[Docs] [txt|pdf|xml|html] [Tracker] [WG] [Email] [Nits]

Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 RFC 8019

IPSecME Working Group                                             Y. Nir
Internet-Draft                                               Check Point
Intended status: Standards Track                        October 27, 2014
Expires: April 30, 2015


Protecting Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Implementations from Distributed
                       Denial of Service Attacks
                 draft-ietf-ipsecme-ddos-protection-00

Abstract

   This document recommends implementation and configuration best
   practices for Internet-connected IPsec Responders, to allow them to
   resist Denial of Service and Distributed Denial of Service attacks.
   Additionally, the document introduces a new mechanism called "Client
   Puzzles" that help accomplish this task.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 30, 2015.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of




Nir                      Expires April 30, 2015                 [Page 1]


Internet-Draft           DDoS Protection for IKE            October 2014


   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  The Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Puzzles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Retention Periods for Half-Open SAs . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Rate Limiting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Plan for Defending a Responder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   7.  Operational Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12

1.  Introduction

   The IKE_SA_INIT Exchange described in section 1.2 of [RFC7296]
   involves the Initiator sending a single message.  The Responder
   replies with a single message and also allocates memory for a
   structure called a half-open IKE SA (Security Association).  This
   half-open SA is later authenticated in the IKE_AUTH Exchange, but if
   that IKE_AUTH request never comes, the half-open SA is kept for an
   unspecified amount of time.  Depending on the algorithms used and
   implementation, such a half-open SA will use from around 100 bytes to
   several thousands bytes of memory.

   This creates an easy attack vector against an Internet Key Exchange
   (IKE) Responder.  Generating the Initial request is cheap, and
   sending multiple such requests can either cause the Responder to
   allocate too much resources and fail, or else if resource allocation
   is somehow throttled, legitimate Initiators would also be prevented
   from setting up IKE SAs.

   An obvious defense, which is described in Section 5, is limiting the
   number of half-open SAs opened by a single peer.  However, since all
   that is required is a single packet, an attacker can use multiple
   spoofed source IP addresses.

   Section 2.6 of RFC 7296 offers a mechanism to mitigate this DoS
   attack: the stateless cookie.  When the server is under load, the
   Responder responds to the Initial request with a calculated
   "stateless cookie" - a value that can be re-calculated based on



Nir                      Expires April 30, 2015                 [Page 2]


Internet-Draft           DDoS Protection for IKE            October 2014


   values in the Initial request without storing Responder-side state.
   The Initiator is expected to repeat the Initial request, this time
   including the stateless cookie.

   Attackers that have multiple source IP addresses with return
   routability, such as bot-nets can fill up a half-open SA table
   anyway.  The cookie mechanism limits the amount of allocated state to
   the size of the bot-net, multiplied by the number of half-open SAs
   allowed for one peer address, multiplied by the amount of state
   allocated for each half-open SA.  With typical values this can easily
   reach hundreds of megabytes.

   The mechanism described in Section 3 adds a proof of work for the
   Initiator, by calculating a pre-image for a partial hash value.  This
   sets an upper bound, determined by the attacker's CPU to the number
   of negotiations it can initiate in a unit of time.

1.1.  Conventions Used in This Document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.  The Vulnerability

   If we break down what a responder has to do during an initial
   exchange, there are three stages:

   1.  When the Initial request arrives, the responder:

       *  Generates or re-uses a D-H private part.
       *  Generates a responder SPI.
       *  Stores the private part and peer public part in a half-open SA
          database.
   2.  When the Authentication request arrives, the responder:

       *  Derives the keys from the half-open SA.
       *  Decrypts the request.
   3.  If the Authentication request decrypts properly:

       *  Validates the certificate chain (if present) in the auth
          request.

   Yes, there's a stage 4 where the responder actually creates Child
   SAs, but when talking about (D)DoS, we never get to this stage.

   Stage #1 is pretty light on CPU power, but requires some storage, and
   it's very light for the initiator as well.  Stage #2 includes



Nir                      Expires April 30, 2015                 [Page 3]


Internet-Draft           DDoS Protection for IKE            October 2014


   private-key operations, so it's much heavier CPU-wise, but it
   releases the storage allocated in stage #1.  Stage #3 includes a
   public key operation, and possibly many of them.

   To attack such a server, an attacker can attempt to either exhaust
   memory or to exhaust CPU.  Without any protection, the most efficient
   attack is to send multiple Initial requests and exhaust memory.  This
   should be easy because those Initial requests are cheap.

   There are obvious ways for the responder to protect itself even
   without changes to the protocol.  It can reduce the time that an
   entry remains in the half-open SA database, and it can limit the
   amount of concurrent half-open SAs from a particular address or
   prefix.  The attacker can overcome this by using spoofed source
   addresses.

   The stateless cookie mechanism from section 2.6 of RFC 7296 prevents
   an attack with spoofed source addresses.  This doesn't solve the
   issue, but it makes the limiting of half-open SAs by address or
   prefix work.  Puzzles do the same thing only more of it.  They make
   it harder for an attacker to reach the goal of getting a half-open
   SA.  They don't have to be so hard that an attacker can't afford to
   solve them - it's enough that they increase the cost of a half-open
   SAs for the attacker.

   Reducing the amount of time an abandoned half-open SA is kept attacks
   the issue from the other side.  It reduces the value the attacker
   gets from managing to create a half-open SA.  So if a half-open SA
   takes 1 KB and it's kept for 1 minute and the capacity is 60,000
   half-open SAs, an attacker would need to create 1,000 half-open SAs
   per second.  Reduce the retention time to 3 seconds, and the attacker
   needs to create 20,000 half-open SAs per second.  Make each of those
   more expensive by introducing a puzzle, and you're likely to thwart
   an exhaustion attack against responder memory.

   At this point, filling up the half-open SA database in no longer the
   most efficient DoS attack.  The attacker has two ways to do better:

   1.  Go back to spoofed addresses and try to overwhelm the CPU that
       deals with generating cookies, or
   2.  Take the attack to the next level by also sending an
       Authentication request.

   I don't think the first thing is something we can deal with at the
   IKE level.  It's probably better left to Intrusion Prevention System
   (IPS) technology.





Nir                      Expires April 30, 2015                 [Page 4]


Internet-Draft           DDoS Protection for IKE            October 2014


   Sending an Authentication request is surprisingly cheap.  It requires
   a proper IKE header with the correct IKE SPIs, and it requires a
   single encrypted payload.  The content of the payload might as well
   be junk.  The responder has to perform the relatively expensive key
   derivation, only to find that the Authentication request does not
   decrypt.  Depending on the responder implementation, this can be
   repeated with the same half-open SA (if the responder does not delete
   the half-open SA following an unsuccessful decryption - see
   discussion in Section 4).

   Here too, the number of half-open SAs that the attacker can achieve
   is crucial, because each one of them allows the attacker to waste
   some CPU time.  So making it hard to make many half-open SAs is
   important.

   A strategy against DDoS has to rely on at least 4 components:

   1.  Hardening the half-open SA database by reducing retention time.
   2.  Hardening the half-open SA database by rate-limiting single IPs/
       prefixes.
   3.  Guidance on what to do when an Authentication request fails to
       decrypt.
   4.  Increasing cost of half-open SA up to what is tolerable for
       legitimate clients.

   Puzzles have their place as part of #4.

3.  Puzzles

   The puzzle introduced here extends the cookie mechanism from RFC
   7296.  It is loosely based on the proof-of-work technique used in
   BitCoins ([bitcoins]).  Future versions of this document will have
   the exact bit structure of the notification payloads, but for now, I
   will only describe the semantics of the content.

   A puzzle is sent to the Initiator in two cases:

   o  The Responder is so overloaded, than no half-open SAs are allowed
      to be created without the puzzle, or
   o  The Responder is not too loaded, but the rate-limiting in
      Section 5 prevents half-open SAs from being created with this
      particular peer address or prefix without first solving a puzzle.

   When the Responder decides to send the challenge notification in
   response to a IKE_SA_INIT request, the notification includes two
   fields:





Nir                      Expires April 30, 2015                 [Page 5]


Internet-Draft           DDoS Protection for IKE            October 2014


   1.  Cookie - this is calculated the same as in RFC 7296.  As in RFC
       7296, the process of generating the cookie is not specified, but
       this specification does assume that it is fixed-length, meaning
       that all cookies produced by a particular responder are of the
       same length.
   2.  Zero Bit Count.  This is a number between 8 and 255 that
       represents the length of the zero-bit run at the end of the
       SHA-256 hash of the Cookie payload that the Initiator is to send.
       Since the mechanism is supposed to be stateless for the
       Responder, the same value is sent to all Initiators who are
       receiving this challenge.  The values 0 and 1-8 are explicitly
       excluded, because the value zero is meaningless, and the values
       1-8 create a puzzle that is too easy to solve to make any
       difference in mitigating DDoS attacks.

   Upon receiving this challenge payload, the Initiator attempts to
   append different strings to the Cookie field from the challenge, and
   calculates the SHA-256 hash of the result.  When a string is found
   such that the resulting hash has a sufficient number of trailing zero
   bits, that result is sent to the Responder in a Cookie notification,
   similar to what is described in RFC 7296.  The difference is that the
   string in this Cookie notification is longer than the one
   transmitted.

   When receiving a request with an extended Cookie, the Responder
   verifies two things:

   o  That the first bits of the transmitted cookie are indeed valid.
   o  That the hash of the transmitted cookie has a sufficient number of
      trailing zero bits.

   Example 1: Suppose the calculated cookie is
   fdbcfa5a430d7201282358a2a034de0013cfe2ae (20 octets) and the required
   number of zero bits is 16.  After successively trying a bunch of
   strings, the Initiator finds out that appending three octets: 022b3d
   yields a 23-octet string whose SHA-256 hash is
   3b4bdf201105e059e09f65219021738b8f6a148896b2e1be2fdc726aeb6e0000.
   That has 17 trailing zero bits, so it is an acceptable cookie.

   Example 2: Same cookie, but this time the required number of zero
   bits is 22.  The first string to satisfy that requirement is 5c2880,
   which yields a hash with 23 trailing zero bits.  Finding this
   requires 6,105,472 hashes.








Nir                      Expires April 30, 2015                 [Page 6]


Internet-Draft           DDoS Protection for IKE            October 2014


   +--------------+--------------------------+---------+---------------+
   |   Appended   | Last 24 Hex Hash Digits  |    #    |    Time To    |
   |    String    |                          |  0-bits |   Calculate   |
   +--------------+--------------------------+---------+---------------+
   |      04      | 2817ae10f20f4e0b0739f5cc |    2    |     0.000     |
   |      06      | e540cf315fff88c1c5f362a8 |    3    |     0.000     |
   |      0d      | 8c459376268f747d7ed40da0 |    5    |     0.000     |
   |      1c      | 398c49be1babe50576cdae40 |    6    |     0.000     |
   |     00f0     | 3f523ad7c0e00252c51ad980 |    7    |     0.000     |
   |     0182     | e284296e2ffffa256bdfa800 |    11   |     0.000     |
   |     235c     | 7dc74302dc8bd695821ab000 |    12   |     0.006     |
   |     7186     | a4411c3df3661eff1d574000 |    14   |     0.019     |
   |     d836     | 498bcd04ab1ae0c2c3a08000 |    15   |     0.036     |
   |    022b3d    | 96b2e1be2fdc726aeb6e0000 |    17   |     0.136     |
   |    0aa679    | 620f48af85428996c1f00000 |    20   |     0.512     |
   |    4ffbad    | f9ba0ece854cd0fa88e00000 |    21   |     3.602     |
   |    5c2880    | d44e6467d8fc37723d800000 |    23   |     4.143     |
   |    cdafe1    | 0d4058660c3e67be62000000 |    25   |     9.245     |
   |   022bffc8   | 5f2d874764a71e2948000000 |    27   |     36.169    |
   |   181ac92a   | c3b5449fa1019b0580000000 |    31   |    255.076    |
   |   a987978d   | 95a5673968a9b37a00000000 |    33   |    1309.519   |
   +--------------+--------------------------+---------+---------------+

         Table 1: COOKIE=fdbcfa5a430d7201282358a2a034de0013cfe2ae

   The figures above were obtained on a 2.4 GHz single core i5.  Run
   times can be halved or quartered with multi-core code, but would be
   longer on mobile phone processors, even if those are multi-core as
   well.  With these figures I believe that 20 bits is a reasonable
   choice for puzzle level difficulty for all Initiators, with 24 bits
   acceptable for specific hosts/prefixes.

4.  Retention Periods for Half-Open SAs

   As a UDP-based protocol, IKEv2 has to deal with packet loss through
   retransmissions.  Section 2.4 of RFC 7296 recommends "that messages
   be retransmitted at least a dozen times over a period of at least
   several minutes before giving up".  Retransmission policies in
   practice wait at least one or two seconds before retransmitting for
   the first time.

   Because of this, setting the timeout on a half-open SA too low will
   cause it to expire whenever even one IKE_AUTH request packet is lost.
   When not under attack, the half-open SA timeout SHOULD be set high
   enough that the Initiator will have enough time to send multiple
   retransmissions, minimizing the chance of transient network
   congestion causing IKE failure.




Nir                      Expires April 30, 2015                 [Page 7]


Internet-Draft           DDoS Protection for IKE            October 2014


   When the system is under attack, as measured by the amount of half-
   open SAs, it makes sense to reduce this lifetime.  The Responder
   should still allow enough time for the round-trip, enough time for
   the Initiator to derive the Diffie-Hellman shared value, and enough
   time to derive the IKE SA keys and the create the IKE_AUTH request.
   Two seconds is probably as low a value as can realistically be used.

   It could make sense to assign a shorter value to half-open SAs
   originating from IP addresses or prefixes from which are considered
   suspect because of multiple concurrent half-open SAs.

5.  Rate Limiting

   Even with DDoS, the attacker has only a limited amount of nodes
   participating in the attack.  By limiting the amount of half-open SAs
   that are allowed to exist concurrently with each such node, the total
   amount of half-open SAs is capped, as is the total amount of key
   derivations that the Responder is forced to complete.

   In IPv4 it makes sense to limit the number of half-open SAs based on
   IP address.  Most IPv4 nodes are either directly attached to the
   Internet using a routable address or are hidden behind a NAT device
   with a single IPv4 external address.  IPv6 networks are currently a
   rarity, so we can only speculate on what their wide deployment will
   be like, but the current thinking is that ISP customers will be
   assigned whole subnets, so we don't expect the kind of NAT deployment
   that is common in IPv4.  For this reason it makes sense to use a
   64-bit prefix as the basis for rate limiting in IPv6.

   The number of half-open SAs is easy to measure, but it is also
   worthwhile to measure the number of failed IKE_AUTH exchanges.  If
   possible, both factors should be taken into account when deciding
   which IP address or prefix is considered suspicious.

   There are two ways to rate-limit a peer address or prefix:

   1.  Hard Limit - where the number of half-open SAs is capped, and any
       further IKE_SA_INIT requests are rejected.
   2.  Soft Limit - where if a set number of half-open SAs exist for a
       particular address or prefix, any IKE_SA_INIT request will
       require solving a puzzle.

   The advantage of the hard limit method is that it provides a hard cap
   on the amount of half-open SAs that the attacker is able to create.
   The downside is that it allows the attacker to block IKE initiation
   from small parts of the Internet.  For example, if a certain purveyor
   of beverages resembling coffee provides Internet connectivity to its
   customers through an IPv4 NAT device, a single malicious customer can



Nir                      Expires April 30, 2015                 [Page 8]


Internet-Draft           DDoS Protection for IKE            October 2014


   create enough half-open SAs to fill the quota for the NAT device
   external IP address.  Legitimate Initiators on the same network will
   not be able to initiate IKE.

   The advantage of a soft limit is that legitimate clients can always
   connect.  The disadvantage is that a sufficiently resourceful (in the
   sense that they have a lot of resources) adversary can still
   effectively DoS the Responder.

   Regardless of the type of rate-limiting used, there is a huge
   advantage in blocking the DoS attack using rate-limiting in that
   legitimate clients who are away from the attacking nodes should not
   be adversely affected by either the attack or by the measures used to
   counteract it.

6.  Plan for Defending a Responder

   This section outlines a plan for defending a Responder from a DDoS
   attack based on the techniques described earlier.  The numbers given
   here are not normative, and their purpose is to illustrate the
   configurable parameters needed for defeating the DDoS attack.

   Implementations may be deployed in different environments, so it is
   RECOMMENDED that the parameters be settable.  As an example, most
   commercial products are required to undergo benchmarking where the
   IKE SA establishment rate is measured.  Benchmarking is
   indistinguishable from a DoS attack and the defenses described in
   this document may defeat the benchmark by causing exchanges to fail
   or take a long time to complete.  Parameters should be tunable to
   allow for benchmarking (if only by turning DDoS protection off).

   Since all countermeasures may cause delays and work on the
   initiators, they SHOULD NOT be deployed unless an attack is likely to
   be in progress.  To minimize the burden imposed on Initiators, the
   Responder should monitor incoming IKE requests, searching for two
   things:

   1.  A general DDoS attack.  Such an attack is indicated by a high
       number of concurrent half-open SAs, a high rate of failed
       IKE_AUTH exchanges, or a combination of both.  For example,
       consider a Responder that has 10,000 distinct peers of which at
       peak 7,500 concurrently have VPN tunnels.  At the start of peak
       time, 600 peers might establish tunnels at any given minute, and
       tunnel establishment (both IKE_SA_INIT and IKE_AUTH) takes
       anywhere from 0.5 to 2 seconds.  For this Responder, we expect
       there to be less than 20 concurrent half-open SAs, so having 100
       concurrent half-open SAs can be interpreted as an indication of
       an attack.  Similarly, IKE_AUTH request decryption failures



Nir                      Expires April 30, 2015                 [Page 9]


Internet-Draft           DDoS Protection for IKE            October 2014


       should never happen.  Supposing the the tunnels are established
       using EAP (see section 2.16 or RFC 7296), users enter the wrong
       password about 20% of the time.  So we'd expect 125 wrong
       password failures a minute.  If we get IKE_AUTH decryption
       failures from multiple sources more than once per second, or EAP
       failure more than 300 times per minute, that can also be an
       indication of a DDoS attack.
   2.  An attack from a particular IP address or prefix.  Such an attack
       is indicated by an inordinate amount of half-open SAs from that
       IP address or prefix, or an inordinate amount of IKE_AUTH
       failures.  A DDoS attack may be viewed as multiple such attacks.
       If they are mitigated well enough, there will not be a need enact
       countermeasures on all Initiators.  Typical figures might be 5
       concurrent half-open SAs, 1 decrypt failure, or 10 EAP failures
       within a minute.

   Note that using counter-measures against an attack from a particular
   IP address may be enough to avoid the load on the half-open SA
   database and the amount of failed IKE_AUTH exchanges to never exceed
   the threshold of attack detection.  This is a good thing as it
   prevent Initiators that are not close to the attackers from being
   affected.

   When there is no general DDoS attack, it is suggested that no Cookie
   or puzzles be used.  At this point the only defensive measure is the
   monitoring, and setting a soft limit per peer IP or prefix.  The soft
   limit can be set to 3-5, and the puzzle difficulty should be set to
   such a level (number of zero-bits) that all legitimate clients can
   handle it without degraded user experience.

   As soon as any kind of attack is detected, either a lot of
   initiations from multiple sources or a lot of initiations from a few
   sources, it is best to begin by requiring stateless cookies from all
   Initiators.  This will force the attacker to use real source
   addresses, and help avoid the need to impose a greater burden in the
   form of cookies on the general population of initiators.  This makes
   the per-node or per-prefix soft limit more effective.

   When Cookies are activated for all requests and the attacker is still
   managing to consume too many resources, the Responder MAY increase
   the difficulty of puzzles imposed on IKE_SA_INIT requests coming from
   suspicious nodes/prefixes.  It should still be doable by all
   legitimate peers, but it can degrade experience, for example by
   taking up to 10 seconds to calculate the cookie extension.

   If the load on the Responder is still too great, and there are many
   nodes causing multiple half-open SAs or IKE_AUTH failures, the
   Responder MAY impose hard limits on those nodes.



Nir                      Expires April 30, 2015                [Page 10]


Internet-Draft           DDoS Protection for IKE            October 2014


   If it turns out that the attack is very widespread and the hard caps
   are not solving the issue, a puzzle MAY be imposed on all Initiators.
   Note that this is the last step, and the Responder should avoid this
   if possible.

7.  Operational Considerations

   [This section needs a lot of expanding]

   Not all Initiators support the puzzles, but all initiators are
   supposed to support stateless cookies.  If this notification is sent
   to a non-supporting but legitimate initiator, the exchange will fail.
   Responders are advised to first try to mitigate the DoS using
   stateless cookies, even imposing them generally before resorting to
   using puzzles.

   The difficulty level should be set by balancing the requirement to
   minimize the latency for legitimate initiators and making things
   difficult for attackers.  A good rule of thumb is for taking about 1
   second to solve the puzzle.  A typical initiator or bot-net member in
   2014 can perform slightly less than a million hashes per second per
   core, so setting the difficulty level to n=20 is a good compromise.
   It should be noted that mobile initiators, especially phones are
   considerably weaker than that.  Implementations should allow
   administrators to set the difficulty level, and/or be able to set the
   difficulty level dynamically in response to load.

   Initiators should set a maximum difficulty level beyond which they
   won't try to solve the puzzle and log or display a failure message to
   the administrator or user.

8.  Security Considerations

   To be added.

9.  IANA Considerations

   IANA is requested to assign a notify message type from the status
   types range (16430-40959) of the "IKEv2 Notify Message Types - Status
   Types" registry with name "PUZZLE".

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.




Nir                      Expires April 30, 2015                [Page 11]


Internet-Draft           DDoS Protection for IKE            October 2014


   [RFC7296]  Kivinen, T., Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P.
              Eronen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
              (IKEv2)", RFC 7296, October 2014.

10.2.  Informative References

   [bitcoins]
              Nakamoto, S., "Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash
              System", October 2008.

Author's Address

   Yoav Nir
   Check Point Software Technologies Ltd.
   5 Hasolelim st.
   Tel Aviv  6789735
   Israel

   Email: ynir.ietf@gmail.com
































Nir                      Expires April 30, 2015                [Page 12]


Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.129d, available from https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/