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Versions: (draft-hares-i2nsf-gap-analysis) 00 01 02 03

I2NSF WG                                                        S. Hares
Internet-Draft                                              R. Moskowitz
Intended status: Informational                                    Huawei
Expires: September 7, 2017                                      D. Zhang
                                                           March 6, 2017


                  Analysis of Existing work for I2NSF
                  draft-ietf-i2nsf-gap-analysis-03.txt

Abstract

   This document analyzes the current state of the art for security
   management devices and security devices technologies in industries
   and the existing IETF work/protocols that are relevant to the
   Interface to Network Security Function (I2NSF).  The I2NSF focus is
   to define data models and interfaces in order to control and monitor
   the physical and virtual aspects of network security functions.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 7, 2017.

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   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of



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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  What is I2NSF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Structure of this Document  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.3.  Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       1.3.1.  Requirements Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       1.3.2.  Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   2.  IETF Gap analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.1.  Traffic Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.1.1.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.1.2.  Middle-box Filters  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       2.1.3.  Security Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   3.  ETSI NFV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     3.1.  ETSI Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     3.2.  I2NSF Gap Analysis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   4.  OPNFV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     4.1.  OPNFV Moon Project  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     4.2.  Gap Analysis for OPNFV Moon Project . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   5.  OpenStack Security Firewall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     5.1.  Overview of API for Security Group  . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     5.2.  Overview of Firewall as a Service . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     5.3.  I2NSF Gap analysis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   6.  CSA Secure Cloud  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     6.1.  CSA Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       6.1.1.  CSA Security as a Service (SaaS)  . . . . . . . . . .  20
       6.1.2.  Identity Access Management (IAM)  . . . . . . . . . .  21
       6.1.3.  Data Loss Prevention (DLP)  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       6.1.4.  Web Security (Web)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
       6.1.5.  Email Security (email)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
       6.1.6.  Security Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
       6.1.7.  Intrusion Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
       6.1.8.  Security Information and Event Management(SIEM) . . .  27
       6.1.9.  Encryption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
       6.1.10. Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery (BC/DR) . .  29
       6.1.11. Network Security Devices  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
     6.2.  I2NSF Gap Analysis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
   7.  IEEE security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
     7.1.  Port-based Network Access Control [802.1X]  . . . . . . .  31
     7.2.  MAC security (802.1AE)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
     7.3.  Secure Device Identity [802.1AR]  . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
   8.  In-depth Review of IETF protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
     8.1.  NETCONF and RESTCONF  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
     8.2.  I2RS Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
     8.3.  NETMOD YANG modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35



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     8.4.  COPS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
     8.5.  PCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
     8.6.  NSIS - Next Steps in Signaling  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
   10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
   11. Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
   12. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
     12.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
     12.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48

1.  Introduction

   This documents provides a gap analysis for I2NSF.

1.1.  What is I2NSF

   A Network Security Function (NSF) ensures integrity, confidentiality
   and availability of network communications, detects unwanted
   activity, and/or blocks out or at least mitigates the effects of
   unwanted activity.  NSFs are provided and consumed in increasingly
   diverse environments.  For example, users of NSFs could consume
   network security services offered on multiple security products
   hosted one or more service provider,their own enterprises, or a
   combination of the two.

   The lack of standard interfaces to control and monitor the behavior
   of NSFs makes it virtually impossible for security service providers
   to automate service offerings that utilize different security
   functions from multiple vendors.

   The Interface to Network Service Functions (I2NSF) work proposes to
   standardize a set of software interfaces to control and monitor the
   physical and virtual NSFs.  Since different security vendors support
   different features and functions, the I2NSF will focus on the flow-
   based NSFs that provide treatment to packets or flows such found in
   IPS/IDS devices, web filtering devices, flow filtering devices, deep
   packet inspection devices, pattern matching inspection devices, and
   re-mediation devices.

   There are two layers of interfaces envisioned in the I2NSF approach:

   o  The I2NSF Capability Layer specifies how to control and monitor
      NSFs at a functional implementation level.  This is the focus for
      this phase of the I2NSF Work.






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   o  The I2NSF Service Layer defines how the security policies of
      clients may be expressed and monitored.  The Service Layer is out
      of scope for this phase of I2NSF's work.

   For the I2NSF Capability Layer, the I2NSF work proposes an
   interoperable protocol that passes NSF provisioning rules and
   orchestration information between the I2NSF client on a network
   manager and the I2NSF agent on an NSF.  It is envisioned that clients
   of the I2NSF interfaces include management applications, service
   orchestration systems, network controllers, or user applications that
   may solicit network security resources.

   The I2NSF work to define this protocol includes the following work:

   o  defining an informational model that defines the concepts for
      standardizing the control and monitoring of NSFs,

   o  defining a set of YANG data models from the information model that
      identifies the data that must be passed,

   o  creating a capability registry (an IANA registry) that identifies
      the characteristics and behaviours of NSFs in vendor-neutral
      vocabulary without requiring the NSFs to be standardized.

   o  examining existing secure communication mechanisms to identify the
      appropriate ones for carrying the data that provisions and
      monitors information between the NSFs and their management entity
      (or entities).

1.2.  Structure of this Document

   This document provides an analysis of the gaps in the state of art in
   the following industry forums:

      IETF working groups (Section 2)

      ETSI Network Functions Virtualization Industry Specification Group
      (ETSI NFV ISG), (Section 3)

      OPNFV Open Source Group (Section 4)

      Open Stack - Firewall as a service (OpenStack Firewall FaaS)
      (Section 5) (http://docs.openstack.org/admin-guide-cloud/content/
      install_neutron-fwaas-agent.html)

      Cloud Security Alliance Security (CSA)as a Service (Section 6)
      (https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/research/secaas/#_overview)




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      In-Depth Review of Some IETF Protocols (Section 7)

1.3.  Terms and Definitions

1.3.1.  Requirements Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119, BCP 14
   [RFC2119] and indicate requirement levels for compliant CoAP.

1.3.2.  Definitions

   The following are a few definitions out of the terminology draft
   utilized in this draft.  For additional definitions please see:
   [I-D.hares-i2nsf-terminology].

   Network Security Function (NSF):    is a function that is provided as
      a set of security-related service function.  Typically, an NSF may
      be responsible for detecting unwanted activity and blocking/
      mitigating the effect of such unwanted activity in order to fulfil
      the service requirements.  The NSF can help in supporting
      communication stream integrity and confidentiality.

   Cloud Data Center (DC):   A data center that may/may not be run on
      the premises of enterprises, but has compute/storage resources
      that can be requested or purchased by the enterprises.  The
      enterprise is actually getting a virtual data center.  The Cloud
      Security Alliance (CSA) (http://cloudsecurityalliance.org) focuses
      on adding security to this environment.  A specific research topic
      is security as a service within the cloud data center.

   Cloud-based security functions:    Network Security Functions (NSFs)
      that may be hosted and managed by service providers or a different
      administrative entity.

   Domain:   The term Domain in this draft has the following different
      connotations in different scenarios:

      *  Client--Provider relationship, i.e. client requesting some
         network security functions from its provider;

      *  Domain A - Domain B relationship, i.e. one operator domain
         requesting some network security functions from another
         operator domain; or






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      *  Applications -- Network relationship, i.e. an application (e.g.
         cluster of servers) requesting some functions from network,
         etc.

      The domain context is important because it indicates the
      interactions the security is focused on.

   I2NSF server/agent:    A software instance that implements a network
      security function that receives provisioning information and
      requests operational data (e.g. monitoring data) from an I2NSF
      client.  It is also responsible for enforcing the policies that it
      receives from an I2NSF client.

   I2NSF client:    A security client software that utilizes the I2NSF
      protocol to read, write or change the provisioning network
      security device via software interface using the I2NSF protocol
      (denoted as I2RS Agent)

   I2NSF Management System:    I2NSF Client operates within an network
      management system which serves as a collections and distribution
      point for security provisioning and filter data.

2.  IETF Gap analysis

   The IETF gap analysis first examines the IETF mechanisms which have
   been developed to secure the IP traffic flows through a network.
   Traffic filters have been defined by IETF specifications at the
   access points, the middle-boxes, or the routing systems.  Protocols
   have been defined to carry provisioning and filtering traffic between
   a management system and an IP system (router or host system).
   Current security work (SACM working group (WG), MILE WG, and DOTS WG)
   is providing correlation of events monitored with the policy set by
   filters.  This section provides a review the filter work, protocols,
   and security correlation for monitors.

2.1.  Traffic Filters

2.1.1.  Overview

   The earliest filters defined by IETF were access filters which
   controlled the acceptance of IP packet data flows.  Additional policy
   filters were created as part of the following protocols:

   o  COPS protocol [RFC2748] for controlling access to networks,

   o  Next Steps in Signalling (NSIS) work (architecture: [RFC4080]
      protocol: [RFC5973]) - for supporting signaling about a data flow
      along its path, and



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   o  Port Control Protocol (PCP) - allows the IPv4/IPv6 host to control
      how IPv6/IPv4 packets are translated and forwarded by NATS and
      firewalls.

   Today NETMOD and I2RS Working groups are specifying additional
   filters in YANG modules to be used as part of the NETCONF or I2RS
   enhancement of NETCONF/RESTCONF.

   Route filtering is outside the scope of the flow filtering, but the
   flow filtering may be impacted by route filtering.  An initial model
   for routing policy is in [I-D.ietf-rtgwg-policy-model]

   This section provides an overview of the flow filtering as an
   introduction to the I2NSF Gap analysis.  Additional detail on
   NETCONF, NETMOD, I2RS, PCP, and NSIS is available in Section 7.

2.1.1.1.  Data Flow Filters in NETMOD and I2RS

   The current work on expanding these filters is focused oncombining a
   configuration and monitoring protocol with YANG data models.
   [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model] provides a set of access list filters
   which can permit or deny traffic flow based on headers at the MAC
   Layer, IP Layer, and Transport Layer.  The configuration and
   monitoring protocols which can pass the filters are: NETCONF protocol
   [RFC6241], RESTCONF [I-D.ietf-netconf-restconf], and the I2RS
   protocol.  The NETCONF and RESTCONF protocols install these filters
   into forwarding tables.  The I2RS protocol uses the ACLs as part of
   the filters installed in an ephemeral protocol-independent filter-
   based RIB [I-D.kini-i2rs-fb-rib-info-model] which controls the flow
   of traffic on interfaces specifically controlled by the I2RS filter-
   based FIB.

                         netconf
      +---------------+    /  \     +---------------+
      | Device: ACLs  |-- /     \---|Device: ACLS   |
      | I2RS FB RIB   |             | I2RS FIB RIB  |
      |routing policy |             | routing policy|
      |               |             |               |
   ===|===============|=============|===============|=
      +---------------+  data flow  +---------------+

           Figure 1

   The I2RS protocol is a programmatic interface to the routing system.
   At this time, the I2RS is targeted to be extensions to the NETCONF/
   RESTCONF protocols to allow the NETCONF/RESTCONF protocol to support
   a highly programmatic interface with high bandwidth of data, highly
   reliable notifications, and ephemeral state (see



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   [I-D.ietf-i2rs-architecture]).  See Section 7.2 on I2RS for
   additional details on I2RS.

   The vocabulary of the [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model] is limited, so
   additional protocol independent filters has been written for the I2RS
   Filter-Based RIBs in [I-D.hares-i2rs-pkt-eca-data-model].

   One thing important to note is that NETCONF and RESTCONF manage
   device layer YANG models.  However, as Figure 2 shows, there are
   multiple device level, network-wide level, and application level YANG
   modules.  The access lists defined by the device level forwarding
   table may be impacted by the routing protocols, the I2RS ephemeral
   protocol independent Filter-Based FIB, or some network-wide security
   issue (IPS/IDS).

   +--------------------------------------------+
   |Application Network Wide: Intent            |
   +--------------------------------------------+
   |Network-wide level: L3SM L3VPN service model|
   +--------------------------------------------+
   |Device level: Protocol Independent: I2RS    |
   | RIB, Topology, Filter-Based RIB            |
   +--------------------------------------------+
   |Device Level:Protocol YANG modules          |
   | (ISIS, OSPF, BGP, EVPN, L2VPN, L3VPN, etc.)
   +--------------------------------------------+
   | Device level: IP and System: NETMOD Models |
   | (config and oper-state), tunnels,          |
   |  forwarding filters                        |
   +--------------------------------------------+

    Figure 2 Levels of YANG modules

2.1.1.2.  I2NSF Gap analysis

   The gap is that none of the current work on these filters considers
   all the variations of data necessary to do IPS/IDS, web-filters,
   stateful flow-based filtering, security-based deep packet inspection,
   or pattern matching with re-mediation.  The I2RS Filter-Based RIB
   work is the closest associated work, but the focus has not been on
   IDS/IPS, web-filters, security-based deep packet inspection, or
   pattern matching with re-mediation.

   The I2RS Working group (I2RS WG) is focused on the routing system so
   the requisite security expertise for such NSFs (IDP/IPS, Web-filter,
   security-based deep-packet inspection, etc.) has not been targeted
   for this WG.




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   Another gap is there is no capability registry (an IANA registry)
   that identifies the characteristics and behaviours of NSFs in vendor-
   neutral vocabulary without requiring the NSFs to be standardized.

   What I2NSF can use from NETCONF/RESTCONF and I2RS

   I2NSF should consider using NETCONF/RESTCONF protocol and the I2RS
   proposed enhancement to the NETCONF/RESTCONF protocol.

2.1.2.  Middle-box Filters

2.1.2.1.  Midcom

   Midcom Summary: MIDCOM developed the protocols for applications to
   communicate with middle boxes.  However, MIDCOM have not been used by
   the industry for a long time.  A main reason is that MIDCOM had a lot
   of IPR encumbered technology and IPR was likely a bigger problem for
   IETF at that time than it is today.  MIDCOM is not specific to SIP.
   It was very much oriented to NAT/FW devices.  SIP was just one
   application that needed the functionality.  MIDCOM is reservation-
   oriented and there was an expectation that the primary deployment
   environment would be VoIP and real-time conferencing, including SIP,
   H.323, and other reservation-oriented protocols.  There was an
   assumption that there would be some authoritative service that would
   have a view into endpoint sessions and be able to authorize (or not)
   resource allocation requests.  In other words, there is a trust model
   in MIDCOM that may not be applicable to endpoint-driven requests
   without some sort of trusted authorization mechanisms/tools.
   Therefore, there is a specific information model applied to security
   devices, and security device requests, that was developed in the
   context of an SNMP MIB.  There is also a two-stage reservation model,
   which was specified in order to allow better resource management.

   Why I2NSF is Different from Midcom

   MIDCOM is different from I2NSF because its SNMP scheme does not work
   with the virtual network security functions (vNSF) management.

   MidCom RFCs:

      [RFC3303] - Midcom architecture

      [RFC5189] - Midcom Protocol Semantics

      [RFC3304] - Midcom protocol requirements






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2.1.3.  Security Work

2.1.3.1.  Overview

   Today's NSFs in security devices can handle flow-based security by
   providing treatment to packets/flows, such as IPS/IDS, Web filtering,
   flow filtering, deep packet inspection, or pattern matching and re-
   mediation.  These flow-based security devices are managed and
   provisioned by network management systems.

   No standardized set of interoperable interfaces control and manage
   the NSFs so that a central management system can be used across
   security devices from multiple Vendors.  I2NSF work plan is to
   standardize a set of interfaces by which control and management of
   NSFs may be invoked, operated, and monitored by:

      Creating an information model that defines concepts required for
      standardizing the control and monitoring of NSFs, and from the
      information model create data models.  (The information model will
      be used to get early agreement on key technical points.)

      Creating a capability registry (at IANA) that enables the
      characteristics and behavior of NSFs to be specified using a
      vendor-neutral vocabulary without requiring the NSFs themselves to
      be standardized.

      Defining the requirements for an I2NSF protocol to pass this
      traffic.  (Ideally by re-using existing protocols.)

   The flow-filtering configuration and management must fit into the
   existing security area's work plan.  This section considers how the
   I2NSF fits into the security area work under way in the SACM
   (Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring), DOTS (DDoS Open
   Threat Signalling), and MILE (Management Incident Lightweight
   Exchange).

2.1.3.2.  Security Work and Filters

   In the proposed I2NSF work plan, the I2NSF security network
   management system controls many NSF nodes via the I2NSF Agent.  This
   control of data flows is similar to the COPS example in Section 7.4.










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                +------------+
                | I2NSF      |
                | Client     |
                |            |
                | security   |
                | NMS system |
                +------------+
      +-----+    /  \    +-----+
      |I2NSF|--/     \---|I2NSF|
      |Agent|            |Agent|
      |     |            |     |
      | NSF |            | NSF |
    --| ----|------------|-----|-----
      +-----+  data flow +-----+

        Figure 2


   The other security protocols work to interact within the network to
   provide additional information in the following way:

   o  SACM [I-D.ietf-sacm-architecture] describes an architecture which
      tries to determine if the end-point security policies and the
      reality (denoted as security posture) align.
      [I-D.ietf-sacm-terminology] defines posture as the configuration
      and/or status of hardware or software on an endpoint as it
      pertains to an organization's security policy.  Filters can be
      considered on the configuration or status pieces that needs to be
      monitored.

   o  DOTS (DDoS Open Threat Signalling) - is working on coordinating
      the mitigation of DDoS attacks.  A part of DDoS attach mitigation
      is to provide lists of addresses to be filtered via IP header
      filters.

   o  MILE (Managed Incident Lightweight Exchange) - is working on
      creating a standardized format for incident and indicator reports,
      and creating a protocol to transport this information.  The
      incident information MILE collects may cause changes in data-flow
      filters on one or more NSFs.

2.1.3.3.  I2NSF interaction

   The network management system that the I2NSF client resides on may
   interact with other clients or agents developed for the work ongoing
   in the SACM, DOTS, and MILES working groups.  This section describes
   how the addition of I2NSF's ability to control and monitor NSF
   devices is compatible and synergistic with these existing efforts.



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                +----------+    +------+
    +--------+  | security |====| DOTS |
    |SACNM   |  | NMS      |    |client|---+
    |consumer|  |..........|\  +------+    |
    +--------+==|SACM  *1  | \             |
           +----|repository|  \            |
           |    |..........|   +-------+   |
           |    | I2NSF    |   |MILES  |   |
    +------|-+  | client   |   |client |   |
    |SACM    |  +----------+   +-----:-+   |
    |Info.   |     / \               :     |
    |provider|    /   \              :     |
    +--------+   /     \             :     |
      +-----+   /       \    +-----+ :     |
      |I2NSF|--/         \---|I2NSF| :     |
      |     |                |     | :     |
      |     |                |MILES|.:     |
      |     |                |Agent|       |
      |     |                |DOTS |       |
      |     |                |Agent|-------+
    --| ----|----------------|-----|-----
      +-----+  data flow     +-----+

    *1 - this is the SACM Controller (CR) with
         its broker/proxy/repository show as
             described in the SACM architecture.

        Figure 3


   Figure 3 provides a diagram of a system in which the I2NSF, SACM,
   DOTS and MILE client-agent or consumer-broker-provider are deployed
   together.  The following are possible positive interactions these
   scenario might have:

   o  An security network management system (NMS) can contain a SACM
      repository and be connected to SACM information providers and SACM
      consumers.  The I2NSF may provide one of the ways to change the
      forwarding filters.

   o  The security NMS may also be connected to DOTS DDoS clients
      managing the information and configuring the rules.  The I2NSF may
      provide one of the ways to change forwarding filters.

   o  The MILE client on a security network management system talking to
      the MILE agent on the node may react to the incidents by using
      I2NSF to set filters.  DOTS creates black-lists, but does not have
      a complete set of filters.



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2.1.3.4.  Benefits from the Interaction

   I2NSF's ability to provide a common interoperable and vendor neutral
   interface may allow the security NMS to use a single change to change
   filters.  SACM provides an information model to describe end-points,
   but does not link this directly to filters.

   DOTS creates black-lists based on source and destination IP address,
   transport port number, protocol ID, and traffic rate.  Like ACLs
   defined NETMOD, the DOTS black-lists are not sufficient for all
   filters or control desired by the NSF boxes.

   The incident data captured by MILE will not have enough filter
   information to provide NSF devices with general services.  The I2NSF
   will be able to handle the MILE incident data and create alerts or
   reports for other security systems.

3.  ETSI NFV

3.1.  ETSI Overview

   Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) provides service providers
   with flexibility, cost effective and agility to offer their services
   to customers.  One such service is the network security function
   which guards the exterior of a service provider or its customers.
   However, the exterior network beyond the service provider NSFs or its
   customer's NSFs is becoming extremely narrow as NSFs are becoming
   more pervasive in any portion of networks (service providers,
   customers, or access networks).

   The flexibility and agility of NFV encourages service providers to
   provide different products to address business trends in their market
   to provide better service offerings to their end user.  A traditional
   product such as the network security function (NSF) may be broken
   into multiple virtual devices each hosted from another vendor.  In
   the past, network security devices may have been sourced from a small
   set of vendors - but in the NFV version of NSF devices, this reduced
   set of sources will not provide a competitive edge.  Due to this
   market shift, the network security vendors are realizing that the
   proprietary provisioning protocols and formats of data may be a
   liability.  Out of the NFV work has arisen a desire for a single
   interoperable network security device provisioning and control
   protocol.

   The I2NSF framework is complementary to the NFV and other security
   frameworks.  The I2NSF management protocol will be deployed in
   networks to provide a common management protocol to manage NSF
   software/devices whether the devices are physical or virtual.  The



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   ETSI NFV security is also deployed along-side other security
   functions (AAA, SACM, DOTS, or MILE devices) and deep-packet stateful
   inspections.

   The ETSI Network Functions Virtualization: NFV security: Security and
   Trust Guidance document (ETSI NFV SEC 003 1.1.1 (2014-12)) indicates
   that multiple administrative domains will deployed in carrier
   networks.  One example of these multiple domains is hosting of
   multiple tenant domains (telecom service providers) on a single
   infrastructure domain (infrastructure service) as Figure 4 shows.
   The ETSI Inter-VNFM document (aka Ve-Vnfn) between the element
   management system and the Virtual network function is the equivalent
   of the interface between the I2NSF client on a management system and
   the I2NSF agent on the network security feature VNF.

        ....................
    +--:   OSS/BSS         :
    |   ....................
    |
    |  +-------------------------+
    |  |                         |
    |  | ........   ........     |
    |  | :  EMS1 :   : EMS  :    |  ETSI inter-VNFM
    |  | ....||...   ...||...    |  (Ve-Vnfn)
    |  |     ||         || ==========I2NSF interface
    |  | ....||...   ...||...    |
    |  | :  VNF1 :   : VNF1 :    | Tenant domain
    |  | ....||...   ...||...    |
     ''''''''||'''''''''||''''''''''
    |  | ....||..... ...||...... | infrastructure
    |  | :virtual  : :virtual  : | domain
    |  | :computing: :computing: | with virtual
    |  | ........... ........... | network
    |  | +=====================+ ---------
    |  | | virtualization layer|           |
    |  | +=====================+           |
    |  | ........... .......... .......... |
    |====:computing: :storage : :network : |
       | :hardware : :hardware: :hardware: |
           | ........... .......... .......... |
           |  hardware resources               |
           +-----------------------------------+

       Figure 4

   The ETSI proof-of-concept demonstrations have been done for the
   security proof of concepts:




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   o  #16 - NFVIaaS with Secure, SDN controlled WAN Gateway,

3.2.  I2NSF Gap Analysis

   The I2NSF protocol/interface can be deployed for security devices
   along-side the network/host configuration done by NETCONF/RESTCONF or
   the routing system interface provided by I2RS that handles.

   In the current NFV-related architecture, there is no interoperable
   protocol defined between a security manager and various NSF devices
   to provision security functions.  The result is that service
   providers have to manage the interoperability security manager and
   different NSF devices using proprietary protocols.  In response to
   this problem, the device manufacturers and the service providers have
   begun to discuss an I2NSF protocol for interoperable passing of
   provisioning and filter in formation.

   Open source work (such as OPNFV) provides a common code base on which
   providers may start their NFV development work.  However, this code
   base faces the same problem.  There is no defacto standard protocol.

4.  OPNFV

   The OPNFV (www.opnfv.org) is a carrier-grade integrated, open source
   platform focused on accelerating the introduction of new Network
   Functions Virtualization (NFV) products and service.  The OPNFV Moon
   project is focused on adding the security interface for a network
   management system within the tenant NFVs and the infrastructure NFVs
   (as shown in Figure 4).  This section provides an overview of the
   OPNFV Moon project and a gap analysis between I2NSF and the OPNFV
   Moon Project.

4.1.  OPNFV Moon Project

   The OPNFV Moon project (https://wiki.opnfv.org) is a security
   management system.  NFV uses cloud computing technologies to
   virtualize the resources and automate the control.  The Moon project
   is working on a security manager for the cloud computing
   infrastructure (https://wiki.opnfv.org/moon).  The Moon project
   proposes to provision a set of different cloud resources/services for
   VNFs (Virtualized Network Functions) while managing the isolation of
   VNS, protection of VNFs, and monitoring of VNS.  Moon is creating a
   security management system for OPNFV with security managers to
   protect different layers of the NFV infrastructure.  The Moon project
   is choosing various security project mechanisms "a la carte" to
   enforcement related security managers.  A security management system
   integrates mechanisms of different security aspects.  This project
   intends propose a security manager that specifies users' security



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   requirements.  It will also enforce the security managers through
   various mechanisms like authorization for access control, firewall
   for networking, isolation for storage, logging for tractability, etc.

   The Moon security manager operates a VNF security manager at the ETSI
   VeVnfm level where the I2NSF protocol is targeted as Figure 5 shows.
   This figure also shows how the OPNFV VNF Security project mixes the
   I2NSF level with the device level.

   The Moon project lists the following gaps in OpenStack:

   o  No centralized control for compute, storage, and networking.  Open
      Stack uses Nova for compute and Swift for object storage.  Each
      system has a configuration file and its own security policy.  The
      system lacks a synchronization mechanism to build a complete
      secure configuration for OPNFV.

   o  No dynamic control so that if a user obtains the token, so there
      is no way to obtain control over the user.

   o  No customization or flexibility to allow integration into
      different vendors,

   o  No fine grained authorization at user level.  Authorization is
      only at the API level.

   Moon addresses these issues adding authorization, logging, IDS,
   enforcement of network policy, and storage protection.  Moon release
   C (2016) plans to:

   o  Define an identity federation scenario between OpenStack and
      OpenDaylight,

   o  Implement an authentication driver in ODL to delegate
      authentication to OpenStack/Keystone,

   o  Implement a command line tool for administration and testing,

   o  Implement a graphic interface for identity management for both
      OpenStack and OpenDaylight,

   o  Set up identity federation testbed,

   o  Define identity federation scenarios with other SDN controllers,
      and

   o  Define authorization federation scenarios with OpenDaylight.




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   Deliverable time frame: Moon Release 3 (mid-year 2016)

        ....................
    +--:   OSS/BSS         :
    |   ....................
    |
    |  +-------------------------+
    |  |                         |
    |  | ........   ........     |
    |  | :  EMS1 :   : EMS  :    |  ETSI inter-VNFM
    |  | ....||...   ...||...    |  (Ve-Vnfn)
    |  |     ||         || ==========I2NSF interface
    |  | ....||...   ...||...    | Moon VNF === Moon VNF
    |  | :       :   :      :    | Security     Security MGR
    |  | :  VNF1 :   : VNF1 :    |
    |  | ....||...   ...||...    | Tenant domain
     ''''''''||'''''''''||''''''''''
    |  | ....||..... ...||...... | infrastructure
    |  | :virtual  : :virtual  : | domain
    |  | :computing: :computing: | with virtual
    |  | ........... ........... | network
    |  | +=====================+ |--------
    |  | | virtualization layer| |
    |  | +=====================+
    |  |                =============Moon VNF ===Moon VI
   |   |                     security project    Security MGR
    |  | ........... .......... .......... |
    |====:computing: :storage : :network : |
       | :hardware : :hardware: :hardware: |
       | ........... .......... .......... |
       |  hardware resources               |
       +-----------------------------------+

       Figure 5

4.2.  Gap Analysis for OPNFV Moon Project

   OpenStack Congress does not provide vendor independent systems.

5.  OpenStack Security Firewall

   OpenStack has advanced features of: a) API for managing security
   groups (http://docs.openstack.org/admin-guide-cloud/content/
   section_securitygroups.html) and b) firewalls as a service
   (http://docs.openstack.org/admin-guide-cloud/content/
   fwaas_api_abstractions.html).





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   This section provides an overview of this open stack work, and a gap
   analysis of how I2NSF provides additional functions

5.1.  Overview of API for Security Group

   The security group rules provide ingress and egress traffic filters
   based on port.  The default rule for the group policy drops all
   ingress traffic and allows all egress traffic.  The group policy
   allows users to add additional groups with additional filters that
   change the default behaviour.  To utilize the security groups, the
   networking plug-in for OpenStack must implement the security group
   API.  The following plug-ins in OpenStack currently implement this
   security: ML2, Open vSwitch, Linux Bridge, NEC, and VMware NSX.  In
   addition, the correct firewall driver must be added to make this
   functional.

5.2.  Overview of Firewall as a Service

   Firewall as a service is an early release of an API that allows early
   adopters to test network implementations.  It contains APIs with
   parameters for firewall rules, firewall policies, and firewall
   identifiers.  The firewall rules include the following information:

   o  identification of rule (id, name, description)

   o  identification tenant rule associated with,

   o  links to installed firewall policy,

   o  IP protocol (TCP, UDP, ICMP, or none)

   o  source and destination IP address

   o  source and destination port

   o  action: allow or deny traffic

   o  status: position and enable/disabled

   The firewall policies include the following information:

   o  identification of the policy (id, name, description),

   o  identification of tenant associated with,

   o  ordered list of firewall rules,

   o  indication if policy can be seen by tenants other than owner, and



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   o  indication if firewall rules have been audited.

   The firewall table provides the following information:

   o  identification of firewall (id, name, description),

   o  tenant associated with this firewall,

   o  administrative state (up/down),

   o  status (active, down, pending create, pending delete, pending
      update, pending error)

   o  firewall policy ID this firewall is associated with

5.3.  I2NSF Gap analysis

   The OpenStack work is preliminary (security groups and firewall as a
   service).  This work does not allow any of the existing network
   security vendors provide a management interface.  The OpenStack work
   provides an interesting simple set of filters, and may in the future
   provide some virtual filter service.  However, at this time this open
   source work does not address the need for a single management
   interfaces for a variety of security devices.

   Phase 1 of I2NSF is proposes rules that will include Event-Condition-
   Action matches (ECA) rules with:

      packet based matches on L2, L3, and L4 headers and/or specific
      addresses within these headers, and

      context based matches on schedule state and schedule.

      basic ations of deny, permit, and mirror,

      advanced actions of: IPS signature filtering and URL filtering.

      [Editorial note: do we need more matches or actions?]

6.  CSA Secure Cloud

6.1.  CSA Overview

   The Cloud Security Alliance (CSA)(www.cloudsecurityaliance.org)
   defined security as a service (SaaS) in their Security as a Service
   working group (SaaS WG) during 2010-2012.  The CSA SaaS group defined
   ten categories of network security
   (https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/initiatives/secaas/



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   SecaaS_V1_0.pdf) and provides implementation guidance for each of
   these ten categories.  This section provides an overview of the CSA
   SaaS working groups documentation and a gap analysis for I2NSF

6.1.1.  CSA Security as a Service (SaaS)

   The CSA SaaS working group defined the following ten categories, and
   provided implementation guidance on these categories:

   1.   Identity Access Management (IAM)
        (https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/initiatives/secaas/
        SecaaS_Cat_1_IAM_Implementation_Guidance.pdf)

   2.   Data Loss Prevention (DLP)
        (https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/initiatives/secaas/
        SecaaS_Cat_2_DLP_Implementation_Guidance.pdf)

   3.   Web Security (web)
        (https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/initiatives/secaas/
        SecaaS_Cat_3_Web_Security_Implementation_Guidance.pdf),

   4.   Email Security (email)
        (https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/initiatives/secaas/
        SecaaS_Cat_4_Email_Security_Implementation_Guidance.pdf),

   5.   Security Assessments
        (https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/initiatives/secaas/
        SecaaS_Cat_5_Security_Assessments_Implementation_Guidance.pdf),

   6.   Intrusion Management
        (https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/initiatives/secaas/
        SecaaS_Cat_6_Intrusion_Management_Implementation_Guidance.pdf),

   7.   Security information and Event Management
        (https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/initiatives/secaas/
        SecaaS_Cat_7_SIEM_Implementation_Guidance.pdf),

   8.   Encryption
        (https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/initiatives/secaas/
        SecaaS_Cat_8_Encryption_Implementation_Guidance.pdf),

   9.   Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery (BCDR)
        https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/initiatives/secaas/
        SecaaS_Cat_9_BCDR_Implementation_Guidance.pdf), and

   10.  Network Security
        (https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/initiatives/secaas/
        SecaaS_Cat_10_Network_Security_Implementation_Guidance.pdf).



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   The sections below give an overview these implementation guidelines.

6.1.2.  Identity Access Management (IAM)

   document:
   (https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/initiatives/secaas/
   SecaaS_Cat_1_IAM_Implementation_Guidance.pdf)

   The identity management systems include the following services:

   o  Centralized Directory Services,

   o  Access Management Services,

   o  Identity Management Services,

   o  Identity Federation Services,

   o  Role-Based Access Control Services,

   o  User Access Certification Services,

   o  Privileged User and Access Management,

   o  Separation of Duties Services, and

   o  Identity and Access Reporting Services.

   The IAM device communications with the security management system
   that controls the filtering of data.  The CSA SaaS IAM specification
   states that interoperability between IAM devices and secure access
   network management systems is a problem.  This 2012 implementation
   report confirms there is a gap with IAM.

    +------------+                      +--------+
    | IAM device | ---- SLA ------------| secure |
    |            |     Access review    | access |
    |            |    security events   |  NMS   |
    |            |    access tracing    |        |
    +---||-------+    Audit report      +---||---+
        ||                                  ||
        ||         +------------------+     ||
        ========== |Filter enforcement|=====||
                   +------------------+
      Figure 6






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6.1.3.  Data Loss Prevention (DLP)

   Document:
   (https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/initiatives/secaas/
   SecaaS_Cat_2_DLP_Implementation_Guidance.pdf)

   The data loss prevention (DLP) services must address:

   o  origination verification,

   o  integrity of data,

   o  confidentiality and access control,

   o  accountability,

   o  avoiding false positives on detection, and

   o  privacy concerns.

   The CSA SaaS DLP device communications require that it have the
   enforcement capabilities to do the following:

      alert and log data loss,

      delete data on system or passing through,

      filter out (block/quarantine) data,

      reroute data,

      encrypt data

    +------------+                      +--------+
    | DLP device | ---- SLA ------------| secure |
    |            |    Alert and log     | access |
    |            |    delete data       |  NMS   |
    |            |    filter/reroute    |        |
    +---||-------+    encrypt data      +---||---+
        ||                                  ||
        ||         +------------------+     ||
        ========== |Filter enforcement|=====||
                   +------------------+
      Figure 7







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6.1.4.  Web Security (Web)

   Document:
   https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/initiatives/secaas/
   SecaaS_Cat_3_Web_Security_Implementation_Guidance.pdf

   The web security services must address:

   o  Web 2.0/Social Media controls,

   o  Malware and Anti-Virus controls,

   o  Data Loss Prevention controls (over Web-based services like Gmail
      or Box.net),

   o  XSS, JavaScript and other web specific attack controls

   o  Web URL Filtering,

   o  Policy control and administrative management,

   o  Bandwidth management and quality of service (QoS) capability, and

   o  Monitoring of SSL enabled traffic.

   The CSA SaaS Web services device communications require that it have
   the enforcement capabilities to do the following:

      alert and log malware or anti-virus data patterns,

      delete data (malware and virus) passing through systems,

      filter out (block/quarantine) data,

      filter Web URLs,

      interact with policy and network management systems,

      control bandwidth and QoS of traffic, and

      monitor encrypted (SSL enabled) traffic,

   All of these features either require the I2NSF standardized I2NSF
   client to I2NSF agent to provide multi-vendor interoperability.







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    +------------+                      +--------+
    |Web security| ---- SLA ------------| secure |
    |            |    Alert and log     | access |
    |            |    delete data       |  NMS   |
    |            | filter/reroute data  |        |
    |            | ensure bandwidth/QOS |        |
    |            | monitor encrypted    |        |
    |            |    data              |        |
    +---||-------+    encrypt data      +---||---+
        ||                                  ||
        ||         +------------------+     ||
        ========== |Filter enforcement|=====||
                   +------------------+
      Figure 8

6.1.5.  Email Security (email))

   Document:
   https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/initiatives/secaas/
   SecaaS_Cat_4_Email_Security_Implementation_Guidance.pdf

   The CSA Document recommends that email security services must
   address:

   o  Common electronic mail components,

   o  Electronic mail architecture protection,

   o  Common electronic mail threats,

   o  Peer authentication,

   o  Electronic mail message standards,

   o  Electronic mail encryption and digital signature,

   o  Electronic mail content inspection and filtering,

   o  Securing mail clients, and

   o  Electronic mail data protection and availability assurance
      techniques

   The CSA SaaS Email security services requires that it have the
   enforcement capabilities to do the following:

      provide the malware and spam detection and removal,




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      alert and provide rapid response to email threats,

      identify email users and secure remote access to email,

      do on-demand provisioning of email services,

      filter out (block/quarantine) email data,

      know where the email traffic or data is residing (to to regulatory
      issues), and

      be able to monitor encrypted email,

      be able to encrypt email,

      be able to retain email records (while abiding with privacy
      concerns), and

      interact with policy and network management systems.

   All of these features require the I2NSF standardized I2NSF client to
   I2NSF agent to provide multi-vendor interoperability.

    +------------+                      +--------+
    |   Email    | ---- SLA ------------| secure |
    |  security  | alert/log malware    | access |
    |            | alert/log email spam |  NMS   |
    |            | filter/reroute data  |        |
    |            | ensure bandwidth/QOS |        |
    |            | monitor encrypted    |        |
    |            |    data              |        |
    +---||-------+    encrypt data      +---||---+
        ||                                  ||
        ||         +------------------+     ||
        ========== |Filter enforcement|=====||
                   +------------------+
      Figure 9

6.1.6.  Security Assessment

   Document:
   https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/initiatives/secaas/
   SecaaS_Cat_5_Security_Assessments_Implementation_Guidance.pdf

   The CSA SaaS Security assessment indicates that assessments need to
   be done on the following devices:

   o  hypervisor infrastructure,



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   o  network security compliance systems,

   o  Servers and workstations,

   o  applications,

   o  network vulnerabilities systems,

   o  internal auditor and intrusion detection/prevention systems (IDS/
      IPS), and

   o  web application systems.

   All of these features require the I2NSF working group standardize the
   way to pass these assessments to and from the I2NSF client on the
   I2NSF management system and the I2NSF Agent.

6.1.7.  Intrusion Detection

   Document:
   https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/initiatives/secaas/
   SecaaS_Cat_6_Intrusion_Management_Implementation_Guidance.pdf)

   The CSA SaaS Intrusion detection management includes intrusion
   detection through: devices:

   o  Network traffic inspection, behavioural analysis, and flow
      analysis,

   o  Operating System, Virtualization Layer, and Host Process Events
      monitoring,

   o  Monitoring of Application Layer Events, and

   o  Correlation Techniques, and other Distributed and Cloud-Based
      Capabilities

   Intrusion response includes both:

   o  Automatic, Manual, or Hybrid Mechanisms,

   o  Technical, Operational, and Process Mechanisms.

   The CSA SaaS recommends the intrusion security management systems
   include provisioning and monitoring of all of these types of
   intrusion detection or intrusion protection devices.  Management of
   these systems requires:




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      Central reporting of events and alerts,

      Administrator notification of intrusions,

      Mapping of alerts to Cloud-Layer Tenancy,

      Cloud sourcing information to prevent false positives in
      detection, and

      Allowing for redirection of traffic to allow remote storage or
      transmission to prevent local evasion.

   In order to be able performing these management actions on NSF
   devices from different vendors, the intrusion security management
   systems need a standard mangement protocol that all the NSF vendors
   support.

    +------------+                      +--------+
    |  IDS/IPS   | ---- Info  ----------| secure |
    |  security  | alert/log intrusion  | access |
    |            | notify administrator |  NMS   |
    |            | Map alerts to Tenant |        |
    |            |filter/reroute traffic|        |
    |            | remote data storage  |        |
    +---||-------+                      +---||---+
        ||                                  ||
        ||         +------------------+     ||
        ========== |Filter enforcement|=====||
                   +------------------+
      Figure 10

   The I2NSF manager - I2NSF (server/agent) protocol is designed to fill
   this gap.

6.1.8.  Security Information and Event Management(SIEM)

   Document:
   https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/initiatives/secaas/
   SecaaS_Cat_7_SIEM_Implementation_Guidance.pdf)

   The Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) receives data
   from a wide range of security systems such as Identity management
   systems (IAM), data loss prevention (DLP), web security (Web), email
   security (email), intrusion detection/prevision (IDS/IPS)),
   encryption, disaster recovery, and network security.  The SIEM
   combines this data into a single streams.  All the requirements for
   data to/from these systems are replicated in these systems needs to
   give a report to the SIEM system.



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   A SIEM system would be a prime candidate to have an I2NSF client that
   gathers data from an I2NSF Agent associated with these various types
   of security systems.  The CSA SaaS SIEM functionality document
   suggests that one concern is to have standards that allow timely
   recording and sharing of data.  I2NSF can provide this.

6.1.9.  Encryption

   Document:
   https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/initiatives/secaas/
   SecaaS_Cat_8_Encryption_Implementation_Guidance.pdf

   The CSA SaaS encryption implementation guidance document considers
   how one implements and manages the following security systems:

      Key management systems (KMS), control of keys, and key life cycle;

      Shared Secret encryption (Symmetric ciphers),

      No-Secret or Public Key Encryption (asymmetric ciphers),

      Hashing algorithms,

      Digital Signature Algorithms,

      Key Establishment Schemes,

      Protection of Cryptographic Key Material (FIPS 140-2; 140-3),

      Interoperability of Encryption Systems, Key Conferencing, Key
      Escrow Systems, and others

      Application of Encryption for Data at rest, data in transit, and
      data in use;

      PKI (including certificate revocation "CRL");

      Future application of such technologies as Homomorphic encryption,
      Quantum Cryptography, Identity-based Encryption, and others;

      Crypto-system Integrity (How bad implementations can under mind a
      crypto-system), and

      Cryptographic Security Standards and Guidelines

   Encryption services typically require that security management
   systems be able to provision, monitor, and control the systems that
   are being used to encrypt data.  This document indicates in the



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   implementation sections that the standardization of interfaces to/
   from management systems are key to good key management systems,
   encryption systems, and crypto-systems.

6.1.10.  Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery (BC/DR)

   Document:
   https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/initiatives/secaas/
   SecaaS_Cat_9_BCDR_Implementation_Guidance.pdf

   The CSA SaaS Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery (BC/DR)
   implementation guidance document considers the systems that implement
   the contingency plans and measures designed and implemented to ensure
   operational resiliency in the event of any service interruptions.
   BC/DR systems includes:

      Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery BC/DR as a Service,
      including categories such as complete Disaster Recovery as a
      Service (DRaaS), and subsets such as file recovery, backup and
      archive,

      Storage as a Service including object, volume, or block storage;

      Cold Site, Warm Site, Hot Site backup plans;

      IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service), PaaS (Platform as a Service),
      and SaaS (Software as a Service);

      Insurance (and insurance reporting programs)

      Business Partner Agents (business associate agreements);

      System Replication (for high availability);

      Fail-back to Live Systems mechanisms and management;

      Recovery Time Objective (RTO) and Recovery Point Objective (RPO);

      Encryption (data at rest [DAR], data in motion [DIM], field
      level);

      Realm-based Access Control;

      Service-level Agreements (SLA); and

      ISO/IEC 24762:2008, BS25999, ISO 27031, and FINRA Rule 4370





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   These BC/DR systems must handle data backup and recovery, server
   backup/recovery, and data center (virtual/physical) backup and
   recovery.  Recovery as a Service (RaaS) means that the BC/DR services
   are being handled by management systems outside the enterprise.

   BC/DR requires security management systems to be able to communicate
   provisioning, monitor, and control those systems that are being used
   to back-up and restore data.  An interoperable protocol that allows
   provision and control of data center's data, servers, and data center
   management devices devices is extremely important to this
   application.  Recovery as a Service (SaaS) indicates that these
   services need to be able to be remotely management.

   The CSA SaaS BC/BR documents indicate how important a standardized
   I2NSF protocol is.

6.1.11.  Network Security Devices

   Document:
   https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/initiatives/secaas/
   SecaaS_Cat_10_Network_Security_Implementation_Guidance.pdf

   The CSA SaaS Network Security implementation recommendation includes
   advice on:

      How to segment networks,

      Network security controls,

      Controlling ingress and egress controls such as Firewalls
      (Stateful), Content Inspection and Control (Network-based),
      Intrusion Detection System/Intrusion Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS),
      and Web Application Firewalls,

      Secure routing and time,

      Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
      Protection/Mitigation,

      Virtual Private Network (VPN) with Multiprotocol Label Switching
      (MPLS) Connectivity (over SSL), Internet Protocol Security (IPsec)
      VPNs, Virtual Private LAN Service (VPLS), and Ethernet Virtual
      Private Line (EVPL),

      Threat Management,

      Forensic Support, and




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      Privileged User/Use Monitoring.

   These network security systems require provisioning, monitoring, and
   the ability for the security management system to subscribe to
   receive logs, snapshots of capture data, and time synchronization.
   This document states the following:

      "It is critical to understand what monitoring APIs are available
      from the CSP, and if they match risk and compliance requirements",

      "Network security auditors are challenged by the need to track a
      server and its identity from creation to deletion.  Audit tracking
      is challenging in even the most mature cloud environments, but the
      challenges are greatly complicated by cloud server sprawl, the
      situation where the number of cloud servers being created is
      growing more quickly than a cloud environments ability to manage
      them."

      A valid threat vector for cloud is the API access.  Since a
      majority of CSPs today support public API interfaces available
      within their networks and likely over the Internet."

   The CSA SaaS network security indicates that the I2NSF must be secure
   so that the I2NSF Client-Agent protocol does not become a valid
   threat vector.  In additions, the need for the management protocol
   like I2NSF is critical in the sprawl of Cloud environment.

6.2.  I2NSF Gap Analysis

   The CSA Security as a Service (SaaS) document show clearly that there
   is a gap between the ability of the CSA SaaS devices to have a vendor
   neutral, inoperable protocol that allow the multiple of network
   security devices to communicate passing provisioning and
   informational data.  Each of the 10 implementation agreements points
   to this as a shortcoming.  Standard I2NSF YANG models and an I2NSF
   protocol are needed according to the CSA SaaS documents.

7.  IEEE security

7.1.  Port-based Network Access Control [802.1X]

   802.1x defines encapsulation of Extensible Authentication Protocol
   (EAP) [RFC3748] over IEEE 802 (EAP over LAN, or EAPOL).  It is widely
   deployed on both wired and Wi-Fi Networks.

   EAP provides support for security from passwords to challenge-
   response tokens and public-key infrastructure certificates.




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   802.1 has three concepts:

   o  the supplicant - the user or client who wants to be authenticated

   o  authentication server - the server doing the authrentication (e.g.
      radius server), and

   o  the authenticator - the device in-between authentication server
      and supplicant (e.g. wireless Access Point (AP).

   A normal sequence is below:

 supplicant     authenticator          authentication server
 ===========    ===================    ========================
        <---- EAP-Request/Identity

 EAP-Response/Identity---->
                        EAP-Response/Identity---gt;
                                                     <---------Challenge
              <------Challenge

 Challenge
   response --------->
                       Challenge
                                            Response --------->


   Gap:

   This basic service provides access, but today's access use cases are
   more complex.  IEEE 801.X has ben attched using the Man-in-the-middle
   attacks.  Another weakness of 802.1X is the speed of the EAP
   protocols processing with the radius server.

   Note: Editor - more is needed here

7.2.  MAC security (802.1AE)

   MACsec security secures a link rather than a conversation for 802.1
   LANs (VLANs 802.1Q, Provider Bridges 802.1AD).  MACsec counters the
   802.1X man-in the middle attacks.

   MACsec (in 802.1AE) provides MAC-layer encryption over wired networks
   by using out-of-band methods for encryption keying.  The MACsec Key
   Agreement (MKA) Protocol provides the required session keys and
   manages the required encryption keys.  MKA and MACsec are implemented
   after successful authentication using the 802.1x Extensible
   Authentication Protocol (EAP) framework.  Only hosts link which face



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   the network can be secured with MACSec.  These links connect the host
   to the network access devices.

   Switch using MACsec accepts either MACsec or non-MACsec frames based
   on policy set.  The NSF controller can set within the switches
   configuration whether MACSec frames are accepted.  Accepted MACsec
   frames are encrypted and protected with an integrity check value
   (ICV).  The switch after receiving frames from the client, decrypts
   them and calculates the correct ICV by using session keys provided by
   MKA.  The switch compares that ICV to the ICV within the frame.  If
   they are not identical, the frame is dropped.  The switch also
   encrypts and adds an ICV to any frames sent over the secured port
   (the access point used to provide the secure MAC service to a client)
   using the current session key.

   The MKA Protocol manages the encryption keys used by the underlying
   MACsec protocol.  The basic requirements of MKA are defined in
   802.1x-REV.  The MKA Protocol extends 802.1x to allow peer discovery
   with confirmation of mutual authentication and sharing of MACsec
   secret keys to protect data exchanged by the peers.  MKA protocol ues
   EAP-over-LAN (EAPOL) packet.  EAP authentication produces a master
   session key (MSK) shared by both partners in the data exchange.
   Entering the EAP session ID generates a secure connectivity
   association key name (CKN).  Because the switch is the authenticator,
   and the key serer, it can generating a random 128-bit secure
   association key (SAK), which it sends it to the client partner.  The
   client is never a key server and can only interact with a single MKA
   entity, the key server.  After key derivation and generati

   Gap Analysis:

   I2NSF Devices must handle the existence of MSEC within the network.

7.3.  Secure Device Identity [802.1AR]

   802.1AR does the following:

      Supports trail of trust from manufacturer to user, and

      Defines how a Secure Device Identifier (DevId) may be
      cryptographically bound to a device to support device identity
      authentication.

      DevIDs are composed of a secure device identifier secret and a
      secure device identifier credential.  These IDs can be controlled
      by the product manufacturer (IDevID, an initially installed
      identity) or by the end-user (LDevID, a subsequent locally




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      significant identity derived from the IDevID).  DevIDs cannot be
      be changed by the end-user.

      One attack mitigation can be to disable support for DeVIDs or
      limit to know DeVIDs.

   GAP analysis:

   I2NSF controllers need to support 802.1AR device management.

8.  In-depth Review of IETF protocols

8.1.  NETCONF and RESTCONF

   The IETF NETCONF working group has developed the basics of the
   NETCONF protocol focusing on secure configuration and querying
   operational state.  The NETCONF protocol [RFC6241] may be run over
   TLS [RFC6639] or SSH ([RFC6242].  NETCONF can be expanded to defaults
   [RFC6243], handling events ([RFC5277] and basic notification
   [RFC6470], and filtering writes/reads based on network access control
   models (NACM, [RFC6536]).  The NETCONF configuration must be
   committed to a configuration data store (denoted as config=TRUE).
   YANG models identify nodes within a configuration data store or an
   operational data store using a XPath expression (document root ---to
   --- target source).  NETCONF uses an RPC model and provides protocol
   for handling configs (get-config, edit-config, copy-config, delete-
   config, lock, unlock, get) and sessions (close-session, kill-
   session).  The NETCONF Working Group has developed RESTCONF, which is
   an HTTP-based protocol that provides a programmatic interface for
   accessing data defined in YANG, using the data stores defined in
   NETCONF.

   RESTCONF supports "two edit condition detections" - time stamp and
   entity tag.  RESTCONF uses URI encoded path expressions.  RESTCONF
   provides operations to get remote servers options (OPTIONS), retrieve
   data headers (HEAD), get data (GET), create resource/invoke operation
   (POST), patch data (PATCH), delete resource (DELETE), or query.

   RFCs for NETCONF

   o  NETCONF [RFC6242]

   o  NETCONF monitoring [RFC6022]

   o  NETCONF over SSH [RFC6242]

   o  NETCONF over TLS [RFC5539]




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   o  NETCONF system notification> [RFC6470]

   o  NETCONF access-control (NACM) [RFC6536]

   o  RESTCONF [I-D.ietf-netconf-restconf]

   o  NETCONF-RESTCONF call home [I-D.ietf-netconf-call-home]

   o  RESTCONF collection protocol
      [I-D.ietf-netconf-restconf-collection]

   o  NETCONF Zero Touch Provisioning [I-D.ietf-netconf-zerotouch]

8.2.  I2RS Protocol

   Based on input from the NETCONF working group, the I2RS working group
   decided to re-use the NETCONF or RESTCONF protocols and specify
   additions to these protocols rather than create yet another protocol
   (YAP).

   The required extensions for the I2RS protocol are in the following
   drafts:

   o  [I-D.ietf-i2rs-ephemeral-state],

   o  [I-D.ietf-i2rs-pub-sub-requirements] (Publication-Subscription
      notifications,

   o  [I-D.ietf-i2rs-traceability]

   o  [I-D.ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements]

   At this time, NETCONF and RESTCONF cannot handle the ephemeral data
   store proposed by I2RS, the publication and subscription
   requirements, the traceability, or the security requirements for the
   transport protocol and message integrity.

8.3.  NETMOD YANG modules

   NETMOD developed initial YANG models for interfaces [RFC7223]), IP
   address ([RFC7277]), IPv6 Router advertisement ([RFC7277]), IP
   Systems ([RFC7317]) with system ID, system time management, DNS
   resolver, Radius client, SSH, syslog
   ([I-D.ietf-netmod-syslog-model]), ACLS ([I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model]),
   and core routing blocks ([I-D.ietf-netmod-routing-cfg] The routing
   working group (rtgwg) has begun to examine policy for routing and
   tunnels.




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   Protocol specific Working groups have developed YANG models for ISIS
   ([I-D.ietf-isis-yang-isis-cfg]), OSPF ([I-D.ietf-ospf-yang]), and BGP
   ([I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-model].

   BGP Services YANG models have been proposed for

   o  EVPN [I-D.brissette-bess-evpn-yang],

   o  L2VPN [I-D.shah-bess-l2vpn-yang],

   o  L3VPN [I-D.li-bess-l3vpn-yang] and
      [I-D.hu-bess-l2vpn-service-yang],

   TEAS working group has proposed [I-D.ietf-teas-yang-te-topo], and
   [I-D.ietf-teas-yang-rsvp].

   MPLS/PCE/CCAMP groups have proposed the following Yang modules:

   o  [I-D.raza-mpls-ldp-mldp-yang]

   o  [I-D.saad-mpls-static-yang],

   o  [I-D.zheng-mpls-lsp-ping-yang-cfg],

   o  [I-D.pkd-pce-pcep-yang], and

   o  [I-D.zhang-ccamp-transport-ctrlnorth-yang].

8.4.  COPS

   One early focus on flow filtering based on policy enforcement of
   traffic entering a network is the 1990s COPS [RFC2748] design (PEP
   and PDP) as shown in Figure 11.  The COPS policy decision points
   (PDP) managed network-wide policy (e.g.  ACLs) by installing this
   policy in policy enforcement points (PEPs) on the edge of the
   network.  These PEPs had firewall-like functions that control what
   data flows into the network at a PEP point, and data flow out of a
   network at a PEP.  [RFC3084] describes COPS usages for policy
   provisioning.












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                 PDP
      +-----+    /  \    +-----+
      |PEP1 |--/     \---|PEP2 |
      |     | ACL/policy |     |
      |     |                |     |
    --| ----|------------|-----|-----
      +-----+  data flow +-----+

              Figure 11

   Why COPS is no longer used

   Network security today uses specific devices (IDS/IPS, NAT firewall,
   etc.) with specific policies and profiles for each types of device.
   No common protocol or policy format exists between the policy manager
   (PDP) and security enforcement points.

   COPs RFCs: [RFC4261], [RFC2940], [RFC3084], and [RFC3483].

   Why I2NSF is Different from COPS

   COPS was a protocol for policy related to Quality of Service (QoS)
   and signaling protocols (e.g.  RSVP) (security, flow, and others).
   I2NSF creates a common protocol between security policy decision
   points (SPDP) and security enforcement points (SEP).  Today's
   security devices currently only use proprietary protocols.
   Manufacturers would like a security specific policy enforcement
   protocol rather than a generic policy protocol.

8.5.  PCP

   As indicated by the name, the Port Control Protocol (PCP) enables an
   IPv4 or IPv6 host to flexibly manage the IP address and port mapping
   information on Network Address Translators (NATs) or firewalls, to
   facilitate communication with remote hosts.

   PCP RFCs:

      [RFC6887]

      [RFC7225]

      [I-D.ietf-pcp-authentication]

      [I-D.ietf-pcp-optimize-keepalives]

      [I-D.ietf-pcp-proxy]




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   Why is I2NSF Different from PCP:

   Here are some aspects that I2NSF is different from PCP:

   o  PCP only supports management of port and address information
      rather than any other security functions

8.6.  NSIS - Next Steps in Signaling

   NSIS aims to standardize an IP signaling protocol (RSVP) along the
   data path for end points to request their unique QoS characteristics,
   unique FW policies or NAT needs (RFC5973) that are different from the
   FW/NAT original settings.  The requests are communicated directly to
   the FW/NAT devices.  NSIS is like east-west protocols that require
   all involved devices to fully comply to make it work.

   NSIS is path-coupled; it is possible to message every participating
   device along a path without having to know its location, or its
   location relative to other devices (This is particularly a pressing
   issue when one or more NATs present in the network, or when trying to
   locate appropriate tunnel endpoints).


              clients----I2NSF controller
                                  |   client
                          |
                          | I2NSF
                                              | server/agent
           +--------+       +--------+       +--------+
           |  host  |       |firewall|       | host   |
           |device-1|-------|device-2|-------|device-3|
           +--------+ RSVP  +--------+ RSVP  +--------+
                   -----NSIS-----------------------

   Why I2NSF is Different from NSIS:

   o  The I2NSF request does not require all network functions in a path
      to comply, but it is a protocol between the I2NSF client and the
      I2NSF Agent/Server

   o  I2NSF defines client (applications) oriented descriptors
      (profiles, or attributes) to request/negotiate/validate the
      network security functions that are not on the local premises.

   Why I2NSF may have higher chance to be deployed than NSIS:

   o  OpenStack already has a proof-of-concept/preliminary
      implementation, but the specification is not complete.  IETF can



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      play an active role to make the specification for I2NSF is
      complete.  IETF can complete and extend the OpenStack
      implementation to provide an interoperable specification that can
      meet the needs and requirements of operators and is workable for
      suppliers of the technology.  The combination of a carefully
      designed interoperable IETF specification with an open-source code
      development OpenStack will leverage the strengths of the two
      communities, and expand the informal ties between the two groups.
      A software development cycle has the following components:
      architecture, design specification, coding, and interoperability
      testing.  The IETF can take ownership of the first two steps, and
      provide expertise and a good working atmosphere (in hack-a-thons)
      in the last two steps for OpenStack or other open-source coders.

   o  IETF has the expertise in security architecture and design for
      interoperable protocols that span controllers/routers, middle-
      boxes, and security end-systems.

   o  IETF has a history of working on interoperable protocols or
      virtualized network functions (L2VPN, L3VPN) that are deployed by
      operators in large scale devices.  IETF has a strong momentum to
      create virtualized network functions (see SFC WG in routing) to be
      deployed in network boxes.  [Note: We need to add SACM and others
      here].

9.  IANA Considerations

   No IANA considerations exist for this document.

10.  Security Considerations

   No security considerations are involved with a gap analysis.

11.  Contributors

   The following people have contributed to this document: Hosnieh
   Rafiee, and Myo Zarny.  Myo Zarny provided the authors with extensive
   comments, great suggestions, and valuable insights on alternative
   views.

12.  References

12.1.  Normative References

   [RFC0791]  Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC0791, September 1981,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc791>.




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   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

12.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.brissette-bess-evpn-yang]
              Brissette, P., Shah, H., Li, Z., Tiruveedhula, K., Singh,
              T., and I. Hussain, "Yang Data Model for EVPN", draft-
              brissette-bess-evpn-yang-01 (work in progress), December
              2015.

   [I-D.hares-i2nsf-terminology]
              Hares, S., Strassner, J., Lopez, D., and L. Xia, "I2NSF
              Terminology", draft-hares-i2nsf-terminology-00 (work in
              progress), March 2016.

   [I-D.hares-i2rs-info-model-service-topo]
              Hares, S., Wu, W., Wang, Z., and J. You, "An Information
              model for service topology", draft-hares-i2rs-info-model-
              service-topo-03 (work in progress), January 2015.

   [I-D.hares-i2rs-pkt-eca-data-model]
              Hares, S., Wu, Q., and R. White, "Filter-Based Packet
              Forwarding ECA Policy", draft-hares-i2rs-pkt-eca-data-
              model-02 (work in progress), February 2016.

   [I-D.hu-bess-l2vpn-service-yang]
              hu, f., Chen, R., and J. Yao, "L2VPN Service YANG Model",
              draft-hu-bess-l2vpn-service-yang-00 (work in progress),
              March 2016.

   [I-D.ietf-i2rs-architecture]
              Atlas, A., Halpern, J., Hares, S., Ward, D., and T.
              Nadeau, "An Architecture for the Interface to the Routing
              System", draft-ietf-i2rs-architecture-11 (work in
              progress), December 2015.

   [I-D.ietf-i2rs-ephemeral-state]
              Haas, J. and S. Hares, "I2RS Ephemeral State
              Requirements", draft-ietf-i2rs-ephemeral-state-23 (work in
              progress), November 2016.

   [I-D.ietf-i2rs-problem-statement]
              Atlas, A., Nadeau, T., and D. Ward, "Interface to the
              Routing System Problem Statement", draft-ietf-i2rs-
              problem-statement-11 (work in progress), May 2016.



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   [I-D.ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements]
              Hares, S., Migault, D., and J. Halpern, "I2RS Security
              Related Requirements", draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-
              requirements-17 (work in progress), September 2016.

   [I-D.ietf-i2rs-pub-sub-requirements]
              Voit, E., Clemm, A., and A. Prieto, "Requirements for
              Subscription to YANG Datastores", draft-ietf-i2rs-pub-sub-
              requirements-09 (work in progress), May 2016.

   [I-D.ietf-i2rs-rib-data-model]
              Wang, L., Ananthakrishnan, H., Chen, M.,
              amit.dass@ericsson.com, a., Kini, S., and N. Bahadur, "A
              YANG Data Model for Routing Information Base (RIB)",
              draft-ietf-i2rs-rib-data-model-07 (work in progress),
              January 2017.

   [I-D.ietf-i2rs-rib-info-model]
              Bahadur, N., Kini, S., and J. Medved, "Routing Information
              Base Info Model", draft-ietf-i2rs-rib-info-model-10 (work
              in progress), December 2016.

   [I-D.ietf-i2rs-traceability]
              Clarke, J., Salgueiro, G., and C. Pignataro, "Interface to
              the Routing System (I2RS) Traceability: Framework and
              Information Model", draft-ietf-i2rs-traceability-11 (work
              in progress), May 2016.

   [I-D.ietf-i2rs-usecase-reqs-summary]
              Hares, S. and M. Chen, "Summary of I2RS Use Case
              Requirements", draft-ietf-i2rs-usecase-reqs-summary-01
              (work in progress), May 2015.

   [I-D.ietf-i2rs-yang-l2-network-topology]
              Dong, J. and X. Wei, "A YANG Data Model for Layer-2
              Network Topologies", draft-ietf-i2rs-yang-l2-network-
              topology-03 (work in progress), July 2016.

   [I-D.ietf-i2rs-yang-network-topo]
              Clemm, A., Medved, J., Varga, R., Bahadur, N.,
              Ananthakrishnan, H., and X. Liu, "A Data Model for Network
              Topologies", draft-ietf-i2rs-yang-network-topo-12 (work in
              progress), March 2017.








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   [I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-model]
              Shaikh, A., Shakir, R., Patel, K., Hares, S., D'Souza, K.,
              Bansal, D., Clemm, A., Zhdankin, A., Jethanandani, M., and
              X. Liu, "BGP Model for Service Provider Networks", draft-
              ietf-idr-bgp-model-01 (work in progress), January 2016.

   [I-D.ietf-isis-yang-isis-cfg]
              Litkowski, S., Yeung, D., Lindem, A., Zhang, J., and L.
              Lhotka, "YANG Data Model for ISIS protocol", draft-ietf-
              isis-yang-isis-cfg-02 (work in progress), March 2015.

   [I-D.ietf-l3sm-l3vpn-service-model]
              Litkowski, S., Shakir, R., Tomotaki, L., Ogaki, K., and K.
              D'Souza, "YANG Data Model for L3VPN service delivery",
              draft-ietf-l3sm-l3vpn-service-model-05 (work in progress),
              March 2016.

   [I-D.ietf-netconf-call-home]
              Watsen, K., "NETCONF Call Home and RESTCONF Call Home",
              draft-ietf-netconf-call-home-06 (work in progress), May
              2015.

   [I-D.ietf-netconf-restconf]
              Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
              Protocol", draft-ietf-netconf-restconf-04 (work in
              progress), January 2015.

   [I-D.ietf-netconf-restconf-collection]
              Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
              Collection Resource", draft-ietf-netconf-restconf-
              collection-00 (work in progress), January 2015.

   [I-D.ietf-netconf-zerotouch]
              Watsen, K., Clarke, J., and M. Abrahamsson, "Zero Touch
              Provisioning for NETCONF Call Home (ZeroTouch)", draft-
              ietf-netconf-zerotouch-02 (work in progress), March 2015.

   [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model]
              Bogdanovic, D., Sreenivasa, K., Huang, L., and D. Blair,
              "Network Access Control List (ACL) YANG Data Model",
              draft-ietf-netmod-acl-model-02 (work in progress), March
              2015.

   [I-D.ietf-netmod-routing-cfg]
              Lhotka, L. and A. Lindem, "A YANG Data Model for Routing
              Management", draft-ietf-netmod-routing-cfg-19 (work in
              progress), May 2015.




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   [I-D.ietf-netmod-syslog-model]
              Wildes, C. and K. Sreenivasa, "SYSLOG YANG model", draft-
              ietf-netmod-syslog-model-03 (work in progress), March
              2015.

   [I-D.ietf-ospf-yang]
              Yeung, D., Qu, Y., Zhang, J., Bogdanovic, D., and K.
              Sreenivasa, "Yang Data Model for OSPF Protocol", draft-
              ietf-ospf-yang-00 (work in progress), March 2015.

   [I-D.ietf-pcp-authentication]
              Wasserman, M., Hartman, S., Zhang, D., and T. Reddy, "Port
              Control Protocol (PCP) Authentication Mechanism", draft-
              ietf-pcp-authentication-09 (work in progress), May 2015.

   [I-D.ietf-pcp-optimize-keepalives]
              Reddy, T., Patil, P., Isomaki, M., and D. Wing,
              "Optimizing NAT and Firewall Keepalives Using Port Control
              Protocol (PCP)", draft-ietf-pcp-optimize-keepalives-06
              (work in progress), May 2015.

   [I-D.ietf-pcp-proxy]
              Perreault, S., Boucadair, M., Penno, R., Wing, D., and S.
              Cheshire, "Port Control Protocol (PCP) Proxy Function",
              draft-ietf-pcp-proxy-08 (work in progress), May 2015.

   [I-D.ietf-rtgwg-policy-model]
              Shaikh, A., Shakir, R., D'Souza, K., and C. Chase,
              "Routing Policy Configuration Model for Service Provider
              Networks", draft-ietf-rtgwg-policy-model-00 (work in
              progress), September 2015.

   [I-D.ietf-sacm-architecture]
              Cam-Winget, N., Lorenzin, L., McDonald, I., and l.
              loxx@cisco.com, "Secure Automation and Continuous
              Monitoring (SACM) Architecture", draft-ietf-sacm-
              architecture-05 (work in progress), October 2015.

   [I-D.ietf-sacm-terminology]
              Birkholz, H., Lu, J., and N. Cam-Winget, "Secure
              Automation and Continuous Monitoring (SACM) Terminology",
              draft-ietf-sacm-terminology-09 (work in progress), March
              2016.








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   [I-D.ietf-teas-yang-rsvp]
              Beeram, V., Saad, T., Gandhi, R., Liu, X., Shah, H., Chen,
              X., Jones, R., and B. Wen, "A YANG Data Model for Resource
              Reservation Protocol (RSVP)", draft-ietf-teas-yang-rsvp-06
              (work in progress), October 2016.

   [I-D.ietf-teas-yang-te-topo]
              Liu, X., Bryskin, I., Beeram, V., Saad, T., Shah, H., and
              O. Dios, "YANG Data Model for TE Topologies", draft-ietf-
              teas-yang-te-topo-06 (work in progress), October 2016.

   [I-D.kini-i2rs-fb-rib-info-model]
              Kini, S., Hares, S., Dunbar, L., Ghanwani, A., Krishnan,
              R., Bogdanovic, D., and R. White, "Filter-Based RIB
              Information Model", draft-kini-i2rs-fb-rib-info-model-03
              (work in progress), February 2016.

   [I-D.li-bess-l3vpn-yang]
              Li, Z., Zhuang, S., Liu, X., Haas, J., Esale, S., and B.
              Wen, "Yang Data Model for BGP/MPLS IP VPN", draft-li-bess-
              l3vpn-yang-00 (work in progress), October 2015.

   [I-D.pkd-pce-pcep-yang]
              Dhody, D., Hardwick, J., Beeram, V., and j.
              jefftant@gmail.com, "A YANG Data Model for Path
              Computation Element Communications Protocol (PCEP)",
              draft-pkd-pce-pcep-yang-06 (work in progress), July 2016.

   [I-D.raza-mpls-ldp-mldp-yang]
              Raza, K., Asati, R., Liu, X., Esale, S., Chen, X., and H.
              Shah, "YANG Data Model for MPLS LDP and mLDP", draft-raza-
              mpls-ldp-mldp-yang-04 (work in progress), July 2016.

   [I-D.saad-mpls-static-yang]
              Saad, T., Raza, K., Gandhi, R., Liu, X., Beeram, V., Shah,
              H., Bryskin, I., Chen, X., Jones, R., and B. Wen, "A YANG
              Data Model for MPLS Static LSPs", draft-saad-mpls-static-
              yang-03 (work in progress), May 2016.

   [I-D.shah-bess-l2vpn-yang]
              Shah, H., Brissette, P., Rahman, R., Raza, K., Li, Z.,
              Zhuang, S., Wang, H., Chen, I., Ahmed, S., Bocci, M.,
              Hardwick, J., Esale, S., Tiruveedhula, K.,
              tsingh@juniper.net, t., Hussain, I., Wen, B., Walker, J.,
              Delregno, N., Jalil, L., and M. Joecylyn, "YANG Data Model
              for MPLS-based L2VPN", draft-shah-bess-l2vpn-yang-01 (work
              in progress), March 2016.




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   [I-D.zhang-ccamp-transport-ctrlnorth-yang]
              Zhang, X., Jing, R., Jian, W., Ryoo, J., Xu, Y., and D.
              King, "YANG Models for the Northbound Interface of a
              Transport Network Controller: Requirements, Functions, and
              a List of YANG Models", draft-zhang-ccamp-transport-
              ctrlnorth-yang-00 (work in progress), March 2016.

   [I-D.zheng-mpls-lsp-ping-yang-cfg]
              Zheng, L., Aldrin, S., Zheng, G., Mirsky, G., and R.
              Rahman, "Yang Data Model for LSP-PING", draft-zheng-mpls-
              lsp-ping-yang-cfg-04 (work in progress), October 2016.

   [RFC2748]  Durham, D., Ed., Boyle, J., Cohen, R., Herzog, S., Rajan,
              R., and A. Sastry, "The COPS (Common Open Policy Service)
              Protocol", RFC 2748, DOI 10.17487/RFC2748, January 2000,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2748>.

   [RFC2940]  Smith, A., Partain, D., and J. Seligson, "Definitions of
              Managed Objects for Common Open Policy Service (COPS)
              Protocol Clients", RFC 2940, DOI 10.17487/RFC2940, October
              2000, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2940>.

   [RFC3084]  Chan, K., Seligson, J., Durham, D., Gai, S., McCloghrie,
              K., Herzog, S., Reichmeyer, F., Yavatkar, R., and A.
              Smith, "COPS Usage for Policy Provisioning (COPS-PR)",
              RFC 3084, DOI 10.17487/RFC3084, March 2001,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3084>.

   [RFC3303]  Srisuresh, P., Kuthan, J., Rosenberg, J., Molitor, A., and
              A. Rayhan, "Middlebox communication architecture and
              framework", RFC 3303, DOI 10.17487/RFC3303, August 2002,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3303>.

   [RFC3304]  Swale, R., Mart, P., Sijben, P., Brim, S., and M. Shore,
              "Middlebox Communications (midcom) Protocol Requirements",
              RFC 3304, DOI 10.17487/RFC3304, August 2002,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3304>.

   [RFC3483]  Rawlins, D., Kulkarni, A., Bokaemper, M., and K. Chan,
              "Framework for Policy Usage Feedback for Common Open
              Policy Service with Policy Provisioning (COPS-PR)",
              RFC 3483, DOI 10.17487/RFC3483, March 2003,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3483>.

   [RFC3484]  Draves, R., "Default Address Selection for Internet
              Protocol version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 3484,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3484, February 2003,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3484>.



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   [RFC3748]  Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
              Levkowetz, Ed., "Extensible Authentication Protocol
              (EAP)", RFC 3748, DOI 10.17487/RFC3748, June 2004,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3748>.

   [RFC4080]  Hancock, R., Karagiannis, G., Loughney, J., and S. Van den
              Bosch, "Next Steps in Signaling (NSIS): Framework",
              RFC 4080, DOI 10.17487/RFC4080, June 2005,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4080>.

   [RFC4261]  Walker, J. and A. Kulkarni, Ed., "Common Open Policy
              Service (COPS) Over Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
              RFC 4261, DOI 10.17487/RFC4261, December 2005,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4261>.

   [RFC4949]  Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
              FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.

   [RFC5189]  Stiemerling, M., Quittek, J., and T. Taylor, "Middlebox
              Communication (MIDCOM) Protocol Semantics", RFC 5189,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5189, March 2008,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5189>.

   [RFC5277]  Chisholm, S. and H. Trevino, "NETCONF Event
              Notifications", RFC 5277, DOI 10.17487/RFC5277, July 2008,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5277>.

   [RFC5539]  Badra, M., "NETCONF over Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
              RFC 5539, DOI 10.17487/RFC5539, May 2009,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5539>.

   [RFC5973]  Stiemerling, M., Tschofenig, H., Aoun, C., and E. Davies,
              "NAT/Firewall NSIS Signaling Layer Protocol (NSLP)",
              RFC 5973, DOI 10.17487/RFC5973, October 2010,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5973>.

   [RFC6022]  Scott, M. and M. Bjorklund, "YANG Module for NETCONF
              Monitoring", RFC 6022, DOI 10.17487/RFC6022, October 2010,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6022>.

   [RFC6241]  Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
              and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
              (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.






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   [RFC6242]  Wasserman, M., "Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure
              Shell (SSH)", RFC 6242, DOI 10.17487/RFC6242, June 2011,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6242>.

   [RFC6243]  Bierman, A. and B. Lengyel, "With-defaults Capability for
              NETCONF", RFC 6243, DOI 10.17487/RFC6243, June 2011,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6243>.

   [RFC6436]  Amante, S., Carpenter, B., and S. Jiang, "Rationale for
              Update to the IPv6 Flow Label Specification", RFC 6436,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6436, November 2011,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6436>.

   [RFC6470]  Bierman, A., "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)
              Base Notifications", RFC 6470, DOI 10.17487/RFC6470,
              February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6470>.

   [RFC6536]  Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration
              Protocol (NETCONF) Access Control Model", RFC 6536,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6536, March 2012,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6536>.

   [RFC6639]  King, D., Ed. and M. Venkatesan, Ed., "Multiprotocol Label
              Switching Transport Profile (MPLS-TP) MIB-Based Management
              Overview", RFC 6639, DOI 10.17487/RFC6639, June 2012,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6639>.

   [RFC6887]  Wing, D., Ed., Cheshire, S., Boucadair, M., Penno, R., and
              P. Selkirk, "Port Control Protocol (PCP)", RFC 6887,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6887, April 2013,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6887>.

   [RFC7223]  Bjorklund, M., "A YANG Data Model for Interface
              Management", RFC 7223, DOI 10.17487/RFC7223, May 2014,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7223>.

   [RFC7225]  Boucadair, M., "Discovering NAT64 IPv6 Prefixes Using the
              Port Control Protocol (PCP)", RFC 7225,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7225, May 2014,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7225>.

   [RFC7277]  Bjorklund, M., "A YANG Data Model for IP Management",
              RFC 7277, DOI 10.17487/RFC7277, June 2014,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7277>.

   [RFC7317]  Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "A YANG Data Model for
              System Management", RFC 7317, DOI 10.17487/RFC7317, August
              2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7317>.



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Authors' Addresses

   Susan Hares
   Huawei
   7453 Hickory Hill
   Saline, MI  48176
   USA

   Email: shares@ndzh.com


   Bob Moskowitz
   Huawei
   Oak Park, MI  48237

   Email: rgm@labs.htt-consult.com


   Dacheng Zhang
   Beijing
   China

   Email: dacheng.zdc@aliabab-inc.com




























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