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Versions: (draft-sriram-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08

IDR and SIDR                                                   K. Sriram
Internet-Draft                                             D. Montgomery
Intended status: Standards Track                                USA NIST
Expires: September 6, 2018                                    B. Dickson

                                                                K. Patel
                                                                  Arrcus
                                                          A. Robachevsky
                                                        Internet Society
                                                           March 5, 2018


        Methods for Detection and Mitigation of BGP Route Leaks
           draft-ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation-08

Abstract

   Problem definition for route leaks and enumeration of types of route
   leaks are provided in RFC 7908.  This document specifies BGP
   enhancements that significantly extend its route-leak detection and
   mitigation capabilities.  The solution involves carrying a per-hop
   route-leak protection (RLP) field in BGP updates.  The RLP fields are
   carried in a new optional transitive attribute, called BGP RLP
   attribute.  The RLP attribute helps with detection and mitigation of
   route leaks at ASes downstream from the leaking AS (in the path of
   BGP update).  This is an inter-AS (multi-hop) solution mechanism.
   This solution complements the intra-AS (local AS) route-leak
   avoidance solution that is described in ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy
   draft.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 6, 2018.





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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Rote-Leak Types that the Solution Must Address  . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Mechanisms for Detection and Mitigation of Route Leaks  . . .   6
     3.1.  Ascertaining Peering Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.2.  Route-Leak Protection (RLP) Field Encoding by Sending
           Router  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       3.2.1.  BGP RLP Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.2.2.  Carrying RLP Field Values in the BGPsec Flags . . . .   9
     3.3.  Recommended Actions at a Receiving Router for Detection
           of Route Leaks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.4.  Possible Actions at a Receiving Router for Mitigation . .  10
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Appendix A.  Related Prior Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Appendix B.  Prevention of Route Leaks at Local AS: Intra-AS
                Messaging  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     B.1.  Non-Transitive BGP Community for Intra-AS Messaging . . .  16
   Appendix C.  Stopgap Solution when Only Origin Validation is
                Deployed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   Appendix D.  Design Rationale and Discussion  . . . . . . . . . .  18
     D.1.  Is route-leak solution without cryptographic protection a
           serious attack vector?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     D.2.  Combining results of route-leak detection, OV and BGPsec
           validation for path selection decision  . . . . . . . . .  20
     D.3.  Are there cases when valley-free violations can be
           considered legitimate?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     D.4.  Comparison with other methods (routing security BCPs) . .  21
     D.5.  Per-Hop RLP Field or Single RLP Flag per Update?  . . . .  21



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   Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24

1.  Introduction

   RFC 7908 [RFC7908] provides a definition of the route leak problem,
   and also enumerates several types of route leaks.  This document
   first examines which of those route-leak types are detected and
   mitigated by the existing Origin Validation (OV) [RFC6811] method.
   OV [RFC6811] and BGPsec path validation [RFC8205] together offer
   mechanisms to protect against re-originations and hijacks of IP
   prefixes as well as man-in-the-middle (MITM) AS path modifications.
   Route leaks [RFC7908] are another type of vulnerability in the global
   BGP routing system against which OV offers very limited protection.
   BGPsec path validation provides cryptographic protection for some
   aspects of BGP update messages, but in its current form BGPsec does
   not offer any protection against route leaks.

   For the types of route leaks enumerated in RFC 7908 [RFC7908], where
   the OV method does not offer a solution, this document specifies BGP
   enhancements that significantly extend its route-leak detection and
   mitigation capabilities.  The solution involves carrying a per-hop
   route-leak protection (RLP) field in BGP updates.  The RLP fields are
   carried in a new optional transitive attribute, called BGP RLP
   attribute.  The RLP attribute helps with detection and mitigation of
   route leaks at ASes downstream from the leaking AS (in the path of
   BGP update).  This is an inter-AS (multi-hop) solution mechanism.
   This solution complements the intra-AS (local AS) route-leak
   avoidance solution that is described in
   [I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy].

   The RLP mechanism is backward compatible with BGP routers that are
   not upgraded to perform RLP.  Early adopters would see significant
   benefits.  If a group of big ISPs deploy RLP, then they would be
   helping each other by blocking route leaks originated within one's
   customer cone from propagating into a peer's AS or their customer
   cone.  The intra-AS (local AS) route-leak avoidance solution
   [I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy] works to prevent a local AS from
   leaking routes but requires 100% deployment in order to prevent
   propagation of route leaks across AS boundaries.  Hence, the inter-AS
   RLP solution (this document) and the intra-AS solution
   [I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy] are complementary.

   The inter-AS RLP solution is meant to be initially implemented as an
   enhancement of BGP without requiring BGPsec.  However, when BGPsec is
   deployed in the future, the solution should be incorporated in
   BGPsec, enabling cryptographic protection for the RLP fields.  That
   is one way of securing the solution against malicious route leaks.



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   It is not claimed that the RLP solution detects all possible types of
   route leaks [RFC7908], but it detects several types (see Section 2),
   especially considering some significant route-leak occurrences that
   have been observed in recent years.  The RLP solution mechanism is
   described in Section 3.  A review of related prior work is presented
   in Appendix A.  An intra-AS route-leak prevention method using BGP
   Community is discussed in Appendix B.  The document also includes a
   stopgap method for detection and mitigation of route leaks for an
   intermediate phase when OV is deployed but BGP protocol on the wire
   is unchanged (see Appendix C).  Design rationale and discussion are
   presented in Appendix D.

2.  Rote-Leak Types that the Solution Must Address

   Referring to the enumeration of route leaks discussed in [RFC7908],
   Table 1 summarizes the route-leak detection capability offered by OV
   and BGPsec for different types of route leaks.

   A detailed explanation of the contents of Table 1 is as follows.  It
   is readily observed that route leaks of Types 1, 2, 3, and 4 are not
   detected by OV or BGPsec in its current form.  Clearly, Type 5 route
   leak involves re-origination or hijacking, and hence can be detected
   by OV.  In the case of Type 5 route leak, there would be no existing
   ROAs to validate a re-originated prefix or more specific, but instead
   a covering ROA would normally exist with the legitimate AS, and hence
   the update will be considered Invalid by OV.

























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   +---------------------------------+---------------------------------+
   | Type of Route Leak              | Current State of Detection      |
   |                                 | Coverage                        |
   +---------------------------------+---------------------------------+
   | Type 1: Hairpin Turn with Full  | Neither OV nor BGPsec (in its   |
   | Prefix                          | current form) detects Type 1.   |
   | ------------------------------- | ------------------------------- |
   | Type 2: Lateral ISP-ISP-ISP     | Neither OV nor BGPsec (in its   |
   | Leak                            | current form) detects Type 2.   |
   | ------------------------------- | ------------------------------- |
   | Type 3: Leak of Transit-        | Neither OV nor BGPsec (in its   |
   | Provider Prefixes to Peer       | current form) detects Type 3.   |
   | ------------------------------- | ------------------------------- |
   | Type 4: Leak of Peer Prefixes   | Neither OV nor BGPsec (in its   |
   | to Transit Provider             | current form) detects Type 4.   |
   | ------------------------------- | ------------------------------- |
   | Type 5: Prefix Re-Origination   | OV detects Type 5.              |
   | with Data Path to Legitimate    |                                 |
   | Origin                          |                                 |
   | ------------------------------- | ------------------------------- |
   | Type 6: Accidental Leak of      | For internal prefixes never     |
   | Internal Prefixes and More      | meant to be routed on the       |
   | Specifics                       | Internet, OV helps detect their |
   |                                 | leak; they might either have no |
   |                                 | covering ROA or have an AS0-ROA |
   |                                 | to always filter them. In the   |
   |                                 | case of accidental leak of more |
   |                                 | specifics, OV may offer some    |
   |                                 | detection due to ROA maxLength. |
   +---------------------------------+---------------------------------+

     Table 1: Examination of Route-Leak Detection Capability of Origin
               Validation and Current BGPsec Path Validation

   In the case of Type 6 leaks involving internal prefixes that are not
   meant to be routed in the Internet, they are likely to be detected by
   OV.  That is because such prefixes might either have no covering ROA
   or have an AS0-ROA to always filter them.  In the case of Type 6
   leaks that are due to accidental leak of more specifics, they may be
   detected due to violation of ROA maxLength.  BGPsec (i.e., path
   validation) in its current form does not detect Type 6.  However,
   route leaks of Type 6 are least problematic due to the following
   reasons.  In the case of leak of more specifics, the offending AS is
   itself the legitimate destination of the leaked more-specific
   prefixes.  Hence, in most cases of this type, the data traffic is not
   misrouted.  Also, leaked announcements of Type 6 are short-lived and
   typically withdrawn quickly following the announcements.  Further,
   the MaxPrefix limit may kick-in in some receiving routers and that



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   helps limit the propagation of sometimes large number of leaked
   routes of Type 6.

   Realistically, BGPsec may take a much longer time being deployed than
   OV.  Hence, solution proposals for route leaks should consider both
   scenarios: (A) OV only (without BGPsec) and (B) OV plus BGPsec.
   Assuming an initial scenario A, and based on the above discussion and
   Table 1, it is evident that the solution method should focus
   primarily on route leaks of Types 1, 2, 3, and 4.

3.  Mechanisms for Detection and Mitigation of Route Leaks

   There are two considerations for route leaks: (1) Prevention of route
   leaks from a local AS [I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy], and (2)
   Detection and mitigation of route leaks in ASes that are downstream
   from the leaking AS (in the path of BGP update).  This document
   focuses on the latter, and the details of the mechanism are described
   in this section.

3.1.  Ascertaining Peering Relationship

   There are four possible peering relationships (i.e., roles) an AS can
   have with a neighbor AS: (1) Provider: transit-provider for all
   prefixes exchanged, (2) Customer: customer for all prefixes
   exchanged, (3) Lateral Peer: lateral peer (i.e., non-transit) for all
   prefixes exchanged, and (4) Complex: different relationships for
   different sets of prefixes [Luckie].  On a per-prefix basis, the
   peering role types simplify to provider, customer, or lateral peer.

   Operators rely on some form of out-of-band (OOB) (i.e., external to
   BGP) communication to exchange information about their peering
   relationship, AS number, interface IP address, etc.  If the
   relationship is complex, the OOB communication also includes the sets
   of prefixes for which they have different roles.
   [I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy] introduces a method of re-confirming
   the BGP Role during BGP OPEN messaging (except when the role is
   complex).  It defines a new BGP Role capability, which helps in re-
   confirming the relationship when it is provider, customer, or lateral
   peer.  BGP Role does not replace the OOB communication since it
   relies on the OOB communication to set the role type in the BGP OPEN
   message.  However, BGP Role provides a means to double check, and if
   there is a contradiction detected via the BGP Role messages, then a
   Role Mismatch Notification is sent [I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy].

   When the BGP relationship information has been correctly exchanged
   (i.e., free of contradictions) including the sets of prefixes with
   different roles (if complex), then this information SHOULD be used to
   set the role per-prefix with each peer.  For example, if the local



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   AS's role is Provider with a neighbor AS, then the per-prefix role is
   set to 'Provider' for all prefixes sent to the neighbor, and set to
   'Customer' for all prefixes received from the neighbor.

   Once the per-prefix roles are set, this information is used in the
   RLP solution mechanism that is described in Section 3.2 and
   Section 3.3.

3.2.  Route-Leak Protection (RLP) Field Encoding by Sending Router

   The key principle is that, in the event of a route leak, a receiving
   router in a transit-provider AS (e.g., referring to Figure 1, ISP2
   (AS2) router) should be able to detect from the update message that
   its customer AS (e.g., AS3 in Figure 1) should not have forwarded the
   update (towards the transit-provider AS).  This means that at least
   one of the ASes in the AS path of the update signaled that it sent
   the update to its customer or lateral peer, but forbade any
   subsequent 'Up' (customer to provider) or 'Lateral' (peer to peer)
   forwarding.  This signaling is achieved by a Route-Leak Protection
   (RLP) field as described below.


                                      /\              /\
                                       \ route-leak(P)/
                                        \ propagated /
                                         \          /
              +------------+    peer    +------------+
        ______| ISP1 (AS1) |----------->|  ISP2 (AS2)|---------->
       /       ------------+  prefix(P) +------------+ route-leak(P)
      | prefix |          \   update      /\        \  propagated
       \  (P)  /           \              /          \
        -------   prefix(P) \            /            \
                     update  \          /              \
                              \        /route-leak(P)  \/
                              \/      /
                           +---------------+
                           | customer(AS3) |
                           +---------------+


        Figure 1: Illustration of the basic notion of a route leak.

   For the purpose of route-leak detection and mitigation, the RLP field
   value MUST be set to one of two values as follows:

   o  0: This is the default value (i.e., "nothing specified"),





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   o  1: This is the 'Do not Propagate Up or Lateral' indication; sender
      indicating that the route must not be forwarded 'Up' towards a
      transit-provider AS or to a lateral (i.e., non-transit) peer AS.

   The RLP indications are set on a per prefix basis.  This is because
   some peering relations between neighbors can be complex (see
   Section 3.1).  Further, the RLP indications are also set on a per hop
   (i.e., per AS) basis.

   There are two different scenarios when a sending AS MUST set value 1
   in the RLP field: (a) when sending the update to a customer AS, and
   (b) when sending the update to a lateral peer (i.e., non-transit) AS.
   In essence, in both scenarios, the intent of RLP = 1 is that the
   neighbor AS and any receiving AS along the subsequent AS path SHOULD
   NOT forward the update 'Up' towards its (receiving AS's) transit-
   provider AS or laterally towards its peer AS.

   When sending an update 'Up' to a transit-provider AS, the RLP
   encoding MUST be set to the default value of 0.  When a sending AS
   sets the RLP encoding to 0, it is indicating to the receiving AS that
   the update can be propagated in any direction (i.e., towards transit-
   provider, customer, or lateral peer).

   The two-state specification in the RLP field (as described above)
   works for detection and mitigation of route leaks of Types 1, 2, 3,
   and 4 which are the focus here (see Section 3.3 and Section 3.4).

   An AS MUST NOT rewrite/reset the values set by any preceding ASes in
   their respective RLP fields.

   The RLP encoding MUST be carried in BGP-4 [RFC4271] updates in a new
   BGP optional transitive attribute (see Section 3.2.1).  In BGPsec, it
   must be carried in the Flags field (see Section 3.2.2).

   In partial deployment, there may be eBGP routers in the AS path that
   are not upgraded and hence do not participate in RLP.  However, the
   RLP mechanism is backward compatible.  Participating ASes can detect
   and mitigate route leaks while ASes not upgraded to do RLP would
   likely allow route leaks to propagate.  If big ISPs deploy RLP, then
   they would be helping each other by not allowing route leaks
   originated within one's customer cone to propagate into another's AS
   or their customer cone.  This accords significant benefit to early
   adopters.








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3.2.1.  BGP RLP Attribute

   The BGP RLP attribute is a new BGP optional transitive attribute.
   The attribute type code for the RLP attribute is to be assigned by
   IANA.  The length field of this attribute is 2 octets.  The value
   field of the RLP attribute is defined as a set of one or more pairs
   of ASN (4 octets) and RLP (one octet) fields as described below
   (Figure 2).


   +-----------------------+ -\
   | ASN: N                |   |
   +-----------------------+    >  (Most recently added)
   | RLP: N                |   |
   +-----------------------+ -/
    ...........
   +-----------------------+ -\
   | ASN: 1                |   |
   +-----------------------+    >  (Least recently added)
   | RLP: 1                |   |
   +-----------------------+ -/


                    Figure 2: BGP RLP Attribute format.

   The RLP Attribute value is a sequence of these two components (see
   Figure 2):

   ASN: Four octets encoding the public registered AS number of a BGP
   speaker.

   RLP Field: One octet encoding the RLP Field bits.  The value of the
   RLP Field octet can be 0 (decimal) or 1 (decimal) as described above
   in Section 3.2.1.  Its usage will be further discussed in subsequent
   sections.

   If all ASes in the AS_PATH of a route are upgraded to participate in
   RLP, then the ASNs in the RLP TLV in Figure 2 will correspond one-to-
   one with sequence of ASes in the AS_PATH (excluding prepends).  If
   some ASes do not participate, then one or more {ASN, RLP} tuples may
   be missing in the RLP attribute relative to the AS_PATH.

3.2.2.  Carrying RLP Field Values in the BGPsec Flags

   In BGPsec-enabled routers that are also performing RLP, the RLP
   encoding MUST be accommodated in the existing Flags field in BGPsec
   updates.  The Flags field is part of the Secure_Path Segment in
   BGPsec updates [RFC8205].  It is one octet long, and one Flags field



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   is available for each AS hop, and currently only the first bit is
   used in BGPsec.  So, there are 7 bits that are currently unused in
   the Flags field.  One of these bits can be designated for the RLP
   field value (see Section 3.2.1).  This bit can be set to 0 when the
   RLP Field value is 0 and set to 1 when the RLP Field value is 1.
   Since the BGPsec protocol specification requires a sending AS to
   include the Flags field in the data that are signed over, the RLP
   field for each hop (assuming it would be part of the Flags field as
   described) will be protected under the sending AS's signature.

3.3.  Recommended Actions at a Receiving Router for Detection of Route
      Leaks

   The following receiver algorithm is RECOMMENDED for detecting route
   leaks:

   A receiving router MUST mark an update as a 'Route Leak' if ALL of
   the following conditions hold true:

   1.  The update is received from a customer or lateral peer AS.

   2.  The update has the RLP Field set to 1 (i.e., 'Do not Propagate Up
       or Lateral') indication for one or more hops (excluding the most
       recent) in the AS path.

   The reason for stating "excluding the most recent" in the above
   algorithm is as follows.  An ISP should look at RLP values set by
   ASes preceding the immediate sending AS in order to ascertain a leak.
   The receiving router already knows that the most recent hop in the
   update is from its customer or lateral-peer AS to itself, and it does
   not need to rely on the RLP field value set by that AS (i.e., the
   immediate neighbor AS in the AS path) for detection of route leaks.

   If the RLP encoding is secured by BGPsec (see Section 3.2) and hence
   protected against tampering by intermediate ASes, then there would be
   added certainty in the route-leak detection algorithm described above
   (see discussions in Appendix D.1 and Appendix D.2).

3.4.  Possible Actions at a Receiving Router for Mitigation

   After applying the above detection algorithm, a receiving router may
   use any policy-based algorithm of its own choosing to mitigate any
   detected route leaks.  An example receiver algorithm for mitigating a
   route leak is as follows:

   o  If an update from a customer or lateral peer AS is marked as a
      'Route Leak' (see Section 3.3), then the receiving router SHOULD
      prefer an alternate unmarked route.



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   o  If no alternate unmarked route is available, then a route marked
      as a 'Route Leak' MAY be accepted.

   A basic principle here is that if an AS receives and marks a customer
   route as 'Route Leak', then the AS should override the "prefer
   customer route" policy, and instead prefer an alternate 'clean' route
   learned from another customer, a lateral peer, or a transit provider.
   This can be implemented by adjusting the local preference for the
   routes in consideration.

4.  Security Considerations

   The Route-Leak Protection (RLP) field requires cryptographic
   protection in order to prevent malicious route leaks.  In the future,
   in conjunction with BGPsec deployment, the RLP field will be included
   in the Flags field in the Secure_Path Segment in BGPsec updates.  So,
   the cryptographic security mechanisms in BGPsec will also apply to
   the RLP field.  The reader is therefore directed to the security
   considerations provided in [RFC8205].

5.  IANA Considerations

   IANA is requested to register a new optional, transitive BGP Path
   Attribute, named "Route Leak Protection" in the BGP Path Attributes
   registry.  The attribute type code is TBD.  The reference for this
   new attribute is this document (i.e., the RFC that replaces this
   draft).  The length field of this attribute is 2 octets, and the
   length of the value field of this attribute is variable (see
   Figure 2) in Section 3.2.1 of this document).

6.  References

6.1.  Normative References

   [RFC4271]  Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
              Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.

6.2.  Informative References

   [Anwar]    Anwar, R., Niaz, H., Choffnes, D., Cunha, I., Gill, P.,
              and N. Katz-Bassett, "Investigating Interdomain Routing
              Policies in the Wild",  ACM Internet Measurement
              Conference (IMC), October 2015,
              <http://www.cs.usc.edu/assets/007/94928.pdf>.





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   [Cowie2010]
              Cowie, J., "China's 18 Minute Mystery",  Dyn
              Research/Renesys Blog, November 2010,
              <http://research.dyn.com/2010/11/
              chinas-18-minute-mystery/>.

   [Cowie2013]
              Cowie, J., "The New Threat: Targeted Internet Traffic
              Misdirection",  Dyn Research/Renesys Blog, November 2013,
              <http://research.dyn.com/2013/11/
              mitm-internet-hijacking/>.

   [draft-dickson-sidr-route-leak-solns]
              Dickson, B., "Route Leaks -- Proposed Solutions",  IETF
              Internet Draft (expired), March 2012,
              <https://tools.ietf.org/html/
              draft-dickson-sidr-route-leak-solns-01>.

   [draft-kunzinger-idrp-ISO10747-01]
              Kunzinger, C., "Inter-Domain Routing Protocol (IDRP)",
               IETF Internet Draft (expired), November 1994,
              <https://tools.ietf.org/pdf/
              draft-kunzinger-idrp-ISO10747-01.pdf>.

   [Gao]      Gao, L. and J. Rexford, "Stable Internet routing without
              global coordination",  IEEE/ACM Transactions on
              Networking, December 2001,
              <http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~jrex/papers/
              sigmetrics00.long.pdf>.

   [Gill]     Gill, P., Schapira, M., and S. Goldberg, "A Survey of
              Interdomain Routing Policies",  ACM SIGCOMM Computer
              Communication Review, January 2014,
              <https://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe/papers/survey.pdf>.

   [Giotsas]  Giotsas, V. and S. Zhou, "Valley-free violation in
              Internet routing - Analysis based on BGP Community data",
               IEEE ICC 2012, June 2012.

   [Hiran]    Hiran, R., Carlsson, N., and P. Gill, "Characterizing
              Large-scale Routing Anomalies: A Case Study of the China
              Telecom Incident",  PAM 2013, March 2013,
              <http://www3.cs.stonybrook.edu/~phillipa/papers/
              CTelecom.html>.

   [Huston2012]
              Huston, G., "Leaking Routes", March 2012,
              <http://labs.apnic.net/blabs/?p=139/>.



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   [Huston2014]
              Huston, G., "What's so special about 512?", September
              2014, <http://labs.apnic.net/blabs/?p=520/>.

   [I-D.ietf-idr-aspath-orf]
              Hares, S. and K. Patel, "AS Path Based Outbound Route
              Filter for BGP-4", draft-ietf-idr-aspath-orf-13 (work in
              progress), December 2016.

   [I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy]
              Azimov, A., Bogomazov, E., Bush, R., Patel, K., and K.
              Sriram, "Route Leak Prevention using Roles in Update and
              Open messages", draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-02 (work in
              progress), January 2018.

   [Kapela-Pilosov]
              Pilosov, A. and T. Kapela, "Stealing the Internet: An
              Internet-Scale Man in the Middle Attack", DEFCON-16 Las
              Vegas, NV, USA, August 2008,
              <https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-16/dc16-
              presentations/defcon-16-pilosov-kapela.pdf>.

   [Kephart]  Kephart, N., "Route Leak Causes Amazon and AWS Outage",
               ThousandEyes Blog, June 2015,
              <https://blog.thousandeyes.com/
              route-leak-causes-amazon-and-aws-outage>.

   [Khare]    Khare, V., Ju, Q., and B. Zhang, "Concurrent Prefix
              Hijacks: Occurrence and Impacts",  IMC 2012, Boston, MA,
              November 2012, <http://www.cs.arizona.edu/~bzhang/
              paper/12-imc-hijack.pdf>.

   [Labovitz]
              Labovitz, C., "Additional Discussion of the April China
              BGP Hijack Incident",  Arbor Networks IT Security Blog,
              November 2010,
              <http://www.arbornetworks.com/asert/2010/11/additional-
              discussion-of-the-april-china-bgp-hijack-incident/>.

   [LRL]      Khare, V., Ju, Q., and B. Zhang, "Large Route Leaks",
               Project web page, 2012,
              <http://nrl.cs.arizona.edu/projects/
              lsrl-events-from-2003-to-2009/>.

   [Luckie]   Luckie, M., Huffaker, B., Dhamdhere, A., Giotsas, V., and
              kc. claffy, "AS Relationships, Customer Cones, and
              Validation",  IMC 2013, October 2013,
              <http://www.caida.org/~amogh/papers/asrank-IMC13.pdf>.



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   [Madory]   Madory, D., "Why Far-Flung Parts of the Internet Broke
              Today",  Dyn Research/Renesys Blog, September 2014,
              <http://research.dyn.com/2014/09/
              why-the-internet-broke-today/>.

   [Mauch]    Mauch, J., "BGP Routing Leak Detection System",  Project
              web page, 2014,
              <http://puck.nether.net/bgp/leakinfo.cgi/>.

   [Mauch-nanog]
              Mauch, J., "Detecting Routing Leaks by Counting",
              NANOG-41 Albuquerque, NM, USA, October 2007,
              <https://www.nanog.org/meetings/nanog41/presentations/
              mauch-lightning.pdf>.

   [Nanog-thread-June2016]
              "Intra-AS messaging for route leak prevention", NANOG
              Email List - Discussion Thread , June 2016,
              <http://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2016-June/
              thread.html#86348>.

   [NIST-800-54]
              Kuhn, D., Sriram, K., and D. Montgomery, "Border Gateway
              Protocol Security",  NIST Special Publication 800-54, July
              2007, <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-54/
              SP800-54.pdf>.

   [Paseka]   Paseka, T., "Why Google Went Offline Today and a Bit about
              How the Internet Works",  CloudFare Blog, November 2012,
              <http://blog.cloudflare.com/
              why-google-went-offline-today-and-a-bit-about/>.

   [proceedings-sixth-ietf]
              Gross, P., "Proceedings of the April 22-24, 1987 Internet
              Engineering Task Force", April 1987,
              <https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/06.pdf>.

   [RFC1105-obsolete]
              Lougheed, K. and Y. Rekhter, "A Border Gateway Protocol
              (BGP)",  IETF RFC (obsolete), June 1989,
              <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1105>.

   [RFC6811]  Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
              Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.





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   [RFC7454]  Durand, J., Pepelnjak, I., and G. Doering, "BGP Operations
              and Security", BCP 194, RFC 7454, DOI 10.17487/RFC7454,
              February 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7454>.

   [RFC7908]  Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., McPherson, D., Osterweil, E.,
              and B. Dickson, "Problem Definition and Classification of
              BGP Route Leaks", RFC 7908, DOI 10.17487/RFC7908, June
              2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7908>.

   [RFC8205]  Lepinski, M., Ed. and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol
              Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205, September
              2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8205>.

   [Snijders]
              Snijders, J., "Practical everyday BGP filtering with
              AS_PATH filters: Peer Locking", NANOG-47 Chicago, IL, USA,
              June 2016, <https://www.nanog.org/sites/default/files/
              Snijders_Everyday_Practical_Bgp.pdf>.

   [Sriram]   Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., Dickson, B., Patel, K., and A.
              Robachevsky , "Methods for Detection and Mitigation of BGP
              Route Leaks",  IETF-95 IDR WG Meeting), April 2016,
              <https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/95/slides/
              slides-95-idr-13.pdf>.

   [Toonk]    Toonk, A., "What Caused Today's Internet Hiccup", August
              2014, <http://www.bgpmon.net/
              what-caused-todays-internet-hiccup/>.

   [Toonk2015-A]
              Toonk, A., "What caused the Google service interruption",
              March 2015, <http://www.bgpmon.net/
              what-caused-the-google-service-interruption/>.

   [Toonk2015-B]
              Toonk, A., "Massive route leak causes Internet slowdown",
              June 2015, <http://www.bgpmon.net/
              massive-route-leak-cause-internet-slowdown/>.

   [Wijchers]
              Wijchers, B. and B. Overeinder, "Quantitative Analysis of
              BGP Route Leaks",  RIPE-69, November 2014,
              <https://ripe69.ripe.net/
              presentations/157-RIPE-69-Routing-WG.pdf>.







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   [Zmijewski]
              Zmijewski, E., "Indonesia Hijacks the World",  Dyn
              Research/Renesys Blog, April 2014,
              <http://research.dyn.com/2014/04/
              indonesia-hijacks-world/>.

Appendix A.  Related Prior Work

   The solution described in this document is based on setting an
   attribute in BGP route announcement to manage the transmission/
   receipt of the announcement based on the type of neighbor (e.g.,
   customer, transit provider, etc.).  Documented prior work related to
   this basic idea and mechanism dates back to at least the 1980's.
   Some examples of prior work are: (1) Information flow rules described
   in [proceedings-sixth-ietf] (see pp. 195-196); (2) Link Type
   described in [RFC1105-obsolete] (see pp. 4-5); (3) Hierarchical
   Recording described in [draft-kunzinger-idrp-ISO10747-01] (see
   Section 6.3.1.12).  The problem of route leaks and possible solution
   mechanisms based on encoding peering-link type information, e.g., P2C
   (i.e., Transit-Provider to Customer), C2P (i.e., Customer to Transit-
   Provider), p2p (i.e., peer to peer) etc., in BGPsec updates and
   protecting the same under BGPsec path signatures have been discussed
   in IETF SIDR WG at least since 2011.
   [draft-dickson-sidr-route-leak-solns] attempted to describe these
   mechanisms in a BGPsec context.  The draft expired in 2012.
   [draft-dickson-sidr-route-leak-solns] defined neighbor relationships
   on a per link basis, but in the current document the relationship is
   encoded per prefix, as routes for prefixes with different peering
   relationships may be sent over the same link.  Also
   [draft-dickson-sidr-route-leak-solns] proposed a second signature
   block for the link type encoding, separate from the path signature
   block in BGPsec.  By contrast, in the current document when BGPsec-
   based solution is considered, cryptographic protection is provided
   for Route-Leak Protection (RLP) encoding using the same signature
   block as that for path signatures (see Section 3.2.2).

Appendix B.  Prevention of Route Leaks at Local AS: Intra-AS Messaging

   Note: The intra-AS messaging for route leak prevention can be done
   using a non-transitive BGP Community or Attribute.  The Community-
   based method is described below.  For the BGP Attribute-based method,
   see [I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy].

B.1.  Non-Transitive BGP Community for Intra-AS Messaging

   The following procedure (or similar) for intra-AS messaging (i.e.,
   between ingress and egress routers) for prevention of route leaks is
   a fairly common practice used by large ISPs.  (Note: This information



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   was gathered from discussions on the NANOG mailing list
   [Nanog-thread-June2016] as well as through private discussions with
   operators of large ISP networks.)

   Routes are tagged on ingress to an AS with communities for origin,
   including the type of eBGP peer it was learned from (customer,
   provider or lateral peer), geographic location, etc.  The community
   attributes are carried across the AS with the routes.  These
   communities are used along with additional logic in route policies to
   determine which routes are to be announced to which eBGP peers and
   which are to be dropped.  In this process, the ISP's AS also ensures
   that routes learned from a transit-provider or a lateral peer (i.e.,
   non-transit) at an ingress router are not leaked at an egress router
   to another transit-provider or lateral peer.

   Additionally, in many cases, ISP network operators' outbound policies
   require explicit matches for expected communities before passing
   routes.  This helps ensure that that if an update has been entered
   into the RIB-in but has missed its ingress community tagging (due to
   a missing/misapplied ingress policy), it will not be inadvertently
   leaked.

   The above procedure (or a simplified version of it) is also
   applicable when an AS consists of a single eBGP router.  It is
   recommended that all AS operators SHOULD implement the procedure
   described above (or similar that is appropriate for their network) to
   prevent route leaks that they have direct control over.

Appendix C.  Stopgap Solution when Only Origin Validation is Deployed

   A stopgap method is described here for detection and mitigation of
   route leaks for the intermediate phase when OV is deployed but BGP
   protocol on the wire is unchanged.  The stopgap solution can be in
   the form of construction of a prefix filter list from ROAs.  A
   suggested procedure for constructing such a list comprises of the
   following steps:

   o  ISP makes a list of all the ASes (Cust_AS_List) that are in its
      customer cone (ISP's own AS is also included in the list).  (Some
      of the ASes in Cust_AS_List may be multi-homed to another ISP and
      that is OK.)

   o  ISP downloads from the RPKI repositories a complete list
      (Cust_ROA_List) of valid ROAs that contain any of the ASes in
      Cust_AS_List.

   o  ISP creates a list of all the prefixes (Cust_Prfx_List) that are
      contained in any of the ROAs in Cust_ROA_List.



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   o  Cust_Prfx_List is the allowed list of prefixes that is permitted
      by the ISP's AS, and will be forwarded by the ISP to upstream
      ISPs, customers, and peers.

   o  A route for a prefix that is not in Cust_Prfx_List but announced
      by one of ISP's customers is 'marked' as a potential route leak.
      Further, the ISP's router SHOULD prefer an alternate route that is
      Valid (i.e., valid according to origin validation) and 'clean'
      (i.e., not marked) over the 'marked' route.  The alternate route
      may be from a peer, transit provider, or different customer.

   Special considerations with regard to the above procedure may be
   needed for DDoS mitigation service providers.  They typically
   originate or announce a DDoS victim's prefix to their own ISP on a
   short notice during a DDoS emergency.  Some provisions would need to
   be made for such cases, and they can be determined with the help of
   inputs from DDoS mitigation service providers.

   For developing a list of all the ASes (Cust_AS_List) that are in the
   customer cone of an ISP, the AS path based Outbound Route Filter
   (ORF) technique [I-D.ietf-idr-aspath-orf] can be helpful (see
   discussion in Appendix D.4).

   Another technique based on AS_PATH filters is described in
   [Snijders].  This method is applicable to very large ISPs that have
   lateral peering.  For a pair of such very large ISPs, say A and B,
   the method depends on ISP A communicating out-of-band (e.g., by
   email) with ISP B about whether or not it (ISP A) has any transit
   providers.  This out-of-band knowledge enables ISP B to apply
   suitable AS_PATH filtering criteria for routes involving the presence
   of ISP A in the path and prevent certain kinds of route leaks (see
   [Snijders] for details).

Appendix D.  Design Rationale and Discussion

   This section provides design justifications for the methodology
   specified in Section 3, and also answers some questions that are
   anticipated or have been raised in the IETF IDR and SIDR working
   group meetings.

D.1.  Is route-leak solution without cryptographic protection a serious
      attack vector?

   It has been asked if a route-leak solution without BGPsec, i.e., when
   RLP Fields are not protected, can turn into a serious new attack
   vector.  The answer seems to be: not really!  Even the NLRI and
   AS_PATH in BGP updates are attack vectors, and RPKI/OV/BGPsec seek to
   fix that.  Consider the following.  Say, if 99% of route leaks are



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   accidental and 1% are malicious, and if route-leak solution without
   BGPsec eliminates the 99%, then perhaps it is worth it (step in the
   right direction).  When BGPsec comes into deployment, the route-leak
   protection (RLP) bits can be mapped into BGPsec (using the Flags
   field) and then necessary security will be in place as well (within
   each BGPsec island as and when they emerge).

   Further, let us consider the worst-case damage that can be caused by
   maliciously manipulating the RLP Field values in an implementation
   without cryptographic protection (i.e., sans BGPsec).  Manipulation
   of the RLP bits can result in one of two types of attacks: (a)
   Upgrade attack and (b) Downgrade attack.  Descriptions and
   discussions about these attacks follow.  In what follows, P2C stands
   for transit provider to customer (Down); C2P stands for customer to
   transit provider (Up), and p2p stands for peer to peer (lateral or
   non-transit relationship).

   (a) Upgrade attack: An AS that wants to intentionally leak a route
   would alter the RLP encodings for the preceding hops from 1 (i.e.,
   'Do not Propagate Up or Lateral') to 0 (default) wherever applicable.
   This poses no problem for a route that keeps propagating in the
   'Down' (P2C) direction.  However, for a route that propagates 'Up'
   (C2P) or 'Lateral' (p2p), the worst that can happen is that a route
   leak goes undetected.  That is, a receiving router would not be able
   to detect the leak for the route in question by the RLP mechanism
   described here.  However, the receiving router may still detect and
   mitigate it in some cases by applying other means such as prefix
   filters [RFC7454].  If some malicious leaks go undetected (when RLP
   is deployed without BGPsec) that is possibly a small price to pay for
   the ability to detect the bulk of route leaks that are accidental.

   (b) Downgrade attack: RLP encoding is set to 1 (i.e., 'Do not
   Propagate Up or Lateral') when it should be set to 0 (default).  This
   would result in a route being mis-detected and marked as a route
   leak.  By default, RLP encoding is set to 0, and that helps reduce
   errors of this kind (i.e., accidental downgrade incidents).  Every AS
   or ISP wants reachability for prefixes it originates and for its
   customer prefixes.  So, an AS or ISP is not likely to change an RLP
   value 0 to 1 intentionally.  If a route leak is detected (due to
   intentional or accidental downgrade) by a receiving router, it would
   prefer an alternate 'clean' route from a transit provider or peer
   over a 'marked' route from a customer.  It may end up with a
   suboptimal path.  In order to have reachability, the receiving router
   would accept a 'marked' route if there is no alternative that is
   'clean'.  So, RLP downgrade attacks (intentional or accidental) would
   be quite rare, and the consequences do not appear to be grave.





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D.2.  Combining results of route-leak detection, OV and BGPsec
      validation for path selection decision

   Combining the results of route-leak detection, OV, and BGPsec
   validation for path selection decision is up to local policy in a
   receiving router.  As an example, a router may always give precedence
   to outcomes of OV and BGPsec validation over that of route-leak
   detection.  That is, if an update fails OV or BGPsec validation, then
   the update is not considered a candidate for path selection.
   Instead, an alternate update is chosen that passed OV and BGPsec
   validation and additionally was not marked as route leak.

   If only OV is deployed (and not BGPsec), then there are six possible
   combinations between OV and route-leak detection outcomes.  Because
   there are three possible outcomes for OV (NotFound, Valid, and
   Invalid) and two possible outcomes for route-leak detection (marked
   as leak and not marked).  If OV and BGPsec are both deployed, then
   there are twelve possible combinations between OV, BGPsec validation,
   and route-leak detection outcomes.  As stated earlier, since BGPsec
   protects the RLP encoding, there would be added certainty in route-
   leak detection outcome if an update is BGPsec valid (see
   Appendix D.1).

D.3.  Are there cases when valley-free violations can be considered
      legitimate?

   There are studies in the literature [Anwar] [Giotsas] [Wijchers]
   observing and analyzing the behavior of routes announced in BGP
   updates using data gathered from the Internet.  In particular, the
   studies have focused on how often there appear to be valley-free
   (e.g., Gao-Rexford [Gao] model) violations, and if they can be
   explained [Anwar].  One important consideration for explanation of
   violations is per-prefix routing policies, i.e., routes for prefixes
   with different peering relationships may be sent over the same link.
   One encouraging result reported in [Anwar] is that when per-prefix
   routing policies are taken into consideration in the data analysis,
   more than 80% of the observed routing decisions fit the valley-free
   model (see Section 4.3 and SPA-1 data in Figure 2).  [Anwar] also
   observes, "it is well known that this model [the basic Gao-Rexford
   model and some variations of it] fails to capture many aspects of the
   interdomain routing system.  These aspects include AS relationships
   that vary based on the geographic region or destination prefix, and
   traffic engineering via hot-potato routing or load balancing."  So,
   there may be potential for explaining the remaining (20% or less)
   violations of valley-free as well.

   One major design factor is that the Route-Leak Protection (RLP)
   encoding is per prefix.  Hence, the solution is consistent with ISPs'



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   per-prefix routing policies.  Large global and other major ISPs will
   be the likely early adopters, and they are expected to have expertise
   in setting policies (including per prefix policies, if applicable),
   and make proper use of the RLP indications on a per prefix basis.
   When the large ISPs participate in this solution deployment, it is
   envisioned that they would form a ring of protection against route
   leaks, and co-operatively avoid many of the common types of route
   leaks that are observed.  Route leaks may still happen occasionally
   within the customer cones (if some customer ASes are not
   participating or not diligently implementing RLP), but such leaks are
   unlikely to propagate from one large participating ISP to another.

D.4.  Comparison with other methods (routing security BCPs)

   It is reasonable to ask if techniques considered in BCPs such
   as[RFC7454] (BGP Operations and Security) and [NIST-800-54] may be
   adequate to address route leaks.  The prefix filtering
   recommendations in the BCPs may be complementary but not adequate.
   The difficulty is in ISPs' ability to construct prefix filters that
   represent their customer cones (CC) accurately, especially when there
   are many levels in the hierarchy within the CC.  In the RLP-encoding
   based solution described here, AS operators signal for each route
   propagated, if it must not be subsequently propagated to a transit
   provider or peer.

   AS path based Outbound Route Filter (ORF) described in
   [I-D.ietf-idr-aspath-orf] is also an interesting complementary
   technique.  It can be used as an automated collaborative messaging
   system (implemented in BGP) for ISPs to try to develop a complete
   view of the ASes and AS paths in their CCs.  Once an ISP has that
   view, then AS path filters can be possibly used to detect route
   leaks.  One limitation of this technique is that it cannot duly take
   into account the fact that routes for prefixes with different peering
   relationships may be sent over the same link between ASes.  Also, the
   success of AS path based ORF depends on whether ASes at all levels of
   the hierarchy in a CC participate and provide accurate information
   (in the ORF messages) about the AS paths they expect to have in their
   BGP updates.

D.5.  Per-Hop RLP Field or Single RLP Flag per Update?

   The route-leak detection and mitigation mechanism described in this
   document is based on setting RLP Fields on a per-hop basis.  There is
   another possible mechanism based on a single RLP flag per update.

   Method A - Per-Hop RLP Field: The sender (eBGP router) on each hop in
   the AS path sets its RLP Field = 1 if sending the update to a
   customer or lateral peer (see Section 3.2) and Section 3.2.1).  No AS



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   (if operating correctly) would rewrite the RLP Field set by any
   preceding AS.

   Method B - Single RLP Flag per Update: As it propagates, the update
   would have at most one RLP flag.  Once an eBGP router (in the update
   path) determines that it is sending an update towards a customer or
   lateral peer AS, it sets the RLP flag.  The flag value equals the AS
   number of the eBGP router that is setting it.  Once the flag is set,
   subsequent ASes in the path must propagate the flag as is.

   To compare Methods A and B, consider the example illustrated in
   Figure 3.  Consider a partial deployment scenario in which AS1, AS2,
   AS3 and AS5 participate in RLP, and AS4 does not.  AS1 (2 levels deep
   in AS3's customer cone) has imperfect RLP operation.  Each complying
   AS's route leak mitigation policy is to prefer an update not marked
   as route leak (see Section 3.4).  If there is no alternative, then a
   transit-provider may propagate a marked update from a customer.  In
   this example, multi-homed AS4 leaks a route received for prefix Q
   from transit-provider AS3 to transit-provider AS5.


                        +-----------+  RLP=1    +-----------+
                        |    AS3    |---------->|    AS5    |
                        |(Major ISP)|        U2 |(Major ISP)|
                        +-----------+           +-----------+
                           /\       \            /\ U1
    Route for Q propagated /         \RLP=1      /
      due to lack of      /RLP=0      \         / (route leak;
     alternate route     /            \/       /   bad behavior)
                 +---------+       +-------------+
                 |   AS2   |       |     AS4     |
                 +---------+       +-------------+
                     /\             (legacy; does not support RLP)
                     /
                    /
                   /RLP=1 (set incorrectly)
                  /
        +----------+
        |    AS1   |
        +----------+
           /\
           /
          / Prefix Q


         Figure 3: Example for comparison of Method A vs. Method B





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   If Method A is implemented in the network, the two BGP updates for
   prefix Q received at AS5 are (note that AS4 is not participating in
   RLP):

      U1A: Q [AS4 AS3 AS2 AS1] {RLP3(AS3)=1, RLP2(AS2)=0, RLP1(AS1)=1}
      ..... from AS4

      U2A: Q [AS3 AS2 AS1] {RLP3(AS3)=1, RLP2(AS2)=0, RLP1(AS1)=1} .....
      from AS3

   Alternatively, if Method B is implemented in the network, the two BGP
   updates for prefix Q received at AS5 are:

      U1B: Q [AS4 AS3 AS2 AS1] {RLP(AS1)=1} ..... from AS4

      U2B: Q [AS3 AS2 AS1] {RLP(AS1)=1} ..... from AS3

   All received routes for prefix Q at AS5 are marked as route leak in
   either case (Method A or B).  In the case of Method A, AS5 can use
   additional information gleaned from the RLP fields in the updates to
   possibly make a better best path selection.  For example, AS5 can
   determine that U1A update received from its customer AS4 exhibits
   violation of two RLP fields (those set by AS1 and AS3) and one of
   them was set just two hops away.  But U2A update exhibits that only
   one RLP field was violated and that was set three hops back.  Based
   on this logic, AS5 may prefer U2A over U1A (even though U1A is a
   customer route).  This would be a good decision.  However, Method B
   does not facilitate this kind of more rational decision process.
   With Method B, both updates U1B and U2B exhibit that they violated
   only one RLP field (set by AS1 several hops away).  AS5 may then
   prefer U1B over U2B since U1B is from a customer, and that would be
   bad decision.  This illustrates that, due to more information in per-
   hop RLP Fields, Method A seems to be operationally more beneficial
   than Method B.

   Further, for detection and notification of neighbor AS's non-
   compliance, Method A (per-hop RLP) is better than Method B (single
   RLP).  With Method A, the bad behavior of AS4 would be explicitly
   evident to AS5 since it violated AS3's (only two hops away) RLP field
   as well.  AS5 would alert AS4 and also AS2 would alert AS1 about lack
   of compliance (when Method A is used).  With Method B, the alerting
   process may not be as expeditious.

Acknowledgements

   The authors wish to thank Jared Mauch, Jeff Haas, Job Snijders,
   Warren Kumari, Amogh Dhamdhere, Jakob Heitz, Geoff Huston, Randy
   Bush, Alexander Azimov, Ruediger Volk, Sue Hares, Wes George, Job



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Internet-Draft     Route Leak Detection and Mitigation        March 2018


   Snijders, Chris Morrow, Sandy Murphy, Danny McPherson, and Eric
   Osterweil for comments, suggestions, and critique.  The authors are
   also thankful to Padma Krishnaswamy, Oliver Borchert, and Okhee Kim
   for their review and comments.

Authors' Addresses

   Kotikalapudi Sriram
   USA National Institute of Standards and Technology

   Email: ksriram@nist.gov


   Doug Montgomery
   USA National Institute of Standards and Technology

   Email: dougm@nist.gov


   Brian Dickson

   Email: brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com


   Keyur Patel
   Arrcus

   Email: keyur@arrcus.com


   Andrei Robachevsky
   Internet Society

   Email: robachevsky@isoc.org

















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