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Versions: (draft-tschofenig-geopriv-radius-lo) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 RFC 5580

Geopriv                                                    H. Tschofenig
Internet-Draft                                                   Siemens
Expires: August 24, 2005                                      F. Adrangi
                                                                   Intel
                                                                M. Jones
                                                                 A. Lior
                                                             Bridgewater
                                                       February 20, 2005


                  Carrying Location Objects in RADIUS
                  draft-ietf-geopriv-radius-lo-02.txt

Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is subject to all provisions
   of Section 3 of RFC 3667.  By submitting this Internet-Draft, each
   author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of
   which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of
   which he or she become aware will be disclosed, in accordance with
   RFC 3668.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 24, 2005.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).

Abstract

   This document describes RADIUS attributes for conveying the Access
   Network's operational ownership and location information based on a



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   civic and geospatial location format.

   The distribution of location information is privacy sensitive.
   Dealing with mechanisms to preserve the user's privacy is important
   and addressed in this document.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  Delivery Methods for Location Information  . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.1   Authentication/Authorization Phase Delivery  . . . . . . .  6
     3.2   Mid-session Authorization  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   4.  Scenarios  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     4.1   Scenario 1 - Use of Location Information in AAA  . . . . .  9
     4.2   Scenario 2 - Use of Location Information for Other
           Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   5.  Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     5.1   Operator-Type Attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     5.2   Operator-Name Attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     5.3   Location-Information Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       5.3.1   Civic Location Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       5.3.2   Geospatial Location Information  . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   6.  Basic- and Extended-Policy-Rule Attributes . . . . . . . . . . 15
   7.  Location-Type Attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   8.  Diameter RADIUS Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   9.  Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
     9.1   Operator-Type Attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
     9.2   Operator-Name Attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
     9.3   Location-Information Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     9.4   Basic Policy Rules Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     9.5   Extended Policy Rules Attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
     9.6   Location-Type Attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
   10.   Table of Attributes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
   11.   Matching with Geopriv Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
     11.1  Distribution of Location Information at the User's
           Home Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
     11.2  Distribution of Location Information at the Visited
           Network  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
     11.3  Requirements matching  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
   12.   Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
   13.   Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
     13.1  Entity in the visited network  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
     13.2  Entity in the home network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
   14.   Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
   15.   IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
     15.1  Operator Type  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
     15.2  Error-Cause Attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42



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   16.   Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
   17.   References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
     17.1  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
     17.2  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
       Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
       Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 48













































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1.  Introduction

   Wireless LAN (WLAN) Access Networks (AN) are being deployed in public
   places such as airports, hotels, shopping malls, and coffee shops by
   a diverse set of operators such as cellular carriers (GSM and CDMA),
   Wireless Internet Service Providers (WISP), and fixed broadband
   operators.

   When a user executes the network access authentication procedure to
   such a network, information about the location and operational
   ownership of this network needs to be conveyed to the user's home
   network to which the user has a contractal relationship.  The main
   intent of this document is to enable location aware billing (e.g.,
   determine the appropriate tariff and taxation in dependence of the
   location of the access network/user), location aware subscriber
   authentication and authorization for roaming environments and to
   enable location aware services.

   This document describes AAA attributes that are used by a AAA client
   or a local AAA server in an access network for conveying
   location-related information to the user's home AAA server.  This
   document defines attributes for RADIUS [1].

   Although the proposed attributes in this draft are intended for
   wireless LAN deployments, they can also be used in wireless and wired
   networks whenever location information is required.

   Location information needs to be protected against unauthorized
   access and distribution to preserve the user's privacy with regard to
   location information.  With [10] requirements for a
   protocol-independent model for the access to geographic location
   information was defined.  The model includes a Location Generator
   (LG) that creates location information, a Location Server (LS) that
   authorizes access to location information, a Location Recipient (LR)
   that requests and receives information, and a Rule Maker (RM) that
   provides authorization policies to the LS which enforces access
   control policies on requests to location information of a target.














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2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [2].

   RADIUS specific terminology is reused from [1] and [3].

   Terminology related to privacy issues, location information and
   authorization policy rules are taken from [10].

   Based on the availability of today's protocols we assume that the
   location information is provided by the access network where the end
   host is attached.  As part of the network attachment, which includes
   the execution of an authentication and authorization protocol
   exchange, authentication is accomplished.  The authenticated identity
   can refer to a user, a device or something else.  Although there
   might often be a user associated with the authentication process
   (either directly or indirectly; indirectly when a one-to-one
   relationship between a device and a user exists) there is no
   assurance that a particular real-world entity (such as a person)
   triggered this process.  Since location based authorization is
   executed based on the network access authentication of a particular
   "user" it might be reasonable to talk about user's privacy within
   this document even though scenarios exist where this might not be
   true (and device or network privacy might be the correct term).
   Furthermore, the authors believe that there is a relationship between
   the location of the network and the location of the entity that
   triggered the network access authentication.  Knowing the location of
   a network (where the user or end host is attached to) might in many
   networks also reveal the location of the user or end host.  In some
   networks it is even possible to provide a more fine-grain granular
   location of the user or end host.  A similar assumption is also made
   with regard to the location information obtained via DHCP (see for
   example [4]).  This information might be used by applications in
   other protocols (such as SIP) to indicate the location of a
   particular user even though the location "only" refers to the
   location of the network or equipment within the network.  The
   assumption here is also that the location of the network has some
   relationship to the location of the end host (and subsequently to a
   user).  This assumption might not hold in all scenarios but seems to
   be a good approximation.

   Please note that the authors use the term end host or user
   interchangable with respect to the used identities as part of the
   network access authentication.  To cover the worst case the term
   'user' is used whenever the privacy of the user could potentially be
   compromised.



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3.  Delivery Methods for Location Information

   Location Objects, which consist of location information and privacy
   rules, are transported over the RADIUS protocol from visited access
   network to the home AAA server.  To embedd a Location Object into
   RADIUS a number of AVPs are used, such as Location-Information AVP,
   Basic-Policy-Rules AVP, Extended-Policy-Rules AVP, Location-Type AVP,
   Operator-Type AVP and Operator-Name AVP.  These AVPs can be delivered
   to the RADIUS server during the authentication/authorization phase
   described in Section 3.1, or in the mid-session using the dynamic
   authorization protocol framework described in Section 3.2.  This
   section describes messages flow for both delivery methods.

3.1  Authentication/Authorization Phase Delivery

   Figure 1 shows an example message flow for delivering location
   information during the network access authentication/authorization
   procedure.  Upon a network authentication request from an access
   network client, the NAS submits a RADIUS Access-Request message which
   contains location information attributes among other required
   attributes.  The attributes (including location information) are
   added based on some criteria, such as local policy and business
   relationship with subscriber's home network provider.  In case that
   no location information is attached although required by the aaa
   server an error message is returned.

   The authentication and/or authorization procedure is completed based
   on a number of criteria, including the newly defined
   Location-Information, Operator-Type, Operator-Name, Location-Type,
   Policy-Information attributes.  A RADIUS Accounting Request message
   is also allowed to carry location specific attributes.


    +---------+             +---------+                   +---------+
    | Access  |             | Network |                   |   AAA   |
    | Network |             | Access  |                   |  Server |
    | Client  |             | Server  |                   |         |
    +---------+             +---------+                   +---------+
        |                       |                              |
        | Authentication phase  |                              |
        | begin                 |                              |
        |---------------------->|                              |
        |                       |                              |
        |                       |                              |
        |                       | RADIUS                       |
        |                       | Access-Request               |
        |                       | + Location-Information       |
        |                       |   attributes                 |



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        |                       |----------------------------->|
        |                       |                              |
        :                       :                              :
        :       Multiple Protocol Exchanges to perform         :
        :    Authentication, Key Exchange and Authorization    :
        :                  ...continued...                     :
        :                       :                              :
        |                       | RADIUS                       |
        |                       | Access-Accept                |
        |                       |  + Rule set Information      |
        |                       |<-----------------------------|
        | Authentication        |                              |
        | Accept                |                              |
        |<----------------------|                              |
        |                       |                              |
        |                       | RADIUS                       |
        |                       | Accounting Request           |
        |                       | + Location-Information       |
        |                       |   attributes                 |
        |                       |----------------------------->|
        |                       |                              |


  Figure 1: Message Flow: Authentication/Authorization Phase Delivery


3.2  Mid-session Authorization

   Mid-session delivery method uses the Change of Authorization (COA)
   message as defined in [5].  At anytime during the session the AAA
   server MAY send a COA message containing session identification
   attributes to the access network.  The COA message may instruct the
   access network to generate an Authorize-Only Access-Request
   (Access-Request with Service-Type set to "Authorize-Only") in which
   case the NAS MUST include the location infromation in this
   Access-Request.

   Figure 2 shows the approach graphically.













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            Access network                                    AAA server
                |                                               |
                |  COA  + Service-Type "Authorize Only"         |
                |<----------------------------------------------|
                |                                               |
                |  COA NAK + Service-Type "Authorize Only"      |
                |          + Error-Cause  "Request Initiated"   |
                |---------------------------------------------->|
                |                                               |
                | Access-Request + Service-Type "Authorize Only"|
                |             + Location Information attributes |
                |             + Location Information policy     |
                |---------------------------------------------->|
                |                                               |
                | Access-Accept                                 |
                |<----------------------------------------------|
                |                                               |

           Figure 2: Message Flow: Mid-session Authorization

   Upon receiving the Authorize-Only message from the access network,
   the AAA server MUST respond with either an Access-Accept message or
   an Access-Reject message.




























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4.  Scenarios

   In the following subsections we describe two scenarios for use of
   location information.  The location infomration may refer to network
   or user location information which in some cases may be identical.
   How the network obtains the user's location information is out of
   scope of this document.  There are two consumers of the location
   information: the AAA servers and other location-based services.  The
   privacy implications of these scenarios are described in Section 13.

4.1  Scenario 1 - Use of Location Information in AAA

   The home network operator requires location information for
   authorization and billing purposes.  The operator may deny service if
   location information is not available.  Or it may offer limited
   service.  The NAS delivers location information to the home AAA
   server.

   The user's location is transferred from the NAS to the RADIUS server.
   The NAS and intermediaries (if any) are not allowed to use that
   information other then to forward it to the home network.

   The RADIUS server authenticates and authorizes the session.  If the
   user's location policies are available to the RADIUS server, the
   RADIUS server must deliver those policies in an Access Accept to the
   RADIUS client.  This information may be needed if intermediaries or
   other elements want to act as Location Servers (see Section 4.2).  In
   the absence of receiving the policies intermediaries MUST NOT make
   any use of the location information other than forwarding it to the
   home network.

   Location Information may also be reported in accounting messages.
   Accounting messages are generated when the session starts, stops and
   periodically.  Accounting messages may also be generated when the
   user roams during handoff.  This information may be needed by the
   billing system to calculate the user's bill.  For example, there may
   be different a rates applied based on the location and there may be
   different tax rates applied based on the location.  Unless otherwise
   specified by authorization rules, location information in the
   accounting stream MUST NOT be transmitted to third parties.

   The location information in the accounting stream MUST only be sent
   in the proxy chain to the home network (unless specified otherwise).

4.2  Scenario 2 - Use of Location Information for Other Services

   Location Servers are entities that receive the user's location
   information and transmit it to other entities.  In this second



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   scenario, Location Servers comprise also the NAS and RADIUS server
   roles.  The RADIUS servers are in the home network, in the visited
   network, or in broker networks.

   Unless explicitly authorized by the user's location policy, location
   information MUST NOT be transmitted to other parties outside the
   proxy chain between the NAS and the Home RADIUS server.

   Upon authentication and authorization, the home RADIUS server must
   transmit the ruleset (if available) in an Access-Accept.  The RADIUS
   client, intermediate proxies are allowed to share location
   information if they received ruleset indicates that it is allowed.

   Note that the NAS is the source of all location information that is
   disseminated by RADIUS, the NAS could tag the location information
   with the policy rules or a reference for the policy rules received in
   an Access-Accept.  All location information in the accounting stream
   will now be tagged.

































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5.  Overview

   Location information and ownership of the access network is conveyed
   in the following RADIUS attributes: Operator-Type, Operator-Name,
   Location-Information and Location-Type.  Furthermore, the
   Basic-Policy-Rules and the Extended-Policy-Rules attributes are
   attached to the Location-Information attribute turning location
   information into a Location Object as defined in [10].

5.1  Operator-Type Attribute

   This attribute contains an operator type which combined with the
   Operator-Name attribute serves to uniquely identify the ownership of
   an access network.  The attribute value is a four octet integer.
   This document defines three values for this attribute: 1 (GSM), 2
   (CDMA), and 3 (REALM).  Additional values require an IANA
   registration and MUST be associated with an organization responsible
   for assigning/managing the operator names.

   The GSM operator type can be used to indicate operator names based on
   GSMA TADIG codes.  The TADIG Working Group within the GSM Association
   is the authority responsible for issuing unique Operator-Name values
   for operators of this type.

   The CDMA operator type can be used to indicate operator names based
   on the Home Network Identifier (HNI).  The HNI is the concatenation
   of the 3-digit Mobile Country Code (MCC) and 3-digit Mobile Network
   Code (MNC).  The IMSI Oversight Council (IOC) is the authority
   responsible for issuing unique Operator-Name values for operators of
   this type.

   The REALM operator type can be used to indicate operator names based
   on any registered domain name.  The Internet Assigned Numbers
   Authority (IANA) or registered delegate is the authority responsible
   for issuing unique Operator-Name values for operators of this type.

5.2  Operator-Name Attribute

   This attribute contains an operator name which combined with the
   Operator-Type attribute serves to uniquely identifies the ownership
   of an access network.  The attribute value is a non-NULL terminated
   string whose Length MUST NOT exceed 253 bytes.  The attribute value
   uniquely identifies the operator name within the scope of the
   operator type.

5.3  Location-Information Attribute

   This document describes two formats for conveying location



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   information: civic and geospatial location information.
   Section 5.3.1 defines the civic location information format.
   Section 5.3.2 defines the geospatial location information format.

   Additionally, the following fields provide more details about the
   transmitted location information.
   Precision: The 'Precision' field provides information of the accuracy
      about the provided location information.  Location information can
      refer to the Access Point, the user, the or the RADIUS server or
      the network itself.  With large networks the location information
      of each of these entities might be different.  The 'Precision'
      field allows to give a hint about the precision of the provided
      location information.
   Method: The 'Method' field describes the way that the location
      information was derived or discovered.  Possible values for this
      field include, as an example GPS or manual configuration.  The
      inclusion of this field should help the user's home network deduce
      further information about the accuracy and to provide an easier
      translation into a Location Object for transmission to third party
      entities (e.g., using SIP).  Note that the values for this field
      are reused from [11].

5.3.1  Civic Location Information

   Civic location is a popular way to describe the location of an
   entity.  Using an unstructured (as a text string) or a custom format
   for civic location format is dangerous since the automatic processing
   capabilities are limited.

   For this document, we reuse the civic location format defined in [4].

   The civic location format includes a number of fields, including the
   country (expressed as a two-letter ISO 3166 code) and the
   administrative units A1 through A6 of [4] .  This designation offers
   street-level precision.

   For completeness we include more detailed information from [4] with
   regard to the defined civic location elements:













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   +----------------------+----------------------+---------------------+
   | Label                | Description          | Example             |
   +----------------------+----------------------+---------------------+
   | country              | The country is       | US                  |
   |                      | identified by the    |                     |
   |                      | two-letter ISO 3166  |                     |
   |                      | code.                |                     |
   |                      |                      |                     |
   | A1                   | national             | New York            |
   |                      | subdivisions (state, |                     |
   |                      | region, province,    |                     |
   |                      | prefecture)          |                     |
   |                      |                      |                     |
   | A2                   | county, parish, gun  | King's County       |
   |                      | (JP), district (IN)  |                     |
   |                      |                      |                     |
   | A3                   | city, township, shi  | New York            |
   |                      | (JP)                 |                     |
   |                      |                      |                     |
   | A4                   | city division,       | Manhattan           |
   |                      | borough, city        |                     |
   |                      | district, ward, chou |                     |
   |                      | (JP)                 |                     |
   |                      |                      |                     |
   | A5                   | neighborhood, block  | Morningside Heights |
   |                      |                      |                     |
   | A6                   | street               | Broadway            |
   |                      |                      |                     |
   | PRD                  | Leading street       | N, W                |
   |                      | direction            |                     |
   |                      |                      |                     |
   | POD                  | Trailing street      | SW                  |
   |                      | suffix               |                     |
   |                      |                      |                     |
   | STS                  | Street suffix        | Avenue, Platz,      |
   |                      |                      | Street              |
   |                      |                      |                     |
   | HNO                  | House number,        | 123                 |
   |                      | numeric part only.   |                     |
   |                      |                      |                     |
   | HNS                  | House number suffix  | A, 1/2              |
   |                      |                      |                     |
   | LMK                  | Landmark or vanity   | Low Library         |
   |                      | address              |                     |
   |                      |                      |                     |
   | LOC                  | Additional location  | Room 543            |
   |                      | information          |                     |
   |                      |                      |                     |



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   | FLR                  | Floor                | 5                   |
   |                      |                      |                     |
   | NAM                  | Name (residence,     | Joe's Barbershop    |
   |                      | business or office   |                     |
   |                      | occupant)            |                     |
   |                      |                      |                     |
   | PC                   | Postal code          | 10027-0401          |
   +----------------------+----------------------+---------------------+

                                Table 1

   More description of these civic location elements can be found in
   Section 3.4 of [4].  These elements can be used to express further
   information about the location, language specific settings via the
   'language' item and encoding information via the 'script' item.
   Section 12 shows usage examples of this attribute.

   All attributes are optional and can appear in any order.  The values
   are encoded using UTF-8 [6].

5.3.2  Geospatial Location Information

   This document reuses geospatial location information from [7] which
   defines latitude, longitude, and altitude, with resolution indicators
   for each.  The value in the Altitude field either indicates meters or
   floors (via the Altitude Type field).  As a coordinate reference
   system Section 2.1 of [7] defines (via extensible mechanism using
   IANA registration) three values in the Datum field: WGS 84, NAD 83
   (with the associated vertical datum for the North American Vertical
   Datum of 1988), NAD 83 (with the associated vertical datum for the
   Mean Lower Low Water (MLLW).  WGS 84 is used by the GPS system.

   During a protocol run it is possible to return Location-Information
   attributes which provide both location information elements.  If only
   one location information element is provided then civic location
   SHOULD be included in the request.  Additionally, geospatial location
   MAY be provided.














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6.  Basic- and Extended-Policy-Rule Attributes

   In some environments it is possible for the user to attach
   information about its privacy preferences.  These preferences allow
   the visited network, intermediate RADIUS proxies and the home network
   to authorize the distribution of the user's location information.  If
   the policies provided by the user itself and the policies provided by
   the home network conflict then the user provided policies have
   precedence.

   Without the user providing authorization information two approaches
   are possible:

   o  The user hides its location information from the access network
      and from intermediate networks using the appropriate network
      access authentication mechanism.  Section 13 discusses these
      issues in more details.
   o  The access network attaches default authorization policies which
      prevents intermediate networks and the home network to distribute
      the location information to other entities.  Additionally, the
      home network might have authorization policies which control
      distribution of location information.  Users can dynamically
      change their policies using the authroization framework defined in
      [12] and [13].

   With regard to authorization policies this document reuses work done
   in [11] and encodes it in an non-XML format.  Two fields ('sighting
   time' and 'time-to-live') are additionally included in the
   Location-Information attribute to conform to the Geopriv Requirements
   [10], Section 2.7.  Two RADIUS attributes are used for this purpose:
   Basic-Policy-Rule and Extended-Policy-Rule attribute.  The
   Basic-Policy-Rule attribute contains a fixed set of privacy relevant
   fields whereas the Extended-Policy-Rule attribute contains a
   reference to a more extensive authorization rule set.

















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7.  Location-Type Attribute

   This document uses the values defined in the location type registry
   [8].

   Using these location types it is possible to describe the area in
   more detail.  Note that one or more values can be specified in this
   attribute.











































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8.  Diameter RADIUS Interoperability

   In deployments where RADIUS clients talk with DIAMETER servers or
   DIAMETER clients talk with RADIUS servers then a translation agent
   will be deployed and operate in accordance to the NASREQ
   specification [14].













































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9.  Attributes

   This section defines the Operator-Type AVP, Operator-Name AVP,
   Location-Information AVP, Basic Policy Rules AVP, Extended Policy
   Rules AVP and the Location-Type AVP.

9.1  Operator-Type Attribute

   The Operator-Type attribute SHOULD be sent in Access-Request, and
   Accounting-Request packets where the Acc-Status-Type is set to Start,
   Interim, or Stop.  If this attribute is present, the Operator-Name
   attribute MUST also be present in the packet.

   A summary of the Operator-Type Attribute is shown below.

       0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Type          | Length        |         Operator-Type
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
          Operator-Type (cont)       |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      Type:
       To Be Assigned by IANA  - Operator-Type

     Length:
       6

     Operator-Type:

         The Operator-Type field is four octets and identifies the
         namespace associated with the Operator-Name attribute.


       #     Namespace
      ---    ---------
       1     GSM
       2     CDMA
       3     REALM


9.2  Operator-Name Attribute

   The Operator-Name attribute SHOULD be sent in Access-Request, and
   Accounting-Request packets where the Acc-Status-Type is set to Start,
   Interim, or Stop.  If this attribute is present, the Operator-Type
   attribute MUST also be present in the packet.




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   A summary of the Operator-Name Attribute is shown below.

       0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Type          | Length        | Operator-Name                ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Type:
       To Be Assigned by IANA - Operator-Name

     Length:
       >= 3 Bytes

     Operator-Name:
       The text field contains an Access Network Operator Name.
       Example: anyisp.com


9.3  Location-Information Attribute

   Location-Information attribute SHOULD be sent in Access-Request, and
   Accounting-Request records where the Acc-Status-Type is set to Start,
   Interim or Stop if available.

   The Location-Information Attribute has two variations depending on
   civic or geospatial location information.  The format is shown below.


       0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |   Type        |  Length       | Code          |  Precision    |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Sighting Time                                                 ~
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Sighting Time                                                 |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Time-to-Live                                                  ~
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Time-to-Live                                                  |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |   Method      |    Location-Info                             ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


     Type (8 bits):
       To Be Assigned by IANA  - Location-Information



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     Length (8 bits):
       >= 3 Bytes

     Code (8 bits):
       Describes which location format is carried in this attribute:
       (0) describes civic location information
       (1) describes geospatial location information
       All other bites of the Code field is reserved
       and required for alignment.

     Precision (8 bits):
       Describes which location this attribute refers to:
       (0) describes the location of the NAS
       (1) describes the location of the AAA server
       (2) describes the location of the end host (user)
       (3) describes the location of the network

     Sighting Time (64 bits):
       NTP timestamp for the 'sighting time' field.

     Time-to-Live (64 bits):
       NTP timestamp for the 'time-to-live' field.

     Method (8 bits):
       Describes the way that the location information was
       derived or discovered. The following values are currently
       defined:
       (0) Global Positioning System (GPS)
       (1) GPS with assistance (A-GPS)
       (2) Manual configured information
       (3) Provided by DHCP
       (4) Triangulation: triangulated from time-of-arrival,
           signal strength or similar measurements
       (5) Cell: location of the cellular radio antenna
       (6) IEEE 802.11 WLAN access point

     Location-Info (variable):
       Contains either civic or
       geospatial location information attributes.

   The following two fields need some explanation:
   sighting time: This field indicates when the Location Information was
      accurate.  The data type of this field is a string and the format
      is a 64 bit NTP timestamp [15].
   time-to-live: This field gives a hint until when location information
      should be considered current.  Note that the time-to-live field is
      different than retention-expires, which indicates the time the
      recipient is no longer permitted to possess the location



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      information and its encapsulating Location Object.  The data type
      of this field is a string and the format is a 64 bit NTP timestamp
      [15].

   For civic location information the Location-Info field in the above
   structure is defined as followed:


       0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |          Countrycode          |  Civic address elements      ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Countrycode (16 bits):
       Two-letter ISO 3166 country code in capital ASCII letters.

     Civic address elements (variable):
       The text field contains location information element.

   The format of the civic address elements is described in Section 3.3
   of [4] with a TLV pair (whereby the Type and Length fields are one
   octet long).  An example is given in Section 12.

   For geospatial location information the Location-Info field is
   defined as follows:


        0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |   LaRes   |     Latitude                                      +
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Latitude      |    LoRes  |  Longitude                        +
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |     Longitude                 |  AT   |  AltRes   | Altitude  +
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                   Altitude                    |    Datum      |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     LaRes (6 bits):
       Latitude resolution

     Latitude (34 bits)

     LoRes (6 bits):
       Longitude resolution.




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     Longitude (34 bits)

     Altitude (30 bits)

     AltRes (6 bits):
       Altitude resolution

     AT (4 bits):
       Altitude Type for altitude. The following codes are defined:

       (1) Meters
       (2) Floors

    Datum (8 bits):
      Coordinate reference system
      The following codes for the this field are defined:

      (1) WGS 84
      (2) NAD 83 (with the associated vertical datum for
                  the North American Vertical Datum of 1988)
      (3) NAD 83 (with the associated vertical datum for
                  the Mean Lower Low Water (MLLW))

   The length of the Location-Information Attribute MUST NOT exceed 253
   octets.  The length of the geospatial location information format is
   fixed with 16 bytes plus a four byte header.

   The Datum field contains an identifier for the coordinate system used
   to interpret the values of Latitude, Longitude and Altitude.  The
   field with value (2) and the value (3) both represent the NAD 83
   coordinate reference system but they differ from each other with
   regard to their vertical datum representation as briefly noted in
   Section 5.3.2 and described in more detail in [7].

9.4  Basic Policy Rules Attribute

   The Basic-Policy-Rules attribute MUST be sent in Access-Accept,
   Access-Challenge, Access-and Access-Reject messages if location
   information is transmitted with this exchange.  If authorization
   policy rules are available to the RADIUS client then the
   Access-Request MUST carry the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute to to the
   RADIUS server.

   A summary of the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute is shown below.







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       0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Type          | Length        |R|  Flags                      |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Retention Expires                                            ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Retention Expires                                             |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Note Well                                                    ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Type :
       To Be Assigned by IANA  - Basic-Policy-Rules

     Length:
       > 3 Bytes

     Flag (16 bits):
       Only the first bit (R) is defined an corresponds to the
       retransmission-allowed field. All other bits are reserved.

     Retention Expires (64 bits):
       NTP timestamp for the 'retention-expires' field.

     Note Well (variable):
       This field contains a URI with human readable
       privacy instructions.

   This document reuses fields of the 'usage-rules' element, described
   in [11].  These fields have the following meaning:

   retransmission-allowed: When the value of this element is '0', then
      the recipient of this Location Object is not permitted to share
      the enclosed location information, or the object as a whole, with
      other parties.  The value of '1' allows to share the location
      information with other parties by considering the extended policy
      rules.
   retention-expires: This field specifies an absolute date at which
      time the Recipient is no longer permitted to possess the location
      information.  The data type of this field is a string and the
      format is a 64 bit NTP timestamp [15].
   note-well: This field contains a URI with human readable privacy
      instructions.  This field is useful when location information is
      distributed to third party entities, which can include humans in a
      location based service.  RADIUS entities are not supposed to
      process this field.




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      Whenever a Location Object leaves the AAA system the URI in the
      note-well attribute MUST be expanded to the human readable text.
      For example, when the Location Object is transferred to a SIP
      based environment then the human readable text is placed in the
      text is put into the 'note-well' attribute inside the
      'usage-rules' element inside the PIDF-LO document (see [11]).

9.5  Extended Policy Rules Attribute

   The Extended-Policy-Rules attribute SHOULD be sent in Access-Accept,
   Access-Challenge, Access-and Access-Reject messages if location
   information is transmitted with this exchange.  If authorization
   policy rules are available to the RADIUS client then the
   Access-Request MUST carry the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute to to the
   RADIUS server.

   Ruleset reference field of this attribute is of variable length.  It
   contains a URI that indicates where a richer ruleset is available.
   The full ruleset SHOULD be fetched using Transport Layer Security
   (TLS).  As a deviation from [11] this field only contains a reference
   and does not carry an attached rule set.  This modification is
   motivated by the size limitations imposed by RADIUS.

   A summary of the Extended-Policy-Rules attribute is shown below.

       0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Type          | Length        | Ruleset reference            ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Type :
       To Be Assigned by IANA  - Extended-Policy-Rules

     Length:
       > 3 Bytes

     Ruleset reference:
       The text field contains a reference to the policy rules.


9.6  Location-Type Attribute

   Location-Type Attribute SHOULD be sent in Access-Request, and
   Accounting-Request records where the Acc-Status-Type is set to Start,
   Interim, or Stop if available.

   A summary of the Location-Type Attribute is shown below.



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       0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Type          | Length        | Loc-Type                      |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Type (8 bits):
       To Be Assigned by IANA - Location-Name

     Length (8 bits):
       4 Bytes

     Loc-Type (16 bits):
       The content of this field corresponds to the integer codes for
       access network location type.

   These integer codes for the location type can be found in Section 7.


































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10.  Table of Attributes

   The following table provides a guide which attributes may be found in
   which RADIUS messages, and in what quantity.

   Request Accept Reject Challenge Accounting  #  Attribute
                                   Request
   0-1     0      0      0         0-1        TBD  Operator-Name
   0+      0      0      0         0+         TBD  Location-Information
   0-1     0-1    0-1    0-1       0-1        TBD  Basic-Policy-Rules
   0-1     0-1    0-1    0-1       0-1        TBD  Extended-Policy-Rules
   0-1     0      0      0         0-1        TBD  Location-Type

   The Location-Information attribute may appear more than once.  This
   is useful if the size of one Location-Information attribute exceeds
   the maximum size of an AVP.  This might happen in case of civic
   location information that has a variable number of fields.  The
   individual fields used for representing civic location information
   inside the Location-Information AVP (see Section 5.3.1 MUST NOT
   appear more than once.  For example, it is not allowed to have a
   CAtype of 3 (indicating the name of the city) to appear more than
   once.

   The next table shows the occurrence of the error-cause attribute.

   Request Accept Reject Challenge Accounting #  Attribute
                                   Request
   0       0       0-1     0-1      0-1      TBD Location-Info-Required
   0       0       0-1     0        0        101 Error-Cause






















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11.  Matching with Geopriv Requirements

   This section compares the Geopriv requirements described in [10] and
   the approach of distributing Location Objects with RADIUS.

   The main usage scenario aimed for Location Object transport in RADIUS
   assumes that the Location Server and the Location Recipient are
   co-located at a single entity with regard to location based network
   access authorization, taxation and billing.  In Section 11.1 and
   Section 11.2 we discuss privacy implications when RADIUS is not used
   according to these usage scenario.

   In Section 11.3 Geopriv requirements are matched against these two
   scenarios.

11.1  Distribution of Location Information at the User's Home Network

   This section focuses on location information transport from the local
   AAA server (acting as the Location Generator) to the home AAA server
   (acting as the Location Server).  To use a more generic scenario we
   assume that the visited AAA and the home AAA server belong to
   different administrative domains.  The Location Recipient obtains
   location information about a particular Target via protocols
   specified outside the scope this document (e.g., SIP, HTTP or an
   API).

   Please note that the main usage scenario defined in this document
   assumes that the Location Server and the Location Recipient are
   co-located into a single entity with regard to location based network
   access authorization, taxation and billing.

   The subsequent figure shows the interacting entities graphically.



















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    visited network    |        home network
                       |
                       |        +----------+
                       |        |  Rule    |
                       |        | Holder   |
                       |        |          |
                       |        +----+-----+
                       |             |
                       |         rule|interface
                       |             V
     +----------+      |        +----------+               +----------+
     |Location  |  publication  | Location |  notification |Location  |
     |Generator |<------------->| Server   |<------------->|Recipient |
     |          |  interface    |          |  interface    |          |
     +----------+      |        +----------+               +----------+
                       |
     Local AAA      RADIUS       Home AAA     SIP/HTTP/API/etc.
     Server            |         Server
                       |

             Figure 14: Location Server at the Home Network

   The term 'Rule Holder' in Figure 14 denotes the entity which creates
   the authorization ruleset.

11.2  Distribution of Location Information at the Visited Network

   This section describes a scenario where Location Information is
   distributed by the visited network.

   In order for this scenario to be applicable a few assumptions must
   hold:
   o  The visited network deploys a Location Server and wants to
      distribute Location Objects of a user
   o  The visited network is able to learn the user identity of the user

   The visited network provides location information to a Location
   Recipient (e.g., via SIP or HTTP).  During the network access
   authentication procedure the visited network is able to retrieve
   authorization policies of the user via RADIUS from the home AAA
   server.

   The subsequent figure shows the interacting entities graphically.
   The transport of the Location Object is not shown in this figure
   since this aspect is already covered in the previous paragraph.






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    visited network    |        home network
                       |
     +----------+      |
     |Location  |      |
     |Recipient |      |
     |          |      |
     +----------+      |
          ^            |        +----------+
          |            |        |  Rule    |
          |            |        | Holder   |
      notification     |        |          |
       interface       |        +----+-----+
          |            |             |
          |            |         rule|interface
          v            |             V
     +----------+      |        +----------+
     |Location  | Rule Transport| Home AAA |
     |Generator |<------------->| Server   |
     |& Server  |   RADIUS      |          |
     +----------+      |        +----------+
                       |

           Figure 15: Location Server at the Visited Network


11.3  Requirements matching

   Section 7.1 of [10] details the requirements of a "Location Object".

   There are:

   Req. 1.  (Location Object generalities):
      *  Regarding requirement 1.1, the Location Object has to be
         understood by the RADIUS server (and possibly a Diameter server
         in case of interworking between the two) as defined in this
         document.  Due to the encoding of the Location Object it is
         possible to convert it to the format used in GMLv3.  The same
         civic location information format is used in PIDF-LO and this
         document.
      *  Regarding requirement 1.2, some fields of the Location Object
         defined in this document are optional.  See Section 5.3.1 as an
         example.
      *  Regarding requirement 1.3, the inclusion of the Location-Type
         attribute which gives a further classification of the location.
         This attribute can be seen as an extension.
      *  Regarding requirement 1.4, the Location Object is extensible in
         the same fashion as RADIUS is extensible.




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      *  Regarding requirement 1.5, the Location Object is useful for
         both receiving and sending location information as described in
         this document.
      *  Regarding requirement 1.6, the Location Object contains both,
         location information and privacy rules.  Location information
         is described in Section 5.3 and the corresponding privacy rules
         are detailed in Section 9.4 and in Section 9.5.
      *  Regarding requirement 1.7, the Location Object is usable in a
         variety of protocols.  The format of the object is reused from
         other documents as detailed in the respective sections (see
         Section 5.3, Section 9.4 and in Section 9.5).
      *  Regarding requirement 1.8, the encoding of the Location Object
         has an emphasis on a lightweight encoding format.  As such it
         is useable on constrained devices.

   Req. 2.  (Location Object fields):
      *  Regarding requirement 2.1, the Target Identifier is carried
         within the network access authentication protocol (e.g., within
         the EAP-Identity Response when EAP is used and/or within the
         EAP method itself).  As described in Section 13 it has a number
         of advantages if this identifier is not carried in clear text.
         This is possible with certain EAP methods whereby the identity
         in the EAP-Identity Response only contains information relevant
         for routing the response to the users home network.  The true
         user identity is protected by the authentication and key
         exchange protocol.
      *  Regarding requirement 2.2, the Location Recipient Identity is,
         in the main scenario the home AAA server.  This entity is
         located using the structure of the Network Access Identifier.
         For a scenario where the Location Recipient is obtaining
         Location Information from the Location Server via HTTP or SIP
         the respective mechanisms defined in these protocols are used
         to identify the recipient.  The Location Generator cannot, a
         priori, know the recipients if they are not defined in this
         protocol.
      *  Regarding requirement 2.3, the credentials of the Location
         Recipient are known to the RADIUS entities based on the
         security mechanisms defined in the RADIUS protocol itself.
         Section 14 describes these security mechanisms offered by the
         RADIUS protocol.  The same is true for requirement 2.4.
      *  Regarding requirement 2.5, Section 5.3 describes the content of
         the Location Field.  Motion and direction vectors as listed in
         requirement 2.6 are not provided as attributes.  It is,
         however, possible to deduce the motion and direction of an
         entity via the Mid-session Delivery mechanism as shown in
         Figure 2.
      *  Regarding requirement 2.6, this document only describes one
         Location Data Type for civic and for geospatial location



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         information, respectively.  No negotiation needs to take place.
      *  Regarding requirement 2.7, timing information is provided with
         'sighting time' and 'time-to-live' field defined in
         Section 9.4.
      *  Regarding requirement 2.8, a reference to an external (more
         detailed ruleset) is provided with the Section 9.5 attribute.
      *  Regarding requirement 2.9, security headers and trailers are
         provided as part of the RADIUS protocol or even as part of
         IPsec.
      *  Regarding requirement 2.10, a version number in RADIUS is
         provided with the IANA registration of the attributes.  New
         attributes are assigned a new IANA number.

   Req. 3.  (Location Data Types):
      *  Regarding requirement 3.1, this document defines two Location
         Data Types as described in Section 5.3.
      *  With the support of civic and geospatial location information
         support requirement 3.2 is fulfilled.
      *  Regarding requirement 3.3, geospatial location information only
         supports absolute coordinates rather than a delta.  However,
         the granularity of the location information can be reduced with
         the help of the AltRes, LoRes, LaRes fields described in the
         Location-Information attribute (see Section 9.3).
      *  Regarding requirement 3.4, further Location Data Types can be
         added via new coordinate reference systems (CRSs) (see Datum
         field in the Location-Information attribute of Section 5.3),
         extensions to existing fields (e.g., new location types as
         shown in Section 7) or via additional attributes.

   Section 7.2 of [10] details the requirements of a "Using Protocol".

   There are:

   Req.  4.: The using protocol has to obey the privacy and security
      instructions coded in the Location Object and in the corresponding
      Rules regarding the transmission and storage of the LO.  This
      document requires, that RADIUS entities sending or receiving
      location MUST obey such instructions.

   Req.  5.: The using protocol will typically facilitate that the keys
      associated with the credentials are transported to the respective
      parties, that is, key establishment is the responsibility of the
      using protocol.  Section 14 specifies how security mechanisms are
      used in RADIUS and how they can be reused to provide security
      protection for the Location Object.  Additionally, the privacy
      considerations (see Section 13) are also applicable for this
      discussion.




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   Req.  6.  (Single Message Transfer): In particular, for tracking of
      small target devices, the design should allow a single
      message/packet transmission of location as a complete transaction.
      The encoding of the Location Object is specifically tailored
      towards the inclusion into a single message that even respects the
      (Path) MTU size.  The concept of a transaction is not immediately
      applicable to RADIUS.

   Section 7.3 of [10] details the requirements of a "Rule based
   Location Data Transfer".

   There are:

   Req.  7.  (LS Rules): With the scenario shown in Figure 14 the
      decision of a Location Server to provide a Location Recipient
      access to location information is based on Rule Maker-defined
      Privacy Rules which are stored at the home network or are
      accessible for the home network.  With regard to the scenario
      shown in Figure 15 the Rule Maker-defined Privacy Rules are sent
      from the home network to the visited network as part of the
      Policy-Information attribute (see Section 9.4, Section 9.5 and
      Section 13 for more details).

   Req.  8.  (LG Rules): It is possible for the non-initial transmission
      (i.e., mid-session delivery) of a Location Object to enforce the
      users privacy rules.  For the initial transmission of a Location
      Object the user would have to use network access authentication
      methods which provide user identity confidentiality which would
      render the Location Object completely useless for the visited
      network.  For the scenario shown in Figure 14 the visited network
      is already in possession of the users location information prior
      to the authentication and authorization of the user (which might
      require several roundtrips).  A correlation between the location
      and the user identity might, however, still not be possible for
      the visited network (as explained in Section 13).  The visited
      network MUST evaluate ruleset provided by the home AAA server as
      soon as possible.

   Req.  9.  (Viewer Rules): The Rule Maker might define (via mechanisms
      outside the scope of this document) which policy rules are
      disclosed to other entities.

   Req.  10.  (Full Rule language): Geopriv has defined a rule language
      capable of expressing a wide range of privacy rules which is
      applicable in this area concerning the distribution of Location
      Objects.  A basic ruleset is provided with the Basic-Policy-Rules
      attribute Section 9.4.  A reference to the extended ruleset is
      carried in Section 9.5.  The format of these rules are described



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      in [12] and [13].

   Req.  11.  (Limited Rule language): A limited (or basic) ruleset is
      provided by the Policy-Information attribute Section 9.4 (and as
      introduced with PIDF-LO [11]).

   Section 7.4 of [10] details the requirements of a "Location Object
   Privacy and Security".

   There are:

   Req.  12 (Identity Protection): Support for unlinkable pseudonyms is
      provided by the usage of a corresponding authentication and key
      exchange protocol.  Such protocols are available, for example,
      with the support of EAP as network access authentication methods.
      Some EAP methods support passive user identity confidentiality
      whereas others even support active user identity confidentiality.
      This issue is further discussed in Section 14.  The importance for
      user identity confidentiality and identity protection has already
      been recognized (see for example a document on 'EAP Method
      Requirements for Wireless LANs' [16]).

   Req.  13.  (Credential Requirements): As described in Section 14
      RADIUS signaling messages can be protected with IPsec.  This
      allows a number of authentication and key exchange protocols to be
      used as part of IKE, IKEv2 or KINK.

   Req.  14.  (Security Features): Geopriv defines a few security
      requirements for the protection of Location Objects such as mutual
      end-point authentication, data object integrity, data object
      confidentiality and replay protection.  As described in Section 14
      these requirements are fulfilled with the usage of IPsec if the
      mutual authentication refers to the RADIUS entities (acting as
      various Geopriv entities) which directly communicate with each
      other.

   Req.  15.  (Minimal Crypto): A minimum of security mechanisms are
      mandated by the usage of RADIUS.  Security for Location Objects is
      provided by the RADIUS protocol (including IPsec and its dynamic
      key management framework) rather than on relying on object
      security via S/SIME (which is not available with RADIUS).  The
      handling of emergency calls is not specified as part of the RADIUS
      protocol and subject for an architectural investigation.  As such
      it might not even be applicable to RADIUS itself.







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12.  Example

   This section provides an example for a civic location information
   format within the Location-Information attribute.  The size of the
   geo-spatial location information object is fixed and well-described
   examples can be found in the Appendix of [7].

   Due to the size limitations of the RADIUS attributes we give a more
   detailed example borrowed from Section 4 of [4].


                +-------------+-----------+-------------------+
                | Type        | Length    | Value             |
                +-------------+-----------+-------------------+
                | Type        | 8 bits    | TBD               |
                | Length      | 8 bits    | 43                |
                | Code        | 16 bits   | 1                 |
                | Precision   | 8 bits    | 2                 |
                | Countrycode | 16 bits   | DE                |
                | CAtype      | 8 bits    | 1                 |
                | CAlength    | 8 bits    | 7                 |
                | CAvalue     | 7 bytes   | Bavaria           |
                | CAtype      | 8 bits    | 3                 |
                | CAlength    | 8 bits    | 6                 |
                | CAvalue     | 6 byte    | Munich            |
                | CAtype      | 8 bits    | 6                 |
                | CAlength    | 8 bits    | 11                |
                | CAvalue     | 11 bytes  | Marienplatz       |
                | CAtype      | 8 bits    | 19                |
                | CAlength    | 8 bits    | 1                 |
                | CAvalue     | 1 byte    | 8                 |
                | CAtype      | 8 bits    | 24                |
                | CAlength    | 8 bits    | 5                 |
                | CAvalue     | 5 bytes   | 80331             |
                +-------------+-----------+-------------------+

   The Length element provides the length of the entire payload minus
   the length of the initial 'Type', the 'Length' and the 'Code'
   attribute.  The Precision field has a value of '2' which refers to
   the location of the end host (user).  The CountryCode is set to 'DE'.
   Note that the subsequent attributes are in Type-Length-Value format.
   Type '1' indicates the region of 'Bavaria', '3' refers to the city
   'Munich', '6' to the street 'Marienplatz', the house number '8' is
   indicated by the type '19' and the zip code of '80331' is of type
   '24'.

   The total sum of these attributes is 46 bytes.




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13.  Privacy Considerations

   This section discusses privacy implications for the distribution of
   location information within RADIUS.

   In many cases the location information of the network also reveals
   the current location of the user with a certain degree of precision
   depending on the mechanism used, the positioning system, update
   frequency, where the location was generated, size of the network and
   other mechanisms (such as movement traces or interpolation).

   Two entities might act as Location Servers as shown in Section 4,
   Figure 14 or in Figure 15:

13.1  Entity in the visited network

   In this scenario it is difficult to obtain authorization policies
   from the end host (or user) immediately when the user attaches to the
   network.  In this case we have to assume that the visited network
   does not allow unrestricted distribution of location information
   other than the intended recipients (e.g., to third party entities)
   immediately.

   The visited network MUST behave according to the following
   guidelines:
   o  Per default only the home network is allowed to receive location
      information.  The visited network MUST NOT distribute location
      information to third parties without seeing the user's privacy
      rule se.
   o  If the home network provides the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute
      either as part of the Access-Accept, the Access-Reject or the
      Access-Challenge message then the visited network MUST follow the
      guidance given with these rules.
   o  If the home network provides the Extended-Policy-Rules attributes
      either as part of the Access-Accept, the Access-Reject or the
      Access-Challenge message then the visited network MUST fetch the
      full ruleset at the indicated URL and MUST follow the guidance
      given with these rules.
   o  If the RADIUS client in the visited network learns the basic rule
      set or a reference to the extended rule set by means outside the
      RADIUS protocol (e.g., provided by the end host) then it MUST
      include the Basic-Policy-Rules and the Extended-Policy-Rules
      attribute in the Access-Request message towards the home AAA
      server.  Furthermore, the visited network MUST evaluate these
      rules prior to the transmission of location information either to
      the home network or a third party.  The visited network MUST
      follow the guidance given with these rules.




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   o  If the RADIUS client in the visited network receives the
      Basic-Policy-Rules attribute with Access-Accept or the
      Access-Challenge message then the Basic-Policy-Rules MUST be
      attach in subsequent RADIUS messages which contain the
      Location-Information attribute (such as interim accounting
      messages).
   o  If the RADIUS client in the visited network receives the
      Extended-Policy-Rules attribute with Access-Accept or the
      Access-Challenge message then the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute
      MUST be attach in subsequent RADIUS messages which contain the
      Location-Information attribute (such as interim accounting
      messages).

13.2  Entity in the home network

   The AAA server in the home network might be an ideal place for
   storing authorization policies.  The user typically has a contractual
   relationship to his home network and hence the trust relationship
   between them are higher.  Once the infrastructure is deployed and
   useful applications are available there might be a strong desire to
   use location information for other purposes as well (such as location
   aware applications).  Authorization policy rules described in [13]
   and in [12] are tailored for this environment.  These policies might
   be useful for preventing further distribution of the user's location
   to other location based services.  The home AAA server (or a similar
   entity) thereby acts as a location server for access to location
   services.

   The home network MUST behave according to the following guidelines:
   o  As a default policy the home network MUST NOT distribute the
      user's location information to third party entities.
   o  If a user provides basic authorization policies then these rules
      MUST be returned to the visited network in the Access-Accept, the
      Access-Reject or the Access-Challenge message.
   o  If a user provides basic authorization policies then these rules
      MUST be returned to the visited network in the Access-Accept, the
      Access-Reject or the Access-Challenge message.
   o  If a user provides extended authorization policies then they MUST
      be accessible for the visited networking using a reference to
      these rule set.  The Extended-Policy-Rules attribute MUST include
      the reference and they MUST be sent to the visited network in the
      Access-Accept, the Access-Reject or the Access-Challenge message.
   o  The home network MUST follow the user provided rule set for both
      local storage and for further distribution.  With regard to the
      usage of these rules the home network MUST ensure that the users
      preferences are taken care of within the given boundaries (such as
      legal regulations or operational considerations).  For example, a
      user might not want the home network to store information about



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      its location information beyond a indicated time frame.  However,
      a user might on the other hand want to ensure that disputes
      concerning the billed amount can be resolved.  location
      information might help to resolve the dispute.  The user might,
      for example, be able to show that he has never been at the
      indicated place.
   o  If the policy rules provided by the user indicate that location
      information must not be distributed at all then the home network
      MUST provide the Basic-Policy-Rules to the RADIUS entity in the
      visited network via an Access-Accept, the Access-Reject or the
      Access-Challenge message.  The RADIUS server in the user's home
      network would set the 'Retention-Expires' and the
      'Retransmission-allowed' field to the user indicated value.

   For the envisioned usage scenarios, the identify of the user or his
   devices is tightly coupled to the transfer of location information.
   If the identity can be determined by the visited network or AAA
   brokers, then it is possible to correlate location information with a
   particular user.  As such, it allows the visited network and brokers
   to learn movement patterns of users.

   The identity of the user can "leak" to the visited network or AAA
   brokers in a number of ways:
   o  The user's device may employ a fixed MAC address, or base its IP
      address on such an address.  This enables the correlation of the
      particular device to its different locations.  Techniques exist to
      avoid the use of an IP address that is based on MAC address [17].
      Some link layers make it possible to avoid MAC addresses or change
      them dynamically.
   o  Network access authentication procedures such as PPP CHAP [18] or
      EAP [19] may reveal the user's identity as a part of the
      authentication procedure.  Techniques exist to avoid this problem
      in EAP, for instance by employing private Network Access
      Identifiers (NAIs) in the EAP Identity Response message [20] and
      by method-specific private identity exchange in the EAP method
      (e.g., [21], [22], [23]).  Support for identity privacy within
      CHAP is not available.
   o  AAA protocols may return information from the home network to the
      visited in a manner that makes it possible to either identify the
      user or at least correlate his session with other sessions, such
      as the use of static data in a Class attribute [1] or in some
      accounting attribute usage scenarios [24].
   o  Mobility mechanisms may reveal some permanent identifier (such as
      a home address) in cleartext in the packets relating to mobility
      signaling.
   o  Application protocols may reveal other permanent identifiers.

   Note that to prevent the correlation of identities with location



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   information it is necessary to prevent leakage of identity
   information from all sources, not just one.

   Unfortunately, most users are not educated about the importance of
   identity confidentiality and there is a lack of support for it in
   many protocols.  This problem is made worse by the fact that the
   users may be unable to choose particular protocols, as the choice is
   often dictated by the type of network they wish to access, the kind
   of equipment they have, or the type of authentication method they are
   using.

   A scenario where the user is attached to the home network is, from a
   privacy point of view, simpler than a scenario where a user roams
   into a visited network since the NAS and the home AAA are in the same
   administrative domain.  No direct relationship between the visited
   and the home network operator may be available and some AAA brokers
   need to be consulted.  With subscription-based network access as used
   today the user has a contractual relationship with the home network
   provider which could allow higher privacy considerations to be
   applied (including policy rules stored at the home network itself for
   the purpose of restricting further distribution).

   In many cases it is necessary to secure the transport of location
   information along the RADIUS infrastructure.  Mechanism to achieve
   this functionality are discussed in Section 14.


























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14.  Security Considerations

   Requirements for the security protection of a Location Object is
   defined in [10]: Mutual end-point authentication, data object
   integrity, data object confidentiality and replay protection.  The
   distribution of location information can be restricted with the help
   of authorization policies.  Basic authorization policies are attached
   to the location information itself, in the same fashion as described
   in [11].  It is possible that the user was already able to transfer
   some authorization policies to the access network to restrict the
   distribution of location information.  This is, however, rather
   unlikely in case of roaming users.  Hence, it will be primarily the
   NAS creating the Location Object which also sets the authorization
   policies.  If no authorization information is provided by the user
   then the visited network MUST set the authorization policies to only
   allow the home AAA server to use the provided location information.
   Other entities, such as the visited network and possibly AAA brokers
   MUST NOT use the location information for a purpose other than
   described in this document.  More extensible authorization policies
   can be stored at the user's home network.  These policies are useful
   when location information is distributed to other entities in a
   location-based service.  This scenario is, however, outside the scope
   of this document.

   It is necessary to use authorization policies to prevent the
   unauthorized distribution of location information.  The security
   requirements which are created based on [10] are inline with threats
   which appear in the relationship with disclosure of location
   information as described in [25].  [11] proposes S/MIME to protect
   the Location Object against modifications and against eavesdropping.
   To provide mutual authentication confidentiality protection and a
   digital signature is necessary.  Furthermore, to offer replay
   protection a guarantee of freshness is necessary (for example, based
   on timestamps).

   The security of S/SIME is based on public key cryptography which
   raises performance, deployment and size considerations.  Encryption
   requires that the local AAA server or the NAS knows the recipient's
   public key (e.g., the public key of the home AAA server).  Knowing
   the final recipient of the location information is in fact impossible
   for RADIUS entities.  Some sort of public key infrastructure would be
   required to obtain the public key and to verify the digital signature
   (at the home network).  Providing per-object cryptographic protection
   is, both at the home and at the visited network, computationally
   expensive.

   If no authentication, integrity and replay protection between the
   participating RADIUS entities is provided then an adversaries can



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   spoof and modify transmitted AVPs.  Two security mechanisms are
   proposed for RADIUS:

   o  [1] proposes the usage of a static key which might raise some
      concerns about the lack dynamic key management.
   o  RADIUS over IPsec [26] allows to run standard key management
      mechanisms, such as KINK [27], IKE and IKEv2 [28], to establish
      IPsec security associations.  Confidentiality protection MUST be
      used to prevent eavesdropper gaining access to location
      information.  Confidentiality protection is not only a property
      required by this document, it is also required for the transport
      of keying material in the context of EAP authentication and
      authorization.  Hence, this requirement is, in many environments,
      already fulfilled.  Mutual authentication must be provided between
      the local AAA server and the home AAA server to prevent
      man-in-the-middle attacks.  This is another requirement raised in
      the area of key transport with RADIUS and does not represent a
      deployment obstacle.  The performance advantages a superior
      compared to the usage of S/MIME and object security since the
      expensive authentication and key exchange protocol run needs to be
      provided only once (at for a long time).  Symmetric channel
      security with IPsec is highly efficient.  Since IPsec protection
      is suggested as a mechanism to protect RAIDUS already no
      additional considerations need to be addressed beyond those
      described in [26].  Where an untrusted AAA intermediary is
      present, the Location Object MUST NOT be provided to the
      intermediary.

   In case that IPsec protection is not available for some reason and
   RADIUS specific security mechanisms have to be used then the
   following considerations apply.  The Access-Request message is not
   integrity protected.  This would allow an adversary to change the
   contents of the Location Object or to insert and modify attributes
   and fields or to delete attributes.  To address these problems the
   Message-Authenticator (80) can be used to integrity protect the
   entire Access-Request packet.  The Message-Authenticator (80) is also
   required when EAP is used and hence is supported by many modern
   RADIUS servers.

   Access-Request packets including Location attribute(s) without a
   Message-Authenticator(80) attribute SHOULD be silently discarded by
   the RADIUS server.  A RADIUS server supporting the Location
   attributes MUST calculate the correct value of the
   Message-Authenticator(80) and MUST silently discard the packet if it
   does not match the value sent.

   Access-Accept, including Location attribute(s) without a
   Message-Authenticator(80) attribute SHOULD be silently discarded by



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   the NAS.  A NAS supporting the Location attribute MUST calculate the
   correct value of a received Message-Authenticator(80) and MUST
   silently discard the packet if it does not match the value sent.

   RADIUS and DIAMETER make some assumptions about the trust between
   traversed AAA entities in sense that object level security is not
   provided by neither RADIUS nor DIAMETER.  Hence, some trust has to be
   placed on the AAA entities to behave according to the defined rules.
   Furthermore, the AAA protocols do not involve the user in their
   protocol interaction except for tunneling authentication information
   (such as EAP messages) through their infrastructure.  RADIUS and
   DIAMETER have even become a de-facto protocol for key distribution.
   Hence, in the past there were some concerns about the trust placed
   into the infrastructure particularly from the security area when it
   comes to keying.  [29] documents this keying infrastructure and the
   security implications.  The uniqueness of the AAA infrastructure
   therefore raises some concerns about the interpretation of the
   retention and redistribution restrictions.  The privacy guidelines
   listed in Section 13 are applicable in this context.
































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15.  IANA Considerations

   The authors request that the Attribute Types, and Attribute Values
   defined in this document be registered by the Internet Assigned
   Numbers Authority (IANA) from the RADIUS name spaces as described in
   the "IANA Considerations" section of RFC 2865 [1], in accordance with
   BCP 26 [9].

15.1  Operator Type

   This document also defines a new registry for the Operator-Type
   attribute.  Initially, IANA is requested to register the following
   values and associated registry owners for the operator namespace:

        +-----+-----------+----------------------------+
        |  #  | Namespace | Registry Owner             |
        +-----+-----------+----------------------------+
        |  1  | GSM       | GSM Association: TADIG WG  |
        |  2  | CDMA      | IMSI Oversight Council     |
        |  3  | REALM     | IANA or delegate           |
        +-----------------+----------------------------+

   Following the policies outlined in [9] new Operator-Types will be
   assigned after Expert Review by the Geopriv working group or its
   designated successor.

15.2  Error-Cause Attribute

   The authors also request that IANA assign a new value for the
   Error-Cause attribute [5], of "Location-Info-Required" TBA.





















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16.  Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank the following people for their help
   with a previous version of this draft and for their input:

      Chuck Black
      Paul Congdon
      Jouni Korhonen
      Sami Ala-luukko
      Farooq Bari
      Ed Van Horne
      Mark Grayson
      Jukkat Tuomi
      Jorge Cuellar
      Christian Guenther

   Henning Schulzrinne provided the civic location information content
   found in this draft.  The geospatial location information format is
   based on work done by J.  Polk, J.  Schnizlein and M.  Linsner.  The
   authorization policy format is based on the work done by Jon
   Peterson.

   The authors would like to thank Victor Lortz, Jose Puthenkulam,
   Bernrad Aboba, Jari Arkko, Parviz Yegani, Serge Manning, Kuntal
   Chowdury, Pasi Eronen, Blair Bullock and Eugene Chang for their
   feedback to an initial version of this draft.  We would like to thank
   Jari Arkko for his text contributions.

   This document is based on the discussions within the IETF GEOPRIV
   working group.  Therefore, the authors thank Henning Schulzrinne,
   James Polk, John Morris, Allison Mankin, Randall Gellens, Andrew
   Newton, Ted Hardie, Jon Peterson for their time to discuss a number
   of issues with us.  We think Stephen Hayes for aligning this work
   with 3GPP activities.

















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17.  References

17.1  Normative References

   [1]  Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A. and W. Simpson, "Remote
        Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2865, June
        2000.

   [2]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
        Levels", March 1997.

   [3]  Rigney, C., "RADIUS Accounting", RFC 2866, June 2000.

   [4]  Schulzrinne, H., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv4
        and DHCPv6) Option for Civic  Addresses Configuration
        Information", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-geopriv-dhcp-civil-04,
        October 2004.

   [5]  Chiba, M., Dommety, G., Eklund, M., Mitton, D. and B. Aboba,
        "Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote Authentication Dial
        In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 3576, July 2003.

   [6]  Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646",
        STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.

   [7]  Polk, J., Schnizlein, J. and M. Linsner, "Dynamic Host
        Configuration Protocol Option for Coordinate-based Location
        Configuration Information", RFC 3825, July 2004.

   [8]  Schulzrinne, H. and H. Tschofenig, "Location Types Registry",
        Internet-Draft draft-ietf-geopriv-location-types-registry-00,
        November 2004.

   [9]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA
        Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434, October 1998.

17.2  Informative References

   [10]  Cuellar, J., Morris, J., Mulligan, D., Peterson, D. and D.
         Polk, "Geopriv Requirements", RFC 3693, February 2004.

   [11]  Peterson, J., "A Presence-based GEOPRIV Location Object
         Format", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-geopriv-pidf-lo-03,
         September 2004.

   [12]  Schulzrinne, H., "A Document Format for Expressing Privacy
         Preferences",
         Internet-Draft draft-ietf-geopriv-common-policy-03, October



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         2004.

   [13]  Schulzrinne, H., "A Document Format for Expressing Privacy
         Preferences for Location  Information",
         Internet-Draft draft-ietf-geopriv-policy-05, November 2004.

   [14]  Calhoun, P., Zorn, G., Spence, D. and D. Mitton, "Diameter
         Network Access Server Application",
         Internet-Draft draft-ietf-aaa-diameter-nasreq-17, July 2004.

   [15]  Mills, D., "Network Time Protocol (Version 3) Specification,
         Implementation", RFC 1305, March 1992.

   [16]  Stanley, D., Walker, J. and B. Aboba, "EAP Method Requirements
         for Wireless LANs", Internet-Draft draft-walker-ieee802-req-04,
         August 2004.

   [17]  Narten, T. and R. Draves, "Privacy Extensions for Stateless
         Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6", RFC 3041, January 2001.

   [18]  Simpson, W., "PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol
         (CHAP)", RFC 1994, August 1996.

   [19]  Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J. and H.
         Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
         RFC 3748, June 2004.

   [20]  Aboba, B., "The Network Access Identifier",
         Internet-Draft draft-ietf-radext-rfc2486bis-03, December 2004.

   [21]  Arkko, J. and H. Haverinen, "Extensible Authentication Protocol
         Method for 3rd Generation Authentication  and Key Agreement
         (EAP-AKA)", Internet-Draft draft-arkko-pppext-eap-aka-15,
         December 2004.

   [22]  Josefsson, S., Palekar, A., Simon, D. and G. Zorn, "Protected
         EAP Protocol (PEAP) Version 2",
         Internet-Draft draft-josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-eap-10, October
         2004.

   [23]  Tschofenig, H. and D. Kroeselberg, "EAP IKEv2 Method
         (EAP-IKEv2)", Internet-Draft draft-tschofenig-eap-ikev2-05,
         October 2004.

   [24]  Adrangi, F., "Chargeable User Identity",
         Internet-Draft draft-ietf-radext-chargeable-user-id-02,
         February 2005.




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   [25]  Danley, M., "Threat Analysis of the Geopriv Protocol",
         RFC 3694, September 2003.

   [26]  Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial
         In User Service) Support For Extensible Authentication Protocol
         (EAP)", RFC 3579, September 2003.

   [27]  Thomas, M. and J. Vilhuber, "Kerberized Internet Negotiation of
         Keys (KINK)", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-kink-kink-06, July
         2004.

   [28]  Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
         Internet-Draft draft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-17, October 2004.

   [29]  Aboba, B., "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key
         Management Framework", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-eap-keying-04,
         November 2004.

   [30]  Schulzrinne, H., Gurbani, V., Kyzivat, P. and J. Rosenberg,
         "RPID: Rich Presence: Extensions to the Presence Information
         Data Format  (PIDF)", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-simple-rpid-04,
         October 2004.

   [31]  Adrangi, F., "Access Network Bandwidth Capability",
         Internet-Draft draft-adrangi-radius-bandwidth-capability-01,
         July 2004.

   [32]  Aboba, B., "The Network Access Identifier",
         Internet-Draft draft-arkko-roamops-rfc2486bis-02, July 2004.


Authors' Addresses

   Hannes Tschofenig
   Siemens
   Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
   Munich, Bavaria  81739
   Germany

   Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@siemens.com











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   F. Adrangi
   Intel Corporatation
   2111 N.E. 25th Avenue
   Hillsboro OR
   USA

   Email: farid.adrangi@intel.com


   Mark Jones
   Bridgewater Systems Corporation
   303 Terry Fox Drive
   Ottawa, Ontario  K2K 3J1
   CANADA

   Email: mark.jones@bridgewatersystems.com


   Avi Lior
   Bridgewater Systems Corporation
   303 Terry Fox Drive
   Ottawa, Ontario  K2K 3J1
   CANADA

   Email: avi@bridgewatersystems.com


























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