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Versions: 00 01 02 RFC 3487

Internet Engineering Task Force                                   IEPREP
Internet Draft                                            H. Schulzrinne
                                                             Columbia U.
draft-ietf-ieprep-sip-reqs-02.txt
December 2, 2002
Expires: May 2003


     Requirements for Resource Priority Mechanisms for the Session
                          Initiation Protocol

STATUS OF THIS MEMO

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
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   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt

   To view the list Internet-Draft Shadow Directories, see
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

Abstract

   This document summarizes requirements for prioritizing access to
   circuit-switched network, end system and proxy resources for
   emergency preparedness communications using the Session Initiation
   Protocol (SIP).


1 Introduction

   During emergencies, communications resources including telephone
   circuits, IP bandwidth and gateways between the circuit-switched and
   IP networks may become congested due to heavy usage, loss of
   resources caused by the disaster and attack during man-made
   emergencies, making it difficult for persons charged with emergency
   assistance, recovery or law enforcement to coordinate their efforts.



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   As IP networks become part of converged or hybrid networks along with
   public and private circuit-switched (telephone) networks, it becomes
   necessary to ensure that these networks can assist during such
   emergencies.

   There are many IP-based services that can assist during emergencies.
   This memo only covers requirements for real-time communications
   applications involving SIP, including voice-over-IP, multimedia
   conferencing and instant messaging/presence.

   This document takes no position as to which mode of communication is
   preferred during an emergency, as such discussion appears to be of
   little practical value. Based on past experience, real-time
   communications is likely to be an important component of any overall
   suite of applications, particularly for coordination of emergency-
   related efforts.

   As we will describe in detail below, such SIP applications involve at
   least five different resources that may become scarce and congested
   during emergencies. In order to improve emergency response, it may
   become necessary to prioritize access to such resources during
   periods of emergency-induced resource scarcity. We call this
   "resource prioritization".

   This document describes requirements rather than possible existing or
   new protocol features. Although it is scoped to deal with SIP-based
   applications, this should not be taken to imply that mechanisms have
   to be SIP protocol features such as header fields, methods or URI
   parameters.

   The document is organized as follows. In Section 2, we explain core
   technical terms and acronyms that are used throughout the document.
   Section 3 describes the five types of resources that may be subject
   to resource prioritization. Section 4 enumerates four network hybrids
   that determine which of these resources are relevant. Since the
   design choices may be constrained by the assumptions placed on the IP
   network, Section 5 attempts to classify networks into categories
   according to the restrictions placed on modifications and traffic
   classes.

   Since this is a major source of confusion due to similar names,
   Section 6 attempts to distinguish emergency call services placed by
   civilians from the topic of this document.

   Request routing is a core component of SIP, covered in Section 7.

   Providing resource priority entails complex implementation choices,
   so that a single priority scheme leads to a set of algorithms that



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   manage queues, resource consumption and resource usage of existing
   calls. Even within a single administrative domain, the combination of
   mechanisms is likely to vary. Since it will also depend on the
   interaction of different policies, it appears inappropriate to have
   SIP applications specify the precise mechanisms. Section 8 discusses
   the call-by-value (specification of mechanisms) and call-by-reference
   (invoke labeled policy) distinction.

   Based on these discussions, Section 9 summarizes some general
   requirements that try to achieve generality and feature-transparency
   across hybrid networks.

   The most challenging component of resource prioritization is likely
   to be security (Section 10). Without adequate security mechanisms,
   resource priority may cause more harm than good, so that the section
   attempts to enumerate some of the specific threats present when
   resource prioritization is being employed.

2 Terminology

        CSN: Circuit-switched network, encompassing both private
             (closed) networks and the public switched telephone network
             (PSTN).

        ETS: Emergency telecommunications service, identifying a
             communications service to be used during large-scale
             emergencies that allows authorized individuals to
             communicate. Such communication may reach end points either
             within a closed network or any endpoint on the CSN or the
             Internet. The communication service may use voice, video,
             text or other multimedia streams.

        Request: In this document, we define "request" as any SIP
             request. This includes call setup requests, instant message
             requests and event notification requests.

3 Resources

   Prioritized access to at least five resource types may be useful:

        Gateway resources: The number of channels (trunks) on a CSN
             gateway is finite. Resource prioritization may prioritize
             access to these channels, by priority queuing or
             preemption.

        CSN resources: Resources in the CSN itself, away from the access
             gateway, may be congested. This is the domain of
             traditional resource prioritization as MLPP and GETS, where



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             circuits are granted to ETS communications based on
             queueing priority or preemption (if allowed by local
             telecommunication regulatory policy). A gateway may also
             use alternate routing (Section 8) to increase the
             probability of call completion.

             Specifying CSN behavior is beyond the scope of this
             document, but as noted below, a central requirement is to
             be able to invoke all such behaviors from an IP endpoint.

        IP network resources: SIP may initiate voice and multimedia
             sessions. In many cases, audio and video streams are
             inelastic and have tight delay and loss requirements. Under
             conditions of IP network overload, emergency services
             applications may not be able to obtain sufficient bandwidth
             in a best-effort network. While quality of service
             management is necessary to solve this problem, this is
             orthogonal to SIP, out of the scope for SIP, and as such
             these requirements will be discussed in another document.

             Bandwidth used for SIP signaling itself may be subject to
             prioritization.

        Receiving end system resources: End systems may include
             automatic call distribution systems (ACDs) or media servers
             as well as traditional telephone-like devices. Gateways are
             also end systems, but have been discussed earlier.

             If the receiving end system can only manage a finite number
             of sessions, a prioritized call may need to preempt an
             existing call or indicate to the callee that a high-
             priority call is waiting. (The precise user agent behavior
             is beyond the scope of this document and considered a
             matter of policy and implementation.)

             Such terminating services may be needed to avoid
             overloading, say, an emergency coordination center.
             However, other approaches beyond prioritization, e.g.,
             random request dropping by geographic origin, need to be
             employed if the number of prioritized calls exceeds the
             terminating capacity. Such approaches are beyond the scope
             of this memo.

        SIP proxy resources: While SIP proxies often have large request
             handling capacities, their capacity is likely to be smaller
             than their access network bandwidth. (This is true in
             particular since different SIP requests consume vastly
             different amounts of proxy computational resources,



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             depending on whether they invoke external services, sip-cgi
             [1] and CPL [2] scripts, etc. Thus, avoiding proxy overload
             by restricting access bandwidth is likely to lead to
             inefficient utilization of the proxy.) Therefore, some
             types of proxies may need to silently drop selected SIP
             requests under overload, reject requests, with overload
             indication or provide multiple queues with different drop
             and scheduling priorities for different types of SIP
             requests. However, this is strictly an implementation
             isssue and does not appear to influence the protocol
             requirements nor the on-the-wire protocol. Thus, it is out
             of scope for the protocol requirements discussion pursued
             here.


             Responses should naturally receive the same treatment
             as the corresponding request. Responses already have
             to be securely mapped to requests, so this requirement
             does not pose a significant burden. Since proxies
             often do not maintain call state, it is not generally
             feasible to assign elevated priority to requests
             originating from a lower-privileged callee back to the
             higher-privileged caller.

   There is no requirement that a single mechanism be used for all five
   resources.

4 Network Topologies

   We consider four types of combinations of IP and circuit-switched
   networks.


        IP end-to-end: Both request originator and destination are on an  |
             IP network, without intervening CSN-IP gateways. Here, any   |
             SIP request could be subject to prioritization.              |

        IP-to-CSN (IP at the start): The request originator is in the IP  |
             network, while the callee is in the CSN. Clearly, this       |
             model only applies to SIP-originated phone calls, not        |
             generic SIP requests such as those supporting instant        |
             messaging services.                                          |

        CSN-to-IP (IP at the end): A call originates in the CSN and       |
             terminates, via an Internet telephony gateway, in the IP     |
             network.                                                     |

        CSN-IP-CSN (IP bridging): This is a concatenation of the two      |



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             previous ones. It is worth calling out specifically to note  |
             that the two CSN sides may use different signaling           |
             protocols. Also, the originating CSN endpoint and the        |
             gateway to the IP network may not know the nature of the     |
             terminating CSN. Thus, encapsulation of originating CSN      |
             information is insufficient.                                 |

   The bridging model (IP-CSN-IP) can be treated as the concatenation of
   the IP-to-CSN and CSN-to-IP cases.

   It is worth emphasizing that CSN-to-IP gateways are unlikely to know
   whether the final destination is in the IP network, the CSN or, via
   SIP forking, in both.

   These models differ in the type of controllable resources, identified
   as gateway, CSN, IP network resources, proxy and receiver. Items
   marked as (x) are beyond the scope of this document.


   Topology       Gateway  CSN  IP   proxy  receiver
   _________________________________________________
   IP-end-to-end                (x)  (x)    x
   IP-to-CSN      x        x    (x)  (x)    (x)
   CSN-to-IP      x        x    (x)  (x)    x
   CSN-IP-CSN     x        x    (x)  (x)    (x)


5 Network Models

   There are at least four IP network models that influence the
   requirements for resource priority. Each model inherits the
   restrictions of the model above it.

        Pre-configured for ETS: In a pre-configured network, an ETS
             application can use any protocol carried in IP packets and
             modify the behavior of existing protocols. As an example,
             if an ETS agency owns the IP network, it can add traffic
             shaping, scheduling or support for a resource reservation
             protocol to routers.

        Transparent: In a transparent network, an ETS application can
             rely on the network to forward all valid IP packets,
             however, the ETS application cannot modify network
             elements. Commercial ISP offer transparent networks as long
             as they do not filter certain types of packets. Networks
             employing firewalls, NATs and "transparent" proxies are not
             transparent. Sometimes, these types of networks are also
             called common-carrier networks since they carry IP packets
             without concern as to their content.


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        SIP/RTP transparent: Networks that are SIP/RTP transparent allow
             users to place and receive SIP calls. The network allows
             ingress and egress for all valid SIP messages, possibly
             subject to authentication.  Similarly, it allows RTP media
             streams in both directions. However, it may block, in
             either inbound or outbound direction, other protocols such
             as RSVP or it may disallow non-zero DSCPs. There are many
             degrees of SIP/RTP transparency, e.g., depending on whether
             firewalls require inspection of SDP content, thus
             precluding end-to-end encryption of certain SIP message
             bodies, or whether only outbound calls are allowed.  Many
             firewalled corporate networks and semi-public access
             networks such as in hotels are likely to fall into this
             category.

        Restricted SIP networks: In restricted SIP networks, users may
             be restricted to particular SIP applications and cannot add
             SIP protocol elements such as header fields or use SIP
             methods beyond a prescribed set. It appears likely that
             3GPP/3GPP2 networks will fall into this category, at least
             initially.


             A separate and distinct problem are SIP networks that
             administratively prohibit or fail to configure access
             to special access numbers, e.g., the 710 area code
             used by GETS. Such operational failures are beyond the
             reach of a protocol specification.

   It appears desirable that ETS users can employ the broadest possible
   set of networks during an emergency. Thus, it appears preferable that
   protocol enhancements work at least in SIP/RTP transparent networks
   and are added explicitly to restricted SIP networks.

   The existing GETS system is an example of an "opportunistic" network,
   allowing use from most unmodified telephones, while MLPP systems are
   typically pre-configured.

6 Relationship to Emergency Call Services

   The resource priority mechanisms are used to have selected
   individuals place calls with elevated priority during times when the
   network is suffering from a shortage of resources. Generally, calls
   for emergency help placed by non-officials (e.g., "911" and "112"
   calls) do not need resource priority under normal circumstances. If
   such emergency calls are placed during emergency-induced network
   resource shortages, the call identifier itself is sufficient to
   identify the emergency nature of the call. Adding an indication of



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   resource priority may be less appropriate, as this would require that
   all such calls carry this indicator. Also, it opens another attack
   mechanism, where non-emergency calls are marked as emergency calls.
   (If the entity can recognize the request URI as an emergency call, it
   would not need the resource priority mechanism.)

7 SIP Call Routing

   The routing of a SIP request, i.e., the proxies it visits and the UAs
   it ends up at, may depend on the fact that the SIP request is an ETS
   request. The set of destinations may be larger or smaller, depending
   on the SIP request routing policies implemented by proxies. For
   example, certain gateways may be reserved for ETS use and thus only
   be reached by labeled SIP requests.

8 Policy and Mechanism

   Most priority mechanisms can be roughly categorized by whether they:

        o use a priority queue for resource attempts,

        o make additional resources available (e.g., via alternate
          routing (ACR)), or

        o preempt existing resource users (e.g., calls.)

   For example, in GETS, alternate routing attempts to use alternate
   GETS-enabled interexchange carriers (IXC) if it cannot be completed
   through the first-choice carrier.

   Priority mechanisms may also exempt certain calls from network
   management traffic controls.

   The choice between these mechanisms depends on the operational needs
   and characteristics of the network, e.g., on the number of active
   requests in the system and the fraction of prioritized calls.
   Generally, if the number of prioritized calls is small compared to
   the system capacity and the system capacity is large, it is likely
   that another call will naturally terminate in short order when a
   higher-priority call arrives.  Thus, it is conceivable that the
   priority indication can cause preemption in some network entities,
   while elsewhere it just influences whether requests are queued
   instead of discarded and what queueing policy is being applied.

   Some namespaces may inherently imply a preemption policy, while
   others may be silent on whether preemption is to be used or not,
   leaving this to local entity policy.




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   Similarly, the precise relationships between labels, e.g., what
   fraction of capacity is set aside for each priority level, is also a
   matter of local policy. This is similar to how differentiated
   services labels are handled.

9 Requirements

   In the PSTN and certain private circuit-switched networks, such as
   those run by military organizations, calls are marked in various ways
   to indicate priorities. We call this a "priority scheme".

   Below are some requirements for providing a similar feature in a SIP
   environment; security requirements are discussed in Section 10. We
   will refer to the feature as a "SIP indication" and to requests
   carrying such an indication as "labelled requests".

        REQ-1: Not specific to one scheme or country: The SIP indication
             should support existing and future priority schemes. For
             example, there are currently at least four priority schemes
             in widespread use: Q.735, also implemented by the U.S.
             defense network and NATO, has five levels, the United
             States GETS (Government Emergency Telecommunications
             Systems) scheme with implied higher priority and the
             British Government Telephone Preference Scheme (GTPS)
             system, which provides three priority levels for receipt of
             dial tone.

             The SIP indication may support these existing CSN priority
             schemes through the use of different name spaces.

             Private-use namespaces may also be useful for certain
             applications.

        REQ-2: Independent of particular network architecture: The SIP
             indication should work in the widest variety of SIP-based
             systems. It should not be restricted to particular
             operators or types of networks, such as wireless networks
             or protocol profiles and dialects in certain types of
             networks. The originator of a SIP request cannot be
             expected to know what kind of CS technology is used by the
             destination gateway.

        REQ-3: Invisible to network (IP) layer: The SIP indication must
             be usable in IP networks that are unaware of the
             enhancement and in SIP/RTP-transparent networks. Obviously,
             such networks will not be able to provide enhanced
             services.




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             This requirement can be translated to mean that the request
             has to be a valid SIP request and that out-of-band
             signaling is not acceptable.

        REQ-4: Mapping of existing schemes: Existing CSN schemes must be
             translatable to SIP-based systems.

        REQ-5: No loss of information: For the CSN-IP-CSN case, there
             should be no loss of signaling information caused by
             transiting the IP network if both circuit-switched networks
             use the same priority scheme.  Loss of information may be
             unavoidable if the destination CSN uses a different
             priority scheme from the origin.

             One cannot assume that both CSNs are using the same
             signaling protocol or protocol version, such as ISUP, so
             that transporting ISUP objects in MIME [3,4] is unlikely to
             be sufficient.

        REQ-6: Extensibility: Any naming scheme specified as part of the
             SIP indication should allow for future expansion. Expanded
             naming schemes may be needed as resource priority is
             applied in additional private networks, or if VoIP-specific
             priority schemes are defined.

        REQ-7: Separation of policy and mechanism: The SIP indication
             should not describe a particular detailed treatment, as it
             is likely that this depends on the nature of the resource
             and local policy.  Instead, it should invoke a particular
             named policy. As an example, instead of specifying that a
             certain SIP request should be granted queueing priority,
             not cause preemption, but be restricted to three-minute
             sessions, the request invokes a certain named policy that
             may well have those properties in a particular
             implementation. An IP-to-CSN gateway may need to be aware
             of the specific actions required for the policy, but the
             protocol indication itself should not.


             Even in the CSN, the same MLPP indication may result
             in different behavior for different networks.

        REQ-8: Request-neutral: The SIP indication chosen should work
             for any SIP request, not just, say, INVITE.

        REQ-9: Default behavior: Network terminals configured to use a
             priority scheme may occasionally end up making calls in a
             network that does not support such a scheme. In those



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             cases, the protocol must support a sensible default
             behavior that treats the call no worse than a call that did
             not invoke the priority scheme. Some networks may choose to
             disallow calls unless they have a suitable priority marking
             and appropriate authentication. This is a matter of local
             policy.

        REQ-10: Address-neutral: Any address or URI scheme may be a
             valid destination and must be usable with the priority
             scheme. The SIP indication cannot rely on identifying a set
             of destination addresses or URI schemes for special
             treatment. This requirement is motivated by existing ETS
             systems. For example, in GETS and similar systems, the
             caller can reach any PSTN destination with increased
             probability of call completion, not just a limited set.
             (This does not preclude local policy that allows or
             disallows, say, calls to international numbers for certain
             users.)


             Some schemes may have an open set of destinations,
             such as any valid E.164 number or any valid domestic
             telephone number, while others may only reach a
             limited set of destinations.

        REQ-11: Identity-independent: The user identity, such as the
             From header field in SIP, is insufficient to identify the
             priority level of the request. The same identity can issue
             non-prioritized requests as well as prioritized ones, with
             the range of priorities determined by the job function of
             the caller. The choice of the priority is made based on
             human judgement, following a set of general rules that are
             likely to be applied by analogy rather than precise mapping
             of each condition. For example, a particular circumstance
             may be considered similarly grave compared to one which is
             listed explicitly.

        REQ-12: Independent of network location: While some existing CSN
             schemes restrict the set of priorities based on the line
             identity, it is recognized that future IP-based schemes
             should be flexible enough to avoid such reliance. Instead,
             a combination of authenticated user identity, user choice
             and policy determines the request treatment.

        REQ-13: Multiple simultaneous schemes: Some user agents will
             need to support multiple different priority schemes, as
             several will remain in use in networks run by different
             agencies and operators. (Not all user agents will have the



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             means of authorizing callers using different schemes, and
             thus may be configured at run-time to only recognize
             certain namespaces.)

        REQ-14: Discovery: A terminal should be able to discover which,
             if any, priority name spaces are supported by a network
             element.  Discovery may be explicit, where a user agent
             requests a list of the supported name spaces or it may be
             implicit, where it attempts to use a particular name space
             and is then told that this name space is not supported.
             This does not imply that every element has to support the
             priority scheme. However, entities should be able discover
             whether a network element supports it or not.

        REQ-15: Testing: It must be possible to test the system outside
             of emergency conditions, to increase the chances that all
             elements work during an actual emergency. In particular,
             critical elements such as indication, authentication,
             authorization and call routing must be testable. Testing
             under load is desirable. Thus, it is desirable that the SIP
             indication is available continuously, not just during
             emergencies.

        REQ-16: 3PCC: The system has to work with SIP third-party call
             control.

        REQ-17: Proxy-visible: Proxies may want to use the indication to
             influence request routing (see Section 7) or impose
             additional authentication requirements.

10 Security Requirements

   Any resource priority mechanism can be abused to obtain resources and
   thus deny service to other users. While the indication itself does
   not have to provide separate authentication, any SIP request carrying
   such information has more rigorous authentication requirements than
   regular requests. Below, we describe authentication and authorization
   aspects, confidentiality and privacy requirements, protection against
   denial of service attacks and anonymity requirements. Additional
   discussion can be found in [5].

10.1 Authentication and Authorization

        SEC-1: More rigorous: Prioritized access to network and end
             system resources enumerated in Section 3 imposes
             particularly stringent requirements on authentication and
             authorization mechanisms since access to prioritized
             resources may impact overall system stability and



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             performance, not just result in theft of, say, a single
             phone call.

             The authentication and authorization requirements for ETS
             calls are, in particular, much stronger than for emergency
             calls (112, 911), where wide access is the design
             objective, sacrificing caller identification if necessary.

        SEC-2: Attack protection: Under certain emergency conditions,
             the network infrastructure, including its authentication
             and authorization mechanism, may be under attack. Thus,
             authentication and authorization must be able to survive
             such attacks and defend the resources against these
             attacks.

             Mechanisms to delegate authentication and to authenticate
             as early as possible are required. In particular, the
             number of packets and the amount of other resources such as
             computation or storage that an unauthorized user can
             consume needs to be minimized.

             Unauthorized users must not be able to block CSN resources,
             as they are likely to be more scarce than packet resources.
             This implies that authentication and authorization must
             take place on the IP network side rather than using, say, a
             CSN circuit to authenticate oneself via a DTMF sequence.

             Given the urgency during emergency events, normal
             statistical fraud detection may be less effective, thus
             placing a premium on reliable authentication.

             SIP nodes should be able to independently verify the
             authorization of requests to receive prioritized service
             and not rely on transitive trust within the network.

        SEC-3: Independent of mechanism: Any indication of the resource
             priority must be independent of the authentication
             mechanism, since end systems will impose different
             constraints on the applicable authentication mechanisms.
             For example, some end systems may only allow user input via
             a 12-digit keypad, while others may have the ability to
             acquire biometrics or read smartcards.

        SEC-4: Non-trusted end systems: Since ETS users may use devices
             that are not their own, systems should support
             authentication mechanisms that do not require the user to
             reveal her secret, such as a PIN or password, to the
             device.



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        SEC-5: Replay: The authentication mechanisms must be resistant
             to replay attacks.

        SEC-6: Cut-and-paste: The authentication mechanisms must be
             resistant to cut-and-paste attacks.

        SEC-7: Bid-down: The authentication mechanisms must be resistant
             to bid down attacks.

10.2 Confidentiality and Integrity

        SEC-8: Confidentiality: All aspects of ETS are likely to be
             sensitive and should be protected from unlawful intercept
             and alteration. In particular, requirements for protecting
             the confidentiality of communications relationships may be
             higher than for normal commercial service. For SIP, the To,
             From, Organization, Subject, Priority and Via header fields
             are examples of particularly sensitive information. Callers
             may be willing to sacrifice confidentiality if the only
             alternative is abandoning the call attempt.

             Unauthorized users must not be able to discern that a
             particular request is using a resource priority mechanism,
             as that may reveal sensitive information about the nature
             of the request to the attacker.  Information not required
             for request routing should be protected end-to-end from
             intermediate SIP nodes.

             The act of authentication, e.g., by contacting a particular
             server, itself may reveal that a user is requesting
             prioritized service.


             SIP allows protection of header fields not used for
             request routing via S/MIME, while hop-by-hop channel
             confidentiality can be provided by TLS or IPsec.

10.3 Anonymity

        SEC-9: Anonymity: Some users may wish to remain anonymous to the
             request destination. For the reasons noted earlier, users
             have to authenticate themselves towards the network
             carrying the request. The authentication may be based on
             capabilities and noms, not necessarily their civil name.
             Clearly, they may remain anonymous towards the request
             destination, using the network-asserted identity and
             general privacy mechanisms [6,7].




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10.4 Denial-of-Service Attacks

        SEC-10: Denial-of-service: ETS systems are likely to be subject
             to deliberate denial-of-service attacks during certain
             types of emergencies. DOS attacks may be launched on the
             network itself as well as its authentication and
             authorization mechanism.

        SEC-11: Minimize resource use by unauthorized users: Systems
             should minimize the amount of state, computation and
             network resources that an unauthorized user can command.

        SEC-12: Avoid amplification: The system must not amplify attacks
             by causing the transmission of more than one packet or SIP
             request to a network address whose reachability has not
             been verified.

11 Security Considerations

   Section 10 discusses the security issues related to priority
   indication for SIP in detail and derives requirements for the SIP
   indicator. As discussed in Section 6, identification of priority
   service should avoid multiple concurrent mechanisms, to avoid
   allowing attackers to exploit inconsistent labeling.

12 Acknowledgements

   Fred Baker, Scott Bradner, Ian Brown, Ken Carlberg, Janet Gunn,
   Kimberly King, Rohan Mahy and James Polk provided helpful comments.

13 Bibliography

   [1] J. Lennox, H. Schulzrinne, and J. Rosenberg, "Common gateway
   interface for SIP," RFC 3050, Internet Engineering Task Force, Jan.
   2001.

   [2] J. Lennox and H. Schulzrinne, "CPL: A language for user control
   of internet telephony services," Internet Draft, Internet Engineering
   Task Force, Nov.  2001.  Work in progress.

   [3] E. Zimmerer, J. Peterson, A. Vemuri, L. Ong, F. Audet, M. Watson,
   and M. Zonoun, "MIME media types for ISUP and QSIG objects," RFC
   3204, Internet Engineering Task Force, Dec. 2001.

   [4] A. Vemuri and J. Peterson, "Session initiation protocol for
   telephones (SIP-T): (SIP-T): context and architectures," RFC 3372,
   Internet Engineering Task Force, Sept. 2002.




H. Schulzrinne                                               [Page 15]


Internet Draft          IEPREP SIP Requirements         December 2, 2002


   [5] I. Brown, "A security framework for emergency communications,"
   Internet Draft, Internet Engineering Task Force, June 2002.  Work in
   progress.

   [6] J. Peterson, "A privacy mechanism for the session initiation
   protocol (SIP)," Internet Draft, Internet Engineering Task Force,
   June 2002.  Work in progress.

   [7] M. Watson, "Short term requirements for network asserted
   identity," Internet Draft, Internet Engineering Task Force, June
   2002.  Work in progress.

14 Authors' Address

   Henning Schulzrinne
   Dept. of Computer Science
   Columbia University
   1214 Amsterdam Avenue
   New York, NY 10027
   USA
   electronic mail: schulzrinne@cs.columbia.edu






























H. Schulzrinne                                               [Page 16]


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