[Docs] [txt|pdf|xml|html] [Tracker] [WG] [Email] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Nits]

Versions: 00 01 02 03 04

Global Routing Operations                                       J. Mauch
Internet-Draft                                                    Akamai
Intended status: Standards Track                             J. Snijders
Expires: September 28, 2017                                          NTT
                                                              G. Hankins
                                                                   Nokia
                                                          March 27, 2017


        Default EBGP Route Propagation Behavior Without Policies
                     draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-04

Abstract

   This document defines the default behavior of a BGP speaker when
   there is no import or export policy associated with an External BGP
   session.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 28, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents



Mauch, et al.          Expires September 28, 2017               [Page 1]


Internet-Draft             BGP Default Reject                 March 2017


   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Solution Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   6.  Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4

1.  Introduction

   There are BGP routing security issues that need to be addressed to
   make the Internet more stable.  Route leaks [RFC7908] are part of the
   problem, but software defects or operator misconfigurations can
   contribute too.  This document provides guidance to BGP [RFC4271]
   implementers to improve the default level of Internet routing
   security.

   Many deployed BGP speakers send and accept any and all route
   announcements between their BGP neighbors by default.  This practice
   dates back to the early days of the Internet, where operators were
   permissive in sending routing information to allow all networks to
   reach each other.  As the Internet has become more densely
   interconnected, the risk of a misbehaving BGP speaker poses
   significant risks to Internet routing.

   This specification intends to improve this situation by requiring the
   explicit configuration of a BGP import and export policy for any
   External BGP (EBGP) session such as customers, peers, or
   confederation boundaries for all enabled address families.  When this
   solution is implemented, BGP speakers do not accept or send routes
   without policies configured on EBGP sessions.







Mauch, et al.          Expires September 28, 2017               [Page 2]


Internet-Draft             BGP Default Reject                 March 2017


2.  Solution Requirements

   The following requirements apply to the solution described in this
   document:

   o  Software MUST consider any routes ineligible for route selection
      (section 9.1.1 [RFC4271]), if no import policy was configured for
      the EBGP peer.

   o  Software MUST NOT advertise any routes to an EBGP peer, if no
      export policy was configured.

   o  Software SHOULD fall back to an "import nothing" and "export
      nothing" mode following failure of internal components, such as a
      policy engine.

   o  Software MUST operate in this mode by default.

   o  Software MAY provide a configuration option to disable this
      security capability.

3.  Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank the following people for their
   comments, support and review: Shane Amante, Christopher Morrow,
   Robert Raszuk, Greg Skinner, Adam Chappell, Sriram Kotikalapudi,
   Brian Dickson, Jeffrey Haas, John Heasley, Ignas Bagdonas and Donald
   Smith.

4.  Security Considerations

   This document addresses a basic routing security issue caused by
   permissive default routing policy configurations.  Operators need
   implementers to address this problem with more secure defaults to
   mitigate collateral damage on Internet routing.  Inadvertent or
   adversarial advertisements cause business impact that can be
   mitigated by a secure default behavior.

5.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no actions for IANA.

6.  Contributors

   The following people contributed to successful deployment of solution
   described in this document:





Mauch, et al.          Expires September 28, 2017               [Page 3]


Internet-Draft             BGP Default Reject                 March 2017


   Jakob Heitz
   Cisco

   Email: jheitz@cisco.com

   Ondrej Filip
   CZ.NIC

   Email: ondrej.filip@nic.cz

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC4271]  Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
              Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.

7.2.  Informative References

   [RFC7908]  Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., McPherson, D., Osterweil, E.,
              and B. Dickson, "Problem Definition and Classification of
              BGP Route Leaks", RFC 7908, DOI 10.17487/RFC7908, June
              2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7908>.

Authors' Addresses

   Jared Mauch
   Akamai Technologies
   8285 Reese Lane
   Ann Arbor  Michigan 48103
   US

   Email: jared@akamai.com











Mauch, et al.          Expires September 28, 2017               [Page 4]


Internet-Draft             BGP Default Reject                 March 2017


   Job Snijders
   NTT Communications
   Theodorus Majofskistraat 100
   Amsterdam  1065 SZ
   NL

   Email: job@ntt.net


   Greg Hankins
   Nokia
   777 E. Middlefield Road
   Mountain View, CA  94043
   USA

   Email: greg.hankins@nokia.com



































Mauch, et al.          Expires September 28, 2017               [Page 5]


Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.121, available from https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/