[Docs] [txt|pdf] [Tracker] [WG] [Email] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Nits] [IPR]
Versions: (draft-moskowitz-hip-rfc5201-bis)
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 RFC 7401
Network Working Group R. Moskowitz, Ed.
Internet-Draft ICSA labs
Obsoletes: 5201 (if approved) P. Jokela
Intended status: Standards Track Ericsson Research NomadicLab
Expires: April 26, 2011 T. Henderson
The Boeing Company
T. Heer
RWTH Aachen University,
Distributed Systems Group
October 23, 2010
Host Identity Protocol
draft-ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis-03
Abstract
This document specifies the details of the Host Identity Protocol
(HIP). HIP allows consenting hosts to securely establish and
maintain shared IP-layer state, allowing separation of the identifier
and locator roles of IP addresses, thereby enabling continuity of
communications across IP address changes. HIP is based on a SIGMA-
compliant Diffie-Hellman key exchange, using public key identifiers
from a new Host Identity namespace for mutual peer authentication.
The protocol is designed to be resistant to denial-of-service (DoS)
and man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks. When used together with
another suitable security protocol, such as the Encapsulated Security
Payload (ESP), it provides integrity protection and optional
encryption for upper-layer protocols, such as TCP and UDP.
This document obsoletes RFC 5201 and addresses the concerns raised by
the IESG, particularly that of crypto agility. It also incorporates
lessons learned from the implementations of RFC 5201.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 26, 2011.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the BSD License.
This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
Contributions published or made publicly available before November
10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
than English.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.1. A New Namespace and Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2. The HIP Base Exchange (BEX) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3. Memo Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2. Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3. Host Identifier (HI) and Its Structure . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1. Host Identity Tag (HIT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2. Generating a HIT from an HI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
4. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1. Creating a HIP Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1.1. HIP Puzzle Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.1.2. Puzzle Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.1.3. Authenticated Diffie-Hellman Protocol with DH
Group Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.1.4. HIP Replay Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.1.5. Refusing a HIP Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.1.6. Aborting a HIP Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.1.7. HIP Downgrade Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.1.8. HIP Opportunistic Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.2. Updating a HIP Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.3. Error Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.4. HIP State Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.4.1. Timespan Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.4.2. HIP States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.4.3. HIP State Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.4.4. Simplified HIP State Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.5. User Data Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.5.1. TCP and UDP Pseudo-Header Computation for User Data . 35
4.5.2. Sending Data on HIP Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.5.3. Transport Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.5.4. Reboot, Timeout, and Restart of HIP . . . . . . . . . 35
4.6. Certificate Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5. Packet Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.1. Payload Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.1.1. Checksum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.1.2. HIP Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.1.3. HIP Fragmentation Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.2. HIP Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.2.1. TLV Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5.2.2. Defining New Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
5.2.3. R1_COUNTER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.2.4. PUZZLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.2.5. SOLUTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
5.2.6. DIFFIE_HELLMAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
5.2.7. HIP_CIPHER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5.2.8. HOST_ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
5.2.9. HIT_SUITE_LIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
5.2.10. DH_GROUP_LIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.2.11. HIP_MAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
5.2.12. HIP_MAC_2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
5.2.13. HIP_SIGNATURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.2.14. HIP_SIGNATURE_2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
5.2.15. SEQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
5.2.16. ACK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.2.17. ENCRYPTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.2.18. NOTIFICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
5.2.19. ECHO_REQUEST_SIGNED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5.2.20. ECHO_REQUEST_UNSIGNED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5.2.21. ECHO_RESPONSE_SIGNED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.2.22. ECHO_RESPONSE_UNSIGNED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.3. HIP Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.3.1. I1 - the HIP Initiator Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.3.2. R1 - the HIP Responder Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.3.3. I2 - the Second HIP Initiator Packet . . . . . . . . 70
5.3.4. R2 - the Second HIP Responder Packet . . . . . . . . 71
5.3.5. UPDATE - the HIP Update Packet . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.3.6. NOTIFY - the HIP Notify Packet . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.3.7. CLOSE - the HIP Association Closing Packet . . . . . 73
5.3.8. CLOSE_ACK - the HIP Closing Acknowledgment Packet . . 73
5.4. ICMP Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.4.1. Invalid Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.4.2. Other Problems with the HIP Header and Packet
Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.4.3. Invalid Puzzle Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.4.4. Non-Existing HIP Association . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
6. Packet Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
6.1. Processing Outgoing Application Data . . . . . . . . . . 75
6.2. Processing Incoming Application Data . . . . . . . . . . 76
6.3. Solving the Puzzle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
6.4. HIP_MAC and SIGNATURE Calculation and Verification . . . 79
6.4.1. HMAC Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
6.4.2. Signature Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
6.5. HIP KEYMAT Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
6.6. Initiation of a HIP Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
6.6.1. Sending Multiple I1s in Parallel . . . . . . . . . . 85
6.6.2. Processing Incoming ICMP Protocol Unreachable
Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
6.7. Processing Incoming I1 Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
6.7.1. R1 Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
6.7.2. Handling Malformed Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
6.8. Processing Incoming R1 Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
6.8.1. Handling Malformed Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
6.9. Processing Incoming I2 Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
6.9.1. Handling Malformed Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
6.10. Processing Incoming R2 Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
6.11. Sending UPDATE Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
6.12. Receiving UPDATE Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
6.12.1. Handling a SEQ Parameter in a Received UPDATE
Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
6.12.2. Handling an ACK Parameter in a Received UPDATE
Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
6.13. Processing NOTIFY Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
6.14. Processing CLOSE Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
6.15. Processing CLOSE_ACK Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
6.16. Handling State Loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
7. HIP Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
8. Changes from RFC 5201 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
8.1. Changes from draft-ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis-02 . . . . . . . 99
8.2. Changes from draft-ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis-01 . . . . . . . 99
8.3. Changes from draft-ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis-00 . . . . . . . 101
8.4. Contents of draft-ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis-00 . . . . . . . . 101
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Appendix A. Using Responder Puzzles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Appendix B. Generating a Public Key Encoding from an HI . . . . 112
Appendix C. Example Checksums for HIP Packets . . . . . . . . . 112
C.1. IPv6 HIP Example (I1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
C.2. IPv4 HIP Packet (I1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
C.3. TCP Segment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Appendix D. ECDH-160 Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Appendix E. HIT Suites and HIT Generation . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
1. Introduction
This memo specifies the details of the Host Identity Protocol (HIP).
A high-level description of the protocol and the underlying
architectural thinking is available in the separate HIP architecture
description [rfc4423-bis]. Briefly, the HIP architecture proposes an
alternative to the dual use of IP addresses as "locators" (routing
labels) and "identifiers" (endpoint, or host, identifiers). In HIP,
public cryptographic keys, of a public/private key pair, are used as
Host Identifiers, to which higher layer protocols are bound instead
of an IP address. By using public keys (and their representations)
as host identifiers, dynamic changes to IP address sets can be
directly authenticated between hosts, and if desired, strong
authentication between hosts at the TCP/IP stack level can be
obtained.
This memo specifies the base HIP protocol ("base exchange") used
between hosts to establish an IP-layer communications context, called
HIP association, prior to communications. It also defines a packet
format and procedures for updating an active HIP association. Other
elements of the HIP architecture are specified in other documents,
such as.
o "Using the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) Transport Format
with the Host Identity Protocol (HIP)" [RFC5202]: how to use the
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) for integrity protection and
optional encryption
o "End-Host Mobility and Multihoming with the Host Identity
Protocol" [RFC5206]: how to support mobility and multihoming in
HIP
o "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Domain Name System (DNS) Extensions"
[RFC5205]: how to extend DNS to contain Host Identity information
o "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Rendezvous Extension" [RFC5204]:
using a rendezvous mechanism to contact mobile HIP hosts
Since the HIP Base Exchange was first developed, there have been a
few advances in cryptography and attacks against cryptographic
systems. As a result, all cryptographic protocols need to be agile.
That is it should be a part of the protocol to switch from one
cryptographic primitive to another, and reasonable effort should be
done to support a reasonable set of mainstream algorithms. This
update to the Base Exchange adds this needed cryptographic agility
while addressing the downgrade attacks that such flexibility enables.
In particular, Elliptic Curve support (ECDSA and ECDH) and
alternative hash functions have been added.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
1.1. A New Namespace and Identifiers
The Host Identity Protocol introduces a new namespace, the Host
Identity namespace. Some ramifications of this new namespace are
explained in the HIP architecture description [rfc4423-bis].
There are two main representations of the Host Identity, the full
Host Identifier (HI) and the Host Identity Tag (HIT). The HI is a
public key and directly represents the Identity. Since there are
different public key algorithms that can be used with different key
lengths, the HI is not good for use as a packet identifier, or as an
index into the various operational tables needed to support HIP.
Consequently, a hash of the HI, the Host Identity Tag (HIT), becomes
the operational representation. It is 128 bits long and is used in
the HIP payloads and to index the corresponding state in the end
hosts. The HIT has an important security property in that it is
self-certifying (see Section 3).
1.2. The HIP Base Exchange (BEX)
The HIP base exchange is a two-party cryptographic protocol used to
establish communications context between hosts. The base exchange is
a SIGMA-compliant [KRA03] four-packet exchange. The first party is
called the Initiator and the second party the Responder. The four-
packet design helps to make HIP DoS resilient. The protocol
exchanges Diffie-Hellman keys in the 2nd and 3rd packets, and
authenticates the parties in the 3rd and 4th packets. Additionally,
the Responder starts a puzzle exchange in the 2nd packet, with the
Initiator completing it in the 3rd packet before the Responder stores
any state from the exchange.
The exchange can use the Diffie-Hellman output to encrypt the Host
Identity of the Initiator in the 3rd packet (although Aura, et al.,
[AUR03] notes that such operation may interfere with packet-
inspecting middleboxes), or the Host Identity may instead be sent
unencrypted. The Responder's Host Identity is not protected. It
should be noted, however, that both the Initiator's and the
Responder's HITs are transported as such (in cleartext) in the
packets, allowing an eavesdropper with a priori knowledge about the
parties to verify their identities.
Data packets start to flow after the 4th packet. The 3rd and 4th HIP
packets may carry a data payload in the future. However, the details
of this may be defined later.
An existing HIP association can be updated using the update mechanism
defined in this document, and when the association is no longer
needed, it can be closed using the defined closing mechanism.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
Finally, HIP is designed as an end-to-end authentication and key
establishment protocol, to be used with Encapsulated Security Payload
(ESP) [RFC5202] and other end-to-end security protocols. The base
protocol does not cover all the fine-grained policy control found in
Internet Key Exchange (IKE) [RFC4306] that allows IKE to support
complex gateway policies. Thus, HIP is not a replacement for IKE.
1.3. Memo Structure
The rest of this memo is structured as follows. Section 2 defines
the central keywords, notation, and terms used throughout the rest of
the document. Section 3 defines the structure of the Host Identity
and its various representations. Section 4 gives an overview of the
HIP base exchange protocol. Sections 5 and 6 define the detail
packet formats and rules for packet processing. Finally, Sections 7,
9, and 10 discuss policy, security, and IANA considerations,
respectively.
2. Terms and Definitions
2.1. Requirements Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2.2. Notation
[x] indicates that x is optional.
{x} indicates that x is encrypted.
X(y) indicates that y is a parameter of X. `
<x>i indicates that x exists i times.
--> signifies "Initiator to Responder" communication (requests).
<-- signifies "Responder to Initiator" communication (replies).
| signifies concatenation of information-- e.g., X | Y is the
concatenation of X with Y.
Ltrunc (H(x), K) denotes the lowest order K bits of the result of
the hash function H on the input x.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
2.3. Definitions
Host Identity (HI) The Host Identity is the public key of a
signature algorithm and represents the identity of the host. In
HIP, a host proves its identity by creating a signature with the
private key belonging to its HI (c.f. Section 3).
Host Identity Tag (HIT) The Host Identity Tag is a shorthand for the
HI in IPv6 format. It is generated by hashing the HI (c.f.
Section 3.1).
HIT Suite: A HIT Suite groups all cryptographic algorithms that are
required to generate and use an HI and its HIT. In particular,
these algorithms are: 1) the public key signature algorithm and 2)
the hash function, 3) the truncation (c.f. Appendix E).
Responder's HIT Hash Algorithm (RHASH): The Hash algorithm used for
various hash calculations in this document. The algorithm is the
same as is used to generate the Responder's HIT. The RHASH is the
hash function defined by the HIT Suite of the Responder's HIT
(c.f. Appendix E).
Length of the Responder's HIT Hash Algorithm (RHASH_len): RHASH_len
is the natural output length of RHASH in bits.
3. Host Identifier (HI) and Its Structure
In this section, the properties of the Host Identifier and Host
Identifier Tag are discussed, and the exact format for them is
defined. In HIP, the public key of an asymmetric key pair is used as
the Host Identifier (HI). Correspondingly, the host itself is
defined as the entity that holds the private key from the key pair.
See the HIP architecture specification [rfc4423-bis] for more details
about the difference between an identity and the corresponding
identifier.
HIP implementations MUST support the Rivest Shamir Adelman (RSA)
[RFC3110] public key algorithm, and SHOULD support the Digital
Signature Algorithm (DSA) [RFC2536] algorithms, and Elliptic Curve
Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) Section 5.2.8, ECDSA description;
other algorithms MAY be supported.
A hashed encoding of the HI, the Host Identity Tag (HIT), is used in
protocols to represent the Host Identity. The HIT is 128 bits long
and has the following three key properties: i) it is the same length
as an IPv6 address and can be used in address-sized fields in APIs
and protocols, ii) it is self-certifying (i.e., given a HIT, it is
computationally hard to find a Host Identity key that matches the
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
HIT), and iii) the probability of HIT collision between two hosts is
very low, hence, it is infeasible for an attacker to find a collision
with a HIT that is in use. For details on the security properties of
the HIT see [rfc4423-bis].
The structure of the HIT is defined in [RFC4843-bis]. The HIT
consists of three parts: first, an IANA assigned prefix to
distinguish it from other IPv6 addresses. Second, a four-bit
encoding of the algorithms that were used for generating the HI and
the hashed representation of HI. Third, a 96-bit hashed
representation of the Host Identity. The encoding of the ORCHID
generation algorithm and the exact algorithm for generating the
hashed representation is specified in Appendix E.
Carrying HIs and HITs in the header of user data packets would
increase the overhead of packets. Thus, it is not expected that they
are carried in every packet, but other methods are used to map the
data packets to the corresponding HIs. In some cases, this makes it
possible to use HIP without any additional headers in the user data
packets. For example, if ESP is used to protect data traffic, the
Security Parameter Index (SPI) carried in the ESP header can be used
to map the encrypted data packet to the correct HIP association.
3.1. Host Identity Tag (HIT)
The Host Identity Tag is a 128-bit value -- a hashed encoding of the
Host Identifier. There are two advantages of using a hashed encoding
over the actual Host Identity public key in protocols. Firstly, its
fixed length makes for easier protocol coding and also better manages
the packet size cost of this technology. Secondly, it presents a
consistent format to the protocol whatever underlying identity
technology is used.
RFC 4843-bis [RFC4843-bis] specifies 128-bit hash-based identifiers,
called Overlay Routable Cryptographic Hash Identifiers (ORCHIDs).
Their prefix, allocated from the IPv6 address block, is defined in
[RFC4843-bis]. The Host Identity Tag is a type of ORCHID.
This document extends [RFC5201] with measures to support crypto
agility. One of these measures is to allow for different hash
functions for creating a HIT. HIT Suites group sets of algorithms
that are required to generate and use a particular HIT. The Suites
are encoded in HIT Suite IDs. These HIT Suite IDs are transmitted in
the ORCHID Generation Algorithm field in the ORCHID. The HIT Suite
ID in the OGA field enables a hosts tell from another host's HIT,
whether it can successfully establish a HIP association with that
host.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
3.2. Generating a HIT from an HI
The HIT MUST be generated according to the ORCHID generation method
described in [RFC4843-bis] using a context ID value of 0xF0EF F02F
BFF4 3D0F E793 0C3C 6E61 74EA (this tag value has been generated
randomly by the editor of this specification), and an input that
encodes the Host Identity field (see Section 5.2.8) present in a HIP
payload packet. The class of hash function, signature algorithm, and
the algorithm used for generating the HIT from the HI depends on the
HIT Suite (see Appendix E) and is indicated by the four bits of the
Orchid Generation Algorithm (OGA) field in the ORCHID. Currently,
truncated SHA-1 [FIPS.95-1.1993] and truncated SHA-256
[FIPS.180-2.2002] are defined as hashes for generating a HIT.
For Identities that are either RSA, Digital Signature Algorithm
(DSA), or Elliptic Curve DSA (ECDSA) public keys, the ORCHID input
consists of the public key encoding as specified in the corresponding
DNSSEC documents, taking the algorithm-specific portion of the RDATA
part of the KEY RR. There are currently only two defined public key
algorithms: RSA/SHA-1 and DSA. Hence, either of the following
applies:
The RSA public key is encoded as defined in [RFC3110] Section 2,
taking the exponent length (e_len), exponent (e), and modulus (n)
fields concatenated. The length (n_len) of the modulus (n) can be
determined from the total HI Length and the preceding HI fields
including the exponent (e). Thus, the data that serves as input
for the HIT generation has the same length as the HI. The fields
MUST be encoded in network byte order, as defined in [RFC3110].
The DSA public key is encoded as defined in [RFC2536] Section 2,
taking the fields T, Q, P, G, and Y, concatenated. Thus, the data
to be hashed is 1 + 20 + 3 * 64 + 3 * 8 * T octets long, where T
is the size parameter as defined in [RFC2536]. The size parameter
T, affecting the field lengths, MUST be selected as the minimum
value that is long enough to accommodate P, G, and Y. The fields
MUST be encoded in network byte order, as defined in [RFC2536].
The ECDSA public key is encoded as defined in [fundamental-ecc]
Section 4.2 and 6.
In Appendix B, the public key encoding process is illustrated using
pseudo-code.
4. Protocol Overview
The following material is an overview of the HIP protocol operation,
and does not contain all details of the packet formats or the packet
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
processing steps. Sections 5 and 6 describe in more detail the
packet formats and packet processing steps, respectively, and are
normative in case of any conflicts with this section.
The protocol number 139 has been assigned by IANA to the Host
Identity Protocol.
The HIP payload (Section 5.1) header could be carried in every IP
datagram. However, since HIP headers are relatively large (40
bytes), it is desirable to 'compress' the HIP header so that the HIP
header only occurs in control packets used to establish or change HIP
association state. The actual method for header 'compression' and
for matching data packets with existing HIP associations (if any) is
defined in separate documents, describing transport formats and
methods. All HIP implementations MUST implement, at minimum, the ESP
transport format for HIP [RFC5202].
4.1. Creating a HIP Association
By definition, the system initiating a HIP exchange is the Initiator,
and the peer is the Responder. This distinction is forgotten once
the base exchange completes, and either party can become the
Initiator in future communications.
The HIP base exchange serves to manage the establishment of state
between an Initiator and a Responder. The first packet, I1,
initiates the exchange, and the last three packets, R1, I2, and R2,
constitute an authenticated Diffie-Hellman [DIF76] key exchange for
session key generation. In the first two packets, the hosts agree on
a set of cryptographic identifiers and algorithms that then are used
in and after the exchange. During the Diffie-Hellman key exchange, a
piece of keying material is generated. The HIP association keys are
drawn from this keying material. If other cryptographic keys are
needed, e.g., to be used with ESP, they are expected to be drawn from
the same keying material.
The Initiator first sends a trigger packet, I1, to the Responder.
The packet contains the HIT of the Initiator and possibly the HIT of
the Responder, if it is known. Moreover, the I1 packet initializes
the negotiation of the Diffie-Hellman group that is used for
generating the keying material. Therefore, the I1 contains a list of
Diffie Hellman Group IDs supported by the Initiator. Note that in
some cases it may be possible to replace this trigger packet by some
other form of a trigger, in which case the protocol starts with the
Responder sending the R1 packet. In such cases, another mechanism to
convey the Initiator's supported DH Groups (e.g., by using a default
group) must be specified.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
The second packet, R1, starts the actual authenticated Diffie-Hellman
exchange. It contains a puzzle -- a cryptographic challenge that the
Initiator must solve before continuing the exchange. The level of
difficulty of the puzzle can be adjusted based on level of trust with
the Initiator, current load, or other factors. In addition, the R1
contains the Responder's Diffie-Hellman parameter and lists of
cryptographic algorithms supported by the Responder. Based on these
lists, the Initiator can continue, abort, or restart the base
exchange with a different selection of cryptographic algorithms. The
R1 packet contains a signature that covers selected parts of the
message. Some fields are left outside the signature to support pre-
created R1s.
In the I2 packet, the Initiator must display the solution to the
received puzzle. Without a correct solution, the I2 message is
discarded. The I2 also contains a Diffie-Hellman parameter that
carries needed information for the Responder. The packet is signed
by the sender.
The R2 packet acknowledges the receipt of the I2 and finalizes the
base exchange. The packet is signed.
The base exchange is illustrated below. The term "key" refers to the
Host Identity public key, and "sig" represents a signature using such
a key. The packets contain other parameters not shown in this
figure.
Initiator Responder
I1: DH list
-------------------------->
select precomputed R1
R1: puzzle, DH, key, sig
<-------------------------
check sig remain stateless
solve puzzle
I2: solution, DH, {key}, sig
-------------------------->
compute DH check puzzle
check sig
R2: sig
<--------------------------
check sig compute DH
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
4.1.1. HIP Puzzle Mechanism
The purpose of the HIP puzzle mechanism is to protect the Responder
from a number of denial-of-service threats. It allows the Responder
to delay state creation until receiving I2. Furthermore, the puzzle
allows the Responder to use a fairly cheap calculation to check that
the Initiator is "sincere" in the sense that it has churned CPU
cycles in solving the puzzle.
The puzzle mechanism has been explicitly designed to give space for
various implementation options. It allows a Responder implementation
to completely delay session-specific state creation until a valid I2
is received. In such a case, a correctly formatted I2 can be
rejected only once the Responder has checked its validity by
computing one hash function. On the other hand, the design also
allows a Responder implementation to keep state about received I1s,
and match the received I2s against the state, thereby allowing the
implementation to avoid the computational cost of the hash function.
The drawback of this latter approach is the requirement of creating
state. Finally, it also allows an implementation to use other
combinations of the space-saving and computation-saving mechanisms.
The Responder can remain stateless and drop most spoofed I2s because
puzzle calculation is based on the Initiator's Host Identity Tag. The
idea is that the Responder has a (perhaps varying) number of pre-
calculated R1 packets, and it selects one of these based on the
information carried in I1. When the Responder then later receives
I2, it can verify that the puzzle has been solved using the
Initiator's HIT. This makes it impractical for the attacker to first
exchange one I1/R1, and then generate a large number of spoofed I2s
that seemingly come from different HITs. The method does not protect
from an attacker that uses fixed HITs, though. Against such an
attacker a viable approach may be to create a piece of local state,
and remember that the puzzle check has previously failed. See
Appendix A for one possible implementation. Implementations SHOULD
include sufficient randomness to the algorithm so that algorithmic
complexity attacks become impossible [CRO03].
The Responder can set the puzzle difficulty for Initiator, based on
its level of trust of the Initiator. Because the puzzle is not
included in the signature calculation, the Responder can use pre-
calculated R1 packets and include the puzzle just before sending the
R1 to the Initiator. The Responder SHOULD use heuristics to
determine when it is under a denial-of-service attack, and set the
puzzle difficulty value K appropriately; see below.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
4.1.2. Puzzle Exchange
The Responder starts the puzzle exchange when it receives an I1. The
Responder supplies a random number I, and requires the Initiator to
find a number J. To select a proper J, the Initiator must create the
concatenation of I, the HITs of the parties, and J, and take a hash
over this concatenation using the RHASH algorithm. The lowest order
K bits of the result MUST be zeros. The value K sets the difficulty
of the puzzle.
To generate a proper number J, the Initiator will have to generate a
number of Js until one produces the hash target of zeros. The
Initiator SHOULD give up after exceeding the puzzle lifetime in the
PUZZLE parameter (Section 5.2.4). The Responder needs to re-create
the concatenation of I, the HITs, and the provided J, and compute the
hash once to prove that the Initiator did its assigned task.
To prevent precomputation attacks, the Responder MUST select the
number I in such a way that the Initiator cannot guess it.
Furthermore, the construction MUST allow the Responder to verify that
the value I was indeed selected by it and not by the Initiator. See
Appendix A for an example on how to implement this.
Using the Opaque data field in the PUZZLE (Section 5.2.4), in an
ECHO_REQUEST_SIGNED (Section 5.2.19) or in an ECHO_REQUEST_UNSIGNED
parameter (Section 5.2.20), the Responder can include some data in R1
that the Initiator must copy unmodified in the corresponding I2
packet. The Responder can generate the Opaque data in various ways;
e.g., using encryption or hashing with some secret, the sent I, and
possibly other related data. Using the same secret, the received I
(from the I2), and the other related data (if any), the Receiver can
verify that it has itself sent the I to the Initiator. The Responder
MUST periodically change such a used secret.
It is RECOMMENDED that the Responder generates new secrets for the
puzzle and new R1s once every few minutes. Furthermore, it is
RECOMMENDED that the Responder is able to verify valid puzzle
solution at least Lifetime seconds after the puzzle secret has been
deprecated. These time values guarantee that the puzzle is valid for
at least Lifetime and at most 2*Lifetime seconds. This limits the
usability that an old, solved puzzle has to an attacker.
The puzzle value I and the solution J are inputs for deriving the
keying material from the Diffie Hellman key exchange (Section 6.5).
Therefore, a Responder SHOULD NOT use the same puzzle I with the same
DH keys for the same Initiator twice to ensure that the derived
keying material differs. Such uniqueness can be achieved, for
example, by using a counter as additional input for generating I.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
This counter can be increased for each processed I1 packet. The
state of the counter can be transmitted in the Opaque data field in
the PUZZLE (Section 5.2.4), in an ECHO_REQUEST_SIGNED
(Section 5.2.19) or in an ECHO_REQUEST_UNSIGNED parameter
(Section 5.2.20) without the need to establish state.
NOTE: The protocol developers explicitly considered whether R1 should
include a timestamp in order to protect the Initiator from replay
attacks. The decision was to NOT include a timestamp.
NOTE: The protocol developers explicitly considered whether a memory
bound function should be used for the puzzle instead of a CPU-bound
function. The decision was not to use memory-bound functions. At
the time of the decision, the idea of memory-bound functions was
relatively new and their IPR status were unknown. Once there is more
experience about memory-bound functions and once their IPR status is
better known, it may be reasonable to reconsider this decision.
4.1.3. Authenticated Diffie-Hellman Protocol with DH Group Negotiation
The packets R1, I2, and R2 implement a standard authenticated Diffie-
Hellman exchange. The Responder sends one of its public Diffie-
Hellman keys and its public authentication key, i.e., its Host
Identity, in R1. The signature in R1 allows the Initiator to verify
that the R1 has been once generated by the Responder. However, since
it is precomputed and therefore does not cover association-specific
information in the I1 packet, it does not protect from replay
attacks.
Before the actual authenticated Diffie-Hellman exchange, the
Initiator expresses its preference regarding its choice of the DH
groups in the I1 packet. The preference is expressed as a sorted
list of DH Group IDs. The I1 packet is not protected by a signature.
Therefore, this list is sent in an unauthenticated way to avoid
costly computations for processing the I1 packet on the Responder's
side. Based on the preferences of the Initiator, the Responder sends
an R1 packet containing its most suitable public DH value. It also
attaches a list of its own preferences to the R1 to convey the basis
for the DH group selection to the Initiator.
If none of the DH Group IDs in the I1 is supported by the Responder,
the Responder selects the DH Group most suitable for it regardless of
the Initiator's preference. It then sends the R1 containing this DH
Group and its list of supported DH Group IDs to the Initiator.
When the Initiator receives an R1, it gets one of the Responder's
public Diffie-Hellman values and the list of DH Group IDs supported
by the Responder. This list is covered by the signature in the R1
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
packet to avoid forgery. The Initiator compares the Group ID of the
public DH value in the R1 packet to the list of supported DH Group
IDs in the R1 packets and to its own preferences expressed in the
list of supported DH Group IDs. The Initiator continues the BEX only
if the Group ID of the public DH value of the Responder matches the
preferences of both Initiator and Responder. Otherwise, the
communication is subject of a downgrade attack and the Initiator must
restart the key exchange with a new I1 packet or must abort the key
exchange. If the Responder's choice of the DH Group is not supported
by the Initiator, the Initiator may abort the handshake or send a new
I1 with a different list of supported DH Groups. However, the
Initiator MUST verify the signature of the R1 packet before
restarting or aborting the handshake. It MUST silently ignore the R1
packet if the signature is not valid.
If the preferences regarding the DH Group ID match, the Initiator
computes the Diffie-Hellman session key (Kij). It creates a HIP
association using keying material from the session key (see
Section 6.5), and may use the association to encrypt its public
authentication key, i.e., Host Identity. The resulting I2 contains
the Initiator's Diffie-Hellman key and its (optionally encrypted)
public authentication key. The signature in I2 covers all of the
packet.
The Responder extracts the Initiator Diffie-Hellman public key from
the I2, computes the Diffie-Hellman session key, creates a
corresponding HIP association, and decrypts the Initiator's public
authentication key. It can then verify the signature using the
authentication key.
The final message, R2, is needed to protect the Initiator from replay
attacks.
4.1.4. HIP Replay Protection
The HIP protocol includes the following mechanisms to protect against
malicious replays. Responders are protected against replays of I1
packets by virtue of the stateless response to I1s with presigned R1
messages. Initiators are protected against R1 replays by a
monotonically increasing "R1 generation counter" included in the R1.
Responders are protected against replays or false I2s by the puzzle
mechanism (Section 4.1.1 above), and optional use of opaque data.
Hosts are protected against replays to R2s and UPDATEs by use of a
less expensive HMAC verification preceding HIP signature
verification.
The R1 generation counter is a monotonically increasing 64-bit
counter that may be initialized to any value. The scope of the
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
counter MAY be system-wide but SHOULD be per Host Identity, if there
is more than one local host identity. The value of this counter
SHOULD be kept across system reboots and invocations of the HIP base
exchange. This counter indicates the current generation of puzzles.
Implementations MUST accept puzzles from the current generation and
MAY accept puzzles from earlier generations. A system's local
counter MUST be incremented at least as often as every time old R1s
cease to be valid, and SHOULD never be decremented, lest the host
expose its peers to the replay of previously generated, higher
numbered R1s. The R1 counter SHOULD NOT roll over.
A host may receive more than one R1, either due to sending multiple
I1s (Section 6.6.1) or due to a replay of an old R1. When sending
multiple I1s, an Initiator SHOULD wait for a small amount of time (a
reasonable time may be 2 * expected RTT) after the first R1 reception
to allow possibly multiple R1s to arrive, and it SHOULD respond to an
R1 among the set with the largest R1 generation counter. If an
Initiator is processing an R1 or has already sent an I2 (still
waiting for R2) and it receives another R1 with a larger R1
generation counter, it MAY elect to restart R1 processing with the
fresher R1, as if it were the first R1 to arrive.
Upon conclusion of an active HIP association with another host, the
R1 generation counter associated with the peer host SHOULD be
flushed. A local policy MAY override the default flushing of R1
counters on a per-HIT basis. The reason for recommending the
flushing of this counter is that there may be hosts where the R1
generation counter (occasionally) decreases; e.g., due to hardware
failure.
4.1.5. Refusing a HIP Exchange
A HIP-aware host may choose not to accept a HIP exchange. If the
host's policy is to only be an Initiator, it should begin its own HIP
exchange. A host MAY choose to have such a policy since only the
Initiator's HI is protected in the exchange. There is a risk of a
race condition if each host's policy is to only be an Initiator, at
which point the HIP exchange will fail.
If the host's policy does not permit it to enter into a HIP exchange
with the Initiator, it should send an ICMP 'Destination Unreachable,
Administratively Prohibited' message. A more complex HIP packet is
not used here as it actually opens up more potential DoS attacks than
a simple ICMP message.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
4.1.6. Aborting a HIP Exchange
Two HIP hosts may encounter situations in which they cannot complete
a HIP exchange because of insufficient suport for cryptographic
algorithms, in particular the HIT Suites and DH Groups. After
receiving the R1 packet, the Initiator can determine whether the
Responder supports the required cryptographic operations to
successfully establish a HIP association. The Initiator can abort
the BEX silently after receiving an R1 packet that indicates an
unsupported set of algorithms. The specific conditions are described
below.
The R1 packet contains a signed list of HIT Suite IDs supported by
the Responder. Therefore, the Initiator can determine whether its
source HIT is supported by the Responder. If the HIT Suite ID of the
Initiator's HIT is not contained in the list of HIT Suites, the
Initiator MAY abort the handshake silently or MAY restart the
handshake with a new I1 packet that contains a source HIT supported
by the Responder.
During the Handshake, the Initiator and the Responder agree on a DH
Group. The Responder selects the DH Group and its DH public value in
the R1 based on the list of DH Suite IDs in the I1 packet. If the
responder supports none of the DH Groups selected by the Initiator,
the Responder selects an arbitrary DH and replies an R1 containing
its list of supported DH Group IDs. In this case, the Initiator will
receive an R1 packet containing the DH public value for an
unsupported DH Group and the Responder's DH Group list in the signed
part of the R1 packet. At this point, the Initiator MAY abort the
handshake or MAY restart the handshake by sending a new I1 containing
a selection of DH Group IDs that is supported by the Responder.
4.1.7. HIP Downgrade Protection
In a downgrade attack, an attacker manipulates the packets of an
Initiator and/or a Responder to unnoticeably influence the result of
the cryptographic negotiations in the BEX to its favor. As a result,
the victims select weaker cryptographic algorithms than they would
have without the attacker's interference. Downgrade attacks can only
be successful if these are not detected by the victims and the
victims assume a secure communication channel.
In HIP, almost all packet parameters related to cryptographic
negotiations are covered by signatures. These parameters cannot be
directly manipulated in a downgrade attack without invalidating the
signature. However, signed packets can be subject to replay attacks.
In such a replay attack, the attacker could use an old BEX packet
with an outdated selection of cryptographic algorithms and replay it
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 19]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
instead of a more recent packet with a collection of stronger
cryptographic algorithms. Signed packets that could be subject to
this replay attack are the R1 and I2 packet. However, replayed R1
and I2 packets cannot be used to successfully establish a HIP BEX
because these packets also contain the public DH values of the
Initiator and the Responder. Old DH values from replayed packet will
lead to invalid keying material and mismatching shared secrets.
In contrast to the first version of HIP [RFC5201], this version
begins the negotiation of the DH Groups already in the first BEX
packet, the I1. The I1 is, by intention, not protected by a
signature to avoid CPU-intensive cryptographic operations for
processing floods of I1s. Hence, the list of DH Group IDs in the I1
is vulnerable to forgery and manipulation. To thwart an unnoticed
manipulation of the I1 packet, the Responder chooses the DH Group
deterministically and includes its own list of DH Group IDs in the
signed part of the R1 packet. The Initiator can detect an attempted
downgrade attack by comparing the list of DH Group IDs in the R1
packet to its own preferences in the I1. If the choice of the DH
Group in the R1 packet does not equal the best match of the two
lists, the Initiator can conclude that its list in the I1 was altered
by an attacker. In this case, the Initiator can restart or abort the
BEX. As mentioned before, the detection of the downgrade attack is
sufficient to prevent it.
4.1.8. HIP Opportunistic Mode
It is possible to initiate a HIP negotiation even if the Responder's
HI (and HIT) is unknown. In this case, the connection initializing
I1 packet contains NULL (all zeros) as the destination HIT. This
kind of connection setup is called opportunistic mode.
The Responder may have multiple HITs due to multiple supported HIT
Suites. Since the Responder's HIT Suite is not determined by the
destination HIT of the I1 packet, the Responder can freely select a
HIT of any HIT Suite. The complete set of HIT Suites supported by
the Initiator is not known to the Responder. Therefore, the
Responder SHOULD use a Responder HIT of the same HIT Suite as the
Initiator's HIT because this HIT Suite is obviously supported by the
Initiator. If the Responder selects a different HIT that is not
supported by the Initiator, the Initiator MAY restart the BEX with an
I1 packet with a source HIT that is contained in the list of the
Responder's HIT Suites in the R1 packet.
Note that the Initiator cannot verify the signature of the R1 packet
if the Responder's HIT Suite is not supported. Therefore, the
Initiator MUST treat R1 packets with unsupported Responder HITs as
potentially forged and MUST NOT use any parameters from the
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 20]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
unverified R1 besides the HIT Suite List. Moreover, an Initiator
that uses a unverified HIT Suite List to determine a possible source
HIT from an R1 packet MUST verify that the HIT_SUITE_LIST in the
first unverified R1 packet matches the HIT_SUITE_LIST in the second
R1 packet for which the Initiator supports the signature algorithm.
The Initiator MUST restart the BEX with a new I1 packet with a source
HIT mentioned in the verifiable R1 if the two lists do not match to
mitigate downgrade attacks.
There are both security and API issues involved with the
opportunistic mode.
Given that the Responder's HI is not known by the Initiator, there
must be suitable API calls that allow the Initiator to request,
directly or indirectly, that the underlying kernel initiate the HIP
base exchange solely based on locators. The Responder's HI will be
tentatively available in the R1 packet, and in an authenticated form
once the R2 packet has been received and verified. Hence, it could
be communicated to the application via new API mechanisms. However,
with a backwards-compatible API the application sees only the
locators used for the initial contact. Depending on the desired
semantics of the API, this can raise the following issues:
o The actual locators may later change if an UPDATE message is used,
even if from the API perspective the session still appears to be
between specific locators. The locator update is still secure,
however, and the session is still between the same nodes.
o Different sessions between the same locators may result in
connections to different nodes, if the implementation no longer
remembers which identifier the peer had in another session. This
is possible when the peer's locator has changed for legitimate
reasons or when an attacker pretends to be a node that has the
peer's locator. Therefore, when using opportunistic mode, HIP
MUST NOT place any expectation that the peer's HI returned in the
R1 message matches any HI previously seen from that address.
If the HIP implementation and application do not have the same
understanding of what constitutes a session, this may even happen
within the same session. For instance, an implementation may not
know when HIP state can be purged for UDP-based applications.
o As with all HIP exchanges, the handling of locator-based or
interface-based policy is unclear for opportunistic mode HIP. An
application may make a connection to a specific locator because
the application has knowledge of the security properties along the
network to that locator. If one of the nodes moves and the
locators are updated, these security properties may not be
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 21]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
maintained. Depending on the security policy of the application,
this may be a problem. This is an area of ongoing study. As an
example, there is work to create an API that applications can use
to specify their security requirements in a similar context
[btns-c-api].
In addition, the following security considerations apply. The
generation counter mechanism will be less efficient in protecting
against replays of the R1 packet, given that the Responder can choose
a replay that uses any HI, not just the one given in the I1 packet.
More importantly, the opportunistic exchange is vulnerable to man-in-
the-middle attacks, because the Initiator does not have any public
key information about the peer. To assess the impacts of this
vulnerability, we compare it to vulnerabilities in current, non-HIP-
capable communications.
An attacker on the path between the two peers can insert itself as a
man-in-the-middle by providing its own identifier to the Initiator
and then initiating another HIP session towards the Responder. For
this to be possible, the Initiator must employ opportunistic mode,
and the Responder must be configured to accept a connection from any
HIP-enabled node.
An attacker outside the path will be unable to do so, given that it
cannot respond to the messages in the base exchange.
These properties are characteristic also of communications in the
current Internet. A client contacting a server without employing
end-to-end security may find itself talking to the server via a man-
in-the-middle, assuming again that the server is willing to talk to
anyone.
If end-to-end security is in place, then the worst that can happen in
both the opportunistic HIP and normal IP cases is denial-of-service;
an entity on the path can disrupt communications, but will be unable
to insert itself as a man-in-the-middle.
However, once the opportunistic exchange has successfully completed,
HIP provides integrity protection and confidentiality for the
communications, and can securely change the locators of the
endpoints.
As a result, it is believed that the HIP opportunistic mode is at
least as secure as current IP.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 22]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
4.2. Updating a HIP Association
A HIP association between two hosts may need to be updated over time.
Examples include the need to rekey expiring user data security
associations, add new security associations, or change IP addresses
associated with hosts. The UPDATE packet is used for those and other
similar purposes. This document only specifies the UPDATE packet
format and basic processing rules, with mandatory parameters. The
actual usage is defined in separate specifications.
HIP provides a general purpose UPDATE packet, which can carry
multiple HIP parameters, for updating the HIP state between two
peers. The UPDATE mechanism has the following properties:
UPDATE messages carry a monotonically increasing sequence number
and are explicitly acknowledged by the peer. Lost UPDATEs or
acknowledgments may be recovered via retransmission. Multiple
UPDATE messages may be outstanding under certain circumstances.
UPDATE is protected by both HIP_MAC and HIP_SIGNATURE parameters,
since processing UPDATE signatures alone is a potential DoS attack
against intermediate systems.
UPDATE packets are explicitly acknowledged by the use of an
acknowledgment parameter that echoes an individual sequence number
received from the peer. A single UPDATE packet may contain both a
sequence number and one or more acknowledgment numbers (i.e.,
piggybacked acknowledgment(s) for the peer's UPDATE).
The UPDATE packet is defined in Section 5.3.5.
4.3. Error Processing
HIP error processing behavior depends on whether or not there exists
an active HIP association. In general, if a HIP association exists
between the sender and receiver of a packet causing an error
condition, the receiver SHOULD respond with a NOTIFY packet. On the
other hand, if there are no existing HIP associations between the
sender and receiver, or the receiver cannot reasonably determine the
identity of the sender, the receiver MAY respond with a suitable ICMP
message; see Section 5.4 for more details.
The HIP protocol and state machine is designed to recover from one of
the parties crashing and losing its state. The following scenarios
describe the main use cases covered by the design.
No prior state between the two systems.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 23]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
The system with data to send is the Initiator. The process
follows the standard four-packet base exchange, establishing
the HIP association.
The system with data to send has no state with the receiver, but
the receiver has a residual HIP association.
The system with data to send is the Initiator. The Initiator
acts as in no prior state, sending I1 and getting R1. When the
Responder receives a valid I2, the old association is
'discovered' and deleted, and the new association is
established.
The system with data to send has a HIP association, but the
receiver does not.
The system sends data on the outbound user data security
association. The receiver 'detects' the situation when it
receives a user data packet that it cannot match to any HIP
association. The receiving host MUST discard this packet.
Optionally, the receiving host MAY send an ICMP packet, with
the type Parameter Problem, to inform the sender that the HIP
association does not exist (see Section 5.4), and it MAY
initiate a new HIP negotiation. However, responding with these
optional mechanisms is implementation or policy dependent.
4.4. HIP State Machine
The HIP protocol itself has little state. In the HIP base exchange,
there is an Initiator and a Responder. Once the security
associations (SAs) are established, this distinction is lost. If the
HIP state needs to be re-established, the controlling parameters are
which peer still has state and which has a datagram to send to its
peer. The following state machine attempts to capture these
processes.
The state machine is presented in a single system view, representing
either an Initiator or a Responder. There is not a complete overlap
of processing logic here and in the packet definitions. Both are
needed to completely implement HIP.
This document extends the state machine defined in [RFC5201] and
introduces a restart option to allow for the negotiation of
cryptographic algorithms. The only change to the previous state
machine is a transition from state I1-SENT to I1-SENT - the restart
option. An Initiator is required to restart the HIP exchange if the
Responder does not support the HIT Suite of the Initiator. In this
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 24]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
case, the Initiator restarts the HIP exchange by sending a new I1
packet with a source HIT supported by the Responder.
Implementors must understand that the state machine, as described
here, is informational. Specific implementations are free to
implement the actual functions differently. Section 6 describes the
packet processing rules in more detail. This state machine focuses
on the HIP I1, R1, I2, and R2 packets only. Other states may be
introduced by mechanisms in other specifications (such as mobility
and multihoming).
4.4.1. Timespan Definitions
Unused Association Lifetime (UAL): Implementation-specific time for
which, if no packet is sent or received for this time interval, a
host MAY begin to tear down an active association.
Maximum Segment Lifetime (MSL): Maximum time that a TCP segment is
expected to spend in the network.
Exchange Complete (EC): Time that the host spends at the R2-SENT
before it moves to ESTABLISHED state. The time is n * I2
retransmission timeout, where n is about I2_RETRIES_MAX.
4.4.2. HIP States
+---------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| State | Explanation |
+---------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| UNASSOCIATED | State machine start |
| | |
| I1-SENT | Initiating base exchange |
| | |
| I2-SENT | Waiting to complete base exchange |
| | |
| R2-SENT | Waiting to complete base exchange |
| | |
| ESTABLISHED | HIP association established |
| | |
| CLOSING | HIP association closing, no data can be |
| | sent |
| | |
| CLOSED | HIP association closed, no data can be sent |
| | |
| E-FAILED | HIP exchange failed |
+---------------------+---------------------------------------------+
Table 1: HIP States
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 25]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
4.4.3. HIP State Processes
System behavior in state UNASSOCIATED, Table 2.
+---------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| Trigger | Action |
+---------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| User data to send, | Send I1 and go to I1-SENT |
| requiring a new HIP | |
| association | |
| | |
| Receive I1 | Send R1 and stay at UNASSOCIATED |
| | |
| Receive I2, process | If successful, send R2 and go to R2-SENT |
| | |
| | If fail, stay at UNASSOCIATED |
| | |
| Receive user data | Optionally send ICMP as defined in |
| for unknown HIP | Section 5.4 and stay at UNASSOCIATED |
| association | |
| | |
| Receive CLOSE | Optionally send ICMP Parameter Problem and |
| | stay at UNASSOCIATED |
| | |
| Receive ANYOTHER | Drop and stay at UNASSOCIATED |
+---------------------+---------------------------------------------+
Table 2: UNASSOCIATED - Start state
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 26]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
System behavior in state I1-SENT, Table 3.
+---------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| Trigger | Action |
+---------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| Receive I1 | If the local HIT is smaller than the peer |
| | HIT, drop I1 and stay at I1-SENT |
| | |
| | If the local HIT is greater than the peer |
| | HIT, send R1 and stay at I1_SENT |
| | |
| Receive I2, process | If successful, send R2 and go to R2-SENT |
| | |
| | If fail, stay at I1-SENT |
| | |
| Receive R1, process | If HIT Suite of own HIT is not supported by |
| | the peer, select supported own HIT, send I1 |
| | and stay at I1-SENT |
| | |
| | If successful, send I2 and go to I2-SENT |
| | |
| | If fail, stay at I1-SENT |
| | |
| Receive ANYOTHER | Drop and stay at I1-SENT |
| | |
| Timeout, increment | If counter is less than I1_RETRIES_MAX, |
| timeout counter | send I1 and stay at I1-SENT |
| | |
| | If counter is greater than I1_RETRIES_MAX, |
| | go to E-FAILED |
+---------------------+---------------------------------------------+
Table 3: I1-SENT - Initiating HIP
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 27]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
System behavior in state I2-SENT, Table 4.
+---------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| Trigger | Action |
+---------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| Receive I1 | Send R1 and stay at I2-SENT |
| | |
| Receive R1, process | If successful, send I2 and cycle at I2-SENT |
| | |
| | If fail, stay at I2-SENT |
| | |
| Receive I2, process | If successful and local HIT is smaller than |
| | the peer HIT, drop I2 and stay at I2-SENT |
| | |
| | If successful and local HIT is greater than |
| | the peer HIT, send R2 and go to R2-SENT |
| | |
| | If fail, stay at I2-SENT |
| | |
| Receive R2, process | If successful, go to ESTABLISHED |
| | |
| | If fail, stay at I2-SENT |
| | |
| Receive CLOSE, | If successful, send CLOSE_ACK and go to |
| process | CLOSED |
| | |
| | If fail, stay at I2-SENT |
| | |
| Receive ANYOTHER | Drop and stay at I2-SENT |
| | |
| Timeout, increment | If counter is less than I2_RETRIES_MAX, |
| timeout counter | send I2 and stay at I2-SENT |
| | |
| | If counter is greater than I2_RETRIES_MAX, |
| | go to E-FAILED |
+---------------------+---------------------------------------------+
Table 4: I2-SENT - Waiting to finish HIP
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 28]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
System behavior in state R2-SENT, Table 5.
+---------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| Trigger | Action |
+---------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| Receive I1 | Send R1 and stay at R2-SENT |
| | |
| Receive I2, process | If successful, send R2 and cycle at R2-SENT |
| | |
| | If fail, stay at R2-SENT |
| | |
| Receive R1 | Drop and stay at R2-SENT |
| | |
| Receive R2 | Drop and stay at R2-SENT |
| | |
| Receive data or | Move to ESTABLISHED |
| UPDATE | |
| | |
| Exchange Complete | Move to ESTABLISHED |
| Timeout | |
| | |
| Receive CLOSE, | If successful, send CLOSE_ACK and go to |
| process | CLOSED |
| | |
| | If fail, stay at ESTABLISHED |
| | |
| Receive NOTIFY | Process and stay at R2-SENT |
+---------------------+---------------------------------------------+
Table 5: R2-SENT - Waiting to finish HIP
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 29]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
System behavior in state ESTABLISHED, Table 6.
+---------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| Trigger | Action |
+---------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| Receive I1 | Send R1 and stay at ESTABLISHED |
| | |
| Receive I2, process | If successful, send R2, drop old HIP |
| with puzzle and | association, establish a new HIP |
| possible Opaque | association, go to R2-SENT |
| data verification | |
| | |
| | If fail, stay at ESTABLISHED |
| | |
| Receive R1 | Drop and stay at ESTABLISHED |
| | |
| Receive R2 | Drop and stay at ESTABLISHED |
| | |
| Receive user data | Process and stay at ESTABLISHED |
| for HIP association | |
| | |
| No packet | Send CLOSE and go to CLOSING |
| sent/received | |
| during UAL minutes | |
| | |
| Receive UPDATE | Process and stay at ESTABLISHED |
| | |
| Receive CLOSE, | If successful, send CLOSE_ACK and go to |
| process | CLOSED |
| | |
| | If fail, stay at ESTABLISHED |
| | |
| Receive CLOSE_ACK | Drop and stay at ESTABLISHED |
| | |
| Receive NOTIFY | Process and stay at ESTABLISHED |
+---------------------+---------------------------------------------+
Table 6: ESTABLISHED - HIP association established
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 30]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
System behavior in state CLOSING, Table 7.
+---------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| Trigger | Action |
+---------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| User data to send, | Send I1 and stay at CLOSING |
| requires the | |
| creation of another | |
| incarnation of the | |
| HIP association | |
| | |
| Receive I1 | Send R1 and stay at CLOSING |
| | |
| Receive I2, process | If successful, send R2 and go to R2-SENT |
| | |
| | If fail, stay at CLOSING |
| | |
| Receive R1, process | If successful, send I2 and go to I2-SENT |
| | |
| | If fail, stay at CLOSING |
| | |
| Receive CLOSE, | If successful, send CLOSE_ACK, discard |
| process | state and go to CLOSED |
| | |
| | If fail, stay at CLOSING |
| | |
| Receive CLOSE_ACK, | If successful, discard state and go to |
| process | UNASSOCIATED |
| | |
| | If fail, stay at CLOSING |
| | |
| Receive ANYOTHER | Drop and stay at CLOSING |
| | |
| Timeout, increment | If timeout sum is less than UAL+MSL |
| timeout sum, reset | minutes, retransmit CLOSE and stay at |
| timer | CLOSING |
| | |
| | If timeout sum is greater than UAL+MSL |
| | minutes, go to UNASSOCIATED |
+---------------------+---------------------------------------------+
Table 7: CLOSING - HIP association has not been used for UAL minutes
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 31]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
System behavior in state CLOSED, Table 8.
+---------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| Trigger | Action |
+---------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| Datagram to send, | Send I1, and stay at CLOSED |
| requires the | |
| creation of another | |
| incarnation of the | |
| HIP association | |
| | |
| Receive I1 | Send R1 and stay at CLOSED |
| | |
| Receive I2, process | If successful, send R2 and go to R2-SENT |
| | |
| | If fail, stay at CLOSED |
| | |
| Receive R1, process | If successful, send I2 and go to I2-SENT |
| | |
| | If fail, stay at CLOSED |
| | |
| Receive CLOSE, | If successful, send CLOSE_ACK, stay at |
| process | CLOSED |
| | |
| | If fail, stay at CLOSED |
| | |
| Receive CLOSE_ACK, | If successful, discard state and go to |
| process | UNASSOCIATED |
| | |
| | If fail, stay at CLOSED |
| | |
| Receive ANYOTHER | Drop and stay at CLOSED |
| | |
| Timeout (UAL+2MSL) | Discard state, and go to UNASSOCIATED |
+---------------------+---------------------------------------------+
Table 8: CLOSED - CLOSE_ACK sent, resending CLOSE_ACK if necessary
System behavior in state E-FAILED, Table 9.
+-------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
| Trigger | Action |
+-------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
| Wait for | Go to UNASSOCIATED. Re-negotiation is |
| implementation-specific | possible after moving to UNASSOCIATED |
| time | state. |
+-------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 32]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
Table 9: E-FAILED - HIP failed to establish association with peer
4.4.4. Simplified HIP State Diagram
The following diagram shows the major state transitions. Transitions
based on received packets implicitly assume that the packets are
successfully authenticated or processed.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 33]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
+--+ +----------------------------+
recv I1, send R1 | | | |
| v v |
+--------------+ recv I2, send R2 |
+----------------| UNASSOCIATED |----------------+ |
datagram| +--+ +--------------+ | |
to send,| | | Alg. not supported, | |
send I1| | | send I1 | |
v | v | |
+---------+ recv I2, send R2 | |
+---->| I1-SENT |--------------------------------------+ | |
| +---------+ | | |
| | +----------------------+ | | |
| | recv R2, | recv I2, send R2 | | | |
| v send I2 | v v v |
| +---------+ | +---------+ |
| +--->| I2-SENT |----------+ +--------------| R2-SENT |<---+ |
| | +---------+ | +---------+ | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | |recv R2 | data or| | |
| |recv R1, | | | EC timeout| | |
| |send I2 +--|-----------------+ | receive I2,| |
| | | | +-------------+ | send R2| |
| | | +------>| ESTABLISHED |<----------+ | |
| | | +-------------+ | |
| | | | | | receive I2, send R2 | |
| | +------------+ | +-------------------------------+ |
| | | +-----------+ | |
| | | no packet sent/received| +---+ | |
| | | for UAL min, send CLOSE| | |timeout | |
| | | v v |(UAL+MSL) | |
| | | +---------+ |retransmit | |
+--|----------|------------------------| CLOSING |-+CLOSE | |
| | +---------+ | |
| | | | | | | |
+----------|-------------------------+ | | +----------------+ |
| | +-----------+ +------------------|--+
| | |recv CLOSE, recv CLOSE_ACK | |
| | |send CLOSE_ACK or timeout | |
| +-------------+ | (UAL+MSL) | |
| recv CLOSE, | | | |
| send CLOSE_ACK v v | |
| +--------+ receive I2, send R2 | |
+---------------------| CLOSED |------------------------------+ |
+--------+ |
^ | | |
recv CLOSE, send CLOSE_ACK| | | timeout (UAL+2MSL) |
+-+ +------------------------------------+
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 34]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
4.5. User Data Considerations
4.5.1. TCP and UDP Pseudo-Header Computation for User Data
When computing TCP and UDP checksums on user data packets that flow
through sockets bound to HITs, the IPv6 pseudo-header format
[RFC2460] MUST be used, even if the actual addresses on the packet
are IPv4 addresses. Additionally, the HITs MUST be used in the place
of the IPv6 addresses in the IPv6 pseudo-header. Note that the
pseudo-header for actual HIP payloads is computed differently; see
Section 5.1.1.
4.5.2. Sending Data on HIP Packets
A future version of this document may define how to include user data
on various HIP packets. However, currently the HIP header is a
terminal header, and not followed by any other headers.
4.5.3. Transport Formats
The actual data transmission format, used for user data after the HIP
base exchange, is not defined in this document. Such transport
formats and methods are described in separate specifications. All
HIP implementations MUST implement, at minimum, the ESP transport
format for HIP [RFC5202].
4.5.4. Reboot, Timeout, and Restart of HIP
Simulating a loss of state is a potential DoS attack. The following
process has been crafted to manage state recovery without presenting
a DoS opportunity.
If a host reboots or the HIP association times out, it has lost its
HIP state. If the host that lost state has a datagram to send to the
peer, it simply restarts the HIP base exchange. After the base
exchange has completed, the Initiator can create a new payload
association and start sending data. The peer does not reset its
state until it receives a valid I2 HIP packet.
If a system receives a user data packet that cannot be matched to any
existing HIP association, it is possible that it has lost the state
and its peer has not. It MAY send an ICMP packet with the Parameter
Problem type, and with the pointer pointing to the referred HIP-
related association information. Reacting to such traffic depends on
the implementation and the environment where the implementation is
used.
If the host, that apparently has lost its state, decides to restart
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 35]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
the HIP base exchange, it sends an I1 packet to the peer. After the
base exchange has been completed successfully, the Initiator can
create a new HIP association and the peer drops its old payload
associations and creates a new one.
4.6. Certificate Distribution
This document does not define how to use certificates or how to
transfer them between hosts. These functions are expected to be
defined in a future specification. A parameter type value, meant to
be used for carrying certificates, is reserved, though: CERT, Type
768; see Section 5.2.
5. Packet Formats
5.1. Payload Format
All HIP packets start with a fixed header.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Next Header | Header Length |0| Packet Type | VER. | RES.|1|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Checksum | Controls |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Sender's Host Identity Tag (HIT) |
| |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Receiver's Host Identity Tag (HIT) |
| |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
/ HIP Parameters /
/ /
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The HIP header is logically an IPv6 extension header. However, this
document does not describe processing for Next Header values other
than decimal 59, IPPROTO_NONE, the IPv6 'no next header' value.
Future documents MAY do so. However, current implementations MUST
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 36]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
ignore trailing data if an unimplemented Next Header value is
received.
The Header Length field contains the length of the HIP Header and HIP
parameters in 8-byte units, excluding the first 8 bytes. Since all
HIP headers MUST contain the sender's and receiver's HIT fields, the
minimum value for this field is 4, and conversely, the maximum length
of the HIP Parameters field is (255*8)-32 = 2008 bytes. Note: this
sets an additional limit for sizes of parameters included in the
Parameters field, independent of the individual parameter maximum
lengths.
The Packet Type indicates the HIP packet type. The individual packet
types are defined in the relevant sections. If a HIP host receives a
HIP packet that contains an unknown packet type, it MUST drop the
packet.
The HIP Version is four bits. The current version is 2. The version
number is expected to be incremented only if there are incompatible
changes to the protocol. Most extensions can be handled by defining
new packet types, new parameter types, or new controls.
The following three bits are reserved for future use. They MUST be
zero when sent, and they SHOULD be ignored when handling a received
packet.
The two fixed bits in the header are reserved for potential SHIM6
compatibility [RFC5533]. For implementations adhering (only) to this
specification, they MUST be set as shown when sending and MUST be
ignored when receiving. This is to ensure optimal forward
compatibility. Note that for implementations that implement other
compatible specifications in addition to this specification, the
corresponding rules may well be different. For example, in the case
that the forthcoming SHIM6 protocol happens to be compatible with
this specification, an implementation that implements both this
specification and the SHIM6 protocol may need to check these bits in
order to determine how to handle the packet.
The HIT fields are always 128 bits (16 bytes) long.
5.1.1. Checksum
Since the checksum covers the source and destination addresses in the
IP header, it must be recomputed on HIP-aware NAT devices.
If IPv6 is used to carry the HIP packet, the pseudo-header [RFC2460]
contains the source and destination IPv6 addresses, HIP packet length
in the pseudo-header length field, a zero field, and the HIP protocol
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 37]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
number (see Section 4) in the Next Header field. The length field is
in bytes and can be calculated from the HIP header length field: (HIP
Header Length + 1) * 8.
In case of using IPv4, the IPv4 UDP pseudo-header format [RFC0768] is
used. In the pseudo-header, the source and destination addresses are
those used in the IP header, the zero field is obviously zero, the
protocol is the HIP protocol number (see Section 4), and the length
is calculated as in the IPv6 case.
5.1.2. HIP Controls
The HIP Controls section conveys information about the structure of
the packet and capabilities of the host.
The following fields have been defined:
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |A|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
A - Anonymous: If this is set, the sender's HI in this packet is
anonymous, i.e., one not listed in a directory. Anonymous HIs
SHOULD NOT be stored. This control is set in packets R1 and/or
I2. The peer receiving an anonymous HI may choose to refuse it.
The rest of the fields are reserved for future use and MUST be set to
zero on sent packets and ignored on received packets.
5.1.3. HIP Fragmentation Support
A HIP implementation must support IP fragmentation/reassembly.
Fragment reassembly MUST be implemented in both IPv4 and IPv6, but
fragment generation is REQUIRED to be implemented in IPv4 (IPv4
stacks and networks will usually do this by default) and RECOMMENDED
to be implemented in IPv6. In IPv6 networks, the minimum MTU is
larger, 1280 bytes, than in IPv4 networks. The larger MTU size is
usually sufficient for most HIP packets, and therefore fragment
generation may not be needed. If a host expects to send HIP packets
that are larger than the minimum IPv6 MTU, it MUST implement fragment
generation even for IPv6.
In IPv4 networks, HIP packets may encounter low MTUs along their
routed path. Since HIP does not provide a mechanism to use multiple
IP datagrams for a single HIP packet, support for path MTU discovery
does not bring any value to HIP in IPv4 networks. HIP-aware NAT
devices MUST perform any IPv4 reassembly/fragmentation.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 38]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
All HIP implementations have to be careful while employing a
reassembly algorithm so that the algorithm is sufficiently resistant
to DoS attacks.
Because certificate chains can cause the packet to be fragmented and
fragmentation can open implementation to denial-of-service attacks
[KAU03], it is strongly recommended that the separate document
specifying the certificate usage in the HIP Base Exchange defines the
usage of "Hash and URL" formats rather than including certificates in
exchanges. With this, most problems related to DoS attacks with
fragmentation can be avoided.
5.2. HIP Parameters
The HIP Parameters are used to carry the public key associated with
the sender's HIT, together with related security and other
information. They consist of ordered parameters, encoded in TLV
format.
The following parameter types are currently defined.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 39]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
+------------------------+-------+----------+-----------------------+
| TLV | Type | Length | Data |
+------------------------+-------+----------+-----------------------+
| R1_COUNTER | 128 | 12 | System Boot Counter |
| | | | |
| PUZZLE | 257 | 12 | K and Random #I |
| | | | |
| SOLUTION | 321 | 20 | K, Random #I and |
| | | | puzzle solution J |
| | | | |
| SEQ | 385 | 4 | Update packet ID |
| | | | number |
| | | | |
| ACK | 449 | variable | Update packet ID |
| | | | number |
| | | | |
| DIFFIE_HELLMAN | 513 | variable | public key |
| | | | |
| HIP_CIPHER | 579 | variable | HIP encryption |
| | | | algorithm |
| | | | |
| ENCRYPTED | 641 | variable | Encrypted part of I2 |
| | | | packet |
| | | | |
| HOST_ID | 705 | variable | Host Identity with |
| | | | Fully-Qualified |
| | | | Domain FQDN (Name) or |
| | | | Network Access |
| | | | Identifier (NAI) |
| | | | |
| HIT_SUITE_LIST | 715 | variable | Ordered list of the |
| | | | HIT suites supported |
| | | | by the Responder |
| | | | |
| CERT | 768 | variable | HI Certificate; used |
| | | | to transfer |
| | | | certificates. Usage |
| | | | is currently not |
| | | | defined, but it will |
| | | | be specified in a |
| | | | separate document |
| | | | once needed. |
| | | | |
| NOTIFICATION | 832 | variable | Informational data |
| | | | |
| ECHO_REQUEST_SIGNED | 897 | variable | Opaque data to be |
| | | | echoed back; under |
| | | | signature |
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 40]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
| ECHO_RESPONSE_SIGNED | 961 | variable | Opaque data echoed |
| | | | back; under signature |
| | | | |
| DH_GROUP_LIST | 2151 | variable | Ordered list of DH |
| | | | Group IDs supported |
| | | | by a host |
| | | | |
| HIP_MAC | 61505 | variable | HMAC-based message |
| | | | authentication code, |
| | | | with key material |
| | | | from KEYMAT |
| | | | |
| HIP_MAC_2 | 61569 | variable | HMAC based message |
| | | | authentication code, |
| | | | with key material |
| | | | from KEYMAT. Compared |
| | | | to HIP_MAC, the |
| | | | HOST_ID parameter is |
| | | | included in HIP_MAC_2 |
| | | | calculation. |
| | | | |
| HIP_SIGNATURE_2 | 61633 | variable | Signature of the R1 |
| | | | packet |
| | | | |
| HIP_SIGNATURE | 61697 | variable | Signature of the |
| | | | packet |
| | | | |
| ECHO_REQUEST_UNSIGNED | 63661 | variable | Opaque data to be |
| | | | echoed back; after |
| | | | signature |
| | | | |
| ECHO_RESPONSE_UNSIGNED | 63425 | variable | Opaque data echoed |
| | | | back; after signature |
+------------------------+-------+----------+-----------------------+
Because the ordering (from lowest to highest) of HIP parameters is
strictly enforced (see Section 5.2.1), the parameter type values for
existing parameters have been spaced to allow for future protocol
extensions.
The following parameter type number ranges are defined.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 41]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
+---------------+---------------------------------------------------+
| Type Range | Purpose |
+---------------+---------------------------------------------------+
| 0 - 1023 | Handshake |
| | |
| 1024 - 2047 | Reserved |
| | |
| 2048 - 8191 | Signed parameters allocated through specification |
| | documents |
| | |
| 8192 - 32767 | Reserved |
| | |
| 32768 - 49151 | Free for experimentation. Signed parameters. |
| | |
| 41952 - 61439 | Reserved |
| | |
| 61440 - 62463 | Signatures and (signed) MACs |
| | |
| 62464 - 63487 | Parameters that are neither signed nor MACed |
| | |
| 63488 - 64511 | Rendezvous and relaying |
| | |
| 64512 - 65023 | Parameters that are neither signed nor MACed |
| | |
| 65024 - 65535 | Reserved |
+---------------+---------------------------------------------------+
The process for defining new parameters is described in Section 5.2.2
of this document.
The range between 32768 (2^15) and 49151 (2^15 + 2^14) are free for
experimentation. Types from this range SHOULD be selected in a
random fashion to reduce the probability of collisions.
5.2.1. TLV Format
The TLV-encoded parameters are described in the following
subsections. The type-field value also describes the order of these
fields in the packet, except for type values from 2048 to 4095 which
are reserved for new transport forms. The parameters MUST be
included in the packet such that their types form an increasing
order. If the parameter can exist multiple times in the packet, the
type value may be the same in consecutive parameters. If the order
does not follow this rule, the packet is considered to be malformed
and it MUST be discarded.
Parameters using type values from 2048 up to 4095 are transport
formats. Currently, one transport format is defined: the ESP
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 42]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
transport format [RFC5202]. The order of these parameters does not
follow the order of their type value, but they are put in the packet
in order of preference. The first of the transport formats it the
most preferred, and so on.
All of the TLV parameters have a length (including Type and Length
fields), which is a multiple of 8 bytes. When needed, padding MUST
be added to the end of the parameter so that the total length becomes
a multiple of 8 bytes. This rule ensures proper alignment of data.
Any added padding bytes MUST be zeroed by the sender, and their
values SHOULD NOT be checked by the receiver.
Consequently, the Length field indicates the length of the Contents
field (in bytes). The total length of the TLV parameter (including
Type, Length, Contents, and Padding) is related to the Length field
according to the following formula:
Total Length = 11 + Length - (Length + 3) % 8;
where % is the modulo operator
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type |C| Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
/ Contents /
/ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type Type code for the parameter. 16 bits long, C-bit
being part of the Type code.
C Critical. One if this parameter is critical, and
MUST be recognized by the recipient, zero otherwise.
The C bit is considered to be a part of the Type
field. Consequently, critical parameters are always
odd and non-critical ones have an even value.
Length Length of the Contents, in bytes excluding Type,
Length, and Padding.
Contents Parameter specific, defined by Type
Padding Padding, 0-7 bytes, added if needed
Critical parameters MUST be recognized by the recipient. If a
recipient encounters a critical parameter that it does not recognize,
it MUST NOT process the packet any further. It MAY send an ICMP or
NOTIFY, as defined in Section 4.3.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 43]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
Non-critical parameters MAY be safely ignored. If a recipient
encounters a non-critical parameter that it does not recognize, it
SHOULD proceed as if the parameter was not present in the received
packet.
5.2.2. Defining New Parameters
Future specifications may define new parameters as needed. When
defining new parameters, care must be taken to ensure that the
parameter type values are appropriate and leave suitable space for
other future extensions. One must remember that the parameters MUST
always be arranged in increasing order by Type code, thereby limiting
the order of parameters (see Section 5.2.1).
The following rules must be followed when defining new parameters.
1. The low-order bit C of the Type code is used to distinguish
between critical and non-critical parameters. Hence, even
parameter type numbers indicate non-critical parameters while odd
parameter type numbers indicate critical parameters.
2. A new parameter may be critical only if an old recipient ignoring
it would cause security problems. In general, new parameters
SHOULD be defined as non-critical, and expect a reply from the
recipient.
3. If a system implements a new critical parameter, it MUST provide
the ability to set the associated feature off, such that the
critical parameter is not sent at all. The configuration option
must be well documented. Implementations operating in a mode
adhering to this specification MUST disable the sending of new
critical parameters. In other words, the management interface
MUST allow vanilla standards-only mode as a default configuration
setting, and MAY allow new critical payloads to be configured on
(and off).
4. See Section 10 for allocation rules regarding Type codes.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 44]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
5.2.3. R1_COUNTER
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved, 4 bytes |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| R1 generation counter, 8 bytes |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 128
Length 12
R1 generation
counter The current generation of valid puzzles
The R1_COUNTER parameter contains a 64-bit unsigned integer in
network-byte order, indicating the current generation of valid
puzzles. The sender is supposed to increment this counter
periodically. It is RECOMMENDED that the counter value is
incremented at least as often as old PUZZLE values are deprecated so
that SOLUTIONs to them are no longer accepted.
The R1_COUNTER parameter is optional. It SHOULD be included in the
R1 (in which case, it is covered by the signature), and if present in
the R1, it MAY be echoed (including the Reserved field verbatim) by
the Initiator in the I2.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 45]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
5.2.4. PUZZLE
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| K, 1 byte | Lifetime | Opaque, 2 bytes |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Random #I, n bytes |
/ /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 257
Length 4+RHASH_len/8
K K is the number of verified bits
Lifetime puzzle lifetime 2^(value-32) seconds
Opaque data set by the Responder, indexing the puzzle
Random #I random number of size RHASH_len bits
Random #I is represented as a n-bit integer (where n is RHASH_len), K
and Lifetime as 8-bit integers, all in network byte order.
The PUZZLE parameter contains the puzzle difficulty K and a n-bit
puzzle random integer #I. The Puzzle Lifetime indicates the time
during which the puzzle solution is valid, and sets a time limit that
should not be exceeded by the Initiator while it attempts to solve
the puzzle. The lifetime is indicated as a power of 2 using the
formula 2^(Lifetime-32) seconds. A puzzle MAY be augmented with an
ECHO_REQUEST_SIGNED or an ECHO_REQUEST_UNSIGNED parameter included in
the R1; the contents of the echo request are then echoed back in the
ECHO_RESPONSE_SIGNED or in the ECHO_RESPONSE_UNSIGNED, allowing the
Responder to use the included information as a part of its puzzle
processing.
The Opaque and Random #I field are not covered by the HIP_SIGNATURE_2
parameter.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 46]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
5.2.5. SOLUTION
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| K, 1 byte | Reserved | Opaque, 2 bytes |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Random #I, n bytes |
/ /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Puzzle solution #J, n bytes |
/ /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 321
Length 4 + RHASH_len/4
K K is the number of verified bits
Reserved zero when sent, ignored when received
Opaque copied unmodified from the received PUZZLE
parameter
Random #I random number of size RHASH_len bits
Puzzle solution #J random number of size RHASH_len bits
Random #I and Random #J are represented as n-bit integers (where n is
RHASH_len), K as an 8-bit integer, all in network byte order.
The SOLUTION parameter contains a solution to a puzzle. It also
echoes back the random difficulty K, the Opaque field, and the puzzle
integer #I.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 47]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
5.2.6. DIFFIE_HELLMAN
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Group ID | Public Value Length | Public Value /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/ |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/ | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 513
Length length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and
Padding
Group ID defines values for p and g
Public Value length of the following Public Value in octets
Length
Public Value the sender's public Diffie-Hellman key
The following Group IDs have been defined:
Group Value
Reserved 0
DEPRECATED 1
DEPRECATED 2
1536-bit MODP group 3 [RFC3526]
3072-bit MODP group 4 [RFC3526]
DEPRECATED 5
DEPRECATED 6
160-bit rnd. ECP grp 7 [App. D,draft-mcgrew-fundamental-ecc-02.txt]
256-bit rnd. ECP grp 8 [RFC4753,draft-mcgrew-fundamental-ecc-02.txt]
384-bit rnd. ECP grp 9 [RFC4753,draft-mcgrew-fundamental-ecc-02.txt]
521-bit rnd. ECP grp 10[RFC4753,draft-mcgrew-fundamental-ecc-02.txt]
The MODP Diffie-Hellman groups are defined in [RFC3526]. The ECDH
groups 8 - 10 are defined in [RFC4753] and [fundamental-ecc]. ECDH
group 7 is covered in Appendix D.
A HIP implementation MUST implement Group ID 3. The 160-bit ECP
group can be used when lower security is enough (e.g., web surfing)
and when the equipment is not powerful enough (e.g., some PDAs).
Implementations SHOULD implement Group IDs 4 and 8.
To avoid unnecessary failures during the base exchange, the rest of
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 48]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
the groups SHOULD be implemented in hosts where resources are
adequate.
5.2.7. HIP_CIPHER
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Cipher ID #1 | Cipher ID #2 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Cipher ID #n | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 579
Length length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and
Padding
Cipher ID defines the cipher algorithm to be used for
encrypting parts of the HIP packet
The following Cipher IDs are defined:
Suite ID Value
RESERVED 0
NULL-ENCRYPT 1 ([RFC2410])
AES-128-CBC 2 ([RFC3602])
3DES-CBC 3 ([RFC2451])
AES-256-CBC 4 ([RFC3602])
The sender of a HIP_CIPHER parameter MUST make sure that there are no
more than six (6) Cipher IDs in one HIP_CIPHER parameter.
Conversely, a recipient MUST be prepared to handle received transport
parameters that contain more than six Cipher IDs by accepting the
first six Cipher IDs and dropping the rest. The limited number of
transforms sets the maximum size of the HIP_CIPHER parameter. As the
default configuration, the HIP_CIPHER parameter MUST contain at least
one of the mandatory Cipher IDs. There MAY be a configuration option
that allows the administrator to override this default.
The Responder lists supported and desired Cipher IDs in order of
preference in the R1, up to the maximum of six Cipher IDs. The
Initiator MUST choose only one of the corresponding Cipher IDs. That
Cipher ID will be used for generating the ENCRYPTED parameter.
Mandatory implementation: AES-128-CBC. NULL-ENCRYPTION is included
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 49]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
for testing purposes. NULL-ENCRYPTION SHOULD NOT be configurable via
the UI.
5.2.8. HOST_ID
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| HI Length |DI-type| DI Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Host Identity /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/ | Domain Identifier /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/ | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 705
Length length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and
Padding
HI Length length of the Host Identity in octets
DI-type type of the following Domain Identifier field
DI Length length of the FQDN or NAI in octets
Host Identity actual Host Identity
Domain Identifier the identifier of the sender
The Host Identity is represented in the DNSKEY format for RSA and
DSA. For these, the Public Key field from RFC 4034 [RFC4034] is
used. For ECC Host Identities this field is defined here directly.
Algorithms Values
RESERVED 0
DSA 3 [RFC2536] (RECOMMENDED)
RSA 5 [RFC3110] (REQUIRED)
ECDSA 7 [fundamental-ecc] (RECOMMENDED)
For ECDSA the Host Identity is represented by the following fields:
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 50]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ECC Curve | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Public Key /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
ECC Curve Curve label
Public Key Represented in Octet-string format [fundamental-ecc]
Required ECC Curve values are:
Curve Values
RESERVED 0
NIST-ECDSA-256 1 [RFC4754]
NIST-ECDSA-384 2 [RFC4754]
brainpoolP160r1 3 [RFC5639]
The following DI-types have been defined:
Type Value
none included 0
FQDN 1
NAI 2
FQDN Fully Qualified Domain Name, in binary format.
NAI Network Access Identifier
The format for the FQDN is defined in RFC 1035 [RFC1035] Section 3.1.
The format for NAI is defined in [RFC4282]
If there is no Domain Identifier, i.e., the DI-type field is zero,
the DI Length field is set to zero as well.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 51]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
5.2.9. HIT_SUITE_LIST
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ID #1 | ID #2 | ID #3 | ID #4 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ID #n | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 715
Length number of HIT Suite IDs
ID defines a HIT Suite ID supported by the host.
The list of IDs is ordered by preference of the
host. Each HIT Suite ID is one octet long. The four
higher-order bits correspond to the HIT Suite ID in
the ORCHID OGA field. The four lower-order bits are
set to 0.
The ID field in the HIT_SUITE_LIST is defined as eight-bit field
opposed to the four-bit HIT Suite ID and OGA field in the ORCHID.
This difference is a measure to accommodate larger HIT Suite IDs if
the 16 available values prove insufficient. In that case, one of the
16 values (0) will be used to indicate that four additional bits of
the ORCHID will be used to encode the HIT Suite ID. Hence, the
current four-bit HIT Suite-IDs only use the four higher order bits in
the ID field. Future documents may define the use of the four lower-
order bits in the ID field. ^
The following HIT Suites ID are defined:
HIT Suite ID
RESERVED 0
RSA/DSA/SHA-1 1 (REQUIRED)
ECDSA/SHA-256 2 (RECOMMENDED)
ECDSA/SHA-384 3 (RECOMMENDED)
The HIT_SUITE_LIST parameter contains a list of the supported HIT
suite IDs of the Responder. The Responder sends the HIT_SUITE_LIST
in the signed part of the R1 packet. Based on the HIT_SUITE_LIST,
the Initiator can determine which source HITs are supported by the
Responder.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 52]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
5.2.10. DH_GROUP_LIST
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| DH GROUP ID #1| DH GROUP ID #2| DH GROUP ID #3| DH GROUP ID #4|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| DH GROUP ID #n| Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 2151
Length number of DH Group IDs
DH GROUP ID defines a DH GROUP ID supported by the host.
The list of IDs is ordered by preference of the
host. The list of define DH Group IDs in the
DIFFIE_HELLMAN parameter. Each DH Group ID is one
octet long.
The DH_GROUP_LIST parameter contains the list of supported DH Group
IDs of a host. The Initiator sends the DH_GROUP_LIST in the I1
packet, the Responder sends it in the signed part of the R1 packet.
The DH Group IDs in the DH_GROUP_LIST are listed in the order of
their preference of the host. DH Group IDs that are listed first are
preferred compared to the DH Group IDs listed later. The information
in the DH_GROUP_LIST allows the Responder to select the DH group
preferred by itself and the Initiator. Based on the DH_GROUP_LIST in
the R1 packet, the Initiator can determine if the Responder has
selected the best possible choice based on the Initiator's and
Responder's preferences. If the Responder's choice differs from the
best choice, the Initiator can conclude that there was an attempted
downgrade attack.
When selecting the DH group for the DIFFIE_HELLMAN parameter in the
R1 packet, the Responder MUST select the first DH Group ID in the
Responder's DH_GROUP_LIST that is contained in the Initiator's
DH_GROUP_LIST.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 53]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
5.2.11. HIP_MAC
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| HMAC |
/ /
/ +-------------------------------+
| | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 61505
Length length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and
Padding
HMAC HMAC computed over the HIP packet, excluding the
HIP_MAC parameter and any following parameters, such
as HIP_SIGNATURE, HIP_SIGNATURE_2,
ECHO_REQUEST_UNSIGNED, or ECHO_RESPONSE_UNSIGNED.
The checksum field MUST be set to zero and the HIP
header length in the HIP common header MUST be
calculated not to cover any excluded parameters
when the HMAC is calculated. The size of the
HMAC is the natural size of the hash computation
output depending on the used hash function.
The HMAC uses RHASH as hash algorithm. The calculation and
verification process is presented in Section 6.4.1.
5.2.12. HIP_MAC_2
The parameter structure is the same as in Section 5.2.11. The fields
are:
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 54]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
Type 61569
Length length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and
Padding
HMAC HMAC computed over the HIP packet, excluding the
HIP_MAC parameter and any following parameters such
as HIP_SIGNATURE, HIP_SIGNATURE_2,
ECHO_REQUEST_UNSIGNED, or ECHO_RESPONSE_UNSIGNED,
and including an additional sender's HOST_ID
parameter during the HMAC calculation. The
checksum field MUST be set to zero and the HIP
header length in the HIP common header MUST be
calculated not to cover any excluded parameters
when the HMAC is calculated. The size of the
HMAC is the natural size of the hash computation
output depending on the used hash function.
The HMAC uses RHASH as hash algorithm. The calculation and
verification process is presented in Section 6.4.1.
5.2.13. HIP_SIGNATURE
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| SIG alg | Signature /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/ | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 61697
Length length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and
Padding
SIG alg signature algorithm
Signature the signature is calculated over the HIP packet,
excluding the HIP_SIGNATURE parameter and any
parameters that follow the HIP_SIGNATURE parameter.
The checksum field MUST be set to zero, and the HIP
header length in the HIP common header MUST be
calculated only to the beginning of the
HIP_SIGNATURE parameter when the signature is
calculated.
The signature algorithms are defined in Section 5.2.8. The signature
in the Signature field is encoded using the proper method depending
on the signature algorithm (e.g., according to [RFC3110] in case of
RSA/SHA-1, according to [RFC5702] in case of RSA/SHA-256, according
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 55]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
to [RFC2536] in case of DSA, or according to [fundamental-ecc] in
case of ECDSA).
The HIP_SIGNATURE calculation and verification process is presented
in Section 6.4.2.
5.2.14. HIP_SIGNATURE_2
The parameter structure is the same as in Section 5.2.13. The fields
are:
Type 61633
Length length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and
Padding
SIG alg signature algorithm
Signature Within the R1 packet that contains the
HIP_SIGNATURE_2 parameter, the Initiator's HIT, the
checksum field, and the Opaque and Random #I fields
in the PUZZLE parameter MUST be set to zero while
computing the HIP_SIGNATURE_2 signature. Further,
the HIP packet length in the HIP header MUST be
adjusted as if the HIP_SIGNATURE_2 was not in the
packet during the signature calculation, i.e., the
HIP packet length points to the beginning of
the HIP_SIGNATURE_2 parameter during signing and
verification.
Zeroing the Initiator's HIT makes it possible to create R1 packets
beforehand, to minimize the effects of possible DoS attacks. Zeroing
the Random #I and Opaque fields within the PUZZLE parameter allows
these fields to be populated dynamically on precomputed R1s.
Signature calculation and verification follows the process in
Section 6.4.2.
5.2.15. SEQ
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Update ID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 385
Length 4
Update ID 32-bit sequence number
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 56]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
The Update ID is an unsigned quantity, initialized by a host to zero
upon moving to ESTABLISHED state. The Update ID has scope within a
single HIP association, and not across multiple associations or
multiple hosts. The Update ID is incremented by one before each new
UPDATE that is sent by the host; the first UPDATE packet originated
by a host has an Update ID of 0.
5.2.16. ACK
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| peer Update ID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 449
Length variable (multiple of 4)
peer Update ID 32-bit sequence number corresponding to the
Update ID being ACKed.
The ACK parameter includes one or more Update IDs that have been
received from the peer. The Length field identifies the number of
peer Update IDs that are present in the parameter.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 57]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
5.2.17. ENCRYPTED
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| IV /
/ /
/ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ /
/ Encrypted data /
/ /
/ +-------------------------------+
/ | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 641
Length length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and
Padding
Reserved zero when sent, ignored when received
IV Initialization vector, if needed, otherwise
nonexistent. The length of the IV is inferred from
the HIP_CIPHER.
Encrypted The data is encrypted using an encryption algorithm
data as defined in the HIP_CIPHER parameter.
The ENCRYPTED parameter encapsulates another parameter, the encrypted
data, which holds one or more HIP parameters in block encrypted form.
Consequently, the first fields in the encapsulated parameter(s) are
Type and Length of the first such parameter, allowing the contents to
be easily parsed after decryption.
The field labelled "Encrypted data" consists of the output of one or
more HIP parameters concatenated together that have been passed
through an encryption algorithm. Each of these inner parameters is
padded according to the rules of Section 5.2.1 for padding individual
parameters. As a result, the concatenated parameters will be a block
of data that is 8-byte aligned.
Some encryption algorithms require that the data to be encrypted must
be a multiple of the cipher algorithm block size. In this case, the
above block of data MUST include additional padding, as specified by
the encryption algorithm. The size of the extra padding is selected
so that the length of the unencrypted data block is a multiple of the
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 58]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
cipher block size. The encryption algorithm may specify padding
bytes other than zero; for example, AES [FIPS.197.2001] uses the
PKCS5 padding scheme (see section 6.1.1 of [RFC2898]) where the
remaining n bytes to fill the block each have the value n. This
yields an "unencrypted data" block that is transformed to an
"encrypted data" block by the cipher suite. This extra padding added
to the set of parameters to satisfy the cipher block alignment rules
is not counted in HIP TLV length fields, and this extra padding
should be removed by the cipher suite upon decryption.
Note that the length of the cipher suite output may be smaller or
larger than the length of the set of parameters to be encrypted,
since the encryption process may compress the data or add additional
padding to the data.
Once this encryption process is completed, the Encrypted data field
is ready for inclusion in the Parameter. If necessary, additional
Padding for 8-byte alignment is then added according to the rules of
Section 5.2.1.
5.2.18. NOTIFICATION
The NOTIFICATION parameter is used to transmit informational data,
such as error conditions and state transitions, to a HIP peer. A
NOTIFICATION parameter may appear in the NOTIFY packet type. The use
of the NOTIFICATION parameter in other packet types is for further
study.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 59]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved | Notify Message Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| /
/ Notification Data /
/ +---------------+
/ | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 832
Length length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and
Padding
Reserved zero when sent, ignored when received
Notify Message specifies the type of notification
Type
Notification informational or error data transmitted in addition
Data to the Notify Message Type. Values for this field
are type specific (see below).
Padding any Padding, if necessary, to make the parameter a
multiple of 8 bytes.
Notification information can be error messages specifying why an SA
could not be established. It can also be status data that a process
managing an SA database wishes to communicate with a peer process.
The table below lists the Notification messages and their
corresponding values.
To avoid certain types of attacks, a Responder SHOULD avoid sending a
NOTIFICATION to any host with which it has not successfully verified
a puzzle solution.
Types in the range 0-16383 are intended for reporting errors and in
the range 16384-65535 for other status information. An
implementation that receives a NOTIFY packet with a NOTIFICATION
error parameter in response to a request packet (e.g., I1, I2,
UPDATE) SHOULD assume that the corresponding request has failed
entirely. Unrecognized error types MUST be ignored except that they
SHOULD be logged.
Notify payloads with status types MUST be ignored if not recognized.
NOTIFICATION PARAMETER - ERROR TYPES Value
------------------------------------ -----
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 60]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_PARAMETER_TYPE 1
Sent if the parameter type has the "critical" bit set and the
parameter type is not recognized. Notification Data contains the
two-octet parameter type.
INVALID_SYNTAX 7
Indicates that the HIP message received was invalid because some
type, length, or value was out of range or because the request
was rejected for policy reasons. To avoid a denial- of-service
attack using forged messages, this status may only be returned
for packets whose HIP_MAC (if present) and SIGNATURE have been
verified. This status MUST be sent in response to any error not
covered by one of the other status types, and should not contain
details to avoid leaking information to someone probing a node.
To aid debugging, more detailed error information SHOULD be
written to a console or log.
NO_DH_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN 14
None of the proposed group IDs was acceptable.
INVALID_DH_CHOSEN 15
The DH Group ID field does not correspond to one offered
by the Responder.
NO_HIP_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN 16
None of the proposed HIT Suites or HIP Encryption Algorithms was
acceptable.
INVALID_HIP_CIPHER_CHOSEN 17
The HIP_CIPHER Crypto ID does not correspond to one offered by
the Responder.
UNSUPPORTED_HIT_SUITE 20
Sent in response to an I1 or R1 packet for which the HIT suite
is not supported.
AUTHENTICATION_FAILED 24
Sent in response to a HIP signature failure, except when
the signature verification fails in a NOTIFY message.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 61]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
CHECKSUM_FAILED 26
Sent in response to a HIP checksum failure.
HIP_MAC_FAILED 28
Sent in response to a HIP HMAC failure.
ENCRYPTION_FAILED 32
The Responder could not successfully decrypt the
ENCRYPTED parameter.
INVALID_HIT 40
Sent in response to a failure to validate the peer's
HIT from the corresponding HI.
BLOCKED_BY_POLICY 42
The Responder is unwilling to set up an association
for some policy reason (e.g., received HIT is NULL
and policy does not allow opportunistic mode).
SERVER_BUSY_PLEASE_RETRY 44
The Responder is unwilling to set up an association as it is
suffering under some kind of overload and has chosen to shed load
by rejecting the Initiator's request. The Initiator may retry;
however, the Initiator MUST find another (different) puzzle
solution for any such retries. Note that the Initiator may need
to obtain a new puzzle with a new I1/R1 exchange.
NOTIFY MESSAGES - STATUS TYPES Value
------------------------------ -----
I2_ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 16384
The Responder has an I2 from the Initiator but had to queue the
I2 for processing. The puzzle was correctly solved and the
Responder is willing to set up an association but currently has a
number of I2s in the processing queue. R2 will be sent after the
I2 has been processed.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 62]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
5.2.19. ECHO_REQUEST_SIGNED
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Opaque data (variable length) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 897
Length variable
Opaque data opaque data, supposed to be meaningful only to the
node that sends ECHO_REQUEST_SIGNED and receives a
corresponding ECHO_RESPONSE_SIGNED or
ECHO_RESPONSE_UNSIGNED.
The ECHO_REQUEST_SIGNED parameter contains an opaque blob of data
that the sender wants to get echoed back in the corresponding reply
packet.
The ECHO_REQUEST_SIGNED and corresponding echo response parameters
MAY be used for any purpose where a node wants to carry some state in
a request packet and get it back in a response packet. The
ECHO_REQUEST_SIGNED is covered by the HIP_MAC and SIGNATURE. A HIP
packet can contain only one ECHO_REQUEST_SIGNED or
ECHO_REQUEST_UNSIGNED parameter. The ECHO_REQUEST_SIGNED parameter
MUST be responded to with a corresponding echo response.
ECHO_RESPONSE_SIGNED SHOULD be used, but if it is not possible, e.g.,
due to a middlebox-provided response, it MAY be responded to with an
ECHO_RESPONSE_UNSIGNED.
5.2.20. ECHO_REQUEST_UNSIGNED
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Opaque data (variable length) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 63661
Length variable
Opaque data opaque data, supposed to be meaningful only to the
node that sends ECHO_REQUEST_UNSIGNED and receives a
corresponding ECHO_RESPONSE_UNSIGNED.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 63]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
The ECHO_REQUEST_UNSIGNED parameter contains an opaque blob of data
that the sender wants to get echoed back in the corresponding reply
packet.
The ECHO_REQUEST_UNSIGNED and corresponding echo response parameters
MAY be used for any purpose where a node wants to carry some state in
a request packet and get it back in a response packet. The
ECHO_REQUEST_UNSIGNED is not covered by the HIP_MAC and SIGNATURE. A
HIP packet can contain one or more ECHO_REQUEST_UNSIGNED parameters.
It is possible that middleboxes add ECHO_REQUEST_UNSIGNED parameters
in HIP packets passing by. The sender has to create the Opaque field
so that it can later identify and remove the corresponding
ECHO_RESPONSE_UNSIGNED parameter.
The ECHO_REQUEST_UNSIGNED parameter MUST be responded to with an
ECHO_RESPONSE_UNSIGNED parameter.
5.2.21. ECHO_RESPONSE_SIGNED
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Opaque data (variable length) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 961
Length variable
Opaque data opaque data, copied unmodified from the
ECHO_REQUEST_SIGNED or ECHO_REQUEST_UNSIGNED
parameter that triggered this response.
The ECHO_RESPONSE_SIGNED parameter contains an opaque blob of data
that the sender of the ECHO_REQUEST_SIGNED wants to get echoed back.
The opaque data is copied unmodified from the ECHO_REQUEST_SIGNED
parameter.
The ECHO_REQUEST_SIGNED and ECHO_RESPONSE_SIGNED parameters MAY be
used for any purpose where a node wants to carry some state in a
request packet and get it back in a response packet. The
ECHO_RESPONSE_SIGNED is covered by the HIP_MAC and SIGNATURE.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 64]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
5.2.22. ECHO_RESPONSE_UNSIGNED
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Opaque data (variable length) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 63425
Length variable
Opaque data opaque data, copied unmodified from the
ECHO_REQUEST_SIGNED or ECHO_REQUEST_UNSIGNED
parameter that triggered this response.
The ECHO_RESPONSE_UNSIGNED parameter contains an opaque blob of data
that the sender of the ECHO_REQUEST_SIGNED or ECHO_REQUEST_UNSIGNED
wants to get echoed back. The opaque data is copied unmodified from
the corresponding echo request parameter.
The echo request and ECHO_RESPONSE_UNSIGNED parameters MAY be used
for any purpose where a node wants to carry some state in a request
packet and get it back in a response packet. The
ECHO_RESPONSE_UNSIGNED is not covered by the HIP_MAC and SIGNATURE.
5.3. HIP Packets
There are eight basic HIP packets (see Table 10). Four are for the
HIP base exchange, one is for updating, one is for sending
notifications, and two are for closing a HIP association.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 65]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
+------------------+------------------------------------------------+
| Packet type | Packet name |
+------------------+------------------------------------------------+
| 1 | I1 - the HIP Initiator Packet |
| | |
| 2 | R1 - the HIP Responder Packet |
| | |
| 3 | I2 - the Second HIP Initiator Packet |
| | |
| 4 | R2 - the Second HIP Responder Packet |
| | |
| 16 | UPDATE - the HIP Update Packet |
| | |
| 17 | NOTIFY - the HIP Notify Packet |
| | |
| 18 | CLOSE - the HIP Association Closing Packet |
| | |
| 19 | CLOSE_ACK - the HIP Closing Acknowledgment |
| | Packet |
+------------------+------------------------------------------------+
Table 10: HIP packets and packet type numbers
Packets consist of the fixed header as described in Section 5.1,
followed by the parameters. The parameter part, in turn, consists of
zero or more TLV-coded parameters.
In addition to the base packets, other packet types will be defined
later in separate specifications. For example, support for mobility
and multi-homing is not included in this specification.
See Notation (Section 2.2) for used operations.
In the future, an OPTIONAL upper-layer payload MAY follow the HIP
header. The Next Header field in the header indicates if there is
additional data following the HIP header. The HIP packet, however,
MUST NOT be fragmented. This limits the size of the possible
additional data in the packet.
5.3.1. I1 - the HIP Initiator Packet
The HIP header values for the I1 packet:
Header:
Packet Type = 1
SRC HIT = Initiator's HIT
DST HIT = Responder's HIT, or NULL
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 66]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
IP ( HIP ( DH_GROUP_LIST ) )
The I1 packet contains the fixed HIP header and the Initiator's
DH_GROUP_LIST.
Valid control bits: none
The Initiator gets the Responder's HIT either from a DNS lookup of
the Responder's FQDN, from some other repository, or from a local
table. If the Initiator does not know the Responder's HIT, it may
attempt to use opportunistic mode by using NULL (all zeros) as the
Responder's HIT. See also "HIP Opportunistic Mode" (Section 4.1.8).
Since this packet is so easy to spoof even if it were signed, no
attempt is made to add to its generation or processing cost.
The Initiator includes a DH_GROUP_LIST parameter in the I1 to inform
the Responder of its preferred DH Group IDs. Note that the
DH_GROUP_LIST in the I1 packet is not protected by a signature.
Implementations MUST be able to handle a storm of received I1
packets, discarding those with common content that arrive within a
small time delta.
5.3.2. R1 - the HIP Responder Packet
The HIP header values for the R1 packet:
Header:
Packet Type = 2
SRC HIT = Responder's HIT
DST HIT = Initiator's HIT
IP ( HIP ( [ R1_COUNTER, ]
PUZZLE,
DIFFIE_HELLMAN,
HIP_CIPHER,
HOST_ID,
HIT_SUITE_LIST,
DH_GROUP_LIST,
[ ECHO_REQUEST_SIGNED, ]
HIP_SIGNATURE_2 )
<, ECHO_REQUEST_UNSIGNED >i)
Valid control bits: A
If the Responder's HI is an anonymous one, the A control MUST be set.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 67]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
The Initiator's HIT MUST match the one received in I1. If the
Responder has multiple HIs, the Responder's HIT used MUST match
Initiator's request. If the Initiator used opportunistic mode, the
Responder may select freely among its HIs. See also "HIP
Opportunistic Mode" (Section 4.1.8).
The R1 generation counter is used to determine the currently valid
generation of puzzles. The value is increased periodically, and it
is RECOMMENDED that it is increased at least as often as solutions to
old puzzles are no longer accepted.
The Puzzle contains a Random #I and the difficulty K. The difficulty
K indicates the number of lower-order bits, in the puzzle hash
result, that must be zeros; see Section 4.1.2. The Random #I is not
covered by the signature and must be zeroed during the signature
calculation, allowing the sender to select and set the #I into a
precomputed R1 just prior sending it to the peer.
The Responder selects the Diffie-Hellman public value based on the
Initiator's preference expressed in the DH_GROUP_LIST parameter in
the I1. The Responder sends back its own preference based on which
it chose the DH public value as DH_GROUP_LIST. This allows the
Initiator to determine whether its own DH_GROUP_LIST in the I1 was
manipulated by an attacker.
The Diffie-Hellman public value is ephemeral, and one value SHOULD be
used only for one connection. Once the Responder has received a
valid response to an R1 packet, that Diffie-Hellman value SHOULD be
deprecated. Because it is possible that the Responder has sent the
same Diffie-Hellman value to different hosts simultaneously in
corresponding R1 packets, those responses should also be accepted.
However, as a defense against I1 storms, an implementation MAY
propose, and re-use if not avoidable, the same Diffie-Hellman value
for a period of time, for example, 15 minutes. By using a small
number of different puzzles for a given Diffie-Hellman value, the R1
packets can be precomputed and delivered as quickly as I1 packets
arrive. A scavenger process should clean up unused Diffie-Hellman
values and puzzles.
Re-using Diffie-Hellman public keys opens up the potential security
risk of more than one Initiator ending up with the same keying
material (due to faulty random number generators). Also, more than
one Initiator using the same Responder public key half may lead to
potentially easier cryptographic attacks and to imperfect forward
security.
However, these risks involved in re-using the same key are
statistical; that is, the authors are not aware of any mechanism that
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 68]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
would allow manipulation of the protocol so that the risk of the re-
use of any given Responder Diffie-Hellman public key would differ
from the base probability. Consequently, it is RECOMMENDED that
implementations avoid re-using the same DH key with multiple
Initiators, but because the risk is considered statistical and not
known to be manipulable, the implementations MAY re-use a key in
order to ease resource-constrained implementations and to increase
the probability of successful communication with legitimate clients
even under an I1 storm. In particular, when it is too expensive to
generate enough precomputed R1 packets to supply each potential
Initiator with a different DH key, the Responder MAY send the same DH
key to several Initiators, thereby creating the possibility of
multiple legitimate Initiators ending up using the same Responder-
side public key. However, as soon as the Responder knows that it
will use a particular DH key, it SHOULD stop offering it. This
design is aimed to allow resource-constrained Responders to offer
services under I1 storms and to simultaneously make the probability
of DH key re-use both statistical and as low as possible.
If a future version of this protocol is considered, we strongly
recommend that these issues be studied again. Especially, the
current design allows hosts to become potentially more vulnerable to
a statistical, low-probability problem during I1 storm attacks than
what they are if no attack is taking place; whether this is
acceptable or not should be reconsidered in the light of any new
experience gained.
The HIP_CIPHER contains the encryption algorithms supported by the
Responder to encrypt the ENCRYPTED parameter, in the order of
preference. All implementations MUST support AES [RFC3602].
The HIT_SUITE_LIST parameter is an ordered list of the Responder's
preferred and supported HIT Suites. The list allows the Initiator to
determine whether its own source HIT is suitable.
The ECHO_REQUEST_SIGNED and ECHO_REQUEST_UNSIGNED contains data that
the sender wants to receive unmodified in the corresponding response
packet in the ECHO_RESPONSE_SIGNED or ECHO_RESPONSE_UNSIGNED
parameter.
The signature is calculated over the whole HIP envelope, after
setting the Initiator's HIT, header checksum, as well as the Opaque
field and the Random #I in the PUZZLE parameter temporarily to zero,
and excluding any parameters that follow the signature, as described
in Section 5.2.14. This allows the Responder to use precomputed R1s.
The Initiator SHOULD validate this signature. It SHOULD check that
the Responder's HI received matches with the one expected, if any.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 69]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
5.3.3. I2 - the Second HIP Initiator Packet
The HIP header values for the I2 packet:
Header:
Type = 3
SRC HIT = Initiator's HIT
DST HIT = Responder's HIT
IP ( HIP ( [R1_COUNTER,]
SOLUTION,
DIFFIE_HELLMAN,
HIP_CIPHER,
ENCRYPTED { HOST_ID } or HOST_ID,
[ ECHO_RESPONSE_SIGNED ,]
HIP_MAC,
HIP_SIGNATURE
<, ECHO_RESPONSE_UNSIGNED>i ) )
Valid control bits: A
The HITs used MUST match the ones used previously.
If the Initiator's HI is an anonymous one, the A control MUST be set.
The Initiator MAY include an unmodified copy of the R1_COUNTER
parameter received in the corresponding R1 packet into the I2 packet.
The Solution contains the Random #I from R1 and the computed #J. The
low-order K bits of the RHASH(I | ... | J) MUST be zero.
The Diffie-Hellman value is ephemeral. If precomputed, a scavenger
process should clean up unused Diffie-Hellman values. The Responder
may re-use Diffie-Hellman values under some conditions as specified
in Section 5.3.2.
The HIP_CIPHER contains the single encryption transform selected by
the Initiator, that will be used to encrypt the ENCRYPTED parameter.
The chosen cipher MUST correspond to one offered by the Responder in
the R1. All implementations MUST support AES m [RFC3602].
The Initiator's HI MAY be encrypted using the HIP_CIPHER encryption
algorithm. The keying material is derived from the Diffie-Hellman
exchanged as defined in Section 6.5.
The ECHO_RESPONSE_SIGNED and ECHO_RESPONSE_UNSIGNED contain the
unmodified Opaque data copied from the corresponding echo request
parameter.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 70]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
The HMAC is calculated over the whole HIP envelope, excluding any
parameters after the HIP_MAC, as described in Section 6.4.1. The
Responder MUST validate the HIP_MAC.
The signature is calculated over the whole HIP envelope, excluding
any parameters after the HIP_SIGNATURE, as described in
Section 5.2.13. The Responder MUST validate this signature. It MAY
use either the HI in the packet or the HI acquired by some other
means.
5.3.4. R2 - the Second HIP Responder Packet
The HIP header values for the R2 packet:
Header:
Packet Type = 4
SRC HIT = Responder's HIT
DST HIT = Initiator's HIT
IP ( HIP ( HIP_MAC_2, HIP_SIGNATURE ) )
Valid control bits: none
The HIP_MAC_2 is calculated over the whole HIP envelope, with
Responder's HOST_ID parameter concatenated with the HIP envelope.
The HOST_ID parameter is removed after the HMAC calculation. The
procedure is described in Section 6.4.1.
The signature is calculated over the whole HIP envelope.
The Initiator MUST validate both the HIP_MAC and the signature.
5.3.5. UPDATE - the HIP Update Packet
Support for the UPDATE packet is MANDATORY.
The HIP header values for the UPDATE packet:
Header:
Packet Type = 16
SRC HIT = Sender's HIT
DST HIT = Recipient's HIT
IP ( HIP ( [SEQ, ACK, ] HIP_MAC, HIP_SIGNATURE ) )
Valid control bits: None
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 71]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
The UPDATE packet contains mandatory HIP_MAC and HIP_SIGNATURE
parameters, and other optional parameters.
The UPDATE packet contains zero or one SEQ parameter. The presence
of a SEQ parameter indicates that the receiver MUST ACK the UPDATE.
An UPDATE that does not contain a SEQ parameter is simply an ACK of a
previous UPDATE and itself MUST NOT be ACKed.
An UPDATE packet contains zero or one ACK parameters. The ACK
parameter echoes the SEQ sequence number of the UPDATE packet being
ACKed. A host MAY choose to ACK more than one UPDATE packet at a
time; e.g., the ACK may contain the last two SEQ values received, for
robustness to ACK loss. ACK values are not cumulative; each received
unique SEQ value requires at least one corresponding ACK value in
reply. Received ACKs that are redundant are ignored.
The UPDATE packet may contain both a SEQ and an ACK parameter. In
this case, the ACK is being piggybacked on an outgoing UPDATE. In
general, UPDATEs carrying SEQ SHOULD be ACKed upon completion of the
processing of the UPDATE. A host MAY choose to hold the UPDATE
carrying ACK for a short period of time to allow for the possibility
of piggybacking the ACK parameter, in a manner similar to TCP delayed
acknowledgments.
A sender MAY choose to forgo reliable transmission of a particular
UPDATE (e.g., it becomes overcome by events). The semantics are such
that the receiver MUST acknowledge the UPDATE, but the sender MAY
choose to not care about receiving the ACK.
UPDATEs MAY be retransmitted without incrementing SEQ. If the same
subset of parameters is included in multiple UPDATEs with different
SEQs, the host MUST ensure that the receiver's processing of the
parameters multiple times will not result in a protocol error.
5.3.6. NOTIFY - the HIP Notify Packet
The NOTIFY packet is OPTIONAL. The NOTIFY packet MAY be used to
provide information to a peer. Typically, NOTIFY is used to indicate
some type of protocol error or negotiation failure. NOTIFY packets
are unacknowledged. The receiver can handle the packet only as
informational, and SHOULD NOT change its HIP state (Section 4.4.2)
based purely on a received NOTIFY packet.
The HIP header values for the NOTIFY packet:
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 72]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
Header:
Packet Type = 17
SRC HIT = Sender's HIT
DST HIT = Recipient's HIT, or zero if unknown
IP ( HIP (<NOTIFICATION>i, [HOST_ID, ] HIP_SIGNATURE) )
Valid control bits: None
The NOTIFY packet is used to carry one or more NOTIFICATION
parameters.
5.3.7. CLOSE - the HIP Association Closing Packet
The HIP header values for the CLOSE packet:
Header:
Packet Type = 18
SRC HIT = Sender's HIT
DST HIT = Recipient's HIT
IP ( HIP ( ECHO_REQUEST_SIGNED, HIP_MAC, HIP_SIGNATURE ) )
Valid control bits: none
The sender MUST include an ECHO_REQUEST_SIGNED used to validate
CLOSE_ACK received in response, and both an HIP_MAC and a signature
(calculated over the whole HIP envelope).
The receiver peer MUST validate both the HIP_MAC and the signature if
it has a HIP association state, and MUST reply with a CLOSE_ACK
containing an ECHO_RESPONSE_SIGNED corresponding to the received
ECHO_REQUEST_SIGNED.
5.3.8. CLOSE_ACK - the HIP Closing Acknowledgment Packet
The HIP header values for the CLOSE_ACK packet:
Header:
Packet Type = 19
SRC HIT = Sender's HIT
DST HIT = Recipient's HIT
IP ( HIP ( ECHO_RESPONSE_SIGNED, HIP_MAC, HIP_SIGNATURE ) )
Valid control bits: none
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 73]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
The sender MUST include both an HMAC and signature (calculated over
the whole HIP envelope).
The receiver peer MUST validate both the HMAC and the signature.
5.4. ICMP Messages
When a HIP implementation detects a problem with an incoming packet,
and it either cannot determine the identity of the sender of the
packet or does not have any existing HIP association with the sender
of the packet, it MAY respond with an ICMP packet. Any such replies
MUST be rate-limited as described in [RFC2463]. In most cases, the
ICMP packet will have the Parameter Problem type (12 for ICMPv4, 4
for ICMPv6), with the Pointer field pointing to the field that caused
the ICMP message to be generated.
5.4.1. Invalid Version
If a HIP implementation receives a HIP packet that has an
unrecognized HIP version number, it SHOULD respond, rate-limited,
with an ICMP packet with type Parameter Problem, the Pointer pointing
to the VER./RES. byte in the HIP header.
5.4.2. Other Problems with the HIP Header and Packet Structure
If a HIP implementation receives a HIP packet that has other
unrecoverable problems in the header or packet format, it MAY
respond, rate-limited, with an ICMP packet with type Parameter
Problem, the Pointer pointing to the field that failed to pass the
format checks. However, an implementation MUST NOT send an ICMP
message if the checksum fails; instead, it MUST silently drop the
packet.
5.4.3. Invalid Puzzle Solution
If a HIP implementation receives an I2 packet that has an invalid
puzzle solution, the behavior depends on the underlying version of
IP. If IPv6 is used, the implementation SHOULD respond with an ICMP
packet with type Parameter Problem, the Pointer pointing to the
beginning of the Puzzle solution #J field in the SOLUTION payload in
the HIP message.
If IPv4 is used, the implementation MAY respond with an ICMP packet
with the type Parameter Problem, copying enough of bytes from the I2
message so that the SOLUTION parameter fits into the ICMP message,
the Pointer pointing to the beginning of the Puzzle solution #J
field, as in the IPv6 case. Note, however, that the resulting ICMPv4
message exceeds the typical ICMPv4 message size as defined in
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 74]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
[RFC0792].
5.4.4. Non-Existing HIP Association
If a HIP implementation receives a CLOSE or UPDATE packet, or any
other packet whose handling requires an existing association, that
has either a Receiver or Sender HIT that does not match with any
existing HIP association, the implementation MAY respond, rate-
limited, with an ICMP packet with the type Parameter Problem, and
with the Pointer pointing to the beginning of the first HIT that does
not match.
A host MUST NOT reply with such an ICMP if it receives any of the
following messages: I1, R2, I2, R2, and NOTIFY. When introducing new
packet types, a specification SHOULD define the appropriate rules for
sending or not sending this kind of ICMP reply.
6. Packet Processing
Each host is assumed to have a single HIP protocol implementation
that manages the host's HIP associations and handles requests for new
ones. Each HIP association is governed by a conceptual state
machine, with states defined above in Section 4.4. The HIP
implementation can simultaneously maintain HIP associations with more
than one host. Furthermore, the HIP implementation may have more
than one active HIP association with another host; in this case, HIP
associations are distinguished by their respective HITs. It is not
possible to have more than one HIP association between any given pair
of HITs. Consequently, the only way for two hosts to have more than
one parallel association is to use different HITs, at least at one
end.
The processing of packets depends on the state of the HIP
association(s) with respect to the authenticated or apparent
originator of the packet. A HIP implementation determines whether it
has an active association with the originator of the packet based on
the HITs. In the case of user data carried in a specific transport
format, the transport format document specifies how the incoming
packets are matched with the active associations.
6.1. Processing Outgoing Application Data
In a HIP host, an application can send application-level data using
an identifier specified via the underlying API. The API can be a
backwards-compatible API (see [RFC5338]), using identifiers that look
similar to IP addresses, or a completely new API, providing enhanced
services related to Host Identities. Depending on the HIP
implementation, the identifier provided to the application may be
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 75]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
different; for example, it can be a HIT or an IP address.
The exact format and method for transferring the data from the source
HIP host to the destination HIP host is defined in the corresponding
transport format document. The actual data is transferred in the
network using the appropriate source and destination IP addresses.
In this document, conceptual processing rules are defined only for
the base case where both hosts have only single usable IP addresses;
the multi-address multi-homing case will be specified separately.
The following conceptual algorithm describes the steps that are
required for handling outgoing datagrams destined to a HIT.
1. If the datagram has a specified source address, it MUST be a HIT.
If it is not, the implementation MAY replace the source address
with a HIT. Otherwise, it MUST drop the packet.
2. If the datagram has an unspecified source address, the
implementation must choose a suitable source HIT for the
datagram.
3. If there is no active HIP association with the given <source,
destination> HIT pair, one must be created by running the base
exchange. While waiting for the base exchange to complete, the
implementation SHOULD queue at least one packet per HIP
association to be formed, and it MAY queue more than one.
4. Once there is an active HIP association for the given <source,
destination> HIT pair, the outgoing datagram is passed to
transport handling. The possible transport formats are defined
in separate documents, of which the ESP transport format for HIP
is mandatory for all HIP implementations.
5. Before sending the packet, the HITs in the datagram are replaced
with suitable IP addresses. For IPv6, the rules defined in
[RFC3484] SHOULD be followed. Note that this HIT-to-IP-address
conversion step MAY also be performed at some other point in the
stack, e.g., before wrapping the packet into the output format.
6.2. Processing Incoming Application Data
The following conceptual algorithm describes the incoming datagram
handling when HITs are used at the receiving host as application-
level identifiers. More detailed steps for processing packets are
defined in corresponding transport format documents.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 76]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
1. The incoming datagram is mapped to an existing HIP association,
typically using some information from the packet. For example,
such mapping may be based on the ESP Security Parameter Index
(SPI).
2. The specific transport format is unwrapped, in a way depending on
the transport format, yielding a packet that looks like a
standard (unencrypted) IP packet. If possible, this step SHOULD
also verify that the packet was indeed (once) sent by the remote
HIP host, as identified by the HIP association.
Depending on the used transport mode, the verification method can
vary. While the HI (as well as HIT) is used as the higher-layer
identifier, the verification method has to verify that the data
packet was sent by a node identity and that the actual identity
maps to this particular HIT. When using ESP transport format
[RFC5202], the verification is done using the SPI value in the
data packet to find the corresponding SA with associated HIT and
key, and decrypting the packet with that associated key.
3. The IP addresses in the datagram are replaced with the HITs
associated with the HIP association. Note that this IP-address-
to-HIT conversion step MAY also be performed at some other point
in the stack.
4. The datagram is delivered to the upper layer. When
demultiplexing the datagram, the right upper-layer socket is
based on the HITs.
6.3. Solving the Puzzle
This subsection describes the puzzle-solving details.
In R1, the values I and K are sent in network byte order. Similarly,
in I2, the values I and J are sent in network byte order. The hash
is created by concatenating, in network byte order, the following
data, in the following order and using the RHASH algorithm:
n-bit random value I (where n is RHASH_len), in network byte
order, as appearing in R1 and I2.
128-bit Initiator's HIT, in network byte order, as appearing in
the HIP Payload in R1 and I2.
128-bit Responder's HIT, in network byte order, as appearing in
the HIP Payload in R1 and I2.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 77]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
n-bit random value J (where n is RHASH_len), in network byte
order, as appearing in I2.
In order to be a valid response puzzle, the K low-order bits of the
resulting RHASH digest must be zero.
Notes:
i) The length of the data to be hashed is variable depending on
the output length of the Responder's hash function RHASH.
ii) All the data in the hash input MUST be in network byte order.
iii) The order of the Initiator's and Responder's HITs are
different in the R1 and I2 packets; see Section 5.1. Care must be
taken to copy the values in the right order to the hash input.
The following procedure describes the processing steps involved,
assuming that the Responder chooses to precompute the R1 packets:
Precomputation by the Responder:
Sets up the puzzle difficulty K.
Creates a signed R1 and caches it.
Responder:
Selects a suitable cached R1.
Generates a random number I.
Sends I and K in an R1.
Saves I and K for a Delta time.
Initiator:
Generates repeated attempts to solve the puzzle until a matching J
is found:
Ltrunc( RHASH( I | HIT-I | HIT-R | J ), K ) == 0
Sends I and J in an I2.
Responder:
Verifies that the received I is a saved one.
Finds the right K based on I.
Computes V := Ltrunc( RHASH( I | HIT-I | HIT-R | J ), K )
Rejects if V != 0
Accept if V == 0
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 78]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
6.4. HIP_MAC and SIGNATURE Calculation and Verification
The following subsections define the actions for processing HIP_MAC,
HIP_MAC_2, HIP_SIGNATURE and HIP_SIGNATURE_2 parameters.
6.4.1. HMAC Calculation
The following process applies both to the HIP_MAC and HIP_MAC_2
parameters. When processing HIP_MAC_2, the difference is that the
HIP_MAC calculation includes a pseudo HOST_ID field containing the
Responder's information as sent in the R1 packet earlier.
Both the Initiator and the Responder should take some care when
verifying or calculating the HIP_MAC_2. Specifically, the Responder
should preserve other parameters than the HOST_ID when sending the
R2. Also, the Initiator has to preserve the HOST_ID exactly as it
was received in the R1 packet.
The scope of the calculation for HIP_MAC and HIP_MAC_2 is:
HMAC: { HIP header | [ Parameters ] }
where Parameters include all HIP parameters of the packet that is
being calculated with Type values from 1 to (HIP_MAC's Type value -
1) and exclude parameters with Type values greater or equal to
HIP_MAC's Type value.
During HIP_MAC calculation, the following applies:
o In the HIP header, the Checksum field is set to zero.
o In the HIP header, the Header Length field value is calculated to
the beginning of the HIP_MAC parameter.
Parameter order is described in Section 5.2.1.
HIP_MAC_2: { HIP header | [ Parameters ] | HOST_ID }
where Parameters include all HIP parameters for the packet that is
being calculated with Type values from 1 to (HIP_MAC_2's Type value -
1) and exclude parameters with Type values greater or equal to
HIP_MAC_2's Type value.
During HIP_MAC_2 calculation, the following applies:
o In the HIP header, the Checksum field is set to zero.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 79]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
o In the HIP header, the Header Length field value is calculated to
the beginning of the HIP_MAC_2 parameter and added to the length
of the concatenated HOST_ID parameter length.
o HOST_ID parameter is exactly in the form it was received in the R1
packet from the Responder.
Parameter order is described in Section 5.2.1, except that the
HOST_ID parameter in this calculation is added to the end.
The HIP_MAC parameter is defined in Section 5.2.11 and the HIP_MAC_2
parameter in Section 5.2.12. The HMAC calculation and verification
process (the process applies both to HIP_MAC and HIP_MAC_2 except
where HIP_MAC_2 is mentioned separately) is as follows:
Packet sender:
1. Create the HIP packet, without the HIP_MAC, HIP_SIGNATURE,
HIP_SIGNATURE_2, or any other parameter with greater Type value
than the HIP_MAC parameter has.
2. In case of HIP_MAC_2 calculation, add a HOST_ID (Responder)
parameter to the end of the packet.
3. Calculate the Header Length field in the HIP header including the
added HOST_ID parameter in case of HIP_MAC_2.
4. Compute the HMAC using either HIP-gl or HIP-lg integrity key
retrieved from KEYMAT as defined in Section 6.5.
5. In case of HIP_MAC_2, remove the HOST_ID parameter from the
packet.
6. Add the HIP_MAC parameter to the packet and any parameter with
greater Type value than the HIP_MAC's (HIP_MAC_2's) that may
follow, including possible HIP_SIGNATURE or HIP_SIGNATURE_2
parameters
7. Recalculate the Length field in the HIP header.
Packet receiver:
1. Verify the HIP header Length field.
2. Remove the HIP_MAC or HIP_MAC_2 parameter, as well as all other
parameters that follow it with greater Type value including
possible HIP_SIGNATURE or HIP_SIGNATURE_2 fields, saving the
contents if they will be needed later.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 80]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
3. In case of HIP_MAC_2, build and add a HOST_ID parameter (with
Responder information) to the packet. The HOST_ID parameter
should be identical to the one previously received from the
Responder.
4. Recalculate the HIP packet length in the HIP header and clear the
Checksum field (set it to all zeros). In case of HIP_MAC_2, the
length is calculated with the added HOST_ID parameter.
5. Compute the HMAC using either HIP-gl or HIP-lg integrity key as
defined in Section 6.5 and verify it against the received HMAC.
6. Set Checksum and Header Length field in the HIP header to
original values.
7. In case of HIP_MAC_2, remove the HOST_ID parameter from the
packet before further processing.
6.4.2. Signature Calculation
The following process applies both to the HIP_SIGNATURE and
HIP_SIGNATURE_2 parameters. When processing HIP_SIGNATURE_2, the
only difference is that instead of HIP_SIGNATURE parameter, the
HIP_SIGNATURE_2 parameter is used, and the Initiator's HIT and PUZZLE
Opaque and Random #I fields are cleared (set to all zeros) before
computing the signature. The HIP_SIGNATURE parameter is defined in
Section 5.2.13 and the HIP_SIGNATURE_2 parameter in Section 5.2.14.
The scope of the calculation for HIP_SIGNATURE and HIP_SIGNATURE_2
is:
HIP_SIGNATURE: { HIP header | [ Parameters ] }
where Parameters include all HIP parameters for the packet that is
being calculated with Type values from 1 to (HIP_SIGNATURE's Type
value - 1).
During signature calculation, the following apply:
o In the HIP header, the Checksum field is set to zero.
o In the HIP header, the Header Length field value is calculated to
the beginning of the HIP_SIGNATURE parameter.
Parameter order is described in Section 5.2.1.
HIP_SIGNATURE_2: { HIP header | [ Parameters ] }
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 81]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
where Parameters include all HIP parameters for the packet that is
being calculated with Type values from 1 to (HIP_SIGNATURE_2's Type
value - 1).
During signature calculation, the following apply:
o In the HIP header, the Initiator's HIT field and Checksum fields
are set to zero.
o In the HIP header, the Header Length field value is calculated to
the beginning of the HIP_SIGNATURE_2 parameter.
o PUZZLE parameter's Opaque and Random #I fields are set to zero.
Parameter order is described in Section 5.2.1.
Signature calculation and verification process (the process applies
both to HIP_SIGNATURE and HIP_SIGNATURE_2 except in the case where
HIP_SIGNATURE_2 is separately mentioned):
Packet sender:
1. Create the HIP packet without the HIP_SIGNATURE parameter or any
parameters that follow the HIP_SIGNATURE parameter.
2. Calculate the Length field and zero the Checksum field in the HIP
header. In case of HIP_SIGNATURE_2, set Initiator's HIT field in
the HIP header as well as PUZZLE parameter's Opaque and Random #I
fields to zero.
3. Compute the signature using the private key corresponding to the
Host Identifier (public key).
4. Add the HIP_SIGNATURE parameter to the packet.
5. Add any parameters that follow the HIP_SIGNATURE parameter.
6. Recalculate the Length field in the HIP header, and calculate the
Checksum field.
Packet receiver:
1. Verify the HIP header Length field.
2. Save the contents of the HIP_SIGNATURE parameter and any
parameters following the HIP_SIGNATURE parameter and remove them
from the packet.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 82]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
3. Recalculate the HIP packet Length in the HIP header and clear the
Checksum field (set it to all zeros). In case of
HIP_SIGNATURE_2, set Initiator's HIT field in HIP header as well
as PUZZLE parameter's Opaque and Random #I fields to zero.
4. Compute the signature and verify it against the received
signature using the packet sender's Host Identifier (public key).
5. Restore the original packet by adding removed parameters (in step
2) and resetting the values that were set to zero (in step 3).
The verification can use either the HI received from a HIP packet,
the HI from a DNS query, if the FQDN has been received in the HOST_ID
packet, or one received by some other means.
6.5. HIP KEYMAT Generation
HIP keying material is derived from the Diffie-Hellman session key,
Kij, produced during the HIP base exchange (Section 4.1.3). The
Initiator has Kij during the creation of the I2 packet, and the
Responder has Kij once it receives the I2 packet. This is why I2 can
already contain encrypted information.
The KEYMAT is derived by feeding Kij into HKDF [RFC5869] using the
RHASH hash function.
where
info = sort(HIT-I | HIT-R)
salt = I | J
Sort(HIT-I | HIT-R) is defined as the network byte order
concatenation of the two HITs, with the smaller HIT preceding the
larger HIT, resulting from the numeric comparison of the two HITs
interpreted as positive (unsigned) 128-bit integers in network byte
order.
I and J values are from the puzzle and its solution that were
exchanged in R1 and I2 messages when this HIP association was set up.
Both hosts have to store I and J values for the HIP association for
future use.
The initial keys are drawn sequentially in the order that is
determined by the numeric comparison of the two HITs, with comparison
method described in the previous paragraph. HOST_g denotes the host
with the greater HIT value, and HOST_l the host with the lower HIT
value.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 83]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
The drawing order for initial keys:
HIP-gl encryption key for HOST_g's outgoing HIP packets
HIP-gl integrity (HMAC) key for HOST_g's outgoing HIP packets
HIP-lg encryption key (currently unused) for HOST_l's outgoing HIP
packets
HIP-lg integrity (HMAC) key for HOST_l's outgoing HIP packets
The number of bits drawn for a given algorithm is the "natural" size
of the keys. For the mandatory algorithms, the following sizes
apply:
AES 128 or 256 bits
SHA-1 160 bits
SHA-256 256 bits
SHA-384 384 bits
NULL 0 bits
If other key sizes are used, they must be treated as different
encryption algorithms and defined separately.
6.6. Initiation of a HIP Exchange
An implementation may originate a HIP exchange to another host based
on a local policy decision, usually triggered by an application
datagram, in much the same way that an IPsec IKE key exchange can
dynamically create a Security Association. Alternatively, a system
may initiate a HIP exchange if it has rebooted or timed out, or
otherwise lost its HIP state, as described in Section 4.5.4.
The implementation prepares an I1 packet and sends it to the IP
address that corresponds to the peer host. The IP address of the
peer host may be obtained via conventional mechanisms, such as DNS
lookup. The I1 contents are specified in Section 5.3.1. The
selection of which Host Identity to use, if a host has more than one
to choose from, is typically a policy decision.
The following steps define the conceptual processing rules for
initiating a HIP exchange:
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 84]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
1. The Initiator gets one or more of the Responder's HITs and one or
more addresses either from a DNS lookup of the Responder's FQDN,
from some other repository, or from a local table. If the
Initiator does not know the Responder's HIT, it may attempt
opportunistic mode by using NULL (all zeros) as the Responder's
HIT. See also "HIP Opportunistic Mode" (Section 4.1.8). If the
Initiator can choose from multiple Responder HITs, it selects a
HIT for which the Initiator supports the HIT Suite.
2. The Initiator sends an I1 to one of the Responder's addresses.
The selection of which address to use is a local policy decision.
3. The Initiator includes the DH_GROUP_LIST in the I1 packet. The
selection and order of DH Group IDs in the DH_GROUP_LIST MUST be
stored by the Initiator because this list is needed for later R1
processing. In most cases, the preferences regarding the DH
Groups will be static, so no per-association storage is
necessary.
4. Upon sending an I1, the sender transitions to state I1-SENT,
starts a timer whose timeout value SHOULD be larger than the
worst-case anticipated RTT, and SHOULD increment a timeout
counter associated with the I1.
5. Upon timeout, the sender SHOULD retransmit the I1 and restart the
timer, up to a maximum of I1_RETRIES_MAX tries.
6.6.1. Sending Multiple I1s in Parallel
For the sake of minimizing the session establishment latency, an
implementation MAY send the same I1 to more than one of the
Responder's addresses. However, it MUST NOT send to more than three
(3) addresses in parallel. Furthermore, upon timeout, the
implementation MUST refrain from sending the same I1 packet to
multiple addresses. That is, if it retries to initialize the
connection after timeout, it MUST NOT send the I1 packet to more than
one destination address. These limitations are placed in order to
avoid congestion of the network, and potential DoS attacks that might
happen, e.g., because someone's claim to have hundreds or thousands
of addresses could generate a huge number of I1 messages from the
Initiator.
As the Responder is not guaranteed to distinguish the duplicate I1s
it receives at several of its addresses (because it avoids storing
states when it answers back an R1), the Initiator may receive several
duplicate R1s.
The Initiator SHOULD then select the initial preferred destination
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 85]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
address using the source address of the selected received R1, and use
the preferred address as a source address for the I2. Processing
rules for received R1s are discussed in Section 6.8.
6.6.2. Processing Incoming ICMP Protocol Unreachable Messages
A host may receive an ICMP 'Destination Protocol Unreachable' message
as a response to sending a HIP I1 packet. Such a packet may be an
indication that the peer does not support HIP, or it may be an
attempt to launch an attack by making the Initiator believe that the
Responder does not support HIP.
When a system receives an ICMP 'Destination Protocol Unreachable'
message while it is waiting for an R1, it MUST NOT terminate the
wait. It MAY continue as if it had not received the ICMP message,
and send a few more I1s. Alternatively, it MAY take the ICMP message
as a hint that the peer most probably does not support HIP, and
return to state UNASSOCIATED earlier than otherwise. However, at
minimum, it MUST continue waiting for an R1 for a reasonable time
before returning to UNASSOCIATED.
6.7. Processing Incoming I1 Packets
An implementation SHOULD reply to an I1 with an R1 packet, unless the
implementation is unable or unwilling to set up a HIP association.
If the implementation is unable to set up a HIP association, the host
SHOULD send an ICMP Destination Protocol Unreachable,
Administratively Prohibited, message to the I1 source address. If
the implementation is unwilling to set up a HIP association, the host
MAY ignore the I1. This latter case may occur during a DoS attack
such as an I1 flood.
The implementation MUST be able to handle a storm of received I1
packets, discarding those with common content that arrive within a
small time delta.
A spoofed I1 can result in an R1 attack on a system. An R1 sender
MUST have a mechanism to rate-limit R1s to an address.
It is RECOMMENDED that the HIP state machine does not transition upon
sending an R1.
The following steps define the conceptual processing rules for
responding to an I1 packet:
1. The Responder MUST check that the Responder's HIT in the received
I1 is either one of its own HITs or NULL.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 86]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
2. If the Responder is in ESTABLISHED state, the Responder MAY
respond to this with an R1 packet, prepare to drop existing SAs,
and stay at ESTABLISHED state.
3. If the Responder is in I1-SENT state, it must make a comparison
between the sender's HIT and its own (i.e., the receiver's) HIT.
If the sender's HIT is greater than its own HIT, it should drop
the I1 and stay at I1-SENT. If the sender's HIT is smaller than
its own HIT, it should send R1 and stay at I1-SENT. The HIT
comparison goes similarly as in Section 6.5.
4. If the implementation chooses to respond to the I1 with an R1
packet, it creates a new R1 or selects a precomputed R1 according
to the format described in Section 5.3.2. It creates or chooses
an R1 that contains its most preferred DH public value that is
also contained in the DH_GROUP_LIST in the I1 packet. If no
suitable DH Group ID was contained in the DH_GROUP_LIST in the I1
packet, it sends an R1 with an arbitrary DH public key.
5. The R1 MUST contain the received Responder's HIT, unless the
received HIT is NULL, in which case the Responder SHOULD select a
HIT that is constructed with the MUST algorithm in Section 3,
which is currently RSA. Other than that, selecting the HIT is a
local policy matter.
6. The Responder sends the R1 to the source IP address of the I1
packet.
6.7.1. R1 Management
All compliant implementations MUST produce R1 packets. An R1 packet
MAY be precomputed. An R1 packet MAY be reused for time Delta T,
which is implementation dependent, and SHOULD be deprecated and not
used once a valid response I2 packet has been received from an
Initiator. During an I1 message storm, an R1 packet may be re-used
beyond this limit. R1 information MUST NOT be discarded until Delta
S after T. Time S is the delay needed for the last I2 to arrive back
to the Responder.
Implementations that support multiple DH groups MAY pre-compute R1
packets for each supported group so that incoming I1 packets with
different DH Group IDs in the DH_GROUP_LIST can be served quickly.
An implementation MAY keep state about received I1s and match the
received I2s against the state, as discussed in Section 4.1.1.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 87]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
6.7.2. Handling Malformed Messages
If an implementation receives a malformed I1 message, it SHOULD NOT
respond with a NOTIFY message, as such practice could open up a
potential denial-of-service danger. Instead, it MAY respond with an
ICMP packet, as defined in Section 5.4.
6.8. Processing Incoming R1 Packets
A system receiving an R1 MUST first check to see if it has sent an I1
to the originator of the R1 (i.e., it is in state I1-SENT). If so,
it SHOULD process the R1 as described below, send an I2, and go to
state I2-SENT, setting a timer to protect the I2. If the system is
in state I2-SENT, it MAY respond to an R1 if the R1 has a larger R1
generation counter; if so, it should drop its state due to processing
the previous R1 and start over from state I1-SENT. If the system is
in any other state with respect to that host, it SHOULD silently drop
the R1.
When sending multiple I1s, an Initiator SHOULD wait for a small
amount of time after the first R1 reception to allow possibly
multiple R1s to arrive, and it SHOULD respond to an R1 among the set
with the largest R1 generation counter.
The following steps define the conceptual processing rules for
responding to an R1 packet:
1. A system receiving an R1 MUST first check to see if it has sent
an I1 to the originator of the R1 (i.e., it has a HIP
association that is in state I1-SENT and that is associated with
the HITs in the R1). Unless the I1 was sent in opportunistic
mode (see Section 4.1.8), the IP addresses in the received R1
packet SHOULD be ignored and, when looking up the right HIP
association, the received R1 SHOULD be matched against the
associations using only the HITs. If a match exists, the system
should process the R1 as described below.
2. Otherwise, if the system is in any other state than I1-SENT or
I2-SENT with respect to the HITs included in the R1, it SHOULD
silently drop the R1 and remain in the current state.
3. If the HIP association state is I1-SENT or I2-SENT, the received
Initiator's HIT MUST correspond to the HIT used in the original,
and the I1 and the Responder's HIT MUST correspond to the one
used, unless the I1 contained a NULL HIT.
4. The system SHOULD validate the R1 signature before applying
further packet processing, according to Section 5.2.14.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 88]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
5. If the HIP association state is I1-SENT, and multiple valid R1s
are present, the system MUST select from among the R1s with the
largest R1 generation counter.
6. The system MUST check that the Initiator HIT Suite is contained
in the HIT_SUITE_LIST parameter in the R1 packet (i.e., the
Initiator's HIT Suite is supported by the Responder). If the
HIT Suite is supported by the Responder, the system proceeds
normally. Otherwise, the system MAY stay in state I1-sent and
restart the BEX by sending a new I1 packet with a Initiator HIT
that is supported by the Responder and hence is contained in the
HIT_SUITE_LIST in the R1 packet. The system MAY abort the BEX
if no suitable source HIT is available. The system SHOULD wait
for acceptable time span to allow further R1 packets with higher
R1 generation counters to arrive before restarting or aborting
the BEX.
7. The system MUST check that the DH Group ID in the DH parameter
in the R1 matches the first DH Suite ID in the Responder's
DH_GROUP_LIST in the R1 that was also contained in the
Initiator's DH_GROUP_LIST in the I1. If the two DH Group ID of
the DH parameter does not express the Responder's best choice,
the Initiator can conclude that the DH_GROUP_LIST in the I1 was
adversely modified. In such case, the Initiator MAY send a new
I1 packet, however, it SHOULD not change its preference in the
DH_GROUP_LIST in the new I1. Alternatively, the Initiator MAY
abort the HIP exchange.
8. If the HIP association state is I2-SENT, the system MAY reenter
state I1-SENT and process the received R1 if it has a larger R1
generation counter than the R1 responded to previously.
9. The R1 packet may have the A bit set -- in this case, the system
MAY choose to refuse it by dropping the R1 and returning to
state UNASSOCIATED. The system SHOULD consider dropping the R1
only if it used a NULL HIT in I1. If the A bit is set, the
Responder's HIT is anonymous and should not be stored.
10. The system SHOULD attempt to validate the HIT against the
received Host Identity by using the received Host Identity to
construct a HIT and verify that it matches the Sender's HIT.
11. The system MUST store the received R1 generation counter for
future reference.
12. The system attempts to solve the puzzle in R1. The system MUST
terminate the search after exceeding the remaining lifetime of
the puzzle. If the puzzle is not successfully solved, the
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 89]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
implementation may either resend I1 within the retry bounds or
abandon the HIP exchange.
13. The system computes standard Diffie-Hellman keying material
according to the public value and Group ID provided in the
DIFFIE_HELLMAN parameter. The Diffie-Hellman keying material
Kij is used for key extraction as specified in Section 6.5. If
the received Diffie-Hellman Group ID is not supported, the
implementation may either resend I1 within the retry bounds or
abandon the HIP exchange.
14. The system selects the HIP_CIPHER ID from the choices presented
in the R1 packet and uses the selected values subsequently when
generating and using encryption keys, and when sending the I2.
If the proposed alternatives are not acceptable to the system,
it may either resend I1 within the retry bounds or abandon the
HIP exchange.
15. The system initializes the remaining variables in the associated
state, including Update ID counters.
16. The system prepares and sends an I2, as described in
Section 5.3.3.
17. The system SHOULD start a timer whose timeout value should be
larger than the worst-case anticipated RTT, and MUST increment a
timeout counter associated with the I2. The sender SHOULD
retransmit the I2 upon a timeout and restart the timer, up to a
maximum of I2_RETRIES_MAX tries.
18. If the system is in state I1-SENT, it shall transition to state
I2-SENT. If the system is in any other state, it remains in the
current state.
6.8.1. Handling Malformed Messages
If an implementation receives a malformed R1 message, it MUST
silently drop the packet. Sending a NOTIFY or ICMP would not help,
as the sender of the R1 typically doesn't have any state. An
implementation SHOULD wait for some more time for a possibly good R1,
after which it MAY try again by sending a new I1 packet.
6.9. Processing Incoming I2 Packets
Upon receipt of an I2, the system MAY perform initial checks to
determine whether the I2 corresponds to a recent R1 that has been
sent out, if the Responder keeps such state. For example, the sender
could check whether the I2 is from an address or HIT that has
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 90]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
recently received an R1 from it. The R1 may have had Opaque data
included that was echoed back in the I2. If the I2 is considered to
be suspect, it MAY be silently discarded by the system.
Otherwise, the HIP implementation SHOULD process the I2. This
includes validation of the puzzle solution, generating the Diffie-
Hellman key, decrypting the Initiator's Host Identity, verifying the
signature, creating state, and finally sending an R2.
The following steps define the conceptual processing rules for
responding to an I2 packet:
1. The system MAY perform checks to verify that the I2 corresponds
to a recently sent R1. Such checks are implementation
dependent. See Appendix A for a description of an example
implementation.
2. The system MUST check that the Responder's HIT corresponds to
one of its own HITs.
3. The system MUST further check that the Initiator's HIT Suite is
supported. The Responder SHOULD drop I2 packets with
unsupported Initiator HITs silently.
4. If the system's state machine is in the R2-SENT state, the
system MAY check if the newly received I2 is similar to the one
that triggered moving to R2-SENT. If so, it MAY retransmit a
previously sent R2, reset the R2-SENT timer, and the state
machine stays in R2-SENT.
5. If the system's state machine is in the I2-SENT state, the
system makes a comparison between its local and sender's HITs
(similarly as in Section 6.5). If the local HIT is smaller than
the sender's HIT, it should drop the I2 packet, use the peer
Diffie-Hellman key and nonce I from the R1 packet received
earlier, and get the local Diffie-Hellman key and nonce J from
the I2 packet sent to the peer earlier. Otherwise, the system
should process the received I2 packet and drop any previously
derived Diffie-Hellman keying material Kij it might have formed
upon sending the I2 previously. The peer Diffie-Hellman key and
the nonce J are taken from the just arrived I2 packet. The
local Diffie-Hellman key and the nonce I are the ones that were
earlier sent in the R1 packet.
6. If the system's state machine is in the I1-SENT state, and the
HITs in the I2 match those used in the previously sent I1, the
system uses this received I2 as the basis for the HIP
association it was trying to form, and stops retransmitting I1
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 91]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
(provided that the I2 passes the below additional checks).
7. If the system's state machine is in any other state than R2-
SENT, the system SHOULD check that the echoed R1 generation
counter in I2 is within the acceptable range. Implementations
MUST accept puzzles from the current generation and MAY accept
puzzles from earlier generations. If the newly received I2 is
outside the accepted range, the I2 is stale (perhaps replayed)
and SHOULD be dropped.
8. The system MUST validate the solution to the puzzle by computing
the hash described in Section 5.3.3 using the same RHASH
algorithm.
9. The I2 MUST have a single value in the HIP_CIPHER parameter,
which MUST match one of the values offered to the Initiator in
the R1 packet.
10. The system must derive Diffie-Hellman keying material Kij based
on the public value and Group ID in the DIFFIE_HELLMAN
parameter. This key is used to derive the HIP association keys,
as described in Section 6.5. If the Diffie-Hellman Group ID is
unsupported, the I2 packet is silently dropped.
11. The encrypted HOST_ID is decrypted by the Initiator encryption
key defined in Section 6.5. If the decrypted data is not a
HOST_ID parameter, the I2 packet is silently dropped.
12. The implementation SHOULD also verify that the Initiator's HIT
in the I2 corresponds to the Host Identity sent in the I2.
(Note: some middleboxes may not able to make this verification.)
13. The system MUST verify the HMAC according to the procedures in
Section 5.2.11.
14. The system MUST verify the HIP_SIGNATURE according to
Section 5.2.13 and Section 5.3.3.
15. If the checks above are valid, then the system proceeds with
further I2 processing; otherwise, it discards the I2 and its
state machine remains in the same state.
16. The I2 packet may have the A bit set -- in this case, the system
MAY choose to refuse it by dropping the I2 and the state machine
returns to state UNASSOCIATED. If the A bit is set, the
Initiator's HIT is anonymous and should not be stored.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 92]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
17. The system initializes the remaining variables in the associated
state, including Update ID counters.
18. Upon successful processing of an I2 when the system's state
machine is in state UNASSOCIATED, I1-SENT, I2-SENT, or R2-SENT,
an R2 is sent and the system's state machine transitions to
state R2-SENT.
19. Upon successful processing of an I2 when the system's state
machine is in state ESTABLISHED, the old HIP association is
dropped and a new one is installed, an R2 is sent, and the
system's state machine transitions to R2-SENT.
20. Upon the system's state machine transitioning to R2-SENT, the
system starts a timer. The state machine transitions to
ESTABLISHED if some data has been received on the incoming HIP
association, or an UPDATE packet has been received (or some
other packet that indicates that the peer system's state machine
has moved to ESTABLISHED). If the timer expires (allowing for
maximal retransmissions of I2s), the state machine transitions
to ESTABLISHED.
6.9.1. Handling Malformed Messages
If an implementation receives a malformed I2 message, the behavior
SHOULD depend on how many checks the message has already passed. If
the puzzle solution in the message has already been checked, the
implementation SHOULD report the error by responding with a NOTIFY
packet. Otherwise, the implementation MAY respond with an ICMP
message as defined in Section 5.4.
6.10. Processing Incoming R2 Packets
An R2 received in states UNASSOCIATED, I1-SENT, or ESTABLISHED
results in the R2 being dropped and the state machine staying in the
same state. If an R2 is received in state I2-SENT, it SHOULD be
processed.
The following steps define the conceptual processing rules for an
incoming R2 packet:
1. The system MUST verify that the HITs in use correspond to the
HITs that were received in the R1.
2. The system MUST verify the HIP_MAC_2 according to the procedures
in Section 5.2.12.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 93]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
3. The system MUST verify the HIP signature according to the
procedures in Section 5.2.13.
4. If any of the checks above fail, there is a high probability of
an ongoing man-in-the-middle or other security attack. The
system SHOULD act accordingly, based on its local policy.
5. If the system is in any other state than I2-SENT, the R2 is
silently dropped.
6. Upon successful processing of the R2, the state machine moves to
state ESTABLISHED.
6.11. Sending UPDATE Packets
A host sends an UPDATE packet when it wants to update some
information related to a HIP association. There are a number of
likely situations, e.g., mobility management and rekeying of an
existing ESP Security Association. The following paragraphs define
the conceptual rules for sending an UPDATE packet to the peer.
Additional steps can be defined in other documents where the UPDATE
packet is used.
The system first determines whether there are any outstanding UPDATE
messages that may conflict with the new UPDATE message under
consideration. When multiple UPDATEs are outstanding (not yet
acknowledged), the sender must assume that such UPDATEs may be
processed in an arbitrary order. Therefore, any new UPDATEs that
depend on a previous outstanding UPDATE being successfully received
and acknowledged MUST be postponed until reception of the necessary
ACK(s) occurs. One way to prevent any conflicts is to only allow one
outstanding UPDATE at a time. However, allowing multiple UPDATEs may
improve the performance of mobility and multihoming protocols.
The following steps define the conceptual processing rules for
sending UPDATE packets.
1. The first UPDATE packet is sent with Update ID of zero.
Otherwise, the system increments its own Update ID value by one
before continuing the below steps.
2. The system creates an UPDATE packet that contains a SEQ parameter
with the current value of Update ID. The UPDATE packet may also
include an ACK of the peer's Update ID found in a received UPDATE
SEQ parameter, if any.
3. The system sends the created UPDATE packet and starts an UPDATE
timer. The default value for the timer is 2 * RTT estimate. If
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 94]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
multiple UPDATEs are outstanding, multiple timers are in effect.
4. If the UPDATE timer expires, the UPDATE is resent. The UPDATE
can be resent UPDATE_RETRY_MAX times. The UPDATE timer SHOULD be
exponentially backed off for subsequent retransmissions. If no
acknowledgment is received from the peer after UPDATE_RETRY_MAX
times, the HIP association is considered to be broken and the
state machine should move from state ESTABLISHED to state CLOSING
as depicted in Section 4.4.4. The UPDATE timer is cancelled upon
receiving an ACK from the peer that acknowledges receipt of the
UPDATE.
6.12. Receiving UPDATE Packets
When a system receives an UPDATE packet, its processing depends on
the state of the HIP association and the presence and values of the
SEQ and ACK parameters. Typically, an UPDATE message also carries
optional parameters whose handling is defined in separate documents.
For each association, the peer's next expected in-sequence Update ID
("peer Update ID") is stored. Initially, this value is zero. Update
ID comparisons of "less than" and "greater than" are performed with
respect to a circular sequence number space.
The sender may send multiple outstanding UPDATE messages. These
messages are processed in the order in which they are received at the
receiver (i.e., no re-sequencing is performed). When processing
UPDATEs out-of-order, the receiver MUST keep track of which UPDATEs
were previously processed, so that duplicates or retransmissions are
ACKed and not reprocessed. A receiver MAY choose to define a receive
window of Update IDs that it is willing to process at any given time,
and discard received UPDATEs falling outside of that window.
The following steps define the conceptual processing rules for
receiving UPDATE packets.
1. If there is no corresponding HIP association, the implementation
MAY reply with an ICMP Parameter Problem, as specified in
Section 5.4.4.
2. If the association is in the ESTABLISHED state and the SEQ (but
not ACK) parameter is present, the UPDATE is processed and
replied to as described in Section 6.12.1.
3. If the association is in the ESTABLISHED state and the ACK (but
not SEQ) parameter is present, the UPDATE is processed as
described in Section 6.12.2.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 95]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
4. If the association is in the ESTABLISHED state and there is both
an ACK and SEQ in the UPDATE, the ACK is first processed as
described in Section 6.12.2, and then the rest of the UPDATE is
processed as described in Section 6.12.1.
6.12.1. Handling a SEQ Parameter in a Received UPDATE Message
The following steps define the conceptual processing rules for
handling a SEQ parameter in a received UPDATE packet.
1. If the Update ID in the received SEQ is not the next in the
sequence of Update IDs and is greater than the receiver's window
for new UPDATEs, the packet MUST be dropped.
2. If the Update ID in the received SEQ corresponds to an UPDATE
that has recently been processed, the packet is treated as a
retransmission. The HIP_MAC verification (next step) MUST NOT be
skipped. (A byte-by-byte comparison of the received and a stored
packet would be OK, though.) It is recommended that a host cache
UPDATE packets sent with ACKs to avoid the cost of generating a
new ACK packet to respond to a replayed UPDATE. The system MUST
acknowledge, again, such (apparent) UPDATE message
retransmissions but SHOULD also consider rate-limiting such
retransmission responses to guard against replay attacks.
3. The system MUST verify the HIP_MAC in the UPDATE packet. If the
verification fails, the packet MUST be dropped.
4. The system MAY verify the SIGNATURE in the UPDATE packet. If the
verification fails, the packet SHOULD be dropped and an error
message logged.
5. If a new SEQ parameter is being processed, the parameters in the
UPDATE are then processed. The system MUST record the Update ID
in the received SEQ parameter, for replay protection.
6. An UPDATE acknowledgment packet with ACK parameter is prepared
and sent to the peer. This ACK parameter may be included in a
separate UPDATE or piggybacked in an UPDATE with SEQ parameter,
as described in Section 5.3.5. The ACK parameter MAY acknowledge
more than one of the peer's Update IDs.
6.12.2. Handling an ACK Parameter in a Received UPDATE Packet
The following steps define the conceptual processing rules for
handling an ACK parameter in a received UPDATE packet.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 96]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
1. The sequence number reported in the ACK must match with an
earlier sent UPDATE packet that has not already been
acknowledged. If no match is found or if the ACK does not
acknowledge a new UPDATE, the packet MUST either be dropped if no
SEQ parameter is present, or the processing steps in
Section 6.12.1 are followed.
2. The system MUST verify the HIP_MAC in the UPDATE packet. If the
verification fails, the packet MUST be dropped.
3. The system MAY verify the SIGNATURE in the UPDATE packet. If the
verification fails, the packet SHOULD be dropped and an error
message logged.
4. The corresponding UPDATE timer is stopped (see Section 6.11) so
that the now acknowledged UPDATE is no longer retransmitted. If
multiple UPDATEs are newly acknowledged, multiple timers are
stopped.
6.13. Processing NOTIFY Packets
Processing NOTIFY packets is OPTIONAL. If processed, any errors in a
received NOTIFICATION parameter SHOULD be logged. Received errors
MUST be considered only as informational, and the receiver SHOULD NOT
change its HIP state (Section 4.4.2) purely based on the received
NOTIFY message.
6.14. Processing CLOSE Packets
When the host receives a CLOSE message, it responds with a CLOSE_ACK
message and moves to CLOSED state. (The authenticity of the CLOSE
message is verified using both HIP_MAC and SIGNATURE). This
processing applies whether or not the HIP association state is
CLOSING in order to handle CLOSE messages from both ends that cross
in flight.
The HIP association is not discarded before the host moves from the
UNASSOCIATED state.
Once the closing process has started, any need to send data packets
will trigger creating and establishing of a new HIP association,
starting with sending an I1.
If there is no corresponding HIP association, the CLOSE packet is
dropped.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 97]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
6.15. Processing CLOSE_ACK Packets
When a host receives a CLOSE_ACK message, it verifies that it is in
CLOSING or CLOSED state and that the CLOSE_ACK was in response to the
CLOSE (using the included ECHO_RESPONSE_SIGNED in response to the
sent ECHO_REQUEST_SIGNED).
The CLOSE_ACK uses HIP_MAC and SIGNATURE for verification. The state
is discarded when the state changes to UNASSOCIATED and, after that,
the host MAY respond with an ICMP Parameter Problem to an incoming
CLOSE message (see Section 5.4.4).
6.16. Handling State Loss
In the case of system crash and unanticipated state loss, the system
SHOULD delete the corresponding HIP state, including the keying
material. That is, the state SHOULD NOT be stored on stable storage.
If the implementation does drop the state (as RECOMMENDED), it MUST
also drop the peer's R1 generation counter value, unless a local
policy explicitly defines that the value of that particular host is
stored. An implementation MUST NOT store R1 generation counters by
default, but storing R1 generation counter values, if done, MUST be
configured by explicit HITs.
7. HIP Policies
There are a number of variables that will influence the HIP exchanges
that each host must support. All HIP implementations MUST support
more than one simultaneous HI, at least one of which SHOULD be
reserved for anonymous usage. Although anonymous HIs will be rarely
used as Responders' HIs, they will be common for Initiators. Support
for more than two HIs is RECOMMENDED.
Many Initiators would want to use a different HI for different
Responders. The implementations SHOULD provide for an ACL of
Initiator's HIT to Responder's HIT. This ACL SHOULD also include
preferred transform and local lifetimes.
The value of K used in the HIP R1 packet can also vary by policy. K
should never be greater than 20, but for trusted partners it could be
as low as 0.
Responders would need a similar ACL, representing which hosts they
accept HIP exchanges, and the preferred transform and local
lifetimes. Wildcarding SHOULD be supported for this ACL also.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 98]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
8. Changes from RFC 5201
This section summarizes the changes made from [RFC5201].
8.1. Changes from draft-ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis-02
o Added recommendation to not use puzzle I twice for the same host
to avoid identical key material.
o Revised state machine and added missing event handling.
o Added UNSUPPORTED_HIT_SUITE to NOTIFY to indicate unsupported HIT
suites.
o Revised parameter type numbers (corresponding to IANA allocations)
and added missing "free for experimentation" range to the
description.
o Clarifying note on the use of the C bit in the parameter type
numbers.
8.2. Changes from draft-ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis-01
o Changed RHASH-len to RHASH_len to avoid confusion in calculations
(- could be minus)
o Added RHASH_len to list of abbreviations
o Fixed length of puzzle I and J to be 1*RHASH_len
o Changed RHASH-len to RHASH_len to avoid confusion in calculations
(- could be minus)
o Added RHASH_len to list of abbreviations
o Fixed length of puzzle I and J to be 1*RHASH_len
o Included HIT_SUITEs.
o Added DH negotiation to I1 and R1.
o Added DH_LIST parameter.
o Added text for DH Group negotiation.
o Removed second DH public value from DH parameter.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 99]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
o Added ECC to HI generation.
o Added Responder HIT selection to opportunistic mode.
o Added ECDSA HI text and references (not complete yet).
o Added separate section on aborting BEX.
o Added separate section on downgrade attack prevention.
o Added text about DH Group selection for use cases without I1.
o Removed type range allocation for parameters related to HIP
transform types.
o New type range allocation for parameters that are only covered by
a signature if a signature is present (Applies to DH_GROUP_LIST).
o Renamed HIP_TRANSFORM to HIP_CIPHER and removed hashes from it -
hashes are determined by RHASH.
o The length of I and J for the puzzle now depends on RHASH.
o New keymat generation.
o Puzzle seed and solution now use RHASH and have variable length.
o Moved timing definitions closer to state machine.
o Simplified text regarding puzzle lifetime.
o Clarified the description of the use of I in the puzzle
o Removed "Opportunistic mode" description from general definitions.
o More consistency across the old RFC5201 text. Aligned
capitalization and abbreviations.
o Extended protocol overview to include restart option.
o Extended state machine to include restart option because of
unsupported Algorithms.
o Replaced SHA-1 with SHA-256 for required implementation.
o Added OGA list parameter (715) for detecting the Responder's set
of OGAs.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 100]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
o Added Appendix on ORCHID use in HITs.
o Added truncated SHA-256 option for HITs.
o Added truncated SHA-1 option for HITs.
o Added text about new ORCHID structure to HIT overview.
o Moved Editor role to Robert Moskowitz.
o Added SHA-256 to puzzle parameter.
o Generalized LTRUNC to be hash-function agnostic.
o Added text about RHASH depending on OGA.
8.3. Changes from draft-ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis-00
o Added reasoning why BIS document is needed.
8.4. Contents of draft-ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis-00
o RFC5201 was submitted as draft-RFC.
9. Security Considerations
HIP is designed to provide secure authentication of hosts. HIP also
attempts to limit the exposure of the host to various denial-of-
service and man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks. In so doing, HIP
itself is subject to its own DoS and MitM attacks that potentially
could be more damaging to a host's ability to conduct business as
usual.
Denial-of-service attacks often take advantage of the cost of start
of state for a protocol on the Responder compared to the 'cheapness'
on the Initiator. HIP makes no attempt to increase the cost of the
start of state on the Initiator, but makes an effort to reduce the
cost to the Responder. This is done by having the Responder start
the 3-way exchange instead of the Initiator, making the HIP protocol
4 packets long. In doing this, packet 2 becomes a 'stock' packet
that the Responder MAY use many times, until some Initiator has
provided a valid response to such an R1 packet. During an I1 storm,
the host may reuse the same DH value also even if some Initiator has
provided a valid response using that particular DH value. However,
such behavior is discouraged and should be avoided. Using the same
Diffie-Hellman values and random puzzle #I value has some risks.
This risk needs to be balanced against a potential storm of HIP I1
packets.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 101]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
This shifting of the start of state cost to the Initiator in creating
the I2 HIP packet, presents another DoS attack. The attacker spoofs
the I1 HIP packet and the Responder sends out the R1 HIP packet.
This could conceivably tie up the 'Initiator' with evaluating the R1
HIP packet, and creating the I2 HIP packet. The defense against this
attack is to simply ignore any R1 packet where a corresponding I1 was
not sent.
A second form of DoS attack arrives in the I2 HIP packet. Once the
attacking Initiator has solved the puzzle, it can send packets with
spoofed IP source addresses with either an invalid encrypted HIP
payload component or a bad HIP signature. This would take resources
in the Responder's part to reach the point to discover that the I2
packet cannot be completely processed. The defense against this
attack is after N bad I2 packets, the Responder would discard any I2s
that contain the given Initiator HIT. This will shut down the
attack. The attacker would have to request another R1 and use that
to launch a new attack. The Responder could up the value of K while
under attack. On the downside, valid I2s might get dropped too.
A third form of DoS attack is emulating the restart of state after a
reboot of one of the partners. A restarting host would send an I1 to
a peer, which would respond with an R1 even if it were in the
ESTABLISHED state. If the I1 were spoofed, the resulting R1 would be
received unexpectedly by the spoofed host and would be dropped, as in
the first case above.
A fourth form of DoS attack is emulating the end of state. HIP
relies on timers plus a CLOSE/CLOSE_ACK handshake to explicitly
signal the end of a HIP association. Because both CLOSE and
CLOSE_ACK messages contain an HIP_MAC, an outsider cannot close a
connection. The presence of an additional SIGNATURE allows
middleboxes to inspect these messages and discard the associated
state (for e.g., firewalling, SPI-based NATing, etc.). However, the
optional behavior of replying to CLOSE with an ICMP Parameter Problem
packet (as described in Section 5.4.4) might allow an IP spoofer
sending CLOSE messages to launch reflection attacks.
A fifth form of DoS attack is replaying R1s to cause the Initiator to
solve stale puzzles and become out of synchronization with the
Responder. The R1 generation counter is a monotonically increasing
counter designed to protect against this attack, as described in
Section 4.1.4.
Man-in-the-middle attacks are difficult to defend against, without
third-party authentication. A skillful MitM could easily handle all
parts of HIP, but HIP indirectly provides the following protection
from a MitM attack. If the Responder's HI is retrieved from a signed
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 102]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
DNS zone, a certificate, or through some other secure means, the
Initiator can use this to validate the R1 HIP packet.
Likewise, if the Initiator's HI is in a secure DNS zone, a trusted
certificate, or otherwise securely available, the Responder can
retrieve the HI (after having got the I2 HIP packet) and verify that
the HI indeed can be trusted. However, since an Initiator may choose
to use an anonymous HI, it knowingly risks a MitM attack. The
Responder may choose not to accept a HIP exchange with an anonymous
Initiator.
The HIP Opportunistic Mode concept has been introduced in this
document, but this document does not specify what the semantics of
such a connection setup are for applications. There are certain
concerns with opportunistic mode, as discussed in Section 4.1.8.
NOTIFY messages are used only for informational purposes and they are
unacknowledged. A HIP implementation cannot rely solely on the
information received in a NOTIFY message because the packet may have
been replayed. It SHOULD NOT change any state information based
purely on a received NOTIFY message.
Since not all hosts will ever support HIP, ICMP 'Destination Protocol
Unreachable' messages are to be expected and present a DoS attack.
Against an Initiator, the attack would look like the Responder does
not support HIP, but shortly after receiving the ICMP message, the
Initiator would receive a valid R1 HIP packet. Thus, to protect from
this attack, an Initiator should not react to an ICMP message until a
reasonable delta time to get the real Responder's R1 HIP packet. A
similar attack against the Responder is more involved. Normally, if
an I1 message received by a Responder was a bogus one sent by an
attacker, the Responder may receive an ICMP message from the IP
address the R1 message was sent to. However, a sophisticated
attacker can try to take advantage of such a behavior and try to
break up the HIP exchange by sending such an ICMP message to the
Responder before the Initiator has a chance to send a valid I2
message. Hence, the Responder SHOULD NOT act on such an ICMP
message. Especially, it SHOULD NOT remove any minimal state created
when it sent the R1 HIP packet (if it did create one), but wait for
either a valid I2 HIP packet or the natural timeout (that is, if R1
packets are tracked at all). Likewise, the Initiator should ignore
any ICMP message while waiting for an R2 HIP packet, and should
delete any pending state only after a natural timeout.
10. IANA Considerations
IANA has reserved protocol number 139 for the Host Identity Protocol.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 103]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
This document defines a new 128-bit value under the CGA Message Type
namespace [RFC3972], 0xF0EF F02F BFF4 3D0F E793 0C3C 6E61 74EA, to be
used for HIT generation as specified in ORCHID [RFC4843-bis].
This document also creates a set of new namespaces. These are
described below.
Packet Type
The 7-bit Packet Type field in a HIP protocol packet describes the
type of a HIP protocol message. It is defined in Section 5.1.
The current values are defined in Sections 5.3.1 through 5.3.8.
New values are assigned through IETF Consensus [RFC2434].
HIP Version
The four-bit Version field in a HIP protocol packet describes the
version of the HIP protocol. It is defined in Section 5.1. The
currently defined values are 1 and 2. The version of this
document is 2. New values are assigned through IETF Consensus.
HIT Suite
The four-bit HIT Suite ID uses the OGA field in the ORCHID to
express the type of the HIT. This document defines two HIT
Suites.
The HIT Suite ID is also carried in the four higher-order bits of
the ID field in the HIT_SUITE_LIST parameter. The four lower-
order bits are reserved for future extensions of the HIT Suite ID
space beyond 16 values.
At the time being, the HIT Suite uses only four bits because these
bits have to be carried in the HIT. Using more bits for the HIT
Suite ID reduces the cryptographic strength of the HIT. HIT Suite
IDs must be allocated carefully to avoid namespace exhaustion.
Moreover, deprecated IDs should be reused after an appropriate
time span. If 16 Suite IDs prove insufficient and more HIT Suite
IDs are needed concurrently, more bits can be used for the HIT
Suite ID by using one HIT Suite ID (0) to indicate that more bits
should be used. The HIT_SUITE_LIST parameter already supports
8-bit HIT Suite IDs, should longer IDs be needed. Possible
extensions of the HIT Suite ID space to eight-bit and new HIT
Suite IDs are defined through IETF consensus.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 104]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
Parameter Type
The 16-bit Type field in a HIP parameter describes the type of the
parameter. It is defined in Section 5.2.1. The current values
are defined in Sections 5.2.3 through 5.2.22.
With the exception of the assigned Type codes, the Type codes 0
through 1023 and 61440 through 65535 are reserved for future base
protocol extensions, and are assigned through IETF Consensus.
The Type codes 32768 through 49151 are reserved for
experimentation. Types SHOULD be selected in a random fashion
from this range, thereby reducing the probability of collisions.
A method employing genuine randomness (such as flipping a coin)
SHOULD be used.
All other Type codes are assigned through First Come First Served,
with Specification Required [RFC2434].
Group ID
The eight-bit Group ID values appear in the DIFFIE_HELLMAN
parameter and the DH_GROUP_LIST parameter and are defined in
Section 5.2.6. New values either from the reserved or unassigned
space are assigned through IETF Consensus.
HIP Cipher ID
The 16-bit Cipher ID values in a HIP_CIPHER parameter are defined
in Section 5.2.7. New values either from the reserved or
unassigned space are assigned through IETF Consensus.
DI-Type
The four-bit DI-Type values in a HOST_ID parameter are defined in
Section 5.2.8. New values are assigned through IETF Consensus.
Notify Message Type
The 16-bit Notify Message Type values in a NOTIFICATION parameter
are defined in Section 5.2.18.
Notify Message Type values 1-10 are used for informing about
errors in packet structures, values 11-20 for informing about
problems in parameters containing cryptographic related material,
values 21-30 for informing about problems in authentication or
packet integrity verification. Parameter numbers above 30 can be
used for informing about other types of errors or events. Values
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 105]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
51-8191 are error types reserved to be allocated by IANA. Values
8192-16383 are error types for experimentation. Values 16385-
40959 are status types to be allocated by IANA, and values 40960-
65535 are status types for experimentation. New values in ranges
51-8191 and 16385-40959 are assigned through First Come First
Served, with Specification Required.
11. Acknowledgments
The drive to create HIP came to being after attending the MALLOC
meeting at the 43rd IETF meeting. Baiju Patel and Hilarie Orman
really gave the original author, Bob Moskowitz, the assist to get HIP
beyond 5 paragraphs of ideas. It has matured considerably since the
early versions thanks to extensive input from IETFers. Most
importantly, its design goals are articulated and are different from
other efforts in this direction. Particular mention goes to the
members of the NameSpace Research Group of the IRTF. Noel Chiappa
provided valuable input at early stages of discussions about
identifier handling and Keith Moore the impetus to provide
resolvability. Steve Deering provided encouragement to keep working,
as a solid proposal can act as a proof of ideas for a research group.
Many others contributed; extensive security tips were provided by
Steve Bellovin. Rob Austein kept the DNS parts on track. Paul
Kocher taught Bob Moskowitz how to make the puzzle exchange expensive
for the Initiator to respond, but easy for the Responder to validate.
Bill Sommerfeld supplied the Birthday concept, which later evolved
into the R1 generation counter, to simplify reboot management. Erik
Nordmark supplied the CLOSE-mechanism for closing connections.
Rodney Thayer and Hugh Daniels provided extensive feedback. In the
early times of this document, John Gilmore kept Bob Moskowitz
challenged to provide something of value.
During the later stages of this document, when the editing baton was
transferred to Pekka Nikander, the input from the early implementors
was invaluable. Without having actual implementations, this document
would not be on the level it is now.
In the usual IETF fashion, a large number of people have contributed
to the actual text or ideas. The list of these people include Jeff
Ahrenholz, Francis Dupont, Derek Fawcus, George Gross, Andrew
McGregor, Julien Laganier, Miika Komu, Mika Kousa, Jan Melen, Henrik
Petander, Michael Richardson, Rene Hummen, Tim Shepard, Jorma Wall,
and Jukka Ylitalo. Our apologies to anyone whose name is missing.
Once the HIP Working Group was founded in early 2004, a number of
changes were introduced through the working group process. Most
notably, the original document was split in two, one containing the
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 106]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
base exchange and the other one defining how to use ESP. Some
modifications to the protocol proposed by Aura, et al., [AUR03] were
added at a later stage.
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[FIPS.180-2.2002] National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Secure Hash Standard", FIPS PUB 180-2,
August 2002, <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/
fips/fips180-2/fips180-2.pdf>.
[FIPS.95-1.1993] National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Codes for the Identification of Federal and
Federally Assisted Organizations", FIPS PUB 95-1,
January 1993.
[RFC0768] Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6,
RFC 768, August 1980.
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation
and specification", STD 13, RFC 1035,
November 1987.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to
Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
March 1997.
[RFC2404] Madson, C. and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96
within ESP and AH", RFC 2404, November 1998.
[RFC2451] Pereira, R. and R. Adams, "The ESP CBC-Mode Cipher
Algorithms", RFC 2451, November 1998.
[RFC2460] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol,
Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460,
December 1998.
[RFC2463] Conta, A. and S. Deering, "Internet Control
Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet
Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification",
RFC 2463, December 1998.
[RFC2536] Eastlake, D., "DSA KEYs and SIGs in the Domain
Name System (DNS)", RFC 2536, March 1999.
[RFC2898] Kaliski, B., "PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 107]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
Specification Version 2.0", RFC 2898,
September 2000.
[RFC3110] Eastlake, D., "RSA/SHA-1 SIGs and RSA KEYs in the
Domain Name System (DNS)", RFC 3110, May 2001.
[RFC3484] Draves, R., "Default Address Selection for
Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 3484,
February 2003.
[RFC3526] Kivinen, T. and M. Kojo, "More Modular Exponential
(MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key
Exchange (IKE)", RFC 3526, May 2003.
[RFC3602] Frankel, S., Glenn, R., and S. Kelly, "The AES-CBC
Cipher Algorithm and Its Use with IPsec",
RFC 3602, September 2003.
[RFC3972] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses
(CGA)", RFC 3972, March 2005.
[RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D.,
and S. Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS
Security Extensions", RFC 4034, March 2005.
[RFC4282] Aboba, B., Beadles, M., Arkko, J., and P. Eronen,
"The Network Access Identifier", RFC 4282,
December 2005.
[RFC4307] Schiller, J., "Cryptographic Algorithms for Use in
the Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)",
RFC 4307, December 2005.
[RFC4753] Fu, D. and J. Solinas, "ECP Groups For IKE and
IKEv2", RFC 4753, January 2007.
[RFC4843-bis] Nikander, P., Laganier, J., and F. Dupont, "STUB:
An IPv6 Prefix for Overlay Routable Cryptographic
Hash Identifiers (ORCHID)",
draft-laganier-rfc4843-bis-00 (work in progress),
February 2010.
[RFC4868] Kelly, S. and S. Frankel, "Using HMAC-SHA-256,
HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec",
RFC 4868, May 2007.
[RFC5201] Moskowitz, R., Nikander, P., Jokela, P., and T.
Henderson, "Host Identity Protocol", RFC 5201,
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 108]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
April 2008.
[RFC5202] Jokela, P., Moskowitz, R., and P. Nikander, "Using
the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) Transport
Format with the Host Identity Protocol (HIP)",
RFC 5202, April 2008.
[RFC5702] Jansen, J., "Use of SHA-2 Algorithms with RSA in
DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource Records for DNSSEC",
RFC 5702, October 2009.
[RFC5869] Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-
and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)",
RFC 5869, May 2010.
[fundamental-ecc] McGrew, D. and K. Igoe, "Fundamental Elliptic
Curve Cryptography Algorithms",
draft-mcgrew-fundamental-ecc-03 (work in
progress), May 2010.
12.2. Informative References
[AUR03] Aura, T., Nagarajan, A., and A. Gurtov, "Analysis
of the HIP Base Exchange Protocol", in Proceedings
of 10th Australasian Conference on Information
Security and Privacy, July 2003.
[CRO03] Crosby, SA. and DS. Wallach, "Denial of Service
via Algorithmic Complexity Attacks", in
Proceedings of Usenix Security Symposium 2003,
Washington, DC., August 2003.
[DIF76] Diffie, W. and M. Hellman, "New Directions in
Cryptography", IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory vol. IT-22, number 6, pages 644-654,
Nov 1976.
[FIPS.197.2001] National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)", FIPS PUB
197, November 2001, <http://csrc.nist.gov/
publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf>.
[KAU03] Kaufman, C., Perlman, R., and B. Sommerfeld, "DoS
protection for UDP-based protocols", ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications
Security , Oct 2003.
[KRA03] Krawczyk, H., "SIGMA: The 'SIGn-and-MAc' Approach
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 109]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
to Authenticated Diffie-Hellman and Its Use in the
IKE-Protocols", in Proceedings of CRYPTO 2003,
pages 400-425, August 2003.
[RFC0792] Postel, J., "Internet Control Message Protocol",
STD 5, RFC 792, September 1981.
[RFC2434] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs",
BCP 26, RFC 2434, October 1998.
[RFC4306] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2)
Protocol", RFC 4306, December 2005.
[RFC5204] Laganier, J. and L. Eggert, "Host Identity
Protocol (HIP) Rendezvous Extension", RFC 5204,
April 2008.
[RFC5205] Nikander, P. and J. Laganier, "Host Identity
Protocol (HIP) Domain Name System (DNS)
Extensions", RFC 5205, April 2008.
[RFC5206] Nikander, P., Henderson, T., Vogt, C., and J.
Arkko, "End-Host Mobility and Multihoming with the
Host Identity Protocol", RFC 5206, April 2008.
[RFC5338] Henderson, T., Nikander, P., and M. Komu, "Using
the Host Identity Protocol with Legacy
Applications", RFC 5338, September 2008.
[RFC5533] Nordmark, E. and M. Bagnulo, "Shim6: Level 3
Multihoming Shim Protocol for IPv6", RFC 5533,
June 2009.
[btns-c-api] Richardson, M., Williams, N., Komu, M., and S.
Tarkoma, "C-Bindings for IPsec Application
Programming Interfaces", draft-ietf-btns-c-api-04
(work in progress), March 2009.
[rfc4423-bis] Moskowitz, R., "Host Identity Protocol
Architecture", draft-moskowitz-hip-rfc4423-bis-01
(work in progress), June 2010.
Appendix A. Using Responder Puzzles
As mentioned in Section 4.1.1, the Responder may delay state creation
and still reject most spoofed I2s by using a number of pre-calculated
R1s and a local selection function. This appendix defines one
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 110]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
possible implementation in detail. The purpose of this appendix is
to give the implementors an idea on how to implement the mechanism.
If the implementation is based on this appendix, it MAY contain some
local modification that makes an attacker's task harder.
The Responder creates a secret value S, that it regenerates
periodically. The Responder needs to remember the two latest values
of S. Each time the S is regenerated, the R1 generation counter
value is incremented by one.
The Responder generates a pre-signed R1 packet. The signature for
pre-generated R1s must be recalculated when the Diffie-Hellman key is
recomputed or when the R1_COUNTER value changes due to S value
regeneration.
When the Initiator sends the I1 packet for initializing a connection,
the Responder gets the HIT and IP address from the packet, and
generates an I value for the puzzle. The I value is set to the pre-
signed R1 packet.
I value calculation:
I = Ltrunc( RHASH ( S | HIT-I | HIT-R | IP-I | IP-R ), n)
where n = RHASH_len
The RHASH algorithm is the same that is used to generate the
Responder's HIT value.
From an incoming I2 packet, the Responder gets the required
information to validate the puzzle: HITs, IP addresses, and the
information of the used S value from the R1_COUNTER. Using these
values, the Responder can regenerate the I, and verify it against the
I received in the I2 packet. If the I values match, it can verify
the solution using I, J, and difficulty K. If the I values do not
match, the I2 is dropped.
puzzle_check:
V := Ltrunc( RHASH( I2.I | I2.hit_i | I2.hit_r | I2.J ), K )
if V != 0, drop the packet
If the puzzle solution is correct, the I and J values are stored for
later use. They are used as input material when keying material is
generated.
Keeping state about failed puzzle solutions depends on the
implementation. Although it is possible for the Responder not to
keep any state information, it still may do so to protect itself
against certain attacks (see Section 4.1.1).
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 111]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
Appendix B. Generating a Public Key Encoding from an HI
The following pseudo-code illustrates the process to generate a
public key encoding from an HI for both RSA and DSA.
The symbol := denotes assignment; the symbol += denotes appending.
The pseudo-function encode_in_network_byte_order takes two
parameters, an integer (bignum) and a length in bytes, and returns
the integer encoded into a byte string of the given length.
switch ( HI.algorithm )
{
case RSA:
buffer := encode_in_network_byte_order ( HI.RSA.e_len,
( HI.RSA.e_len > 255 ) ? 3 : 1 )
buffer += encode_in_network_byte_order ( HI.RSA.e, HI.RSA.e_len )
buffer += encode_in_network_byte_order ( HI.RSA.n, HI.RSA.n_len )
break;
case DSA:
buffer := encode_in_network_byte_order ( HI.DSA.T , 1 )
buffer += encode_in_network_byte_order ( HI.DSA.Q , 20 )
buffer += encode_in_network_byte_order ( HI.DSA.P , 64 +
8 * HI.DSA.T )
buffer += encode_in_network_byte_order ( HI.DSA.G , 64 +
8 * HI.DSA.T )
buffer += encode_in_network_byte_order ( HI.DSA.Y , 64 +
8 * HI.DSA.T )
break;
}
Appendix C. Example Checksums for HIP Packets
The HIP checksum for HIP packets is specified in Section 5.1.1.
Checksums for TCP and UDP packets running over HIP-enabled security
associations are specified in Section 3.5. The examples below use IP
addresses of 192.168.0.1 and 192.168.0.2 (and their respective IPv4-
compatible IPv6 formats), and HITs with the prefix of 2001:10
followed by zeros, followed by a decimal 1 or 2, respectively.
The following example is defined only for testing a checksum
calculation. The address format for the IPv4-compatible IPv6 address
is not a valid one, but using these IPv6 addresses when testing an
IPv6 implementation gives the same checksum output as an IPv4
implementation with the corresponding IPv4 addresses.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 112]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
C.1. IPv6 HIP Example (I1)
Source Address: ::192.168.0.1
Destination Address: ::192.168.0.2
Upper-Layer Packet Length: 40 0x28
Next Header: 139 0x8b
Payload Protocol: 59 0x3b
Header Length: 4 0x4
Packet Type: 1 0x1
Version: 1 0x1
Reserved: 1 0x1
Control: 0 0x0
Checksum: 446 0x1be
Sender's HIT : 2001:10::1
Receiver's HIT: 2001:10::2
C.2. IPv4 HIP Packet (I1)
The IPv4 checksum value for the same example I1 packet is the same as
the IPv6 checksum (since the checksums due to the IPv4 and IPv6
pseudo-header components are the same).
C.3. TCP Segment
Regardless of whether IPv6 or IPv4 is used, the TCP and UDP sockets
use the IPv6 pseudo-header format [RFC2460], with the HITs used in
place of the IPv6 addresses.
Sender's HIT: 2001:10::1
Receiver's HIT: 2001:10::2
Upper-Layer Packet Length: 20 0x14
Next Header: 6 0x06
Source port: 65500 0xffdc
Destination port: 22 0x0016
Sequence number: 1 0x00000001
Acknowledgment number: 0 0x00000000
Header length: 20 0x14
Flags: SYN 0x02
Window size: 65535 0xffff
Checksum: 28618 0x6fca
Urgent pointer: 0 0x0000
0x0000: 6000 0000 0014 0640 2001 0010 0000 0000
0x0010: 0000 0000 0000 0001 2001 0010 0000 0000
0x0020: 0000 0000 0000 0002 ffdc 0016 0000 0001
0x0030: 0000 0000 5002 ffff 6fca 0000
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 113]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
Appendix D. ECDH-160 Group
The ECDH-160 group is rated at 80 bits strength. Once this was
considered appropriate for one year of security. Today should be
used only when the host is not powerful enough (e.g., some PDAs) and
when security requirements are low (e.g., during normal web surfing).
Appendix E. HIT Suites and HIT Generation
The HIT as an ORCHID [RFC4843-bis] consists of three parts: A 28-bit
prefix, a 4-bit encoding of the ORCHID generation algorithm (OGA) and
the representation of the public key. The OGA is an index pointing
to the specific algorithm by which the public key and the 96-bit
hashed encoding is generated. The OGA is protocol specific and is to
be interpreted as defined below for all protocols that use the same
context ID as HIP. HIP groups sets of valid combinations of
signature and hash algorithms into HIT Suites. These HIT suites are
addressed by an index, which is transmitted in the OGA field of the
ORCHID.
The set of used HIT Suites will be extended to counter the progress
in computation capabilities and vulnerabilities in the employed
algorithms. The intended use of the HIT Suites is to introduce a new
HIT Suite and phase out an old one before it becomes insecure. Since
the 4-bit OGA field only permits 15 HIT Suites (the HIT Suite with ID
0 is reserved) to be used in parallel, phased-out HIT Suites must be
reused at some point. In such a case, there will be a rollover of
the HIT Suite ID and the next newly introduced HIT Suite will start
with a lower HIT Suite index than the previously introduced one. The
rollover effectively deprecates the reused HIT Suite. For a smooth
transition, the HIT Suite should be deprecated a considerable time
before the HIT Suite index is reused.
Since the number of HIT Suites is tightly limited to 16, the HIT
Suites must be assigned carefully. Hence, sets of suitable
algorithms are grouped in a HIT Suite.
The HIT Suite of the Responder's HIT determines the RHASH and the
hash function to be used for the HMAC in HIP control packets as well
as the signature algorithm family used for generating the HI. The
list of HIT Suites is defined in Table 11.
The following HIT Suites are defined for HIT generation. The input
for each generation algorithm is the encoding of the HI as defined in
Section 3.2. The output is 96 bits long and is directly used in the
ORCHID.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 114]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
+-------+----------+-----------------+------------------------------+
| Index | Hash | Signature | Description |
| | function | algorithm | |
| | | family | |
+-------+----------+-----------------+------------------------------+
| 0 | | | Reserved |
| 1 | SHA-1 | RSA, DSA | RSA or DSA HI hashed with |
| | | | SHA-1, truncated to 96 bits |
| 2 | SHA-256 | ECDSA | ECDSA HI hashed with |
| | | | SHA-256, truncated to 96 |
| | | | bits |
| 3 | SHA-384 | ECDSA | ECDSA HI hashed with |
| | | | SHA-384, truncated to 96 |
| | | | bits |
+-------+----------+-----------------+------------------------------+
Table 11: HIT Suites
Authors' Addresses
Robert Moskowitz (editor)
ICSA labs, An Independent Division of Verizon Business
1000 Bent Creek Blvd, Suite 200
Mechanicsburg, PA
USA
EMail: robert.moskowitz@icsalabs.com
Petri Jokela
Ericsson Research NomadicLab
JORVAS FIN-02420
FINLAND
Phone: +358 9 299 1
EMail: petri.jokela@nomadiclab.com
Thomas R. Henderson
The Boeing Company
P.O. Box 3707
Seattle, WA
USA
EMail: thomas.r.henderson@boeing.com
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 115]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2010
Tobias Heer
RWTH Aachen University, Distributed Systems Group
Ahornstrasse 55
Aachen 52062
Germany
EMail: heer@cs.rwth-aachen.de
URI: http://ds.cs.rwth-aachen.de/members/heer
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 26, 2011 [Page 116]
Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.129d, available from
https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/