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Internet-Draft                                                 Wood, M.
Internet Engineering Task Force               Internet Security Systems
Intrusion Detection Exchange Format Working Group         October, 1999
Category: Informational



            Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Requirements
                 <draft-ietf-idwg-requirements-02.txt>

Status of this Memo

     This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance
     with all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

     Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet
     Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working
     groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working
     documents as Internet-Drafts.

     Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
     months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other
     documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-
     Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work
     in progress."

     The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
     http://www.ietf.org/ietf/lid-abstracts.txt

     The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
     http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html

     Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

     This Internet Draft expires April 22, 2000.

1. Abstract

     The purpose of the Intrusion Detection Exchange Format is to
     define data formats and exchange procedures for sharing
     information of interest to intrusion detection and response
     systems, and to the management systems which may need to interact
     with them.  This Internet-Draft describes the high-level
     requirements for such communication, including the rationale for
     those requirements. Scenarios are used to illustrate the
     requirements.

2. Conventions used in this document

     The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
     "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in
     this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [1].

3.  Introduction

This document defines requirements for the Intrusion Detection Exchange
Format (IDEF), which is the intended work product of the Intrusion
Detection Exchange Format Working Group (IDWG). IDEF is planned to be
a standard format which automated Intrusion Detection Systems can use
for reporting events which they have deemed to be suspicious.


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3.1  Rationale

The reasons such a format should be useful are as follows:

1) A number of commercial and free Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are
   available and more are becoming available all the time. Some products
   are aimed at detecting intrusions on the network, others are aimed at
   host operating systems, while still others are aimed at applications.
   Even within a given category, the products have very different
   strengths and weaknesses. Hence it is likely that users will deploy
   more than a single product. And users will want to observe the output
   of these products from one or more manager(s). A standard format for
   reporting events will simplify this task greatly.

2) Intrusions frequently involve multiple organizations as victims, or
   multiple sites within the same organization. Typically, those sites
   will use different ID systems. It would be very helpful to correlate
   such distributed intrusions across multiple sites and administrative
   domains. Having reports from all sites in a common format would
   facilitate this task

3) The existence of a common format should allow components from
   different ID systems to be integrated more readily. ID research
   should migrate into commercial products more easily.

4) We feel that, in addition to enabling communication from an ID
   analyzer to an ID manager, the IDEF notification system may also
   enable communication between a variety of IDS components. However,
   for the remainder of this document, we refer to the communication as
   going from an analyzer to a manager.

All of these reasons suggest that a common format for reporting
suspicious events should help the IDS market to grow and innovate more
successfully, and should result in IDS users obtaining better results
from deployment of ID systems.

3.2  Intrusion Detection Terms

In order to make the rest of the requirements clearer, we define some
terms about typical intrusion detection systems. These terms are
presented in alphabetical order. The diagram at the end of this section
illustrates the relationships of some of the terms defined herein.

3.2.1 Activity:

Instantiations of the data source that are identified by the sensor or
analyzer as being of interest to the operator. Examples of this include
(but are not limited to) network sessions, user activity, and
application events.

Activity can range from extremely serious occurrences (such as an
unequivocally malicious attack) to less serious occurrences (such as
unusual user activity that's worth a further look).

3.2.2 Administrator:

The human with overall responsibility for setting the security policy of
the organization, and, thus, for decisions about deploying and
configuring the ID system. This may or may not be the same person as the
operator of the IDS. In some organizations, the administrator is


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associated with the network or systems administration groups. In other
organizations, it's an independent position.

3.2.3 Alert:

A message from an analyzer to a manager that an event has been detected.
An alert typically contains information about the unusual activity that
was detected, as well as the specifics of the occurrence.

3.2.4 Analyzer:

The ID component or process that analyzes the data collected by the
sensor for signs of unauthorized or undesired activity or for events
that might be of interest to the security administrator. In many
existing ID systems, the sensor and the analyzer are part of the same
component. In this document, the term analyzer is used generically to
refer to the sender of the IDEF message.

3.2.5 Data Source:

The raw information that an intrusion detection system uses to detect
unauthorized or undesired activity. Common data sources include (but
are not limited to) raw network packets, operating system audit logs,
application audit logs, and system-generated checksum data.

3.2.6 Event:

The occurrence in the data source that is detected by the analyzer and
which may result in an IDEF alert being transmitted. For example, three
failed logins in 10 seconds might indicate a brute-force login attack.

3.2.7 IDS:

Intrusion detection system. Some combination of one or more of the
following components: sensor, analyzer, manager.

3.2.8 Manager:

The ID component or process from which the operator manages the various
components of the ID system. Management functions typically include (but
are not limited to) sensor configuration, analyzer configuration, event
notification management, data consolidation, and reporting.

3.2.9 Notification:

The method by which the IDS manager makes the operator aware of the
event occurrence. In many ID systems, this is done via the display of a
colored icon on the IDS manager screen, the transmission of an e-mail or
pager message, or the transmission of an SNMP trap, although other
notification techniques are also used.

3.2.10 Operator:

The human that is the primary user of the IDS manager. The operator
often monitors the output of the ID system and initiates or recommends
further action.

3.2.11 Response:

The actions taken in response to an event. Responses may be undertaken


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automatically by some entity in the ID system architecture or may be
initiated by a human. Sending a notification to the operator is a very
common response. Other responses include (but are not limited to)
logging the activity, recording the raw data (from the data source) that
characterized the event, terminating a network, user, or application
session, or altering network or system access controls.

3.2.12 Sensor:

The ID component that collects data from the data source. The
frequency of data collection will vary across IDS offerings.

3.2.13 Signature:

A rule used by the analyzer to identify interesting activity to the
security administrator. Signatures represent one of the mechanisms
(though not necessarily the only mechanism) by which ID systems detect
intrusions.

3.2.14 Security Policy:

The predefined, formally documented statement which defines what
services are allowed to be transported across the monitored segment of
the network to support the organization's requirements. This includes,
but is not limited to, which hosts are to be denied external network
access.

 ________
|        |
| Data   |_________                   __________
| Source |     Activity              |          |
|________|         |                 | Operator |_________
                   |                 |          |         |
                   |                 |__________|         |
           . . . .\|/ . . . . .             A             |
         .    _____V___          .         /|\            |
        .    |         |           .         \            |
        .    | Sensor  |__           .        \           |
        .    |         |  |            .  Notification    |
        .    |_________| Event           .      \        \|/
        .          A      |     _________  .     \        V
          .       /|\     |    |         |   .    \    Response
            .      |       --->| Analyzer|__ .     |      A
              .    |           |         | Alert   |     /|\
                .  |           |_________|  |.     |      |
                  .| . . . . . . .  A  . . .|      |      |
                   |               /|\     \|/     |      |
                   |________________|   ____V___   |      |
                       |               |        |__|      |
                       |               | Manager|_________|
                       |               |        |
                       |               |________|
                       |                  A
                     Security            /|\
     _______________   |  Policy__________|
    |               |  |
    | Administrator |__|
    |               |
    |_______________|

The diagram above illustrates the terms above and their relationships.

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3.3  Architectural Assumptions

In this document, as defined in the terms above, we assume that an
analyzer determines somehow that a suspicious event has been seen by a
sensor, and sends an alert to a manager. The format of that alert and
the method of communicating it are what IDEF proposes to standardize.

For the purposes of this document, we assume that the analyzer and
manager are separate components, and that they are communicating
pairwise across a TCP/IP network.  No other form of communication
between these entities is contemplated in this document, and no other
use of IDEF alerts is considered.

We try to make no further architectural assumptions than those just
stated.  For example, the following points should not matter:

  * Whether the sensor and the analyzer are integrated or separate.

  * Whether the analyzer and manager are isolated, or embedded in some
    large hierarchy or distributed mesh of components.

  * Whether the manager actually notifies a human, takes action
    automatically, or just analyzes incoming alerts and correlates them.

  * Whether a component might act as an analyzer with respect to one
    component, while also acting as a manager with respect to another.

3.4  Organization of this document.

Besides this requirements document, the IDWG working group should
produce two other documents. The first should describe a data format or
language for exchanging information about suspicious events.  In this
document, we refer to that as the "data-format specification".  The
second document should identify existing IETF protocols that are best
used for conveying the data so formatted, and explain how to package
this data in those existing formats. We refer to this as the
"communication specification".

Accordingly, the requirements here are partitioned into five sections

   * The first of these contains general requirements that apply to all
     aspects of the IDEF specification.

   * The second section describes requirements on the formatting of IDEF
     messages.

   * The third section outlines requirements on the communications
     mechanism used to move IDEF messages from the analyzer to the
     manager.

   * The fourth section contains requirements on the content and
     semantics of the IDEF messages.

   * The final section places requirements on IDEF event definitions and
     the event definition process.

For each requirement, we attempt to state the requirement as clearly as
possible without imposing an idea of what a design solution should be.
Then we give the rationale for why this requirement is important, and
state whether this should be an essential feature of the specification,


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or is beneficial but could be lacking if it is difficult to fulfill.
Finally, where it seems necessary, we give an illustrative scenario. In
some cases, we include possible design solutions in the scenario. These
are purely illustrative.

3.5 Document Impact on IDEF Designs

It is expected that proposed IDEF designs will, at a minimum, satisfy
the requirements expressed in this document. However, this document will
be used only as one of many criteria in the evaluation of various IDEF
designs. It is recognized that the working group may use additional
metrics to evaluate competing IDEF designs.


4.  General Requirements

4.1   The IDEF SHALL reference and use previously published RFCs where
      possible.

4.1.1 Rationale: The IETF has already completed a great deal of research
      and work into the areas of networks and security. In the interest
      of time, it is smart to use already defined and accepted
      standards.

4.1.2 Scenario: IDEF specification proposals SHOULD rely heavily on
      existing communications or encryption standards, where possible.


4.2   The IDEF MUST be able to operate in environments that contain IPv4
      and IPv6 implementations.

4.2.1 Rationale: Since pure IPv4, hybrid IPv6/IPv4, and pure IPv6
      environments are expected to exist within the timeframe of IDEF
      implementations, the IDEF specification MUST support IPv6
      and IPv4 environments.

4.2.2 Scenario: IDEF specification proposals SHOULD include detailed
      descriptions of how they will operate in pure IPv4, pure IPv6, and
      hybrid environments.


5. Message Format

The IDEF message format is intended to be independent of the IDEF
communications mechanism.  Although use of the IDEF communications
mechanism whenever possible is RECOMMENDED, other mechanisms MAY be
used when necessary.

5.1   IDEF message formats SHALL support full internationalization and
      localization.

5.1.1 Rationale: Since network security and intrusion detection are
      areas that cross geographic, political, and cultural boundaries,
      the IDEF messages MUST be formatted such that they can be
      presented to an operator in a local language and adhering to local
      presentation customs.

5.1.2 Scenario: An IDEF specification might include numeric event
      identifiers. An IDEF implementation might translate these numeric
      event identifiers into local language descriptions. In cases where


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      the messages contain strings, the information might be represented
      using the ISO/IEC IS 10646-1 character set and encoded using the
      UTF-8 transformation format to facilitate internationalization.


5.2   The format of IDEF messages MUST support filtering and/or
      aggregation of data by the manager.

5.2.1 Rationale: Since it is anticipated that some managers might want
      to perform filtering and/or data aggregation functions on IDEF
      messages, the IDEF messages MUST be structured to facilitate these
      operations.

5.2.2 Scenario: An IDEF specification proposal might recommend fixed
      format messages with strong numerical semantics. This would lend
      itself to high-performance filtering and aggegration by the
      receiving station.


6.  Communications Mechanism Requirements

6.1   The IDEF MUST support reliable transmission of messages.

6.1.1 Rationale: IDS managers often rely on receipt of data from IDS
      analyzers to do their jobs effectively. Since IDS managers will
      rely on IDEF messages for this purpose, it is important that IDEF
      messages be delivered reliably.

6.1.2 Scenario: The IDEF system might rely upon TCP reliability
      mechanisms or might design its own reliable protocol for use with
      UDP.


6.2   The IDEF MUST support transmission of messages between ID
      components across firewall boundaries without compromising
      security.

6.2.1 Rationale: Since it is expected that firewalls will often be
      deployed between IDEF analyzers and their corresponding managers,
      the ability to send IDEF messages through firewalls is necessary.
      Setting up this communication MUST NOT require changes to the
      intervening firewall(s) that weaken the security of the protected
      network(s). Nor SHOULD this be achieved by conflating IDEF
      messages with other kinds of traffic (e.g., by overloading the
      HTTP POST method) since that would make it difficult for an
      organization to apply separate policies to IDEF traffic and other
      kinds of traffic.

6.2.2 Scenario: One possible design is the use of TCP to convey IDEF
      messages. The general goal in this case is to avoid opening
      dangerous inbound "holes" in the firewall. When the manager is
      inside the firewall and the analyzers are outside the firewall,
      this is often achieved by having the manager initiate an outbound
      connection to each analyzer. However, it is also possible to
      place the manager outside the firewall and the analyzers on the
      inside; this can occur when a third-party vendor (such as an ISP)
      is providing monitoring services to a user. In this case, the
      outbound connections would be initiated by each analyzer to the
      manager. A mechanism that permits either the manager or the



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      analyzer to initiate connections would provide maximum flexibility
      in manager and analyzer deployment.


6.3   The IDEF MUST support mutual authentication of the analyzer and
      the manager to each other.

6.3.1 Rationale: Since the alert messages are used by a manager to
      direct responses or further investigation related to the security
      of an enterprise network, it is important that the receiver have
      confidence in the identity of the sender and that the sender have
      confidence in the identity of the receiver. This is peer-to-peer
      authentication of each party to the other. It MUST NOT be
      based on authentication of the underlying communications
      mechanism, for example, because of the risk that this
      authentication process might be subverted or misconfigured.

6.3.2 Scenario: Analyzer process authenticates itself to manager process
      via public key exchange or some other method. Manager process does
      the same to the analyzer process.


6.4   The IDEF MUST support confidentiality of the message content
      during message exchange. The selected design MUST be capable of
      supporting a variety of encryption algorithms and MUST be
      adaptable to a wide variety of environments.

6.4.1 Rationale: IDEF messages potentially contain extremely sensitive
      information (such as passwords) and would be of great interest to
      an intruder. Since it is likely some of these messages will be
      transmitted across uncontrolled network segments, it is important
      that the content be shielded. Furthermore, since the legal
      environment for encryption technologies is extremely varied and
      changes often, it is important that the design selected be capable
      of supporting a number of different encryption options and be
      adaptable by the user to a variety of environments.

6.4.2 Scenario: The IDEF system might offer two different encryption
      modules, one using 168-bit keys and another using 56-bit keys.


6.5   The IDEF MUST ensure the integrity of the message content. The
      selected design MUST be capable of supporting a variety of
      integrity mechanisms and MUST be adaptable to a wide variety of
      environments.

6.5.1 Rationale: IDEF messages are used by the manager to direct action
      related to the security of the protected enterprise network. It is
      vital for the manager to be certain that the content of the
      message has not been changed after transmission.

6.5.2 Scenario: An integrity hash, such as the MD5 algorithm, might be
      part of the IDEF design.


6.6   The IDEF communications mechanism SHOULD be able to ensure non-
      repudiation of the origin of IDEF messages.

6.6.1 Rationale: Given that sensitive security information is being
      exchanged with the IDEF, it is important that the humans operating


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      the system are able to associate messages with the originating
      IDEF entity.

6.6.2 Scenario: If it cannot later be satisfactorily proven that the
      apparent source of an IDEF alert and its actual source are the
      same, then the IDEF alert might have less evidentiary value.


6.7   The IDEF communications mechanism SHOULD resist protocol denial of
      service attacks.

6.7.1 Rationale: A common way to defeat secure communications systems is
      through resource exhaustion. While this does not corrupt valid
      messages, it can prevent any communication at all. It is desirable
      that the IDEF communications mechanism resist such denial of
      service attacks.

6.7.2 Scenario: An attacker penetrates a network being defended by an
      IDS. Although the attacker is not certain that an IDS is present,
      he is certain that application-level encrypted traffic (i.e.,
      IDEF traffic) is being exchanged between components on the network
      being attacked. He decides to mask his presence and disrupt the
      encrypted communications by initiating one or more flood events.
      If the IDEF can resist such an attack, the probability that the
      attacker will be stopped increases.


6.8   The IDEF communications mechanism SHOULD resist malicious
      duplication of messages.

6.8.1 Rationale: A common way to impair the performance of secure
      communications mechanisms is to duplicate the messages being
      sent, even though the attacker might not understand them, in an
      attempt to confuse the receiver. It is desirable that the IDEF
      communications mechanism resist such message duplication.

6.8.2 Scenario: At attacker penetrates a network being defended by an
      IDS. The attacker suspects that an IDS is present and quickly
      identifies the encrypted traffic flowing between system components
      as being a possible threat. Even though she cannot read this
      traffic, she copies the messages and directs multiple copies at
      the receiver in an attempt to confuse it. If the IDEF resists
      such message duplication, the probability that the attacker will
      be stopped increases.


7. Message Content

7.1    The IDEF message MUST encompass all types of intrusion detection
       mechanisms currently available as well as those expected to be
       available in the future. These include, but are not limited to:

         Signature-based detection systems
         Anomaly-based detection systems
         Correlation-based detection systems
         Network-based detection systems
         Host-based detection systems
         Application-based detection systems

7.1.1  Rationale: There are many types of intrusion detection systems


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       that analyze a variety of data sources. Some are profile based
       and operate on log files, attack signatures etc. Others are
       anomaly based and define normal behavior and detect deviations
       from the established baseline. Each of these systems report
       different data that, in part, depends on their intrusion
       detection methodology. All MUST be supported by this standard.

7.1.2  Scenario: An attacker invents a new attack. The profile-based
       system does not detect it. An anomaly-based system detects the
       novel attack but it cannot provide an attack type in an alert
       message.


7.2    The content of IDEF messages MUST contain the identified name of
       the event if it is known. This name MUST be drawn from a
       standardized list of events or will be an implementation-specific
       name if the event identity has not yet been standardized. It is
       not known how this list will be defined or updated, although
       requirements on the creation of this list are presented in the
       next section of this document.

7.2.1  Rationale: Given that this document presents requirements on
       standardizing ID message formats so that an ID manager is able to
       receive alerts from analyzers from multiple implementations, it
       is important that the manager understand the semantics of the
       reported events. There is, therefore, a need to identify known
       events and store information concerning their methods and
       possible fixes to these events. Some events are well known and
       this recognition can help the operator.

7.2.2  Scenario: Intruder launches an attack that is detected by two
       different analyzers from two distinct implementations. Both
       report the same event identity to the ID manager, even though the
       algorithms used to detect the attack by each analyzer might have
       been different.


7.3    The IDEF message MUST be such that any security advisories
       associated with the event contained therein can be inferred.
       (Such advisories are created by many incident response teams,
       vendors and research organizations.)

7.3.1  Rationale: This information is used by administrators to report
       and fix problems.

7.3.2  Scenario: Attacker performs a well-known attack. A reference to
       the appropriate CERT advisory is included in IDEF message since
       the implementer has access to a list of CERT advisory numbers.
       Operator uses this information to initiate repairs on the
       vulnerable system.


7.4    The IDEF message MUST be able to reference additional detailed
       data related to this specific underlying event. It is OPTIONAL
       for implementations to use this field.

7.4.1  Rationale: Operators might want more information on specifics of
       an event. This field, if filled in by the analyzer, MAY point
       to additional or more detailed information about the event.



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7.4.2  Scenario: Attacker attacks host and is detected by ID system.
       IDEF message contains a pointer to a set of records that gives
       access to system audit data.


7.5    The IDEF message MUST contain the identity of the source of the
       event and target component identifier if it is known. In the case
       of a network-based event, this will be the source and destination
       IP address of the session used to launch the event. Note that the
       identity of source and target will vary for other types of
       events, such as those launched/detected at the operating system
       or application level.

7.5.1  Rationale: This will allow the operator to identify the source
       and target of the event.

7.5.2  Scenario: Intruder launches a network attack against a DNS server
       using a buffer overflow attack. The IDEF alert message indicates
       the DNS server as the target and includes the source IP address
       used to launch the attack.


7.6    The IDEF message MUST support the representation of different
       types of device addresses.

7.6.1  Rationale: Devices involved in an intrusion might have addresses
       in various levels of the network protocol hierarchy (e.g., level
       2 and level 3 addresses). Additionally, the devices involved in
       an intrusion event might use addresses that are not IP-centric.

7.6.2  Scenario: The IDS recognizes an intrusion on a particular device
       and includes both the IP address and the MAC address of the
       device in the IDEF message. In another situation, the IDS
       recognizes an intrusion on a device which has only a MAC address
       and includes only that address in the IDEF message. Another
       situation involves analyzers in an ATM switch fabric which use
       E.164 address formats.


7.7    The IDEF message MUST contain an indication of the possible
       impact of this event on the target. The value of this field MUST
       be drawn from a standardized list of values.

7.7.1  Rationale: Information concerning the possible impact of the
       event on the target system provides an indication of what the
       intruder is attempting to do and is critical data for the
       operator to perform damage assessment. Not all systems will be
       able to determine this, but it is important data to transmit for
       those systems that can.

7.7.2  Scenario: A buffer overflow attack is launched and detected by
       the ID analyzer. The IDEF message might contain information that
       this buffer overflow attack is of impact type "attempt to gain
       root or administrator privilege" on the target system. The ID
       operator might use this data to increase the priority of the
       response.


7.8    The IDEF message MUST provide information about the automatic
       actions taken by the analyzer in response to the event (if any).


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7.8.1  Rationale: It is very important for the operator to know if
       there was an automated response and what that response was. This
       will help determine what further action to take, if any.

7.8.2  Scenario: The attacker launches the attack, the ID system detects
       the attack and disables the user account performing the
       suspicious activity. This suspension is for 10 minutes to allow
       the operator time to investigate the suspicious activity. The
       IDEF message contains this information.


7.9    The IDEF message MUST include information which would make it
       possible to later identify and locate the individual analyzer
       which reported the event.

7.9.1  Rationale: The identity of the detecting analyzer often proves to
       be a valuable piece of data to have in determining how to respond
       to a particular event.

7.9.2  Scenario: One interesting scenario involves the progress of an
       intrusion event throughout a network. If the same event is
       detected and reported by multiple analyzers, the identity of the
       analyzer (in the case of a network-based analyzer) might provide
       some indication of the network location of the target systems and
       might warrant a specific type of response. This might be
       implemented as an IP address.


7.10   The IDEF message MUST be able to contain the identity of the
       implementer and the tool that detected the event.

7.10.1 Rationale: Users might run multiple intrusion detection systems
       to protect their enterprise. This data will help the systems
       administrator determine which implementer and tool detected the
       event.

7.10.2 Scenario: Tool X from implementer Y detects a potential
       intrusion. A message is sent reporting that it found a potential
       break-in with X and Y specified. The operator is therefore able
       to include the known capabilities or weaknesses of tool X in his
       decision regarding further action.


7.11   The IDEF message MUST be able to state the degree of confidence
       of the report. The completion of this field by an analyzer is
       OPTIONAL, as this data might not be available at all analyzers.

7.11.1 Rationale: Many ID systems contain thresholds to determine
       whether or not to generate an alert. This might influence the
       degree of confidence one has in the report or perhaps would
       indicate the likelihood of the report being a false alarm.

7.11.2 Scenario: The alarm threshold monitor is set at a low level to
       indicate that an organization wants reports on any suspicious
       activity, regardless of the probability of a real attack. The
       degree of confidence measure is used to indicate if this is a low
       probability or high probability event.





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7.12   The IDEF message MUST be uniquely identifiable in that it can be
       distinguished from other IDEF messages.

7.12.1 Rationale: An IDEF message might be sent by multiple
       geographically-distributed analyzers at different times. A unique
       identifier will allow an IDEF message to be identified
       efficiently for data reduction and correlation purposes.

7.12.2 Scenario: The unique identifier might consist of a unique
       originator identifier (e.g. IPv4 or IPv6 address) concatenated
       with a unique sequence number generated by the originator. In a
       typical IDS deployment, a low-level event analyzer will log the
       raw sensor information into, e.g., a database while analyzing
       and reporting results to higher levels. In this case, the unique
       raw message identifier can be included in the result message as
       supporting evidence. Higher level analyzers can later use this
       identifier to retrieve the raw message from the database if
       necessary.


7.13   The IDEF MUST support reporting alert creation date and time in
       each event. The IDEF MAY support reporting the event detection
       date and time in addition to the alert creation date and time.

7.13.1 Rationale: Time is important from both a reporting and
       correlation point of view. Event detection time might differ from
       the alert creation time as it might take some time to actually
       generate the alert message given that an event has been detected.
       If the sensing element can determine the time the event occurred
       it is strongly encouraged to place that information in the alert
       message as well.

7.13.2 Scenario: If an event is reported in the quiet hours of the
       night, the operator might assign a higher priority to it than she
       would to the same event reported in the busy hours of the day.


7.14   Time SHALL be reported as the localtime and time zone offset on
       the system generating the message.

7.14.1 Rationale: For event correlation purposes, it is important that
       the manager be able to normalize the time information reported
       in the IDEF alerts.

7.14.2 Scenario: A distributed ID system has analyzers located in
       multiple timezones, all reporting to a single manager. An
       intrusion occurs that spans multiple timezones as well as
       multiple analyzers. The central manager requires sufficient
       information to normalize these alerts and determine that all were
       reported near the same "time" and that they are part of the
       same attack.


7.15   The format for reporting the date MUST be compliant with all
       current standards for Year 2000 rollover, and it MUST have
       sufficient capability to continue reporting date values past the
       year 2038.

7.15.1 Rationale: It is desirable that the IDEF have a long lifetime and
       that implementations be suitable for use in a variety of


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       environments. Therefore, characteristics that limit the lifespan
       of the IDEF (such as 2038 date representation limitation) MUST be
       avoided.

7.15.2 Scenario: If IDEF uses "Unix time" as a time representation, it
       would expire in 2038. This is not adequate.


7.16   Time granularity in event messages SHALL NOT be specified by the
       IDEF.

7.16.1 Rationale: The IDEF cannot assume a certain clock granularity on
       sensing elements, and so cannot impose any requirements on the
       granularity of the event timestamps.

7.16.2 Scenario: One analyzer has a clock granularity of 1 millisecond
       while another analyzer has a clock granularity of 1 second. Both
       analyzers MUST be able to send compliant IDEF messages.


7.17   The IDEF message MUST support an extension mechanism used by
       implementers to define implementation-specific data. The use of
       this mechanism by the implementer is OPTIONAL. This data contains
       implementation-specific information determined by each
       implementer. The implementer MUST indicate how to interpret these
       extensions.

7.17.1 Rationale: Implementers might wish to supply extra data such as
       the version number of their product or other data that they
       believe provides value added due to the specific nature of their
       product.

7.17.2 Scenario: The implementer passes back detailed information
       specific to her product after it detects an event.


7.18   The semantics of the IDEF message MUST be well defined.

7.18.1 Rationale: Good semantics are key to understanding what the
       message is trying to convey so there are no errors. Operators
       will decide what action to take based on these messages, so it is
       important that they can interpret them correctly.

7.18.2 Scenario: Without this requirement, the operator receives an IDEF
       message and interprets it one way. The implementer who
       constructed the message intended it to have a different meaning
       from the operator's interpretation. The resulting corrective
       action is, therefore, incorrect.


8. Alert Identifiers and the Alert Identifier Definition Process

8.1   The standard list of IDEF alerts MUST be extensible. As new events
      are defined by the community and as new methods of detecting them
      are available, the IDEF MUST be able to grow with the technology.

8.1.1 Rationale: New intrusions are rapidly created; some are variations
      of existing intrusions and some are newly created intrusion
      techniques. If IDEF is not extensible then the usefulness of the
      standard will quickly diminish.


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8.1.2 Scenario: A specific implementation creates a new attack
      signature. Using the IDEF process, the implementer is able to
      exhibit this signature quickly to the intrusion detection
      community.


8.2   The IDEF itself MUST be extensible. As new ID technologies emerge
      and as new information about events becomes available, the IDEF
      message format MUST be able to include this new information.

8.2.1 Rationale: As intrusion detection technology continues to evolve,
      it is likely that additional information relating to detected
      events will become available. The IDEF message format MUST be able
      to be extended by a specific implementation to encompass this new
      information.

8.2.2 Scenario: A new type of ID analyzer is built which is able to
      identify the true login name of an attacker as well as the series
      of system hops he's using to attack the target system. The
      implementer should be able to include this new information in the
      IDEF message.


8.3   The standard list of alert identifiers MUST be extensible by
      implementers and administrators.

8.3.1 Rationale: The IDEF will specify the basic information for each
      intrusion. To distinguish their offerings, different implementers
      desire the ability to provide additional information beyond that
      required for IDEF. Additionally, specific implementations might
      want to use the IDEF for non-standard events.

8.3.2 Scenario: An IDS detects a new event for which there is yet no
      IDEF standard alert identifier. The implementer of that IDS sends
      an IDEF message using a private, implementation-specific
      identifier.


8.4   The process by which new alert identifiers are defined and
      standardized MUST be implementation-independent.

8.4.1 Rationale: The process for new alert identifier definition MUST
      NOT favor one IDS implementation over another, otherwise a
      specific IDS implementation might determine that making event
      information  available to the community has a negative effect on
      that implementation and might elect not to do so.

8.4.2 Scenario: Implementer A discovers a new intrusion event and
      forwards that information to the IDEF event process. Implementer A
      must view this as a positive action.


9. References

[1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
    Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.






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Acknowledgements:

The following individuals contributed substantially to this document and
should be recognized for their efforts. This document would not exist
without their help:

    Mark Crosbie, Hewlett-Packard
    David Curry, IBM Emergency Response Services
    David Donahoo, Air Force Information Warfare Center
    Mike Erlinger, Harvey Mudd College
    Fengmin Gong, Microcomputing Center of North Carolina
    Dipankar Gupta, Hewlett-Packard
    Glenn Mansfield, Cyber Solutions, Inc.
    Jed Pickel, CERT Coordination Center
    Stuart Staniford-Chen, Silicon Defense
    Maureen Stillman, Nokia IP Telephony


Editor's Address:

     Mark Wood
     Internet Security Systems, Inc.
     6600 Peachtree-Dunwoody Road
     300 Embassy Row
     Atlanta, GA 30328
     Phone: +1 (678) 443-6147
     E-mail: mark1@iss.net


Intrusion Detection Exchange Format Working Group:

The Intrusion Detection Exchange Format Working Group can be contacted
via the working group's mailing list (idwg-public@zurich.ibm.com) or
through its chairs:

     Stuart Staniford-Chen
     stuart@SiliconDefense.com
     Silicon Defense

     Mike Erlinger
     mike@cs.hmc.edu
     Harvey Mudd College

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provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are included
on all such copies and derivative works. However, this document itself
may not be modified in any way, such as by removing the copyright notice
or references to the Internet Society or other Internet organizations,
except as needed for the purpose of developing Internet standards in
which case the procedures for copyrights defined in the Internet
Standards process must be followed.





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