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Versions: (draft-tschofenig-geopriv-radius-lo) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 RFC 5580

Geopriv                                                    H. Tschofenig
Internet-Draft                                                   Siemens
Intended status: Informational                                F. Adrangi
Expires: February 13, 2007                                         Intel
                                                                M. Jones
                                                                 A. Lior
                                                             Bridgewater
                                                         August 12, 2006


                  Carrying Location Objects in RADIUS
                  draft-ietf-geopriv-radius-lo-08.txt

Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
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   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on February 13, 2007.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).










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Abstract

   This document describes RADIUS attributes for conveying access
   network ownership and location information based on a civic and
   geospatial location format.

   The distribution of location information is a privacy sensitive task.
   Dealing with mechanisms to preserve the user's privacy is important
   and addressed in this document.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  Delivery Methods for Location Information  . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.1.  Authentication/Authorization Phase Delivery  . . . . . . .  6
     3.2.  Mid-session Authorization  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   4.  Scenarios  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     4.1.  Scenario 1 - Use of Location Information in AAA  . . . . . 11
     4.2.  Scenario 2 - Use of Location Information for Other
           Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   5.  Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     5.1.  Operator-Name Attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     5.2.  Location-Information Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     5.3.  Location-Info-Civic Attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
     5.4.  Location-Info-Geo Attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     5.5.  Basic Policy Rules Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
     5.6.  Extended Policy Rules Attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
     5.7.  Challenge-Capable Attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
     5.8.  Requested-Info Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
   6.  Table of Attributes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
   7.  Diameter RADIUS Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
   8.  Matching with Geopriv Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
     8.1.  Distribution of Location Information at the User's
           Home Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
     8.2.  Distribution of Location Information at the Visited
           Network  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
     8.3.  Requirements matching  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
   9.  Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
     9.1.  Entity in the visited network  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
     9.2.  Entity in the home network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
   10. Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
   11. IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
     11.1. New Registry: Operator Type  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
     11.2. New Registry: Requested-Info attribute . . . . . . . . . . 50
   12. Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
   13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53



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     13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
     13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 57















































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1.  Introduction

   Wireless LAN (WLAN) access networks are being deployed in public
   places such as airports, hotels, shopping malls, and coffee shops by
   a diverse set of operators such as cellular network operators (GSM
   and CDMA), Wireless Internet Service Providers (WISPs), and fixed
   broadband operators.

   When a user executes the network access authentication procedure to
   such a network, information about the location and ownership of this
   network needs to be conveyed to the user's home network to which the
   user has a contractual relationship.  The main intent of this
   document is to enable location aware billing (e.g., by determining
   the appropriate tariff and taxation in dependence of the location of
   the access network and the end host), location aware subscriber
   authentication and authorization for roaming environments and to
   enable other location aware services.

   This document describes AAA attributes, which are used by a AAA
   client or a AAA proxy in an access network, to convey location-
   related information to the user's home AAA server.

   Although the proposed attributes in this draft are intended for
   wireless LAN deployments, they can also be used in other types of
   wireless and wired networks whenever location information is
   required.

   Location information needs to be protected against unauthorized
   access and distribution to preserve the user's privacy. [10] defines
   requirements for a protocol-independent model for the access to
   geographic location information.  The model includes a Location
   Generator (LG) that creates location information, a Location Server
   (LS) that authorizes access to location information, a Location
   Recipient (LR) that requests and receives information, and a Rule
   Maker (RM) that provides authorization policies to the LS which
   enforces access control policies on requests to location information.















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2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [1].

   RADIUS specific terminology is borrowed from [2] and [3].

   Terminology related to privacy issues, location information and
   authorization policy rules is taken from [10].

   Based on today's protocols we assume that the location information is
   provided by the access network where the end host is attached.  As
   part of the network attachment authentication to the AAA server
   location information is sent from the AAA client to the AAA server.
   The authenticated identity might refer to a user, a device or
   something else.  Although there might often be a user associated with
   the authentication process (either directly or indirectly; indirectly
   when a binding between a device and a user exists) there is no
   assurance that a particular real-world entity (such as a person)
   triggered this process.  Since location based authorization is
   executed based on the network access authentication of a particular
   "user" it might be reasonable to talk about user's privacy within
   this document even though scenarios exist where this might not apply
   (and device or network privacy might be the better term).
   Furthermore, the authors believe that there is a relationship between
   the NAS (or other nodes in the access network) and the location of
   the entity that triggered the network access authentication, such as
   the user.  The NAS might in many cases know the location of the end
   host through various techniques (e.g., wire databases, wireless
   triangulation).  Knowing the location of a network (where the user or
   end host is attached) might in many networks also reveal enough
   information about the location of the user or the end host.  A
   similar assumption is also made with regard to the location
   information obtained via DHCP (see for example [4]).  This
   information might be used by applications in other protocols (such as
   SIP [11] with extensions [12]) to indicate the location of a
   particular user even though the location "only" refers to the
   location of the network or equipment within the network.  This
   assumption might not hold in all scenarios but seems to be reasonable
   and practicable.

   Please note that the authors use the terms end host and user
   interchangably.







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3.  Delivery Methods for Location Information

   Location Objects, which consist of location information and privacy
   rules, are transported via the RADIUS protocol from the AAA client to
   the AAA server.  A few attributes are introduced for this purpose, as
   listed in Section 5, whereby delivery to the RADIUS server can happen
   during the authentication/authorization phase (described in
   Section 3.1), or in the mid-session using the dynamic authorization
   protocol framework (described in Section 3.2).  This section
   describes messages flows for both delivery methods.

3.1.  Authentication/Authorization Phase Delivery

   Figure 1 shows an example message flow for delivering location
   information during the network access authentication and
   authorization procedure.  Upon a network authentication request from
   an access network client, the NAS submits a RADIUS Access-Request
   message that contains location information attributes among other
   required attributes.  These attributes are added based on various
   criteria (such as local policy, business relationship with
   subscriber's home network provider and in case of location
   information also by considering privacy policies).





























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    +---------+             +---------+                   +---------+
    | Network |             | Network |                   |   AAA   |
    | Access  |             | Access  |                   |  Server |
    | Client  |             | Server  |                   |         |
    +---------+             +---------+                   +---------+
        |                       |                              |
        | Authentication phase  |                              |
        | begin                 |                              |
        |---------------------->|                              |
        |                       |                              |
        |                       | RADIUS                       |
        |                       | Access-Request               |
        |                       | + Location-Information       |
        |                       |----------------------------->|
        |                       |                              |
        |                       | RADIUS                       |
        |                       | Access-Accept                |
        |                       |<-----------------------------|
        | Authentication        |                              |
        | Success               |                              |
        |<----------------------|                              |
        |                       |                              |
        |                       | RADIUS                       |
        |                       | Accounting-Request           |
        |                       | + Location-Information       |
        |                       |----------------------------->|
        |                       |                              |

        Figure 1: Location Delivery based on out-of-band Agreements

   If no location information is provided by the RADIUS client although
   it is needed by the RADIUS server to compute the authorization
   decision then the RADIUS server challenges the RADIUS client.  This
   exchange is shown in Figure 2.  The Access-Challenge thereby provides
   a hint to the Network Access Server regarding the type of location
   information attributes that are desired.  In the shown message flow
   these attributes are then provided in the subsequent Access-Request
   message.  When receiving this Access-Request message the
   authorization procedure at the RADIUS server might be based on a
   number of criteria, including the newly defined attributes listed in
   Section 5.










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    +---------+             +---------+                   +---------+
    | Network |             | Network |                   |   AAA   |
    | Access  |             | Access  |                   |  Server |
    | Client  |             | Server  |                   |         |
    +---------+             +---------+                   +---------+
        |                       |                              |
        | Authentication phase  |                              |
        | begin                 |                              |
        |---------------------->|                              |
        |                       |                              |
        |                       | RADIUS                       |
        |                       | Access-Request               |
        |                       | + Challenge-Capable          |
        |                       |----------------------------->|
        |                       |                              |
        |                       | RADIUS                       |
        |                       | Access-Challenge             |
        |                       |  + Rule set Information      |
        |                       |  + Requested-Info            |
        |                       |<-----------------------------|
        |                       |                              |
        |                       | RADIUS                       |
        |                       | Access-Request               |
        |                       | + Location-Information       |
        |                       |----------------------------->|
        |                       |                              |
        :                       :                              :
        :       Multiple Protocol Exchanges to perform         :
        :    Authentication, Key Exchange and Authorization    :
        :                  ...continued...                     :
        :                       :                              :
        |                       |                              |
        |                       | RADIUS                       |
        |                       | Access-Accept                |
        |                       |  + Requested-Info            |
        |                       |<-----------------------------|
        | Authentication        |                              |
        | Success               |                              |
        |<----------------------|                              |
        |                       |                              |
        |                       | RADIUS                       |
        |                       | Accounting-Request           |
        |                       | + Location-Information       |
        |                       |----------------------------->|
        |                       |                              |

               Figure 2: Location Delivery based on Request




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   If the AAA server needs to obtain location information also in
   accounting messages then it needs to include a Requested-Info
   attribute to the Access-Accept to express that is desired (if privacy
   policy allow it) and the Network Access Server SHOULD then include
   location information to the RADIUS accounting messages .

3.2.  Mid-session Authorization

   The mid-session delivery method uses the Change of Authorization
   (COA) message as defined in [5].  At anytime during the session the
   RADIUS server MAY send a COA message containing session
   identification attributes and a Requested-Info attribute attribute to
   the AAA client if authorization policies allow it.  The COA message
   MAY instruct the RADIUS client to generate an Authorize-Only Access-
   Request (Access-Request with Service-Type set to "Authorize-Only") in
   which case the RADIUS client includes location information in this
   Access-Request if policies allow it.

   Figure 3 shows the approach graphically.


    +---------+                                    +---------+
    |   AAA   |                                    |   AAA   |
    |  Client |                                    |  Server |
    |  (NAS)  |                                    |         |
    +---------+                                    +---------+
        |                                               |
        |  COA  + Service-Type "Authorize Only"         |
        |       + Requested-Info                        |
        |<----------------------------------------------|
        |                                               |
        |  COA NAK + Service-Type "Authorize Only"      |
        |          + Error-Cause  "Request Initiated"   |
        |---------------------------------------------->|
        |                                               |
        | Access-Request + Service-Type "Authorize Only"|
        |             + Location-Information            |
        |             + Policy-Rules                    |
        |---------------------------------------------->|
        |                                               |
        | Access-Accept                                 |
        |<----------------------------------------------|
        |                                               |

                    Figure 3: Mid-session Authorization

   Upon receiving the Access-Request message containing the Service-Type
   hint attribute with a value of Authorize-Only from the NAS, the



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   RADIUS server responds with either an Access-Accept or an Access-
   Reject message.

   Since location information can be sent in accounting records
   (including accounting interim records), RFC 3576 [5] is only needed
   for authorization changes.













































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4.  Scenarios

   In the following subsections we describe two scenarios for use of
   location information.  Location information may refer to the
   (visited) network or to the end host.  How the network obtains the
   end hosts location information is out of the scope of this document.
   There are two potential consumers of location information: the AAA
   server and location-based services.  The privacy implications of
   these scenarios are described in Section 9.

4.1.  Scenario 1 - Use of Location Information in AAA

   The home network operator requires location information for
   authorization and billing purposes.  The operator may deny service if
   location information is not available, or it may offer limited
   service only.  The NAS delivers location information to the home AAA
   server.

   The location of the AAA client and/or the end host is transferred
   from the NAS to the RADIUS server (based on a pre-established
   agreement or if the RADIUS server asks for it under consideration of
   privacy policies).  The NAS and intermediaries (if any) are not
   allowed to use that information other than to forward it to the home
   network.

   The RADIUS server authenticates and authorizes the user requesting
   access to the network.  If the user's location policies are available
   to the RADIUS server, the RADIUS server MUST deliver those policies
   in an Access Accept to the RADIUS client.  This information MAY be
   needed if intermediaries or other elements want to act as Location
   Servers (see Section 4.2).  If the NAS or intermediaries do not
   receive policies from the RADIUS server (or the end host itself) then
   they MUST NOT make any use of the location information other than
   forwarding it to the user's home network.

   Location Information may also be reported in accounting messages.
   Accounting messages are generated when the session starts, stops and
   periodically.  Accounting messages may also be generated when the
   user roams during handoff.  This information may be needed by the
   billing system to calculate the user's bill.  For example, there may
   be different tariffs or tax rates applied based on the location.
   Unless otherwise specified by authorization rules, location
   information in the accounting stream MUST NOT be transmitted to third
   parties.

   Location information in the accounting stream MUST only be sent in
   the proxy chain to the home network (unless specified otherwise).




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4.2.  Scenario 2 - Use of Location Information for Other Services

   Location Servers are entities that receive the user's location
   information and transmit it to other entities.  In this second
   scenario, Location Servers comprise also the NAS and the RADIUS
   server.  The RADIUS servers are in the home network, in the visited
   network, or in broker networks.

   Unless explicitly authorized by the user's location policy, location
   information MUST NOT be transmitted to other parties outside the
   proxy chain between the NAS and the Home RADIUS server.

   Upon authentication and authorization, the home RADIUS server MUST
   transmit the ruleset (if available) in an Access-Accept.  The RADIUS
   client, intermediate proxies are allowed to share location
   information if they received ruleset indicates that it is allowed.



































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5.  Attributes

5.1.  Operator-Name Attribute

   This attribute contains the operator namespace and the operator name.
   The operator name is combined with the namespace to uniquely identify
   the owner of an access network.  The value of the Operator-Name is a
   non-NULL terminated string whose length MUST NOT exceed 253 bytes.

   The Operator-Name attribute SHOULD be sent in Access-Request, and
   Accounting-Request records where the Acc-Status-Type is set to Start,
   Interim, or Stop.

   A summary of the Operator-Name attribute is shown below.





































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      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |     Type      |    Length     |            Value             ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |       Value (cont.)                                          ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Type:

       To Be Assigned by IANA  - Operator-Name

     Length:

       >= 5

     Value:

       The Value field is at least two octets in length, and the format
       is shown below. The data type of the Value field is string.
       All fields are transmitted from left to right:

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |   Namespace   | Operator-Name                                ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Operator-Name                                                ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Namespace:

       The value within this field contains the
       Operator Namespace identifier. The Namespace value
       is encoded as an 8-bit unsigned integer value.

       Example: 2 for REALM

     Operator-Name:

       The text field of variable length contains an
       Access Network Operator Name.
       This field is a RADIUS base data type of Text.

       Example: anyisp.com


   The Namespace field provides information about the operator



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   namespace.  This document defines four values for this attribute that
   are listed below.  Defining additional namespaces requires IANA
   registration and MUST be associated with an organization responsible
   for managing this namespace.

   TADIG (0):

      This namespace can be used to indicate operator names based on
      Transferred Account Data Interchange Group (TADIG) codes defined
      in [13].  TADIG codes are assigned by the TADIG Working Group
      within the GSM Association.  The TADIG Code consists of two
      fields, with a total length of five ASCII characters consisting of
      a three-character country code and a two-character aplhanumeric
      operator (or company) ID.


   E212 (1):

      The E212 namespace can be used to indicate operator names based on
      the Mobile Country Code (MCC) and Mobile Network Code (MNC)
      defined in [14].  The MCC/MCC values are assigned by the
      Telecommunications Standardization Bureau (TSB) within the ITU-T
      and designated administrators in different countries.  The E212
      value consists of three ASCII digits containing the MCC, followed
      by two or three ASCII digits containing the MNC.


   REALM (2):

      The REALM operator namespace can be used to indicate operator
      names based on any registered domain name.  Such names are
      required to be unique and the rights to use a given realm name are
      obtained coincident with acquiring the rights to use a particular
      Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN).


   ICC (3):

      The ICC namespace can be used to indicate operator names based on
      ITU Carrier Codes (ICC) defined in [15].  ICC values are assigned
      by national regulatory authorities and are coordinated by the
      Telecommunication Standardization Bureau (TSB) within the ITU-T.
      When using the ICC namespace, the attribute consists of three
      uppercase ASCII characters containing a three-letter alphabetic
      country code as defined in [16], followed by one to six uppercase
      alphanumeric ASCII characters containing the ICC itself.





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5.2.  Location-Information Attribute

   The Location-Information attribute SHOULD be sent in Access-Request
   and in Accounting-Request messages.  For the Accounting-Request
   message the Acc-Status-Type may be set to Start, Interim or Stop.

   The Location-Information Attribute provides meta-data about the
   location information, such as sighting time, time-to-live, mechanism
   that was used to determine the location information, etc.  The format
   is shown below.


      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |     Type      |    Length     |            Value             ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |       Value (cont.)                                          ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Type:

       To Be Assigned by IANA  - Location-Information

     Length:

       >= 21

     Value:

       The Value field is at least two octets in length, and the format
       is shown below. The data type of the Value field is string.
       The fields are transmitted from left to right:

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |   Index                       | Code          |  Entity       |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Sighting Time                                                 ~
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Sighting Time                                                 |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Time-to-Live                                                 ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Time-to-Live                                                  |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |   Method                                                     ...



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     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Index (16 bits):

       The 16-bit unsigned integer value allows to associate
       the Location-Information attribute with
       Location-Info-Civic and Location-Info-Geo
       attributes.

     Code (8 bits):

       Describes the location format that is carried in this attribute
       as an unsigned 8-bit integer value. Two values are defined by
       this document:

       (0) describes civic location information
       (1) describes geospatial location information

     Entity (8 bits):

       This field encodes which location this attribute refers to as an
       unsigned 8-bit integer value. Two values are defined by this
       document:

       (0) describes the location of the user's client device
       (1) describes the location of the AAA client

     Sighting Time (64 bits):

       NTP timestamp for the 'sighting time' field.

     Time-to-Live (64 bits):

       NTP timestamp for the 'time-to-live' field.

     Method (variable):

       Describes the way that the location information was
       determined. The values are registered with the 'method' Tokens
       registry by RFC 4119. The data type of this
       field is a string.

   The following two fields need some explanation:

   sighting time:

      This field indicates when the Location Information was accurate.
      The data type of this field is a string and the format is a 64 bit



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      NTP timestamp [17].


   time-to-live:

      This field gives a hint until when location information should be
      considered current.  Note that the time-to-live field is different
      than retention-expires.  The latter indicates the time the
      recipient is no longer permitted to possess the location
      information.  The data type of this field is a string and the
      format is a 64 bit NTP timestamp [17].

   The length of the Location-Information Attribute MUST NOT exceed 253
   octets.

5.3.  Location-Info-Civic Attribute

   Civic location is a popular way to describe the location of an
   entity.  For the RADIUS protocol civic location information is an
   opaque object and the RADIUS server parses the location information
   based on the encoding format defined in [4].  The data format
   described in Section 3.1 of [4] is used.

   Location-Info-Civic attribute SHOULD be sent in Access-Request and in
   Accounting-Request messages.  For the Accounting-Request message the
   Acc-Status-Type may be set to Start, Interim or Stop.

   The Location-Information attribute provides information about civic
   location information.  The format is shown below.






















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      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |     Type      |    Length     |            Value             ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |       Value (cont.)                                          ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Type:

       To Be Assigned by IANA  - Location-Info-Civic

     Length:

       >= 21

     Value:

       The Value field is at least two octets in length, and the format
       is shown below. The data type of the Value field is string.
       All fields are transmitted from left to right:

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |   Index                       |  Civic Location              ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |  Civic Location                                              ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Index (16 bits):

       The 16-bit unsigned integer value allows to associate
       the Location-Info-Civic attribute with the
       Location-Information attributes.

     Civic Location (variable):

       The format of the data is described in Section 3.1 of [4]
       whereby the first 14 bits (i.e., the code for this DHCP option,
       the length of the DHCP option, and the 'what' element)
       are not included.

5.4.  Location-Info-Geo Attribute

   Geospatial location information is encoded as an opaque object
   whereby the format is reused from [6].  The RFC 3825 Location
   Configuration Information (LCI) format defined in Section 2 of [6]



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   starting with bit 17 (i.e., the code for the DHCP option and the
   length field is not included.).

   Location-Info-Geo attribute SHOULD be sent in Access-Request, and
   Accounting-Request records where the Acc-Status-Type is set to Start,
   Interim or Stop if available.

   The Location-Information attribute provides information about
   geospatial location information.  The format is shown below.










































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      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |     Type      |    Length     |            Value             ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |       Value (cont.)                                          ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Type:

       To Be Assigned by IANA  - Location-Info-Geo

     Length:

       >= 21

     Value:

       The Value field is at least two octets in length, and the format
       is shown below. The data type of the Value field is string.
       All fields are transmitted from left to right:

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |   Index                       |  Geo Location                ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |  Geo Location                                                ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Index (16 bits):

       The 16-bit unsigned integer value allows to associate
       the Location-Info-Geo attribute with the
       Location-Information attributes.

     Geo Location (variable):

       The RFC 3825 Location Configuration Information (LCI) format
       defined in Section 2 of RFC 3825 starting with starting with
       the third octet (i.e., the code for the DHCP option and the
       length field is not included).

5.5.  Basic Policy Rules Attribute

   Policy rules control the distribution of location location
   information.  In some environments the the AAA client might know the
   privacy preferences of the user based on pre-configuration or the



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   user communicated them as part of the network attachment.  In many
   other cases the AAA server (or an entity with a relationship to the
   AAA server) might possess the user's authorization policies.  The
   Basic-Policy-Rules attribute SHOULD be sent in an an Access-Request,
   Access-Accept, an Access-Challenge, an Access-Reject and an
   Accounting-Request message.

   When the AAA client does not know the user's policy then the
   following procedure is applicable:

   o  The AAA client SHOULD NOT attach location information in the
      initial Access-Request message but should rather wait for the AAA
      server to receive a challenge for location information.

   o  If a roamig agreement or legal circumstances require the AAA
      client to transfer location information in the initial Access-
      Request message to the AAA server (even though user specific
      policies are not available to the AAA client) then the access
      network attaches default authorization policies.  In this case
      default policies with restrictive privacy settings appropriate for
      the respective environment are attached in this case.  The
      'retransmission-allowed' flag MUST be set to '0' meaning that the
      location must not be shared with other parties (other than
      forarding them to the user's home network).  In case the home
      network knows the user's privacy policies then these policies
      SHOULD be sent from the RADIUS server to the RADIUS client in a
      subsequent response message and these policies will be applied to
      further location dissemination and in subsequent RADIUS
      interactions (e.g., when attaching location information to
      Accounting messages).

   Note that the authorization framework defined in [18] and [19]
   together with XCAP [20] gives users the ability to change their
   privacy policies.

   With regard to authorization policies this document reuses work done
   in [21] and encodes them in a non-XML format.  Two fields ('sighting
   time' and 'time-to-live') are additionally included in the Location-
   Information attribute to conform to the Geopriv requirements [10],
   Section 2.7.  Two RADIUS attributes are used for this purpose: Basic-
   Policy-Rule and Extended-Policy-Rule attribute.  The latter is
   defined in Section 5.6.  The Basic-Policy-Rule attribute contains a
   fixed set of privacy relevant fields whereas the Extended-Policy-Rule
   attribute contains a reference to a more extensive authorization rule
   set.

   The format of the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute is shown below.




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      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |     Type      |    Length     |            Value            ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |       Value (cont.)                                         ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Type:

       To Be Assigned by IANA  - Basic-Policy-Rules

     Length:

       >= 12

     Value:

       The Value field is at least 8 octets in length, and the format
       is shown below. The data type of the Value field is string.
       All fields are transmitted from left to right:

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |  Flags                        | Retention Expires            ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Retention Expires                                            ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Retention Expires             | Note Well                    ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Note Well                                                    ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Flag (16 bits):

       Only the first bit (R) is defined and corresponds to the
       retransmission-allowed field. All other bits are reserved
       and MUST be zero.

        0                   1
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |R|o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o|
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

       The symbol 'o' refers to reserved flags.




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     Retention Expires (64 bits):

       NTP timestamp for the 'retention-expires' field.

     Note Well (variable):

       This field contains a URI that points to human readable
       privacy instructions. The data type of this field is string.

   This document reuses fields of the 'usage-rules' element, described
   in [21].  These fields have the following meaning:

   retransmission-allowed:

      When the value of this element is '0', then the recipient of this
      Location Object is not permitted to share the enclosed location
      information, or the object as a whole, with other parties.  The
      value of '1' allows to share the location information with other
      parties by considering the extended policy rules.


   retention-expires:

      This field specifies an absolute date at which time the Recipient
      is no longer permitted to possess the location information.  The
      data type of this field is a string and the format is a 64 bit NTP
      timestamp [17].


   note-well:

      This field contains a URI which points to human readable privacy
      instructions.  This field is useful when location information is
      distributed to third party entities, which can include humans in a
      location based service.  RADIUS entities are not supposed to
      process this field.

      Whenever a Location Object leaves the AAA system the URI in the
      note-well attribute MUST be expanded to the human readable text.
      For example, when the Location Object is transferred to a SIP
      based environment then the human readable text is placed into the
      'note-well' element of the 'usage-rules' element contained in the
      PIDF-LO document (see [21]).








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5.6.  Extended Policy Rules Attribute

   The Extended-Policy-Rules attribute SHOULD be sent in an Access-
   Request, an Access-Accept, an Access-Challenge, an Access-Reject and
   in an Accounting-Request message whenever location information is
   transmitted.

   Ruleset reference field of this attribute is of variable length.  It
   contains a URI that indicates where the richer ruleset can be found.
   This URI SHOULD use the HTTPS URI scheme.  As a deviation from [21]
   this field only contains a reference and does not carry an attached
   extended rule set.  This modification is motivated by the size
   limitations imposed by RADIUS.

   The format of the Extended-Policy-Rules attribute is shown below.


      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |     Type      |    Length     |            Value            ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |       Value (cont.)                                         ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Type:

       To Be Assigned by IANA  - Extended-Policy-Rules

     Length:

       >= 4

     Value:

       The Value field is at least two octets in length, and the format
       is shown below. The data type of the Value field is string.
       The fields are transmitted from left to right:

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |    Ruleset Reference                                         ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Ruleset Reference:

       This field contains a URI that points to policy rules.



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5.7.  Challenge-Capable Attribute

   The Challenge-Capable attribute allows a NAS (or client function of a
   proxy server) to indicate support for processing general purpose
   Access-Challenge messages from the RADIUS server, beyond those
   specified for support of the authentication methods of textual
   challenge-response, CHAP or EAP.  This mechanism allows the RADIUS
   server to request additional information from the RADIUS client prior
   to making an authentication and authorization decision.  The
   Challenge-Capable attribute MUST appear in Access-Request Messages,
   if the NAS supports this feature, as a hint to the RADIUS server.


      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Type          | Length        | Value                         |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Type:

       To Be Assigned by IANA - Challenge-Capable Attribute

     Length:

       4

     Value:

       The Value field is two octets long and of type string.
       Every bit of the two octets MUST be set to 0.

5.8.  Requested-Info Attribute

   The Requested-Info attribute allows the RADIUS server to indicate
   whether it needs civic and/or geospatial location information of the
   NAS or the end host (i.e., the entities that are indicated in the
   Entity field of the Location-Information attribute).

   If the RADIUS server wants to dynamically decide on a per-request
   basis to ask for location information from the RADIUS client then the
   following cases need to be differentiated.  If the AAA client and the
   AAA server have agreed out-of-band to mandate the transfer of
   location information for every network access authentication request
   then the processing listed below is not applicable.






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   o  The RADIUS server requires location information for computing the
      authorization decision.  If the RADIUS client does not provide
      location information with the Access-Request message then the
      Requested-Info attribute is attached to the Access-Challenge to
      indicate what is required.  Two cases can be differentiated:

   o

      1.  If the RADIUS client sends the requested information then the
          RADIUS server can process the location-based attributes.

      2.  If the RADIUS server does not receive the requested
          information in response to the Access-Challenge (including the
          Requested-Info attribute) then the RADIUS server responds with
          an Access-Reject with an Error-Cause attribute (including the
          "Location-Info-Required" value).  Note that an Access-Reject
          message SHOULD only be sent if the RADIUS server MUST use
          location information for returning a positive access control
          decision.

   o  If the RADIUS server would like location information in the
      Accounting-Request message but does not require it for computing
      an authorization decision then an Access-Accept MUST include a
      Required-Info attribute.  This is typically the case when location
      information is used for inclusion to the user's bill only.  The
      RADIUS client SHOULD attach location information to the
      Accounting-Request (unless authorization policies dictate
      something different), if it is available.

   If the RADIUS server does not send a Requested-Info attribute then
   the RADIUS client MUST NOT attach location information to messages to
   the RADIUS server.  The user's authorization policies, if available,
   MUST be consulted by the RADIUS server before requesting location
   information delivery from the RADIUS client.

   Figure 11 shows a simple protocol exchange where the RADIUS server
   indicates the desire to obtain location information, namely civic
   location information of the user, to grant access.  Since the
   Requested-Info attribute is attached to the Access-Challenge the
   RADIUS server indicates that location information is required for
   computing an authorization decision.










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    +---------+                    +---------+
    | RADIUS  |                    | RADIUS  |
    | Client  |                    | Server  |
    +---------+                    +---------+
         |                              |
         |                              |
         | RADIUS                       |
         | Access-Request               |
         | + Challenge-Capable          |
         |----------------------------->|
         |                              |
         | RADIUS                       |
         | Access-Challenge             |
         | + Requested-Info             |
         |   ('CIVIC_LOCATION',         |
         |    'USERS_LOCATION')         |
         |<-----------------------------|
         |                              |
         | RADIUS                       |
         | Access-Request               |
         | + Location-Information       |
         |   (civic-location)           |
         |----------------------------->|
         |                              |
         |        ....                  |

         Figure 11: RADIUS server requesting location information

   The Requested-Info attribute MUST be sent by the RADIUS server if it
   wants the RADIUS client to return civic and/or geospatial
   information.  This Requested-Info attribute MAY appear in the Access-
   Accept or in the Access-Challenge message.

   A summary of the attribute is shown below.

















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      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |     Type      |    Length     |            Value             ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |       Value (cont.)                                          ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |       Value (cont.)           |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Type:

       To Be Assigned by IANA - Requested-Info Attribute

     Length:

       10

     Value:

       The content of the Value field is shown below.
       The data type of the Value field is string.
       The fields are transmitted from left to right:

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Requested-Info                                                |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Requested-Info                                                |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Requested-Info (64 bits):

       This text field contains an integer value that encodes the
       requested information attributes.
       Each capability value represents a bit position.

   This document specifies the following capabilities:

   Name:

      CIVIC_LOCATION








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   Description:

      The RADIUS server uses this attribute to request information from
      the RADIUS client to be returned.  The numerical value
      representing CIVIC_LOCATION requires the RADIUS client to attach
      civic location attributes.


   Numerical Value:

      A numerical value of this attribute is '1'.


   Name:

      GEO_LOCATION


   Description:

      The RADIUS server uses this attribute to request information from
      the RADIUS client to be returned.  The numerical value
      representing GEO_LOCATION requires the RADIUS client to attach
      geospatial location attributes.


   Numerical Value:

      A numerical value of this attribute is '2'.


   Name:

      USERS_LOCATION


   Description:

      The numerical value representing USERS_LOCATION indicates that the
      AAA client must sent a Location-Information attribute that
      contains location information with the Entity attribute expressing
      the value of zero (0).  A value of zero indicates that the
      location information in the Location-Information attribute refers
      to the user's client device.







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   Numerical Value:

      A numerical value of this attribute is '4'.


   Name:

      NAS_LOCATION


   Description:

      The numberical value representing NAS_LOCATION indicates that the
      AAA client must sent a Location-Information attribute that
      contains location information with the Entity attribute expressing
      the value of one (1).  A value of one indicates that the location
      information in the Location-Information attribute refers to the
      AAA client.


   Numerical Value:

      A numerical value of this attribute is '8'.


   If neither the NAS_LOCATION nor the USERS_LOCATION bit is set then
   per-default the location of the user's client device MUST be returned
   (if authorization policies allow it).  If both the NAS_LOCATION and
   the USERS_LOCATION bits are set then the location information has to
   be put into separate attributes.  If neither the CIVIC_LOCATION nor
   the GEO_LOCATION bit is set in the Requested-Info attribute then no
   location information is returned.  If both the CIVIC_LOCATION and the
   GEO_LOCATION bits are set then the location information has to be put
   into separate attributes.  The value of NAS_LOCATION and
   USERS_LOCATION refers to the location information requested via
   CIVIC_LOCATION and via GEO_LOCATION.  As an example, if the bits for
   NAS_LOCATION, USERS_LOCATION and GEO_LOCATION are set then location
   information of the AAA client and the users' client device are
   returned in a geospatial location format.












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6.  Table of Attributes

   The following table provides a guide which attributes may be found in
   which RADIUS messages, and in what quantity.

   Request Accept Reject Challenge Accounting  #  Attribute
                                   Request
   0-1     0      0      0         0-1        TBD  Operator-Name
   0+      0      0      0         0+         TBD  Location-Information
   0+      0      0      0         0+         TBD  Location-Info-Civic
   0+      0      0      0         0+         TBD  Location-Info-Geo
   0-1     0-1    0-1    0-1       0-1        TBD  Basic-Policy-Rules
   0-1     0-1    0-1    0-1       0-1        TBD  Extended-Policy-Rules
   0       0-1    0      0-1       0          TBD  Requested-Info
   0-1     0      0      0         0          TBD  Challenge-Capable

   The Location-Information, the Location-Info-Civic and the Location-
   Info-Geo attribute MAY appear more than once.  For example, if the
   server asks for civic and geospatial location information two
   Location-Information attributes need to be sent.  If multiple
   Location-Information attributes are sent then they MUST NOT contain
   the same information.

   The next table shows the occurrence of the error-cause attribute.


   Request Accept Reject Challenge Accounting #
                                   Request
   0       0       0-1     0        0        TBD Location-Info-Required
   0       0       0-1     0        0        101 Error-Cause





















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7.  Diameter RADIUS Interoperability

   When used in Diameter, the attributes defined in this specification
   can be used as Diameter AVPs from the Code space 1-255 (RADIUS
   attribute compatibility space).  No additional Diameter Code values
   are therefore allocated.  The data types and flag rules for the
   attributes are as follows:


                                     +---------------------+
                                     |    AVP Flag rules   |
                                     |----+-----+----+-----|----+
                                     |    |     |SHLD| MUST|    |
    Attribute Name        Value Type |MUST| MAY | NOT|  NOT|Encr|
   ----------------------------------|----+-----+----+-----|----|
    Operator-Name         OctetString|    | P,M |    |  V  | Y  |
    Location-Information  OctetString| M  |  P  |    |  V  | Y  |
    Location-Info-Civic   OctetString| M  |  P  |    |  V  | Y  |
    Location-Info-Geo     OctetString| M  |  P  |    |  V  | Y  |
    Basic-Policy-Rules    OctetString| M  |  P  |    |  V  | Y  |
    Extended-Policy-Rules OctetString| M  |  P  |    |  V  | Y  |
    Requested-Info        OctetString| M  |  P  |    |  V  | Y  |
    Challenge-Capable     OctetString|    |  P  |    |  V  | Y  |
   ----------------------------------|----+-----+----+-----|----|

   The attributes in this specification have no special translation
   requirements for Diameter to RADIUS or RADIUS to Diameter gateways;
   they are copied as is, except for changes relating to headers,
   alignment, and padding.  See also Section 4.1 of [7] and Section 9 of
   [22].

   What this specification says about the applicability of the
   attributes for RADIUS Access-Request packets applies in Diameter to
   AA-Request [22] or Diameter-EAP-Request [23].  What is said about
   Access-Challenge applies in Diameter to AA-Answer [22] or Diameter-
   EAP-Answer [23] with Result-Code AVP set to
   DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH.  What is said about Access-Accept applies
   in Diameter to AA-Answer or Diameter-EAP-Answer messages that
   indicate success.  Similarly, what is said about RADIUS Access-Reject
   packets applies in Diameter to AA- Answer or Diameter-EAP-Answer
   messages that indicate failure.

   What is said about COA-Request applies in Diameter to Re-Auth-Request
   [22].

   What is said about Accounting-Request applies to Diameter Accounting-
   Request [22] as well.




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8.  Matching with Geopriv Requirements

   This section compares the Geopriv requirements described in [10] and
   the approach of distributing Location Objects with RADIUS.

   In Section 8.1 and Section 8.2 we discuss privacy implications when
   RADIUS is not used according to these usage scenario.  In Section 8.3
   Geopriv requirements are matched against these two scenarios.

8.1.  Distribution of Location Information at the User's Home Network

   This section focuses on location information transport from the local
   AAA server (acting as the Location Generator) to the home AAA server
   (acting as the Location Server).  To use a more generic scenario we
   assume that the visited AAA and the home AAA server belong to
   different administrative domains.  The Location Recipient obtains
   location information about a particular Target via protocols
   specified outside the scope of this document (e.g., SIP, HTTP or an
   API).

   Please note that the main usage scenario defined in this document
   assumes that the Location Server and the Location Recipient are co-
   located into a single entity with regard to location based network
   access authorization, taxation and billing.

   The subsequent figure shows the interacting entities graphically.


    visited network    |        home network
                       |
                       |        +----------+
                       |        |  Rule    |
                       |        | Holder   |
                       |        |          |
                       |        +----+-----+
                       |             |
                       |         rule|interface
                       |             V
     +----------+      |        +----------+               +----------+
     |Location  |  publication  | Location |  notification |Location  |
     |Generator |<------------->| Server   |<------------->|Recipient |
     |          |  interface    |          |  interface    |          |
     +----------+      |        +----------+               +----------+
                       |
     Local AAA      RADIUS       Home AAA     SIP/HTTP/API/etc.
     Server            |         Server
                       |




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              Figure 16: Location Server at the Home Network

   The term 'Rule Holder' in Figure 16 denotes the entity that creates
   the authorization rule set.

8.2.  Distribution of Location Information at the Visited Network

   This section describes a scenario where location information made
   available to Location Recipients by some entity in the visited
   network.

   In order for this scenario to be applicable the following two
   assumptions must hold:

   o  The visited network deploys a Location Server and wants to
      distribute Location Objects

   o  The visited network is able to learn the user's identity.

   The visited network provides location information to a Location
   Recipient (e.g., via SIP or HTTP).  During the network access
   authentication procedure the visited network is able to retrieve the
   user's authorization policies from the home AAA server.  This should
   ensure that the visited network acts according to the user's
   policies.

   The subsequent figure shows the interacting entities graphically.
























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    visited network    |        home network
                       |
     +----------+      |
     |Location  |      |
     |Recipient |      |
     |          |      |
     +----------+      |
          ^            |        +----------+
          |            |        |  Rule    |
          |            |        | Holder   |
      notification     |        |          |
       interface       |        +----+-----+
          |            |             |
          |            |         rule|interface
          v            |             V
     +----------+      |        +----------+
     |Location  | Rule Transport| Home AAA |
     |Generator |<------------->| Server   |
     |& Server  |   RADIUS      |          |
     +----------+      |        +----------+
                       |

             Figure 17: Location Server at the Visited Network

8.3.  Requirements matching

   Section 7.1 of [10] details the requirements of a "Location Object".
   We discuss these requirements in the subsequent list.

   Req. 1.  (Location Object generalities):

      *  Regarding requirement 1.1, the Location Object has to be
         understood by the RADIUS server (and possibly a Diameter server
         in case of interworking between the two) as defined in this
         document.  Due to the encoding of the Location Object it is
         possible to convert it to the format used in GMLv3 [24].  This
         document uses the civic and geospatial location information
         format used in [6] and in [4].  The format of [6] and of [4]
         can be convered into a PIDF-LO [21].

      *  Regarding requirement 1.2, a number of fields in the civic
         location information format are optional.

      *  Regarding requirement 1.3, the inclusion of type of place item
         (CAtype 29) used in the DHCP civic format gives a further
         classification of the location.  This attribute can be seen as
         an extension.




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      *  Regarding requirement 1.4, the location information is not
         defined in this document.

      *  Regarding requirement 1.5, the Location Object is useful for
         both receiving and sending location information as described in
         this document.

      *  Regarding requirement 1.6, the Location Object contains both
         location information and privacy rules.  Location information
         is described in Section 5.2, in Section 5.3 and in Section 5.4.
         The corresponding privacy rules are detailed in Section 5.5 and
         in Section 5.6.

      *  Regarding requirement 1.7, the Location Object is usable in a
         variety of protocols.  The format of the object is reused from
         other documents as detailed in Section 5.2, Section 5.3,
         Section 5.4 Section 5.5 and in Section 5.6).

      *  Regarding requirement 1.8, the encoding of the Location Object
         has an emphasis on a lightweight encoding format.  As such it
         is useable on constrained devices.


   Req. 2.  (Location Object fields):

      *  Regarding requirement 2.1, the Target Identifier is carried
         within the network access authentication protocol (e.g., within
         the EAP-Identity Response when EAP is used and/or within the
         EAP method itself).  As described in Section 9 it has a number
         of advantages if this identifier is not carried in clear.  This
         is possible with certain EAP methods whereby the identity in
         the EAP-Identity Response only contains information relevant
         for routing the response to the user's home network.  The user
         identity is protected by the authentication and key exchange
         protocol.

      *  Regarding requirement 2.2, the Location Recipient is in the
         main scenario the home AAA server.  For a scenario where the
         Location Recipient is obtaining Location Information from the
         Location Server via HTTP or SIP the respective mechanisms
         defined in these protocols are used to identify the recipient.
         The Location Generator cannot, a priori, know the recipients if
         they are not defined in this protocol.

      *  Regarding requirement 2.3, the credentials of the Location
         Recipient are known to the RADIUS entities based on the
         security mechanisms defined in the RADIUS protocol itself.
         Section 10 describes these security mechanisms offered by the



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         RADIUS protocol.  The same is true for requirement 2.4.

      *  Regarding requirement 2.5, Section 5.2, Section 5.3 and
         Section 5.4 describe the content of the Location Field.  Since
         the location format itself is not defined in this document
         motion and direction vectors as listed in requirement 2.6 are
         not defined.

      *  Regarding requirement 2.6, this document provides the
         capability for the AAA server to indicate what type of location
         information it would like to see from the AAA client.

      *  Regarding requirement 2.7, timing information is provided with
         'sighting time' and 'time-to-live' field defined in
         Section 5.2.

      *  Regarding requirement 2.8, a reference to an external (more
         detailed rule set) is provided with the Section 5.6 attribute.

      *  Regarding requirement 2.9, security headers and trailers are
         provided as part of the RADIUS protocol or even as part of
         IPsec.

      *  Regarding requirement 2.10, a version number in RADIUS is
         provided with the IANA registration of the attributes.  New
         attributes are assigned a new IANA number.


   Req. 3.  (Location Data Types):

      *  Regarding requirement 3.1, this document reuses civic and
         geospatial location information as described in Section 5.4 and
         in Section 5.3.

      *  With the support of civic and geospatial location information
         support requirement 3.2 is fulfilled.

      *  Regarding requirement 3.3, the geospatial location information
         used by this document only refers to absolute coordinates.
         However, the granularity of the location information can be
         reduced with the help of the AltRes, LoRes, LaRes fields
         described in [6].

      *  Regarding requirement 3.4, further Location Data Types can be
         added via new coordinate reference systems (CRSs) (see Datum
         field in [6]) and via extensions to [6] and [4].

   Section 7.2 of [10] details the requirements of a "Using Protocol".



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   These requirements are listed below:


   Req. 4.:  The using protocol has to obey the privacy and security
      instructions coded in the Location Object regarding the
      transmission and storage of the LO.  This document requires that
      RADIUS entities sending or receiving location MUST obey such
      instructions.


   Req. 5.:  The using protocol will typically facilitate that the keys
      associated with the credentials are transported to the respective
      parties, that is, key establishment is the responsibility of the
      using protocol.  Section 10 specifies how security mechanisms are
      used in RADIUS and how they can be reused to provide security
      protection for the Location Object.  Additionally, the privacy
      considerations (see Section 9) are also relevant for this
      requirement.


   Req. 6.  (Single Message Transfer):  In particular, for tracking of
      small target devices, the design should allow a single message/
      packet transmission of location as a complete transaction.  The
      encoding of the Location Object is specifically tailored towards
      the inclusion into a single message that even respects the (Path)
      MTU size.  The concept of a transaction is not immediately
      applicable to RADIUS.

   Section 7.3 of [10] details the requirements of a "Rule based
   Location Data Transfer".  These requirements are listed below:


   Req. 7.  (LS Rules):  With the scenario shown in Figure 16 the
      decision of a Location Server to provide a Location Recipient
      access to location information is based on Rule Maker-defined
      Privacy Rules that are stored at the home network.  With regard to
      the scenario shown in Figure 17 the Rule Maker-defined Privacy
      Rules are sent from the home network to the visited network (see
      Section 5.5, Section 5.6 and Section 9 for more details).


   Req. 8.  (LG Rules):  For mid-session delivery it is possible to
      enforce the user's privacy rules for the transfer of the Location
      Object.  For the initial transmission of a Location Object the
      user would have to use network access authentication methods which
      provide user identity confidentiality which would render the
      Location Object completely useless for the visited network.  For
      the scenario shown in Figure 16 the visited network is already in



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      possession of the users location information prior to the
      authentication and authorization of the user.  A correlation
      between the location and the user identity might, however, still
      not be possible for the visited network (as explained in
      Section 9).  The visited network MUST evaluate ruleset provided by
      the home AAA server as soon as possible.


   Req. 9.  (Viewer Rules):  The Rule Maker might define (via mechanisms
      outside the scope of this document) which policy rules are
      disclosed to other entities.


   Req. 10.  (Full Rule language):  Geopriv has defined a rule language
      capable of expressing a wide range of privacy rules which is
      applicable in the area of the distribution of Location Objects.  A
      basic ruleset is provided with the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute
      Section 5.5.  A reference to the extended ruleset is carried in
      Section 5.6.  The format of these rules are described in [18] and
      [19].


   Req. 11.  (Limited Rule language):  A limited (or basic) ruleset is
      provided by the Policy-Information attribute Section 5.5 (and as
      introduced with PIDF-LO [21]).

   Section 7.4 of [10] details the requirements of a "Location Object
   Privacy and Security".  These requirements are listed below:


   Req. 12 (Identity Protection):  Support for unlinkable pseudonyms is
      provided by the usage of a corresponding authentication and key
      exchange protocol.  Such protocols are available, for example,
      with the support of EAP as network access authentication methods.
      Some EAP methods support passive user identity confidentiality
      whereas others even support active user identity confidentiality.
      This issue is further discussed in Section 10.  The importance for
      user identity confidentiality and identity protection has already
      been recognized as an important property (see for example a
      document on 'EAP Method Requirements for Wireless LANs' [25]).


   Req. 13.  (Credential Requirements):  As described in Section 10
      RADIUS signaling messages can be protected with IPsec.  This
      allows a number of authentication and key exchange protocols to be
      used as part of IKE, IKEv2 or KINK.





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   Req. 14.  (Security Features):  Geopriv defines a few security
      requirements for the protection of Location Objects such as mutual
      end-point authentication, data object integrity, data object
      confidentiality and replay protection.  As described in Section 10
      these requirements are fulfilled with the usage of IPsec if mutual
      authentication refers to the RADIUS entities (acting as various
      Geopriv entities) which directly communicate with each other.


   Req. 15.  (Minimal Crypto):  A minimum of security mechanisms are
      mandated by the usage of RADIUS.  Communication security for
      Location Objects between AAA infrastructure elements is provided
      by the RADIUS protocol (including IPsec and its dynamic key
      management framework) rather than on relying on object security
      via S/SIME (which is not available with RADIUS).




































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9.  Privacy Considerations

   This section discusses privacy implications for the distribution of
   location information within RADIUS.

   In many cases the location information of the network also reveals
   the current location of the user with a certain degree of precision
   depending on the mechanism used, the positioning system, update
   frequency, where the location was generated, size of the network and
   other mechanisms (such as movement traces or interpolation).

   Two entities might act as Location Servers as shown in Section 4, in
   Figure 16 and in Figure 17:

9.1.  Entity in the visited network

   In this scenario it is difficult to obtain authorization policies
   from the end host (or user) immediately when the user attaches to the
   network.  In this case we have to assume that the visited network
   does not allow unrestricted distribution of location information to
   other than the intended recipients (e.g., to third party entities).
   When the AAA messages traverses one or more broker networks, the
   broker network is bound by the same guidelines as the visited network
   with respect to the distribution of location information.

   The visited network MUST behave according to the following
   guidelines:

   o  Per default only the home network is allowed to receive location
      information.  The visited network MUST NOT distribute location
      information to third parties without seeing the user's privacy
      rule set.

   o  If the home network provides the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute
      either as part of the Access-Accept, the Access-Reject or the
      Access-Challenge message then the visited network MUST follow the
      guidance given with these rules.

   o  If the home network provides the Extended-Policy-Rules attributes
      either as part of the Access-Accept, the Access-Reject or the
      Access-Challenge message then the visited network MUST fetch the
      full ruleset at the indicated URL and MUST follow the guidance
      given with these rules.

   o  If the RADIUS client in the visited network learns the basic rule
      set or a reference to the extended rule set by means outside the
      RADIUS protocol (e.g., provided by the end host) then it MUST
      include the Basic-Policy-Rules and the Extended-Policy-Rules



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      attribute in the Access-Request message towards the home AAA
      server.  Furthermore, the visited network MUST evaluate these
      rules prior to the transmission of location information either to
      the home network or a third party.  The visited network MUST
      follow the guidance given with these rules.

   o  If the RADIUS client in the visited network receives the Basic-
      Policy-Rules attribute with Access-Accept or the Access-Challenge
      message then the Basic-Policy-Rules MUST be attach in subsequent
      RADIUS messages which contain the Location-Information attribute
      (such as interim accounting messages).

   o  If the RADIUS client in the visited network receives the Extended-
      Policy-Rules attribute with Access-Accept or the Access-Challenge
      message then the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute MUST be attach in
      subsequent RADIUS messages which contain the Location-Information
      attribute (such as interim accounting messages).

9.2.  Entity in the home network

   The AAA server in the home network might be an ideal place for
   storing authorization policies.  The user typically has a contractual
   relationship with his home network and hence the trust relationship
   between them is stronger.  Once the infrastructure is deployed and
   useful applications are available there might be a strong desire to
   use location information for other purposes as well (such as location
   aware applications).  Authorization policy rules described in [19]
   and in [18] are tailored for this environment.  These policies might
   be useful for limiting further distribution of the user's location to
   other location based services.  The home AAA server (or a similar
   entity) thereby acts as a location server for access to location
   services.

   The home network MUST behave according to the following guidelines:

   o  As a default policy the home network MUST NOT distribute the
      user's location information to third party entities.

   o  If a user provides basic authorization policies then these rules
      MUST be returned to the visited network in the Access-Accept, the
      Access-Reject or the Access-Challenge message.

   o  If a user provides basic authorization policies then these rules
      MUST be returned to the visited network in the Access-Accept, the
      Access-Reject or the Access-Challenge message.

   o  If a user provides extended authorization policies then they MUST
      be accessible for the visited networking using a reference to



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      these rule set.  The Extended-Policy-Rules attribute MUST include
      the reference and they MUST be sent to the visited network in the
      Access-Accept, the Access-Reject or the Access-Challenge message.

   o  The home network MUST follow the user provided rule set for both
      local storage and for further distribution.  With regard to the
      usage of these rules the home network MUST ensure that the users
      preferences are taken care of within the given boundaries (such as
      legal regulations or operational considerations).  For example, a
      user might not want the home network to store information about
      its location information beyond a indicated time frame.  However,
      a user might on the other hand want to ensure that disputes
      concerning the billed amount can be resolved. location information
      might help to resolve the dispute.  The user might, for example,
      be able to show that he has never been at the indicated place.

   o  If the policy rules provided by the user indicate that location
      information must not be distributed at all then the home network
      MUST provide the Basic-Policy-Rules to the RADIUS entity in the
      visited network via an Access-Accept, the Access-Reject and the
      Access-Challenge message.  The RADIUS server in the user's home
      network would set the 'Retention-Expires' and the 'Retransmission-
      allowed' field to the user indicated value.

   For the envisioned usage scenarios, the identity of the user and his
   device is tightly coupled to the transfer of location information.
   If the identity can be determined by the visited network or AAA
   brokers, then it is possible to correlate location information with a
   particular user.  As such, it allows the visited network and brokers
   to learn movement patterns of users.

   The identity of the user can "leak" to the visited network or AAA
   brokers in a number of ways:

   o  The user's device may employ a fixed MAC address, or base its IP
      address on such an address.  This enables the correlation of the
      particular device to its different locations.  Techniques exist to
      avoid the use of an IP address that is based on MAC address [26].
      Some link layers make it possible to avoid MAC addresses or change
      them dynamically.

   o  Network access authentication procedures such as PPP CHAP [27] or
      EAP [28] may reveal the user's identity as a part of the
      authentication procedure.  Techniques exist to avoid this problem
      in EAP, for instance by employing private Network Access
      Identifiers (NAIs) in the EAP Identity Response message [29] and
      by method-specific private identity exchange in the EAP method
      (e.g., [29], [30], [31]).  Support for identity privacy within



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      CHAP is not available.

   o  AAA protocols may return information from the home network to the
      visited in a manner that makes it possible to either identify the
      user or at least correlate his session with other sessions, such
      as the use of static data in a Class attribute [2] or in some
      accounting attribute usage scenarios [32].

   o  Mobility mechanisms may reveal some permanent identifier (such as
      a home address) in cleartext in the packets relating to mobility
      signaling.

   o  Application protocols may reveal other permanent identifiers.

   Note that to prevent the correlation of identities with location
   information it is necessary to prevent leakage of identity
   information from all sources, not just one.

   Unfortunately, most users are not educated about the importance of
   identity confidentiality and there is a lack of support for it in
   many protocols.  This problem is made worse by the fact that the
   users may be unable to choose particular protocols, as the choice is
   often dictated by the type of network they wish to access, the kind
   of equipment they have, or the type of authentication method they are
   using.

   A scenario where the user is attached to the home network is, from a
   privacy point of view, simpler than a scenario where a user roams
   into a visited network since the NAS and the home AAA are in the same
   administrative domain.  No direct relationship between the visited
   and the home network operator may be available and some AAA brokers
   need to be consulted.  With subscription-based network access as used
   today the user has a contractual relationship with the home network
   provider which could allow higher privacy considerations to be
   applied (including policy rules stored at the home network itself for
   the purpose of restricting further distribution).

   In many cases it is necessary to secure the transport of location
   information along the RADIUS infrastructure.  Mechanisms to achieve
   this functionality are discussed in Section 10.











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10.  Security Considerations

   Requirements for the protection of a Location Object are defined in
   [10]: Mutual end-point authentication, data object integrity, data
   object confidentiality and replay protection.  The distribution of
   location information can be restricted with the help of authorization
   policies.  Basic authorization policies are attached to the location
   information itself, in the same fashion as described in [21].  It is
   possible that the user was already able to transfer some
   authorization policies to the access network to restrict the
   distribution of location information.  This is, however, rather
   unlikely in case of roaming users.  Hence, it will be primarily the
   NAS creating the Location Object which also sets the authorization
   policies.  If no authorization information is provided by the user
   then the visited network MUST set the authorization policies to only
   allow the home AAA server to use the provided location information.
   Other entities, such as the visited network and possibly AAA brokers
   MUST NOT use the location information for a purpose other than
   described in this document.  More extensible authorization policies
   can be stored at the user's home network.  These policies are useful
   when location information is distributed to other entities in a
   location-based service.  This scenario is, however, outside the scope
   of this document.

   It is necessary to use authorization policies to limit the
   unauthorized distribution of location information.  The security
   requirements which are created based on [10] are inline with threats
   which appear in the relationship with disclosure of location
   information as described in [33].  PIDF-LO [21] proposes S/MIME to
   protect the Location Object against modifications.  S/SIME relies on
   public key cryptography which raises performance, deployment and size
   considerations.  Encryption would require that the local AAA server
   or the NAS knows the recipient's public key (e.g., the public key of
   the home AAA server).  Knowing the final recipient of the location
   information is in many cases difficult for RADIUS entities.  Some
   sort of public key infrastructure would be required to obtain the
   public key and to verify the digital signature (at the home network).
   Providing per-object cryptographic protection is, both at the home
   and at the visited network, computationally expensive.

   If no authentication, integrity and replay protection between the
   participating RADIUS entities is provided then an adversaries can
   spoof and modify transmitted attributes.  Two security mechanisms are
   proposed for RADIUS:

   o  [2] proposes the usage of a static key which might raise some
      concerns about the lack dynamic key management.




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   o  RADIUS over IPsec [34] allows to run standard key management
      mechanisms, such as KINK, IKE and IKEv2 [35], to establish IPsec
      security associations.  Confidentiality protection MUST be used to
      prevent eavesdropper gaining access to location information.
      Confidentiality protection is not only a property required by this
      document, it is also required for the transport of keying material
      in the context of EAP authentication and authorization.  Hence,
      this requirement is, in many environments, already fulfilled.
      Mutual authentication must be provided between the local AAA
      server and the home AAA server to prevent man-in-the-middle
      attacks from being successful.  This is another requirement raised
      in the area of key transport with RADIUS and does not represent a
      deployment obstacle.  The performance advantages superior compared
      to the usage of S/MIME and object security since the expensive
      authentication and key exchange protocol run needs to be provided
      only once (for a long time).  Symmetric channel security with
      IPsec is highly efficient.  Since IPsec protection is suggested as
      a mechanism to protect RADIUS already no additional considerations
      need to be addressed beyond those described in [34].  Where an
      untrusted AAA intermediary is present, the Location Object MUST
      NOT be provided to the intermediary.

   In case that IPsec protection is not available for some reason and
   RADIUS specific security mechanisms have to be used then the
   following considerations apply.  The Access-Request message is not
   integrity protected.  This would allow an adversary to change the
   contents of the Location Object or to insert and modify attributes
   and fields or to delete attributes.  To address these problems the
   Message-Authenticator (80) can be used to integrity protect the
   entire Access-Request packet.  The Message-Authenticator (80) is also
   required when EAP is used and hence is supported by many modern
   RADIUS servers.

   Access-Request packets including Location attribute(s) without a
   Message-Authenticator(80) attribute SHOULD be silently discarded by
   the RADIUS server.  A RADIUS server supporting the Location
   attributes MUST calculate the correct value of the Message-
   Authenticator(80) and MUST silently discard the packet if it does not
   match the value sent.

   Access-Accept, including Location attribute(s) without a Message-
   Authenticator(80) attribute SHOULD be silently discarded by the NAS.
   A NAS supporting the Location attribute MUST calculate the correct
   value of a received Message-Authenticator(80) and MUST silently
   discard the packet if it does not match the value sent.

   RADIUS and Diameter make some assumptions about the trust between
   traversed AAA entities in sense that object level security is not



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   provided by neither RADIUS nor Diameter.  Hence, some trust has to be
   placed on the AAA entities to behave according to the defined rules.
   Furthermore, the AAA protocols do not involve the user in their
   protocol interaction except for tunneling authentication information
   (such as EAP messages) through their infrastructure.  RADIUS and
   Diameter have even become a de-facto protocol for key distribution.
   Hence, in the past there were some concerns about the trust placed
   into the infrastructure particularly from the security area when it
   comes to keying.  The EAP keying infrastructure is described in [28].










































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11.  IANA Considerations

   The authors request that the Attribute Types, and Attribute Values
   defined in this document be registered by the Internet Assigned
   Numbers Authority (IANA) from the RADIUS name spaces as described in
   the "IANA Considerations" section of RFC 3575 [8], in accordance with
   BCP 26 [9].  Additionally, the Attribute Type should be registered in
   the Diameter name space.

   This document defines the following attributes:

         Operator-Name
         Location-Information
         Basic-Policy-Rules
         Extended-Policy-Rules
         Challenge-Capable
         Requested-Info

   Please refer to Section 6 for the registered list of numbers.

   This document also instructs IANA to assign a new value for the
   Error-Cause attribute [5], of "Location-Info-Required" TBA.

   Additionally, IANA is requested to create the following new
   registries:

11.1.  New Registry: Operator Type

   This document also defines an operator namespace registry (used in
   the Namespace field of the Operator-Name attribute).  IANA is
   requested to add the following values to this registry using their
   identifier and a token for the operator-namespace / registry owner:


   +----------+--------------------------------------+
   |Identifier| Operator-Namespace / Registry Owner  |
   +----------+--------------------------------------+
   |    0     | TADIG                                |
   |    1     | E212                                 |
   |    2     | REALM                                |
   |    3     | ICC                                  |
   +----------+--------------------------------------+

   Following the policies outlined in [9] new values to the Operator-
   Namespaces will be assigned after Expert Review initiated by the O&M
   Area Director in consultation with the RADEXT working group chairs or
   the working group chairs of a designated successor working group.
   Updates can be provided based on expert approval only.  No mechanism



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   to mark entries as "deprecated" is envisioned.  Based on expert
   approval it is possible to delete entries from the registry.

11.2.  New Registry: Requested-Info attribute

   This document creates a new IANA registry for the Requested-Info
   attribute.  IANA is requested to add the following four values to
   this registry:


    +----------+----------------------+
    |  Value   | Capability Token     |
    +----------+----------------------+
    |    1     | CIVIC_LOCATION       |
    |    2     | GEO_LOCATION         |
    |    4     | USERS_LOCATION       |
    |    8     | NAS_LOCATION         |
    +----------+----------------------+

   The semantic of these values is defined in Section 5.8.

   Following the policies outline in [8] new Capability Tokens with a
   description of their semantic for usage with the Requested-Info
   attribute will be assigned after Expert Review initiated by the O&M
   Area Directors in consultation with the RADEXT working group chairs
   or the working group chairs of a designated successor working group.
   Updates can be provided based on expert approval only.  A designated
   expert will be appointed by the O&M Area Directors.  No mechanism to
   mark entries as "deprecated" is envisioned.  Based on expert approval
   it is possible to delete entries from the registry.

   Each registration must include:

   Name:

      Capability Token (i.e., an identifier of the capability)


   Description:

      Brief description indicating the meaning of the info element.


   Numerical Value:

      A numerical value that is placed into the Capability attribute
      representing a bit in the bit-string of the Requested-Info
      attribute.



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12.  Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank the following people for their help
   with a previous version of this draft and for their input:

      Chuck Black

      Paul Congdon

      Jouni Korhonen

      Sami Ala-luukko

      Farooq Bari

      Ed Van Horne

      Mark Grayson

      Jukka Tuomi

      Jorge Cuellar

      Christian Guenther

   Henning Schulzrinne provided the civic location information content
   found in this draft.  The geospatial location information format is
   based on work done by J. Polk, J. Schnizlein and M. Linsner.  The
   authorization policy format is based on the work done by Jon
   Peterson.

   The authors would like to thank Victor Lortz, Jose Puthenkulam,
   Bernrad Aboba, Jari Arkko, Parviz Yegani, Serge Manning, Kuntal
   Chowdury, Pasi Eronen, Blair Bullock and Eugene Chang for their
   feedback to an initial version of this draft.  We would like to thank
   Jari Arkko for his text contributions.  Lionel Morand provided
   detailed feedback on numerous issues.  His comments helped to improve
   the quality of this document.  Jouni Korhonen and John Loughney
   helped us with the Diameter RADIUS interoperability.  Andreas
   Pashalidis reviewed the final document and provided a number of
   comments.  Bernard Aboba, Alan DeKok, Lionel Morand, Jouni Korhonen,
   David Nelson and Emile van Bergen provided guidance on the Requested-
   Info attribute and participated in the capability exchange
   discussions.

   This document is based on the discussions within the IETF GEOPRIV
   working group.  Therefore, the authors thank Henning Schulzrinne,
   James Polk, John Morris, Allison Mankin, Randall Gellens, Andrew



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   Newton, Ted Hardie, Jon Peterson for their time to discuss a number
   of issues with us.  We thank Stephen Hayes for aligning this work
   with 3GPP activities.

   The RADEXT working group chairs, David Nelson and Bernard Aboba,
   provided several draft reviews and we would like to thank them for
   the help and their patience.












































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13.  References

13.1.  Normative References

   [1]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
        Levels", March 1997.

   [2]  Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson, "Remote
        Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2865,
        June 2000.

   [3]  Rigney, C., "RADIUS Accounting", RFC 2866, June 2000.

   [4]  Schulzrinne, H., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv4
        and DHCPv6) Option for Civic  Addresses Configuration
        Information", draft-ietf-geopriv-dhcp-civil-09 (work in
        progress), January 2006.

   [5]  Chiba, M., Dommety, G., Eklund, M., Mitton, D., and B. Aboba,
        "Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote Authentication Dial
        In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 3576, July 2003.

   [6]  Polk, J., Schnizlein, J., and M. Linsner, "Dynamic Host
        Configuration Protocol Option for Coordinate-based Location
        Configuration Information", RFC 3825, July 2004.

   [7]  Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. Arkko,
        "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003.

   [8]  Aboba, B., "IANA Considerations for RADIUS (Remote
        Authentication Dial In User Service)", RFC 3575, July 2003.

   [9]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA
        Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434, October 1998.

13.2.  Informative References

   [10]  Cuellar, J., Morris, J., Mulligan, D., Peterson, D., and D.
         Polk, "Geopriv Requirements", RFC 3693, February 2004.

   [11]  Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A.,
         Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, "SIP:
         Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, June 2002.

   [12]  Polk, J. and B. Rosen, "Session Initiation Protocol Location
         Conveyance", draft-ietf-sip-location-conveyance-03 (work in
         progress), June 2006.




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   [13]  "TADIG Naming Conventions, Version 4.1", GSM Association
         Official Document TD.13",  , June 2006.

   [14]  "The international identification plan for mobile terminals and
         mobile users, ITU-T Recommendation E.212",  , May 2004.

   [15]  "Designations for interconnections among operators' networks,
         ITU-T Recommendation M.1400",  , January 2004.

   [16]  "Codes for the representation of names of countries and their
         subdivisions - Part 1: Country codes, ISO 3166-1",  , 1997.

   [17]  Mills, D., "Network Time Protocol (Version 3) Specification,
         Implementation", RFC 1305, March 1992.

   [18]  Schulzrinne, H., "Common Policy: A Document Format for
         Expressing Privacy Preferences",
         draft-ietf-geopriv-common-policy-11 (work in progress),
         August 2006.

   [19]  Schulzrinne, H., "A Document Format for Expressing Privacy
         Preferences for Location  Information",
         draft-ietf-geopriv-policy-08 (work in progress), February 2006.

   [20]  Rosenberg, J., "The Extensible Markup Language (XML)
         Configuration Access Protocol (XCAP)",
         draft-ietf-simple-xcap-11 (work in progress), May 2006.

   [21]  Peterson, J., "A Presence-based GEOPRIV Location Object
         Format", RFC 4119, December 2005.

   [22]  Calhoun, P., Zorn, G., Spence, D., and D. Mitton, "Diameter
         Network Access Server Application", RFC 4005, August 2005.

   [23]  Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, "Diameter Extensible
         Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application", RFC 4072,
         August 2005.

   [24]  "Open Geography Markup Language (GML) Implementation
         Specification", OGC 02-023r4,
         http://www.opengis.org/techno/implementation.htm",  ,
         January 2003.

   [25]  Stanley, D., Walker, J., and B. Aboba, "Extensible
         Authentication Protocol (EAP) Method Requirements for Wireless
         LANs", RFC 4017, March 2005.

   [26]  Narten, T. and R. Draves, "Privacy Extensions for Stateless



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         Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6", RFC 3041, January 2001.

   [27]  Simpson, W., "PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol
         (CHAP)", RFC 1994, August 1996.

   [28]  Aboba, B., Beadles, M., Arkko, J., and P. Eronen, "The Network
         Access Identifier", RFC 4282, December 2005.

   [29]  Arkko, J. and H. Haverinen, "Extensible Authentication Protocol
         Method for 3rd Generation Authentication and Key Agreement
         (EAP-AKA)", RFC 4187, January 2006.

   [30]  Josefsson, S., Palekar, A., Simon, D., and G. Zorn, "Protected
         EAP Protocol (PEAP) Version 2",
         draft-josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-eap-10 (work in progress),
         October 2004.

   [31]  Tschofenig, H., "EAP IKEv2 Method",
         draft-tschofenig-eap-ikev2-11 (work in progress), June 2006.

   [32]  Adrangi, F., Lior, A., Korhonen, J., and J. Loughney,
         "Chargeable User Identity", RFC 4372, January 2006.

   [33]  Danley, M., "Threat Analysis of the Geopriv Protocol",
         RFC 3694, September 2003.

   [34]  Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial
         In User Service) Support For Extensible Authentication Protocol
         (EAP)", RFC 3579, September 2003.

   [35]  Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
         RFC 4306, December 2005.



















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Authors' Addresses

   Hannes Tschofenig
   Siemens
   Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
   Munich, Bavaria  81739
   Germany

   Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@siemens.com
   URI:   http://www.tschofenig.com


   Farid Adrangi
   Intel Corporatation
   2111 N.E. 25th Avenue
   Hillsboro OR
   USA

   Email: farid.adrangi@intel.com


   Mark Jones
   Bridgewater Systems Corporation
   303 Terry Fox Drive
   Ottawa, Ontario  K2K 3J1
   CANADA

   Email: mark.jones@bridgewatersystems.com


   Avi Lior
   Bridgewater Systems Corporation
   303 Terry Fox Drive
   Ottawa, Ontario  K2K 3J1
   CANADA

   Email: avi@bridgewatersystems.com














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Full Copyright Statement

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