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I2NSF                                                           S. Hares
Internet-Draft                                                    Huawei
Intended status: Standards Track                                D. Lopez
Expires: August 1, 2017                                   Telefonica I+D
                                                                M. Zarny
                                                                 vArmour
                                                            C. Jacquenet
                                                          France Telecom
                                                                R. Kumar
                                                        Juniper Networks
                                                                J. Jeong
                                                 Sungkyunkwan University
                                                        January 28, 2017


                 I2NSF Problem Statement and Use cases
               draft-ietf-i2nsf-problem-and-use-cases-07

Abstract

   This document describes the problem statement for Interface to
   Network Security Functions (I2NSF) as well as some companion use
   cases.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 1, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents



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   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Problem Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Challenges Facing Security Service Providers  . . . . . .   5
       3.1.1.  Diverse Types of Security Functions . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.1.2.  Diverse Interfaces to Control and Monitor NSFs  . . .   6
       3.1.3.  More Distributed NSFs and vNSFs . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       3.1.4.  More Demand to Control NSFs Dynamically . . . . . . .   7
       3.1.5.  Demand for Multi-Tenancy to Control and Monitor NSFs    7
       3.1.6.  Lack of Characterization of NSFs and Capability
               Exchange  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       3.1.7.  Lack of Mechanism for NSFs to Utilize External
               Profiles  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       3.1.8.  Lack of Mechanisms to Accept External Alerts to
               Trigger Automatic Rule and Configuration Changes  . .   8
       3.1.9.  Lack of Mechanism for Dynamic Key Distribution to
               NSFs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.2.  Challenges Facing Customers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       3.2.1.  NSFs from Heterogeneous Administrative Domains  . . .  10
       3.2.2.  Today's Control Requests are Vendor Specific  . . . .  11
       3.2.3.  Difficulty to Monitor the Execution of Desired
               Policies  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     3.3.  Difficulty to Validate Policies across Multiple Domains .  13
     3.4.  Software-Defined Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     3.5.  Lack of Standard Interface to Inject Feedback to NSF  . .  14
     3.6.  Lack of Standard Interface for Capability Negotiation . .  14
   4.  Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.1.  Basic Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     4.2.  Access Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     4.3.  Cloud Data Center Scenario  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       4.3.1.  On-Demand Virtual Firewall Deployment . . . . . . . .  19
       4.3.2.  Firewall Policy Deployment Automation . . . . . . . .  20
       4.3.3.  Client-Specific Security Policy in Cloud VPNs . . . .  20
       4.3.4.  Internal Network Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     4.4.  Preventing Distributed DoS, Malware and Botnet attacks  .  21
     4.5.  Regulatory and Compliance Security Policies . . . . . . .  22
   5.  Management Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22



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   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   8.  Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   9.  Contributing Authors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   10. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   11. Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25

1.  Introduction

   This document describes the problem statement for Interface to
   Network Security Functions (I2NSF) as well as some I2NSF use cases.
   A summary of the state of the art in the industry and IETF which is
   relevant to I2NSF work is documented in
   [I-D.hares-i2nsf-gap-analysis].

   The growing challenges and complexity in maintaining a secure
   infrastructure, complying with regulatory requirements, and
   controlling costs are enticing enterprises into consuming network
   security functions hosted by service providers.  The hosted security
   service is especially attractive to small and medium size enterprises
   who suffer from a lack of security experts to continuously monitor
   networks, acquire new skills and propose immediate mitigations to
   ever increasing sets of security attacks.

   According to [Gartner-2013], the demand for hosted (or cloud-based)
   security services is growing.  Small and medium-sized businesses
   (SMBs) are increasingly adopting cloud-based security services to
   replace on-premises security tools, while larger enterprises are
   deploying a mix of traditional and cloud-based security services.

   To meet the demand, more and more service providers are providing
   hosted security solutions to deliver cost-effective managed security
   services to enterprise customers.  The hosted security services are
   primarily targeted at enterprises (especially small/medium ones), but
   could also be provided to any kind of mass-market customer.  As a
   result, the Network Security Functions (NSFs) are provided and
   consumed in a large variety of environments.  Users of NSFs may
   consume network security services hosted by one or more providers,
   which may be their own enterprise, service providers, or a
   combination of both.  This document also briefly describes the
   following use cases summarized by
   [I-D.pastor-i2nsf-merged-use-cases]:

   o  [I-D.pastor-i2nsf-access-usecases] (I2NSF-Access),

   o  [I-D.zarny-i2nsf-data-center-use-cases](I2NSF-DC), and

   o  [I-D.qi-i2nsf-access-network-usecase] (I2NSF-Mobile).



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2.  Terminology

   AAA:    Authentication, Authorization, and Account [RFC2904].

   ACL:   Access Control List

   B2B:   Business-to-Business

   Bespoke:   Something made to fit a particular person, client or
      company.

   Bespoke security management:   Security management which is made to
      fit a particular customer.

   DC:    Data Center

   FW:    Firewall

   IDS:    Intrusion Detection System

   IPS:    Intrusion Protection System

   I2NSF:    Interface to Network Security Functions.

   NSF:    Network Security Function.  An NSF is a function that used to
      ensure integrity, confidentiality, or availability of network
      communication, to detect unwanted network activity, or to block or
      at least mitigate the effects of unwanted activity.

   Flow-based NSF:    An NSF which inspects network flows according to a
      security policy.  Flow-based security also means that packets are
      inspected in the order they are received, and without altering
      packets due to the inspection process (e.g., MAC rewrites, TTL
      decrement action, or NAT inspection or changes).

   SDN:    Software Defined Networks

   Virtual NSF:    An NSF which is deployed as a distributed virtual
      resource.

   VPN:    Virtual Private Networks

3.  Problem Space

   The following sub-section describes the problems and challenges
   facing customers and security service providers when some or all of
   the security functions are no longer physically hosted by the
   customer's adminstrative domain.



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   Security service providers can be internal or external to the
   company.  For example, an internal IT Security group within a large
   enterprise could act as a security service provider for the
   enterprise.  In contrast, an enterprise could outsource all security
   services to an external security service provider.  In this document,
   the security service provider function, whether it is internal or
   external, will be denoted as "service provider".

   The "Customer-Provider" relationship may be between any two parties.
   The parties can be in different firms or different domains of the
   same firm.  Contractual agreements may be required in such contexts
   to formally document the customer's security requirements and the
   provider's guarantees to fulfill those requirements.  Such agreements
   may detail protection levels, escalation procedures, alarms
   reporting, etc.  There is currently no standard mechanism to capture
   those requirements.

   A service provider may be a customer of another service provider.

   It is the objective of the I2NSF work to address these problems and
   challenges.

3.1.  Challenges Facing Security Service Providers

3.1.1.  Diverse Types of Security Functions

   There are many types of NSFs.  NSFs by different vendors can have
   different features and have different interfaces.  NSFs can be
   deployed in multiple locations in a given network, and perhaps have
   different roles.

   Below are a few examples of security functions and locations or
   contexts in which they are often deployed:

   External Intrusion and Attack Protection:   Examples of this function
      are firewall/ACL authentication, IPS, IDS, and endpoint
      protection.

   Security Functions in a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ):   Examples of this
      function are firewall/ACLs, IDS/IPS, one or all of AAA services
      NAT, forwarding proxies, and application filtering.  These
      functions may be physically on-premise in a server provider's
      network at the DMZ spots or located in a "virtual" DMZ.

   Centralized or Distributed security functions:   The security
      functions could be deployed in a centralized fashion for ease of
      management and network design or in a distributed fashion for
      scaled requirement.  No matter how a security function is deployed



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      and provisioned, it is desirable to have same interface to
      provision security policies; otherwise it makes the job of
      security administration more complex, requiring knowledge of
      firewall and network design.

   Internal Security Analysis and Reporting:   Examples of this function
      are security logs, event correlation, and forensic analysis.

   Internal Data and Content Protection:   Examples of this function are
      encryption, authorization, and public/private key management for
      internal database.

   Security gateways and VPN concentrators:    Examples of these
      functions are; IP-sec gateways, Secure VPN concentrators that
      handle bridging secure VPNs, and Secure VPN controllers for data
      flows.

   Given the diversity of security functions, the contexts in which
   these functions can be deployed, and the constant evolution of these
   functions, standardizing all aspects of security functions is
   challenging, and most probably not feasible.  Fortunately, it is not
   necessary to standardize all aspects.  For example, from an I2NSF
   perspective, there is no need to standardize how every firewall's
   filtering is created or applied.  Some features in a specific
   vendor's filtering may be unique to the vendor's product so it is not
   necessary to standardize these features.

   What is needed is a standardized interface to control and monitor the
   rule sets that NSFs use to treat packets traversing through these
   NSFs.  Thus standardizing interfaces will provide an impetus for
   standardizing established security functions.

   I2NSF may specify some filters, but these filters will be linked to
   specific common functionality developed by I2NSF in information
   models or data models.

3.1.2.  Diverse Interfaces to Control and Monitor NSFs

   To provide effective and competitive solutions and services, Security
   Service Providers may need to utilize multiple security functions
   from various vendors to enforce the security policies desired by
   their customers.

   Since no widely accepted industry standard security interface to
   security NSFs exists today, management of NSFs (device and policy
   provisioning, monitoring, etc.) tends to be bespoke security
   management offered by product vendors.  As a result, automation of
   such services, if it exists at all, is also bespoke.  Thus, even in



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   the traditional way of deploying security features, there is a gap to
   coordinate among implementations from distinct vendors.  This is the
   main reason why mono-vendor security functions are often deployed and
   enabled in a particular network segment.

   A challenge for monitoring is that an NSF cannot monitor what it
   cannot view.  Therefore, enabling a security function (e.g., firewall
   [I-D.ietf-opsawg-firewalls]) does not mean that a network is
   protected.  As such, it is necessary to have a mechanism to monitor
   and provide execution status of NSFs to security and compliance
   management tools.  There exist various network security monitoring
   vendor-specific interfaces for forensics and troubleshooting.

3.1.3.  More Distributed NSFs and vNSFs

   The security functions which are invoked to enforce a security policy
   can be located in different equipment and network locations.

   The European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) Network
   Functions Virtualization (NFV) initiative [ETSI-NFV] creates new
   management challenges for security policies to be enforced by
   distributed virtual network security functions (vNSF).

   A vNSF has higher risk of changes to the state of network connection,
   interfaces, or traffic as their hosting Virtual Machines (VMs) are
   being created, moved, or decommissioned.

3.1.4.  More Demand to Control NSFs Dynamically

   In the advent of Software-Defined Networking (SDN)(see
   [I-D.jeong-i2nsf-sdn-security-services]), more clients, applications
   or application controllers need to dynamically update their security
   policies that are enforced by NSFs.  The Security Service Providers
   have to dynamically update their decision-making process (e.g., in
   terms of NSF resource allocation and invocation) upon receiving
   security-related requests from their clients.

3.1.5.  Demand for Multi-Tenancy to Control and Monitor NSFs

   Service providers may need several operational units to control and
   monitor the NSFs, especially when NSFs become distributed and
   virtualized.

3.1.6.  Lack of Characterization of NSFs and Capability Exchange

   To offer effective security services, service providers need to
   activate various security functions in NSFs or vNSFs manufactured by
   multiple vendors.  Even within one product category (e.g., firewall),



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   security functions provided by different vendors can have different
   features and capabilities.  For example, filters that can be designed
   and activated by a firewall may or may not support IPv6 depending on
   the firewall technology.

   The service provider's management system (or controller) needs a way
   to retrieve the capabilities of service functions by different
   vendors so that it could build an effective security solution.  These
   service function capabilities can be documented in a static manner
   (e.g., a file) or via an interface which accesses a repository of
   security function capabilities which the NSF vendors dynamically
   update.

   A dynamic capability registration is useful for automation because
   security functions may be subject to software and hardware updates.
   These updates may have implications on the policies enforced by the
   NSFs.

   Today, there is no standard method for vendors to describe the
   capabilities of their security functions.  Without a common technical
   framework to describe the capabilities of security functions, service
   providers cannot automate the process of selecting NSFs by different
   vendors to accommodate customer's security requirements.

   The I2NSF work will focus on developing a standard method to describe
   capabilities of security functions.

3.1.7.  Lack of Mechanism for NSFs to Utilize External Profiles

   Many security functions depend on signature files or profiles to
   perform (e.g., IPS/IDS signatures, DDos Open Threat Signaling (DOTS)
   filters).  Different policies might need different signatures or
   profiles.  Today, the construction and use of black list databases
   can be a win-win strategy for all parties involved.  There might be
   Open Source-provided signature/profiles (e.g., by Snort, Suricata,
   Bro and Kisnet) in the future.

   There is a need to have a standard envelope (i.e., the format) to
   allow NSFs to use external profiles.

3.1.8.  Lack of Mechanisms to Accept External Alerts to Trigger
        Automatic Rule and Configuration Changes

   NSF can ask the I2NSF security controller to alter specific rules
   and/or configurations.  For example, a Distributed Denial of services
   (DDoS) alert could trigger a change to the routing system to send
   traffic to a traffic scrubbing service to mitigate the DDoS.




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   The DDoS protection has the following two parts: a) the configuration
   of signaling of open threats and b) DDoS mitigation.  DOTS controller
   manages the signaling part of DDoS.  I2NSF controller(s) would manage
   the changing to the affected policies (e.g., forwarding and routing,
   filtering, etc.).  By monitoring the network alerts from DDoS, I2NSF
   can feed an alerts analytics engine that could recognize attacks so
   the I2NSF can enforce the appropriate policies.

   DDoS mitigation is enhanced if the provider's network security
   controller can monitor, analyze, and investigate the abnormal events
   and provide information to the client or change the network
   configuration automatically.

   [I-D.zhou-i2nsf-capability-interface-monitoring] provides details on
   how monitoring aspects of the flow-based Network Security Functions
   (NSFs) can use the I2NSF interfaces to receive traffic reports and
   enforce appropriate policies.

3.1.9.  Lack of Mechanism for Dynamic Key Distribution to NSFs

   There is a need for a controller to distribute various keys to
   distributed NSFs.  To distribute various keys, the keys must be
   created and managed.  While there are many key management methods and
   cryptographic suites (e.g. encryption algorithms, key deriation
   functions, etc.) and other functions, there is a lack of a standard
   interface to provision and manage security associations.

   The keys may be used for message authentication and integrity in
   order to protect data flows.  In addition, keys may be used to secure
   the protocol and messages in the core routing infrastructure (see
   [RFC4948])

   As of now there is not much focus on an abstraction for keying
   information that describes the interface between protocols,
   operators, and automated key management.

   An example of a solution may provide some insight into why the lack
   of a mechanism is a problem.  If a device had an abstract key table
   maintained by security services, a device could use these keys for
   routing and seurity devices.

   What does this take?

   Conceptually, there must be an interface defined for routing/
   signaling protocols to make requests for automated key management
   when it is being used, and to notify the protocols when keys become
   available in the key table.  One potential use of such an interface
   is to manage IPSec security associations on SDN networks.



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   An abstract key service will work under the following conditions:

   1.  I2NSF needs to design the key table abstraction, the interface
       between key management protocols and routing/other protocols, and
       possibly security protocols at other layers.

   2.  For each routing/other protocol, I2NSF needs to define the
       mapping between how the protocol represents key material and the
       protocol-independent key table abstraction.  If protocols share
       common mechanisms for authentication (e.g., TCP Authentication
       Option), then the same mapping may be reused.

   3.  Automated Key management must support both symmetric keys and
       group keys via the service provided by items 1 and 2.

3.2.  Challenges Facing Customers

   When customers invoke hosted security services, their security
   policies may be enforced by a collection of security functions hosted
   in different domains.  Customers may not have the security skills to
   express sufficiently precise requirements or security policies.
   Usually, these customers express the expectations of their security
   requirements or the intent of their security policies.  These
   expectations can be considered customer-level security expectations.
   Customers may also desire to express guidelines for security
   management.  Examples of such guidelines include:

   o  Which critical communications are to be preserved during critical
      events (DOTS working group is standardizing),

   o  Which hosts are to continue service even during severe security
      attacks (DOTS working group is standardizing),

   o  Reporting of attacks to CERT (MILE working group is
      standardizing), and

   o  Managing network connectivity of systems out of compliance (SACM
      working gorup is standardizing).

3.2.1.  NSFs from Heterogeneous Administrative Domains

   Many medium and large enterprises have deployed various on-premises
   security functions which they want to continue to deploy.  These
   enterprises want to combine local security functions with remote
   hosted security functions to achieve more efficient and immediate
   counter-measures to both Internet-originated attacks and enterprise
   network-originated attacks.




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   Some enterprises may only need the hosted security services for their
   remote branch offices where minimal security infrastructures/
   capabilities exist.  The security solution will consist of deploying
   NSFs on customer networks and on service provider networks.

3.2.2.  Today's Control Requests are Vendor Specific

   Customers may utilize NSFs provided by multiple service providers.
   Customers need to express their security requirements, guidelines,
   and expectations to the service providers.  In turn, the service
   providers must translate this customer information into customer
   security policies and associated configuration tasks for the set of
   security functions in their network.  Without a standard technical
   standard interface that provides a clear technical characterization,
   the service provider faces many challenges:

   No standard technical characterization and/or APIs:    Even for the
      most common security services there is no standard technical
      characterization or APIs.  Most security services are accessible
      only through disparate, proprietary interfaces (e.g., portals or
      APIs) in whatever format vendors choose to offer.  The service
      provider must process the customer's input with these widely
      varying interfaces.

   No standard interface:    Without standard interfaces it is complex
      for customers to update security policies or integrate the
      security functions in their enterprise with the security services
      provided by the security service providers.  This complexity is
      induced by the diversity of the configuration models, policy
      models, and supported management interfaces.  Without a standard
      interface, new innovative security products find a large barrier
      to entry into the market.

   Managing by scripts de-jour:    The current practices rely upon the
      use of scripts that generate other scripts which automatically run
      to upload or download configuration changes, log information and
      other things.  These scripts have to be adjusted each time an
      implementation from a different vendor technology is enabled on a
      provider side.

   Lack of immediate feedback:    Customers may also require a mechanism
      to easily update/modify their security requirements with immediate
      effect in the underlying involved NSFs.

   Lack of explicit invocation request:    While security agreements are
      in place, security functions may be solicited without requiring an
      explicit invocation means.  Nevertheless, some explicit invocation
      means may be required to interact with a service function.



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   To see how standard interfaces could help achieve faster
   implementation time cycles, let us consider a customer who would like
   to dynamically allow an encrypted flow with specific port, src/dst
   addresses or protocol type through the firewall/IPS to enable an
   encrypted video conferencing call only during the time of the call.
   With no commonly accepted interface in place, as shown in figure 1,
   the customer would have to learn about the particular provider's
   firewall/IPS interface and send the request in the provider's
   required format.

           +------------+
           | security   |
           | management |
           | system     |
           +----||------+
                ||   proprietary
                ||   or I2NSF standard
   Video:       ||
   Port 10   +--------+
     --------| FW/IPS |-------------
   Encrypted +--------+
   Video Flow

    Figure 1: Example of non-standard vs. standard interface

   In contrast, as figure 1 shows, if a firewall/IPS interface standard
   exists the customer would be able to send the request to a security
   management system without having to do the extensive preliminary
   legwork.  A standard interface also helps service providers since
   they could now offer the same firewall/IPS interface to represent
   firewall/IPS services for utilizing products from many vendors.  The
   result is that the service provider has now abstracted the firewall/
   IPS services.  The standard interface also helps the firewall/IPS
   vendors to focus on their core security functions or extended
   features rather than the standard building blocks of a management
   interface.

3.2.3.  Difficulty to Monitor the Execution of Desired Policies

   How a policy is translated into technology-specific actions is hidden
   from the customers.  However, customers still need ways to monitor
   the delivered security service that results from the execution of
   their desired security requirements, guidelines and expectations.

   Today, there is no standard way for customers to get security service
   assurance of their specified security policies properly enforced by
   the security functions in the provider domain.  The customer also




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   lacks the ability to perform "what-if" scenarios to assess the
   efficiency of the delivered security service.

   It is the objective of the I2NSF work to provide a standard way to
   get security service assurance of a customers specific security
   policies which provides enough information for customers to perform
   "what-if" scenarios to assess efficiency of delivered security
   services.

3.3.  Difficulty to Validate Policies across Multiple Domains

   One key aspect of a hosted security service with security functions
   located at different premises is the ability to express, monitor and
   verify security policies that combine several distributed security
   functions.  It is crucial to an effective service to be able to take
   these actions via a standard interface.  This standard interface
   becomes more crucial to the hosted security service when NSFs are
   instantiated in Virtual Machines which are sometimes widely
   distributed in the network and sometimes are combined together in one
   device to perform a set of tasks for delivering a service.

   Without standard interfaces and security policy data models, the
   enforcement of a customer-driven security policy remains challenging
   because of the inherent complexity created by combining the
   invocation of several vendor-specific security functions into a
   multi-vendor, heterogeneous environment.  Each vendor-specific
   function may require specific configuration procedures and
   operational tasks.

   Ensuring the consistent enforcement of the policies at various
   domains is also challenging.  Standard data models are likely to
   contribute to solving that issue.

3.4.  Software-Defined Networks

   Software-Defined Networks have changed the landscape of data center
   designs by introducing overlay networks deployed over ToR switches
   that connect to a hypervisor.  SDN techniques are meant to improve
   the flexibility of workload management without affecting applications
   and how they work.  Workload can thus be easily and seamlessly
   managed across private and public clouds.  SDN techniques optimize
   resource usage and are now being deployed in various networking
   environments, besides cloud infrastructures.  Yet, such SDN-inferred
   agility may raise specific security issues.  For example a security
   admin must make sure that a security policy can be enforced
   regardless of the location of the workload, thereby raising concerns
   about the ability of SDN computation logic to send security policy-
   provisioning information to the participating NSFs.  A second example



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   is workload migration to a public cloud infrastructure which may
   raise raise additional security requirements during the migration.

3.5.  Lack of Standard Interface to Inject Feedback to NSF

   Today, many security functions in the NSF, such as IPS, IDS, DDoS
   mitigation and Antivirus, depend heavily on the associated profiles.
   NSF devices can perform more effective protection if these NSF
   devices have the up-to-date profiles for these functions.  Today
   there is no standard interface to provide these security profiles for
   the NSF.

   As more sophisticated threats arise, enterprises, vendors, and
   service providers have to rely on each other to achieve optimal
   protection.  Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA,
   http://cyberthreatalliance.org/) is one of those initiatives that aim
   at combining efforts conducted by multiple organizations.

   The standrd interface to provide security profiles to the NSF should
   interwork with the formats which exchange security profiles between
   organizations.

   One objective of the I2NSF work is to provide this type of standard
   interface to security profiles.

3.6.  Lack of Standard Interface for Capability Negotiation

   There could be situations when the selected NSFs cannot perform the
   policies requested by the Security Controller, due to resource
   constraints.  The customer and security service provider should
   negotiate the appropriate resource constraints before the security
   service begins.  However, unexpected events may happen causing the
   NSF to exhaust those negotiated resources.  At this point, the NSF
   should inform the security controller that the alloted resources have
   been exhausted.  To support the automatic control in the SDN-era, it
   is necessary to have a set of messages for proper notification (and a
   response to that notification) between the Security Controller and
   the NSFs.

4.  Use Cases

   Standard interfaces for monitoring and controlling the behavior of
   NSFs are essential building blocks for Security Service Providers and
   enterprises to automate the use of different NSFs from multiple
   vendors by their security management entities.  I2NSF may be invoked
   by any (authorized) client.  Examples of authorized clients are
   upstream applications (controllers), orchestration systems, and
   security portals.



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4.1.  Basic Framework

   Users request security services through specific clients (e.g., a
   customer application, the Network Service Providers (NSP) Business
   Support Systems/Operations Support Systems (BSS/OSS) or management
   platform) and the appropriate NSP network entity will invoke the
   (v)NSFs according to the user service request.  This network entity
   is denoted as the security controller in this document.  The
   interaction between the entities discussed above (client, security
   controller, NSF) is shown in Figure 2:

                                +----------+
         +-------+              |          |                  +-------+
         |       |  Interface 1 |Security  |   Interface 2    | NSF(s)|
         |Client <-------------->          <------------------>       |
         |       |              |Controller|                  |       |
         +-------+              |          |                  +-------+
                                +----------+

         Figure 2: Interaction between Entities

   Interface 1 is used for receiving security requirements from a client
   and translating them into commands that NSFs can understand and
   execute.  The security controller also passes back NSF security
   reports (e.g., statistics) to the client which the security
   controller has gathered from NSFs.  Interface 2 is used for
   interacting with NSFs according to commands (e.g. enact/revoke a
   security policy, or distribute a policy), and collecting status
   information about NSFs.

   Client devices or applications can require the security controller to
   add, delete or update rules in the security service function for
   their specific traffic.

   When users want to get the executing status of a security service,
   they can request NSF status from the client.  The security controller
   will collect NSF information through Interface 2, consolidate it, and
   give feedback to the client through Interface 1.  This interface can
   be used to collect not only individual service information, but also
   aggregated data suitable for tasks like infrastructure security
   assessment.

   Customers may require validating NSF availability, provenance, and
   execution.  This validation process, especially relevant to vNSFs,
   includes at least:

   Integrity of the NSF:   by ensuring that the NSF is not compromised;




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   Isolation:   by ensuring the execution of the NSF is self-contained
      for privacy requirements in multi-tenancy scenarios.

   Provenance of NSF:    Customers may need to be provided with strict
      guarantees about the origin of the NSF, its status (e.g.,
      available, idle, down, and others), and feedback mechanisms so
      that a customer may be able to check that a given NSF or set of
      NSFs properly conform to the the customer's requirements and
      subsequent configuration tasks.

   In order to achieve this, the security controller may collect
   security measurements and share them with an independent and trusted
   third party (via Interface 1) in order to allow for attestation of
   NSF functions using the third party added information.

   This implies that there may be the following two types of clients
   using interface 1: the end-user and and the trusted independent third
   party.  The I2NSF work may determine that interface 1 creates two
   sub-interfaces to support these two types of clients.

4.2.  Access Networks

   This scenario describes use cases for users (e.g., residential user,
   enterprise user, mobile user,and management system) that request and
   manage security services hosted in the NSP infrastructure.  Given
   that NSP customers are essentially users of their access networks,
   the scenario is essentially associated with their characteristics as
   well as with the use of vNSFs.  Figure 3 shows how these virtual
   access nodes for different types of customers connect connect through
   virtual access nodes an NSF.

   The virtual customer premise equipment (vCPE) described in use cases
   #7 in [NFVUC] requires a model of access virtualization that includes
   mobile and residential access networks where the operator may offload
   security services from the customer local environment (e.g., device
   or terminal) to its own infrastructure.

   These use cases define the interaction between the operator and the
   vNSFs through automated interfaces, typically by means of Business-
   to-Business (B2B)communications.











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            Customer   +     Access     +     PoP/Datacenter
                       |                |     +--------+
                       |          ,-----+--.  |Network |
                       |        ,'      |   `-|Operator|
       +-------------+ |       /+----+  |     |Mgmt Sys|
       | Residential |-+------/-+vCPE+----+   +--------+
       +-------------+ |     /  +----+  |  \     |     :
                       |    /           |   \    |     |
        +----------+   |   ;    +----+  |    +----+    |
        |Enterprise|---+---+----+ vPE+--+----+ NSF|    |
        +----------+   |   :    +----+  |    +----+    |
                       |    :           |   /          |
            +--------+ |    :   +----+  |  /           ;
            | Mobile |-+-----\--+vEPC+----+           /
            +--------+ |      \ +----+  |          ,-'
                       |       `--.     |      _.-'
                       |           `----+----''
                       +                +

       vCPE - virtual customer premise equipment
       vPE  - virtual provider equipment
       vEPC - virtual evolved packet core
              (mobile-core network)

                  Figure 3:  NSF and actors

   Different access clients may have different service requests:

   Residential:   service requests for parental control, content
      management, and threat management.

      Parental control requests may include identity based filters for
      web content or usage.  Content management may include identifying
      and blocking malicious activities from web contents, mail, or
      files downloaded.  Threat management may include identifying and
      blocking botnets or malware.

   Enterprise:   service requests for enterprise flow security policies
      and managed security services

      Flow security policies include access to (or isolation from) to
      data from various internal groups, access to (or isolation from)
      various web sites or social media applications, and encryption on
      data transferred between corporates sites (main office, enterprise
      branch offices, and remote campuses).  Managed security services
      may include detection and mitigation of external and internal
      threats.  External threats can include application or phishing
      attacks, malware, botnet, DDoS, and others.  Internal threats (aka



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      lateral threats) can include detecting programs moving from one
      enterprise site to another without permission.

   Service Provider:   Service requests for policies that protect
      service provider networks against various threats (including DDoS,
      botnets and malware).  Such policies are meant to securely and
      reliably deliver contents (e.g., data, voice, and video) to
      various customers, including residential, mobile and corporate
      customers.  These security policies are also enforced to guarantee
      isolation between multiple tenants, regardless of the nature of
      the corresponding connectivity services.

   Mobile:   service requests from interfaces which monitor and ensure
      user quality of experience, content management, parental controls,
      and external threat management.

      Content management for the mobile device includes identifying and
      blocking malicious activities from web contents, mail, files
      uploaded/downloaded.  Threat management for infrastructure
      includes detecting and removing malicious programs such as botnet,
      malware, and other programs that create distributed DoS attacks).

   Some access customers may not care about which NSFs are utilized to
   achieve the services they requested.  In this case, provider network
   orchestration systems can internally select the NSFs (or vNSFs) to
   enforce the security policies requested by the clients.  Other access
   customers, especially some enterprise customers, may want to get
   their dedicated NSFs (most likely vNSFs) for direct control purposes.
   In this case, here are the steps to associate vNSFs to specific
   customers:

   vNSF Deployment:   The deployment process consists in instantiating
      an NSF on a Virtualization Infrastructure (NFVI), within the NSP
      administrative domain(s) or with other external domain(s).  This
      is a required step before a customer can subscribe to a security
      service supported in the vNSF.

   vNSF Customer Provisioning:    Once a vNSF is deployed, any customer
      can subscribe to it.  The provisioning lifecycle includes the
      following:

      *  Customer enrollment and cancellation of the subscription to a
         vNSF;

      *  Configuration of the vNSF, based on specific configurations, or
         derived from common security policies defined by the NSP.





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      *  Retrieval of the vNSF functionalities, extracted from a
         manifest or a descriptor.  The NSP management systems can
         demand this information to offer detailed information through
         the commercial channels to the customer.

4.3.  Cloud Data Center Scenario

   In a data center, network security mechanisms such as firewalls may
   need to be dynamically added or removed for a number of reasons.
   These changes may be explicitly requested by the user, or triggered
   by a pre-agreed upon demand level in the Service Level Agreement
   (SLA) between the user and the provider of the service.  For example,
   the service provider may be required to add more firewall capacity
   within a set timeframes whenever the bandwidth utilization hits a
   certain threshold for a specified period.  This capacity expansion
   could result in adding new instances of firewalls on existing
   machines or provisioning a completely new firewall instance in a
   different machine.

   The on-demand, dynamic nature of security service delivery
   essentially encourages that the network security "devices" be in
   software or virtual form factors, rather than in a physical appliance
   form.  This requirement is a provider-side concern.  Users of the
   firewall service are agnostic (as they should) as to whether or not
   the firewall service is run on a VM or any other form factor.
   Indeed, they may not even be aware that their traffic traverses
   firewalls.

   Furthermore, new firewall instances need to be placed in the "right
   zone" (domain).  The issue applies not only to multi-tenant
   environments where getting the tenant in the right domain is of
   paramount importance, but also in environments owned and operated by
   a single organization with its own service segregation policies.  For
   example, an enterprise may mandate that firewalls serving Internet
   traffic and B2B traffic be separated.  Another example is that IPS/
   IDS services for investment banking and non-banking traffic may be
   separated for regulatory reasons.

4.3.1.  On-Demand Virtual Firewall Deployment

   A service provider-operated cloud data center could serve tens of
   thousands of clients.  Clients' compute servers are typically hosted
   on virtual machines (VMs), which could be deployed across different
   server racks located in different parts of the data center.  It is
   often not technically and/or financially feasible to deploy dedicated
   physical firewalls to suit each client's security policy
   requirements, which can be numerous.  What is needed is the ability
   to dynamically deploy virtual firewalls for each client's set of



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   servers based on established security policies and underlying network
   topologies.  Figure 4 shows an example toipology of virtual firewalls
   within a data center.


           ---+-----------------------------+-----
              |                             |
             +---+                         +-+-+
             |vFW|                         |vFW|
             +---+                         +-+-+
               |    Client #1                |  Client #2
            ---+-------+---               ---+-------+---
             +-+-+   +-+-+                 +-+-+   +-+-+
             |vM |   |vM |                 |vM |   |vM |
             +---+   +---+                 +---+   +---+

                Figure 4:  NSF in Data Centers

4.3.2.  Firewall Policy Deployment Automation

   Firewall rule setting is often a time consuming, complex and error-
   prone process even within a single organization/enterprise framework.
   It becomes far more complex in provider-owned cloud networks that
   serve myriads of customers.

   Firewall rules today are highly tied with ports and addresses that
   identify traffic.  This makes it very difficult for clients of cloud
   data centers to construct rules for their own traffic as the clients
   only see the virtual networks and the virtual addresses.  The
   customer-visible virtual networks and addresses may be different from
   the actual packets traversing the FWs.

   Even though most vendors support similar firewall features, the
   actual rule configuration keywords are different from vendors to
   vendors, making it difficult for automation.  Automation works best
   when it can leverage a common set of standards that will work across
   NSFs by multiple vendors.  Without automation, it is virtually
   impossible for clients to dynamically specify their desired rules for
   their traffic.

   Another feature that aids automation of firewalls that must be
   covered in automation is dynamic key management.

4.3.3.  Client-Specific Security Policy in Cloud VPNs

   Clients of service provider-operated cloud data centers not only need
   to secure Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), but also virtual security
   functions that apply the clients' security policies.  The security



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   policies may govern communication within the clients' own virtual
   networks as well as communication with external networks.  For
   example, VPN service providers may need to provide firewall and other
   security services to their VPN clients.  Today, it is generally not
   possible for clients to dynamically view (let alone change) what,
   where and how security policies are implemented on their provider-
   operated clouds.  Indeed, no standards-based framework exists to
   allow clients to retrieve/manage security policies in a consistent
   manner across different providers.

   As described above, the dynamic key management is critical for the
   securing the VPN and the distribution of policies.

4.3.4.  Internal Network Monitoring

   There are many types of internal traffic monitors that may be managed
   by a security controller.  This includes a new class of services
   referred to as Data Loss Prevention (DLP), or Reputation Protection
   Services (RPS).  Depending on the class of event, alerts may go to
   internal administrators, or external services.

4.4.  Preventing Distributed DoS, Malware and Botnet attacks

   In the Internet where everything is connected, preventing unwanted
   traffic that may cause a Denial of Service (DoS) attack or a
   distributed DoS (DDoS) attack has become a challenge.  Similarly, a
   network could be exposed to malware attacks and become an attack
   vector to jeopardize the operation of other networks, by means of
   remote commands for example.  Many networks such as Internet of
   Things (IoT) networks, Information-Centric Networks (ICN), Content
   Delivery Networks (CDN), Voice over IP packet networks (VoIP), and
   Voice over LTE (VoLTE) are also exposed to such attacks.

   In order for organizations to better secure their networks against
   these kind of attacks, the I2NSF framework should provide a client-
   side interface that is use case-independent and technology-agnostic.
   Technology-agnostic is to is defined to be generic, technology
   independent, and able to support multiple protocols and data models.
   For example, such an I2NSF interface could be used to provision
   security policy configuration information that looks for specific
   malware signatures.  Similarly, botnet attacks could be easily
   prevented by provisioing security policies using the I2NSF client-
   side interface that prevent access to botnet command and control
   servers.







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4.5.  Regulatory and Compliance Security Policies

   Organizations are not only supposed to protect their networks against
   attacks, but they should also adhere to various industry regulations:
   any organization that falls under a specific regulation like Payment
   Card Industry(PCI)-Data Security Standard (DSS) [PCI-DSS]
   (https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/pci_security/) for the payment
   industry or Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
   [HIPPA] (https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/) for the healthcare industry must
   be able to isolate various kinds of traffic.  They must also show
   records of their security policies whenever audited.

   The I2NSF client-side interface could be used to provision regulatory
   and compliance-related security policies.  The security controller
   would keep track of when and where a specific policy is applied and
   if there is any policy violation; this information can be provided in
   the event of an audit as a proof that traffic is isolated between
   specific endpoints, in full compliance with the required regulations.

5.  Management Considerations

   Management of NSFs usually include the following:

   o  Lifecycle managment and resource management of NSFs,

   o  Device configuration, such as address configuration, device
      internal attributes configuration, etc.,

   o  Signaling of events, notifications and changes, and

   o  Policy rule provisioning.

   I2NSF will only focus on the policy provisioning part of NSF
   management.

6.  IANA Considerations

   No IANA considerations exist for this document.

7.  Security Considerations

   Having a secure access to control and monitor NSFs is crucial for
   hosted security services.  An I2NSF security controller raises new
   security threats.  It needs to be resilient to attacks and quickly
   recover from attacks.  Therefore, proper secure communication
   channels have to be carefully specified for carrying controlling and
   monitoring traffic between the NSFs and their management entity (or
   entities).



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   In addition, the Flow security policies specified by customers can
   conflict with providers' internal security policies which may allow
   unauthorized traffic or unauthorized changes to flow polices (e.g.
   customers changing flow policies that do not belong to them).
   Therefore, it is crucial to have proper AAA [RFC2904] to authorize
   access to the network and access to the I2NSF management stream.

8.  Contributors

   I2NSF is a group effort.  The following people actively contributed
   to the initial use case text: Xiaojun Zhuang (China Mobile), Sumandra
   Majee (F5), Ed Lopez (Fortinet), and Robert Moskowitz (Huawei).

9.  Contributing Authors

   I2NSF has had a number of contributing authors.  The following are
   contributing authors:

   o  Linda Dunbar (Huawei),

   o  Antonio Pastur (Telefonica I+D),

   o  Mohamed Boucadair (France Telecom),

   o  Michael Georgiades (Prime Tel),

   o  Minpeng Qi (China Mobile),

   o  Shaibal Chakrabarty (US Ignite),

   o  Nic Leymann (Deutsche Telekom),

   o  Anil Lohiya (Juniper),

   o  David Qi (Bloomberg),

   o  Xiaobo Long,

   o  Hyoungshick Kim (Sungkyunkwan University),

   o  Jung-Soo Park (ETRI),

   o  Tae-Jin Ahn (Korea Telecom), and

   o  Se-Hui Lee (Korea Telecom).






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10.  Acknowledgements

   This document was supported by Institute for Information and
   communications Technology Promotion (IITP) funded by the Korea
   government (MSIP) [R0166-15-1041, Standard Development of Network
   Security based SDN].

11.  Informative References

   [ETSI-NFV]
              ETSI GS NFV 002 V1.1.1, , "Network Functions
              Virtualisation (NFV); Architectural Framework", October
              2013.

   [Gartner-2013]
              Messmer, E., "Gartner: Cloud-based security as a service
              set to take off", October 2013.

   [HIPPA]    US Congress, , "HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND
              ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1996 (Public Law 104-191)", August
              1996.

   [I-D.hares-i2nsf-gap-analysis]
              Hares, S., Zhang, D., Moskowitz, R., and H. Rafiee,
              "Analysis of Existing work for I2NSF", draft-hares-i2nsf-
              gap-analysis-01 (work in progress), December 2015.

   [I-D.ietf-opsawg-firewalls]
              Baker, F. and P. Hoffman, "On Firewalls in Internet
              Security", draft-ietf-opsawg-firewalls-01 (work in
              progress), October 2012.

   [I-D.jeong-i2nsf-sdn-security-services]
              Jeong, J., Kim, H., Jung-Soo, P., Ahn, T., and s.
              sehuilee@kt.com, "Software-Defined Networking Based
              Security Services using Interface to Network Security
              Functions", draft-jeong-i2nsf-sdn-security-services-05
              (work in progress), July 2016.

   [I-D.pastor-i2nsf-access-usecases]
              Pastor, A. and D. Lopez, "Access Use Cases for an Open OAM
              Interface to Virtualized Security Services", draft-pastor-
              i2nsf-access-usecases-00 (work in progress), October 2014.








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   [I-D.pastor-i2nsf-merged-use-cases]
              Pastor, A., Lopez, D., Wang, K., Zhuang, X., Qi, M.,
              Zarny, M., Majee, S., Leymann, N., Dunbar, L., and M.
              Georgiades, "Use Cases and Requirements for an Interface
              to Network Security Functions", draft-pastor-i2nsf-merged-
              use-cases-00 (work in progress), June 2015.

   [I-D.qi-i2nsf-access-network-usecase]
              Wang, K. and X. Zhuang, "Integrated Security with Access
              Network Use Case", draft-qi-i2nsf-access-network-
              usecase-02 (work in progress), March 2015.

   [I-D.zarny-i2nsf-data-center-use-cases]
              Zarny, M., Leymann, N., and L. Dunbar, "I2NSF Data Center
              Use Cases", draft-zarny-i2nsf-data-center-use-cases-00
              (work in progress), October 2014.

   [I-D.zhou-i2nsf-capability-interface-monitoring]
              Zhou, C., Xia, L., Boucadair, M., and J. Xiong, "The
              Capability Interface for Monitoring Network Security
              Functions (NSF) in I2NSF", draft-zhou-i2nsf-capability-
              interface-monitoring-00 (work in progress), October 2015.

   [NFVUC]    ETSI GS NFV 002 V1.1.1, , "ETSI NFV Group Specification,
              Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) Use Cases", June
              2014.

   [PCI-DSS]  PCI Security Council, , "Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data
              Security Standard Requirements and Security Assessment
              Procedures (version 3.2)", April 2016.

   [RFC2904]  Vollbrecht, J., Calhoun, P., Farrell, S., Gommans, L.,
              Gross, G., de Bruijn, B., de Laat, C., Holdrege, M., and
              D. Spence, "AAA Authorization Framework", RFC 2904,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2904, August 2000,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2904>.

   [RFC4948]  Andersson, L., Davies, E., and L. Zhang, "Report from the
              IAB workshop on Unwanted Traffic March 9-10, 2006",
              RFC 4948, DOI 10.17487/RFC4948, August 2007,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4948>.

Authors' Addresses








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   Susan Hares
   Huawei
   7453 Hickory Hill
   Saline, MI  48176
   USA

   Phone: +1-734-604-0332
   Email: shares@ndzh.com


   Diego R. Lopex
   Telefonica I+D
   Don Ramon de la Cruz, 82
   Madrid  28006
   Spain

   Email: diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com


   Myo Zarny
   vArmour
   800 El Camino Real, Suite 3000
   Mountain View, CA  94040
   USA

   Email: myo@varmour.com


   Christian Jacquenet
   France Telecom
   Rennes, 35000
   France

   Email: Christian.jacquenet@orange.com


   Rakesh Kumar
   Juniper Networks
   1133 Innovation Way
   Sunnyvale, CA  94089
   USA

   Email: rkkumar@juniper.net








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   Jaehoon Paul Jeong
   Department of Software
   Sungkyunkwan University
   2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
   Suwon, Gyeonggi-Do  16419
   Republic of Korea

   Phone: +82 31 299 4957
   Fax:   +82 31 290 7996
   Email: pauljeong@skku.edu
   URI:   http://iotlab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php








































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