protocol": [
             integer
           ],
           "target-fqdn": [
             "string"
           ],
           "target-uri": [
             "string"
           ]
         }
       ]
     }
   }

                   Figure 3: POST to create identifiers




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   The parameters are described below:

   client-identifier:  This attribute has the same meaning, syntax, and
      processing rules as the 'client-identifier' attribute defined in
      [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel].

      This is an optional attribute.

   alias-name:  Name of the alias.

      This is a mandatory attribute.

   target-prefix:   Prefixes are separated by commas.  Prefixes are
      represented using Classless Inter-domain Routing (CIDR) notation
      [RFC4632].  As a reminder, the prefix length must be less than or
      equal to 32 (resp. 128) for IPv4 (resp.  IPv6).

      This is an optional attribute.

   target-port-range:   A range of port numbers.

      The port range is defined by two bounds, a lower port number
      (lower-port) and an upper port number (upper-port).

      When only 'lower-port' is present, it represents a single port
      number.

      For TCP, UDP, Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP)
      [RFC4960], or Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP)
      [RFC4340], the range of port numbers can be, for example,
      1024-65535.

      This is an optional attribute.

   target-protocol:   A list of protocols.  Values are taken from the
      IANA protocol registry [proto_numbers].

      The value '0' has a special meaning for 'all protocols'.

      This is an optional attribute.

   target-fqdn:   A list of Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDNs).  An
      FQDN is the full name of a resource, rather than just its
      hostname.  For example, "venera" is a hostname, and
      "venera.isi.edu" is an FQDN.

      This is an optional attribute.




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   target-uri:   A list of Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)
      [RFC3986].

      This is an optional attribute.

   In the POST request at least one of the attributes 'target-prefix' or
   'target-fqdn' or 'target-uri' MUST be present.  DOTS agents can
   safely ignore Vendor-Specific parameters they don't understand.

   Figure 4 shows a POST request to create alias called "https1" for
   HTTPS servers with IP addresses 2001:db8:6401::1 and 2001:db8:6401::2
   listening on port 443.

   POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel HTTP/1.1
   Host: www.example.com
   Content-Type: "application/yang-data+json"
   {
     "ietf-dots-data-channel:identifier": {
       "alias": [
         {
           "alias-name": "https1",
           "target-protocol": [
             6
           ],
           "target-prefix": [
             "2001:db8:6401::1/128",
             "2001:db8:6401::2/128"
           ],
           "target-port-range": [
             {
               "lower-port": 443
             }
           ]
         }
       ]
     }
   }

                   Figure 4: POST to create identifiers

   The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the POST request
   using status-line codes.  Status codes in the range "2xx" codes are
   success, "4xx" codes are some sort of invalid requests and "5xx"
   codes are returned if the DOTS server has erred or it is incapable of
   accepting the alias.

   "201 Created" status-line is returned in the response if the DOTS
   server has accepted the alias.



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   If the request is missing one or more mandatory attributes or if the
   request contains invalid or unknown parameters, then "400 Bad
   Request" status-line MUST be returned in the response.  The HTTP
   response will include the JSON body received in the request.

   A DOTS client MAY use the PUT request (Section 4.5 in [RFC8040]) to
   create or modify the aliases in the DOTS server.

6.2.  Retrieve Installed Identifiers

   A GET request is used to retrieve one or all installed identifiers by
   a DOTS client from a DOTS server (Section 3.3.1 in [RFC8040]).  If no
   'alias-name' parameter is included in the request, this is an
   indication the request is about retrieving all identifiers
   instantiated by the DOTS client.

   Figure 5 shows an example to retrieve all the identifiers that were
   instantiated by the DOTS client.  The content parameter and its
   permitted values are defined in Section 4.8.1 of [RFC8040].

     GET /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:identifier\
         /client-identifier=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw?\
         content=config HTTP/1.1
     Host: {host}:{port}
     Accept: application/yang-data+json

          Figure 5: GET to retrieve all the installed identifiers

   Figure 6 shows an example of response message body that includes all
   the identifiers that are maintained by the DOTS server for DOTS
   client identified by the 'client-identifier' parameter.




















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   {
    "ietf-dots-data-channel:identifier": {
       "client-identifier": [
          "dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
       ],
       "alias": [
         {
           "alias-name": "Server1",
           "traffic-protocol": [
             6
           ],
           "target-prefix": [
             "2001:db8:6401::1/128",
             "2001:db8:6401::2/128"
           ],
           "target-port-range": [
             {
               "lower-port": 443
             }
           ]
         },
         {
           "alias-name": "Server2",
           "target-protocol": [
             6
           ],
           "target-prefix": [
             "2001:db8:6401::10/128",
             "2001:db8:6401::20/128"
           ],
           "target-port-range": [
             {
               "lower-port": 80
             }
           ]
         }
       ]
     }
   }

                          Figure 6: Response body

   If 'alias-name' parameter is included in the request, but the DOTS
   server does not find that alias name in its configuration data, it
   MUST respond with a "404 Not Found" status-line.






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6.3.  Delete Identifiers

   A DELETE request is used to delete identifiers maintained by a DOTS
   server.

   In RESTCONF, URI-encoded path expressions are used.  A RESTCONF data
   resource identifier is encoded from left to right, starting with the
   top-level data node, according to the 'api-path' rule defined in
   Section 3.5.3.1 of [RFC8040].  The data node in the path expression
   is a YANG list node and MUST be encoded according to the rules
   defined in Section 3.5.1 of [RFC8040].

   If the DOTS server does not find the alias name conveyed in the
   DELETE request in its configuration data, it MUST respond with a "404
   Not Found" status-line.

   The DOTS server successfully acknowledges a DOTS client's request to
   remove the identifier using "204 No Content" status-line in the
   response.

   Figure 7 shows an example of a request to delete an alias.

     DELETE /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:identifier\
            /client-identifier=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw,\
            iAYmCNPmrYoKoqzgFMiobw/alias-name=Server1 HTTP/1.1
     Host: {host}:{port}

                      Figure 7: DELETE an identifier

7.  DOTS Filtering Rules

   The DOTS server either receives the filtering rules directly from the
   DOTS client or via a DOTS gateway.

   If the DOTS client signals the filtering rules via a DOTS gateway,
   the DOTS gateway validates first if the DOTS client is authorized to
   signal the filtering rules.  If the client is authorized, it
   propagates the rules to the DOTS server.  Likewise, the DOTS server
   validates if the DOTS gateway is authorized to signal the filtering
   rules.  To create or purge filters, the DOTS client sends HTTP
   requests to its DOTS gateway.  The DOTS gateway validates the rules
   in the requests and proxies the requests containing the filtering
   rules to a DOTS server.  When the DOTS gateway receives the
   associated HTTP response from the DOTS server, it propagates the
   response back to the DOTS client.

   The following sub-sections define means for a DOTS client to
   configure filtering rules on a DOTS server.



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7.1.  Install Filtering Rules

   A POST request is used to push filtering rules to a DOTS server.

   Figure 8 shows a POST request example to block traffic from
   192.0.2.0/24, destined to 198.51.100.0/24.  The ACL JSON
   configuration for the filtering rule is generated using the ACL YANG
   module (Section 4.3 of [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model]).

  POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel HTTP/1.1
  Host: www.example.com
  Content-Type: "application/yang-data+json"
  {
   "ietf-dots-data-channel:access-lists": {
      "client-identifier": [
       "dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
      ],
      "acl": [
          {
               "acl-name": "sample-ipv4-acl",
               "acl-type": "ipv4-acl",
               "aces": {
                   "ace": [
                       {
                           "rule-name": "rule1",
                           "matches": {
                             "ipv4-acl": {
                               "source-ipv4-network": "192.0.2.0/24",
                               "destination-ipv4-network": "198.51.100.0/24"
                             }
                            },
                            "actions": {
                               "forwarding" : "drop"
                            }
                        }
                    ]
               }
          }
      ]
   }
  }

                 Figure 8: POST to install filtering rules

   The parameters defined in [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model] are discussed
   below:

   acl-name:  The name of access-list.  This is a mandatory attribute.



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   acl-type:  Indicates the primary intended type of match criteria
      (e.g., IPv4, IPv6).  This is a mandatory attribute.

   protocol:   Internet Protocol numbers.  This is an optional
      attribute.

   source-ipv4-network:  The source IPv4 prefix.  This is an optional
      attribute.

   destination-ipv4-network:  The destination IPv4 prefix.  This is an
      optional attribute.

   actions:   Actions in the forwarding ACL category can be "drop" or
      "accept" or "rate-limit". "accept" action is used to white-list
      traffic. "drop" action is used to black-list traffic.  "rate-
      limit" action is used to rate-limit traffic, the allowed traffic
      rate is represented in bytes per second indicated in IEEE floating
      point format [IEEE.754.1985].  This is an optional attribute.

   The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the POST request
   using status-line header. "2xx" codes are success, 4xx codes are some
   sort of invalid requests, and 5xx codes are returned if the DOTS
   server has erred or it is incapable of configuring the filtering
   rules.  Concretely, "201 Created" status-line MUST be returned in the
   response if the DOTS server has accepted the filtering rules.  If the
   request is missing one or more mandatory attributes or contains
   invalid or unknown parameters, then "400 Bad Request" status-line
   MUST be returned in the response.

   If the request is conflicting with an existing filtering, the DOTS
   server returns "409 Conflict" status-line to the requesting DOTS
   client.  The error-tag "invalid-value" is used in this case.

   The "insert" query parameter discussed in Section 4.8.5 of [RFC8040]
   MAY be used to specify how a ACE is inserted within an ACL and how a
   ACL is inserted within an ACL list.

   The DOTS client MAY use the PUT request to create or modify the
   filtering rules in the DOTS server.

7.2.  Retrieve Installed Filtering Rules

   The DOTS client periodically queries the DOTS server to check the
   counters for installed filtering rules.  A GET request is used to
   retrieve filtering rules from a DOTS server.






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   If the DOTS server does not find the access list name and access list
   type conveyed in the GET request in its configuration data, it
   responds with a "404 Not Found" status-line.

   Figure 9 shows how to retrieve all the filtering rules programmed by
   the DOTS client and the number of matches for the installed filtering
   rules.

     GET /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:access-lists\
         /client-identifier=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw?\
         content=all HTTP/1.1
     Host: {host}:{port}
     Accept: application/yang-data+json

    Figure 9: GET to retrieve the configuration data and state data for
                            the filtering rules

7.3.  Remove Filtering Rules

   A DELETE request is used to delete filtering rules from a DOTS
   server.

   If the DOTS server does not find the access list name and access list
   type conveyed in the DELETE request in its configuration data, then
   it responds with a "404 Not Found" status-line.  The DOTS server
   successfully acknowledges a DOTS client's request to withdraw the
   filtering rules using "204 No Content" status-line, and removes the
   filtering rules as soon as possible.

   Figure 10 shows an example of a request to remove the IPv4 ACL named
   "sample-ipv4-acl".  This request is being relayed by a DOTS gateway
   as hinted by the presence of the 'client-identifier' parameter.

     DELETE /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:access-lists\
            /client-identifier=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw\
            /acl-name=sample-ipv4-acl&\
            acl-type=ipv4-acl HTTP/1.1
     Host: {host}:{port}

              Figure 10: DELETE to remove the filtering rules

8.  IANA Considerations

8.1.  DOTS Data Channel JSON Attribute Mappings Registry

   The document requests IANA to create a new registry, entitled "DOTS
   Data Channel JSON Attribute Mappings Registry".  The structure of
   this registry is provided in Section 8.1.1.



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   The registry is initially populated with the values in Section 8.1.2.

   Values from that registry MUST be assigned via Expert Review
   [RFC8126].

8.1.1.  Registration Template

   JSON Attribute:
      JSON attribute name.

   Description:
      Brief description of the attribute.

   Change Controller:
      For Standards Track RFCs, list the "IESG".  For others, give the
      name of the responsible party.  Other details (e.g., postal
      address, email address, home page URI) may also be included.

   Specification Document(s):
      Reference to the document or documents that specify the parameter,
      preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of
      the documents.  An indication of the relevant sections may also be
      included but is not required.

8.1.2.  Initial Registry Contents

   o  JSON Attribute: "client-identifier"
   o  Description: Client identifier.
   o  Change Controller: IESG
   o  Specification Document(s): this document

   o  JSON Attribute: "alias-name"
   o  Description: Name of alias.
   o  Change Controller: IESG
   o  Specification Document(s): this document

   o  JSON Attribute: "target-protocol"
   o  Description: Internet protocol numbers.
   o  Change Controller: IESG
   o  Specification Document(s): this document

   o  JSON Attribute: "target-port-range"
   o  Description: The port range, lower-port for lower port number and
      upper-port for upper port number.  For TCP, UDP, SCTP, or DCCP: a
      range of ports can be, e.g., 80 to 8080.
   o  Change Controller: IESG
   o  Specification Document(s): this document




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   o  JSON Attribute: "lower-port"
   o  Description: Lower port number for the port range.
   o  Change Controller: IESG
   o  Specification Document(s): this document

   o  JSON Attribute: "upper-port"
   o  Description: Upper port number for the port range.
   o  Change Controller: IESG
   o  Specification Document(s): this document

   o  JSON Attribute: "target-prefix"
   o  Description: IP prefix
   o  Change Controller: IESG
   o  Specification Document(s): this document

   o  JSON Attribute: "target-fqdn"
   o  Description: Fully Qualified Domain Name, is the full name of a
      system, rather than just its hostname.  For example, "venera" is a
      hostname, and "venera.isi.edu" is an FQDN.
   o  Change Controller: IESG
   o  Specification Document(s): this document

   o  JSON Attribute: "target-uri"
   o  Description: Uniform Resource Identifier (URI).
   o  Change Controller: IESG
   o  Specification Document(s): this document

8.2.  YANG Module

   This document requests IANA to register the following URI in the
   "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]:

            URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-data-channel
            Registrant Contact: The IESG.
            XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.

   This document requests IANA to register the following YANG module in
   the "YANG Module Names" registry [RFC7950].

           name: ietf-dots-data-channel
           namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-data-channel
           prefix: data-channel
           reference: RFC XXXX








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9.  Contributors

   The following individuals have contributed to this document:

   Dan Wing

   Email: dwing-ietf@fuggles.com

10.  Security Considerations

   RESTCONF security considerations are discussed in [RFC8040].  In
   particular, DOTS agents MUST follow the security recommendations in
   Sections 2 and 12 of [RFC8040] and the mutual authentication TLS
   profile discussed in Section 7.1 of [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel].

   Authenticated encryption MUST be used for data confidentiality and
   message integrity.  The interaction between the DOTS agents requires
   Transport Layer Security (TLS) with a cipher suite offering
   confidentiality protection and the guidance given in [RFC7525] MUST
   be followed to avoid attacks on TLS.

   An attacker may be able to inject RST packets, bogus application
   segments, etc., regardless of whether TLS authentication is used.
   Because the application data is TLS protected, this will not result
   in the application receiving bogus data, but it will constitute a DoS
   on the connection.  This attack can be countered by using TCP-AO
   [RFC5925].  If TCP-AO is used, then any bogus packets injected by an
   attacker will be rejected by the TCP-AO integrity check and therefore
   will never reach the TLS layer.

   In order to prevent leaking internal information outside a client-
   domain, client-side DOTS gateways SHOULD NOT reveal the identity of
   internal DOTS clients (client-identifier) unless explicitly
   configured to do so.

   Special care should be taken in order to ensure that the activation
   of the proposed mechanism won't have an impact on the stability of
   the network (including connectivity and services delivered over that
   network).

   All data nodes defined in the YANG module which can be created,
   modified, and deleted (i.e., config true, which is the default) are
   considered sensitive.  Write operations applied to these data nodes
   without proper protection can negatively affect network operations.
   Appropriate security measures are recommended to prevent illegitimate
   users from invoking DOTS data channel primitives.  Nevertheless, an
   attacker who is able to access to a DOTS client can undertake various
   attacks, such as:



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   o  Set an arbitrarily low rate-limit that may lead to discarding
      legitimate traffic to be forwarded (rate-limit).
   o  Set an arbitrarily high rate-limit that may lead to allowing
      illegitimate DDoS traffic to be forwarded (rate-limit).
   o  Communicate invalid aliases to the server (alias) that will lead
      to failure to associate both data and signal channels.
   o  Set invalid ACL entries that may lead to discard legitimate
      traffic from being forwarding.  Likewise, invalid ACL entries may
      lead to forward DDoS traffic.

11.  Acknowledgements

   Thanks to Christian Jacquenet, Roland Dobbins, Roman Danyliw, Ehud
   Doron, Russ White, Jon Shallow, Gilbert Clark, and Nesredien Suleiman
   for the discussion and comments.

12.  References

12.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]
              Mortensen, A., Andreasen, F., Reddy, T.,
              christopher_gray3@cable.comcast.com, c., Compton, R., and
              N. Teague, "Distributed-Denial-of-Service Open Threat
              Signaling (DOTS) Architecture", draft-ietf-dots-
              architecture-05 (work in progress), October 2017.

   [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel]
              Reddy, T., Boucadair, M., Patil, P., Mortensen, A., and N.
              Teague, "Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
              Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel", draft-ietf-dots-signal-
              channel-13 (work in progress), December 2017.

   [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model]
              Jethanandani, M., Huang, L., Agarwal, S., and D. Blair,
              "Network Access Control List (ACL) YANG Data Model",
              draft-ietf-netmod-acl-model-14 (work in progress), October
              2017.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3688]  Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.




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   [RFC4632]  Fuller, V. and T. Li, "Classless Inter-domain Routing
              (CIDR): The Internet Address Assignment and Aggregation
              Plan", BCP 122, RFC 4632, DOI 10.17487/RFC4632, August
              2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4632>.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.

   [RFC5925]  Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP
              Authentication Option", RFC 5925, DOI 10.17487/RFC5925,
              June 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5925>.

   [RFC7230]  Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
              Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
              RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.

   [RFC7525]  Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
              "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
              Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
              (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
              2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.

   [RFC7951]  Lhotka, L., "JSON Encoding of Data Modeled with YANG",
              RFC 7951, DOI 10.17487/RFC7951, August 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7951>.

   [RFC8040]  Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
              Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>.

   [RFC8126]  Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
              Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
              RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.

12.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]
              Mortensen, A., Moskowitz, R., and T. Reddy, "Distributed
              Denial of Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling
              Requirements", draft-ietf-dots-requirements-08 (work in
              progress), December 2017.






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   [I-D.ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams]
              Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, "YANG Tree Diagrams", draft-
              ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams-02 (work in progress),
              October 2017.

   [IEEE.754.1985]
              Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
              "Standard for Binary Floating-Point Arithmetic", August
              1985.

   [proto_numbers]
              "IANA, "Protocol Numbers"", 2011,
              <http://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers>.

   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
              RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.

   [RFC4340]  Kohler, E., Handley, M., and S. Floyd, "Datagram
              Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP)", RFC 4340,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4340, March 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4340>.

   [RFC4960]  Stewart, R., Ed., "Stream Control Transmission Protocol",
              RFC 4960, DOI 10.17487/RFC4960, September 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4960>.

   [RFC5389]  Rosenberg, J., Mahy, R., Matthews, P., and D. Wing,
              "Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN)", RFC 5389,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5389, October 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5389>.

   [RFC6020]  Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
              the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>.

   [RFC6241]  Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
              and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
              (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.

   [RFC6520]  Seggelmann, R., Tuexen, M., and M. Williams, "Transport
              Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
              (DTLS) Heartbeat Extension", RFC 6520,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6520, February 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6520>.



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   [RFC6887]  Wing, D., Ed., Cheshire, S., Boucadair, M., Penno, R., and
              P. Selkirk, "Port Control Protocol (PCP)", RFC 6887,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6887, April 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6887>.

   [RFC7159]  Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
              Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
              2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.

   [RFC7950]  Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
              RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.

Authors' Addresses

   Tirumaleswar Reddy (editor)
   McAfee, Inc.
   Embassy Golf Link Business Park
   Bangalore, Karnataka  560071
   India

   Email: kondtir@gmail.com


   Mohamed Boucadair (editor)
   Orange
   Rennes  35000
   France

   Email: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com


   Kaname Nishizuka
   NTT Communications
   GranPark 16F 3-4-1 Shibaura, Minato-ku
   Tokyo  108-8118
   Japan

   Email: kaname@nttv6.jp


   Liang Xia
   Huawei
   101 Software Avenue, Yuhuatai District
   Nanjing, Jiangsu  210012
   China

   Email: frank.xialiang@huawei.com



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   Prashanth Patil
   Cisco Systems, Inc.

   Email: praspati@cisco.com


   Andrew Mortensen
   Arbor Networks, Inc.
   2727 S. State St
   Ann Arbor, MI  48104
   United States

   Email: amortensen@arbor.net


   Nik Teague
   Verisign, Inc.
   United States

   Email: nteague@verisign.com































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