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Versions: (draft-pauly-ipsecme-tcp-encaps) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 RFC 8229

Network                                                         T. Pauly
Internet-Draft                                                Apple Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track                               S. Touati
Expires: July 27, 2017                                          Ericsson
                                                               R. Mantha
                                                           Cisco Systems
                                                        January 23, 2017


               TCP Encapsulation of IKE and IPsec Packets
                    draft-ietf-ipsecme-tcp-encaps-05

Abstract

   This document describes a method to transport IKE and IPsec packets
   over a TCP connection for traversing network middleboxes that may
   block IKE negotiation over UDP.  This method, referred to as TCP
   encapsulation, involves sending both IKE packets for tunnel
   establishment as well as tunneled packets using ESP over a TCP
   connection.  This method is intended to be used as a fallback option
   when IKE cannot be negotiated over UDP.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 27, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents



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   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Prior Work and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  TCP-Encapsulated Header Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.  TCP-Encapsulated IKE Header Format  . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  TCP-Encapsulated ESP Header Format  . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  TCP-Encapsulated Stream Prefix  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.1.  Recommended Fallback from UDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Connection Establishment and Teardown . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   7.  Interaction with NAT Detection Payloads . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   8.  Using MOBIKE with TCP encapsulation . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   9.  Using IKE Message Fragmentation with TCP encapsulation  . . .  10
   10. Considerations for Keep-alives and DPD  . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   11. Middlebox Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   12. Performance Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     12.1.  TCP-in-TCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     12.2.  Added Reliability for Unreliable Protocols . . . . . . .  12
     12.3.  Quality of Service Markings  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     12.4.  Maximum Segment Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   14. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   15. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   16. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     16.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     16.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Appendix A.  Using TCP encapsulation with TLS . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Appendix B.  Example exchanges of TCP Encapsulation with TLS  . .  15
     B.1.  Establishing an IKE session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     B.2.  Deleting an IKE session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     B.3.  Re-establishing an IKE session  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     B.4.  Using MOBIKE between UDP and TCP Encapsulation  . . . . .  19
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20

1.  Introduction

   IKEv2 [RFC7296] is a protocol for establishing IPsec tunnels, using
   IKE messages over UDP for control traffic, and using Encapsulating
   Security Payload (ESP) messages for tunneled data traffic.  Many



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   network middleboxes that filter traffic on public hotspots block all
   UDP traffic, including IKE and IPsec, but allow TCP connections
   through since they appear to be web traffic.  Devices on these
   networks that need to use IPsec (to access private enterprise
   networks, to route voice-over-IP calls to carrier networks, or
   because of security policies) are unable to establish IPsec tunnels.
   This document defines a method for encapsulating both the IKE control
   messages as well as the IPsec data messages within a TCP connection.

   Using TCP as a transport for IPsec packets adds a third option to the
   list of traditional IPsec transports:

   1.    Direct.  Currently, IKE negotiations begin over UDP port 500.
         If no NAT is detected between the initiator and the receiver,
         then subsequent IKE packets are sent over UDP port 500 and
         IPsec data packets are sent using ESP [RFC4303].

   2.    UDP Encapsulation [RFC3948].  If a NAT is detected between the
         initiator and the receiver, then subsequent IKE packets are
         sent over UDP port 4500 with four bytes of zero at the start of
         the UDP payload and ESP packets are sent out over UDP port
         4500.  Some peers default to using UDP encapsulation even when
         no NAT are detected on the path as some middleboxes do not
         support IP protocols other than TCP and UDP.

   3.    TCP Encapsulation.  If both of the other two methods are not
         available or appropriate, both IKE negotiation packets as well
         as ESP packets can be sent over a single TCP connection to the
         peer.

   Direct use of ESP or UDP Encapsulation should be preferred by IKE
   implementations due to performance concerns when using TCP
   Encapsulation [Section 12].  Most implementations should use TCP
   Encapsulation only on networks where negotiation over UDP has been
   attempted without receiving responses from the peer, or if a network
   is known to not support UDP.

1.1.  Prior Work and Motivation

   Encapsulating IKE connections within TCP streams is a common approach
   to solve the problem of UDP packets being blocked by network
   middleboxes.  The goal of this document is to promote
   interoperability by providing a standard method of framing IKE and
   ESP message within streams, and to provide guidelines for how to
   configure and use TCP encapsulation.

   Some previous alternatives include:




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   Cellular Network Access  Interworking Wireless LAN (IWLAN) uses IKEv2
         to create secure connections to cellular carrier networks for
         making voice calls and accessing other network services over
         Wi-Fi networks. 3GPP has recommended that IKEv2 and ESP packets
         be sent within a TLS connection to be able to establish
         connections on restrictive networks.

   ISAKMP over TCP  Various non-standard extensions to ISAKMP have been
         deployed that send IPsec traffic over TCP or TCP-like packets.

   SSL VPNs  Many proprietary VPN solutions use a combination of TLS and
         IPsec in order to provide reliability.

   IKEv2 over TCP  IKEv2 over TCP as described in
         [I-D.nir-ipsecme-ike-tcp] is used to avoid UDP fragmentation.

   The goal of this specification is to provide a standardized method
   for using TCP streams to transport IPsec that is compatible with the
   current IKE standard, and avoids the overhead of other alternatives
   that always rely on TCP or TLS.

1.2.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

2.  Configuration

   One of the main reasons to use TCP encapsulation is that UDP traffic
   may be entirely blocked on a network.  Because of this, support for
   TCP encapsulation is not specifically negotiated in the IKE exchange.
   Instead, support for TCP encapsulation must be pre-configured on both
   the initiator and the responder.

   The configuration defined on each peer should include the following
   parameters:

   o  One or more TCP ports on which the responder will listen for
      incoming connections.  Note that the initiator may initiate TCP
      connections to the responder from any local port.  The ports on
      which the responder listens will likey be based on the ports
      commonly allowed on restricted networks.

   o  Optionally, an extra framing protocol to use on top of TCP to
      further encapsulate the stream of IKE and IPsec packets.  See
      Appendix A for a detailed discussion.




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   This document leaves the selection of TCP ports up to
   implementations.  It is suggested to use TCP port 4500, which is
   allocated for IPsec NAT Traversal.

   Since TCP encapsulation of IKE and IPsec packets adds overhead and
   has potential performance trade-offs compared to direct or UDP-
   encapsulated tunnels (as described in Performance Considerations,
   Section 12), implementations SHOULD prefer ESP direct or UDP
   encapsulated tunnels over TCP encapsulated tunnels when possible.

3.  TCP-Encapsulated Header Formats

   Like UDP encapsulation, TCP encapsulation uses the first four bytes
   of a message to differentiate IKE and ESP messages.  TCP
   encapsulation also adds a length field to define the boundaries of
   messages within a stream.  The message length is sent in a 16-bit
   field that precedes every message.  If the first 32-bits of the
   message are zeros (a Non-ESP Marker), then the contents comprise an
   IKE message.  Otherwise, the contents comprise an ESP message.
   Authentication Header (AH) messages are not supported for TCP
   encapsulation.

   Although a TCP stream may be able to send very long messages,
   implementations SHOULD limit message lengths to typical UDP datagram
   ESP payload lengths.  The maximum message length is used as the
   effective MTU for connections that are being encrypted using ESP, so
   the maximum message length will influence characteristics of inner
   connections, such as the TCP Maximum Segment Size (MSS).

   Note that this method of encapsulation will also work for placing IKE
   and ESP messages within any protocol that presents a stream
   abstraction, beyond TCP.

3.1.  TCP-Encapsulated IKE Header Format

                       1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
                                   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                                   |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                         Non-ESP Marker                        |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ~                      IKE header [RFC7296]                     ~
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                                 Figure 1



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   The IKE header is preceded by a 16-bit length field in network byte
   order that specifies the length of the IKE message (including the
   Non-ESP marker) within the TCP stream.  As with IKE over UDP port
   4500, a zeroed 32-bit Non-ESP Marker is inserted before the start of
   the IKE header in order to differentiate the traffic from ESP traffic
   between the same addresses and ports.

   o  Length (2 octets, unsigned integer) - Length of the IKE packet
      including the Length Field and Non-ESP Marker.

3.2.  TCP-Encapsulated ESP Header Format

                       1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
                                   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                                   |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ~                     ESP header [RFC4303]                      ~
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                                 Figure 2

   The ESP header is preceded by a 16-bit length field in network byte
   order that specifies the length of the ESP packet within the TCP
   stream.

   The SPI field in the ESP header MUST NOT be a zero value.

   o  Length (2 octets, unsigned integer) - Length of the ESP packet
      including the Length Field.

4.  TCP-Encapsulated Stream Prefix

   Each stream of bytes used for IKE and IPsec encapsulation MUST begin
   with a fixed sequence of six bytes as a magic value, containing the
   characters "IKETCP" as ASCII values.  This allows peers to
   differentiate this protocol from other protocols that may be run over
   the same TCP port.  Since TCP encapsulated IPsec is not assigned to a
   specific port, responders may be able to receive multiple protocols
   on the same port.  The bytes of the stream prefix do not overlap with
   the valid start of any other known stream protocol.  This value is
   only sent once, by the Initiator only, at the beginning of any stream
   of IKE and ESP messages.

   If other framing protocols are used within TCP to further encapsulate
   or encrypt the stream of IKE and ESP messages, the Stream Prefix must



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   be at the start of the Initiator's IKE and ESP message stream within
   the added protocol layer [Appendix A].  Although some framing
   protocols do support negotiating inner protocols, the stream prefix
   should always be used in order for implementations to be as generic
   as possible and not rely on other framing protocols on top of TCP.

    0      1      2      3      4      5
   +------+------+------+------+------+------+
   | 0x49 | 0x4b | 0x45 | 0x54 | 0x43 | 0x50 |
   +------+------+------+------+------+------+

                                 Figure 3

5.  Applicability

   TCP encapsulation is applicable only when it has been configured to
   be used with specific IKE peers.  If a responder is configured to use
   TCP encapsulation, it MUST listen on the configured port(s) in case
   any peers will initiate new IKE sessions.  Initiators MAY use TCP
   encapsulation for any IKE session to a peer that is configured to
   support TCP encapsulation, although it is recommended that initiators
   should only use TCP encapsulation when traffic over UDP is blocked.

   Since the support of TCP encapsulation is a configured property, not
   a negotiated one, it is recommended that if there are multiple IKE
   endpoints representing a single peer (such as multiple machines with
   different IP addresses when connecting by Fully-Qualified Domain
   Name, or endpoints used with IKE redirection), all of the endpoints
   equally support TCP encapsulation.

   If TCP encapsulation is being used for a specific IKE SA, all
   messages for that IKE SA and its Child SAs MUST be sent over a TCP
   connection until the SA is deleted or MOBIKE is used to change the SA
   endpoints and/or encapsulation protocol.  See Section 8 for more
   details on using MOBIKE to transition between encapsulation modes.

5.1.  Recommended Fallback from UDP

   Since UDP is the preferred method of transport for IKE messages,
   implementations that use TCP encapsulation should have an algorithm
   for deciding when to use TCP after determining that UDP is unusable.
   If an initiator implementation has no prior knowledge about the
   network it is on and the status of UDP on that network, it SHOULD
   always attempt negotiate IKE over UDP first.  IKEv2 defines how to
   use retransmission timers with IKE messages, and IKE_SA_INIT messages
   specifically [RFC7296].  Generally, this means that the
   implementation will define a frequency of retransmission, and the
   maximum number of retransmissions allowed before marking the IKE SA



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   as failed.  An implementation can attempt negotiation over TCP once
   it has hit the maximum retransmissions over UDP, or slightly before
   to reduce connection setup delays.  It is recommended that the
   initial message over UDP is retransmitted at least once before
   falling back to TCP, unless the initiator knows beforehand that the
   network is likely to block UDP.

6.  Connection Establishment and Teardown

   When the IKE initiator uses TCP encapsulation for its negotiation, it
   will initiate a TCP connection to the responder using the configured
   TCP port.  The first bytes sent on the stream MUST be the stream
   prefix value [Section 4].  After this prefix, encapsulated IKE
   messages will negotiate the IKE SA and initial Child SA [RFC7296].
   After this point, both encapsulated IKE Figure 1 and ESP Figure 2
   messages will be sent over the TCP connection.  The responder MUST
   wait for the entire stream prefix to be received on the stream before
   trying to parse out any IKE or ESP messages.  The stream prefix is
   sent only once, and only by the initiator.

   In order to close an IKE session, either the initiator or responder
   SHOULD gracefully tear down IKE SAs with DELETE payloads.  Once all
   SAs have been deleted, the initiator of the original connection
   SHOULD close the TCP connection if it does not intend to use the
   connection for another IKE session to the responder.  If the
   connection is left idle, and the responder needs to clean up
   resources, the responder MAY close the TCP connection.

   An unexpected FIN or a RST on the TCP connection may indicate either
   a loss of connectivity, an attack, or some other error.  If a DELETE
   payload has not been sent, both sides SHOULD maintain the state for
   their SAs for the standard lifetime or time-out period.  The original
   initiator (that is, the endpoint that initiated the TCP connection
   and sent the first IKE_SA_INIT message) is responsible for re-
   establishing the TCP connection if it is torn down for any unexpected
   reason.  Since new TCP connections may use different ports due to NAT
   mappings or local port allocations changing, the responder MUST allow
   packets for existing SAs to be received from new source ports.

   A peer MUST discard a partially received message due to a broken
   connection.

   Whenever the initiator opens a new TCP connection to be used for an
   existing IKE SA, it MUST send the stream prefix first, before any IKE
   or ESP messages.  This follows the same behavior as the initial TCP
   connection.





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   If the connection is being used to resume a previous IKE session, the
   responder can recognize the session using either the IKE SPI from an
   encapsulated IKE message or the ESP SPI from an encapsulated ESP
   message.  If the session had been fully established previously, it is
   suggested that the initiator send an UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES message if
   MOBIKE is supported, or an INFORMATIONAL message (a keepalive)
   otherwise.  If either initiator or responder receives a stream that
   cannot be parsed correctly (initiator stream missing the stream
   prefix, or message frames not parsable as IKE or ESP messages), it
   MUST close the TCP connection.  If there is instead a syntax issue
   within an IKE message, an implementation MUST send the INVALID_SYNTAX
   notify payload and tear down the IKE session as ususal, rather than
   tearing down the TCP connection directly.

   An initiator SHOULD only open one TCP connection per IKE SA, over
   which it sends all of the corresponding IKE and ESP messages.  This
   helps ensure that any firewall or NAT mappings allocated for the TCP
   connection apply to all of the traffic associated with the IKE SA
   equally.

   A responder SHOULD at any given time send packets for an IKE SA and
   its Child SAs over only one TCP connection.  It SHOULD choose the TCP
   connection on which it last received a valid and decryptable IKE or
   ESP message.  In order to be considered valid for choosing a TCP
   connection, an IKE message successfully decrypt and be authenticated,
   not be a retransmission of a previously received message, and be
   within the expected window for IKE message IDs.  Similarly, an ESP
   message must pass authentication checks and be decrypted, not be a
   replay of a previous message.

   Since a connection may be broken and a new connection re-established
   by the initiator without the responder being aware, a responder
   SHOULD accept receiving IKE and ESP messages on both old and new
   connections until the old connection is closed by the initiator.  A
   responder MAY close a TCP connection that it perceives as idle and
   extraneous (one previously used for IKE and ESP messages that has
   been replaced by a new connection).

   Multiple IKE SAs MUST NOT share a single TCP connection.

7.  Interaction with NAT Detection Payloads

   When negotiating over UDP port 500, IKE_SA_INIT packets include
   NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP and NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP payloads to
   determine if UDP encapsulation of IPsec packets should be used.
   These payloads contain SHA-1 digests of the SPIs, IP addresses, and
   ports.  IKE_SA_INIT packets sent on a TCP connection SHOULD include




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   these payloads, and SHOULD use the applicable TCP ports when creating
   and checking the SHA-1 digests.

   If a NAT is detected due to the SHA-1 digests not matching the
   expected values, no change should be made for encapsulation of
   subsequent IKE or ESP packets, since TCP encapsulation inherently
   supports NAT traversal.  Implementations MAY use the information that
   a NAT is present to influence keep-alive timer values.

   If a NAT is detected, implementations need to handle transport mode
   TCP and UDP packet checksum fixup as defined for UDP encapsulation
   [RFC3948].

8.  Using MOBIKE with TCP encapsulation

   When an IKE session that has negotiated MOBIKE [RFC4555] is
   transitioning between networks, the initiator of the transition may
   switch between using TCP encapsulation, UDP encapsulation, or no
   encapsulation.  Implementations that implement both MOBIKE and TCP
   encapsulation MUST support dynamically enabling and disabling TCP
   encapsulation as interfaces change.

   When a MOBIKE-enabled initiator changes networks, the
   UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES notification SHOULD be sent out first over UDP
   before attempting over TCP.  If there is a response to the
   UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES notification sent over UDP, then the ESP packets
   should be sent directly over IP or over UDP port 4500 (depending on
   if a NAT was detected), regardless of if a connection on a previous
   network was using TCP encapsulation.  Similarly, if the responder
   only responds to the UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES notification over TCP, then
   the ESP packets should be sent over the TCP connection, regardless of
   if a connection on a previous network did not use TCP encapsulation.

9.  Using IKE Message Fragmentation with TCP encapsulation

   IKE Message Fragmentation [RFC7383] is not required when using TCP
   encapsulation, since a TCP stream already handles the fragmentation
   of its contents across packets.  Since fragmentation is redundant in
   this case, implementations might choose to not negotiate IKE
   fragmentation.  Even if fragmentation is negotiated, an
   implementation SHOULD NOT send fragments when going over a TCP
   connection, although it MUST support receiving fragements.

   If an implementation supports both MOBIKE and IKE fragmentation, it
   SHOULD negotiate IKE fragmentation over a TCP encapsulated session in
   case the session switches to UDP encapsulation on another network.





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10.  Considerations for Keep-alives and DPD

   Encapsulating IKE and IPsec inside of a TCP connection can impact the
   strategy that implementations use to detect peer liveness and to
   maintain middlebox port mappings.  Peer liveness should be checked
   using IKE Informational packets [RFC7296].

   In general, TCP port mappings are maintained by NATs longers than UDP
   port mappings, so IPsec ESP NAT keep-alives [RFC3948] SHOULD NOT be
   sent when using TCP encapsulation.  Any implementation using TCP
   encapsulation MUST silently drop incoming NAT keep-alive packets, and
   not treat them as errors.  NAT keep-alive packets over a TCP
   encapsulated IPsec connection will be sent with a length value of 1
   byte, whose value is 0xFF [Figure 2].

   Note that depending on the configuration of TCP and TLS on the
   connection, TCP keep-alives [RFC1122] and TLS keep-alives [RFC6520]
   may be used.  These MUST NOT be used as indications of IKE peer
   liveness.

11.  Middlebox Considerations

   Many security networking devices such as Firewalls or Intrusion
   Prevention Systems, network optimization/acceleration devices and
   Network Address Translation (NAT) devices keep the state of sessions
   that traverse through them.

   These devices commonly track the transport layer and/or the
   application layer data to drop traffic that is anomalous or malicious
   in nature.

   A network device that monitors up to the application layer will
   commonly expect to see HTTP traffic within a TCP socket running over
   port 80, if non-HTTP traffic is seen (such as TCP encapsulated IKE),
   this could be dropped by the security device.

   A network device that monitors the transport layer will track the
   state of TCP sessions, such as TCP sequence numbers.  TCP
   encapsulation of IKE should therefore use standard TCP behaviors to
   avoid being dropped by middleboxes.

12.  Performance Considerations

   Several aspects of TCP encapsulation for IKE and IPsec packets may
   negatively impact the performance of connections within the tunnel.
   Implementations should be aware of these and take these into
   consideration when determining when to use TCP encapsulation.




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12.1.  TCP-in-TCP

   If the outer connection between IKE peers is over TCP, inner TCP
   connections may suffer effects from using TCP within TCP.  In
   particular, the inner TCP's round-trip-time estimation will be
   affected by the burstiness of the outer TCP.  This will make loss-
   recovery of the inner TCP traffic less reactive and more prone to
   spurious retransmission timeouts.

12.2.  Added Reliability for Unreliable Protocols

   Since ESP is an unreliable protocol, transmitting ESP packets over a
   TCP connection will change the fundamental behavior of the packets.
   Some application-level protocols that prefer packet loss to delay
   (such as Voice over IP or other real-time protocols) may be
   negatively impacted if their packets are retransmitted by the TCP
   connection due to packet loss.

12.3.  Quality of Service Markings

   Quality of Service (QoS) markings, such as DSCP and Traffic Class,
   should be used with care on TCP connections used for encapsulation.
   Individual packets SHOULD NOT use different markings than the rest of
   the connection, since packets with different priorities may be routed
   differently and cause unnecessary delays in the connection.

12.4.  Maximum Segment Size

   A TCP connection used for IKE encapsulation SHOULD negotiate its
   maximum segment size (MSS) in order to avoid unnecessary
   fragmentation of packets.

13.  Security Considerations

   IKE responders that support TCP encapsulation may become vulnerable
   to new Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks that are specific to TCP, such
   as SYN-flooding attacks.  Responders should be aware of this
   additional attack-surface.

   Responders should be careful to ensure that the stream prefix
   "IKETCP" uniquely identifies streams using the TCP encapsulation
   protocol.  The prefix was chosen to not overlap with the start of any
   known valid protocol over TCP, but implementations should make sure
   to validate this assumption in order to avoid unexpected processing
   of TCP connections.

   Attackers may be able to disrupt the TCP connection by sending
   spurious RST packets.  Due to this, implementations SHOULD make sure



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   that IKE session state persists even if the underlying TCP connection
   is torn down.

   If MOBIKE is being used, all of the security considerations outlined
   for MOBIKE apply [[RFC4555]].

   Similarly to MOBIKE, TCP encapsulation requires a responder to handle
   changing of source address and port due to network or connection
   disruption.  The successful delivery of valid IKE or ESP messages
   over a new TCP connection is used by the responder to determine where
   to send subsequent responses.  If an attacker is able to send packets
   on a new TCP connection that pass the validation checks of the
   responder, it can influence which path future packets take.  For this
   reason, the validation of messages on the responder must include
   decryption, authentication, and replay checks.

14.  IANA Considerations

   This memo includes no request to IANA.

   TCP port 4500 is already allocated to IPsec.  This port MAY be used
   for the protocol described in this document, but implementations MAY
   prefer to use other ports based on local policy.

15.  Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to acknowledge the input and advice of Stuart
   Cheshire, Delziel Fernandes, Yoav Nir, Christoph Paasch, Yaron
   Sheffer, David Schinazi, Graham Bartlett, Byju Pularikkal, March Wu,
   Kingwel Xie, Valery Smyslov, Jun Hu, and Tero Kivinen.  Special
   thanks to Eric Kinnear for his implementation work.

16.  References

16.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC7296]  Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
              Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
              (IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
              2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.






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16.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.nir-ipsecme-ike-tcp]
              Nir, Y., "A TCP transport for the Internet Key Exchange",
              draft-nir-ipsecme-ike-tcp-01 (work in progress), July
              2012.

   [RFC1122]  Braden, R., Ed., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
              Communication Layers", STD 3, RFC 1122,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC1122, October 1989,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1122>.

   [RFC2817]  Khare, R. and S. Lawrence, "Upgrading to TLS Within
              HTTP/1.1", RFC 2817, DOI 10.17487/RFC2817, May 2000,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2817>.

   [RFC3948]  Huttunen, A., Swander, B., Volpe, V., DiBurro, L., and M.
              Stenberg, "UDP Encapsulation of IPsec ESP Packets",
              RFC 3948, DOI 10.17487/RFC3948, January 2005,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3948>.

   [RFC4303]  Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
              RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4303>.

   [RFC4555]  Eronen, P., "IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol
              (MOBIKE)", RFC 4555, DOI 10.17487/RFC4555, June 2006,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4555>.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.

   [RFC6520]  Seggelmann, R., Tuexen, M., and M. Williams, "Transport
              Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
              (DTLS) Heartbeat Extension", RFC 6520,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6520, February 2012,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6520>.

   [RFC7383]  Smyslov, V., "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
              (IKEv2) Message Fragmentation", RFC 7383,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7383, November 2014,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7383>.







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Appendix A.  Using TCP encapsulation with TLS

   This section provides recommendations on the support of TLS with the
   TCP encapsulation.

   When using TCP encapsulation, implementations may choose to use TLS
   [RFC5246], to be able to traverse middle-boxes, which may block non
   HTTP traffic.

   If a web proxy is applied to the ports for the TCP connection, and
   TLS is being used, the initiator can send an HTTP CONNECT message to
   establish a tunnel through the proxy [RFC2817].

   The use of TLS should be configurable on the peers.  The responder
   may expect to read encapsulated IKE and ESP packets directly from the
   TCP connection, or it may expect to read them from a stream of TLS
   data packets.  The initiator should be pre-configured to use TLS or
   not when communicating with a given port on the responder.

   When new TCP connections are re-established due to a broken
   connection, TLS must be re-negotiated.  TLS Session Resumption is
   recommended to improve efficiency in this case.

   The security of the IKE session is entirely derived from the IKE
   negotiation and key establishment and not from the TLS session (which
   in this context is only used for encapsulation purposes), therefore
   when TLS is used on the TCP connection, both the initiator and
   responder SHOULD allow the NULL cipher to be selected for performance
   reasons.

   Implementations should be aware that the use of TLS introduces
   another layer of overhead requiring more bytes to transmit a given
   IKE and IPsec packet.  For this reason, direct ESP, UDP
   encapsulation, or TCP encapsulation without TLS should be preferred
   in situations in which TLS is not required in order to traverse
   middle-boxes.

Appendix B.  Example exchanges of TCP Encapsulation with TLS

B.1.  Establishing an IKE session

                   Client                              Server
                 ----------                          ----------
     1)  --------------------  TCP Connection  -------------------
         (IP_I:Port_I  -> IP_R:TCP443 or TCP4500)
         TcpSyn                    ---------->
                                   <----------          TcpSyn,Ack
         TcpAck                    ---------->



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     2)  ---------------------  TLS Session  ---------------------
         ClientHello               ---------->
                                                       ServerHello
                                                      Certificate*
                                                ServerKeyExchange*
                                   <----------     ServerHelloDone
         ClientKeyExchange
         CertificateVerify*
         [ChangeCipherSpec]
         Finished                  ---------->
                                                [ChangeCipherSpec]
                                   <----------            Finished

     3)  ---------------------- Stream Prefix --------------------
         "IKETCP"                  ---------->
     4)  ----------------------- IKE Session ---------------------
         Length + Non-ESP Marker   ---------->
         IKE_SA_INIT
         HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni,
         [N(NAT_DETECTION_*_IP)]
                                   <------ Length + Non-ESP Marker
                                                       IKE_SA_INIT
                                               HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr,
                                           [N(NAT_DETECTION_*_IP)]
         Length + Non-ESP Marker   ---------->
         first IKE_AUTH
         HDR, SK {IDi, [CERTREQ]
         CP(CFG_REQUEST), IDr,
         SAi2, TSi, TSr, ...}
                                   <------ Length + Non-ESP Marker
                                                    first IKE_AUTH
                                       HDR, SK {IDr, [CERT], AUTH,
                                              EAP, SAr2, TSi, TSr}
         Length + Non-ESP Marker   ---------->
         IKE_AUTH + EAP
         repeat 1..N times
                                   <------ Length + Non-ESP Marker
                                                    IKE_AUTH + EAP
         Length + Non-ESP Marker   ---------->
         final IKE_AUTH
         HDR, SK {AUTH}
                                   <------ Length + Non-ESP Marker
                                                    final IKE_AUTH
                                     HDR, SK {AUTH, CP(CFG_REPLY),
                                                SA, TSi, TSr, ...}
         ----------------- IKE Tunnel Established ----------------
         Length + ESP frame        ---------->




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                                 Figure 4

   1.    Client establishes a TCP connection with the server on port 443
         or 4500.

   2.    Client initiates TLS handshake.  During TLS handshake, the
         server SHOULD NOT request the client's' certificate, since
         authentication is handled as part of IKE negotiation.

   3.    Client send the Stream Prefix for TCP encapsulated IKE
         [Section 4] traffic to signal the beginning of IKE negotation.

   4.    Client and server establish an IKE connection.  This example
         shows EAP-based authentication, although any authentication
         type may be used.

B.2.  Deleting an IKE session

                   Client                              Server
                 ----------                          ----------
     1)  ----------------------- IKE Session ---------------------
         Length + Non-ESP Marker   ---------->
         INFORMATIONAL
         HDR, SK {[N,] [D,]
                [CP,] ...}
                                   <------ Length + Non-ESP Marker
                                                     INFORMATIONAL
                                                HDR, SK {[N,] [D,]
                                                        [CP], ...}

     2)  ---------------------  TLS Session  ---------------------
         close_notify              ---------->
                                   <----------        close_notify
     3)  --------------------  TCP Connection  -------------------
         TcpFin                    ---------->
                                   <----------                 Ack
                                   <----------              TcpFin
         Ack                       ---------->
         --------------------- Tunnel Deleted  -------------------

                                 Figure 5

   1.    Client and server exchange INFORMATIONAL messages to notify IKE
         SA deletion.

   2.    Client and server negotiate TLS session deletion using TLS
         CLOSE_NOTIFY.




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   3.    The TCP connection is torn down.

   The deletion of the IKE SA should lead to the disposal of the
   underlying TLS and TCP state.

B.3.  Re-establishing an IKE session


                   Client                              Server
                 ----------                          ----------
     1)  --------------------  TCP Connection  -------------------
         (IP_I:Port_I  -> IP_R:TCP443 or TCP4500)
         TcpSyn                    ---------->
                                   <----------          TcpSyn,Ack
         TcpAck                    ---------->
     2)  ---------------------  TLS Session  ---------------------
         ClientHello               ---------->
                                   <----------         ServerHello
                                                [ChangeCipherSpec]
                                                          Finished
         [ChangeCipherSpec]        ---------->
         Finished
     3)  ---------------------- Stream Prefix --------------------
         "IKETCP"                  ---------->
     4)  <---------------------> IKE/ESP flow <------------------>
         Length + ESP frame        ---------->


                                 Figure 6

   1.    If a previous TCP connection was broken (for example, due to a
         RST), the client is responsible for re-initiating the TCP
         connection.  The initiator's address and port (IP_I and Port_I)
         may be different from the previous connection's address and
         port.

   2.    In ClientHello TLS message, the client SHOULD send the Session
         ID it received in the previous TLS handshake if available.  It
         is up to the server to perform either an abbreviated handshake
         or full handshake based on the session ID match.

   3.    After TCP and TLS are complete, the client sends the Stream
         Prefix for TCP encapsulated IKE traffic [Section 4].

   4.    The IKE and ESP packet flow can resume.  If MOBIKE is being
         used, the initiator SHOULD send UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES.





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B.4.  Using MOBIKE between UDP and TCP Encapsulation


                     Client                              Server
                   ----------                          ----------
         (IP_I1:UDP500 -> IP_R:UDP500)
     1)  ----------------- IKE_SA_INIT Exchange -----------------
         (IP_I1:UDP4500 -> IP_R:UDP4500)
         Non-ESP Marker           ----------->
         Intial IKE_AUTH
         HDR, SK { IDi, CERT, AUTH,
         CP(CFG_REQUEST),
         SAi2, TSi, TSr,
         N(MOBIKE_SUPPORTED) }
                                  <-----------      Non-ESP Marker
                                                  Initial IKE_AUTH
                                        HDR, SK { IDr, CERT, AUTH,
                                              EAP, SAr2, TSi, TSr,
                                             N(MOBIKE_SUPPORTED) }
         <---------------- IKE tunnel establishment ------------->

     2)  ------------ MOBIKE Attempt on new network --------------
         (IP_I2:UDP4500 -> IP_R:UDP4500)
         Non-ESP Marker           ----------->
         INFORMATIONAL
         HDR, SK { N(UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES),
         N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
         N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP) }


     3)  --------------------  TCP Connection  -------------------
         (IP_I2:PORT_I -> IP_R:TCP443 or TCP4500)
         TcpSyn                   ----------->
                                  <-----------          TcpSyn,Ack
         TcpAck                   ----------->

     4)  ---------------------  TLS Session  ---------------------
         ClientHello              ----------->
                                                       ServerHello
                                                      Certificate*
                                                ServerKeyExchange*
                                  <-----------     ServerHelloDone
         ClientKeyExchange
         CertificateVerify*
         [ChangeCipherSpec]
         Finished                 ----------->
                                                [ChangeCipherSpec]
                                  <-----------            Finished



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     5)  ---------------------- Stream Prefix --------------------
         "IKETCP"                  ---------->

     6)  ----------------------- IKE Session ---------------------
         Length + Non-ESP Marker  ----------->
         INFORMATIONAL (Same as step 2)
         HDR, SK { N(UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES),
         N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
         N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP) }

                                  <------- Length + Non-ESP Marker
                             HDR, SK { N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
                                 N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP) }
     7)  <----------------- IKE/ESP data flow ------------------->


                                 Figure 7

   1.    During the IKE_SA_INIT exchange, the client and server exchange
         MOBIKE_SUPPORTED notify payloads to indicate support for
         MOBIKE.

   2.    The client changes its point of attachment to the network, and
         receives a new IP address.  The client attempts to re-establish
         the IKE session using the UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES notify payload,
         but the server does not respond because the network blocks UDP
         traffic.

   3.    The client brings up a TCP connection to the server in order to
         use TCP encapsulation.

   4.    The client initiates and TLS handshake with the server.

   5.    The client sends the Stream Prefix for TCP encapsulated IKE
         traffic [Section 4].

   6.    The client sends the UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES notify payload on the
         TCP encapsulated connection.  Note that this IKE message is the
         same as the one sent over UDP in step 2, and should have the
         same message ID and contents.

   7.    The IKE and ESP packet flow can resume.

Authors' Addresses







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   Tommy Pauly
   Apple Inc.
   1 Infinite Loop
   Cupertino, California  95014
   US

   Email: tpauly@apple.com


   Samy Touati
   Ericsson
   300 Holger Way
   San Jose, California  95134
   US

   Email: samy.touati@ericsson.com


   Ravi Mantha
   Cisco Systems
   SEZ, Embassy Tech Village
   Panathur, Bangalore  560 037
   India

   Email: ramantha@cisco.com


























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