[Docs] [txt|pdf] [Tracker] [WG] [Email] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Nits]

Versions: 00 01 02 RFC 2404

Network Working Group                                IPsec Working Group
INTERNET DRAFT                                                 C. Madson
Expire in six months                                  Cisco Systems Inc.
                                                                R. Glenn
                                                                    NIST
                                                           February 1998


               The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH
              <draft-ietf-ipsec-auth-hmac-sha196-02.txt>




Status of this Memo

   This document is a submission to the IETF Internet Protocol Security
   (IPSEC) Working Group. Comments are solicited and should be addressed
   to the working group mailing list (ipsec@tis.com) or to the editor.

   This document is an Internet-Draft.  Internet Drafts are working
   documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas,
   and its working Groups. Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts draft documents are valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the
   "1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow
   Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), nic.nordu.net (Europe),
   munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim), ds.internic.net (US East Coast), or
   ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast).

   Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Abstract

   This draft describes the use of the HMAC algorithm [RFC-2104] in
   conjunction with the SHA-1 algorithm [FIPS-180-1] as an
   authentication mechanism within the revised IPSEC Encapsulating
   Security Payload [ESP] and the revised IPSEC Authentication Header
   [AH]. HMAC with SHA-1 provides data origin authentication and
   integrity protection.

   Further information on the other components necessary for ESP and AH
   implementations is provided by [Thayer97a].








Madson, Glenn                                                   [Page 1]


INTERNET DRAFT                February 1998          Expires August 1998


1.  Introduction

   This draft specifies the use of SHA-1 [FIPS-180-1] combined with HMAC
   [RFC-2104] as a keyed authentication mechanism within the context of
   the Encapsulating Security Payload and the Authentication Header.
   The goal of HMAC-SHA-1-96 is to ensure that the packet is authentic
   and cannot be modified in transit.

   HMAC is a secret key authentication algorithm. Data integrity and
   data origin authentication as provided by HMAC are dependent upon the
   scope of the distribution of the secret key. If only the source and
   destination know the HMAC key, this provides both data origin
   authentication and data integrity for packets sent between the two
   parties; if the HMAC is correct, this proves that it must have been
   added by the source.

   In this draft, HMAC-SHA-1-96 is used within the context of ESP and
   AH.  For further information on how the various pieces of ESP -
   including the confidentiality mechanism -- fit together to provide
   security services, refer to [ESP] and [Thayer97a]. For further
   information on AH, refer to [AH] and [Thayer97a].

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED",  "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119].

2. Algorithm and Mode

   [FIPS-180-1] describes the underlying SHA-1 algorithm, while
   [RFC-2104] describes the HMAC algorithm. The HMAC algorithm provides
   a framework for inserting various hashing algorithms such as SHA-1.

   HMAC-SHA-1-96 operates on 64-byte blocks of data.  Padding
   requirements are specified in [FIPS-180-1] and are part of the SHA-1
   algorithm.  If you build SHA-1 according to [FIPS-180-1] you do not
   need to add any additional padding as far as HMAC-SHA-1-96 is
   concerned.  With regard to "implicit packet padding" as defined in
   [AH] no implicit packet padding is required.

   HMAC-SHA-1-96 produces a 160-bit authenticator value.  This 160-bit
   value can be truncated as described in RFC2104.  For use with either
   ESP or AH, a truncated value using the first 96 bits MUST be
   supported.  Upon sending, the truncated value is stored within the
   authenticator field.  Upon receipt, the entire 160-bit value is
   computed and the first 96 bits are compared to the value stored in
   the authenticator field.  No other authenticator value lengths are
   supported by HMAC-SHA-1-96.

   The length of 96 bits was selected because it is the default
   authenticator length as specified in [AH] and meets the security
   requirements described in [RFC-2104].






Madson, Glenn                                                   [Page 2]


INTERNET DRAFT                February 1998          Expires August 1998


2.1  Performance

   [Bellare96a] states that "(HMAC) performance is essentially that of
   the underlying hash function".  As of this writing no detailed
   performance analysis has been done of SHA-1, HMAC or HMAC combined
   with SHA-1.

   [RFC-2104] outlines an implementation modification which can improve
   per-packet performance without affecting interoperability.

3. Keying Material

   HMAC-SHA-1-96 is a secret key algorithm. While no fixed key length is
   specified in [RFC-2104], for use with either ESP or AH a fixed key
   length of 160-bits MUST be supported.  Key lengths other than
   160-bits MUST NOT be supported (i.e. only 160-bit keys are to be used
   by HMAC-SHA-1-96).  A key length of 160-bits was chosen based on the
   recommendations in [RFC-2104] (i.e. key lengths less than the
   authenticator length decrease security strength and keys longer than
   the authenticator length do not significantly increase security
   strength).

   [RFC-2104] discusses requirements for key material, which includes a
   discussion on requirements for strong randomness.  A strong pseudo-
   random function MUST be used to generate the required 160-bit key.

   At the time of this writing there are no specified weak keys for use
   with HMAC.  This does not mean to imply that weak keys do not exist.
   If, at some point, a set of weak keys for HMAC are identified, the
   use of these weak keys must be rejected followed by a request for
   replacement keys or a newly negotiated Security Association.

   [ARCH] describes the general mechanism for obtaining keying material
   when multiple keys are required for a single SA (e.g. when an ESP SA
   requires a key for confidentiality and a key for authentication).

   In order to provide data origin authentication, the key distribution
   mechanism must ensure that unique keys are allocated and that they
   are distributed only to the parties participating in the
   communication.

   [RFC-2104] states that for "minimally reasonable hash functions" the
   "birthday attack" is impractical. For a 64-byte block hash such as
   HMAC-SHA-1-96, an attack involving the successful processing of 2**80
   blocks would be infeasible unless it were discovered that the
   underlying hash had collisions after processing 2**30 blocks.  A hash
   with such weak collision-resistance characteristics would generally
   be considered to be unusable.  No time-based attacks are discussed in
   the document.

   While it it still cryptographically prudent to perform frequent
   rekeying, current literature does not include any recommended key
   lifetimes for HMAC-SHA-1-96 (i.e. there are too many variable
   involved to propose a general recommendation).  When any



Madson, Glenn                                                   [Page 3]


INTERNET DRAFT                February 1998          Expires August 1998


   recommendations for HMAC-SHA-1-96 key lifetimes become available they
   will be included in a revised version of this document.

4.  Interaction with the ESP Cipher Mechanism

   As of this writing, there are no known issues which preclude the use
   of the HMAC-SHA-1-96 algorithm with any specific cipher algorithm.

5.  Security Considerations

   The security provided by HMAC-SHA-1-96 is based upon the strength of
   HMAC, and to a lesser degree, the strength of SHA-1.  At the time of
   this writing there are no known cryptographic attacks against SHA-1
   or HMAC-SHA-1-96.

   It is also important to consider that while SHA-1 was never developed
   to be used as a keyed hash algorithm, HMAC had that criteria from the
   onset.

   [RFC-2104] also discusses the potential additional security which is
   provided by the truncation of the resulting hash. Specifications
   which include HMAC are strongly encouraged to perform this hash
   truncation.

   As [RFC-2104] provides a framework for incorporating various hash
   algorithms with HMAC, it is possible to replace SHA-1 with other
   algorithms such as MD5. [RFC-2104] contains a detailed discussion on
   the strengths and weaknesses of HMAC algorithms.

   As is true with any cryptographic algorithm, part of its strength
   lies in the correctness of the algorithm implementation, the security
   of the key management mechanism and its implementation, the strength
   of the associated secret key, and upon the correctness of the
   implementation in all of the participating systems.  [RFC-2202]
   contains test vectors and example code to assist in verifying the
   correctness of HMAC-SHA-1-96 code.

6.  Acknowledgments

   This document is derived in part from previous works by Jim Hughes,
   those people that worked with Jim on the combined DES/CBC+HMAC-MD5
   ESP transforms, the ANX bakeoff participants, and the members of the
   IPsec working group.

7.  References

   [FIPS-180-1] NIST, FIPS PUB 180-1: Secure Hash Standard,
                April 1995.
                http://csrc.nist.gov/fips/fip180-1.txt (ascii)
                http://csrc.nist.gov/fips/fip180-1.ps  (postscript)

   [RFC-2104]   Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., Canetti, R., "HMAC: Keyed-
                Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC-2104,
                February 1997.



Madson, Glenn                                                   [Page 4]


INTERNET DRAFT                February 1998          Expires August 1998


   [Bellare96a] Bellare, M., Canetti, R., Krawczyk, H., "Keying
                Hash Functions for Message Authentication", Advances
                in Cryptography, Crypto96 Proceeding, June 1996.

   [ARCH]       Kent, S., Atkinson, R., "Security Architecture for
                the Internet Protocol",
                draft-ietf-ipsec-arch-sec-02.txt, work in progress,
                November 1997.

   [ESP]        Kent, S., Atkinson, R., "IP Encapsulating Security
                Payload", draft-ietf-ipsec-esp-v2-02.txt,
                work in progress, November 1997.

   [AH]         Kent, S., Atkinson, R., "IP Authentication Header",
                draft-ietf-ipsec-auth-header-03.txt, work in progress,
                November 1997.

   [Thayer97a]  Thayer, R., Doraswamy, N., Glenn, R., "IP Security
                Document Roadmap",
                draft-ietf-ipsec-doc-roadmap-02.txt, work in
                progress, November 1997.

   [RFC-2202]   Cheng, P., Glenn, R., "Test Cases for HMAC-MD5 and
                HMAC-SHA-1", RFC-2202, March 1997.

   [RFC-2119]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
                Requirement Levels", RFC-2119, March 1997.

8.  Editors' Address

        Cheryl Madson
        Cisco Systems, Inc.
        e-mail: <cmadson@cisco.com>

        Rob Glenn
        NIST
        e-mail: <rob.glenn@nist.gov>

   The IPsec working group can be contacted through the chairs:

        Robert Moskowitz
        ICSA
        e-mail: <rgm@icsa.net>

        Ted T'so
        Massachusetts Institute of Technology
        e-mail: <tytso@mit.edu>










Madson, Glenn                                                   [Page 5]


Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.114, available from https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/