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DOTS                                                          R. Dobbins
Internet-Draft                                            Arbor Networks
Intended status: Informational                                D. Migault
Expires: January 21, 2018                                       Ericsson
                                                               S. Fouant

                                                            R. Moskowitz
                                                          HTT Consulting
                                                               N. Teague
                                                                  L. Xia
                                                            K. Nishizuka
                                                      NTT Communications
                                                           July 20, 2017

                Use cases for DDoS Open Threat Signaling


   The DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) effort is intended to provide a
   protocol that facilitates interoperability between multivendor
   solutions/services.  This document presents use cases to evaluate the
   interactions expected between the DOTS components as well as DOTS
   messaging exchanges.  The purpose of describing use cases is to
   identify the interacting DOTS components, how they collaborate and
   what are the types of information to be exchanged.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 21, 2018.

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology and Acronyms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Requirements Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Use Cases Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Inter-domain Use Cases  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.1.1.  End-customer with a single upstream transit provider
               offering DDoS mitigation services . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.1.2.  End-customer with multiple upstream transit providers
               offering DDoS mitigation services . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.1.3.  End-customer with multiple upstream transit
               providers, but only a single upstream transit
               provider offering DDoS mitigation services  . . . . .   7
       3.1.4.  End-customer with an overlay DDoS mitigation managed
               security service provider (MSSP)  . . . . . . . . . .   7
       3.1.5.  End-customer operating an application or service with
               an integrated DOTS client . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.1.6.  End-customer operating a CPE network infrastructure
               device with an integrated DOTS client . . . . . . . .   9
       3.1.7.  End-customer with an out-of-band smartphone
               application featuring DOTS client capabilities  . . .   9
       3.1.8.  MSSP as an end-customer requesting overflow DDoS
               mitigation assistance from other MSSPs  . . . . . . .  10
     3.2.  Intra-domain Use Cases  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       3.2.1.  Suppression of outbound DDoS traffic originating from
               a consumer broadband access network . . . . . . . . .  11
       3.2.2.  Homenet DDoS Detection Collaboration for ISP network
               management  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       3.2.3.  DDoS Orchestration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   6.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19

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   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19

1.  Introduction

   Currently, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack mitigation
   solutions are largely based upon siloed, proprietary communications
   schemes which result in vendor lock-in.  As a side-effect, this makes
   the configuration, provisioning, operation, and activation of these
   solutions a highly manual and often time-consuming process.
   Additionally, coordination of multiple DDoS mitigation solutions
   simultaneously engaged in defending the same organization (resources)
   against DDoS attacks is fraught with both technical and process-
   related hurdles.  This greatly increase operational complexity and
   often results in suboptimal DDoS attack mitigation efficacy.

   The DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) effort is intended to specify a
   protocol that facilitates interoperability between multivendor DDoS
   mitigation solutions and ensures more automation in term of
   mitigation requests and attack characterization patterns.  As DDoS
   solutions are broadly heterogeneous among different vendors, the
   primary goal for DOTS is to provide a high level interaction with
   these DDoS solutions such as initiating or terminating DDoS
   mitigation assistance.

   It should be noted that DOTS is not in and of itself intended to
   perform orchestration functions duplicative of the functionality
   being developed by the [I2NSF] WG; rather, DOTS is intended to allow
   devices, services, and applications to request DDoS attack mitigation
   assistance and receive mitigation status updates.

   These use cases are expected to provide inputs for the design of the
   DOTS protocol(s).

2.  Terminology and Acronyms

   This document makes use of the terms defined in

   In addition, this document introduces the following terms:

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     Inter-domain: a DOTS communications relationship between distinct
     organizations with separate spans of administrative control.
     Typical inter-domain DOTS communication relationships would be
     between a DDoS mitigation service provider and an end-customer who
     requires DDoS mitigation assistance; between multiple DDoS
     mitigation service providers coordinating mutual defense of a
     mutual end-customer; or between DDoS mitigation service providers
     which are requesting additional DDoS mitigation assistance in for
     attacks which exceed their inherent DDoS mitigation capacities
     and/or capabilities.

     Intra- domain: a DOTS communications relationship between various
     (network) elements that are owned and operated by the same
     administrative entity.  A typical intra-domain DOTS communications
     relationship would be between DOTS agents [I-D.ietf-dots-
     requirements] within the same organization.

2.1.  Requirements Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

3.  Use Cases Scenarios

   This section provides a high-level description of scenarios addressed
   by DOTS.  In both sub-sections, the scenarios are provided in order
   to illustrate the use of DOTS in typical DDoS attack scenarios.  They
   are not definitive, and other use cases are expected to emerge with
   widespread DOTS deployment.

   All scenarios present a coordination between the targeted
   organization, the DDoS attack telemetry and the mitigator.  The
   coordination and communication between these entities depends, for
   example, on the characteristic or functionality of the entity itself,
   the reliability of the information provided by DDoS attack telemetry,
   and the business relationship between the DDoS target domain and the

   More explicitly, in some cases, the DDoS attack telemetry may simply
   activate a DDoS mitigation, whereas in other cases, it may
   collaborate by providing some information about an attack.  In some
   cases, the DDoS mitigation may be orchestrated, which includes
   selecting a specific appliance as well as starting/ending a

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3.1.  Inter-domain Use Cases

   Inter-domain DOTS deployment scenarios span two or more distinct
   spans of administrative control.  A typical inter-domain DOTS
   deployment may consist of an endpoint network such as an Internet-
   connected enterprise requesting DDoS mitigation assistance from one
   or more upstream transit providers offering DDoS mitigation services,
   or from a topologically-distant MSSP offering cloud-based overlay
   DDoS mitigation services.  DOTS may also be used to facilitate
   coordination of DDoS mitigation activities between mitigation

   Coordination between organizations making use of DOTS in such
   scenarios is necessary.  Along with DOTS-specific tasks such as DOTS
   peering and validating the exchange of DOTS messaging between the
   relevant organizations, externalities relating to routing
   advertisements, authoritative DNS records (for DNS-based diversion),
   network access policies for DOTS nodes, service-level agreements
   (SLAs), and DDoS mitigation provisioning are required.

3.1.1.  End-customer with a single upstream transit provider offering
        DDoS mitigation services

   In this scenario, an enterprise network with self-hosted Internet-
   facing properties such as Web servers, authoritative DNS servers, and
   VoIP PBXes has an intelligent DDoS mitigation system (IDMS) deployed
   to protect those servers and applications from DDoS attacks.  In
   addition to their on-premise DDoS defense capability, they have
   contracted with their Internet transit provider for DDoS mitigation
   services which threaten to overwhelm their transit link bandwidth.

   The IDMS is configured such that if the incoming Internet traffic
   volume exceeds 50% of the provisioned upstream Internet transit link
   capacity, the IDMS will request DDoS mitigation assistance from the
   upstream transit provider.

   The requests to trigger, manage, and finalize a DDoS mitigation
   between the enterprise IDMS and the transit provider is performed
   using DOTS.  The enterprise IDMS implements a DOTS client while the
   transit provider implements a DOTS server which is integrated with
   their DDoS mitigation orchestration system.

   When the IDMS detects an inbound DDoS attack targeting the enterprise
   servers and applications, it immediately begins mitigating the

   During the course of the attack, the inbound traffic volume exceeds
   the 50% threshold; the IDMS DOTS client signals the DOTS server on

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   the upstream transit provider network to initiate DDoS mitigation.
   The DOTS server signals the DOTS client that it can service this
   request, and mitigation is initiated on the transit provider network.

   Over the course of the attack, the DOTS server on the transit
   provider network periodically signals the DOTS client on the
   enterprise IDMS in order to provide mitigation status information,
   statistics related to DDoS attack traffic mitigation, and related
   information.  Once the DDoS attack has ended, the DOTS server signals
   the enterprise IDMS DOTS client that the attack has subsided.

   The enterprise IDMS then requests that DDoS mitigation services on
   the upstream transit provider network be terminated.  The DOTS server
   on the transit provider network receives this request, communicates
   with the transit provider orchestration system controlling its DDoS
   mitigation system to terminate attack mitigation, and once the
   mitigation has ended, confirms the end of upstream DDoS mitigation
   service to the enterprise IDMS DOTS client.

   Note that communications between the enterprise DOTS client and the
   upstream transit provider DOTS server may take place in-band within
   the main Internet transit link between the enterprise and the transit
   provider; out-of-band via a separate, dedicated wireline network link
   utilized solely for DOTS signaling; or out-of-band via some other
   form of network connectivity such as a third-party wireless 4G
   network link.

3.1.2.  End-customer with multiple upstream transit providers offering
        DDoS mitigation services

   This scenario shares many characteristics with the above, but with
   the key difference that the enterprise in question is multi-homed,
   i.e., has two or more upstream transit providers, and that they all
   provide DDoS mitigation services.

   In most cases, the communications model for a multi-homed model would
   be the same as in the single-homed model, merely duplicated in
   parallel.  However, if two or more of the upstream transit providers
   have entered into a mutual DDoS mitigation agreement and have
   established DOTS peering between the participants, DDoS mitigation
   status messages may exchanged between the DOTS servers of the
   participants in order to provide a more complete picture of the DDoS
   attack scope, and allow for either automated or operator-assisted
   programmatic cooperative DDoS mitigation activities on the part of
   the transit providers.

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3.1.3.  End-customer with multiple upstream transit providers, but only
        a single upstream transit provider offering DDoS mitigation

   This scenario is similar to the multi-homed scenario referenced
   above; however, only one of the upstream transit providers in
   question offers DDoS mitigation services.  In this situation, the
   enterprise would cease advertising the relevant network prefixes via
   the transit providers which do not provide DDoS mitigation services -
   or, in the case where the enterprise does not control its own
   routing, request that the upstream transit providers which do not
   offer DDoS mitigation services stop advertising the relevant network
   prefixes on their behalf.

   Once it has been determined that the DDoS attack has ceased, the
   enterprise once again announces the relevant routes to the upstream
   transit providers which do not offer DDoS mitigation services, or
   requests that they resume announcing the relevant routes on behalf of
   the enterprise.

   Note that falling back to a single transit provider has the effect of
   reducing available inbound transit bandwidth during a DDoS attack.
   Without proper planning and sufficient provisioning of both the link
   capacity and DDoS mitigation capacity of the sole transit provider
   offering DDoS mitigation services, this reduction of available
   bandwidth could lead to network link congestion caused by legitimate
   inbound network traffic.  Therefore, careful planning and
   provisioning of both upstream transit bandwidth as well as DDoS
   mitigation capacity is required in scenarios of this nature.

   The withdrawal and announcement of routing prefixes described in this
   use-case falls outside the scope of DOTS, although they could
   conceivably be triggered as a result of provider-specific
   orchestration triggered by the receipt of specific DOTS messages from
   the enterprise in question.

3.1.4.  End-customer with an overlay DDoS mitigation managed security
        service provider (MSSP)

   This use case details an enterprise that has a local DDoS detection
   and classification capability and may or may not have an on-premise
   mitigation capability.  The enterprise is contracted with an overlay
   DDoS mitigation MSSP, topologically distant from the enterprise
   network (i.e., not a direct upstream transit provider), which can
   redirect (divert) traffic away from the enterprise, provide DDoS
   mitigation services services, and then forward (re-inject) legitimate
   traffic to the enterprise on an on-demand basis.  In this scenario,
   diversion of Internet traffic destined for the enterprise network

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   into the overlay DDoS mitigation MSSP network is typically
   accomplished via eBGP announcements of the relevant enterprise
   network CIDR blocks, or via authoritative DNS subdomain-based
   mechanisms (other mechanisms are not precluded, these are merely the
   most common ones in use today).

   The enterprise determines thresholds at which a request for
   mitigation is triggered indicating to the MSSP that inbound network
   traffic should be diverted into the MSSP network and that DDoS
   mitigation should be initiated.  The enterprise may also elect to
   manually request diversion and mitigation via the MSSP network as

   The communications required to initiate, manage, and terminate active
   DDoS mitigation by the MSSP is performed using DOTS.  The enterprise
   DDoS detection/classification system implements a DOTS client, while
   the MSSP implements a DOTS server integrated with its DDoS mitigation
   orchestration system.  One or more out-of-band methods for initiating
   a mitigation request, such as a Web portal, a smartphone app, or
   voice support hotline, may also be made available by the MSSP.

   When an attack is detected, an automated or manual DOTS mitigation
   request is be generated by the enterprise and sent to the MSSP.  The
   enterprise DOTS mitigation request is processed by the MSSP DOTS
   server, which validates the origin of the request and passes it to
   the MSSP DDoS mitigation orchestration system, which then initiates
   active DDoS mitigation.  This action will usually involve the
   diversion of all network traffic destined for the targeted enterprise
   into the MSSP DDoS mitigation network, where it will be subjected to
   further scrutiny, with DDoS attack traffic filtered by the MSSP.
   Successful mitigation of the DDoS attack will not only result
   preserving the availability of services and applications resident on
   the enterprise network, but will also prevent DDoS attack traffic
   from ingressing the networks of the enterprise upstream transit

   The MSSP should signal via DOTS to the enterprise that a mitigation
   request has been received and acted upon, and should also include an
   update of the mitigation status.  The MSSP may respond periodically
   with additional updates on the mitigation status to in order to
   enable the enterprise to make an informed decision on whether to
   maintain or terminate the mitigation.  An alternative approach would
   be for the DOTS client mitigation request to include a time to live
   (TTL) for the mitigation, which may also be extended by the client
   should the attack still be ongoing as the TTL reaches expiration.

   A variation of this use case may be that the enterprise is providing
   a DDoS monitoring and analysis service to customers whose networks

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   may be protected by any one of a number of third-party providers.
   The enterprise in question may integrate with these third-party
   providers using DOTS and signal accordingly when a customer is
   attacked - the MSSP may then manage the life-cycle of the attack
   mitigation on behalf of the enterprise.

3.1.5.  End-customer operating an application or service with an
        integrated DOTS client

   In this scenario, a Web server has a built-in mechanism to detect and
   classify DDoS attacks, which also incorporates a DOTS client.  When
   an attack is detected, the self-defense mechanism is activated, and
   local DDoS mitigation is initiated.

   The DOTS client built into the Web server has been configured to
   request DDoS mitigation services from an upstream transit provider or
   overlay MSSP once specific attack traffic thresholds have been
   reached, or certain network traffic conditions prevail.  Once the
   specified conditions have been met, the DOTS communications dialogue
   and subsequent DDoS mitigation initiation and termination actions
   described above take place.

3.1.6.  End-customer operating a CPE network infrastructure device with
        an integrated DOTS client

   Similar to the above use-case featuring applications or services with
   built-in DDoS attack detection/classification and DOTS client
   capabilities, in this scenario, an end-customer network
   infrastructure CPE device such as a router, layer-3 switch, firewall,
   or load-balance incorporates both the functionality required to
   detect and classify incoming DDoS attacks as well as DOTS client

   The subsequent DOTS communications dialogue and resultant DDoS
   mitigation initiation and termination activities take place in the
   same manner as the use-cases described above.

3.1.7.  End-customer with an out-of-band smartphone application
        featuring DOTS client capabilities

   This scenario would typically apply in a small office/home office
   (SOHO) setting, where the end-customer does not have CPE equipment or
   software capable of detecting/classifying/mitigating DDoS attack, yet
   still has a requirement for on-demand DDoS mitigation services.  A
   smartphone application containing a DOTS client would be provided by
   the upstream transit mitigation provider or overlay DDoS MSSP to the
   SOHO end-customer; this application would allow a manual 'panic-

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   button' to request the initiation and termination of DDoS mitigation

   The DOTS communications dialogue and resultant DDoS mitigation
   initiation/status reporting/termination actions would then take place
   as in the other use-cases described above, with the end-customer DOTS
   client serving to display received status information while DDoS
   mitigation activities are taking place.

3.1.8.  MSSP as an end-customer requesting overflow DDoS mitigation
        assistance from other MSSPs

   This is a more complex use-case involving multiple DDoS MSSPs,
   whether transit operators, overlay MSSPs, or both.  In this scenario,
   an MSSP has entered into a pre-arranged DDoS mitigation assistance
   agreement with one or more other DDoS MSSPs in order to ensure that
   sufficient DDoS mitigation capacity and/or capabilities may be
   activated in the event that a given DDoS attack threatens to
   overwhelm the ability of a given DDoS MSSP to mitigate the attack on
   its own.

   BGP-based diversion (including relevant Letters of Authorization, or
   LoAs), DNS-based diversion (including relevant LoAs), traffic re-
   injection mechanisms such as Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)
   tunnels, provisioning of DDoS orchestration systems, et. al. must be
   arranged in advance between the DDoS MSSPs which are parties to the
   agreement.  They should also be tested on a regular basis.

   When a DDoS MSSP which is party to the agreement is nearing its
   capacity or ability to mitigate a given DDoS attack traffic, the DOTS
   client integrated with the MSSP DDoS mitigation orchestration system
   signals partner MSSPs to initiate network traffic diversion and DDoS
   mitigation activities.  Ongoing attack and mitigation status messages
   may be passed between the DDoS MSSPs, and between the requesting MSSP
   and the ultimate end-customer of the attack.

   The DOTS dialogues and resultant DDoS mitigation-related activities
   in this scenario progress as described in the other use-cases
   detailed above.  Once the requesting DDoS MSSP is confident that the
   DDoS attack has either ceased or has fallen to levels of traffic/
   complexity which they can handle on their own, the requesting DDoS
   MSSP DOTS client sends mitigation termination requests to the
   participating overflow DDoS MSSPs.

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3.2.  Intra-domain Use Cases

   While many of the DOTS-specific elements of inter-domain DOTS
   deployment scenarios apply to intra-domain scenarios, it is expected
   that many externalities such as coordination of and authorization for
   routing advertisements and authoritative DNS updates may be automated
   to a higher degree than is practicable in inter-domain scenarios,
   given that the scope of required activities and authorizations are
   confined to a single organization.  In theory, provisioning and
   change-control related both to DOTS itself as well as relevant
   externalities may require less administrative overhead and less
   implementation lead-times.

   The scope of potential DDoS mitigation actions may also be broader in
   intra-organizational scenarios, as presumably an organization will
   have a higher degree of autonomy with regards to both techically and
   administratively feasible activities.

3.2.1.  Suppression of outbound DDoS traffic originating from a consumer
        broadband access network

   While most DDoS defenses concentrate on inbound DDoS attacks
   ingressing from direct peering links or upstream transit providers,
   the DDoS attack traffic in question originates from one or more
   Internet-connected networks.  In some cases, compromised devices
   residing on the local networks of broadband access customers are used
   to directly generate this DDoS attack traffic; in others,
   misconfigured devices residing on said local customer networks are
   exploited by attackers to launch reflection/amplification DDoS
   attacks.  In either scenario, the outbound DDoS traffic emanating
   from these devices can be just as disruptive as an inbound DDoS
   attack, and can cause disruption for substantial proportions of the
   broadband access network operator's customer base.

   Some broadband access network operators provide CPE devices (DSL
   modems/routers, cablemodems, FTTH routers, etc.) to their end-
   customers.  Others allow end-customers to provide their own CPE
   devices.  Many will either provide CPE devices or allow end-customers
   to supply their own.

   Broadband access network operators typically have mechanisms to
   detect and classify both inbound and outbound DDoS attacks, utilizing
   flow telemetry exported from their peering/transit and customer
   aggregation routers.  In the event of an outbound DDoS attack, they
   may make use of internally-developed systems which leverage their
   subscriber-management systems to de-provision end-customers who are
   sourcing outbound DDoS traffic; in some cases, they may have
   implemented quarantine systems to block all outbound traffic sourced

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   from the offending end-customers.  In either case, the perceived
   disruption of the end-customer's Internet access often prompts a
   help-desk call, which erodes the margins of the broadband access
   provider and can cause end-customer dissatisfaction.

   Increasingly, CPE devices themselves are targeted by attackers who
   exploit security flaws in these devices in order to compromise them
   and subsume them into botnets, and then leverage them to launch
   outbound DDoS attacks.  In all of the described scenarios, the end-
   customers are unaware that their computers and/or CPE devices have
   been compromised and are being used to launch outbound DDoS attacks -
   however, they may notice a degradation of their Internet connectivity
   as a result of outbound bandwidth consumption or other disruption.

   By deploying DOTS-enabled telemetry systems and CPE devices (and
   possibly requiring DOTS functionality in customer-provided CPE
   devices), broadband access providers can utilize a standards-based
   mechanism to suppress outbound DDoS attack traffic while optionally
   allowing legitimate end-customer traffic to proceed unmolested.

   In order to achieve this capability, the telemetry analysis system
   utilized by the broadband access provider must have DOTS client
   functionality, and the end-customer CPE devices must have DOTS server
   functionality.  When the telemetry analysis system detects and
   classifies an outbound DDoS attack sourced from one or more end-
   customer networks/devices, the DOTS client of the telemetry analysis
   system sends a DOTS request to the DOTS server implemented on the CPE
   devices, requesting local mitigation assistance in suppressing either
   the identified outbound DDoS traffic, or all outbound traffic sourced
   from the end-customer networks/devices.  The DOTS server residing
   within the CPE device(s) would then perform predefined actions such
   as implementing on-board access-control lists (ACLs) to suppress the
   outbound traffic in question and prevent it from leaving the local
   end-customer network(s).

   Broadband access network operators may choose to implement a
   quarantine of all or selected network traffic originating from end-
   customer networks/devices which are sourcing outbound DDoS traffic,
   redirecting traffic from interactive applications such as Web
   browsers to an internal portal which informs the end-customer of the
   quarantine action, and providing instructions for self-remediation
   and/or helpdesk contact information.

   Quarantine systems for broadband access networks are typically
   custom-developed and -maintained, and are generally deployed only by
   a relatively small number of broadband access providers with
   considerable internal software development and support capabilities.
   By requiring the manufacturers of operator-supplied CPE devices to

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   implement DOTS server functionality, and requiring customer-provided
   CPE devices to feature DOTS server functionality, broadband access
   network operators who previously could not afford the development
   expense of creating custom quarantine systems to integrate DOTS-
   enabled network telemetry systems to act as DOTS clients and perform
   effective quarantine of end-customer networks and devices until such
   time as they have been remediated.

3.2.2.  Homenet DDoS Detection Collaboration for ISP network management

   Home networks run with (limited) bandwidth as well as limited routing
   resources, while they are expected to provide services reachable from
   the outside [RFC7368].  This makes such networks some easy targets to
   DDoS attacks via their WAN interface.  As these DDoS attacks are easy
   to perform, they may remain undetected by the upstream ISP.  When the
   CPE is congested, the customer is likely to call the ISP hotline.  In
   order to improve the quality of experience of the connectivity as
   well as to automate the request for DDoS mitigation, ISPs are likely
   to consider a standard mean for CPEs to automatically inform a
   dedicated service mitigation platform when they are under a suspected

   Note also that this section only considers DDoS attacks CPE or
   services in the home network are encountering.  This differs from
   DDoS attacks the CPE or any device within the home network may take
   part of - such as botnets.  In the later attacks, the home network
   generates traffic under the control of a botmaster.  Such attacks may
   only be detected once the attacks have been characterized.  It would
   be tempting to consider a feature in the DOTS protocol to allow a
   DOTS server to inform a CPE that some suspect traffic is being sent
   by the CPE so that appropriate actions are undertaken by the CPE/
   user.  Nevertheless, this feature would require some interaction with
   the CPE administrator.  Such scenario is outside the scope of this

   In this use case, ISPs are willing to prevent their customer
   undergoing DDoS attacks in order to enhance the quality of experience
   of their customers, to avoid unnecessary costly call on hot lines as
   well as to optimize the bandwidth of their network.  A key challenge
   for the ISP is to detect DDoS attacks.  In fact, DDoS detection is
   not only fine grained but is also expected to be different for each
   home network or small businesses networks (SOHO), and the ISP is
   unlikely to have sufficient resource to inspect the traffic of all
   its customers.

   In order to address these challenges, ISPs are delegating the DDoS
   detection to CPE of home network or SOHO.  Outsourcing the detection
   on the CPE provides the following advantages to the ISP: 1) Avoid the

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   ISP to dedicate a huge amount of resource for deep packet inspection
   over a large amount of traffic with a specific security policies
   associated to each home network.  It is expected that such traffic
   only constitutes a small fraction of the total traffic the ISP is
   responsible for. 2) DDoS detection is deployed in a scalable way. 3)
   Provide more deterministic DDoS attack detection.  For example, what
   could be suspected to be an UDP flood by the ISP may be consented by
   the terminating point hosted in the home network or SOHO.  In fact,
   without specific home network security policies, the ISP is likely to
   detect DDoS attack over regular traffic or to miss DDoS attacks
   targeting a specific home network or CPE.  In the first case, this
   would result in the ISP spending unnecessary resources and in the
   second case this would directly impact the quality of experience of
   the customer.

   Note that in this scenario slightly differs from the "Enterprise with
   an upstream transit provider DDoS mitigation Service" scenario
   described in Section 3.1.1.  In this scenario, the detection DDoS is
   motivated by the ISP in order to operate appropriately its network.

   For that purpose, it requires some collaboration with the home
   network.  In Section 3.1.1, the target network requests a mitigation
   service from the upstream transit provider in order to operate its

   Even though the motivations differ, there are still significant
   advantages for the home network to collaborate.  On the home network
   or SOHO perspective such collaboration provides the following
   advantages: 1) If it removes the flows contributing to a DDoS
   attacks, then it enhances the quality of experience of the users of
   the targeted services or the entire home network. 2) If mitigation is
   being handled by the ISP rather then the home network, then it
   reduces the management of DDoS attacks by the network administrator
   which involves detection as well as mitigation as well as the
   provisioning of extra resources. 3) If the DDoS detection is based on
   information specific to the home network, such as for example the
   description of the services, the hosts capacities or the network
   topology, then performing the DDoS detection by the home network
   instead of the ISP avoids the home network to leak private
   information to the ISP.  In that sense, it better preserves the home
   network or SOHO privacy while enabling a better detection.  However,
   the request for mitigation may still leak some informations.  ISPs
   must not retrieve sensitive data without the consent of the user.
   This is usually captured in administrative contracts that are out of
   scope of this document.

   When the CPE suspects an attack, it notifies automatically or the
   ISP.  The contact address of the DDoS Mitigation service of the ISP

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   may be hard coded or may be configured manually or automatically
   (e.g., eventually the DHCP server may provide the DDoS mitigation
   service via specific DHCP options).

   The communication to trigger a DDoS mitigation between the home
   network and the ISP is performed using DOTS.  The home network CPE
   implements a DOTS client while the ISP implements a DOTS server.

   The DOTS client on the CPE monitors the status of CPE's resource and
   WAN link bandwidth usage.  If something unusual happens based on
   preconfigured throughput, traffic patter, explicit action from the
   user, or some heuristics methods, the DOTS client sends a DOTS
   mitigation request to the ISP DOTS server.  Typically, a default
   configuration with no additional information associated to the DOTS
   mitigation request is expected.  The ISP derives traffic to mitigate
   from the CPE IP address.

   In some cases, the DOTS mitigation request contains options such as
   some IP addresses or prefixes that belongs to a whitelist or a
   blacklist.  In this case, the white and black lists are not
   associated to some analysis performed by the CPE - as the CPE is
   clearly not expected to analyze such attacks.  Instead these are part
   of some configuration parameters.  For example, in the case of small
   business, one may indicate specific legitimate IP addresses such as
   those used for VPNs, or third party services the company is likely to
   set a session.  Similarly, the CPE may provide the IP addresses
   targeting the assets to be protected inside the network.  Note that
   the IP address is the IP address used to reach the asset from the
   internet, and as such is expected to be globally routable.  Such
   options may include the IP address as well as a service description.
   Similarly to the previous blacklist and whitelist, such information
   are likely not derived from a traffic analysis performed by the CPE,
   but instead are more related to configuration parameters.

   Upon receiving the DOTS mitigation request, the DOTS server
   acknowledges its reception and confirms DDoS mitigation starts or
   not.  Such feed back is mostly to avoid retransmission of the

   Note that the ISP is connected to multiple CPEs and as such the CPE
   can potentially perform DDoS attack to the DOTS server.  ISP may use
   gateways to absorbs the traffic.  These gateways, will typically
   aggregate a smaller number of CPEs and retransmit to the destination
   DOTS Server a selected information.  Note that such gateways may
   somehow act as a DOTS relay, which is implemented with a DOTS Server
   and a DOTS Client.  Note also that the case of a large DDoS attack
   targeting simultaneously multiple CPEs is expected to be detected and

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   mitigated by the upstream architecture, eventually without DOTS
   alerts sent by each single CPE.

   ISP may activate mitigation for the traffic associated to the CPE
   sending the alert or instead to the traffic associated to all CPE.
   Such decisions are not part of DOTS, but instead depend on the
   policies of the ISP.

   It is unlikely the CPE will follow the status of the mitigation.  The
   ISP is only expected to inform the CPE the mitigation has been

   Upon receipt of such notification the CPE may, for example, re-
   activate the monitoring jobs and thus is likely to provide some
   further DOTS alert.

3.2.3.  DDoS Orchestration

   In this use case, one or multiple DDoS telemetry systems or
   monitoring devices like a flow collector monitor a network --
   typically an ISP network.  Upon detection of a DDoS attack, these
   telemetry systems alert an orchestrator in charge of coordinating the
   various DDoS mitigation systems within the domain.  The telemetry
   systems may be configured to provide some necessary or useful pieces
   of information, such as a preliminary analysis of the observation to
   the orchestrator.

   The orchestrator analyses the various information it receives from
   specialized equipement, and elaborates one or multiple DDoS
   mitigation strategies.  In some case, a manual confirmation may also
   be required to choose a proposed strategy or to start the DDoS
   mitigation.  The DDoS mitigation may consists in multiple steps such
   as configuring the network, the various hardware or already
   instantiated DDoS mitigation functions.  In some cases, some specific
   virtual DDoS mitigation functions need to be instantiated and
   properly chained between each other.  Eventually, the coordination of
   the mitigation may involve external DDoS resources such as a transit
   provider (Section 3.1.1) or an MSSP (Section 3.1.4).

   The communication to trigger a DDoS mitigation between the telemetry
   and monitoring systems and the orchestrator is performed using DOTS.
   The telemetry systems implements a DOTS client while the Orchestrator
   implements a DOTS server.

   The communication between a network administrator and the
   orchestrator is also performed using DOTS.  The network administrator
   via its web interfaces implements a DOTS client, while the
   Orchestrator implements a DOTS server.

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   The communication between the Orchestrator and the DDoS mitigation
   systems is performed using DOTS.  The Orchestrator implements a DOTS
   client while the DDoS mitigation systems implement a DOTS server.

   The configuration aspects of each DDoS mitigation system, as well as
   the instantiations of DDoS mitigation functions or network
   configuration is not part of DOTS.  Similarly, the discovery of
   available DDoS mitigation functions is not part of DOTS.

              | network  |C
              | adminis  |<-+
              | trator   |  |
              +----------+  |
                            |                       (internal)
              +----------+  | S+--------------+     +-----------+
              |telemetry/|  +->|              |C   S| DDoS      |+
              |monitoring|<--->| Orchestrator |<--->| mitigation||
              |systems   |C   S|              |<-+  | systems   ||
              +----------+     +--------------+C |  +-----------+|
                                                 |    +----------+
                                                 |  (external)
                                                 |  +-----------+
                                                 | S| DDoS      |
                                                 +->| mitigation|
                                                    | systems   |
              * C is for DOTS client functionality
              * S is for DOTS server functionality

      Figure 1: DDoS Orchestration

   The telemetry systems monitor various traffic network and perform
   their measurement tasks.  They are configured so that when an event
   or some measurements reach a predefined level to report a DOTS
   mitigation request to the Orchestrator.  The DOTS mitigation request
   may be associated with some element such as specific reporting.

   Upon receipt of the DOTS mitigation request from the telemetry
   system, the Orchestrator responds with an acknowledgement, to avoid
   retransmission of the request for mitigation.  The status of the DDoS
   mitigation indicates the Orchestrator is in an analysing phase.  The
   Orchestrator begins collecting various information from various
   telemetry systems in order to correlate the measurements and provide
   an analysis of the event.  Eventually, the Orchestrator may ask

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   additional information to the telemetry system, however, the
   collection of these information is performed outside DOTS.

   The Orchestrator may be configured to start a DDoS mitigation upon
   approval from a network administrator.  The analysis from the
   orchestrator is reported to the network administrator via a web
   interface.  If the network administrator decides to start the
   mitigation, she orders through her web interface a DOTS client to
   send a request for DDoS mitigation.  This request is expected to be
   associated with a context that identifies the DDoS mitigation

   Upon receiving the DOTS request for DDoS mitigation from the network
   administrator, the orchestrator orchestrates the DDoS mitigation
   according to the specified strategy.  Its status indicates the DDoS
   mitigation is starting while not effective.

   Orchestration of the DDoS mitigation systems works similarly as
   described in Section 3.1.1 and Section 3.1.4.  The Orchestrator
   indicates with its status whether the DDoS Mitigation is effective.

   When the DDoS mitigation is finished on the DDoS mitigation systems,
   the orchestrator indicates to the Telemetry systems as well as to the
   network administrator the DDoS mitigation is finished.

4.  Security Considerations

   DOTS is at risk from three primary attacks: DOTS agent impersonation,
   traffic injection, and signaling blocking.  Associated security
   requirements and additional ones are defined in

   Impersonation and traffic injection mitigation can be managed through
   current secure communications best practices.  DOTS is not subject to
   anything new in this area.  One consideration could be to minimize
   the security technologies in use at any one time.  The more needed,
   the greater the risk of failures coming from assumptions on one
   technology providing protection that it does not in the presence of
   another technology.

5.  IANA Considerations

   No IANA considerations exist for this document at this time.

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6.  Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank among others Tirumaleswar Reddy, ,
   Andrew Mortensen, Mohamed Boucadaire, and the DOTS WG chairs Roman D.
   Danyliw and Tobias Gondrom for their valuable feed backs.

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,

7.2.  Informative References

              Mortensen, A., Moskowitz, R., and T. Reddy, "Distributed
              Denial of Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling
              Requirements", draft-ietf-dots-requirements-06 (work in
              progress), July 2017.

   [I2NSF]    "Interface to Network Security Functions (i2nsf)", n.d.,

   [RFC6335]  Cotton, M., Eggert, L., Touch, J., Westerlund, M., and S.
              Cheshire, "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
              Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and
              Transport Protocol Port Number Registry", BCP 165,
              RFC 6335, DOI 10.17487/RFC6335, August 2011,

   [RFC7368]  Chown, T., Ed., Arkko, J., Brandt, A., Troan, O., and J.
              Weil, "IPv6 Home Networking Architecture Principles",
              RFC 7368, DOI 10.17487/RFC7368, October 2014,

Authors' Addresses

   Roland Dobbins
   Arbor Networks

   EMail: rdobbins@arbor.net

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   Daniel Migault
   8400 boulevard Decarie
   Montreal, QC  H4P 2N2

   EMail: daniel.migault@ericsson.com

   Stefan Fouant

   EMail: stefan.fouant@copperriverit.com

   Robert Moskowitz
   HTT Consulting
   Oak Park, MI  48237

   EMail: rgm@labs.htt-consult.com

   Nik Teague
   12061 Bluemont Way
   Reston, VA  20190

   EMail: nteague@verisign.com

   Liang Xia
   No. 101, Software Avenue, Yuhuatai District

   EMail: Frank.xialiang@huawei.com

   Kaname Nishizuka
   NTT Communications
   GranPark 16F 3-4-1 Shibaura, Minato-ku
   Tokyo  108-8118

   EMail: kaname@nttv6.jp

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