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Global Routing Operations                                      K. Sriram
Internet-Draft                                             D. Montgomery
Intended status: Informational                                   US NIST
Expires: January 6, 2016                                    D. McPherson
                                                            E. Osterweil
                                                          Verisign, Inc.
                                                              B. Dickson
                                                           Twitter, Inc.
                                                            July 5, 2015


        Problem Definition and Classification of BGP Route Leaks
            draft-ietf-grow-route-leak-problem-definition-02

Abstract

   A systemic vulnerability of the Border Gateway Protocol routing
   system, known as 'route leaks', has received significant attention in
   recent years.  Frequent incidents that result in significant
   disruptions to Internet routing are labeled "route leaks", but to
   date we have lacked a common definition of the term.  In this
   document, we provide a working definition of route leaks, keeping in
   mind the real occurrences that have received significant attention.
   Further, we attempt to enumerate (though not exhaustively) different
   types of route leaks based on observed events on the Internet.  We
   aim to provide a taxonomy that covers several forms of route leaks
   that have been observed and are of concern to Internet user community
   as well as the network operator community.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 6, 2016.






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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Working Definition of Route Leaks . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Classification of Route Leaks Based on Documented Events  . .   3
   4.  Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10

1.  Introduction

   Frequent incidents [Huston2012][Cowie2013][Toonk2015-A][Toonk2015-B][
   Cowie2010][Madory][Zmijewski][Paseka][LRL][Khare] that result in
   significant disruptions to Internet routing are commonly called
   "route leaks".  Examination of the details of some of these incidents
   reveals that they vary in their form and technical details.  Before
   we can discuss solutions to "the route leak problem" we need a clear,
   technical definition of the problem and its most common forms.  In
   Section 2, we provide a working definition of route leaks, keeping in
   view many recent incidents that have received significant attention.
   Further, in Section 3, we attempt to enumerate (though not
   exhaustively) different types of route leaks based on observed events
   on the Internet.  We aim to provide a taxonomy that covers several
   forms of route leaks that have been observed and are of concern to
   Internet user community as well as the network operator community.
   This document builds on and extends earlier work in the IETF by
   Dickson [draft-dickson-sidr-route-leak-def][draft-dickson-sidr-route-
   leak-reqts].





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2.  Working Definition of Route Leaks

   A proposed working definition of route leak is as follows:

   A "route leak" is the propagation of routing announcement(s) beyond
   their intended scope.  That is, an AS's announcement of a learned BGP
   route to another AS is in violation of the intended policies of the
   receiver, the sender and/or one of the ASes along the preceding AS
   path.  The intended scope is usually defined by a set of local
   redistribution/filtering policies distributed among the ASes
   involved.  Often, these intended policies are defined in terms of the
   pair-wise peering business relationship between ASes (e.g., customer,
   provider, peer).  For literature related to AS relationships and
   routing policies, see [Gao][Gill][Luckie].  For measurements of
   valley-free violations in Internet routing, see [Giotsas][Wijchers].

   The result of a route leak can be redirection of traffic through an
   unintended path which may enable eavesdropping or traffic analysis,
   and may or may not result in an overload or black-hole.  Route leaks
   can be accidental or malicious, but most often arise from accidental
   misconfigurations.

   The above definition is not intended to be all encompassing.
   Perceptions vary widely about what constitutes a route leak.  Our aim
   here is to have a working definition that fits enough observed
   incidents so that the IETF community has a basis for starting to work
   on route leak mitigation methods.

3.  Classification of Route Leaks Based on Documented Events

   As illustrated in Figure 1, a common form of route leak occurs when a
   multi-homed customer AS (such as AS3 in Figure 1) learns a prefix
   update from one provider (ISP1) and leaks the update to another
   provider (ISP2) in violation of intended routing policies, and
   further the second provider does not detect the leak and propagates
   the leaked update to its customers, peers, and transit ISPs.















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                                      /\              /\
                                       \ route-leak(P)/
                                        \ propagated /
                                         \          /
              +------------+    peer    +------------+
        ______| ISP1 (AS1) |----------->|  ISP2 (AS2)|---------->
       /       ------------+  prefix(P) +------------+ route-leak(P)
      | prefix |          \   update      /\        \  propagated
       \  (P)  /           \              /          \
        -------   prefix(P) \            /            \
                     update  \          /              \
                              \        /route-leak(P)  \/
                              \/      /
                           +---------------+
                           | customer(AS3) |
                           +---------------+


        Figure 1: Illustration of the basic notion of a route leak.

   We propose the following taxonomy for classification of route leaks
   aiming to cover several types of recently observed route leaks, while
   acknowledging that the list is not meant to be exhaustive.  In what
   follows, we refer to the AS that announces a route that is in
   violation of the intended policies as the "offending AS".

   o  Type 1 "U-Turn with Full Prefix": A multi-homed AS learns a prefix
      route from one upstream ISP and simply propagates the prefix to
      another upstream ISP.  Neither the prefix nor the AS path in the
      update is altered.  This is similar to a straight forward path-
      poisoning attack [Kapela-Pilosov], but with full prefix.  It
      should be noted that attacks or leaks of this type are often
      accidental (i.e. not malicious).  The update basically makes a
      U-turn at the attacker's multi-homed AS.  The attack (accidental
      or deliberate) often succeeds because the second ISP prefers
      customer announcement over peer announcement of the same prefix.
      Data packets would reach the legitimate destination albeit via the
      offending AS, unless they are dropped at the offending AS due to
      its inability to handle resulting large volumes of traffic.

      *  Example incidents: Examples of Type 1 route-leak incidents are
         (1) the Dodo-Telstra incident in March 2012 [Huston2012], (2)
         the Moratel-PCCW route leak of Google prefixes in November 2012
         [Paseka], (3) the VolumeDrive-Atrato incident in September 2014
         [Madory], (4) the Hathway-Airtel route leak of 336 Google
         prefixes causing widespread interruption of Google services in
         Europe and Asia [Toonk2015-A], and (5) the massive Telekom




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         Malaysia route-leaks of about 179,000 prefixes, which in turn
         Level3 accepted and propagated [Toonk2015-B].

   o  Type 2 "U-Turn with More Specific Prefix": A multi-homed AS learns
      a prefix route from one upstream ISP and announces a sub-prefix
      (subsumed in the prefix) to another upstream ISP.  The AS path in
      the update is not altered.  Update is crafted by the attacker to
      have a subprefix to maximize the success of the attack while
      reverse path is kept open by the path poisoning techniques as in
      [Kapela-Pilosov].  Data packets reach the legitimate destination
      albeit via the offending AS.

      *  Example incidents: One example is the demo performed at
         DEFCON-16 in August 2008 [Kapela-Pilosov].  Another example is
         the earlier-mentioned incident of route leaks from Telekom
         Malaysia via Level3, in which out of about 179,000 total route-
         leaked prefixes, about 10,000 were more specifics of previously
         announced aggregates [Toonk2015-B].  [Note: An attacker who
         deliberately performs a Type 1 route leak (with full prefix)
         can just as easily perform a Type 2 route leak (with subprefix)
         to achieve a greater impact.]

   o  Type 3 "Prefix Mis-Origination with Data Path to Legitimate
      Origin": A multi-homed AS learns a prefix route from one upstream
      ISP and announces the prefix to another upstream ISP as if it is
      being originated by it (i.e. strips the received AS path, and re-
      originates the prefix).  This amounts to mis-origination or
      hijacking.  However, somehow (not attributable to the use of path
      poisoning trick by the attacker) a reverse path is present, and
      data packets reach the legitimate destination albeit via the
      offending AS.  But sometimes the reverse path may not be there,
      and data packets get dropped following receipt by the offending
      AS.

      *  Example incidents: Examples of Type 3 route leak include (1)
         the China Telecom incident in April 2010
         [Hiran][Cowie2010][Labovitz], (2) the Belarusian GlobalOneBel
         route leak incidents in February-March 2013 and May 2013
         [Cowie2013], (3) the Icelandic Opin Kerfi-Simmin route leak
         incidents in July-August 2013 [Cowie2013], and (4) the Indosat
         route leak incident in April 2014 [Zmijewski].

   o  Type 4 "Leak of Internal Prefixes and Accidental Deaggregation":
      An offending AS simply leaks its internal prefixes to one or more
      of its transit ASes and/or ISP peers.  The leaked internal
      prefixes are often deaggregated subprefixes (i.e. more specifics)
      of already announced aggregate prefixes.  Further, the AS
      receiving those leaks fails to filter them.  Typically these



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      leaked announcements are due to some transient failures within the
      AS; they are short-lived, and typically withdrawn quickly
      following the announcements.

      *  Example incidents: Leaks of internal prefix-routes occur
         frequently (e.g. multiple times in a week), and the number of
         prefixes leaked range from hundreds to thousands per incident.
         One highly conspicuous and widely disruptive leak of internal
         prefixes happened recently in August 2014 when AS701 and AS705
         leaked about 22,000 more specifics of already announced
         aggregates [Huston2014][Toonk2014].

   o  Type 5 "Lateral ISP-ISP-ISP Leak": This type of route leak
      typically occurs when, for example, three sequential ISP peers
      (e.g.  ISP-A, ISP-B and ISP-C) are involved, and ISP-B receives a
      prefix-route from ISP-A and in turn leaks it to ISP-C.  The
      typical routing policy between laterally (i.e. non-hierarchically)
      peering ISPs is that they should only propagate to each other
      their respective customer prefixes.

      *  Example incidents: In [Mauch-nanog][Mauch], route leaks of this
         type are reported by monitoring updates in the global BGP
         system and finding three or more very large ISP ASNs in a
         sequence in a BGP update's AS path.  Mauch [Mauch] observes
         that these are anomalies and potentially route leaks because
         very large ISPs such as ATT, Sprint, Verizon, and
         Globalcrossing do not in general buy transit services from each
         other.  However, he also notes that there are exceptions when
         one very large ISP does indeed buy transit from another very
         large ISP, and accordingly exceptions are made in his detection
         algorithm for known cases.

   o  Type 6 "Leak of Provider Prefixes to Peer": This type of route
      leak occurs when an offending AS leaks prefix-routes learned from
      its provider to a lateral peer.

      *  Example incidents: The incidents reported in [Mauch] include
         the Type 6 leaks.

   o  Type 7 "Leak of Peer Prefixes to Provider": This type of route
      leak occurs when an offending AS leaks prefix-routes learned from
      a lateral peer to its (the AS's) own provider.  These leaked
      prefix-routes typically originate from the customer cone of the
      lateral peer.

      *  Example incidents: Some of the example incidents cited for Type
         1 route leaks above are also inclusive of Type 7 route leaks.
         For instance, in the Dodo-Telstra incident [Huston2012], the



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         leaked routes from Dodo to Telstra included routes that Dodo
         learned from its providers as well as lateral peers.

4.  Summary

   We attempted to provide a working definition of route leak.  We also
   presented a taxonomy for categorizing route leaks.  It covers not all
   but at least several forms of route leaks that have been observed and
   are of concern to Internet user and network operator communities.  We
   hope that this work provides the IETF community a basis for pursuing
   possible BGP enhancements for route leak detection and mitigation.

5.  Security Considerations

   No security considerations apply since this is a problem definition
   document.

6.  IANA Considerations

   No updates to the registries are suggested by this document.

7.  Acknowledgements

   The authors wish to thank Jared Mauch, Jeff Haas, Warren Kumari,
   Amogh Dhamdhere, Jakob Heitz, Geoff Huston, Randy Bush, Ruediger
   Volk, Andrei Robachevsky, Chris Morrow, and Sandy Murphy for
   comments, suggestions, and critique.  The authors are also thankful
   to Padma Krishnaswamy, Oliver Borchert, and Okhee Kim for their
   comments and review.

8.  Informative References

   [Cowie2010]
              Cowie, J., "China's 18 Minute Mystery", Dyn Research/
              Renesys Blog, November 2010,
              <http://research.dyn.com/2010/11/
              chinas-18-minute-mystery/>.

   [Cowie2013]
              Cowie, J., "The New Threat: Targeted Internet Traffic
              Misdirection", Dyn Research/Renesys Blog, November 2013,
              <http://research.dyn.com/2013/11/
              mitm-internet-hijacking/>.








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   [draft-dickson-sidr-route-leak-def]
              Dickson, B., "Route Leaks -- Definitions", IETF Internet
              Draft (expired), October 2012,
              <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-dickson-sidr-route-
              leak-def-03>.

   [draft-dickson-sidr-route-leak-reqts]
              Dickson, B., "Route Leaks -- Requirements for Detection
              and Prevention thereof", IETF Internet Draft (expired),
              March 2012, <http://tools.ietf.org/html/
              draft-dickson-sidr-route-leak-reqts-02>.

   [Gao]      Gao, L. and J. Rexford, "Stable Internet routing without
              global coordination", IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking,
              December 2001, <http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~jrex/papers/
              sigmetrics00.long.pdf>.

   [Gill]     Gill, P., Schapira, M., and S. Goldberg, "A Survey of
              Interdomain Routing Policies", ACM SIGCOMM Computer
              Communication Review, January 2014,
              <https://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe/papers/survey.pdf>.

   [Giotsas]  Giotsas, V. and S. Zhou, "Valley-free violation in
              Internet routing - Analysis based on BGP Community data",
              IEEE ICC 2012, June 2012,
              <http://www0.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/V.Giotsas/files/
              giotsas.icc.2012.pdf>.

   [Hiran]    Hiran, R., Carlsson, N., and P. Gill, "Characterizing
              Large-scale Routing Anomalies: A Case Study of the China
              Telecom Incident", PAM 2013, March 2013,
              <http://www3.cs.stonybrook.edu/~phillipa/papers/
              CTelecom.html>.

   [Huston2012]
              Huston, G., "Leaking Routes", March 2012,
              <http://labs.apnic.net/blabs/?p=139/>.

   [Huston2014]
              Huston, G., "What's so special about 512?", September
              2014, <http://labs.apnic.net/blabs/?p=520/>.

   [Kapela-Pilosov]
              Pilosov, A. and T. Kapela, "Stealing the Internet: An
              Internet-Scale Man in the Middle Attack", DEFCON-16 Las
              Vegas, NV, USA, August 2008,
              <https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-16/dc16-
              presentations/defcon-16-pilosov-kapela.pdf/>.



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   [Khare]    Khare, V., Ju, Q., and B. Zhang, "Concurrent Prefix
              Hijacks: Occurrence and Impacts", IMC 2012, Boston, MA,
              November 2012, <http://www.cs.arizona.edu/~bzhang/
              paper/12-imc-hijack.pdf/>.

   [Labovitz]
              Labovitz, C., "Additional Discussion of the April China
              BGP Hijack Incident", Arbor Networks IT Security Blog,
              November 2010,
              <http://www.arbornetworks.com/asert/2010/11/additional-
              discussion-of-the-april-china-bgp-hijack-incident/>.

   [LRL]      Khare, V., Ju, Q., and B. Zhang, "Large Route Leaks",
              Project web page, 2012,
              <http://nrl.cs.arizona.edu/projects/
              lsrl-events-from-2003-to-2009/>.

   [Luckie]   Luckie, M., Huffaker, B., Dhamdhere, A., Giotsas, V., and
              kc. claffy, "AS Relationships, Customer Cones, and
              Validation", IMC 2013, October 2013,
              <http://www.caida.org/~amogh/papers/asrank-IMC13.pdf>.

   [Madory]   Madory, D., "Why Far-Flung Parts of the Internet Broke
              Today", Dyn Research/Renesys Blog, September 2014,
              <http://research.dyn.com/2014/09/
              why-the-internet-broke-today/>.

   [Mauch]    Mauch, J., "BGP Routing Leak Detection System", Project
              web page, 2014,
              <http://puck.nether.net/bgp/leakinfo.cgi/>.

   [Mauch-nanog]
              Mauch, J., "Detecting Routing Leaks by Counting", NANOG-41
              Albuquerque, NM, USA, October 2007,
              <https://www.nanog.org/meetings/nanog41/presentations/
              mauch-lightning.pdf/>.

   [Paseka]   Paseka, T., "Why Google Went Offline Today and a Bit about
              How the Internet Works", CloudFare Blog, November 2012,
              <http://blog.cloudflare.com/
              why-google-went-offline-today-and-a-bit-about/>.

   [Toonk2014]
              Toonk, A., "What caused today's Internet hiccup", August
              2014, <http://www.bgpmon.net/
              what-caused-todays-internet-hiccup/>.





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   [Toonk2015-A]
              Toonk, A., "What caused the Google service interruption",
              March 2015, <http://www.bgpmon.net/
              what-caused-the-google-service-interruption/>.

   [Toonk2015-B]
              Toonk, A., "Massive route leak causes Internet slowdown",
              June 2015, <http://www.bgpmon.net/
              massive-route-leak-cause-internet-slowdown/>.

   [Wijchers]
              Wijchers, B. and B. Overeinder, "Quantitative Analysis of
              BGP Route Leaks", RIPE-69, November 2014,
              <https://ripe69.ripe.net/presentations/157-RIPE-69-
              Routing-WG.pdf>.

   [Zmijewski]
              Zmijewski, E., "Indonesia Hijacks the World", Dyn
              Research/Renesys Blog, April 2014,
              <http://research.dyn.com/2014/04/
              indonesia-hijacks-world/>.

Authors' Addresses

   Kotikalapudi Sriram
   US NIST

   Email: ksriram@nist.gov


   Doug Montgomery
   US NIST

   Email: dougm@nist.gov


   Danny McPherson
   Verisign, Inc.

   Email: dmcpherson@verisign.com


   Eric Osterweil
   Verisign, Inc.

   Email: eosterweil@verisign.com





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   Brian Dickson
   Twitter, Inc.

   Email: bdickson@twitter.com















































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