[Docs] [txt|pdf|xml|html] [Tracker] [WG] [Email] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Nits]

Versions: (draft-kumar-i2nsf-client-facing-interface-req) 00 01 02 03

I2NSF Working Group                                             R. Kumar
Internet-Draft                                                 A. Lohiya
Intended status: Informational                          Juniper Networks
Expires: January 17, 2018                                          D. Qi
                                                               Bloomberg
                                                                N. Bitar
                                                         S. Palislamovic
                                                                   Nokia
                                                                  L. Xia
                                                                  Huawei
                                                           July 16, 2017


    Requirements for Client-Facing Interface to Security Controller
            draft-ietf-i2nsf-client-facing-interface-req-03

Abstract

   This document captures requirements for Client-Facing interface to
   the Security Controller as defined by [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-framework].
   The interface is expressed using objects and constructs understood by
   Security Admin as opposed to vendor or device specific expressions
   associated with individual product and feature.  This document
   identifies a broad set of requirements needed to express Security
   Policies based on User-constructs which are well understood by the
   User Community.  This gives ability to decouple policy definition
   from policy enforcement on a specific security functional element, be
   it a physical or virtual.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 17, 2018.






Kumar, et al.           Expires January 17, 2018                [Page 1]


Internet-Draft        Client Interface Requirements            July 2017


Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Conventions Used in this Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Guiding principle for Client-Facing Interface definition  . .   5
     3.1.  User-construct based modeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  Basic rules for Client-Facing Interface definition  . . .   6
     3.3.  Deployment Models for Implementing Security Policies  . .   7
   4.  Functional Requirements for the Client-Facing Interface . . .  10
     4.1.  Requirement for Multi-Tenancy in Client-Facing interface   11
     4.2.  Requirement for Authentication and Authorization of
           Client-Facing interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.3.  Requirement for Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) in
           Client-Facing interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.4.  Requirement to protect Client-Facing interface from
           attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.5.  Requirement to protect Client-Facing interface from
           misconfiguration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.6.  Requirement to manage policy lifecycle with rich set of
           controls  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.7.  Requirement to define dynamic Policy Endpoint Group . . .  14
     4.8.  Requirement to express rich set of Policy Rules . . . . .  16
     4.9.  Requirement to express rich set of Policy Actions . . . .  17
     4.10. Requirement for consistent policy enforcement . . . . . .  19
     4.11. Requirement to detect and correct policy conflicts  . . .  19
     4.12. Requirement for backward compatibility  . . . . . . . . .  19
     4.13. Requirement for Third-Party integration . . . . . . . . .  20
     4.14. Requirement to collect telemetry data . . . . . . . . . .  20
   5.  Operational Requirements for the Client-Facing Interface  . .  20
     5.1.  API Versioning  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     5.2.  API Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     5.3.  APIs and Data Model Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     5.4.  Notification and Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21



Kumar, et al.           Expires January 17, 2018                [Page 2]


Internet-Draft        Client Interface Requirements            July 2017


     5.5.  Affinity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     5.6.  Test Interface  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   8.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   9.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23

1.  Introduction

   Programming security policies in a network has been a fairly complex
   task that often requires deep knowledge of vendor specific devices
   and features.  This has been the biggest challenge for both Service
   Providers and Enterprises, henceforth named as Security Admins in
   this document.  This challenge is further amplified due to network
   virtualization with security functions deployed in physical and
   virtual form factors, henceforth named as network security function
   (NSF) in this document, from multiple vendors with proprietary
   interfaces.

   Even if Security Admin deploys a single vendor solution with one or
   more security appliances across its entire network, it is still very
   difficult to manage Security Policies that requires mapping of
   business needs to complex security features with vendor specific
   configurations.  The Security Admin may use vendor provided
   management systems to provision and manage Security Policies.  But,
   the single vendor approach is highly restrictive in today's network
   for following reasons:

   o  An organization may not be able to rely on a single vendor because
      the changing security requirements may not align with vendor's
      release cycle.

   o  A large organization may have a presence across different sites
      and regions; which means, it may not be possible to deploy same
      solution from the same vendor because of regional regulatory and
      compliance policy.

   o  If and when an organization migrates from one vendor to another,
      it is almost impossible to migrate Security Policies from one
      vendor to another without complex and time consuming manual
      workflows.

   o  An organization may deploy multiple security functions in either
      virtual or physical form to attain the flexibility, elasticity,
      performance scale and operational efficiency they require.
      Practically, that often requires different sources (vendor, open
      source) to get the best of breed for a given security function.



Kumar, et al.           Expires January 17, 2018                [Page 3]


Internet-Draft        Client Interface Requirements            July 2017


   o  An organization may choose all or part of their assets such as
      routers, switches, firewalls, and overlay-networks as policy
      enforcement points for operational and cost efficiency.  It would
      be highly complex to manage policy enforcement with different tool
      set for each type of device.

   In order to facilitate deployment of Security Policies across
   different vendor provided NSFs, the Interface to Network Security
   Functions (I2NSF) working group in the IETF is defining a Client-
   Facing interface to Security Controller [I-D. ietf-i2nsf-framework]
   [I-D. ietf-i2nsf-terminology].  Deployment facilitation should be
   agnostic to the type of device, be it physical or virtual, or type of
   enforcement point.  Using these interfaces, it becomes possible to
   write different kinds of security management applications (e.g.  GUI
   portal, template engine, etc.) allowing Security Admin to express
   Security Policy in an abstract form with choice of wide variety of
   NSF as policy enforcement point.  The implementation of security
   management applications or controller is out of scope for I2NSF
   working group.

   This document captures the requirements for Client-Facing interface
   that can be easily used by Security Admin without a need for
   expertise in vendor and device specific feature set.  We refer to
   this as "User-construct" based interfaces.  To further clarify, in
   the scope of this document, the "User-construct" here does not mean
   some free-from natural language input or an abstract intent such as
   "I want my traffic secure" or "I don't want DDoS attacks in my
   network"; rather the User-construct here means that Security Policies
   are described using expressions such as application names,
   application groups, device groups, user groups etc. with a vocabulary
   of verbs (e.g., drop, tap, throttle), prepositions, conjunctions,
   conditionals, adjectives, and nouns instead of using standard
   n-tuples from the packet header.

2.  Conventions Used in this Document

   BSS:  Business Support System

   CLI:  Command Line Interface

   CMDB:  Configuration Management Database

   Controller:  Used interchangeably with Security Controller or
      management system throughout this document

   CRUD:  Create, Retrieve, Update, Delete

   FW:  Firewall



Kumar, et al.           Expires January 17, 2018                [Page 4]


Internet-Draft        Client Interface Requirements            July 2017


   GUI:  Graphical User Interface

   IDS:  Intrusion Detection System

   IPS:  Intrusion Protection System

   LDAP:  Lightweight Directory Access Protocol

   NSF:  Network Security Function, defined by
      [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-problem-and-use-cases]

   OSS:  Operation Support System

   RBAC:  Role Based Access Control

   SIEM:  Security Information and Event Management

   URL:  Universal Resource Locator

   vNSF:  Refers to NSF being instantiated on Virtual Machines

3.  Guiding principle for Client-Facing Interface definition

   Client-Facing Interface must ensure that a Security Admin can deploy
   a NSF from any vendor and should still be able to use the same
   consistent interface.  In essence, this interface allows a Security
   Admin to express a Security Policy enforced on the NSF to be
   independent of vendor and its implementation.  Henceforth, in this
   document, we use "security policy management interface"
   interchangeably when we refer to Client-Facing interface.

3.1.  User-construct based modeling

   Traditionally, Security Policies have been expressed using vendor
   proprietary interface.  The interface is defined by a vendor based on
   proprietary command line text or a GUI based system with
   implementation specific constructs such IP address, protocol and
   L4-L7 information.  This requires Security Admin to translate their
   business objectives into vendor provided constructs in order to
   express a Security Policy.  But, this alone is not sufficient to
   render a policy in the network; the admin must also understand
   network and application design to locate a specific policy
   enforcement point to make sure policy is effective.  To further
   complicate the matters, when changes happen in the network topology,
   the Security Policy may require modifications accordingly.  This may
   be a highly manual task based on network design and becomes
   unmanageable in virtualized environment.




Kumar, et al.           Expires January 17, 2018                [Page 5]


Internet-Draft        Client Interface Requirements            July 2017


   The User-construct based framework does not rely on lower level
   semantics due to problem explained above, but rather uses higher
   level constructs such as User-group, Application-group, Device-group,
   Location-group, etcetera.  A Security Admin would use these
   constructs to express a security policy instead of proprietary
   implementation or feature specific constructs.  The policy defined in
   such a manner is referred to User-construct based policies in this
   draft.  The idea is to enable Security Admin to use constructs they
   understand best in expressing Security Policies which simplify their
   tasks and help avoiding human errors in complex security
   provisioning.

3.2.  Basic rules for Client-Facing Interface definition

   The basic rules in defining the Client-Facing interfaces are as
   follows:

   o  Not dependent on a particular network topology or the NSF location
      in the network

   o  Not forced to express Security Policy with proprietary vendor
      specific interfaces for a given NSFa€

   o  Independent of NSF type that will implement a specific Security
      Policy; e.g., the interface remains same no matter if a specific
      Security Policy is enforced on a stateful firewall,IDP, IDS,
      Router or a Switch

   o  Declarative/Descriptive model instead of Imperative/Prescriptive
      model - What security policy need to be expressed (declarative)
      instead of how it is implemented (imperative)

   o  Not dependent on vendor's' implementation or form-factor
      (physical, virtual) of the NSF

   o  Not dependent on how a NSF becomes operational - network
      connectivity and other hosting requirements.

   o  Not dependent on NSF control plane implementation (if there is
      one), e.g., cluster of NSFs active as one unified service for
      scale and/ or resilience.

   o  Not depending on specific data plane implementation of NSF, e.g.
      encapsulation, service function chains.

   Note that the rules stated above only apply to the Client-Facing
   interface, which a Security Admin would use to express a high level
   policy.  These rules do not apply to the lower layers, e.g., Security



Kumar, et al.           Expires January 17, 2018                [Page 6]


Internet-Draft        Client Interface Requirements            July 2017


   Controller that convert higher level policies into lower level
   constructs.  The lower layers may still need some intelligence such
   as topology awareness, capability of the NSF and its functions,
   supported encapsulations etc., to convert and apply the policies
   accurately on the NSF.

3.3.  Deployment Models for Implementing Security Policies

   Traditionally, medium and large Enterprises deploy vendor provided
   management systems to create Security Policies and any changes to
   these Security Policies are made manually over time by Security
   Admin.  This approach may not be suitable and nor sufficient for
   modern highly automated data centers that are largely virtualized and
   rely on various management systems and controllers to implement
   dynamic Security Policies over large number of NSF in the network.

   There are two distinct deployment models for Security Controller.
   Although, these have no direct impact on the Client-Facing interface,
   but illustrate the overall Security Policy management framework in an
   organization and how the Client-Facing interface remain same which is
   the main objective of this document.  These models are:

   a.  Policy management without an explicit management system for
       control of NSFs.  In this deployment, Security Controller acts as
       a NSF management system; it takes information passed over Client-
       Facing interface and translates into data on I2NSF NSF-facing
       interface.  The NSF-Facing interface is implemented by NSF
       vendors; this would usually be done by having an I2NSF agent
       embedded in the NSF.  This deployment model is shown in Figure 1.






















Kumar, et al.           Expires January 17, 2018                [Page 7]


Internet-Draft        Client Interface Requirements            July 2017


                            RESTful API
                    SUPA or I2NSF Policy Management
                                  ^
                                  |
    Client-Facing Interface       |
    (Independent of individual    |
     NSFs, devices, and vendors)  |
                                  |
                    ------------------------------
                   |                              |
                   |       Security Controller    |
                   |                              |
                    ------------------------------
                         |                 ^
                         |   I2NSF         |
    NSF Interface        |   NSF-facing    |
    (Specific to NSFs)   |   Interface     |
                     ..............................
                         |                 |
                         v                 |


                   -------------     -------------
                  | I2NSF Agent |   | I2NSF Agent |
                  |-------------|   |-------------|
                  |             |---|             |
                  |     NSF     |   |     NSF     |
        NSFs      |             |   |             |
    (virtual       -------------\   /-------------
       and               |       \ /       |
    physical)            |        X        |
                         |       / \       |
                   -------------/   \-------------
                  | I2NSF Agent |   | I2NSF Agent |
                  |-------------|   |-------------|
                  |             |---|             |
                  |     NSF     |   |     NSF     |
                  |             |   |             |
                   -------------     -------------


              Figure 1: Deployment without Management System

   b.  Policy management with an explicit management system for control
       of NSFs.  This model is similar to the model above except that
       Security Controller interacts with a vendor's dedicated
       management system that proxy I2NSF NSF-Facing interfaces as NSF




Kumar, et al.           Expires January 17, 2018                [Page 8]


Internet-Draft        Client Interface Requirements            July 2017


       may not support NSF-Facing interface.  This is a useful model to
       support legacy NSF.  This deployment model is shown in Figure 2.


                            RESTful API
                    SUPA or I2NSF Policy Management
                                  ^
                                  |
    Client-facing Interface       |
    (Independent of individual    |
     NSFs, devices, and vendors)  |
                                  |
                    ------------------------------
                   |                              |
                   |       Security Controller    |
                   |                              |
                    ------------------------------
                         |                 ^
                         |   I2NSF         |
    NSF Interface        |   NSF-facing    |
    (Specific to NSFs)   |   Interface     |
                     ..............................
                         |                 |
                         v                 |
                    ------------------------------
                   |                              |
                   |      I2NSF Proxy Agent /     |
                   |      Management System       |
                   |                              |
                    ------------------------------
                         |                 ^
                         |  Proprietary    |
                         |  Functional     |
                         |  Interface      |
                     ..............................
                         |                 |
                         v                 |

                   -------------     -------------
                  |             |---|             |
                  |     NSF     |   |     NSF     |
        NSFs      |             |   |             |
    (virtual       -------------\   /-------------
       and               |       \ /       |
    physical)            |        X        |
                         |       / \       |
                   -------------/   \-------------
                  |             |---|             |



Kumar, et al.           Expires January 17, 2018                [Page 9]


Internet-Draft        Client Interface Requirements            July 2017


                  |     NSF     |   |     NSF     |
                  |             |   |             |
                   -------------     -------------


     Figure 2: Deployment with Management System or I2NSF Proxy Agent

   As mentioned above, these models discussed here don't affect the
   definition of Client-Facing interface, they do give an overall
   context for defining a Security Policy interface based on
   abstraction.  This can help in implementing a Security Controller.

4.  Functional Requirements for the Client-Facing Interface

   As stated in the guiding principle for defining the I2NSF Client-
   Facing interface, the Security Policies and the Client-Facing
   interface shall be defined from Security Admin's perspective and
   abstracted away from type of NSF, NSF specific implementation,
   controller implementation, network topology, controller NSF-Facing
   interface.  Thus, the Security Policy definition shall be
   declarative, expressed using User-construct, and driven by how
   Security Admin view Security Policies from their business needs and
   objectives.

   Security Controller's' implementation is outside the scope of this
   document and the I2NSF working group.

   In order to express and build security policies, high level
   requirement for Client-Facing interface is as follows:

   o  Multi-Tenancy

   o  Authentication and Authorization

   o  Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)

   o  Protection from Attacks

   o  Protection from Misconfiguration

   o  Policy Lifecycle Management

   o  Dynamic Policy Endpoint Groups

   o  Policy Rules

   o  Policy Actions




Kumar, et al.           Expires January 17, 2018               [Page 10]


Internet-Draft        Client Interface Requirements            July 2017


   o  Generic Policy Model

   o  Policy Conflict Resolution

   o  Backward Compatibility

   o  Third-Party Integration

   o  Telemetry Data

   The above requirements are by no means a complete list and may not be
   sufficient or required for all use-cases, but should be a good
   starting point for a wide variety of use-cases in Service Provider
   and Enterprise networks.

   A specific implementation may not support all these requirements but
   in order to define a base set of requirements which would works for
   most use-cases, this document will make an attempt to classify these
   requirements in three categories:

   MUST:  This means, the requirement must be supported by Client-Facing
      interface.

   RECOMMENDED:  This means, we recommend that Client-Facing interface
      support this requirement since it might be applicable to large
      number of use-cases but some vendor may choose to omit if their
      focus is only certain market segments.

   MAY:  This means, the requirement is not mandatory for Client-Facing
      interface but may be needed for specific use-cases.

4.1.  Requirement for Multi-Tenancy in Client-Facing interface

   An organization may have internal tenants and might want a framework
   wherein each tenant manages its own Security Policies with isolation
   from other tenants.  This requirement may be applicable to Service
   Providers and Large Enterprises so we classify this requirement in
   RECOMMENDED category.  If an implement does not support this
   requirement, it must support a default implicit tenant created by
   Security Controller that owns all the Security Policies.

   A Security Admin may be a Cloud Service Provider with multi-tenant
   deployment, where each tenant is a different customer.  Each tenant
   or customer must be able to manage its own Security Policies without
   affecting other tenants.

   It should be noted that tenants may have their own tenants, so a
   recursive relation may exist.  For instance, a tenant in a Cloud



Kumar, et al.           Expires January 17, 2018               [Page 11]


Internet-Draft        Client Interface Requirements            July 2017


   Service Provider may have multiple departments or organizations that
   need to manage their own security rules for compliance.

   The following objects are needed to fulfill this requirement:

   Policy-Tenant:  An entity that owns and manages Security Policies
      applied to its own asset and resources.

   Policy-Administrator:  A user authorized to manage the security
      policies for a Policy-Tenant.

   Policy-User:  A user within a Policy-Tenant who is authorized to
      access certain resources of that tenant according to the
      privileges assigned to it.

4.2.  Requirement for Authentication and Authorization of Client-Facing
      interface

   A Security Admin must be authenticated and authorized in order to
   manage Security Policies.  We classify this requirement in MUST
   category since without proper authentication and authorization, the
   security posture of entire organization can be easily compromised.

   There must be methods defined for Policy-Administrator to be
   authenticated and authorized to use Security Controller.  There are
   several authentication methods available such as OAuth [RFC6749],
   XAuth and X.509 certificate based; the authentication may be mutual
   or single-sided based on business needs and outside the scope of
   I2NSF.  In addition, there must be a method o authorize the Policy-
   Administrator to perform certain action.  It should be noted that,
   Policy-Administrator authentication and authorization to perform
   actions could be part of Security Controller or outside; this
   document does not mandate any specific implementation but requires
   that such a scheme must be implemented.

4.3.  Requirement for Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) in Client-Facing
      interface

   A tenant in organization may have multiple users with each user given
   certain privileges.  Some user such as "Admin" may have all the
   permission but other may have limited permissions.  We classify this
   requirement in RECOMMENDED category since it aligns with Multi-
   Tenancy requirement.  If this requirement is not supported, a default
   privilege must be assigned to all the users.

   The following objects are needed to fulfill this requirement:





Kumar, et al.           Expires January 17, 2018               [Page 12]


Internet-Draft        Client Interface Requirements            July 2017


   Policy-Authorization-Role:  Defines the permissions assigned to a
      user such as creating and managing policies on specified
      resources.  A user may not be allowed to change existing policies
      but only view them.

4.4.  Requirement to protect Client-Facing interface from attacks

   The interface must be protections against attacks from malicious
   clients or a client impersonator.  Potential attacks could come from
   Botnets, hosts infected with virus or some unauthorized entities.
   This requirement is highly RECOMMENDED since it may not be needed if
   the entire framework is deployed in very controlled environment.  But
   if needed, we recommend that Security Controller uses a out-of-band
   communication channel for Client-Facing interface.  In addition,it is
   also recommended that traffic Client-Facing interface communication
   be encrypted; furthermore, some straightforward traffic/session
   control mechanisms (i.e., Rate-limit, ACL, White/Black list) can be
   employed on Security Controller to defend against DDoS flooding
   attacks.

4.5.  Requirement to protect Client-Facing interface from
      misconfiguration

   There must be protections from mis-configured clients.  System and
   policy parameters validations should be implemented to detect this.
   Validation may be based on a set of default parameters or custom
   tuned thresholds such as the number of policy changes submitted,
   number of objects requested in a given time interval, etc.  We
   consider this to be a MUST requirement but implementation aspects
   would depend upon each individual API communication.

4.6.  Requirement to manage policy lifecycle with rich set of controls

   In order to provide more sophisticated security framework, there
   should be a mechanism so that a policy becomes dynamically active/
   enforced or inactive based on multiple different criteria such as
   Security Admin's manual intervention or some external event.  We
   consider requirement listed here to be a MUST for wide variety of
   use-cases.

   One example of dynamic policy management is when Security Admin pre-
   configures all the security policies, but the policies get activated
   or deactivated based on dynamic threat detection.  Basically, a
   threat event may activate certain inactive policies, and once a new
   event indicates that the threat has gone away, the policies become
   inactive again.

   There are following ways for dynamically activating policies:



Kumar, et al.           Expires January 17, 2018               [Page 13]


Internet-Draft        Client Interface Requirements            July 2017


   o The policy may be activated by Security Admin manually using a
   client interface such as GUI or CLI.

   o The policy may be dynamically activated by Security Controller upon
   detecting an external event or an event from I2NSF monitoring
   interface

   o The policy can be configured but gets activated or deactivated upon
   specified timing calendar with Security Policy definition.

   Client-Facing interface should support the following policy
   attributes for policy enforcement:

   Admin-Enforced:  A policy, once configured, remains active/enforced
      until removed by Security Admin.

   Time-Enforced:  A policy configuration specifies the time profile
      that determines when the policy is to be activated/enforced.
      Otherwise, it is de-activated.

   Event-Enforced:  A policy configuration specifies the event profile
      that determines when the policy is to be activated/enforced.  It
      also specifies the duration attribute of that policy once
      activated based on event.  For instance, if the policy is
      activated upon detecting an application flow, the policy could be
      de-activated when the corresponding session is closed or the flow
      becomes inactive for certain time.

   A policy could be a composite policy, that is composed of many rules,
   and subject to updates and modification.  For the policy maintenance,
   enforcement, and audit-ability purposes, it becomes important to name
   and version Security Policy.  Thus, the policy definition SHALL
   support policy naming and versioning.  In addition, the i2NSF Client-
   Facing interface SHALL support the activation, deactivation,
   programmability, and deletion of policies based on name and version.
   In addition, it should support reporting operational state of
   policies by name and version.  For instance, a Security Admin may
   probe Security Controller whether a Security Policy is enforced for a
   tenant and/or a sub-tenant (organization) for audit-ability or
   verification purposes.

4.7.  Requirement to define dynamic Policy Endpoint Group

   When Security Admin configures a Security Policy, it may have
   requirement to apply this policy to certain subsets of the network.
   The subsets may be identified based on criteria such as Users,
   Devices, and Applications.  We refer to such a subset of the network
   as a "Policy Endpoint Group".  This requirement is the fundamental



Kumar, et al.           Expires January 17, 2018               [Page 14]


Internet-Draft        Client Interface Requirements            July 2017


   building block of Client-Facing interface; so making it a MUST
   requirement.  But object defined here may not support all use-cases
   and may not be required by everyone so it is left up to vendor
   whether all or partial set of these object is supported.

   One of the biggest challenges for a Security Admin is how to make
   sure that a Security Policy remain effective while constant changes
   are happening to the "Policy Endpoint Group" for various reasons
   (e.g., organizational, network and application changes).  If a policy
   is created based on static information such as user names,
   application, or network subnets; then every time this static
   information change, policies need to be updated.  For example, if a
   policy is created that allows access to an application only from the
   group of Human Resource users (HR-users group), then each time the
   HR-users group changes, the policy needs to be updated.

   We call these dynamic Policy Endpoint Groups "Metadata Driven
   Groups".  The metadata is a tag associated with endpoint information
   such as User, Application, or Device.  The mapping from metadata to
   dynamic content could come from a standards-based or proprietary
   tools.  Security Controller could use any available mechanisms to
   derive this mapping and to make automatic updates to policy content
   if the mapping information changes.  The system SHOULD allow for
   multiple, or sets of tags to be applied to a single endpoint.

   Client-Facing interface must support Endpoint Groups as a target for
   a Security Policy.  The following metadata driven groups MAY be used
   for configuring Security Polices:

   User-Group:  This group identifies a set of users based on a tag or
      static information such as user-names.  The tag identifying users,
      is dynamically derived from systems such as Active Directory or
      LDAP.  For example, an organization may have different User-
      groups,such as HR-users, Finance-users, Engineering-users, to
      classify a set of users in each department.

   Device-Group:  This group identifies a set of devices based on a tag
      or device information.  The tag identifying the devices, is
      dynamically derived from systems such as configuration management
      database (CMDB).  For example, a Security Admin may want to
      classify all machines running a particular operating system into
      one group and machines running a different operating system into
      another group.

   Application-Group:  This group identifies a set of applications based
      on a tag or on application names.  The tag identifying
      applications, is dynamically derived from systems such as CMDB.
      For example, a Security Admin may want to classify all



Kumar, et al.           Expires January 17, 2018               [Page 15]


Internet-Draft        Client Interface Requirements            July 2017


      applications running in the Legal department into one group and
      all applications running in the HR department into another group.
      In some cases, the application can semantically associated with a
      VM or a device.  However, in other cases, the application may need
      to be associated with a set of identifiers (e.g., transport
      numbers, signature in the application packet payload) that
      identify the application in the corresponding packets.  The
      mapping of application names/tags to signatures in the associated
      application packets should be defined and communicated to the NSF.
      The Client-Facing Interface shall support the communication of
      this information.

   Location-Group:  This group identifies a set of locations.  Tag may
      correspond 1:1 to location.  The tag identifying locations is
      either statically defined or dynamically derived from systems such
      as CMDB.  For example, a Security Admin may want to classify all
      sites/locations in a geographic region as one group.

4.8.  Requirement to express rich set of Policy Rules

   The Policy Rules is a central component of any Security Policy but
   rule requirements may vary based on use-cases and it is hard to
   define a complete set that works for everyone.  In order to build a
   rich interface, we are going to take a different approach; we will
   define the building block of rules and let Security Admin build rules
   using these construct so that Security Policies meet their
   requirements:

   Segmentation policies  :  This set of policies create rules for
      communication between two Endpoint Groups.  An organization may
      restrict certain communication between a set of user and
      applications for example.  The segmentation policy may be a micro-
      segmentation rule between components of complex applications or
      related to hybrid cloud deployment based on location.

   Threat policies:  This set of policies creates rules to prevent
      communication with externally or internally identified threats.
      The threats may be well knows such as threat feeds from external
      sources or dynamically identified by using specialty devices in
      the network.

   Governance and Compliance policies:  This set of policies creates
      rules to implement business requirement such as controlling access
      to internal or external resources for meeting regulatory
      compliance or business objectives.

   In order to build a generic rule engine to satisfy diverse set of
   Policy Rules, we propose following objects:



Kumar, et al.           Expires January 17, 2018               [Page 16]


Internet-Draft        Client Interface Requirements            July 2017


   In order to build a generic rule engine to satisfy diverse set of
   Policy Rules, we propose following objects:

   Source Policy Endpoint Group:  A source target of the Policy Rule.
      This may be special object "ALL" if all groups meet this criteria.

   Destination Policy Endpoint Group:  A destination target of the
      Policy Rule.  This may be a special object "ALL", if all groups
      meet this criteria.

   Direction:  By default rules are applied in either direction but this
      object can be used to make rule definition uni-directional.

   Threat Group:  An object that represents a set of static or dynamic
      threats such as Botnet, GeoIP, URL feeds or virus and malware
      signatures detected dynamically.  This object can be used as
      source or destination target in a rule.

   Match Condition:  An object that represents a set of allowed
      interactions.  It could be as simple as group of application names
      or L4 ports allowed between two Endpoint Groups.  It could very
      well that all traffic is allowed between two groups.

   Exceptions:  In order to truly build rules which are Security Admin
      and built with user semantics, we should allow to specify
      exceptions to the match criteria.  This will greatly simplify
      Security Admin's task.  E.g., we could build a rule that allows
      all traffic between two groups except a particular application or
      threat source.

   Actions:  Action is what makes rule and Policy work.  The Action is
      defined in details in next section.  We RECOMMEND that there be a
      one-to-one mapping between rule and action otherwise if multiple
      rules are associated with one action, it may be a difficult to
      manage Security Policy lifecycle as they evolve.

4.9.  Requirement to express rich set of Policy Actions

   Security Admin must be able to configure a variety of actions for a
   given Policy Rule.  Typically, Security Policy specifies a simple
   action of "deny" or "permit" if a particular condition is matched.
   Although this may be enough for most use-cases, the I2NSF Client-
   Facing interface must provide a more comprehensive set of actions so
   that the interface can be used effectively across various security
   needs.

   Policy action MUST be extensible so that additional policy action
   specifications can easily be added.



Kumar, et al.           Expires January 17, 2018               [Page 17]


Internet-Draft        Client Interface Requirements            July 2017


   The following list of actions SHALL be supported:

   Permit:  This action means continue processing the next rule or allow
      the packet to pass if this is the last rule.  This is often a
      default action.

   Deny:  This action means stop further packet processing and drop the
      packet.

   Drop connection:  This action means stop further packet processing,
      drop the packet, and drop connection (for example, by sending a
      TCP reset).

   Log:  This action means create a log entry whenever a rule is
      matched.

   Authenticate connection:  This action means that whenever a new
      connection is established it should be authenticated.

   Quarantine/Redirect:  This action is useful for threat remediation
      purposes.  If a security breach or infection point is detected, a
      Security Admin would like to isolate for purpose of remediation or
      controlling attack surface.

   Netflow:  This action creates a Netflow record; Need to define
      Netflow server or local file and version of Netflow.

   Count:  This action counts the packets that meet the rule condition.

   Encrypt:  This action encrypts the packets on an identified flow.
      The flow could be over an IPSEC tunnel, or TLS session for
      instance.

   Decrypt:  This action decrypts the packets on an identified flow.
      The flow could be over an IPSEC tunnel, or TLS session for
      instance.

   Throttle:  This action defines shaping a flow or a group of flows
      that match the rule condition to a designated traffic profile.

   Mark:  This action defines traffic that matches the rule condition by
      a designated DSCP value and/or VLAN 802.1p Tag value.

   Instantiate-NSF:  This action instantiates an NSF with a predefined
      profile.  An NSF can be any of the FW, IPS, IDS, honeypot, or VPN,
      etc.





Kumar, et al.           Expires January 17, 2018               [Page 18]


Internet-Draft        Client Interface Requirements            July 2017


   The policy actions should support combination of terminating actions
   and non-terminating actions.  For example, Syslog and then Permit;
   Count and then Redirect.

   Policy actions SHALL support any L2, L3, L4-L7 policy actions.

4.10.  Requirement for consistent policy enforcement

   As proposed in this document that the Client-Facing interface MUST be
   built using higher-level "User-Constructs" that are independent of
   network design and implementations.  In order to achieve this, it
   becomes important that Security Controller functionality becomes more
   complex that keep track of various objects that are used to express
   Security Policies.  The Security Controller MUST evaluate the
   Security Policies whenever these objects and network topology change
   to make sure that Security Policy is consistently enforced as
   expressed.

   Although this document does not specify how Security Controller
   achieve this and any implementation challenges.  It is assumed that
   once Security Controller uses Client-Facing interface to accept
   Security Policies; it would maintain the security posture as per the
   Security Policies during all changes in network or Endpoints and
   other building blocks of the framework.

   An event must be logged by Security Controller when a Security Policy
   is updated due to changes in it's building blocks such as Endpoint
   Group contents or the Security Policy is moved from one enforcement
   point to another because the Endpoint has moved in the network.  This
   may help in debugging and auditing for compliance reasons.  The
   Security Admin may optionally receive notifications if supported and
   desired.

4.11.  Requirement to detect and correct policy conflicts

   Client-Facing interface SHALL be able to detect policy "conflicts",
   and SHALL specify methods on how to resolve these "conflicts"

   For example a newly expressed Security Policy could conflict with
   existing Security Policies applied to a set of Policy Endpoint
   Groups.  This MUST be detected and Security Admin be allowed for
   manual correction if needed.

4.12.  Requirement for backward compatibility

   It MUST be possible to add new capabilities to Client-Facing
   interface in a backward compatible fashion.




Kumar, et al.           Expires January 17, 2018               [Page 19]


Internet-Draft        Client Interface Requirements            July 2017


4.13.  Requirement for Third-Party integration

   The security framework in a network may require the use of a
   specialty device such as honeypot, behavioral analytic, or SIEM for
   threat detection; the device may provide threat information such as
   threat feeds, virus signatures, and malicious file hashes.

   The Client-Facing interface must allow Security Admin to include
   these devices under Security Controller's Client-Facing interface so
   that a Security Policy could be expressed using information from such
   devices; basically it allows ability to integrate third part devices
   into the Security Policy framework.

4.14.  Requirement to collect telemetry data

   One of the most important aspect of security is to have visibility
   into the network.  As threats become more sophisticated, Security
   Admin must be able to gather different types of telemetry data from
   various NSFs in the network.  The collected data could simply be
   logged or sent to security analysis engines for behavioral analysis,
   policy violations, and for threat detection.

   The Client-Facing interface MUST allow Security Admin to collect
   various kinds of data from NSFs.  The data source could be syslog,
   flow records, policy violation records, and other available data.

   Client-Facing interface must provide a set of telemetry data
   available to Security Admin from Security Controller.  The Security
   Admin should be able to subscribe and receive to this data set.

5.  Operational Requirements for the Client-Facing Interface

5.1.  API Versioning

   Client-Facing interface must support a version number for each
   RESTful API.  This is important since Security Controller could be
   deployed by using multiple componenets and different pieces may come
   from different vendors; it is difficult to isolate and debug issues
   without ablility to track each component's operational behavior.
   Even if the vendor is same for all the components, it is hard to
   imagine that all pieces would be released in lock step by the vendor.

   Without API versioning, it is hard to debug and figure out issues
   when deploying Security Controller and its components built overtime
   across multiple release cycles.  Although API versioning does not
   guarantee that Security Controller would always work but it helps in
   debugging if the problem is caused by an API mismatch.




Kumar, et al.           Expires January 17, 2018               [Page 20]


Internet-Draft        Client Interface Requirements            July 2017


5.2.  API Extensibility

   Abstraction and standardization of Client-Facing interface is of
   tremendous value to Security Admins as it gives them the flexibility
   of deploying any vendor's NSF without need to redefine their policies
   if or when a NSF is changed.

   If a vendor comes up with new feature or functionality that can't be
   expressed through the currently defined Client-Facing interface,
   there SHALL be a way to extend existing APIs or to create a new API
   that addresses specific vendors's new NSF functionality.

5.3.  APIs and Data Model Transport

   The APIs for interface SHALL be derived from the YANG based data
   model.  The data model for Client-Facing interface must capture all
   the requirements as defined in this document to express a Security
   Policy.  The interface between a client and controller must be
   reliable to ensure robust policy enforcement.  One such transport
   mechanism is RESTCONF that uses HTTP operations to provide necessary
   CRUD operations for YANG data objects, but any other mechanism can be
   used.

5.4.  Notification and Monitoring

   Client-Facing interface must allow ability to collect various alarms,
   events, statistics about enforcement and policy violations from NSFs
   in the network.  The events and alarms may be associated with a
   specific policy or associated with operating conditions of a specific
   NSF in general.  The statistics may be a measure of potential
   Security Policy violations or general data that reflect operational
   behavior of a NSF.  The events, alarms and statistics may also be
   used as an input to automate Security Policy lifecycle management.

5.5.  Affinity

   Client-Facing interface must allow Security Admin to pass any
   additional metadata that a user may want to provide with a Security
   Policy e.g., if the policy needs to be enforced by a very highly
   secure NSF with Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip.  Another example
   would be, if a policy can not be enforced by a multi-tenant NSF.
   This would Security Admin control on operating environment

5.6.  Test Interface

   Client-Facing interface must support ability to test a Security
   Policy before it is enforced e.g., a user may want to verify whether
   the policy creates any potential conflicts with existing policies or



Kumar, et al.           Expires January 17, 2018               [Page 21]


Internet-Draft        Client Interface Requirements            July 2017


   if there are enough resources and capability to enforce this policy.
   The test interface would provide a mechanism to Security Admin where
   policies could be tested in the actual environment before
   enforcement.

6.  Security Considerations

   Client-Facing interface to Security controller must be protected to
   make sure that entire security posture is not compromised.  This
   draft mandates that interface must have proper authentication and
   authorization control mechanisms to ward off malicious attacks.  The
   draft does not specify a particular mechanism as different
   organization may have different needs based on their specific
   deployment environment and moreover new methods may evolve to better
   suit contemporary requirements.

   Authentication and authorization alone may not be sufficient for
   Client-Facing interface; the interface API must be validated for
   proper input to guard against attacks.  The type of checks and
   verification may be specific to each interface API, but a careful
   consideration must be made to ensure that Security Controller is not
   compromised.

   We recommend that all attack surface must be examined with careful
   consideration of the operating environment and available industry
   best practices must be used such as process and standards to protect
   security controller against malicious or inadvertent attacks.

7.  IANA Considerations

   This document requires no IANA actions.  RFC Editor: Please remove
   this section before publication.

8.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank Adrian Farrel, Linda Dunbar and Diego
   R.Lopez from IETF I2NSF WG for helpful discussions and advice.

   The authors would also like to thank Kunal Modasiya, Prakash T.
   Sehsadri and Srinivas Nimmagadda from Juniper networks for helpful
   discussions.

9.  Normative References








Kumar, et al.           Expires January 17, 2018               [Page 22]


Internet-Draft        Client Interface Requirements            July 2017


   [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-framework]
              Lopez, D., Lopez, E., Dunbar, L., Strassner, J., and R.
              Kumar, "Framework for Interface to Network Security
              Functions", draft-ietf-i2nsf-framework-06 (work in
              progress), July 2017.

   [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-problem-and-use-cases]
              Hares, S., Lopez, D., Zarny, M., Jacquenet, C., Kumar, R.,
              and J. Jeong, "I2NSF Problem Statement and Use cases",
              draft-ietf-i2nsf-problem-and-use-cases-16 (work in
              progress), May 2017.

Authors' Addresses

   Rakesh Kumar
   Juniper Networks
   1133 Innovation Way
   Sunnyvale, CA  94089
   US

   Email: rakeshkumarcloud@gmail.com


   Anil Lohiya
   Juniper Networks
   1133 Innovation Way
   Sunnyvale, CA  94089
   US

   Email: alohiya@juniper.net


   Dave Qi
   Bloomberg
   731 Lexington Avenue
   New York, NY  10022
   US

   Email: DQI@bloomberg.net


   Nabil Bitar
   Nokia
   755 Ravendale Drive
   Mountain View, CA  94043
   US

   Email: nabil.bitar@nokia.com



Kumar, et al.           Expires January 17, 2018               [Page 23]


Internet-Draft        Client Interface Requirements            July 2017


   Senad Palislamovic
   Nokia
   755 Ravendale Drive
   Mountain View, CA  94043
   US

   Email: senad.palislamovic@nokia.com


   Liang Xia
   Huawei
   101 Software Avenue
   Nanjing, Jiangsu  210012
   China

   Email: Frank.Xialiang@huawei.com



































Kumar, et al.           Expires January 17, 2018               [Page 24]


Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.124, available from https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/