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IPsec Working Group R. Housley
Internet Draft RSA Laboratories
expires in six months July 2002
Using AES Counter Mode With IPsec ESP
<draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-aes-ctr-00.txt>
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all
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Abstract
This document describes the use of AES Counter Mode, with an explicit
initialization vector, as an IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload
confidentiality mechanism.
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1. Introduction
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) recently
selected the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [AES], also known as
Rijndael. The AES is a block cipher, and it can be used in many
different modes. This document describes the use of AES Counter Mode
(AES-CTR), with an explicit initialization vector (IV), as an IPsec
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [ESP] confidentiality mechanism.
This document does not provide an overview of IPsec. However,
information about how the various components of IPsec and the way in
which they collectively provide security services is available in
[ARCH] and [ROAD].
1.1. Conventions Used In This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [STDWORDS].
2. AES Block Cipher
This section contains a brief description of the relevant
characteristics of the AES block cipher. Implementation requirements
are also discussed.
2.1. Counter Mode
NIST has defined five modes of operation for AES and other FIPS-
approved block ciphers [MODES]. Each of these modes has different
characteristics. The five modes are: ECB (Electronic Code Book), CBC
(Cipher Block Chaining), CFB (Cipher FeedBack), OFB (Output FeedBack),
and CTR (Counter).
In this specification, only AES-CTR is discussed. This mode requires
the encryptor to generate a unique per-packet value, and communicate
this value to the decryptor. This specification calls this per-packet
value an initialization vector (IV). The same IV and key combination
MUST NOT be used more than once. The encryptor can generate the IV in
any manner that ensures uniqueness. Common approaches to IV
generation include incrementing a counter for each packet and linear
feedback shift registers (LFSRs).
AES Counter mode (AES-CTR) has many properties that make it an
attractive encryption algorithm for in high-speed networking. AES-CTR
uses the AES block cipher to create a stream cipher. It is easy to
implement, and it is parallelizable. It can take advantage of
pipelining. Further, it uses the only AES encrypt operation (for both
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encryption and decryption), making AES-CTR implementations smaller
than many other AES modes. When used correctly, AES-CTR provides a
high level of confidentiality.
Unfortunately, AES-CTR is easy to use incorrectly. Being a stream
cipher, any reuse of the per-packet value, called the IV, with the
same key is catastrophic. An IV collision immediately leaks
information about the plaintext in both packets. For this reason, it
is inappropriate to use this mode of operation with statically
configured keys. Extraordinary measures would be needed to prevent
reuse of an IV value with the static key across power cycles. To be
safe, implementations MUST use fresh keys with AES-CTR. The Internet
Key Exchange (IKE) [IKE] protocol can be used to establish fresh keys.
With AES-CTR, it is trivial to use a valid ciphertext to forge other
(valid to the decryptor) ciphertexts. Thus, it is equally
catastrophic to use AES-CTR without a companion authentication
function. To be safe, implementations MUST use AES-CTR in conjunction
with an authentication function, such as HMAC-SHA-1-96 [HMAC-SHA].
To encrypt a payload with AES-CTR, the encryptor partitions the
plaintext, PT, into 128-bit blocks. The final block need not be full
128 bits.
PT = PT[1] PT[2] ... PT[n]
Each block of PT is then XORed with a block of the key stream to
generate the ciphertext, CT. The AES encryption of each counter
block results in 128 bits of key stream. Part of the 128-bit counter
block is set to the per-packet IV value, and the least significant 32
bits of the counter block are initially set to zero. This counter
value is incremented by one to generate subsequent counter blocks,
each resulting in another 128 bits of key stream. The encryption of
n plaintext blocks can be summarized as:
CTRBLK := IV || ZERO
FOR i := 1 to n-1 DO
CT[i] := PT[i] XOR AES(CTRBLK)
CTRBLK := CTRBLK + 1
END
CT[n] := PT[n] XOR TRUNC(AES(CTRBLK))
The TRUNC() function truncates the output of the AES encrypt
operation to the same length as the final plaintext block, returning
the most significant bits.
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Decryption is similar. The decryption of n ciphertext blocks can be
summarized as:
CTRBLK := IV || ZERO
FOR i := 1 to n-1 DO
PT[i] := CT[i] XOR AES(CTRBLK)
CTRBLK := CTRBLK + 1
END
PT[n] := CT[n] XOR TRUNC(AES(CTRBLK))
2.2. Key Size and Rounds
AES supports three key sizes: 128 bits, 192 bits, and 256 bits. The
default key size is 128 bits, and all implementations MUST support
this key size. Implementations MAY also support key sizes of 192
bits and 256 bits.
AES uses a different number of rounds for each of the defined key
sizes. When a 128-bit key is used, implementations MUST use 10
rounds. When a 192-bit key is used, implementations MUST use 12
rounds. When a 256-bit key is used, implementations MUST use 14
rounds.
2.3. Block Size
The AES has a block size of 128 bits (16 octets). As such, when
using AES-CTR, each AES encrypt operation generates 128 bits of key
stream. AES-CTR encryption is the XOR of the key stream with the
plaintext. AES-CTR decryption is the XOR of the key stream with the
ciphertext. If the generated key stream is longer than the plaintext
or ciphertext, the extra key stream bits are simply discarded. For
this reason, AES-CTR does not require the plaintext to be padded to a
multiple of the block size. However, to provide limited traffic flow
confidentiality, padding MAY be included, as specified in [ESP].
3. ESP Payload
The ESP payload is comprised of the IV followed by the ciphertext.
The payload field, as defined in [ESP], is structured as shown in
Figure 1.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Initialization Vector |
| (8 octets) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ Encrypted Payload (variable) ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ Authentication Data (variable) ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 1. ESP Payload Encrypted with AES-CTR
3.1. Initialization Vector
The AES-CTR IV field MUST be eight octets. The IV MUST be chosen by
the encryptor in a manner that ensures that the same IV value is used
only once for a given key. The encryptor can generate the IV in any
manner that ensures uniqueness. Common approaches to IV generation
include incrementing a counter for each packet and linear feedback
shift registers (LFSRs).
Including the IV in each packet ensures that the decryptor can
generate the key stream needed for decryption, even when some
datagrams are lost or reordered.
3.2. Encrypted Payload
The encrypted payload contains the ciphertext.
AES-CTR mode does not require plaintext padding. However, ESP does
require padding to 32-bit word-align the authentication data. The
padding, Pad Length, and the Next Header MUST be concatenated with
the plaintext before performing encryption, as described in [ESP].
3.3. Authentication Data
Since it is trivial to construct a forgery AES-CTR ciphertext from a
valid AES-CTR ciphertext, AES-CTR implementations MUST employ a non-
NULL ESP authentication method. HMAC-SHA-1-96 [HMAC-SHA] is a likely
choice.
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4. Counter Block Format
Each packet conveys the IV that is necessary to construct the
sequence of counter blocks used to generate the key stream necessary
to decrypt the payload. The AES counter block cipher block is 128
bits. Figure 2 shows the format of the counter block.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Flags | Truncated SPI |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Initialization Vector |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Block Counter |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 2. Counter Block Format
The components of the counter block are as follows:
Flags
The Flags field is 8 bits. It MUST be set to zero. The Flags
field provides compatibility with CCM mode [CCM].
Truncated SPI
The truncated SPI field is 24 bits. As the name implies, it
contains the least significant 24 bits of the ESP SPI.
Initialization Vector
The IV field is 64 bits. As described in section 3, the IV
MUST be chosen by the encryptor in a manner that ensures that
the same IV value is used only once for a given key.
Block Counter
The block counter field is the least significant 32 bits of the
counter block. The block counter begins with the value of
zero, and it is incremented to generate subsequent portions of
the key stream. The block counter is a 32-bit big-Endian
integer value.
The first 128-bit block of the packet plaintext is encrypted by
XORing the plaintext block with the AES encryption of the counter
block (with the block counter set to zero), the second is encrypted
by XORing the second block of plaintext with AES encryption of the
incremented counter block (with the block counter set to one), and so
on.
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This construction permits each packet to consist of up to:
2^32 blocks = 4,294,967,296 blocks
= 68,719,476,736 octets
This construction provides more key stream for each packet than is
needed to handle any IPv6 Jumbogram.
5. Test Vectors
To be supplied.
6. Security Considerations
When used properly, AES-CTR mode provides strong confidentiality.
Bellare, Desai, Jokipii, Rogaway show in [BDJR] that the privacy
guarantees provided by counter mode are at least as strong as those
for CBC mode when using the same block cipher.
Unfortunately, it is very easy to misuse this counter mode. If a
counter value is ever used for more that one packet with the same
key, then the same key stream will be used to encrypt both packets,
and the confidentiality guarantees are voided.
What happens if the encryptor XORs the same key stream with two
different plaintexts? Suppose two plaintext byte sequences P1, P2,
P3 and Q1, Q2, Q3 are both encrypted with key stream K1, K2, K3. The
two corresponding ciphertexts are:
(P1 XOR K1), (P2 XOR K2), (P3 XOR K3)
(Q1 XOR K1), (Q2 XOR K2), (Q3 XOR K3)
If both of these two ciphertext streams are exposed to an attacker,
then a catastrophic failure of confidentiality results, since:
(P1 XOR K1) XOR (Q1 XOR K1) = P1 XOR Q1
(P2 XOR K2) XOR (Q2 XOR K2) = P2 XOR Q2
(P3 XOR K3) XOR (Q3 XOR K3) = P3 XOR Q3
Once the attacker obtains the two plaintexts XORed together, it is
relatively straightforward to separate them. Thus, using any stream
cipher, including AES-CTR, to encrypt two plaintexts under the same
key stream leaks the plaintext.
Therefore, stream ciphers, including AES-CTR, should not be used with
statically configured keys. It is inappropriate to use this m AES-
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CTR with statically configured keys. Extraordinary measures would be
needed to prevent reuse of a counter block value with the static key
across power cycles. To be safe, implementations MUST use fresh keys
with AES-CTR. The Internet Key Exchange (IKE) [IKE] protocol can be
used to establish fresh keys.
When IKE is used to establish fresh keys between two peer entities,
separate keys are established for the two traffic flows. If a
different mechanism is used to establish fresh keys, one that
establishes only a single key to encrypt packets, then there is a
high probability that the peers will select the same IV values for
some packets. Thus, to avoid counter block collisions, ESP
implementations that permit use of the same key for encrypting and
decrypting packets with the same peer MUST ensure that the two peers
assign different SPI values to the security association (SA).
Further, since the counter block only contains the least significant
24 bits of the SPI, such implementations MUST ensure that the two SPI
values differ in the least significant bits.
Data forgery is trivial with CTR mode. The demonstration of this
attack is very similar to discussion above. If a known plaintext
byte sequence P1, P2, P3 is encrypted with key stream K1, K2, K3,
then the attacker can replace the plaintext with one of his own
choosing. The ciphertext is:
(P1 XOR K1), (P2 XOR K2), (P3 XOR K3)
The attacker simply XORs a selected sequence Q1, Q2, Q3 with the
ciphertext to obtain:
(Q1 XOR (P1 XOR K1)), (Q2 XOR (P2 XOR K2)), (Q3 XOR (P3 XOR K3))
Which is the same as:
((Q1 XOR P1) XOR K1), ((Q2 XOR P2) XOR K2), ((Q3 XOR P3) XOR K3)
Decryption of the attacker-generated ciphertext will yield exactly
what the attacker intended:
(Q1 XOR P1), (Q2 XOR P2), (Q3 XOR P3)
Accordingly, ESP implementations that MUST NOT allow the use of AES-
CTR without ESP authentication.
Additionally, AES with a 128-bit key is vulnerable to the birthday
attack after 2^64 blocks are encrypted with a single key, regardless
of the mode used. Since ESP with Enhanced Sequence Numbers allows
for up to 2^64 packets in a single security association (SA), there
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is real potential for more than 2^64 blocks to be encrypted with one
key. Implementations SHOULD generate a fresh key before 2^64 blocks
are encrypted with the same key, or implementations SHOULD make use
of the longer AES key sizes. Note that ESP with 32-bit Sequence
Numbers will not exceed 2^64 blocks even if all of the packets are
maximum-length Jumbograms.
7. Design Rationale
In the development of this specification, the use of the ESP sequence
number field instead of an explicit IV field was considered. This
section documents the rationale for the selection of an explicit IV.
This selection is not a cryptographic security issue, as either
approach will prevent counter block collisions.
The use of the explicit IV does not dictate the manner that the
encryptor uses to assign the per-packet value in the counter block.
This is desirable for several reasons.
1. Only the encryptor can ensure that the value is not used for
more than one packet, so there is no advantage to selecting a
mechanism that allows the decryptor to determine whether counter
block values collide. Damage from the collision is done, whether
the decryptor detects it or not.
2. Allows adders, LFSRs, and any other technique that meets the
time budget of the encryptor, so long as the technique results in
a unique value for each packet. Adders are simple and
straightforward to implement, but due to carries, they do not
execute in constant time. LSFRs offer an alternative that
executes in constant time.
3. Complexity is in control of the implementer. Further, the
decision made by the implementer of the encryptor does not make
the decryptor more (or less) complex.
4. The assignment of the per-packet counter block value needs to
be inside the assurance boundary. Some implementations assign the
sequence number inside the assurance boundary, but others do not.
A sequence number collision does not have the dire consequences,
but, as described in section 6, a collision in counter block
values has disastrous consequences.
5. Coupling with the sequence number is possible in those
architectures where the sequence number assignment is performed in
the assurance boundary. In this situation, the sequence number
and the IV field will contain the same value.
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6. Decoupling from the sequence number is possible in those
architectures where the sequence number assignment is performed
outside the assurance boundary.
The use of an explicit IV field directly follows from the decoupling
of the sequence number and the per-packet counter block value. The
additional overhead (64 bits for the IV field) is acceptable. This
overhead is significantly less overhead associated with Cipher Block
Chaining (CBC) mode. As normally employed, CBC requires a full block
for the IV and, on average, half of a block for padding. AES-CTR
with an explicit IV has about one-third of the overhead as AES-CBC,
and the overhead is constant for each packet.
8. IANA Considerations
IANA has assigned three ESP transform numbers for use with AES
Counter Mode with an explicit IV, one for each AES key size:
<TBD1> for AES-CTR with a 128 bit key;
<TBD2> for AES-CTR with a 192 bit key; and
<TBD3> for AES-CTR with a 256 bit key.
9. Acknowledgements
This document is the result of extensive discussions and compromises.
While not all of the participants are completely satisfied with the
outcome, the document is better for their contributions. The author
thanks the members of the IPsec working group, with special mention
of the efforts of (in alphabetical order): Steve Bellovin, Niels
Ferguson, Steve Kent, David McGrew, Robert Moskowitz, Jesse Walker,
and Doug Whiting.
10. References
This section provides normative and informative references.
10.1. Normative References
[AES] NIST, FIPS PUB 197, "Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES)," November 2001.
[ESP] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security
Payload (ESP)," RFC 2406, November 1998.
[MODES] Dworkin, M., "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes
of Operation: Methods and Techniques," NIST Special
Publication 800-38A, December 2001.
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[STDWORDS] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels," RFC 2119, March 1997.
10.2. Informative References
[ARCH] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for
the Internet Protocol," RFC 2401, November 1998.
[BDJR] Bellare, M, Desai, A., Jokipii, E., and P. Rogaway,
"A Concrete Security Treatment of Symmetric Encryption:
Analysis of the DES Modes of Operation", Proceedings
38th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer
Science, 1997.
[CCM] Whiting, D., Housley, R. and N. Ferguson, "AES
Encryption & Authentication Using CTR Mode & CBC-MAC,"
IEEE P802.11 doc 02/001r2, May 2002.
[HMAC-SHA] Madson, C. and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96
within ESP and AH," RFC 2404, November 1998.
[IKE] Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange
(IKE)," RFC 2409, November 1998.
[ROAD] Thayer, R., N. Doraswamy and R. Glenn, "IP Security
Document Roadmap," RFC 2411, November 1998.
11. Author's Address
Russell Housley
RSA Laboratories
918 Spring Knoll Drive
Herndon, VA 20170
USA
rhousley@rsasecurity.com
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