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Versions: (draft-mglt-dots-use-cases) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

DOTS WG                                                  R. Dobbins, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                            Arbor Networks
Intended status: Informational                                 S. Fouant
Expires: September 22, 2016                      Corero Network Security
                                                              D. Migault
                                                                Ericsson
                                                            R. Moskowitz
                                                          HTT Consulting
                                                               N. Teague
                                                            Verisign Inc
                                                                  L. Xia
                                                                  Huawei
                                                          March 21, 2016


                Use cases for DDoS Open Threat Signaling
                    draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-01.txt

Abstract

   This document delineates principal and ancillary use cases for DDoS
   Open Threat Signaling (DOTS), a communications protocol intended to
   facilitate the programmatic, coordinated mitigation of Distributed
   Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks via a standards-based mechanism.
   DOTS is purposely designed to support requests for DDoS mitigation
   services and status updates across inter-organizational
   administrative boundaries.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 22, 2016.







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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology and Acronyms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Requirements Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  Acronyms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Primary Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.1.1.  Automatic or Operator-Assisted CPE or PE Mitigators
               Request Upstream DDoS Mitigation Services . . . . . .   6
       3.1.2.  Automatic or Operator-Assisted CPE or PE Network
               Infrastructure Element Request to Upstream Mitigator    8
       3.1.3.  Automatic or Operator-Assisted CPE or PE Attack
               Telemetry Detection/Classification System Request to
               Upstream   Mitigator  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       3.1.4.  Automatic or Operator-Assisted Targeted Service/
               Application Request to Upstream Mitigator . . . . . .  11
       3.1.5.  Manual Web Portal Request to   Upstream Mitigator . .  13
       3.1.6.  Manual Mobile Device Application Request to
               Upstream Mitigator  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       3.1.7.  Unsuccessful Automatic or Operator-Assisted CPE or
               PE Mitigators Request Upstream DDoS Mitigation
               Services  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     3.2.  Ancillary Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
       3.2.1.  Auto-registration of DOTS clients with DOTS   servers  18
       3.2.2.  Auto-provisioning of DDoS countermeasures . . . . . .  18
       3.2.3.  Informational DDoS attack notification to
               interested and authorized third parties . . . . . . .  19
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   6.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20



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     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20

1.  Introduction

   Currently, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack mitigation
   solutions/services are largely based upon siloed, proprietary
   communications paradigms which result in vendor/service lock-in, and
   as a side-effect make the configuration, provisioning, operation, and
   activation of these solutions a highly manual and often time-
   consuming process.  Additionally, coordination of multiple DDoS
   mitigation solutions/services simultaneously engaged in defending the
   same organization against DDoS attacks is fraught with both technical
   and process-related hurdles which greatly increase operational
   complexity and often result in suboptimal DDoS attack mitigation
   efficacy.

   The DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) effort is intended to
   facilitate interoperability between DDoS solutions/services by
   providing a standards-based, programmatic communications mechanism
   for the invitation and termination of heterogeneous DDoS attack
   mitigation systems and services.  This allows for a much higher
   degree of automation and concomitant efficacy and rapidity of DDoS
   attack mitigation involving multiple DDoS mitigation systems and
   services than is currently the norm, as well as providing additional
   benefits such as automatic DDoS mitigation service registration and
   provisioning.  It should be noted that DOTS is not in and of itself
   intended to perform orchestration functions duplicative of the
   functionality being developed by the [I2NSF] WG; rather, DOTS is
   intended to allow devices, services, and applications to request
   mitigation assistance and receive mitigation status updates from
   systems of this nature.

   This document provides an overview of common DDoS mitigation system/
   service deployment and operational models which are in use today, but
   which are currently limited in scope to a single vendor or service
   provider and are often highly manual in nature, which can lead to
   miscommunications, misconfigurations, and delays in bringing
   mitigation services to bear against an attack.  The introduction of
   DOTS into these scenarios will reduce reaction times and the risks
   associated with manual processes, simplify the use of multiple types
   of DDoS mitigation systems and services as required, and make
   practical the simultaneous use multiple DDoS mitigation systems and
   services as circumstances warrant.







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2.  Terminology and Acronyms

2.1.  Requirements Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

2.2.  Acronyms

   This document makes use of the same terminology and definitions as
   [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements], except where noted.

3.  Use Cases

   This section provides a high-level overview of likely use cases and
   deployment scenarios for DOTS-enabled DDoS mitigation services.  It
   should be noted that DOTS servers may be standalone entities which,
   upon receiving a DOTS mitigation service request from a DOTS client,
   proceed to initiate DDoS mitigation service by communicating directly
   or indirectly with DDoS mitigators, and likewise terminate the
   service upon receipt of a DOTS service termination request;
   conversely, the DDoS mitigators themselves may incorporate DOTS
   servers and/or DOTS clients.  The mechanisms by which DOTS servers
   initiate and terminate DDoS mitigation service with DDoS mitigators
   is beyond the scope of this document.

   All of the primary use cases described in this section are derived
   from current, real-world DDoS mitigation functionality, capabilities,
   and operational models.

   The posited ancillary use cases described in this section are
   reasonable and highly desirable extrapolations of the functionality
   of baseline DOTS capabilities, and are readily attainable in the near
   term.

   Each of the primary and ancillary use cases described in this section
   may be read as involving one or more DDoS mitigation service
   providers; DOTS makes multi-provider coordinated DDoS defenses much
   more effective and practical due to abstraction of the particulars of
   a given DDoS mitigation service/solution set.

   Both the primary and ancillary use cases may be facilitated by direct
   DOTS client - DOTS server communications or via DOTS relays deployed
   in order to aggregate DOTS mitigation service requests/responses, to
   mediate between stateless and stateful underlying transport
   protocols, to aggregate multiple DOTS requests and/or responses, to




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   filter DOTS requests and/or responses via configured policy
   mechanisms, or some combination of these functions.

   All DOTS messages exchanged between the DOTS clients and DOTS servers
   in these use cases may be communicated directly between DOTS clients
   and servers, or mediated by one or more DOTS relays residing on the
   network of the originating network, the network where upstream DDoS
   mitigation service takes place, an intervening network or networks,
   or some combination of the above.

   DOTS is intended to apply to both inter- and intra-domain DDoS attack
   mitigation scenarios.  The technical and operational requirements for
   inter- and intra-domain DOTS communications are identical.  The main
   difference is administrative in nature; although it should be noted
   that provisioning challenges which are typically associated with
   inter- domain DOTS communications relationships may also apply in
   intra- domain deployment scenarios, based upon organizational
   factors.  All of the same complexities surrounding authentication and
   authorization can apply in both contexts, including considerations
   such as network access policies to allow DOTS communications, DOTS
   transport selection (including considerations of the implications of
   link congestion if a stateful DOTS transport option is selected),
   etc.  Registration of well-known ports for DOTS transports per
   [RFC6335] should be considered in light of these challenges.

   It should also be noted that DOTS does not directly ameliorate the
   various administrative challenges required for successful DDoS attack
   mitigation.  Letters of authorization, RADB updates, DNS zone
   delegations, alteration of network access policies, technical
   configurations required to facilitate network traffic diversion and
   re-injection, etc., are all outside the scope of DOTS.  DOTS may,
   however, prove useful in automating the registration of DOTS clients
   with DOTS servers, as well as in the automatic provisioning of
   situationally- appropriate DDoS defenses and countermeasures.  This
   ancillary DOTS functionality is described in Section 3.2.

   Many of the 'external' administrative challenges associated with
   establishing workable DDoS attack mitigation service may be addressed
   by work currently in progress in the I2RS and I2NSF WGs.  Interested
   parties may wish to consider tracking those efforts, and coordination
   with both I2RS and I2NSF is highly desirable.

   Note that all the use-cases in this document are universal in nature.
   They apply equally to endpoint networks, transit backbone providers,
   cloud providers, broadband access providers, ASPs, CDNs, etc.  They
   are not specific to particular business models, topological models,
   or application types, and are deliberately generalizable.  Both
   networks targeted for attack as well as any adjacent or topologically



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   distant networks involved in a given scenario may be either single-
   or multi-homed.  In the accompanying vector illustrations
   incorporated into draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-01.pdf, specific business
   and topological models are described in order to provide context.

   Likewise, both DOTS itself and the use cases described in this
   document are completely independent of technologies utilized for the
   detection, classification, traceback, and mitigation of DDoS attacks.
   Flow telemetry such as NetFlow and IPFIX, direct full-packet
   analysis, log-file analysis, indirection manual observation, etc. can
   and will be enablers for detection, classification and traceback.
   Intelligent DDoS mitigation systems (IDMSes), flowspec, S/RTBH, ACLs,
   and other network traffic manipulation tools and techniques may be
   used for DDoS attack mitigation.  BGP, flowspec, DNS, inline
   deployment, and various 'NFV' technologies may be used for network
   traffic diversion into mitigation centers or devices in applicable
   scenarios; GRE, MPLS, 'NFV', inline deployment and other techniques
   may be utilized for 'cleaned' traffic re-injection to its intended
   destination.

   The scope, format, and content of all DOTS message types cited in
   this document must be codified by the DOTS WG.

   The following use cases are intended to inform the DOTS requirements
   described in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements].

3.1.  Primary Use Cases

3.1.1.  Automatic or Operator-Assisted CPE or PE Mitigators Request
        Upstream DDoS Mitigation Services

   One or more CPE or PE mitigators with DOTS client capabilities may be
   configured to signal to one or more DOTS servers in order to request
   upstream DDoS mitigation service initiation during an attack when
   DDoS attack volumes and/or attack characteristics exceed the
   capabilities of such CPE mitigators.  DDoS mitigation service may be
   terminated either automatically or manually via a DOTS mitigation
   service termination request initiated by the mitigator when it has
   been determined that the DDoS attack has ended.

   (a)  A DDoS attack is initiated against online properties of an
        organization which has deployed DOTS-client-capable DDoS
        mitigators.

   (b)  CPE or PE DDoS mitigators detect, classify, and begin mitigating
        the DDoS attack.





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   (c)  CPE or PE DDoS mitigators determine that their capacity and/or
        capability to mitigate the DDoS attack is insufficient, and
        utilize their DOTS client functionality to send a DOTS
        mitigation service initiation request to one or more DOTS
        servers residing on one or more upstream transit networks, peer
        networks, or overlay MSSP networks.  This DOTS mitigation
        service initiation request may be automatically initiated by the
        CPE or PE DDoS mitigators, or may be manually triggered by
        personnel of the requesting organization in response to an alert
        from the mitigators (the mechanism by which this process takes
        place is beyond the scope of this document).

   (d)  The DOTS servers which receive the DOTS mitigation service
        initiation requests determine that they have been configured to
        honor requests from the requesting CPE or PE mitigators, and
        initiate situationally-appropriate DDoS mitigation service on
        their respective networks (the mechanism by which this process
        takes place is beyond the scope of this document).

   (e)  The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS service status message to the
        requesting CPE or PE mitigators indicating that upstream DDoS
        mitigation service has been initiated.

   (f)  While DDoS mitigation services are active, the DOTS servers
        regularly transmit DOTS mitigation status updates to the
        requesting CPE or PE mitigators.

   (g)  While DDoS mitigation services are active, the CPE or PE
        mitigators may optionally regularly transmit DOTS mitigation
        efficacy updates to the relevant DOTS servers.

   (h)  When the upstream DDoS mitigators determine that the DDoS attack
        has ceased, they indicate this change in status to their
        respective DOTS servers (the mechanism by which this process
        takes place is beyond the scope of this document).

   (i)  The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to the
        CPE or PE mitigators indicating that the DDoS attack has ceased.

   (j)  The CPE or PE DDoS mitigators transmit a DOTS mitigation service
        termination request to the DOTS servers.  This DOTS mitigation
        service termination request may be automatically initiated by
        the CPE or PE DDoS mitigators, or may be manually triggered by
        personnel of the requesting organization in response to an alert
        from the mitigators or a management system which monitors them
        (the mechanism by which this process takes place is beyond the
        scope of this document).




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   (k)  The DOTS servers terminate DDoS mitigation service on their
        respective networks (the mechanism by which this process takes
        place is beyond the scope of this document).

   (l)  The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to the
        CPE or PE mitigators indicating that DDoS mitigation services
        have been terminated.

   (m)  The CPE or PE DDoS mitigators transmit a DOTS mitigation
        termination status acknowledgement to the DOTS servers.

3.1.2.  Automatic or Operator-Assisted CPE or PE Network Infrastructure
        Element Request to Upstream Mitigator

   CPE or PE network infrastructure elements such as routers, switches,
   load-balancers, firewalls, 'IPSes', etc. which have the capability to
   detect and classify DDoS attacks and which have DOTS client
   capabilities may be configured to signal to one or more DOTS servers
   in order to request upstream DDoS mitigation service initiation
   during an attack.  DDoS mitigation service may be terminated either
   automatically or manually via a DOTS mitigation service termination
   request initiated by the network element when it has been determined
   that the DDoS attack has ended.

   In this use-case, the network elements involved are not engaged in
   mitigating DDoS attack traffic.  They are signaling for upstream
   attack mitigation assistance.  This can be an inter- or intra- domain
   use-case.

   (a)  A DDoS attack is initiated against online properties of an
        organization with DOTS-client-capable network infrastructure
        elements deployed.

   (b)  The network infrastructure elements utilize their DOTS client
        functionality to send a DOTS mitigation service initiation
        request to one or more DOTS servers residing on one or more
        upstream transit networks, peer networks, or overlay MSSP
        networks, either directly or via intermediate DOTS relays
        residing upon the requesting organization's network, the
        upstream mitigation provider's network, or both.  The scope,
        format, and content of these messages must be codified by the
        DOTS WG.  This DOTS mitigation service initiation request may be
        automatically initiated by the network infrastructure elements,
        or may be manually triggered by personnel of the requesting
        organization in response to an alert from the network elements
        or a management system which monitors them (the mechanism by
        which this process takes place is beyond the scope of this
        document).



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   (c)  The DOTS servers which receive the DOTS mitigation service
        initiation requests determine that they have been configured to
        honor requests from the requesting network infrastructure
        elements, and initiate situationally-appropriate DDoS mitigation
        service on their respective networks (the mechanism by which
        this process takes place is beyond the scope of this document).

   (d)  The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS service status message to the
        requesting network infrastructure elements indicating that
        upstream DDoS mitigation service has been initiated.

   (e)  While DDoS mitigation services are active, the DOTS servers
        regularly transmit DOTS mitigation status updates to the
        requesting requesting network infrastructure elements.

   (f)  While DDoS mitigation services are active, the network
        infrastructure elements may optionally regularly transmit DOTS
        mitigation efficacy updates to the relevant DOTS servers.

   (g)  When the upstream DDoS mitigators determine that the DDoS attack
        has ceased, they indicate this change in status to their
        respective DOTS servers (the mechanism by which this process
        takes place is beyond the scope of this document).

   (h)  The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to the
        network infrastructure elements indicating that the DDoS attack
        has ceased.

   (i)  The network infrastructure elements transmit a DOTS mitigation
        service termination request to the DOTS servers.  This DOTS
        mitigation service termination request may be automatically
        initiated by the network infrastructure elements, or may be
        manually triggered by personnel of the requesting organization
        in response to an alert from the mitigators (the mechanism by
        which this process takes place is beyond the scope of this
        document).

   (j)  The DOTS servers terminate DDoS mitigation service on their
        respective networks (the mechanism by which this process takes
        place is beyond the scope of this document).

   (k)  The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to the
        network infrastructure elements indicating that DDoS mitigation
        services have been terminated.

   (l)  The network infrastructure elements transmit a DOTS mitigation
        termination status acknowledgement to the DOTS servers.




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3.1.3.  Automatic or Operator-Assisted CPE or PE Attack Telemetry
        Detection/Classification System Request to Upstream Mitigator

   CPE or PE Attack Telemetry Detection/Classification Systems which
   have DOTS client capabilities may be configured so that upon
   detecting and classifying a DDoS attack, they signal one or more DOTS
   servers in order to request upstream DDoS mitigation service
   initiation.  DDoS mitigation service may be terminated either
   automatically or manually via a DOTS mitigation service termination
   request initiated by the Attack Telemetry Detection/Classification
   System when it has been determined that the DDoS attack has ended.

   In this use-case, the Attack Telemetry Detection/Classification does
   not possess any inherent capability to mitigate DDoS attack traffic,
   and is signaling for upstream mitigation assistance.  This can be an
   inter- or intra-domain use-case.

   (a)  A DDoS attack is initiated against online properties of an
        organization with DOTS-client-capable CPE or PE Attack Telemetry
        Detection/Classification Systems deployed.

   (b)  The CPE or PE Attack Telemetry Detection/Classification Systems
        utilize their DOTS client functionality to send a DOTS
        mitigation service initiation request to one or more DOTS
        servers residing on one or more upstream transit networks, peer
        networks, or overlay MSSP networks, either directly or via
        intermediate DOTS relays residing upon the requesting
        organization's network, the upstream mitigation provider's
        network, or both.  This DOTS mitigation service initiation
        request may be automatically initiated by the CPE or PE Attack
        Telemetry Detection/Classification Systems, or may be manually
        triggered by personnel of the requesting organization in
        response to an alert from the CPE or PE Attack Telemetry
        Detection/Classification Systems (the mechanism by which this
        process takes place is beyond the scope of this document).

   (c)  The DOTS servers which receive the DOTS mitigation service
        initiation requests determine that they have been configured to
        honor requests from the requesting CPE or PE Attack Telemetry
        Detection/Classification Systems, and initiate situationally-
        appropriate DDoS mitigation service on their respective networks
        (the mechanism by which this process takes place is beyond the
        scope of this document).

   (d)  The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS service status message to the
        requesting CPE or PE Attack Telemetry Detection/Classification
        Systems indicating that upstream DDoS mitigation service has
        been initiated.



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   (e)  While DDoS mitigation services are active, the DOTS servers
        regularly transmit DOTS mitigation status updates to the
        requesting CPE or PE Attack Telemetry Detection/Classification
        Systems.

   (f)  While DDoS mitigation services are active, the CPE or PE Attack
        Telemetry Detection/Classification Systems may optionally
        regularly transmit DOTS mitigation efficacy updates to the
        relevant DOTS servers.

   (g)  When the upstream DDoS mitigators determine that the DDoS attack
        has ceased, they indicate this change in status to their
        respective DOTS servers (the mechanism by which this process
        takes place is beyond the scope of this document).

   (h)  The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to the
        CPE or PE Attack Telemetry Detection/Classification Systems
        indicating that the DDoS attack has ceased.

   (i)  The CPE or PE Attack Telemetry Detection/Classification Systems
        transmit a DOTS mitigation service termination request to the
        DOTS servers.  This DOTS mitigation service termination request
        may be automatically initiated by the CPE or PE Attack Telemetry
        Detection/Classification Systems, or may be manually triggered
        by personnel of the requesting organization in response to an
        alert from the CPE or PE Attack Telemetry Detection/
        Classification Systems (the mechanism by which this process
        takes place is beyond the scope of this document).

   (j)  The DOTS servers terminate DDoS mitigation service on their
        respective networks (the mechanism by which this process takes
        place is beyond the scope of this document).

   (k)  The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to the
        CPE or PE Attack Telemetry Detection/Classification Systems
        indicating that DDoS mitigation services have been terminated.

   (l)  The CPE or PE Attack Telemetry Detection/Classification Systems
        transmit a DOTS mitigation termination status acknowledgement to
        the DOTS servers.

3.1.4.  Automatic or Operator-Assisted Targeted Service/ Application
        Request to Upstream Mitigator

   A service or application which is the target of a DDoS attack and
   which has the capability to detect and classify DDoS attacks (i.e,
   Apache mod_security [APACHE], BIND RRL [RRL], etc.) as well as DOTS
   client functionality may be configured so that upon detecting and



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   classifying a DDoS attack, it signals one or more DOTS servers in
   order to request upstream DDoS mitigation service initiation.  DDoS
   mitigation service may be terminated either automatically or manually
   via a DOTS mitigation service termination request initiated by the
   service/application when it has been determined that the DDoS attack
   has ended.

   In this use-case, the service/application does not possess inherent
   DDoS attack mitigation capabilities, and is signaling for upstream
   mitigation assistance.  This can be an inter- or intra-domain use-
   case.

   (a)  A DDoS attack is initiated against online properties of an
        organization which include DOTS-client-capable services or
        applications that are the specific target(s) of the attack.

   (b)  The targeted services or applications utilize their DOTS client
        functionality to send a DOTS mitigation service initiation
        request to one or more DOTS servers residing on the same network
        as the services or applications, one or more upstream transit
        networks, peer networks, or overlay MSSP networks, either
        directly or via intermediate DOTS relays residing upon the
        requesting organization's network, the upstream mitigation
        provider's network, or both.  This DOTS mitigation service
        initiation request may be automatically initiated by the
        targeted services or applications, or may be manually triggered
        by personnel of the requesting organization in response to an
        alert from the targeted services or applications or a system
        which monitors them (the mechanism by which this process takes
        place is beyond the scope of this document).

   (c)  The DOTS servers which receive the DOTS mitigation service
        initiation requests determine that they have been provisioned to
        honor requests from the requesting services or applications, and
        initiate situationally-appropriate DDoS mitigation service on
        their respective networks (the mechanism by which this process
        takes place is beyond the scope of this document).

   (d)  The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS service status message to the
        services or applications indicating that upstream DDoS
        mitigation service has been initiated

   (e)  While DDoS mitigation services are active, the DOTS servers
        regularly transmit DOTS mitigation status updates to the
        requesting services or applications.






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   (f)  While DDoS mitigation services are active, the requesting
        services or applications may optionally regularly transmit DOTS
        mitigation efficacy updates to the relevant DOTS servers.

   (g)  When the upstream DDoS mitigators determine that the DDoS attack
        has ceased, they indicate this change in status to their
        respective DOTS servers (the mechanism by which this process
        takes place is beyond the scope of this document).

   (h)  The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to the
        requesting services or applications indicating that the DDoS
        attack has ceased.

   (i)  The targeted services or applications transmit a DOTS mitigation
        service termination request to the DOTS servers.  This DOTS
        mitigation service termination request may be automatically
        initiated by the targeted services or applications, or may be
        manually triggered by personnel of the requesting organization
        in response to an alert from a system which monitors them (the
        mechanism by which this process takes place is beyond the scope
        of this document).

   (j)  The DOTS servers terminate DDoS mitigation service on their
        respective networks (the mechanism by which this process takes
        place is beyond the scope of this document).

   (k)  The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to the
        targeted services or applications indicating that DDoS
        mitigation services have been terminated.

   (l)  The targeted services or applications transmit a DOTS mitigation
        termination status acknowledgement to the DOTS servers.

3.1.5.  Manual Web Portal Request to Upstream Mitigator

   A Web portal which has DOTS client capabilities has been configured
   in order to allow authorized personnel of organizations which are
   targeted by DDoS attacks to manually request upstream DDoS mitigation
   service initiation from a DOTS server.  When an organization has
   reason to believe that it is under active attack, authorized
   personnel may utilize the Web portal to manually initiate a DOTS
   client mitigation request to one or more DOTS servers.  DDoS
   mitigation service may be terminated manually via a DOTS mitigation
   service termination request through the Web portal when it has been
   determined that the DDoS attack has ended.

   In this use-case, the organization targeted for attack does not
   possess any automated or operator-assisted mechanisms for DDoS attack



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   detection, classification, traceback, or mitigation; the existence of
   an attack has been inferred manually, and the organization is
   requesting upstream mitigation assistance.  This can theoretically be
   an inter- or intra-domain use-case, but is more typically an inter-
   domain scenario.

   (a)  A DDoS attack is initiated against online properties of an
        organization have access to a Web portal which incorporates DOTS
        client functionality and can generate DOTS mitigation service
        requests upon demand.

   (b)  Authorized personnel utilize the Web portal to send a DOTS
        mitigation service initiation request to one or more upstream
        transit networks, peer networks, or overlay MSSP networks,
        either directly or via intermediate DOTS relays residing upon
        the requesting organization's network, the upstream mitigation
        provider's network, or both.  This DOTS mitigation service
        initiation request is manually triggered by personnel of the
        requesting organization when it is judged that the organization
        is under DDoS attack (the mechanism by which this process takes
        place is beyond the scope of this document).

   (c)  The DOTS servers which receive the DOTS mitigation service
        initiation requests determine that they have been provisioned to
        honor requests from the Web portal, and initiate situationally-
        appropriate DDoS mitigation service on their respective networks
        (the mechanism by which this process takes place is beyond the
        scope of this document).

   (d)  The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS service status message to the
        Web portal indicating that upstream DDoS mitigation service has
        been initiated.

   (e)  While DDoS mitigation services are active, the DOTS servers
        regularly transmit DOTS mitigation status updates to the Web
        portal.

   (f)  While DDoS mitigation services are active, the Web portal may
        optionally regularly transmit manually-triggered DOTS mitigation
        efficacy updates to the relevant DOTS servers.

   (g)  When the upstream DDoS mitigators determine that the DDoS attack
        has ceased, they indicate this change in status to their
        respective DOTS servers (the mechanism by which this process
        takes place is beyond the scope of this document).

   (h)  The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to the
        Web portal indicating that the DDoS attack has ceased.



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   (i)  The Web portal transmits a manually-triggered DOTS mitigation
        service termination request to the DOTS servers (the mechanism
        by which this process takes place is beyond the scope of this
        document).

   (j)  The Web portal transmits a manually-triggered DOTS mitigation
        service termination request to the DOTS servers (the mechanism
        by which this process takes place is beyond the scope of this
        document).

   (k)  The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to the
        Web portal indicating that DDoS mitigation services have been
        terminated.

   (l)  The Web portal transmits a DOTS mitigation termination status
        acknowledgement to the DOTS servers.

3.1.6.  Manual Mobile Device Application Request to Upstream Mitigator

   An application for mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets
   which incorporates DOTS client capabilities has been made available
   to authorized personnel of an organization.  When the organization
   has reason to believe that it is under active DDoS attack, authorized
   personnel may utilize the mobile device application to manually
   initiate a DOTS client mitigation request to one or more DOTS servers
   in order to initiate upstream DDoS mitigation services.  DDoS
   mitigation service may be terminated manually via a DOTS mitigation
   service termination request initiated through the mobile device
   application when it has been determined that the DDoS attack has
   ended.

   This use-case is similar to the one described in Section 3.1.5; the
   difference is that a mobile application provided by the DDoS
   mitigation service provider is used to request upstream attack
   mitigation assistance.  This can theoretically be an inter- or intra-
   domain use-case, but is more typically an inter-domain scenario.

   (a)  A DDoS attack is initiated against online properties of an
        organization have access to a Web portal which incorporates DOTS
        client functionality and can generate DOTS mitigation service
        requests upon demand.

   (b)  Authorized personnel utilize the mobile application to send a
        DOTS mitigation service initiation request to one or more DOTS
        servers residing on the same network as the targeted Internet
        properties, one or more upstream transit networks, peer
        networks, or overlay MSSP networks, either directly or via
        intermediate DOTS relays residing upon the requesting



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        organization's network, the upstream mitigation provider's
        network, or both.  This DOTS mitigation service initiation
        request is manually triggered by personnel of the requesting
        organization when it is judged that the organization is under
        DDoS attack (the mechanism by which this process takes place is
        beyond the scope of this document).

   (c)  The DOTS servers which receive the DOTS mitigation service
        initiation requests determine that they have been provisioned to
        honor requests from the mobile application, and initiate
        situationally-appropriate DDoS mitigation service on their
        respective networks (the mechanism by which this process takes
        place is beyond the scope of this document).

   (d)  The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS service status message to the
        mobile application indicating that upstream DDoS mitigation
        service has been initiated.

   (e)  While DDoS mitigation services are active, the DOTS servers
        regularly transmit DOTS mitigation status updates to the mobile
        application.

   (f)  While DDoS mitigation services are active, the mobile
        application may optionally regularly transmit manually-triggered
        DOTS mitigation efficacy updates to the relevant DOTS servers.

   (g)  When the upstream DDoS mitigators determine that the DDoS attack
        has ceased, they indicate this change in status to their
        respective DOTS servers (the mechanism by which this process
        takes place is beyond the scope of this document).

   (h)  The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to the
        mobile application indicating that the DDoS attack has ceased.

   (i)  The mobile application transmits a manually-triggered DOTS
        mitigation service termination request to the DOTS servers (the
        mechanism by which this process takes place is beyond the scope
        of this document).

   (j)  The DOTS servers terminate DDoS mitigation service on their
        respective networks (the mechanism by which this process takes
        place is beyond the scope of this document).

   (k)  The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to the
        mobile application indicating that DDoS mitigation services have
        been terminated.





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   (l)  The mobile application transmits a DOTS mitigation termination
        status acknowledgement to the DOTS servers.

3.1.7.  Unsuccessful Automatic or Operator-Assisted CPE or PE Mitigators
        Request Upstream DDoS Mitigation Services

   One or more CPE or PE mitigators with DOTS client capabilities may be
   configured to signal to one or more DOTS servers in order to request
   upstream DDoS mitigation service initiation during an attack when
   DDoS attack volumes and/or attack characteristics exceed the
   capabilities of such CPE mitigators.  DDoS mitigation service may be
   terminated either automatically or manually via a DOTS mitigation
   service termination request initiated by the mitigator when it has
   been determined that the DDoS attack has ended.

   This can theoretically be an inter- or intra-domain use-case, but is
   more typically an inter-domain scenario.

   (a)  A DDoS attack is initiated against online properties of an
        organization which has deployed DOTS-client-capable DDoS
        mitigators.

   (b)  CPE or PE DDoS mitigators detect, classify, and begin mitigating
        the DDoS attack.

   (c)  CPE or PE DDoS mitigators determine that their capacity and/or
        capability to mitigate the DDoS attack is insufficient, and
        utilize their DOTS client functionality to send a DOTS
        mitigation service initiation request to one or more DOTS
        servers residing on one or more upstream transit networks, peer
        networks, or overlay MSSP networks.  This DOTS mitigation
        service initiation request may be automatically initiated by the
        CPE or PE DDoS mitigators, or may be manually triggered by
        personnel of the requesting organization in response to an alert
        from the mitigators (the mechanism by which this process takes
        place is beyond the scope of this document).

   (d)  The DOTS servers which receive the DOTS mitigation service
        initiation requests determine that they have been configured to
        honor requests from the requesting CPE or PE mitigators, and
        attempt to initiate situationally-appropriate DDoS mitigation
        service on their respective networks (the mechanism by which
        this process takes place is beyond the scope of this document).

   (e)  The DDoS mitigators on the upstream network report back to the
        DOTS servers that they are unable to initiate DDoS mitigation
        service for the requesting organization due to mitigation
        capacity constraints, bandwidth constraints, functionality



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        constraints, hardware casualties, or other impediments (the
        mechanism by which this process takes place is beyond the scope
        of this document).

   (f)  The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS service status message to the
        requesting CPE or PE mitigators indicating that upstream DDoS
        mitigation service cannot be initiated as requested.

   (g)  The CPE or PE mitigators may optionally regularly re-transmit
        DOTS mitigation status request messages to the relevant DOTS
        servers until acknowledgement that mitigation services have been
        initiated.

   (h)  The CPE or PE mitigators may optionally transmit a DOTS
        mitigation service initiation request to DOTS servers associated
        with a configured fallback upstream DDoS mitigation service.
        Multiple fallback DDoS mitigation services may optionally be
        configured.

   (i)  The process describe above cyclically continues until the DDoS
        mitigation service request is fulfilled; the CPE or PE
        mitigators determine that the DDoS attack volume has decreased
        to a level and/or complexity which they themselves can
        successfully mitigate; the DDoS attack has ceased; or manual
        intervention by personnel of the requesting organization has
        taken place.

3.2.  Ancillary Use Cases

3.2.1.  Auto-registration of DOTS clients with DOTS servers

   An additional benefit of DOTS is that by utilizing agreed-upon
   authentication mechanisms, DOTS clients can automatically register
   for DDoS mitigation service with one or more upstream DOTS servers.
   The details of such registration are beyond the scope of this
   document.

3.2.2.  Auto-provisioning of DDoS countermeasures

   The largely manual tasks associated with provisioning effective,
   situationally-appropriate DDoS countermeasures is a significant
   barrier to providing/obtaining DDoS mitigation services for both
   mitigation providers and mitigation recipients.  Due to the 'self-
   descriptive' nature of DOTS registration messages and mitigation
   requests, the implementation and deployment of DOTS has the potential
   to automate countermeasure selection and configuration for DDoS
   mitigators.  The details of such provisioning are beyond the scope of
   this document.



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   This can theoretically be an inter- or intra-domain use-case, but is
   more typically an inter-domain scenario.

3.2.3.  Informational DDoS attack notification to interested and
        authorized third parties

   In addition to its primary role of providing a standardized,
   programmatic approach to the automated and/or operator-assisted
   request of DDoS mitigation services and providing status updates of
   those mitigations to requesters, DOTS may be utilized to notify
   security researchers, law enforcement agencies, regulatory bodies,
   etc. of DDoS attacks against attack targets, assuming that
   organizations making use of DOTS choose to share such third-party
   notifications, in keeping with all applicable laws, regulations,
   privacy and confidentiality considerations, and contractual
   agreements between DOTS users and said third parties.

   This is an inter-domain scenario.

4.  Security Considerations

   DOTS is at risk from three primary attacks: DOTS agent impersonation,
   traffic injection, and signaling blocking.  The DOTS protocol MUST be
   designed for minimal data transfer to address the blocking risk.

   Impersonation and traffic injection mitigation can be managed through
   current secure communications best practices.  DOTS is not subject to
   anything new in this area.  One consideration could be to minimize
   the security technologies in use at any one time.  The more needed,
   the greater the risk of failures coming from assumptions on one
   technology providing protection that it does not in the presence of
   another technology.

   Additional details of DOTS security requirements may be found in
   [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements].

5.  IANA Considerations

   No IANA considerations exist for this document at this time.

6.  Acknowledgments

   TBD








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7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

7.2.  Informative References

   [APACHE]   "Apache mod_security", <https://www.modsecurity.org>.

   [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]
              Mortensen, A., Moskowitz, R., and T. Reddy, "DDoS Open
              Threat Signaling Requirements", draft-ietf-dots-
              requirements-00 (work in progress), October 2015.

   [RFC6335]  Cotton, M., Eggert, L., Touch, J., Westerlund, M., and S.
              Cheshire, "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
              Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and
              Transport Protocol Port Number Registry", BCP 165,
              RFC 6335, DOI 10.17487/RFC6335, August 2011,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6335>.

   [RRL]      "BIND RRL", <https://deepthought.isc.org/article/AA-
              00994/0/Using-the-Response-Rate-Limiting-Feature-in-BIND-
              9.10.html>.

Authors' Addresses

   Roland Dobbins (editor)
   Arbor Networks
   30 Raffles Place
   Level 17 Chevron House
   Singapore 048622
   Singapore

   Email: rdobbins@arbor.net


   Stefan Fouant
   Corero Network Security

   Email: Stefan.Fouant@corero.com






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   Daniel Migault
   Ericsson
   8400 boulevard Decarie
   Montreal, QC  H4P 2N2
   Canada

   Phone: +1 514-452-2160
   Email: daniel.migault@ericsson.com


   Robert Moskowitz
   HTT Consulting
   Oak Park, MI  48237
   USA

   Email: rgm@labs.htt-consult.com


   Nik Teague
   Verisign Inc
   12061 Bluemont Way
   Reston, VA  20190
   USA

   Phone: +44 791 763 5384
   Email: nteague@verisign.com


   Liang Xia
   Huawei
   No. 101, Software Avenue, Yuhuatai District
   Nanjing
   China

   Email: Frank.xialiang@huawei.com
















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