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Versions: (draft-bortzmeyer-dprive-rfc7626-bis) 00 01 02 03

dprive                                                     S. Bortzmeyer
Internet-Draft                                                     AFNIC
Obsoletes: 7626 (if approved)                               S. Dickinson
Intended status: Informational                                Sinodun IT
Expires: April 18, 2020                                 October 16, 2019


                       DNS Privacy Considerations
                    draft-ietf-dprive-rfc7626-bis-02

Abstract

   This document describes the privacy issues associated with the use of
   the DNS by Internet users.  It is intended to be an analysis of the
   present situation and does not prescribe solutions.  This document
   obsoletes RFC 7626.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 18, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.



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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.  The Alleged Public Nature of DNS Data . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  Data in the DNS Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.2.1.  Data in the DNS payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.3.  Cache Snooping  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.4.  On the Wire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       3.4.1.  Unencrypted Transports  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       3.4.2.  Encrypted Transports  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.5.  In the Servers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       3.5.1.  In the Recursive Resolvers  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       3.5.2.  In the Authoritative Name Servers . . . . . . . . . .  15
     3.6.  Re-identification and Other Inferences  . . . . . . . . .  16
     3.7.  More Information  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   4.  Actual "Attacks"  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   5.  Legalities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   7.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   8.  Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     9.3.  URIs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27

1.  Introduction

   This document is an analysis of the DNS privacy issues, in the spirit
   of Section 8 of [RFC6973].

   The Domain Name System (DNS) is specified in [RFC1034], [RFC1035],
   and many later RFCs, which have never been consolidated.  It is one
   of the most important infrastructure components of the Internet and
   often ignored or misunderstood by Internet users (and even by many
   professionals).  Almost every activity on the Internet starts with a
   DNS query (and often several).  Its use has many privacy implications
   and this document is an attempt at a comprehensive and accurate list.

   Let us begin with a simplified reminder of how the DNS works (See
   also [RFC8499]).  A client, the stub resolver, issues a DNS query to
   a server, called the recursive resolver (also called caching resolver
   or full resolver or recursive name server).  Let's use the query
   "What are the AAAA records for www.example.com?" as an example.  AAAA
   is the QTYPE (Query Type), and www.example.com is the QNAME (Query
   Name).  (The description that follows assumes a cold cache, for



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   instance, because the server just started.)  The recursive resolver
   will first query the root name servers.  In most cases, the root name
   servers will send a referral.  In this example, the referral will be
   to the .com name servers.  The resolver repeats the query to one of
   the .com name servers.  The .com name servers, in turn, will refer to
   the example.com name servers.  The example.com name server will then
   return the answer.  The root name servers, the name servers of .com,
   and the name servers of example.com are called authoritative name
   servers.  It is important, when analyzing the privacy issues, to
   remember that the question asked to all these name servers is always
   the original question, not a derived question.  The question sent to
   the root name servers is "What are the AAAA records for
   www.example.com?", not "What are the name servers of .com?".  By
   repeating the full question, instead of just the relevant part of the
   question to the next in line, the DNS provides more information than
   necessary to the name server.  In this simplified description,
   recursive resolvers do not implement QNAME minimization as described
   in [RFC7816], which will only send the relevant part of the question
   to the upstream name server.

   Because DNS relies on caching heavily, the algorithm described above
   is actually a bit more complicated, and not all questions are sent to
   the authoritative name servers.  If a few seconds later the stub
   resolver asks the recursive resolver, "What are the SRV records of
   _xmpp-server._tcp.example.com?", the recursive resolver will remember
   that it knows the name servers of example.com and will just query
   them, bypassing the root and .com.  Because there is typically no
   caching in the stub resolver, the recursive resolver, unlike the
   authoritative servers, sees all the DNS traffic.  (Applications, like
   web browsers, may have some form of caching that does not follow DNS
   rules, for instance, because it may ignore the TTL.  So, the
   recursive resolver does not see all the name resolution activity.)

   It should be noted that DNS recursive resolvers sometimes forward
   requests to other recursive resolvers, typically bigger machines,
   with a larger and more shared cache (and the query hierarchy can be
   even deeper, with more than two levels of recursive resolvers).  From
   the point of view of privacy, these forwarders are like resolvers,
   except that they do not see all of the requests being made (due to
   caching in the first resolver).

   At the time of writing, almost all this DNS traffic is currently sent
   in clear (i.e., unencrypted).  However there is increasing deployment
   of DNS-over-TLS (DoT) [RFC7858] and DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) [RFC8484],
   particularly in mobile devices, browsers, and by providers of anycast
   recursive DNS resolution services.  There are a few cases where there
   is some alternative channel encryption, for instance, in an IPsec VPN
   tunnel, at least between the stub resolver and the resolver.



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   Today, almost all DNS queries are sent over UDP [thomas-ditl-tcp].
   This has practical consequences when considering encryption of the
   traffic as a possible privacy technique.  Some encryption solutions
   are only designed for TCP, not UDP and new solutions are still
   emerging [I-D.ietf-quic-transport].

   Another important point to keep in mind when analyzing the privacy
   issues of DNS is the fact that DNS requests received by a server are
   triggered by different reasons.  Let's assume an eavesdropper wants
   to know which web page is viewed by a user.  For a typical web page,
   there are three sorts of DNS requests being issued:

   o  Primary request: this is the domain name in the URL that the user
      typed, selected from a bookmark, or chose by clicking on an
      hyperlink.  Presumably, this is what is of interest for the
      eavesdropper.

   o  Secondary requests: these are the additional requests performed by
      the user agent (here, the web browser) without any direct
      involvement or knowledge of the user.  For the Web, they are
      triggered by embedded content, Cascading Style Sheets (CSS),
      JavaScript code, embedded images, etc.  In some cases, there can
      be dozens of domain names in different contexts on a single web
      page.

   o  Tertiary requests: these are the additional requests performed by
      the DNS system itself.  For instance, if the answer to a query is
      a referral to a set of name servers, and the glue records are not
      returned, the resolver will have to do additional requests to turn
      the name servers' names into IP addresses.  Similarly, even if
      glue records are returned, a careful recursive server will do
      tertiary requests to verify the IP addresses of those records.

   It can be noted also that, in the case of a typical web browser, more
   DNS requests than strictly necessary are sent, for instance, to
   prefetch resources that the user may query later or when
   autocompleting the URL in the address bar.  Both are a big privacy
   concern since they may leak information even about non-explicit
   actions.  For instance, just reading a local HTML page, even without
   selecting the hyperlinks, may trigger DNS requests.

   For privacy-related terms, we will use the terminology from
   [RFC6973].








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2.  Scope

   This document focuses mostly on the study of privacy risks for the
   end user (the one performing DNS requests).  We consider the risks of
   pervasive surveillance [RFC7258] as well as risks coming from a more
   focused surveillance.

   This document does not attempt a comparison of specific privacy
   protections provided by individual networks or organisations, it
   makes only general observations about typical current practices.

   Privacy risks for the holder of a zone (the risk that someone gets
   the data) are discussed in [RFC5936] and [RFC5155].

   Privacy risks for recursive operators (including access providers and
   operators in enterprise networks) such as leakage of private
   namespaces or blocklists are out of scope for this document.

   Non-privacy risks (e.g security related concerns such as cache
   poisoning) are also out of scope.

   The privacy risks associated with the use of other protocols, e.g.,
   unencrypted TLS SNI extensions or HTTPS destination IP address
   fingerprinting are not considered here.

3.  Risks

3.1.  The Alleged Public Nature of DNS Data

   It has long been claimed that "the data in the DNS is public".  While
   this sentence makes sense for an Internet-wide lookup system, there
   are multiple facets to the data and metadata involved that deserve a
   more detailed look.  First, access control lists (ACLs) and private
   namespaces notwithstanding, the DNS operates under the assumption
   that public-facing authoritative name servers will respond to "usual"
   DNS queries for any zone they are authoritative for without further
   authentication or authorization of the client (resolver).  Due to the
   lack of search capabilities, only a given QNAME will reveal the
   resource records associated with that name (or that name's non-
   existence).  In other words: one needs to know what to ask for, in
   order to receive a response.  The zone transfer QTYPE [RFC5936] is
   often blocked or restricted to authenticated/authorized access to
   enforce this difference (and maybe for other reasons).

   Another differentiation to be considered is between the DNS data
   itself and a particular transaction (i.e., a DNS name lookup).  DNS
   data and the results of a DNS query are public, within the boundaries
   described above, and may not have any confidentiality requirements.



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   However, the same is not true of a single transaction or a sequence
   of transactions; that transaction is not / should not be public.  A
   typical example from outside the DNS world is: the web site of
   Alcoholics Anonymous is public; the fact that you visit it should not
   be.

3.2.  Data in the DNS Request

   The DNS request includes many fields, but two of them seem
   particularly relevant for the privacy issues: the QNAME and the
   source IP address. "source IP address" is used in a loose sense of
   "source IP address + maybe source port number", because the port
   number is also in the request and can be used to differentiate
   between several users sharing an IP address (behind a Carrier-Grade
   NAT (CGN) or a NPTv6, for instance [RFC6269]).

   The QNAME is the full name sent by the user.  It gives information
   about what the user does ("What are the MX records of example.net?"
   means he probably wants to send email to someone at example.net,
   which may be a domain used by only a few persons and is therefore
   very revealing about communication relationships).  Some QNAMEs are
   more sensitive than others.  For instance, querying the A record of a
   well-known web statistics domain reveals very little (everybody
   visits web sites that use this analytics service), but querying the A
   record of www.verybad.example where verybad.example is the domain of
   an organization that some people find offensive or objectionable may
   create more problems for the user.  Also, sometimes, the QNAME embeds
   the software one uses, which could be a privacy issue.  For instance,
   _ldap._tcp.Default-First-Site-Name._sites.gc._msdcs.example.org.
   There are also some BitTorrent clients that query an SRV record for
   _bittorrent-tracker._tcp.domain.example.

   Another important thing about the privacy of the QNAME is the future
   usages.  Today, the lack of privacy is an obstacle to putting
   potentially sensitive or personally identifiable data in the DNS.  At
   the moment, your DNS traffic might reveal that you are doing email
   but not with whom.  If your Mail User Agent (MUA) starts looking up
   Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) keys in the DNS [RFC7929], then privacy
   becomes a lot more important.  And email is just an example; there
   would be other really interesting uses for a more privacy-friendly
   DNS.

   For the communication between the stub resolver and the recursive
   resolver, the source IP address is the address of the user's machine.
   Therefore, all the issues and warnings about collection of IP
   addresses apply here.  For the communication between the recursive
   resolver and the authoritative name servers, the source IP address
   has a different meaning; it does not have the same status as the



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   source address in an HTTP connection.  It is typically the IP address
   of the recursive resolver that, in a way, "hides" the real user.
   However, hiding does not always work.  Sometimes EDNS(0) Client
   subnet [RFC7871] is used (see its privacy analysis in
   [denis-edns-client-subnet]).  Sometimes the end user has a personal
   recursive resolver on her machine.  In both cases, the IP address is
   as sensitive as it is for HTTP [sidn-entrada].

   A note about IP addresses: there is currently no IETF document that
   describes in detail all the privacy issues around IP addressing.  In
   the meantime, the discussion here is intended to include both IPv4
   and IPv6 source addresses.  For a number of reasons, their assignment
   and utilization characteristics are different, which may have
   implications for details of information leakage associated with the
   collection of source addresses.  (For example, a specific IPv6 source
   address seen on the public Internet is less likely than an IPv4
   address to originate behind an address sharing scheme.)  However, for
   both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, it is important to note that source
   addresses are propagated with queries and comprise metadata about the
   host, user, or application that originated them.

3.2.1.  Data in the DNS payload

   At the time of writing there are no standardized client identifiers
   contained in the DNS payload itself (ECS [RFC7871] while widely used
   is only of Category Informational).

   DNS Cookies [RFC7873] are a lightweight DNS transaction security
   mechanism that provides limited protection against a variety of
   increasingly common denial-of-service and amplification/forgery or
   cache poisoning attacks by off-path attackers.  It is noted, however,
   that they are designed to just verify IP addresses (and should change
   once a client's IP address changes), they are not designed to
   actively track users (like HTTP cookies).

   There are anecdotal accounts of MAC addresses [1] and even user names
   being inserted in non-standard EDNS(0) options for stub to resolver
   communications to support proprietary functionality implemented at
   the resolver (e.g., parental filtering).

3.3.  Cache Snooping

   The content of recursive resolvers' caches can reveal data about the
   clients using it (the privacy risks depend on the number of clients).
   This information can sometimes be examined by sending DNS queries
   with RD=0 to inspect cache content, particularly looking at the DNS
   TTLs [grangeia.snooping].  Since this also is a reconnaissance




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   technique for subsequent cache poisoning attacks, some counter
   measures have already been developed and deployed.

3.4.  On the Wire

3.4.1.  Unencrypted Transports

   For unencrypted transports, DNS traffic can be seen by an
   eavesdropper like any other traffic.  (DNSSEC, specified in
   [RFC4033], explicitly excludes confidentiality from its goals.)  So,
   if an initiator starts an HTTPS communication with a recipient, while
   the HTTP traffic will be encrypted, the DNS exchange prior to it will
   not be.  When other protocols will become more and more privacy-aware
   and secured against surveillance (e.g., [RFC8446],
   [I-D.ietf-quic-transport]), the use of unencrypted transports for DNS
   may become "the weakest link" in privacy.  It is noted that at the
   time of writing there is on-going work attempting to encrypt the SNI
   in the TLS handshake [I-D.ietf-tls-sni-encryption].

   An important specificity of the DNS traffic is that it may take a
   different path than the communication between the initiator and the
   recipient.  For instance, an eavesdropper may be unable to tap the
   wire between the initiator and the recipient but may have access to
   the wire going to the recursive resolver, or to the authoritative
   name servers.

   The best place to tap, from an eavesdropper's point of view, is
   clearly between the stub resolvers and the recursive resolvers,
   because traffic is not limited by DNS caching.

   The attack surface between the stub resolver and the rest of the
   world can vary widely depending upon how the end user's device is
   configured.  By order of increasing attack surface:

   o  The recursive resolver can be on the end user's device.  In
      (currently) a small number of cases, individuals may choose to
      operate their own DNS resolver on their local machine.  In this
      case, the attack surface for the connection between the stub
      resolver and the caching resolver is limited to that single
      machine.

   o  The recursive resolver may be at the local network edge.  For
      many/most enterprise networks and for some residential users, the
      caching resolver may exist on a server at the edge of the local
      network.  In this case, the attack surface is the local network.
      Note that in large enterprise networks, the DNS resolver may not
      be located at the edge of the local network but rather at the edge
      of the overall enterprise network.  In this case, the enterprise



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      network could be thought of as similar to the Internet Access
      Provider (IAP) network referenced below.

   o  The recursive resolver can be in the IAP network.  For most
      residential users and potentially other networks, the typical case
      is for the end user's device to be configured (typically
      automatically through DHCP or RA options) with the addresses of
      the DNS proxy in the CPE, which in turns points to the DNS
      recursive resolvers at the IAP.  The attack surface for on-the-
      wire attacks is therefore from the end user system across the
      local network and across the IAP network to the IAP's recursive
      resolvers.

   o  The recursive resolver can be a public DNS service.  Some machines
      may be configured to use public DNS resolvers such as those
      operated by Google Public DNS or OpenDNS.  The end user may have
      configured their machine to use these DNS recursive resolvers
      themselves -- or their IAP may have chosen to use the public DNS
      resolvers rather than operating their own resolvers.  In this
      case, the attack surface is the entire public Internet between the
      end user's connection and the public DNS service.

   It is also noted that typically a device connected _only_ to a modern
   cellular network is

   o  directly configured with only the recursive resolvers of the IAP
      and

   o  all traffic (including DNS) between the device and the cellular
      network is encrypted following an encryption profile edited by the
      IPv6 for Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP [2]).

   The attack surface for this specific scenario is not considered here.

3.4.2.  Encrypted Transports

   The use of encrypted transports directly mitigates passive
   surveillance of the DNS payload, however there are still some privacy
   attacks possible.  This section enumerates the residual privacy risks
   to an end user when an attacker can passively monitor encrypted DNS
   traffic flows on the wire.

   These are cases where user identification, fingerprinting or
   correlations may be possible due to the use of certain transport
   layers or clear text/observable features.  These issues are not
   specific to DNS, but DNS traffic is susceptible to these attacks when
   using specific transports.




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   There are some general examples, for example, certain studies have
   highlighted that IPv4 TTL, IPv6 Hop Limit, or TCP Window sizes os-
   fingerprint [3] values can be used to fingerprint client OS's or that
   various techniques can be used to de-NAT DNS queries dns-de-nat [4].

   The use of clear text transport options to optimize latency may also
   identify a user, e.g., using TCP Fast Open with TLS 1.2 [RFC7413].

   More specifically, (since the deployment of encrypted transports is
   not widespread at the time of writing) users wishing to use encrypted
   transports for DNS may in practice be limited in the resolver
   services available.  Given this, the choice of a user to configure a
   single resolver (or a fixed set of resolvers) and an encrypted
   transport to use in all network environments can actually serve to
   identify the user as one that desires privacy and can provide an
   added mechanism to track them as they move across network
   environments.

   Users of encrypted transports are also highly likely to re-use
   sessions for multiple DNS queries to optimize performance (e.g., via
   DNS pipelining or HTTPS multiplexing).  Certain configuration options
   for encrypted transports could also in principle fingerprint a user
   or client application.  For example:

   o  TLS version or cipher suite selection

   o  session resumption

   o  the maximum number of messages to send or

   o  a maximum connection time before closing a connections and re-
      opening.

   Whilst there are known attacks on older versions of TLS the most
   recent recommendations [RFC7525] and developments [RFC8446] in this
   area largely mitigate those.

   Traffic analysis of unpadded encrypted traffic is also possible
   [pitfalls-of-dns-encrption] because the sizes and timing of encrypted
   DNS requests and responses can be correlated to unencrypted DNS
   requests upstream of a recursive resolver.

3.5.  In the Servers

   Using the terminology of [RFC6973], the DNS servers (recursive
   resolvers and authoritative servers) are enablers: they facilitate
   communication between an initiator and a recipient without being
   directly in the communications path.  As a result, they are often



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   forgotten in risk analysis.  But, to quote again [RFC6973], "Although
   [...] enablers may not generally be considered as attackers, they may
   all pose privacy threats (depending on the context) because they are
   able to observe, collect, process, and transfer privacy-relevant
   data."  In [RFC6973] parlance, enablers become observers when they
   start collecting data.

   Many programs exist to collect and analyze DNS data at the servers --
   from the "query log" of some programs like BIND to tcpdump and more
   sophisticated programs like PacketQ [packetq] and DNSmezzo
   [dnsmezzo].  The organization managing the DNS server can use this
   data itself, or it can be part of a surveillance program like PRISM
   [prism] and pass data to an outside observer.

   Sometimes, this data is kept for a long time and/or distributed to
   third parties for research purposes [ditl] [day-at-root], security
   analysis, or surveillance tasks.  These uses are sometimes under some
   sort of contract, with various limitations, for instance, on
   redistribution, given the sensitive nature of the data.  Also, there
   are observation points in the network that gather DNS data and then
   make it accessible to third parties for research or security purposes
   ("passive DNS" [passive-dns]).

3.5.1.  In the Recursive Resolvers

   Recursive Resolvers see all the traffic since there is typically no
   caching before them.  To summarize: your recursive resolver knows a
   lot about you.  The resolver of a large IAP, or a large public
   resolver, can collect data from many users.

3.5.1.1.  Resolver Selection

   Given all the above considerations, the choice of recursive resolver
   has direct privacy considerations for end users.  Historically, end
   user devices have used the DHCP-provided local network recursive
   resolver, which may have strong, medium, or weak privacy policies
   depending on the network.  Privacy policies for these servers may or
   may not be available and users need to be aware that privacy
   guarantees will vary with network.

   More recently some networks and end users have actively chosen to use
   a large public resolver instead, e.g., Google Public DNS [5],
   Cloudflare [6], or Quad9 [7].  There can be many reasons: cost
   considerations for network operators, better reliability or anti-
   censorship considerations are just a few.  Such services typically do
   provide a privacy policy and the end user can get an idea of the data
   collected by such operators by reading one e.g., Google Public DNS -
   Your Privacy [8].



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   Even more recently some applications have announced plans to deploy
   application-specific DNS settings which might be enabled by default.
   For example, current proposals by Firefox [firefox] revolve around a
   default based on the geographic region, using a pre-configured list
   of large public resolver services which offer DoH, combined with non-
   standard probing and signalling mechanism to disable DoH in
   particular networks.  Whereas Chrome [chrome] is experimenting with
   using DoH to the DHCP-provided resolver if it is on a list of DoH-
   compatible providers.  At the time of writing, efforts to provide
   standardized signalling mechanisms for applications to discover the
   services offered by local resolvers are in progress
   [I-D.ietf-dnsop-resolver-information].

   If applications enable application-specific DNS settings without
   properly informing the user of the change (or do not provide an
   option for user configuration of the application's recursive
   resolver) there is a potential privacy issue; depending on the
   network context and the application default, the application might
   use a recursive server that provides less privacy protection than the
   default network-provided server without the user's full knowledge.
   Users that are fully aware of an application specific DNS setting may
   want to actively override any default in favour of their chosen
   recursive resolver.

   There are also concerns that, should the trend towards using large
   public resolvers increase, this will itself provide a privacy
   concern, due to a small number of operators having visibility of the
   majority of DNS requests globally and the potential for aggregating
   data across services about a user.  Additionally the operating
   organisation of the resolver may be in a different legal jurisdiction
   than the user, which creates further privacy concerns around legal
   protections of and access to the data collected by the operator.

   At the time of writing the deployment models for DNS are evolving,
   their implications are complex and extend beyond the scope of this
   document.  They are the subject of much other work including
   [I-D.livingood-doh-implementation-risks-issues], the IETF ADD mailing
   list [9] and the Encrypted DNS Deployment Initiative [10].

3.5.1.2.  Active Attacks on Resolver Configuration

   The previous section discussed DNS privacy, assuming that all the
   traffic was directed to the intended servers (i.e those that would be
   used in the absence of an active attack) and that the potential
   attacker was purely passive.  But, in reality, we can have active
   attackers in the network redirecting the traffic, not just to observe
   it but also potentially change it.




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   For instance, a DHCP server controlled by an attacker can direct you
   to a recursive resolver also controlled by that attacker.  Most of
   the time, it seems to be done to divert traffic in order to also
   direct the user to a web server controlled by the attacker.  However
   it could be used just to capture the traffic and gather information
   about you.

   Other attacks, besides using DHCP, are possible.  The cleartext
   traffic from a DNS client to a DNS server can be intercepted along
   its way from originator to intended source, for instance, by
   transparent attacker controlled DNS proxies in the network that will
   divert the traffic intended for a legitimate DNS server.  This server
   can masquerade as the intended server and respond with data to the
   client.  (Attacker controlled servers that inject malicious data are
   possible, but it is a separate problem not relevant to privacy.)  A
   server controlled by an attacker may respond correctly for a long
   period of time, thereby foregoing detection.

   Also, malware like DNSchanger [dnschanger] can change the recursive
   resolver in the machine's configuration, or the routing itself can be
   subverted (for instance, [ripe-atlas-turkey]).

3.5.1.3.  Blocking of User Selected Services

   User privacy can also be at risk if there is blocking (by local
   network operators or more general mechanisms) of access to remote
   recursive servers that offer encrypted transports when the local
   resolver does not offer encryption and/or has very poor privacy
   policies.  For example, active blocking of port 853 for DoT or of
   specific IP addresses (e.g., 1.1.1.1 or 2606:4700:4700::1111) could
   restrict the resolvers available to the user.  The extent of the risk
   to end user privacy is highly dependent on the specific network and
   user context; a user on a network that is known to perform
   surveillance would be compromised if they could not access such
   services, whereas a user on a trusted network might have no privacy
   motivation to do so.

   In some cases, networks might block access to remote resolvers for
   security reasons, for example to cripple malware and bots or to
   prevent data exfiltration methods that use encrypted DNS
   communications as transport.  In these cases, if the network fully
   respects user privacy in other ways (i.e.  encrypted DNS and good
   data handling policies) the block can serve to further protect user
   privacy by ensuring such security precautions.

   It is also noted that attacks on remote resolver services, e.g., DDoS
   could force users to switch to other services that do not offer
   encrypted transports for DNS.



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3.5.1.4.  Authentication of Servers

   Both DoH and Strict mode for DoT [RFC8310] require authentication of
   the server and therefore as long as the authentication credentials
   are obtained over a secure channel then using either of these
   transports defeats the attack of re-directing traffic to rogue
   servers.  Of course attacks on these secure channels are also
   possible, but out of the scope of this document.

3.5.1.5.  Encrypted Transports

3.5.1.5.1.  DoT and DoH

   Use of encrypted transports does not reduce the data available in the
   recursive resolver and ironically can actually expose more
   information about users to operators.  As mentioned in Section 3.4
   use of session based encrypted transports (TCP/TLS) can expose
   correlation data about users.  Such concerns in the TCP/TLS layers
   apply equally to DoT and DoH which both use TLS as the underlying
   transport, some examples are:

   o  fingerprinting based on TLS version and/or cipher suite selection

   o  user tracking via session resumption in TLS 1.2

3.5.1.5.2.  DoH Specific Considerations

   Section 8 of [RFC8484] highlights some of the privacy consideration
   differences between HTTP and DNS.  As a deliberate design choice DoH
   inherits the privacy properties of the HTTPS stack and as a
   consequence introduces new privacy concerns when compared with DNS
   over UDP, TCP or TLS [RFC7858].  The rationale for this decision is
   that retaining the ability to leverage the full functionality of the
   HTTP ecosystem is more important than placing specific constraints on
   this new protocol based on privacy considerations (modulo limiting
   the use of HTTP cookies).

   In analyzing the new issues introduced by DoH it is helpful to
   recognize that there exists a natural tension between

   o  the wide practice in HTTP to use various headers to optimize HTTP
      connections, functionality and behaviour (which can facilitate
      user identification and tracking)

   o  and the fact that the DNS payload is currently very tightly
      encoded and contains no standardized user identifiers.





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   DoT, for example, would normally contain no client identifiers above
   the TLS layer and a resolver would see only a stream of DNS query
   payloads originating within one or more connections from a client IP
   address.  Whereas if DoH clients commonly include several headers in
   a DNS message (e.g., user-agent and accept-language) this could lead
   to the DoH server being able to identify the source of individual DNS
   requests not only to a specific end user device but to a specific
   application.

   Additionally, depending on the client architecture, isolation of DoH
   queries from other HTTP traffic may or may not be feasible or
   desirable.  Depending on the use case, isolation of DoH queries from
   other HTTP traffic may or may not increase privacy.

   The picture for privacy considerations and user expectations for DoH
   with respect to what additional data may be available to the DoH
   server compared to DNS over UDP, TCP or TLS is complex and requires a
   detailed analysis for each use case.  In particular the choice of
   HTTPS functionality vs privacy is specifically made an implementation
   choice in DoH and users may well have differing privacy expectations
   depending on the DoH use case and implementation.

   At the extremes, there may be implementations that attempt to achieve
   parity with DoT from a privacy perspective at the cost of using no
   identifiable headers, there might be others that provide feature rich
   data flows where the low-level origin of the DNS query is easily
   identifiable.

   Privacy focused users should be aware of the potential for additional
   client identifiers in DoH compared to DoT and may want to only use
   DoH client implementations that provide clear guidance on what
   identifiers they add.

3.5.2.  In the Authoritative Name Servers

   Unlike what happens for recursive resolvers, observation capabilities
   of authoritative name servers are limited by caching; they see only
   the requests for which the answer was not in the cache.  For
   aggregated statistics ("What is the percentage of LOC queries?"),
   this is sufficient, but it prevents an observer from seeing
   everything.  Similarly the increasing deployment of QNAME
   minimisation [ripe-qname-measurements] reduces the data visible at
   the authoritative name server.  Still, the authoritative name servers
   see a part of the traffic, and this subset may be sufficient to
   violate some privacy expectations.

   Also, the end user typically has some legal/contractual link with the
   recursive resolver (he has chosen the IAP, or he has chosen to use a



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   given public resolver), while having no control and perhaps no
   awareness of the role of the authoritative name servers and their
   observation abilities.

   As noted before, using a local resolver or a resolver close to the
   machine decreases the attack surface for an on-the-wire eavesdropper.
   But it may decrease privacy against an observer located on an
   authoritative name server.  This authoritative name server will see
   the IP address of the end client instead of the address of a big
   recursive resolver shared by many users.

   This "protection", when using a large resolver with many clients, is
   no longer present if ECS [RFC7871] is used because, in this case, the
   authoritative name server sees the original IP address (or prefix,
   depending on the setup).

   As of today, all the instances of one root name server, L-root,
   receive together around 50,000 queries per second.  While most of it
   is "junk" (errors on the Top-Level Domain (TLD) name), it gives an
   idea of the amount of big data that pours into name servers.  (And
   even "junk" can leak information; for instance, if there is a typing
   error in the TLD, the user will send data to a TLD that is not the
   usual one.)

   Many domains, including TLDs, are partially hosted by third-party
   servers, sometimes in a different country.  The contracts between the
   domain manager and these servers may or may not take privacy into
   account.  Whatever the contract, the third-party hoster may be honest
   or not but, in any case, it will have to follow its local laws.  So,
   requests to a given ccTLD may go to servers managed by organizations
   outside of the ccTLD's country.  End users may not anticipate that,
   when doing a security analysis.

   Also, it seems (see the survey described in [aeris-dns]) that there
   is a strong concentration of authoritative name servers among
   "popular" domains (such as the Alexa Top N list).  For instance,
   among the Alexa Top 100K, one DNS provider hosts today 10% of the
   domains.  The ten most important DNS providers host together one
   third of the domains.  With the control (or the ability to sniff the
   traffic) of a few name servers, you can gather a lot of information.

3.6.  Re-identification and Other Inferences

   An observer has access not only to the data he/she directly collects
   but also to the results of various inferences about this data.  The
   term 'observer' here is used very generally, it might be one that is
   passively observing cleartext DNS traffic, one in the network that is




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   actively attacking the user by re-directing DNS resolution, or it
   might be a local or remote resolver operator.

   For instance, a user can be re-identified via DNS queries.  If the
   adversary knows a user's identity and can watch their DNS queries for
   a period, then that same adversary may be able to re-identify the
   user solely based on their pattern of DNS queries later on regardless
   of the location from which the user makes those queries.  For
   example, one study [herrmann-reidentification] found that such re-
   identification is possible so that "73.1% of all day-to-day links
   were correctly established, i.e., user u was either re-identified
   unambiguously (1) or the classifier correctly reported that u was not
   present on day t+1 any more (2)."  While that study related to web
   browsing behavior, equally characteristic patterns may be produced
   even in machine-to-machine communications or without a user taking
   specific actions, e.g., at reboot time if a characteristic set of
   services are accessed by the device.

   For instance, one could imagine that an intelligence agency
   identifies people going to a site by putting in a very long DNS name
   and looking for queries of a specific length.  Such traffic analysis
   could weaken some privacy solutions.

   The IAB privacy and security program also have a work in progress
   [RFC7624] that considers such inference-based attacks in a more
   general framework.

3.7.  More Information

   Useful background information can also be found in [tor-leak] (about
   the risk of privacy leak through DNS) and in a few academic papers:
   [yanbin-tsudik], [castillo-garcia], [fangming-hori-sakurai], and
   [federrath-fuchs-herrmann-piosecny].

4.  Actual "Attacks"

   A very quick examination of DNS traffic may lead to the false
   conclusion that extracting the needle from the haystack is difficult.
   "Interesting" primary DNS requests are mixed with useless (for the
   eavesdropper) secondary and tertiary requests (see the terminology in
   Section 1).  But, in this time of "big data" processing, powerful
   techniques now exist to get from the raw data to what the
   eavesdropper is actually interested in.

   Many research papers about malware detection use DNS traffic to
   detect "abnormal" behavior that can be traced back to the activity of
   malware on infected machines.  Yes, this research was done for the
   good, but technically it is a privacy attack and it demonstrates the



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   power of the observation of DNS traffic.  See [dns-footprint],
   [dagon-malware], and [darkreading-dns].

   Passive DNS systems [passive-dns] allow reconstruction of the data of
   sometimes an entire zone.  They are used for many reasons -- some
   good, some bad.  Well-known passive DNS systems keep only the DNS
   responses, and not the source IP address of the client, precisely for
   privacy reasons.  Other passive DNS systems may not be so careful.
   And there is still the potential problems with revealing QNAMEs.

   The revelations from the Edward Snowden documents, which were leaked
   from the National Security Agency (NSA) provide evidence of the use
   of the DNS in mass surveillance operations [morecowbell].  For
   example the MORECOWBELL surveillance program, which uses a dedicated
   covert monitoring infrastructure to actively query DNS servers and
   perform HTTP requests to obtain meta information about services and
   to check their availability.  Also the QUANTUMTHEORY project which
   includes detecting lookups for certain addresses and injecting bogus
   replies is another good example showing that the lack of privacy
   protections in the DNS is actively exploited.

5.  Legalities

   To our knowledge, there are no specific privacy laws for DNS data, in
   any country.  Interpreting general privacy laws like
   [data-protection-directive] or GDPR [11] applicable in the European
   Union in the context of DNS traffic data is not an easy task, and we
   do not know a court precedent here.  See an interesting analysis in
   [sidn-entrada].

6.  Security Considerations

   This document is entirely about security, more precisely privacy.  It
   just lays out the problem; it does not try to set requirements (with
   the choices and compromises they imply), much less define solutions.
   Possible solutions to the issues described here are discussed in
   other documents (currently too many to all be mentioned); see, for
   instance, 'Recommendations for DNS Privacy Operators'
   [I-D.ietf-dprive-bcp-op].

7.  Acknowledgments

   Thanks to Nathalie Boulvard and to the CENTR members for the original
   work that led to this document.  Thanks to Ondrej Sury for the
   interesting discussions.  Thanks to Mohsen Souissi and John Heidemann
   for proofreading and to Paul Hoffman, Matthijs Mekking, Marcos Sanz,
   Tim Wicinski, Francis Dupont, Allison Mankin, and Warren Kumari for
   proofreading, providing technical remarks, and making many



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   readability improvements.  Thanks to Dan York, Suzanne Woolf, Tony
   Finch, Stephen Farrell, Peter Koch, Simon Josefsson, and Frank Denis
   for good written contributions.  Thanks to Vittorio Bertola and
   Mohamed Boucadair for a detailed review of the -bis.  And thanks to
   the IESG members for the last remarks.

8.  Changelog

   draft-ietf-dprive-rfc7626-bis-02

   o  Numerous editorial corrections thanks to Mohamed Boucadair and

      *  Minor additions to Scope section

      *  New text on cellular network DNS

   o  Additional text from Vittorio Bertola on blocking and security

   draft-ietf-dprive-rfc7626-bis-01

   o  Re-structure section 3.5 (was 2.5)

      *  Collect considerations for recursive resolvers together

      *  Re-work several sections here to clarify their context (e.g.,
         'Rogue servers' becomes 'Active attacks on resolver
         configuration')

      *  Add discussion of resolver selection

   o  Update text and old reference on Snowdon revelations.

   o  Add text on and references to QNAME minimisation RFC and
      deployment measurements

   o  Correct outdated references

   o  Clarify scope by adding a Scope section (was Risks overview)

   o  Clarify what risks are considered in section 3.4.2

   draft-ietf-dprive-rfc7626-bis-00

   o  Rename after WG adoption

   o  Use DoT acronym throughout

   o  Minor updates to status of deployment and other drafts



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   draft-bortzmeyer-dprive-rfc7626-bis-02

   o  Update various references and fix some nits.

   draft-bortzmeyer-dprive-rfc7626-bis-01

   o  Update reference for dickinson-bcp-op to draft-dickinson-dprive-
      bcp-op

   draft-borztmeyer-dprive-rfc7626-bis-00:

   Initial commit.  Differences to RFC7626:

   o  Update many references

   o  Add discussions of encrypted transports including DoT and DoH

   o  Add section on DNS payload

   o  Add section on authentication of servers

   o  Add section on blocking of services

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC1034]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
              STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>.

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
              November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.

   [RFC6973]  Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
              Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
              Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013, <https://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc6973>.

   [RFC7258]  Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
              Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May
              2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258>.







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9.2.  Informative References

   [aeris-dns]
              Vinot, N., "Vie privee: et le DNS alors?", (In French),
              2015, <https://blog.imirhil.fr/vie-privee-et-le-dns-
              alors.html>.

   [castillo-garcia]
              Castillo-Perez, S. and J. Garcia-Alfaro, "Anonymous
              Resolution of DNS Queries", 2008,
              <http://deic.uab.es/~joaquin/papers/is08.pdf>.

   [chrome]   Baheux, , "Experimenting with same-provider DNS-over-HTTPS
              upgrade", September 2019,
              <https://blog.chromium.org/2019/09/experimenting-with-
              same-provider-dns.html>.

   [dagon-malware]
              Dagon, D., "Corrupted DNS Resolution Paths: The Rise of a
              Malicious Resolution Authority", ISC/OARC Workshop, 2007,
              <https://www.dns-oarc.net/files/workshop-2007/Dagon-
              Resolution-corruption.pdf>.

   [darkreading-dns]
              Lemos, R., "Got Malware? Three Signs Revealed In DNS
              Traffic", InformationWeek Dark Reading, May 2013,
              <http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/
              got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/
              d-id/1139680>.

   [data-protection-directive]
              European Parliament, "Directive 95/46/EC of the European
              Pariament and of the council on the protection of
              individuals with regard to the processing of personal data
              and on the free movement of such data", Official Journal L
              281, pp. 0031 - 0050, November 1995, <http://eur-
              lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
              LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML>.

   [day-at-root]
              Castro, S., Wessels, D., Fomenkov, M., and K. Claffy, "A
              Day at the Root of the Internet", ACM SIGCOMM Computer
              Communication Review, Vol. 38, Number 5,
              DOI 10.1145/1452335.1452341, October 2008,
              <http://www.sigcomm.org/sites/default/files/ccr/
              papers/2008/October/1452335-1452341.pdf>.





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   [denis-edns-client-subnet]
              Denis, F., "Security and privacy issues of edns-client-
              subnet", August 2013, <https://00f.net/2013/08/07/edns-
              client-subnet/>.

   [ditl]     CAIDA, "A Day in the Life of the Internet (DITL)", 2002,
              <http://www.caida.org/projects/ditl/>.

   [dns-footprint]
              Stoner, E., "DNS Footprint of Malware", OARC Workshop,
              October 2010, <https://www.dns-oarc.net/files/workshop-
              201010/OARC-ers-20101012.pdf>.

   [dnschanger]
              Wikipedia, "DNSChanger", October 2013,
              <https://en.wikipedia.org/w/
              index.php?title=DNSChanger&oldid=578749672>.

   [dnsmezzo]
              Bortzmeyer, S., "DNSmezzo", 2009,
              <http://www.dnsmezzo.net/>.

   [fangming-hori-sakurai]
              Fangming, Z., Hori, Y., and K. Sakurai, "Analysis of
              Privacy Disclosure in DNS Query", 2007 International
              Conference on Multimedia and Ubiquitous Engineering (MUE
              2007), Seoul, Korea, ISBN: 0-7695-2777-9, pp. 952-957,
              DOI 10.1109/MUE.2007.84, April 2007,
              <http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1262690.1262986>.

   [federrath-fuchs-herrmann-piosecny]
              Federrath, H., Fuchs, K., Herrmann, D., and C. Piosecny,
              "Privacy-Preserving DNS: Analysis of Broadcast, Range
              Queries and Mix-based Protection Methods", Computer
              Security ESORICS 2011, Springer, page(s) 665-683,
              ISBN 978-3-642-23821-5, 2011, <https://svs.informatik.uni-
              hamburg.de/publications/2011/2011-09-14_FFHP_PrivacyPreser
              vingDNS_ESORICS2011.pdf>.

   [firefox]  Deckelmann, , "What's next in making Encrypted DNS-over-
              HTTPS the Default", September 2019,
              <https://blog.mozilla.org/futurereleases/2019/09/06/whats-
              next-in-making-dns-over-https-the-default/>.








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   [grangeia.snooping]
              Grangeia, L., "DNS Cache Snooping or Snooping the Cache
              for Fun and Profit", 2005,
              <https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Cache-Snooping-or-
              Snooping-the-Cache-for-Fun-and-
              1-Grangeia/9b22f606e10b3609eafbdcbfc9090b63be8778c3>.

   [herrmann-reidentification]
              Herrmann, D., Gerber, C., Banse, C., and H. Federrath,
              "Analyzing Characteristic Host Access Patterns for Re-
              Identification of Web User Sessions",
              DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-27937-9_10, 2012, <http://epub.uni-
              regensburg.de/21103/1/Paper_PUL_nordsec_published.pdf>.

   [I-D.ietf-dnsop-resolver-information]
              Sood, P., Arends, R., and P. Hoffman, "DNS Resolver
              Information Self-publication", draft-ietf-dnsop-resolver-
              information-00 (work in progress), August 2019.

   [I-D.ietf-dprive-bcp-op]
              Dickinson, S., Overeinder, B., Rijswijk-Deij, R., and A.
              Mankin, "Recommendations for DNS Privacy Service
              Operators", draft-ietf-dprive-bcp-op-04 (work in
              progress), October 2019.

   [I-D.ietf-quic-transport]
              Iyengar, J. and M. Thomson, "QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed
              and Secure Transport", draft-ietf-quic-transport-23 (work
              in progress), September 2019.

   [I-D.ietf-tls-sni-encryption]
              Huitema, C. and E. Rescorla, "Issues and Requirements for
              SNI Encryption in TLS", draft-ietf-tls-sni-encryption-08
              (work in progress), October 2019.

   [I-D.livingood-doh-implementation-risks-issues]
              Livingood, J., Antonakakis, M., Sleigh, B., and A.
              Winfield, "Centralized DNS over HTTPS (DoH) Implementation
              Issues and Risks", draft-livingood-doh-implementation-
              risks-issues-04 (work in progress), September 2019.

   [morecowbell]
              Grothoff, C., Wachs, M., Ermert, M., and J. Appelbaum,
              "NSA's MORECOWBELL: Knell for DNS", GNUnet e.V., January
              2015, <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2610/2b99bdd6a258a
              98740af8217ba8da8a1e4fa.pdf>.





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   [packetq]  DNS-OARC, "PacketQ, a simple tool to make SQL-queries
              against PCAP-files", 2011, <https://github.com/DNS-OARC/
              PacketQ>.

   [passive-dns]
              Weimer, F., "Passive DNS Replication", April 2005,
              <https://www.first.org/conference/2005/papers/florian-
              weimer-slides-1.pdf>.

   [pitfalls-of-dns-encrption]
              Shulman, H., "Pretty Bad Privacy:Pitfalls of DNS
              Encryption", <https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2665959>.

   [prism]    Wikipedia, "PRISM (surveillance program)", July 2015,
              <https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=PRISM_(surveil
              lance_program)&oldid=673789455>.

   [RFC4033]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
              RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4033>.

   [RFC5155]  Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS
              Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of
              Existence", RFC 5155, DOI 10.17487/RFC5155, March 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5155>.

   [RFC5936]  Lewis, E. and A. Hoenes, Ed., "DNS Zone Transfer Protocol
              (AXFR)", RFC 5936, DOI 10.17487/RFC5936, June 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5936>.

   [RFC6269]  Ford, M., Ed., Boucadair, M., Durand, A., Levis, P., and
              P. Roberts, "Issues with IP Address Sharing", RFC 6269,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6269, June 2011, <https://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc6269>.

   [RFC7413]  Cheng, Y., Chu, J., Radhakrishnan, S., and A. Jain, "TCP
              Fast Open", RFC 7413, DOI 10.17487/RFC7413, December 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7413>.

   [RFC7525]  Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
              "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
              Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
              (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
              2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.






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   [RFC7624]  Barnes, R., Schneier, B., Jennings, C., Hardie, T.,
              Trammell, B., Huitema, C., and D. Borkmann,
              "Confidentiality in the Face of Pervasive Surveillance: A
              Threat Model and Problem Statement", RFC 7624,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7624, August 2015, <https://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc7624>.

   [RFC7816]  Bortzmeyer, S., "DNS Query Name Minimisation to Improve
              Privacy", RFC 7816, DOI 10.17487/RFC7816, March 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7816>.

   [RFC7858]  Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D.,
              and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport
              Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May
              2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>.

   [RFC7871]  Contavalli, C., van der Gaast, W., Lawrence, D., and W.
              Kumari, "Client Subnet in DNS Queries", RFC 7871,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7871, May 2016, <https://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc7871>.

   [RFC7873]  Eastlake 3rd, D. and M. Andrews, "Domain Name System (DNS)
              Cookies", RFC 7873, DOI 10.17487/RFC7873, May 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7873>.

   [RFC7929]  Wouters, P., "DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities
              (DANE) Bindings for OpenPGP", RFC 7929,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7929, August 2016, <https://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc7929>.

   [RFC8310]  Dickinson, S., Gillmor, D., and T. Reddy, "Usage Profiles
              for DNS over TLS and DNS over DTLS", RFC 8310,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8310, March 2018, <https://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc8310>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.

   [RFC8484]  Hoffman, P. and P. McManus, "DNS Queries over HTTPS
              (DoH)", RFC 8484, DOI 10.17487/RFC8484, October 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8484>.

   [RFC8499]  Hoffman, P., Sullivan, A., and K. Fujiwara, "DNS
              Terminology", BCP 219, RFC 8499, DOI 10.17487/RFC8499,
              January 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8499>.





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   [ripe-atlas-turkey]
              Aben, E., "A RIPE Atlas View of Internet Meddling in
              Turkey", March 2014,
              <https://labs.ripe.net/Members/emileaben/a-ripe-atlas-
              view-of-internet-meddling-in-turkey>.

   [ripe-qname-measurements]
              University of Twente, "Making the DNS More Private with
              QNAME Minimisation", April 2019,
              <https://labs.ripe.net/Members/wouter_de_vries/make-dns-a-
              bit-more-private-with-qname-minimisation>.

   [sidn-entrada]
              Hesselman, C., Jansen, J., Wullink, M., Vink, K., and M.
              Simon, "A privacy framework for 'DNS big data'
              applications", November 2014,
              <https://www.sidnlabs.nl/downloads/
              yBW6hBoaSZe4m6GJc_0b7w/2211058ab6330c7f3788141ea19d3db7/
              SIDN_Labs_Privacyraamwerk_Position_Paper_V1.4_ENG.pdf>.

   [thomas-ditl-tcp]
              Thomas, M. and D. Wessels, "An Analysis of TCP Traffic in
              Root Server DITL Data", DNS-OARC 2014 Fall Workshop,
              October 2014, <https://indico.dns-
              oarc.net/event/20/session/2/contribution/15/material/
              slides/1.pdf>.

   [tor-leak]
              Tor, "DNS leaks in Tor", 2013,
              <https://www.torproject.org/docs/
              faq.html.en#WarningsAboutSOCKSandDNSInformationLeaks>.

   [yanbin-tsudik]
              Yanbin, L. and G. Tsudik, "Towards Plugging Privacy Leaks
              in the Domain Name System", October 2009,
              <http://arxiv.org/abs/0910.2472>.

9.3.  URIs

   [1] https://lists.dns-oarc.net/pipermail/dns-
       operations/2016-January/014141.html

   [2] https://www.3gpp.org

   [3] http://netres.ec/?b=11B99BD

   [4] https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320322146_DNS-DNS_DNS-
       based_De-NAT_Scheme



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   [5] https://developers.google.com/speed/public-dns

   [6] https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/setting-up-1.1.1.1/

   [7] https://www.quad9.net

   [8] https://developers.google.com/speed/public-dns/privacy

   [9] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/static/add

   [10] https://www.encrypted-dns.org

   [11] https://www.eugdpr.org/the-regulation.html

Authors' Addresses

   Stephane Bortzmeyer
   AFNIC
   1, rue Stephenson
   Montigny-le-Bretonneux
   France  78180

   Email: bortzmeyer+ietf@nic.fr


   Sara Dickinson
   Sinodun IT
   Magdalen Centre
   Oxford Science Park
   Oxford  OX4 4GA
   United Kingdom

   Email: sara@sinodun.com


















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