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Versions: (draft-mglt-homenet-front-end-naming-delegation) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09

HOMENET                                                  D. Migault (Ed)
Internet-Draft                                                  Ericsson
Intended status: Standards Track                             W. Cloetens
Expires: August 20, 2015                                      SoftAtHome
                                                            C. Griffiths
                                                                     Dyn
                                                                R. Weber
                                                                 Nominum
                                                       February 16, 2015


         Outsourcing Home Network Authoritative Naming Service
         draft-ietf-homenet-front-end-naming-delegation-01.txt

Abstract

   CPEs are designed to provide IP connectivity to home networks.  Most
   CPEs assign IP addresses to the nodes of the home network which makes
   it a good candidate for hosting the naming service.  With IPv6, the
   naming service makes nodes reachable from the home network as well as
   from the Internet.

   However, CPEs have not been designed to host such a naming service
   exposed on the Internet.  This may expose the CPEs to resource
   exhaustion which would make the home network unreachable, and most
   probably would also affect the home network inner communications.

   In addition, DNSSEC management and configuration may not be well
   understood or mastered by regular end users.  Misconfiguration may
   also results in naming service disruption, thus these end users may
   prefer to rely on third party naming providers.

   This document describes a homenet naming architecture where the CPEs
   manage the DNS zone associates to its home network, and outsources
   the naming service and eventually the DNSSEC management on the
   Internet to a third party designated as the Public Authoritative
   Servers.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.




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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 20, 2015.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Architecture Description  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.1.  Architecture Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.2.  Example: DNS(SEC) Homenet Zone  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.3.  Example: CPE necessary parameters for outsourcing . . . .   9
   5.  Synchronization between CPE and Public Authoritative Servers   10
     5.1.  Synchronization with a Hidden Master  . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.2.  Securing Synchronization  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.3.  CPE Security Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   6.  DNSSEC compliant Homenet Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.1.  Zone Signing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.2.  Secure Delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   7.  Handling Different Views  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     7.1.  Motivations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     7.2.  Consequences  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     7.3.  Guidance and Recommendations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   8.  Reverse Zone  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   9.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     10.1.  Names are less secure than IP addresses  . . . . . . . .  19
     10.2.  Names are less volatile than IP addresses  . . . . . . .  19
   11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20



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   12. Acknowledgment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   13. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     13.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     13.2.  Informational References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   Appendix A.  Document Change Log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24

1.  Requirements notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.  Introduction

   IPv6 provides global end to end IP reachability.  To access services
   hosted in the home network with IPv6 addresses, end users prefer to
   use names instead of long and complex IPv6 addresses.

   CPEs are already providing IPv6 connectivity to the home network and
   generally provide IPv6 addresses or prefixes to the nodes of the home
   network.  This makes the CPEs a good candidate to manage binding
   between names and IP addresses of the nodes.  In addition, [RFC7368]
   recommends that home networks be resilient to connectivity disruption
   from the ISP.  This requires that a dedicate device inside the home
   network manage bindings between names and IP addresses of the nodes
   and builds the DNS Homenet Zone.  All this makes the CPE the natural
   candidate for setting the DNS(SEC) zone file of the home network.

   CPEs are usually low powered devices designed for the home network,
   but not for heavy traffic.  As a result, hosting the an authoritative
   DNS service on the Internet may expose the home network to resource
   exhaustion, which may isolate the home network from the Internet and
   affect the services hosted by the CPEs, thus affecting the overall
   home network communications.

   In order to avoid resource exhaustion, this document describes an
   architecture that outsources the authoritative naming service of the
   home network.  More specifically, the DNS(SEC) Homenet Zone built by
   the CPE is outsourced to Public Authoritative Servers.  These servers
   publish the corresponding DN(SEC) Public Zone on the Internet.
   Section 4.1 describes the architecture.  In order to keep the
   DNS(SEC) Public Zone up-to-date Section 5 describes how the DNS(SEC)
   Homenet Zone and the DN(SEC) Public Zone can be synchronized.  The
   proposed architecture aims at deploying DNSSEC and the DNS(SEC)
   Public Zone is expected to be signed with a secure delegation.  The
   zone signing and secure delegation can be performed either by the CPE
   or by the Public Authoritative Servers.  Section 6 discusses these



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   two alternatives.  Section 7 discusses multiple views aspects and
   provide guidance to avoid them.  Section 8 discusses the case of the
   reverse zone.  Section 9 and Section 10 respectively discuss privacy
   and security considerations when outsourcing the DNS Homenet Zone.

3.  Terminology

   - Customer Premises Equipment:   (CPE) is the router providing
         connectivity to the home network.  It is configured and managed
         by the end user.  In this document, the CPE MAY also hosts
         services such as DHCPv6.  This device MAY be provided by the
         ISP.

   - Registered Homenet Domain:   is the Domain Name associated to the
         home network.

   - DNS Homenet Zone:   is the DNS zone associated to the home network.
         This zone is set by the CPE and essentially contains the
         bindings between names and IP addresses of the nodes of the
         home network.  In this document, the CPE does neither perform
         any DNSSEC management operations such as zone signing nor
         provide an authoritative service for the zone.  Both are
         delegated to the Public Authoritative Server.  The CPE
         synchronizes the DNS Homenet Zone with the Public Authoritative
         Server via a hidden master / slave architecture.  The Public
         Authoritative Server MAY use specific servers for the
         synchronization of the DNS Homenet Zone: the Public
         Authoritative Name Server Set as public available name servers
         for the Registered Homenet Domain.

   - DNS Homenet Reverse Zone:   The reverse zone file associated to the
         DNS Homenet Zone.

   - Public Authoritative Server:   performs DNSSEC management
         operations as well as provides the authoritative service for
         the zone.  In this document, the Public Authoritative Server
         synchronizes the DNS Homenet Zone with the CPE via a hidden
         master / slave architecture.  The Public Authoritative Server
         acts as a slave and MAY use specific servers called Public
         Authoritative Name Server Set. Once the Public Authoritative
         Server synchronizes the DNS Homenet Zone, it signs the zone and
         generates the DNSSEC Public Zone.  Then the Public
         Authoritative Server hosts the zone as an authoritative server
         on the Public Authoritative Master(s).

   - DNSSEC Public Zone:   corresponds to the signed version of the DNS
         Homenet Zone.  It is hosted by the Public Authoritative Server,




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         which is authoritative for this zone, and is reachable on the
         Public Authoritative Master(s).

   - Public Authoritative Master(s):   are the visible name server
         hosting the DNSSEC Public Zone.  End users' resolutions for the
         Homenet Domain are sent to this server, and this server is a
         master for the zone.

   - Public Authoritative Name Server Set:   is the server the CPE
         synchronizes the DNS Homenet Zone.  It is configured as a slave
         and the CPE acts as master.  The CPE sends information so the
         DNSSEC zone can be set and served.

   - Reverse Public Authoritative Master(s):   are the visible name
         server hosting the DNS Homenet Reverse Zone.  End users'
         resolutions for the Homenet Domain are sent to this server, and
         this server is a master for the zone.

   - Reverse Public Authoritative Name Server Set:   is the server the
         CPE synchronizes the DNS Homenet Reverse Zone.  It is
         configured as a slave and the CPE acts as master.  The CPE
         sends information so the DNSSEC zone can be set and served.

4.  Architecture Description

   This section describes the architecture for outsourcing the
   authoritative naming service from the CPE to the Public Authoritative
   Master(s).  Section 4.1 describes the architecture, Section 4.2 and
   Section 4.3 illustrate this architecture and shows how the DNS(SEC)
   Homenet Zone should be built by the CPE, as well as lists the
   necessary parameters the CPE needs to outsource the authoritative
   naming service.  These two section are informational and non
   normative.

4.1.  Architecture Overview

   Figure 1 provides an overview of the architecture.

   The home network is designated by the Registered Homenet Domain Name
   -- example.com in Figure 1.  The CPE builds the DNS(SEC) Homenet Zone
   associated to the home network.  How the DNS(SEC) Homenet Zone is
   built is out of the scope of this document.  The CPE may host and
   involve multiple services like a web GUI, DHCP [RFC6644] or mDNS
   [RFC6762].  These services may coexist and may be used to populate
   the DNS Homenet Zone.  This document assumes the DNS(SEC) Homenet
   Zone has been populated with domain names that are intended to be
   publicly published and that are publicly reachable.  More
   specifically, names associated to services or devices that are not



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   expected to be reachable from outside the home network or names bound
   to non globally reachable IP addresses MUST NOT be part of the
   DNS(SEC) Homenet Zone.

   Once the DNS(SEC) Homenet Zone has been built, the CPE does not host
   the authoritative naming service for it, but instead outsources it to
   the Public Authoritative Servers.  The Public Authoritative Servers
   take the DNS(SEC) Homenet as an input and publishes the DNS(SEC)
   Public Zone.  In fact the DNS(SEC) Homenet Zone and the DNS(SEC)
   Public Zone have different names as they may be different.  If the
   CPE does not sign the DNS Homenet Zone, for example, the Public
   Authoritative Servers may instead sign it on behalf of the CPE.
   Figure 1 provides a more detailed description of the Public
   Authoritative Servers, but overall, it is expected that the CPE
   provides the DNS(SEC) Homenet Zone, the DNS(SEC) Public Zone is
   derived from the DNS(SEC) Homenet Zone and published on the Internet.

   As a result, DNS(SEC) queries from the DNS(SEC) Resolvers on the
   Internet are answered by the Public Authoritative Server and do not
   reach the CPE.  Figure 1 illustrates the case of the resolution of
   node1.example.com.

   home network +-------------------+ Internet
                |                   |
                |        CPE        |
                |                   |         +----------------------+
   +-------+    |+-----------------+|         | Public Authoritative |
   |       |    || DNS(SEC) Homenet||         | Servers              |
   | node1 |    || Zone            ||         |+--------------------+|
   |       |    ||                 ||         ||DNS(SEC) Public Zone||
   +-------+    || Homenet Domain  ||=========||                    ||
                || Name            ||   ^     ||   (example.com)    ||
   node1.\      || (example.com)   ||   |     |+--------------------+|
   example.com  |+-----------------+|   |     +----------------------+
                +-------------------+   |          ^     |
                                Synchronization    |     |
                                                   |     |
         DNSSEC resolution for node1.example.com   |     v
                                              +----------------------+
                                              |                      |
                                              |   DNSSEC Resolver    |
                                              |                      |
                                              +----------------------+

             Figure 1: Homenet Naming Architecture Description

   The Public Authoritative Servers are described in Figure 2.  The
   Public Authoritative Name Server Set receives the DNS(SEC) Homenet



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   Zone as an input.  The received zone may be transformed to output the
   DNS(SEC) Public Zone.  Various operations may be performed here,
   however this document only considers zone signing as potential
   operation.  This could occur only when the CPE outsources this
   operation to the Public Authoritative Name Server Set. On the other
   hand, if the CPE signs the DNSSEC Homenet Zone itself, the zone it
   collected by the Public Authoritative Name Server Set and directly
   transferred to the Public Authoritative Master.  Implications of such
   policy are detailed in Section 6 and Section 7.

                                      Internet

             +--------------------------------------------------------+
             |              Public Authoritative Servers              |
             +--------------------------------------------------------+

             +----------------------+         +----------------------+
             |                      |         |                      |
             | Public Authoritative |         | Public Authoritative |
             | Name Server Set      |         | Masters              |
             |                      |         |                      |
             | +------------------+ |    X    | +------------------+ |
             | | DNS(SEC) Homenet | |    ^    | | DNS(SEC) Public  | |
   =========>| | Zone             | |    |    | | Zone             | |
       ^     | |                  | |    |    | |                  | |
       |     | | (example.com)    | |    |    | | (example.com)    | |
       |     | +------------------+ |    |    | +------------------+ |
       |     +----------------------+    |    +----------------------+
       |                         Homenet to Public Zone
   Synchronization                   transformation
   from the CPE

            Figure 2: Public Authoritative Servers Description

4.2.  Example: DNS(SEC) Homenet Zone

   This section is not normative and intends to illustrate how the CPE
   builds the DNS(SEC) Homenet Zone.

   As depicted in Figure 1 and Figure 2, the DNS(SEC) Public Zone is
   hosted on the Public Authoritative Masters, whereas the DNS(SEC)
   Homenet Zone is hosted on the CPE.  Motivations for keeping these two
   zones identical are detailed in Section 7, and this section considers
   that the CPE builds the zone that will be effectively published on
   the Public Authoritative Masters.  In other words "Homenet to Public
   Zone transformation" is the identity.





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   In that case, the DNS Homenet Zone should configure its Name Server
   RRset (NS) and Start of Authority (SOA) with the ones associated to
   the Public Authoritative Masters.  This is illustrated in Figure 3.
   public.masters.example.net is the FQDN of the Public Authoritative
   Masters, and IP1, IP2, IP3, IP4 are the associated IP addresses.
   Then the CPE should add the different new nodes that enter the home
   network, remove those that should be removed and sign the DNS Homenet
   Zone.

           $ORIGIN example.com
           $TTL 1h

           @  IN  SOA  public.masters.example.net
                       hostmaster.example.com. (
                 2013120710 ; serial number of this zone file
                 1d         ; slave refresh
                 2h         ; slave retry time in case of a problem
                 4w         ; slave expiration time
                 1h         ; maximum caching time in case of failed
                            ; lookups
                 )

           @   NS  public.authoritative.servers.example.net

           public.masters.example.net   A @IP1
           public.masters.example.net   A @IP2
           public.masters.example.net   AAAA @IP3
           public.masters.example.net   AAAA @IP4

                        Figure 3: DNS Homenet Zone

   The SOA RRset is defined in [RFC1033], [RFC1035] and [RFC2308].  This
   SOA is specific as it is used for the synchronization between the
   Hidden Master and the Public Authoritative Name Server Set and
   published on the DNS Public Authoritative Master.

   - MNAME:   indicates the primary master.  In our case the zone is
         published on the Public Authoritative Master, and its name MUST
         be mentioned.  If multiple Public Authoritative Masters are
         involved, one of them MUST be chosen.  More specifically, the
         CPE MUST NOT place the name of the Hidden Master.

   - RNAME:   indicates the email address to reach the administrator.
         [RFC2142] recommends to use hostmaster@domain and replacing the
         '@' sign by '.'.

   - REFRESH and RETRY:   indicate respectively in seconds how often
         slaves need to check the master and the time between two



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         refresh when a refresh has failed.  Default value indicated by
         [RFC1033] are 3600 (1 hour) for refresh and 600 (10 minutes)
         for retry.  This value MAY be long for highly dynamic content.
         However, Public Authoritative Masters and the CPE are expected
         to implement NOTIFY [RFC1996].  Then short values MAY increase
         the bandwidth usage for slaves hosting large number of zones.
         As a result, default values looks fine.

   EXPIRE:   is the upper limit data SHOULD be kept in absence of
         refresh.  Default value indicated by [RFC1033] is 3600000 about
         42 days.  In home network architectures, the CPE provides both
         the DNS synchronization and the access to the home network.
         This device MAY be plug / unplugged by the end user without
         notification, thus we recommend large period.

   MINIMUM:   indicates the minimum TTL.  Default value indicated by
         [RFC1033] is 86400 (1 day).  For home network, this value MAY
         be reduced, and 3600 (1hour) seems more appropriated.

4.3.  Example: CPE necessary parameters for outsourcing

   This section specifies the various parameters required by the CPE to
   configure the naming architecture of this document.  This section is
   informational, and is intended to clarify the information handled by
   the CPE and the various settings to be done.

   Public Authoritative Name Server Set may be defined with the
   following parameters.  These parameters are necessary to establish a
   secure channel between the CPE and the Public Authoritative Name
   Server Set:

   - Public Authoritative Name Server Set:   The associated FQDNs or IP
         addresses of the Public Authoritative Server.  IP addresses are
         optional and the FQDN is sufficient.  To secure the binding
         name and IP addresses, a DNSSEC exchange is required.
         Otherwise, the IP addresses should be entered manually.

   - Authentication Method:   How the CPE authenticates itself to the
         Public Server.  This MAY depend on the implementation but we
         should consider at least IPsec, DTLS and TSIG

   - Authentication data:   Associated Data.  PSK only requires a single
         argument.  If other authentication mechanisms based on
         certificates are used, then, files for the CPE private keys,
         certificates and certification authority should be specified.

   - Public Authoritative Master(s):   The FQDN or IP addresses of the
         Public Authoritative Master.  It MAY correspond to the data



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         that will be set in the NS RRsets and SOA of the DNS Homenet
         Zone.  IP addresses are optional and the FQDN is sufficient.
         To secure the binding name and IP addresses, a DNSSEC exchange
         is required.  Otherwise, the IP addresses should be entered
         manually.

   - Registered Homenet Domain:   The domain name the Public
         Authoritative is configured for DNS slave, DNSSEC zone signing
         and DNSSEC zone hosting.

   Setting the DNS(SEC) Homenet Zone requires the following information.

   - Registered Homenet Domain:   The Domain Name of the zone.  Multiple
         Registered Homenet Domain may be provided.  This will generate
         the creation of multiple DNS Homenet Zones.

   - Public Authoritative Server:   The Public Authoritative Servers
         associated to the Registered Homenet Domain.  Multiple Public
         Authoritative Server may be provided.

5.  Synchronization between CPE and Public Authoritative Servers

   The DNS(SEC) Homenet Reverse Zone and the DNS Homenet Zone can be
   updated either with DNS update [RFC2136] or using a master / slave
   synchronization.  The master / slave mechanism is preferred as it
   better scales and avoids DoS attacks: First the master notifies the
   slave the zone must be updated, and leaves the slave to proceed to
   the update when possible.  Then, the NOTIFY message sent by the
   master is a small packet that is less likely to load the slave.  At
   last, the AXFR query performed by the slave is a small packet sent
   over TCP (section 4.2 [RFC5936]) which makes unlikely the slave to
   perform reflection attacks with a forged NOTIFY.  On the other hand,
   DNS updates can use UDP, packets require more processing then a
   NOTIFY, and they do not provide the server the opportunity to post-
   pone the update.

   This document recommends the use of a master / slave mechanism
   instead of the use of nsupdates.  This section details the master /
   slave mechanism.

5.1.  Synchronization with a Hidden Master

   Uploading and dynamically updating the zone file on the Public
   Authoritative Name Server Set can be seen as zone provisioning
   between the CPE (Hidden Master) and the Public Authoritative Name
   Server Set (Slave Server).  This can be handled either in band or out
   of band.




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   The Public Authoritative Name Server Set is configured as a slave for
   the Homenet Domain Name.  This slave configuration has been
   previously agreed between the end user and the provider of the Public
   Authoritative Servers.  In order to set the master/ slave
   architecture, the CPE acts as a Hidden Master Server, which is a
   regular Authoritative DNS(SEC) Server listening on the WAN interface.

   The Hidden Master Server is expected to accept SOA [RFC1033], AXFR
   [RFC1034], and IXFR [RFC1995] queries from its configured slave DNS
   servers.  The Hidden Master Server SHOULD send NOTIFY messages
   [RFC1996] in order to update Public DNS server zones as updates
   occur.  Because, DNS Homenet Zones are likely to be small, CPE MUST
   implement AXFR and SHOULD implement IXFR.

   Hidden Master Server differs from a regular authoritative server for
   the home network by:

   - Interface Binding:   the Hidden Master Server listens on the WAN
         Interface, whereas a regular authoritative server for the home
         network would listen on the home network interface.

   - Limited exchanges:   the purpose of the Hidden Master Server is to
         synchronizes with the Public Authoritative Name Server Set, not
         to serve zone.  As a result, exchanges are performed with
         specific nodes (the Public Authoritative Servers).  Then
         exchange types are limited.  The only legitimate exchanges are:
         NOTIFY initiated by the Hidden Master and IXFR or AXFR
         exchanges initiated by the Public Authoritative Name Server
         Set.  On the other hand regular authoritative servers would
         respond any hosts on the home network, and any DNS(SEC) query
         would be considered.  The CPE SHOULD filter IXFR/AXFR traffic
         and drop traffic not initiated by the Public Authoritative
         Server.  The CPE MUST listen for DNS on TCP and UDP and at
         least allow SOA lookups to the DNS Homenet Zone.

5.2.  Securing Synchronization

   Exchange between the Public Servers and the CPE MUST be secured, at
   least for integrity protection and for authentication.  This is the
   case whatever mechanism is used between the CPE and the Public
   Authoritative Name Server Set.

   TSIG [RFC2845] or SIG(0) [RFC2931] can be used to secure the DNS
   communications between the CPE and the Public DNS(SEC) Servers.  TSIG
   uses a symmetric key which can be managed by TKEY [RFC2930].
   Management of the key involved in SIG(0) is performed through zone
   updates.  How to roll the keys with SIG(0) is out-of-scope of this
   document.  The advantage of these mechanisms is that they are only



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   associated with the DNS application.  Not relying on shared libraries
   ease testing and integration.  On the other hand, using TSIG, TKEY or
   SIG(0) requires that these mechanisms to be implemented on the
   DNS(SEC) Server's implementation running on the CPE, which adds
   codes.  Another disadvantage is that TKEY does not provides
   authentication mechanism.

   Protocols like TLS [RFC5246] / DTLS [RFC6347] can be used to secure
   the transactions between the Public Authoritative Servers and the
   CPE.  The advantage of TLS/DTLS is that this technology is widely
   deployed, and most of the boxes already embeds a TLS/DTLS libraries,
   eventually taking advantage of hardware acceleration.  Then TLS/DTLS
   provides authentication facilities and can use certificates to
   authenticate the Public Authoritative Server and the CPE.  On the
   other hand, using TLS/DTLS requires to integrate DNS exchange over
   TLS/DTLS, as well as a new service port.  This is why we do not
   recommend this option.

   IPsec [RFC4301] IKEv2 [RFC7296] can also be used to secure the
   transactions between the CPE and the Public Authoritative Servers.
   Similarly to TLS/DTLS, most CPE already embeds a IPsec stack, and
   IKEv2 provides multiple authentications possibilities with its EAP
   framework.  In addition, IPsec can be used to protect the DNS
   exchanges between the CPE and the Public Authoritative Servers
   without any modifications of the DNS Servers or client.  DNS
   integration over IPsec only requires an additional security policy in
   the Security Policy Database.  One disadvantage of IPsec is that it
   hardly goes through NATs and firewalls.  However, in our case, the
   CPE is connected to the Internet, and IPsec communication between the
   CPE and Public Authoritative Server SHOULD NOT be impacted by middle
   boxes.

   As mentioned above, TSIG, IPsec and TLS/DTLS may be used to secure
   transactions between the CPE and the Public Authentication Servers.
   The CPE and Public Authoritative Server SHOULD implement TSIG and
   IPsec.

   How the PSK can be used by any of the TSIG, TLS/DTLS or IPsec
   protocols.  Authentication based on certificates implies a mutual
   authentication and thus requires the CPE to manage a private key, a
   public key or certificates as well as Certificate Authorities.  This
   adds complexity to the configuration especially on the CPE side.  For
   this reason, we recommend that CPE MAY use PSK or certificate base
   authentication and that Public Authentication Servers MUST support
   PSK and certificate based authentication.






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5.3.  CPE Security Policies

   This section details security policies related to the Hidden Master /
   Slave synchronization.

   The Hidden Master, as described in this document SHOULD drop any
   queries from the home network.  This can be performed with port
   binding and/or firewall rules.

   The Hidden Master SHOULD drop on the WAN interface any DNS queries
   that is not issued from the Public Authoritative Server Name Server
   Set.

   The Hidden Master SHOULD drop any outgoing packets other than DNS
   NOTIFY query, SOA response, IXFR response or AXFR responses.

   The Hidden Master SHOULD drop any incoming packets other than DNS
   NOTIFY response, SOA query, IXFR query or AXFR query.

   The Hidden Master SHOULD drop any non protected IXFR or AXFR
   exchange.  This depends how the synchronization is secured.

6.  DNSSEC compliant Homenet Architecture

   [RFC7368] in Section 3.7.3 recommends DNSSEC to be deployed on the
   both the authoritative server and the resolver.  The resolver side is
   out of scope of this document, and only the authoritative part is
   considered.

   Deploying DNSSEC requires signing the zone and configuring a secure
   delegation.  As described in Section 4.1, signing can be performed by
   the CPE or by the Public Authoritative Servers.  Section 6.1 details
   the implications of these two alternatives.  Similarly, the secure
   delegation can be performed by the CPE or by the Public Authoritative
   Servers.  Section 6.2 discusses these two alternatives.

6.1.  Zone Signing

   This section discusses the pros and cons when zone signing is
   performed by the CPE or by the Public Authoritative Servers.  It is
   recommended to sign the zone by the CPE unless there is a strong
   argument against it, like a CPE that is not able to sign the zone.
   In that case zone signing may be performed by the Public
   Authoritative Servers on behalf of the CPE.

   Reasons for signing the zone by the CPE are:





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   - 1:  Keeping the Homenet Zone and the Public Zone equals to securely
         optimize DNS resolution.  As the Public Zone is signed with
         DNSSEC, RRsets are authenticated and thus DNS responses can be
         validated even though they are not provided by the
         authoritative server.  This provides the CPE the ability to
         respond on behalf of the Public Authoritative Master.  This
         could be useful for example if, in the future, the CPE could
         announce to the home network that the CPE can act a a local
         authoritative master or equivalent for the Homenet Zone.
         Currently the CPE is not expected to receive authoritative DNS
         queries as its IP address is not mentioned in the Public Zone.
         On the other hand most CPE host a resolving function, and could
         be configured to perform a local lookup to the Homenet Zone
         instead of initiating a DNS exchange with the Public
         Authoritative Master.  Note that outsourcing the zone signing
         operation requires that all DNSSEC queries be cached to perform
         a local lookup, otherwise a resolution with the Public
         Authoritative Master is performed.

   - 2:  Keeping the Homenet Zone and the Public Zone equals to securely
         address the connectivity disruption independence exposed in
         [RFC7368] section 4.4.1 and 3.7.5.  As local lookup is
         possible, in case of network disruption, communications within
         the home network can still rely on the DNSSEC service.  Note
         that outsourcing the zone signing operation does not address
         connectivity disruption independence with DNSSEC.  Instead a
         fall back to DNS resolution occurs as the local Homenet Zone is
         not signed.

   - 3:  Keeping the Homenet Zone and the Public Zone equals to
         guarantee coherence between DNS(SEC) responses.  Using a unique
         zone is one way to guarantee uniqueness of the responses among
         servers and places.  Issues generated by different views are
         discussed in more details in Section 7.

   - 2:  Privacy and Integrity of the DNS Zone are better guaranteed.
         When the Zone is signed by the CPE, it makes modification of
         the DNS data -- for example for flow redirection -- not
         possible.  As a result, signing the Homenet Zone by the CPE
         provides better protection for the end user privacy.

   Reasons for signing the zone by the Public Authoritative Servers are:

   - 1:  The CPE is not able to sign the zone, most likely because its
         firmware does not make it possible.  However the reason is
         expected to be less and less valid over time.





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   - 2:  Outsourcing DNSSEC management operations.  Management
         operations involve key-roll over which can be done
         automatically by the CPE and transparently for the end user.
         As result avoiding DNSSEC management is mostly motivated by bad
         software implementations.

   - 3:  Reducing the impact of CPE replacement on the Public Zone.
         Unless the CPE private keys are backuped, CPE replacement
         results in a emergency key roll over.  This can be mitigated
         also by using relatively small TTLs.

   - 4:  Reducing configuration impacts on the end user.  Unless there
         are some zero configuration mechanisms to provide credentials
         between the new CPE and the Public Authoritative Name Server
         Sets.  Authentications to Public Authoritative Name Server Set
         should be re-configured.  As CPE replacement is not expected to
         happen regularly, end users may not be at ease with such
         configuration settings.  However, mechanisms as described in
         [I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options] use DHCP
         Options to outsource the configuration and avoid this issue.

   - 5:  Public Authoritative Servers are more likely to handle securely
         private keys than the CPE.  However, having all private
         information at one place may also balance that risk.

6.2.  Secure Delegation

   The secure delegation is set if the DS RRset is properly set in the
   parent zone.  Secure delegation can be performed by the CPE or the
   Public Authoritative Servers.

   The DS RRset can be updated manually by the CPE or the Public
   Authoritative Servers.  This can be used then with nsupdate for
   example bu requires the CPE or the Public Authoritative Server to be
   authenticated by the Parent Zone Server.  Such a trust channel
   between the CPE and the Parent Zone server may be hard to maintain,
   and thus may be easier to establish with the Public Authoritative
   Server.  On the other hand, [RFC7344] may mitigate such issues.

7.  Handling Different Views

   The DNS Homenet Zone provides information about the home network and
   some user may be tempted to have different information regarding the
   origin of the DNS query.  More specifically, some users may be
   tempted to provide a different view for DNS queries originating from
   the home network and for DNS queries coming from the wild Internet.
   Each view can be associated to a dedicated Homenet Zone.  Note that
   this document does not specify how DNS queries coming from the home



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   network are addressed to the DNS(SEC) Homenet Zone.  This could be
   done via the DNS resolver hosted on the CPE for example.

   This section is not normative.  Section 7.1 expose different reasons
   that result in different views, Section 7.2 briefly describes the
   consequences of having distinct views, and Section 7.3 provides
   guidance to avoid this situation.

7.1.  Motivations

   The main motivation to handle different views is to provide different
   information depending on the location the DNS query is emitted.  Here
   are a few motivations for doing so:

   - 1:  An end user may want to have services not published on the
         Internet.  Services like the CPE administration interface that
         provides the GUI to administrate your CPE may not be published
         on the Internet.  Similarly services like the mapper that
         registers the devices of your home network may not be published
         on the Internet.  In both case, these services should only be
         known/used by the network administrator.  To restrict the
         access of such services, the home network administrator may
         chose to publish these information only within the home
         network, where it may suppose users are more trustable then on
         the Internet.  Even though, this assumption may not be valid,
         at least, this reduces the surface of attack.

   - 2:  Services within the home network may be reachable using non
         global IP addresses.  IPv4 and NAT may be one reason.  On the
         other hand IPv6 may favor link-local or site-local IP
         addresses.  These IP addresses are not significant outside the
         boundaries of the home network.  As a result, they may be
         published in the home network view, and should not be published
         in the Internet.

   - 3:  If the CPE does not sign the Homenet Zone and outsource the
         signing process, the two views are at least different since,
         one is protected with DNSSEC whereas the other is not.

7.2.  Consequences

   Enabling different views leads to a non-coherent naming system.
   Basically, depending on where you are some services will not be
   available.  This may be especially inconvenient with devices with
   multiple interfaces that are attached both to the Internet via a
   3G/4G interface and to the home network via a WLAN interface.





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   Regarding local-scope IP addresses, such device may end up with poor
   connectivity.  Suppose, for example, the DNS resolution is performed
   via the WLAN interface attached to the CPE, the response provides
   local-scope IP addresses and the communication is initiated on the
   3G/4G interface.  Communications with local-scope addresses will be
   unreachable on the Internet, thus aborting the communication.  The
   same situation occurs if a device is flip / flopping between various
   WLAN networks.

   Regarding DNSSEC, devices with multiple interfaces will have
   difficulties to secure the naming resolution as responses emitted
   from the home network may not be signed.

   For devices with all its interfaces attached to a single
   administrative domain, that is to say the home network or the
   Internet.  Incoherence between DNS responses may also happen if the
   device is able to perform DNS resolutions.  DNS resolutions performed
   via the CPE resolver may be different then those performed over the
   Internet.

7.3.  Guidance and Recommendations

   As exposed in Section 7.2, it is recommended to avoid different
   views.  If network administrators chose to implement multiple views,
   impacts on devices' resolution should be evaluated.

   A consequence the DNS(SEC) Homenet Zone is expected to be the exact
   copy of the DNS(SEC) Public Zone.  As a result, services that are not
   expected to be published on the Internet should not be part of the
   DNS(SEC) Homenet Zone, local-scope address should not be part of the
   DNS(SE) Homenet Zone, and when possible, the CPE should sign the
   DNSSEC Homenet Zone.

   The DNS(SEC) Homenet Zone is expected to host public information.  It
   is not to the DNS service to define local home networks boundaries.
   Instead, local scope information is expected to be provided to the
   home network using local scope naming services. mDNS [RFC6762] DNS-SD
   [RFC6763] are one of these services.  Currently mDNS is limited to a
   single link network.  However, future protocols are expected to
   leverage this constraint as pointed out in
   [I-D.ietf-dnssd-requirements].

8.  Reverse Zone

   Most of the description considered the DNS Homenet Zone as the non-
   Reverse Zone.  This section is focused on the Reverse Zone.





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   First, all considerations for the DNS Homenet Zone apply to the
   Reverse Homenet Zone.  The main difference between the Reverse DNS
   Homenet Zone and the DNS Homenet Zone is that the parent zone of the
   Reverse Homenet Zone is most likely managed by the ISP.  As the ISP
   also provides the IP prefix to the CPE, it may be able to
   authenticate the CPE.  If the Reverse Public Authoritative Name
   Server Set is managed by the ISP, credentials to authenticate the CPE
   for the zone synchronization may be set automatically and
   transparently to the end user.
   [I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options] describes how
   automatic configuration may be performed.

   With IPv6, the domain space for IP address is so large, that reverse
   zone may be confronted to a scalability issue.  How to reverse zone
   is generated is out of scope of this document.
   [I-D.howard-dnsop-ip6rdns] provides guidance on how to address the
   scalability issue.

9.  Privacy Considerations

   Outsourcing the DNS Authoritative service from the CPE to a third
   entity comes with a a few privacy related concerns.

   First the DNS Homenet Zone contains a full description of the
   services hosted in the network.  These services may not be expected
   to be publicly shared although their names remains accessible though
   the Internet.  Even though DNS makes information public, the DNS does
   not expect to make the complete list of service public.  In fact,
   making information public still requires the key (or FQDN) of each
   service to be known by the resolver in order to retrieve information
   of the services.  More specifically, making mywebsite.example.com
   public in the DNS, is not sufficient to make resolvers aware of the
   existence web site.

   In order to prevent the complete DN(SEC) Homenet Zone to be published
   on the Internet, one should prevent AXFR queries on the Public
   Authoritative Masters.  Similarly, to avoid zone-walking one should
   prefer NSEC3 [RFC5155] over NSEC [RFC4034].

   When the DNS Homenet Zone is outsourced the end user must be aware
   that it provides a complete description of the services available on
   the home network.  More specifically, names usually provides a clear
   indication of the service and eventually the device, by as the DNS
   Homenet Zone contains the IP addresses associated to the service,
   they limit the scope of the scan.

   In addition to the DNS Homenet Zone, the third party can also monitor
   the traffic associated to the DNS Homenet Zone.  This traffic may



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   provide indication of the services you use, how and when you use
   these services.  Although, cache may alter this information inside
   the home network, it is likely that outside your home network this
   information will not be cached.

10.  Security Considerations

   The Homenet Naming Architecture described in this document solves
   exposing the CPE's DNS service as a DoS attack vector.

10.1.  Names are less secure than IP addresses

   This document describes how an End User can make his services and
   devices from his home network reachable on the Internet with Names
   rather than IP addresses.  This exposes the home network to attackers
   since names are expected to provide less randomness than IP
   addresses.  The naming delegation protects the End User's privacy by
   not providing the complete zone of the home network to the ISP.
   However, using the DNS with names for the home network exposes the
   home network and its components to dictionary attacks.  In fact, with
   IP addresses, the Interface Identifier is 64 bit length leading to
   2^64 possibilities for a given subnetwork.  This is not to mention
   that the subnet prefix is also of 64 bit length, thus providing
   another 2^64 possibilities.  On the other hand, names used either for
   the home network domain or for the devices present less randomness
   (livebox, router, printer, nicolas, jennifer, ...) and thus exposes
   the devices to dictionary attacks.

10.2.  Names are less volatile than IP addresses

   IP addresses may be used to locate a device, a host or a Service.
   However, home networks are not expected to be assigned the same
   Prefix over time.  As a result observing IP addresses provides some
   ephemeral information about who is accessing the service.  On the
   other hand, Names are not expected to be as volatile as IP addresses.
   As a result, logging Names, over time, may be more valuable that
   logging IP addresses, especially to profile End User's
   characteristics.

   PTR provides a way to bind an IP address to a Name.  In that sense
   responding to PTR DNS queries may affect the End User's Privacy.  For
   that reason we recommend that End Users may choose to respond or not
   to PTR DNS queries and may return a NXDOMAIN response.








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11.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no actions for IANA.

12.  Acknowledgment

   The authors wish to thank Philippe Lemordant for its contributions on
   the early versions of the draft, Ole Troan for pointing out issues
   with the IPv6 routed home concept and placing the scope of this
   document in a wider picture, Mark Townsley for encouragement and
   injecting a healthy debate on the merits of the idea, Ulrik de Bie
   for providing alternative solutions, Paul Mockapetris, Christian
   Jacquenet, Francis Dupont and Ludovic Eschard for their remarks on
   CPE and low power devices, Olafur Gudmundsson for clarifying DNSSEC
   capabilities of small devices, Simon Kelley for its feedback as
   dnsmasq implementer.  Andrew Sullivan, Mark Andrew, Ted Lemon, Mikael
   Abrahamson and Michael Richardson, Ray Bellis for their feed backs on
   handling different views as well as clarifying the impact of
   outsourcing the zone signing operation outside the CPE.

13.  References

13.1.  Normative References

   [RFC1034]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
              STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.

   [RFC1995]  Ohta, M., "Incremental Zone Transfer in DNS", RFC 1995,
              August 1996.

   [RFC1996]  Vixie, P., "A Mechanism for Prompt Notification of Zone
              Changes (DNS NOTIFY)", RFC 1996, August 1996.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2136]  Vixie, P., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y., and J. Bound,
              "Dynamic Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)",
              RFC 2136, April 1997.

   [RFC2142]  Crocker, D., "MAILBOX NAMES FOR COMMON SERVICES, ROLES AND
              FUNCTIONS", RFC 2142, May 1997.

   [RFC2308]  Andrews, M., "Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS
              NCACHE)", RFC 2308, March 1998.



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   [RFC2845]  Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake, D., and B.
              Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS
              (TSIG)", RFC 2845, May 2000.

   [RFC2930]  Eastlake, D., "Secret Key Establishment for DNS (TKEY
              RR)", RFC 2930, September 2000.

   [RFC2931]  Eastlake, D., "DNS Request and Transaction Signatures (
              SIG(0)s)", RFC 2931, September 2000.

   [RFC4034]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
              RFC 4034, March 2005.

   [RFC4301]  Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
              Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.

   [RFC5155]  Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS
              Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of
              Existence", RFC 5155, March 2008.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.

   [RFC5936]  Lewis, E. and A. Hoenes, "DNS Zone Transfer Protocol
              (AXFR)", RFC 5936, June 2010.

   [RFC6347]  Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
              Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, January 2012.

   [RFC6644]  Evans, D., Droms, R., and S. Jiang, "Rebind Capability in
              DHCPv6 Reconfigure Messages", RFC 6644, July 2012.

   [RFC6762]  Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "Multicast DNS", RFC 6762,
              February 2013.

   [RFC6763]  Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "DNS-Based Service
              Discovery", RFC 6763, February 2013.

   [RFC7296]  Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
              Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
              (IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, October 2014.

13.2.  Informational References







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   [I-D.howard-dnsop-ip6rdns]
              Howard, L., "Reverse DNS in IPv6 for Internet Service
              Providers", draft-howard-dnsop-ip6rdns-00 (work in
              progress), June 2014.

   [I-D.ietf-dnssd-requirements]
              Lynn, K., Cheshire, S., Blanchet, M., and D. Migault,
              "Requirements for Scalable DNS-SD/mDNS Extensions", draft-
              ietf-dnssd-requirements-04 (work in progress), October
              2014.

   [I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options]
              Migault, D., Cloetens, W., Griffiths, C., and R. Weber,
              "DHCP Options for Homenet Naming Architecture", draft-
              ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options-00 (work in
              progress), September 2014.

   [RFC1033]  Lottor, M., "Domain administrators operations guide", RFC
              1033, November 1987.

   [RFC7344]  Kumari, W., Gudmundsson, O., and G. Barwood, "Automating
              DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance", RFC 7344, September
              2014.

   [RFC7368]  Chown, T., Arkko, J., Brandt, A., Troan, O., and J. Weil,
              "IPv6 Home Networking Architecture Principles", RFC 7368,
              October 2014.

Appendix A.  Document Change Log

   [RFC Editor: This section is to be removed before publication]

   -05:

   *Clarifying on handling different views:

   - 1:  How the CPE may be involved in the resolution and responds
         without necessarily requesting the Public Masters (and
         eventually the Hidden Master)

   - 2:  How to handle local scope resolution that is link-local, site-
         local and NAT IP addresses as well as Private domain names that
         the administrator does not want to publish outside the home
         network.

   Adding a Privacy Considerations Section

   Clarification on pro/cons outsourcing zone-signing



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   Documenting how to handle reverse zones

   Adding reference to RFC 2308

   -04:

   *Clarifications on zone signing

   *Rewording

   *Adding section on different views

   *architecture clarifications

   -03:

   *Simon's comments taken into consideration

   *Adding SOA, PTR considerations

   *Removing DNSSEC performance paragraphs on low power devices

   *Adding SIG(0) as a mechanism for authenticating the servers

   *Goals clarification: the architecture described in the document 1)
   does not describe new protocols, and 2) can be adapted to specific
   cases for advance users.

   -02:

   *remove interfaces: "Public Authoritative Server Naming Interface" is
   replaced by "Public Authoritative Master(s)".  "Public Authoritative
   Server Management Interface" is replaced by "Public Authoritative
   Name Server Set".

   -01.3:

   *remove the authoritative / resolver services of the CPE.
   Implementation dependent

   *remove interactions with mdns and dhcp.  Implementation dependent.

   *remove considerations on low powered devices

   *remove position toward homenet arch

   *remove problem statement section




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   -01.2:

   * add a CPE description to show that the architecture can fit CPEs

   * specification of the architecture for very low powered devices.

   * integrate mDNS and DHCP interactions with the Homenet Naming
   Architecture.

   * Restructuring the draft. 1) We start from the homenet-arch draft to
   derive a Naming Architecture, then 2) we show why CPE need mechanisms
   that do not expose them to the Internet, 3) we describe the
   mechanisms.

   * I remove the terminology and expose it in the figures A and B.

   * remove the Front End Homenet Naming Architecture to Homenet Naming

   -01:

   * Added C.  Griffiths as co-author.

   * Updated section 5.4 and other sections of draft to update section
   on Hidden Master / Slave functions with CPE as Hidden Master/Homenet
   Server.

   * For next version, address functions of MDNS within Homenet Lan and
   publishing details northbound via Hidden Master.

   -00: First version published.

Authors' Addresses

   Daniel Migault
   Ericsson
   8400 boulevard Decarie
   Montreal, QC H4P 2N2
   Canada

   Email: mglt.ietf@gmail.com











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   Wouter Cloetens
   SoftAtHome
   vaartdijk 3 701
   3018 Wijgmaal
   Belgium

   Email: wouter.cloetens@softathome.com


   Chris Griffiths
   Dyn
   150 Dow Street
   Manchester, NH  03101
   US

   Email: cgriffiths@dyn.com
   URI:   http://dyn.com


   Ralf Weber
   Nominum
   2000 Seaport Blvd #400
   Redwood City, CA  94063
   US

   Email: ralf.weber@nominum.com
   URI:   http://www.nominum.com
























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