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Versions: (draft-birrane-dtn-bpsec-interop-cs) 00

Delay-Tolerant Networking                                     E. Birrane
Internet-Draft                                                   JHU/APL
Intended status: Standards Track                          March 11, 2019
Expires: September 12, 2019


                BPSec Interoperability Security Contexts
                   draft-ietf-dtn-bpsec-interop-sc-00

Abstract

   This document defines an integrity security context and a
   confidentiality security context suitable for testing the
   interoperability of Bundle Protocol Security (BPSec) implementations.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 12, 2019.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Security Context BIB-HMAC256-SHA256 . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.2.  Key Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.3.  Canonicalization Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.4.  Security Context Parameter Definitions  . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.5.  Security Result Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Security Context BCB-AES-GCM-256  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.2.  Key Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.3.  Canonicalization Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.4.  Processing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       4.4.1.  Encryption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       4.4.2.  Decryption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.5.  Security Context Parameter Definitions  . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.6.  Security Result Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.1.  Bundle Block Types  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Introduction

   The Bundle Protocol Security (BPSec) [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpsec]
   specification provides inter-bundle integrity and confidentiality
   features for networks deploying the Bundle Protocol (BP)
   [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpbis].  BPSec defines a set of BP extension blocks to
   carry security information produced under the auspices of some
   security context, but does not define a common set of these security
   contexts.

   This document defines two security contexts (one for integrity
   services and one for confidentiality services) suitable for
   populating BPSec Block Integrity Blocks (BIBs) and Block
   Confidentiality Blocks (BCBs).

   This purpose of the security contexts described in this document is
   twofold.  First, these contexts should be used to test the
   interoperability of BPSec implementations.  Second, this
   specification can serve as a template to be followed by other BPSec
   security context authors.

   The intent of these security context definitions is to provide a
   mechanism for interoperability testing.  There is no claim that these



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   contexts are suitable for operational deployment in any particular
   networking scenario.  Further, there is no requirement that these
   contexts be used in any operational network deployments.

   These contexts generate information that MUST be encoded using the
   CBOR specification documented in [RFC7049].

2.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   [RFC2119].

3.  Security Context BIB-HMAC256-SHA256

3.1.  Overview

   This integrity context provides a signed hash over the security
   target based on the use of the SHA-256 message digest algorithm
   [RFC4634] combined with HMAC [RFC2104] with a 256 bit truncation
   length.  This formulation is based on the HMAC 256/256 algorithm
   defined in [RFC8152] Table 7: HMAC Algorithm Values.

   The BIB-HMAC256-SHA256 context has a Security Context ID of 0x1.

3.2.  Key Considerations

   Keys used with this specification MUST be symmetric and 256 bits in
   length.

   This context provides no requirements on the configuration or
   management of keys.

3.3.  Canonicalization Algorithms

   BIB-HMAC256-SHA256 uses the standard canonicalization algorithms
   defined in [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpsec] and operates over all of the block-
   type-specific data fields for the security target.  This context does
   not include hashing over other parts of the target block header, such
   as the block type code, block number, block processing control flags,
   or any CRC information.

3.4.  Security Context Parameter Definitions

   BIB-HMAC256-SHA256 defines the following security context parameters.





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                       BIB-HMAC256-SHA256 Parameters

   +------+------+--------+--------------------------------------------+
   | Parm | Parm |  CBOR  |                Description                 |
   |  Id  | Name |  Type  |                                            |
   +------+------+--------+--------------------------------------------+
   |  1   | Key  |  byte  |  Material encoded or protected by the key  |
   |      |      | string | management system and used to transport an |
   |      |      |        |   ephemeral key protected by a long-term   |
   |      |      |        |                    key.                    |
   +------+------+--------+--------------------------------------------+

                                  Table 1

3.5.  Security Result Definitions

   BIB-HMAC256-SHA256 defines the following security results.

                    BIB-HMAC256-SHA256 Security Results

   +-----------+-------------+-------------+---------------------------+
   | Result Id | Result Name |  CBOR Type  |        Description        |
   +-----------+-------------+-------------+---------------------------+
   |     1     |     Tag     | byte string | The tag produced by HMAC. |
   +-----------+-------------+-------------+---------------------------+

                                  Table 2

4.  Security Context BCB-AES-GCM-256

4.1.  Overview

   This confidentiality context provides cipher-text to replace the
   plain-text block-type-specific data fields of its target block.  BCB-
   AES-GCM-256 uses the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cipher
   operating in Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) [AES-GCM].  This formulation
   is based on the A256GCM algorithm defined in [RFC8152] Table 9:
   Algorithm Value for AES-GCM.

   The BCB-AES-GCM-256 context has a Security Context ID of 0x02.

   This context modifies the size of the target block.

4.2.  Key Considerations

   Keys used with this specification MUST be symmetric and 256 bits in
   length.




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   This context provides no requirements on the configuration or
   management of keys.

4.3.  Canonicalization Algorithms

   BCB-AES-GCM-256 uses the standard canonicalization algorithms defined
   in [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpsec] and operates over all of the block-type-
   specific data fields for the security target.  This context does not
   include hashing over other parts of the target block header, such as
   the block type code, block number, block processing control flags, or
   any CRC information.

4.4.  Processing

4.4.1.  Encryption

   When encrypting, the BCB-AES-GCM-256 context treats the catenation of
   the target block's block-type-specific data fields as a single set of
   plain-text.

   Cipher-text, once calculated, is stored as a CBOR byte string
   replacing the value of the target block's block-type-specific data.
   Because the plain-text and cipher-text will have the same length, the
   CBOR byte string encoding will have the same encoding of the byte
   string type and length.  This allows the replacement of plain-text
   with cipher-text without any additional consideration of block-type-
   specific data field processing.

4.4.2.  Decryption

   When decrypting, the target block's block-type-specific field is
   verified to be only a CBOR byte string.  If this is not the case the
   decryption is treated as failed and processed in accordance with
   local security policy.  Otherwise, the byte string and key
   information is passed to the cipher for decryption.

   If the cipher-text fails to authenticate, or if there are other
   problems in the decryption (such as the creation of invalid CBOR
   plain-text) then the decryption MUST be treated as failed and
   processed in accordance with local security policy.

   If the decryption succeeds, the resultant plain-text MUST replace the
   cipher-text in the target-block.








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4.5.  Security Context Parameter Definitions

   BCB-AES-GCM-256 defines the following security context parameters.
   It should be noted in this specification there is no additional
   authenticated data passed in to the AES-GCM cipher.  The plain-text
   is the only data input and MUST be the entire data contents of the
   target block.  Because replaying an IV in counter mode voids the
   confidentiality of all messages encryption with said IV, this context
   also requires a unique IV for every encryption performed with the
   same key.  This means the same key and IV combination must never be
   used more than once.

                        BCB-AES-GCM-256 Parameters

   +------+----------------+--------+----------------------------------+
   | Parm |   Parm Name    |  CBOR  |           Description            |
   |  Id  |                |  Type  |                                  |
   +------+----------------+--------+----------------------------------+
   |  1   |      Key       |  byte  | Material encoded or protected by |
   |      |                | string |  the key management system and   |
   |      |                |        |  used to transport an ephemeral  |
   |      |                |        |   key protected by a long-term   |
   |      |                |        |               key.               |
   |  2   | Initialization |  byte  |   The initialization vector. A   |
   |      |     Vector     | string | random value between 8-16 bytes. |
   |      |                |        |     12 bytes is recommended.     |
   +------+----------------+--------+----------------------------------+

                                  Table 3

4.6.  Security Result Definitions

   BCB-AES-GCM-256 defines the following security results.  It should be
   noted that cipher-text is not a security result as the resultant
   cipher-text is stored in the target block.  When operating in GCM
   mode, AES produces cipher-text of the same size as its plain-text
   and, therefore, no security results are necessary to capture padding
   information.













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                     BCB-AES-GCM-256 Security Results

   +--------+----------------+--------+--------------------------------+
   | Result |  Result Name   |  CBOR  |          Description           |
   |   Id   |                |  Type  |                                |
   +--------+----------------+--------+--------------------------------+
   |   1    | Authentication |  byte  |    Output from the AES-GCM     |
   |        |      Tag       | string |  cipher. This value (prior to  |
   |        |                |        |   CBOR encoding) MUST be 16    |
   |        |                |        |          bytes long.           |
   +--------+----------------+--------+--------------------------------+

                                  Table 4

5.  IANA Considerations

5.1.  Bundle Block Types

   This specification allocates two block types from the "BPSec Security
   Context IDs" registry defined in [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpsec].

                  Additional BPSec Security Context IDs:

              +-------+--------------------+---------------+
              | Value |    Description     |   Reference   |
              +-------+--------------------+---------------+
              |   1   | BIB-HMAC256-SHA256 | This document |
              |   2   |  BCB-AES-GCM-256   | This document |
              +-------+--------------------+---------------+

                                  Table 5

6.  Normative References

   [AES-GCM]  Dworkin, M., "NIST Special Publication 800-38D:
              Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
              Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC.", November 2007.

   [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpbis]
              Burleigh, S., Fall, K., and E. Birrane, "Bundle Protocol
              Version 7", draft-ietf-dtn-bpbis-12 (work in progress),
              November 2018.

   [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpsec]
              Birrane, E. and K. McKeever, "Bundle Protocol Security
              Specification", draft-ietf-dtn-bpsec-09 (work in
              progress), February 2019.




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   [RFC2104]  Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
              Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC4634]  Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
              (SHA and HMAC-SHA)", RFC 4634, DOI 10.17487/RFC4634, July
              2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4634>.

   [RFC7049]  Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
              Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,
              October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.

   [RFC8152]  Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
              RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.

Appendix A.  Acknowledgements

   The following participants contributed useful analysis of this
   specification: Prathibha Rama of the Johns Hopkins University Applied
   Physics Laboratory.

Author's Address

   Edward J. Birrane, III
   The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory
   11100 Johns Hopkins Rd.
   Laurel, MD  20723
   US

   Phone: +1 443 778 7423
   Email: Edward.Birrane@jhuapl.edu













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