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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 RFC 3654

  Internet Draft                                 H. Khosravi,
  Expiration: November 2003                      T. Anderson (Editors)
  File: draft-ietf-forces-requirements-09.txt      Intel
  Working Group: ForCES                           May 2003




  Requirements for Separation of IP Control and Forwarding



                  draft-ietf-forces-requirements-09.txt




  Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.  Internet-Drafts are
   working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF),
   its areas, and its working groups.  Note that other groups may
   also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
   months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other
   documents at any time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts
   as reference material or to cite them other than as ``work in
   progress.''

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

  Conventions used in this document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED",  "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in
   this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC-2119].

1. Abstract

   This document introduces the ForCES architecture and defines a set
   of associated terminology.  This document also defines a set of
   architectural, modeling, and protocol requirements to logically
   separate the control and data forwarding planes of an IP (IPv4,
   IPv6, etc.) networking device.





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   1. Abstract........................................................1
   2. Introduction....................................................2
   3. Definitions.....................................................3
   4. Architecture....................................................5
   5. Architectural Requirements......................................6
   6. FE Model Requirements...........................................8
 6.1. Types of Logical Functions......................................8
 6.2. Variations of Logical Functions.................................8
 6.3. Ordering of Logical Functions...................................8
 6.4. Flexibility.....................................................9
 6.5. Minimal Set of Logical Functions................................9
   7. ForCES Protocol Requirements...................................10
   8. References.....................................................14
 8.1. Normative References...........................................14
 8.2. Informative References.........................................14
   9. Security Considerations........................................15
   10. Authors' Addresses & Acknowledgments..........................15
   11. Editors' Contact Information..................................16


2. Introduction

   An IP network element is composed of numerous logically separate
   entities that cooperate to provide a given functionality (such as a
   routing or IP switching) and yet appear as a normal integrated
   network element to external entities.  Two primary types of network
   element components exist: control-plane components and forwarding-
   plane components.  In general, forwarding-plane components are ASIC,
   network-processor, or general-purpose processor-based devices that
   handle all data path operations.  Conversely, control-plane
   components are typically based on general-purpose processors that
   provide control functionality such as the processing of routing or
   signaling protocols.  A standard set of mechanisms for connecting
   these components provides increased scalability and allows the
   control and forwarding planes to evolve independently, thus
   promoting faster innovation.

   For the purpose of illustration, let us consider the architecture of
   a router to illustrate the concept of separate control and
   forwarding planes.  The architecture of a router is composed of two
   main parts.  These components, while inter-related, perform
   functions that are largely independent of each other.  At the bottom
   is the forwarding path that operates in the data-forwarding plane
   and is responsible for per-packet processing and forwarding.  Above
   the forwarding plane is the network operating system that is
   responsible for operations in the control plane.  In the case of a
   router or switch, the network operating system runs routing,
   signaling and control protocols (e.g., RIP, OSPF and RSVP) and
   dictates the forwarding behavior by manipulating forwarding tables,



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   per-flow QoS tables and access control lists.  Typically, the
   architecture of these devices combines all of this functionality
   into a single functional whole with respect to external entities.

3. Definitions

   Addressable Entity (AE) - A physical device that is directly
   addressable given some interconnect technology.  For example, on IP
   networks, it is a device to which we can communicate using an IP
   address; and on a switch fabric, it is a device to which we can
   communicate using a switch fabric port number.

   Physical Forwarding Element (PFE) - An AE that includes hardware
   used to provide per-packet processing and handling.  This hardware
   may consist of (but is not limited to) network processors, ASIC's,
   line cards with multiple chips or stand alone box with general-
   purpose processors.

   Physical Control Element (PCE) - An AE that includes hardware used
   to provide control functionality.  This hardware typically includes
   a general-purpose processor.

   Forwarding Element (FE) - A logical entity that implements the
   ForCES protocol.  FEs use the underlying hardware to provide per-
   packet processing and handling as directed/controlled by a CE via
   the ForCES protocol.  FEs may happen to be a single blade(or PFE), a
   partition of a PFE or multiple PFEs.

   Control Element (CE) - A logical entity that implements the ForCES
   protocol and uses it to instruct one or more FEs how to process
   packets.  CEs handle functionality such as the execution of control
   and signaling protocols.  CEs may consist of PCE partitions or whole
   PCEs.

   Pre-association Phase - The period of time during which a FE Manager
   (see below) and a CE Manager (see below) are determining which FE
   and CE should be part of the same network element. Any partitioning
   of PFEs and PCEs occurs during this phase.

   Post-association Phase - The period of time during which a FE does
   know which CE is to control it and vice versa, including the time
   during which the CE and FE are establishing communication with one
   another.

   ForCES Protocol - While there may be multiple protocols used within
   the overall ForCES architecture, the term "ForCES protocol" refers
   only to the ForCES post-association phase protocol (see below).






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   ForCES Post-Association Phase Protocol - The protocol used for post-
   association phase communication between CEs and FEs.  This protocol
   does not apply to CE-to-CE communication, FE-to-FE communication, or
   to communication between FE and CE managers.  The ForCES protocol is
   a master-slave protocol in which FEs are slaves and CEs are masters.
   This protocol includes both the management of the communication
   channel (e.g., connection establishment, heartbeats) and the control
   messages themselves. This protocol could be a single protocol or
   could consist of multiple protocols working together.

   FE Model - A model that describes the logical processing functions
   of a FE.

   FE Manager - A logical entity that operates in the pre-association
   phase and is responsible for determining to which CE(s) a FE should
   communicate.  This process is called CE discovery and may involve
   the FE manager learning the capabilities of available CEs.  A FE
   manager may use anything from a static configuration to a pre-
   association phase protocol (see below) to determine which CE(s) to
   use, however this is currently out of scope.  Being a logical
   entity, a FE manager might be physically combined with any of the
   other logical entities mentioned in this section.

   CE Manager - A logical entity that operates in the pre-association
   phase and is responsible for determining to which FE(s) a CE should
   communicate.  This process is called FE discovery and may involve
   the CE manager learning the capabilities of available FEs.  A CE
   manager may use anything from a static configuration to a pre-
   association phase protocol (see below) to determine which FE to use,
   however this is currently out of scope.  Being a logical entity, a
   CE manager might be physically combined with any of the other
   logical entities mentioned in this section.

   Pre-association Phase Protocol - A protocol between FE managers and
   CE managers that is used to determine which CEs or FEs to use.  A
   pre-association phase protocol may include a CE and/or FE capability
   discovery mechanism.  Note that this capability discovery process is
   wholly separate from (and does not replace) that used within the
   ForCES protocol (see Section 7, requirement #1).  However, the two
   capability discovery mechanisms may utilize the same FE model (see
   Section 6).  Pre-association phase protocols are not discussed
   further in this document.

   ForCES Network Element (NE) - An entity composed of one or more CEs
   and one or more FEs.  To entities outside a NE, the NE represents a
   single point of management.  Similarly, a NE usually hides its
   internal organization from external entities.

   ForCES Protocol Element - A FE or CE.




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   High Touch Capability - This term will be used to apply to the
   capabilities found in some forwarders to take action on the contents
   or headers of a packet based on content other than what is found in
   the IP header.  Examples of these capabilities include NAT-PT,
   firewall, and L7 content recognition.

4. Architecture

   The chief components of a NE architecture are the CE, the FE, and
   the interconnect protocol.  The CE is responsible for operations
   such as signaling and control protocol processing and the
   implementation of management protocols.  Based on the information
   acquired through control processing, the CE(s) dictates the packet-
   forwarding behavior of the FE(s) via the interconnect protocol.  For
   example, the CE might control a FE by manipulating its forwarding
   tables, the state of its interfaces, or by adding or removing a NAT
   binding.

   The FE operates in the forwarding plane and is responsible for per-
   packet processing and handling.  By allowing the control and
   forwarding planes to evolve independently, different types of FEs
   can be developed - some general purpose and others more specialized.
   Some functions that FEs could perform include layer 3 forwarding,
   metering, shaping, firewall, NAT, encapsulation (e.g., tunneling),
   decapsulation, encryption, accounting, etc.  Nearly all combinations
   of these functions may be present in practical FEs.

   Below is a diagram illustrating an example NE composed of a CE and
   two FEs. Both FEs and CE require minimal configuration as part of
   the pre-configuration process and this may be done by FE Manager and
   CE Manager respectively. Apart from this, there is no defined role
   for FE Manager and CE Manager. These components are out of scope of
   the architecture and requirements for the ForCES protocol, which
   only involves CEs and FEs.

         --------------------------------
         | NE                           |
         |        -------------         |
         |        |    CE     |         |
         |        -------------         |
         |          /        \          |
         |         /          \         |
         |        /            \        |
         |       /              \       |
         |  -----------     ----------- |
         |  |   FE    |     |    FE   | |
         |  -----------     ----------- |
         |    | | | |         | | | |   |



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         |    | | | |         | | | |   |
         |    | | | |         | | | |   |
         |    | | | |         | | | |   |
         --------------------------------
              | | | |         | | | |
              | | | |         | | | |

5. Architectural Requirements

   The following are the architectural requirements:

   1) CEs and FEs MUST be able to connect by a variety of interconnect
   technologies.  Examples of interconnect technologies used in current
   architectures include Ethernet,bus backplanes, and ATM (cell)
   fabrics.  FEs MAY be connected to each other via a different
   technology than that used for CE/FE communication.

   2) FEs MUST support a minimal set of capabilities necessary for
   establishing network connectivity (e.g., interface discovery, port
   up/down functions).  Beyond this minimal set, the ForCES
   architecture MUST NOT restrict the types or numbers of capabilities
   that FEs may contain.

   3) Packets MUST be able to arrive at the NE by one FE and leave the
   NE via a different FE.

   4) A NE MUST support the appearance of a single functional device.
   For example, in a router, the TTL of the packet should be
   decremented only once as it traverses the NE regardless of how many
   FEs through which it passes.  However, external entities (e.g., FE
   managers and CE managers) MAY have direct access to individual
   ForCES protocol elements for providing information to transition
   them from the pre-association to post-association phase.

   5) The architecture MUST provide a way to prevent unauthorized
   ForCES protocol elements from joining a NE.(For more protocol
   details, refer to section 7 requirement# 2)

   6) A FE MUST be able to asynchronously inform the CE of a failure or
   increase/decrease in available resources or capabilities on the FE.
   Thus the FE MUST support error monitoring and reporting. (Since
   there is not a strict 1-to-1 mapping between FEs and PFEs, it is
   possible for the relationship between a FE and its physical
   resources to change over time).  For example, the number of physical
   ports or the amount of memory allocated to a FE may vary over time.
   The CE needs to be informed of such changes so that it can control
   the FE in an accurate way.






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   7) The architecture MUST support mechanisms for CE redundancy or CE
   failover. This includes the ability for CEs and FEs to determine
   when there is a loss of association between them, ability to restore
   association and efficient state (re)synchronization mechanisms. This
   also includes the ability to preset the actions an FE will take in
   reaction to loss of association to its CE e.g., whether the FE will
   continue to forward packets or whether it will halt operations.

   8) FEs MUST be able to redirect control packets (such as RIP, OSPF
   messages) addressed to their interfaces to the CE. They MUST also
   redirect other relevant packets (e.g., such as those with Router
   Alert Option set) to their CE. The CEs MUST be able to configure the
   packet redirection information/filters on the FEs. The CEs MUST also
   be able to create packets and have its FEs deliver them.

   9) Any proposed ForCES architectures MUST explain how that
   architecture supports all of the router functions as defined in
   [RFC1812]. IPv4 Forwarding functions such IP header validation,
   performing longest prefix match algorithm, TTL decrement, Checksum
   calculation, generation of ICMP error messages, etc defined in RFC
   1812 should be explained.

   10) In a ForCES NE, the FEs MUST be able to provide their topology
   information (topology by which the FEs in the NE are connected) to
   the CE(s).

   11) The ForCES NE architecture MUST be capable of supporting (i.e.,
   must scale to) at least hundreds of FEs and tens of thousands of
   ports.

   12) The ForCES architecture MUST allow FEs AND CEs to join and leave
   NEs dynamically.

   13) The ForCES NE architecture MUST support multiple CEs and FEs.
   However, coordination between CEs is out of scope of ForCES.

   14) For pre-association phase setup, monitoring, configuration
   issues, it MAY be useful to use standard management mechanisms for
   CEs and FEs. The ForCES architecture and requirements do not
   preclude this. In general, for post-association phase, most
   management tasks SHOULD be done through interaction with the CE. In
   certain conditions (e.g. CE/FE disconnection), it may be useful to
   allow management tools (e.g. SNMP) to be used to diagnose and repair
   problems. The following guidelines MUST be observed:
   1. The ability for a management tool (e.g. SNMP) to be used to read
     (but not change) the state of FE SHOULD NOT be precluded.
   2. It MUST NOT be possible for management tools (e.g. SNMP, etc) to
     change the state of a FE in a manner that affects overall NE
     behavior without the CE being notified.




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6. FE Model Requirements

   The variety of FE functionality that the ForCES architecture allows
   poses a potential problem for CEs.  In order for a CE to effectively
   control a FE, the CE must understand how the FE processes packets.
   We therefore REQUIRE that a FE model be created that can express the
   logical packet processing capabilities of a FE.  This model will be
   used in the ForCES protocol to describe FE capabilities (see Section
   7, requirement #1). The FE model MUST define both a capability model
   and a state model, which expresses the current configuration of the
   device. The FE model MUST also support multiple FEs in the NE
   architecture.

6.1. Types of Logical Functions

   The FE model MUST express what logical functions can be applied to
   packets as they pass through a FE.
   Logical functions are the packet processing functions that are
   applied to the packets as they are forwarded through a FE. Examples
   of logical functions are layer 3 forwarding, firewall, NAT, shaping.
   Section 6.5 defines the minimal set of logical functions that the FE
   Model MUST support.

6.2. Variations of Logical Functions
   The FE model MUST be capable of supporting/allowing variations in
   the way logical functions are implemented on a FE. For example, on a
   certain FE the forwarding logical function might have information
   about both the next hop IP address and the next hop MAC address,
   while on another FE these might be implemented as separate logical
   functions. Another example would be NAT functionality that can have
   several flavors such as Traditional/Outbound NAT, Bi-directional
   NAT, Twice NAT, Multihomed NAT [RFC2663]. The model must be flexible
   enough to allow such variations in functions.

6.3. Ordering of Logical Functions
   The model MUST be capable of describing the order in which these
   logical functions are applied in a FE. The ordering of logical
   functions is important in many cases.  For example, a NAT function
   may change a packet's source or destination IP address.  Any number
   of other logical functions (e.g., layer 3 forwarding, ingress/egress
   firewall, shaping, accounting) may make use of the source or
   destination IP address when making decisions.  The CE needs to know
   whether to configure these logical functions with the pre-NAT or
   post-NAT IP address.  Furthermore, the model MUST be capable of
   expressing multiple instances of the same logical function in a FE's
   processing path.  Using NAT again as an example, one NAT function is
   typically performed before the forwarding decision (packets arriving
   externally have their public addresses replaced with private



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   addresses) and one NAT function is performed after the forwarding
   decision (for packets exiting the domain, their private addresses
   are replaced by public ones).

6.4. Flexibility

   Finally, the FE model SHOULD provide a flexible infrastructure in
   which new logical functions and new classification, action, and
   parameterization data can be easily added.  In addition, the FE
   model MUST be capable of describing the types of statistics gathered
   by each logical function.

6.5. Minimal Set of Logical Functions

   The rest of this section defines a minimal set of logical functions
   that any FE model MUST support.  This minimal set DOES NOT imply
   that all FEs must provide this functionality.  Instead, these
   requirements only specify that the model must be capable of
   expressing the capabilities that FEs may choose to provide.

   1)Port Functions
   The FE model MUST be capable of expressing the number of ports on
   the device, the static attributes of each port (e.g., port type,
   link speed), and the configurable attributes of each port (e.g., IP
   address, administrative status).

   2)Forwarding Functions
   The FE model MUST be capable of expressing the data that can be used
   by the forwarding function to make a forwarding decision. Support
   for IPv4 and IPv6 unicast and multicast forwarding functions MUST be
   provided by the model.

   3)QoS Functions
   The FE model MUST allow a FE to express its QoS capabilities in
   terms of, e.g., metering, policing, shaping, and queuing functions.
   The FE model MUST be capable of expressing the use of these
   functions to provide IntServ or DiffServ functionality as described
   in [RFC2211], [RFC2212], [RFC2215], [RFC2475], and [RFC3290].

   4)Generic Filtering Functions
   The FE model MUST be capable of expressing complex sets of filtering
   functions.  The model MUST be able to express the existence of these
   functions at arbitrary points in the sequence of a FE's packet
   processing functions.  The FE model MUST be capable of expressing a
   wide range of classification abilities from single fields (e.g.,
   destination address) to arbitrary n-tuples.  Similarly, the FE model
   MUST be capable of expressing what actions these filtering functions
   can perform on packets that the classifier matches.




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   5)Vendor-Specific Functions
   The FE model SHOULD be extensible so that new, currently unknown  FE
   functionality can be expressed. The FE Model SHOULD NOT be extended
   to express standard/common functions in a proprietary manner. This
   would NOT be ForCES compliant.

   6)High-Touch Functions
   The FE model MUST be capable of expressing the encapsulation and
   tunneling capabilities of a FE. The FE model MUST support functions
   that mark the class of service that a packet should receive (i.e.
   IPv4 header TOS octet or the IPv6 Traffic Class octet).  The FE
   model MAY support other high touch functions (e.g., NAT, ALG).

   7)Security Functions
   The FE model MUST be capable of expressing the types of encryption
   that may be applied to packets in the forwarding path.

   8)Off-loaded Functions
   Per-packet processing can leave state in the FE, so that logical
   functions executed during packet processing can perform in a
   consistent manner (for instance, each packet may update the state of
   the token bucket occupancy of a give policer). In addition, FEs MUST
   allow logical functions to execute asynchronously from packet
   processing, according to a certain finite-state machine, in order to
   perform functions that are, for instance, off-loaded from the CE to
   the FE. The FE model MUST be capable of expressing these
   asynchronous functions. Examples of such functions include the
   finite-state machine execution required by TCP termination or OSPF
   Hello processing, triggered not only by packet events, but by timer
   events as well. This Does NOT mean off-loading of any piece of code
   to an FE, just that the FE Model should be able to express existing
   Off-loaded functions on an FE.

   9)IPFLOW/PSAMP Functions
   Several applications such as, Usage-based Accounting, Traffic
   engineering, require flow-based IP traffic measurements from Network
   Elements. [IPFLOW] defines architecture for IP traffic flow
   monitoring, measuring and exporting. The FE model SHOULD be able to
   express metering functions and flow accounting needed for exporting
   IP traffic flow information.
   Similarly to support measurement-based applications, [PSAMP]
   describes a framework to define a standard set of capabilities for
   network elements to sample subsets of packets by statistical and
   other methods. The FE model SHOULD be able to express statistical
   packet filtering functions and packet information needed for
   supporting packet sampling applications.


7. ForCES Protocol Requirements




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   This section specifies some of the requirements that the ForCES
   protocol MUST meet.

   1)Configuration of Modeled Elements
   The ForCES protocol MUST allow the CEs to determine the capabilities
   of each FE.  These capabilities SHALL be expressed using the FE
   model whose requirements are defined in Section 6.  Furthermore, the
   protocol MUST provide a means for the CEs to control all the FE
   capabilities that are discovered through the FE model. The protocol
   MUST be able to add/remove classification/action entries, set/delete
   parameters, query statistics, and register for and receive events.

   2)Support for Secure Communication
   a) FE configuration will contain information critical to the
     functioning of a network (e.g. IP Forwarding Tables). As such, it
     MUST be possible to ensure the integrity of all ForCES protocol
     messages and protect against man-in-the-middle attacks.
   b) FE configuration information may also contain information derived
     from business relationships (e.g. service level agreements).
     Because of the confidential nature of the information, it MUST be
     possible to secure (make private) all ForCES protocol messages.
   c) In order to ensure that authorized CEs and FEs are participating
     in a NE and defend against CE or FE impersonation attacks, the
     ForCES architecture MUST select a means of authentication for CEs
     and FEs.
   d) In some deployments ForCES is expected to be deployed between CEs
     and FEs connected to each other inside a box over a backplane,
     where physical security of the box ensures that man-in-the-middle,
     snooping, and impersonation attacks are not possible. In such
     scenarios the ForCES architecture MAY rely on the physical
     security of the box to defend against these attacks and protocol
     mechanisms May be turned off.
   e) In the case when CEs and FEs are connected over a network,
     security mechanisms MUST be specified or selected that protect the
     ForCES protocol against such attacks.  Any security solution used
     for ForCES MUST specify how it deals with such attacks.

   3)Scalability
   The ForCES protocol MUST be capable of supporting (i.e., must scale
   to) at least hundreds of FEs and tens of thousands of ports.  For
   example, the ForCES protocol field sizes corresponding to FE or port
   numbers SHALL be large enough to support the minimum required
   numbers.  This requirement does not relate to the performance of a
   NE as the number of FEs or ports in the NE grows.

   4)Multihop
   When the CEs and FEs are separated beyond a single hop, the ForCES
   protocol will make use of an existing RFC2914 compliant L4 protocol




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   with adequate reliability, security and congestion control (e.g.
   TCP, SCTP) for transport purposes.

   5)Message Priority
   The ForCES protocol MUST provide a means to express the protocol
   message priorities.

   6)Reliability
   a) The ForCES protocol will be used to transport information that
     requires varying levels of reliability. By strict or robust
     reliability in this requirement we mean, no losses, no corruption,
     no re-ordering of information being transported and delivery in a
     timely fashion.
   b) Some information or payloads, such as redirected packets or packet
     sampling, may not require robust reliability (can tolerate some
     degree of losses). For information of this sort, ForCES MAY NOT
     impose strict reliability.
   c) Payloads such as configuration information, e.g. ACLs, FIB
     entries, or FE capability information (described in section 7,
     (1)) are mission critical and must be delivered in a robust
     reliable fashion. Thus, for information of this sort, ForCES MUST
     either provide built-in protocol mechanisms or use a reliable
     transport protocol for achieving robust/strict reliability.
   d) Some information or payloads, such as heartbeat packets that may
     be used to detect loss of association between CE and FEs (see
     section 7, (8)), may prefer timeliness over reliable delivery. For
     information of this sort, ForCES MAY NOT impose strict
     reliability.
   e) When ForCES is carried over multi-hop IP networks, it is a
     requirement that ForCES MUST use a [RFC2914]-compliant transport
     protocol.
   f) In cases where ForCES is not running over an IP network such as an
     Ethernet or cell fabric between CE and FE, then reliability still
     MUST be provided when carrying critical information of the types
     specified in (c) above, either by the underlying link/network/
     transport layers or by built-in protocol mechanisms.

   7)Interconnect Independence
   The ForCES protocol MUST support a variety of interconnect
   technologies. (refer to section 5, requirement# 1)

   8)CE redundancy or CE failover
   The ForCES protocol MUST support mechanisms for CE redundancy or CE
   failover. This includes the ability for CEs and FEs to determine
   when there is a loss of association between them, ability to restore
   association and efficient state (re)synchronization mechanisms. This
   also includes the ability to preset the actions an FE will take in
   reaction to loss of association to its CE e.g., whether the FE will





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   continue to forward packets or whether it will halt operations.
   (refer to section 5, requirement# 7)

   9)Packet Redirection/Mirroring
   a) The ForCES protocol MUST define a way to redirect packets from the
     FE to the CE and vice-versa. Packet redirection terminates any
     further processing of the redirected packet at the FE.
   b) The ForCES protocol MUST define a way to mirror packets from the
     FE to the CE. Mirroring allows the packet duplicated by the FE at
     the mirroring point to be sent to the CE while the original packet
     continues to be processed by the FE.
   Examples of packets that may be redirected or mirrored include
   control packets (such as RIP, OSPF messages) addressed to the
   interfaces or any other relevant packets (such as those with Router
   Alert Option set). The ForCES protocol MUST also define a way for the
   CE to configure the behavior of a) and b) (above), to specify which
   packets are affected by each.

   10)Topology Exchange
   The ForCES protocol MUST allow the FEs to provide their topology
   information (topology by which the FEs in the NE are connected) to
   the CE(s). (refer to section 5, requirement# 10)

   11)Dynamic Association
   The ForCES protocol MUST allow CEs and FEs to join and leave a NE
   dynamically. (refer to section 5, requirement# 12)

   12)Command Bundling
   The ForCES protocol MUST be able to group an ordered set of commands
   to a FE. Each such group of commands SHOULD be sent to the FE in as
   few messages as possible. Furthermore, the protocol MUST support the
   ability to specify if a command group MUST have all-or-nothing
   semantics.

   13)Asynchronous Event Notification
   The ForCES protocol MUST be able to asynchronously notify the CE of
   events on the FE such as failures or change in available resources
   or capabilities. (refer to section 5, requirement# 6)

   14)Query Statistics
   The ForCES protocol MUST provide a means for the CE to be able to
   query statistics (monitor performance) from the FE.

   15) Protection against Denial of Service Attacks (based on CPU
   overload or queue overflow)
   Systems utilizing the ForCES protocol can be attacked using denial
   of service attacks based on CPU overload or queue overflow.
   The ForCES protocol could be exploited by such attacks to cause the
   CE to become unable to control the FE or appropriately communicate




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Internet Draft             ForCES Requirements            May 2003
   with other routers and systems.  The ForCES protocol MUST therefore
   provide mechanisms for controlling FE capabilities that can be used
   to protect against such attacks. FE capabilities that MUST be
   manipulated via ForCES include the ability to install classifiers
   and filters to detect and drop attack packets, as well as to be able
   to install rate limiters that limit the rate of packets which appear
   to be valid but may be part of an attack (e.g. bogus BGP packets).


8. References
8.1.Normative References

   [RFC3290]  Y. Bernet, et. al., "An Informal Management Model for
   DiffServ Routers", , May 2002.

   [RFC1812]  F. Baker, "Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers",
   RFC1812, June 1995.

   [RFC2211]  J. Wroclawski, "Specification of the Controlled-Load
   Network Element Service", RFC2211, September 1997.

   [RFC2212]  S. Shenker, C. Partridge, R. Guerin, "Specification of
   Guaranteed Quality of Service", RFC2212, September 1997.

   [RFC2215]  S. Shenker, J. Wroclawski, "General Characterization
   Parameters for Integrated Service Network Elements", RFC2215,
   September 1997.

   [RFC2475]  S. Blake, et. Al., "An Architecture for Differentiated
   Service", RFC2475, December 1998.

   [RFC2914]  S. Floyd, "Congestion Control Principles", RFC2914,
   September 2000.

   [RFC2663]  P. Srisuresh & M. Holdrege, "IP Network Address
   Translator (NAT) Terminology and Considerations", RFC2663, August
   1999.

8.2.Informative References

   [REQ-PART] T. Anderson, J. Buerkle, "Requirements for the Dynamic
   Partitioning of Switching Elements", work in progress, July 2002,
   <draft-ietf-gsmp-dyn-part-reqs-02.txt>.

   [IPFLOW] Quittek, et. Al., "Requirements for IP Flow Information
   Export", work in progress, February 2003, <draft-ietf-ipfix-reqs-
   09.txt>.





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Internet Draft             ForCES Requirements            May 2003
   [PSAMP] Duffield, et. Al., "A Framework for Passive Packet
   Measurement ", work in progress, March 2003, <draft-ietf-psamp-
   framework-02.txt>.

9. Security Considerations

   See architecture requirement #5 and protocol requirement #2.


10. Authors' Addresses & Acknowledgments

   This document was written by the ForCES Requirements design team:

   Todd A. Anderson (Editor)

   Ed Bowen
   IBM Zurich Research Laboratory
   Saumerstrasse 4
   CH-8803 Rueschlikon Switzerland
   Phone: +41 1 724 83 68
   Email: edbowen@us.ibm.com

   Ram Dantu
   Department of Computer Science
   University of North Texas,
   Denton, Texas, 76203
   Email: rdantu@unt.edu
   Phone: 940 565 2822

   Avri Doria
   Institute for System Technology
   Lulea University of Technology
   SE-971 87, Lulea, Sweden
   Phone: +46 (0)920 49 3030
   Email: avri@sm.luth.se

   Ram Gopal
   Nokia Research Center
   5, Wayside Road,
   Burlington, MA 01803
   Phone: 1-781-993-3685
   Email: ram.gopal@nokia.com

   Jamal Hadi Salim
   Znyx Networks
   Ottawa, Ontario
   Canada
   Email: hadi@znyx.com




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Internet Draft             ForCES Requirements            May 2003
   Hormuzd Khosravi (Editor)

   Muneyb Minhazuddin
   Avaya Inc.
   123, Epping road,
   North Ryde, NSW 2113, Australia
   Phone: +61 2 9352 8620
   email: muneyb@avaya.com

   Margaret Wasserman
   Wind River
   10 Tara Blvd., Suite 330
   Nashua, NH  03062
   Phone: +1 603 897 2067
   Email:  mrw@windriver.com

   The authors would like to thank Vip Sharma and Lily Yang for their
   valuable contributions.

11. Editors' Contact Information

   Hormuzd Khosravi
   Intel
   2111 NE 25th Avenue
   Hillsboro, OR 97124 USA
   Phone: +1 503 264 0334
   Email: hormuzd.m.khosravi@intel.com

   Todd A. Anderson
   Intel
   2111 NE 25th Avenue
   Hillsboro, OR 97124 USA
   Phone: +1 503 712 1760
   Email: todd.a.anderson@intel.com



















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