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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 RFC 7520

JOSE Working Group                                             M. Miller
Internet-Draft                                       Cisco Systems, Inc.
Intended status: Informational                            April 21, 2014
Expires: October 23, 2014


   Examples of Protecting Content using JavaScript Object Signing and
                           Encryption (JOSE)
                      draft-ietf-jose-cookbook-02

Abstract

   A set of examples of using JavaScript Object Signing and Encryption
   (JOSE) to protect data.  This document illustrates a representative
   sampling of various JSON Web Signature (JWS) and JSON Web Encryption
   (JWE) results given similar inputs.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 23, 2014.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.



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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.1.  Conventions Used in this Document . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  JSON Web Signature Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.  RSA v1.5 Signature  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.1.1.  Input Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.1.2.  Signing Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       3.1.3.  Output Results  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.2.  RSA-PSS Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.2.1.  Input Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       3.2.2.  Signing Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       3.2.3.  Output Results  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.3.  ECDSA Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       3.3.1.  Input Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       3.3.2.  Signing Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       3.3.3.  Output Results  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     3.4.  HMAC-SHA2 Integrity Protection  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       3.4.1.  Input Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       3.4.2.  Signing Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       3.4.3.  Output Results  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     3.5.  Detached Signature  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       3.5.1.  Input Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       3.5.2.  Signing Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       3.5.3.  Output Results  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     3.6.  Protecting Specific Header Fields . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
       3.6.1.  Input Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
       3.6.2.  Signing Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
       3.6.3.  Output Results  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     3.7.  Protecting Content Only . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       3.7.1.  Input Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       3.7.2.  Signing Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       3.7.3.  Output Results  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     3.8.  Multiple Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       3.8.1.  Input Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       3.8.2.  First Signing Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       3.8.3.  Second Signing Operation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
       3.8.4.  Third Signing Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
       3.8.5.  Output Results  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
   4.  JSON Web Encryption Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     4.1.  Key Encryption using RSA v1.5 and AES-HMAC-SHA2 . . . . .  27
       4.1.1.  Input Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
       4.1.2.  Generated Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
       4.1.3.  Encrypting the Key  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
       4.1.4.  Encrypting the Content  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
       4.1.5.  Output Results  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
     4.2.  Key Encryption using RSA-OAEP with A256GCM  . . . . . . .  32



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       4.2.1.  Input Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
       4.2.2.  Generated Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
       4.2.3.  Encrypting the Key  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
       4.2.4.  Encrypting the Content  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
       4.2.5.  Output Results  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
     4.3.  Key Wrap using PBES2-AES-KeyWrap with AES-CBC-HMAC-SHA2 .  38
       4.3.1.  Input Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
       4.3.2.  Generated Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
       4.3.3.  Encrypting the Key  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
       4.3.4.  Encrypting the Content  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
       4.3.5.  Output Results  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
     4.4.  Key Agreement with Key Wrapping using ECDH-ES and AES-
           KeyWrap with AES-GCM  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
       4.4.1.  Input Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
       4.4.2.  Generated Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
       4.4.3.  Encrypting the Key  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
       4.4.4.  Encrypting the Content  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
       4.4.5.  Output Results  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46
     4.5.  Key Agreement using ECDH-ES with AES-CBC-HMAC-SHA2  . . .  48
       4.5.1.  Input Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
       4.5.2.  Generated Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
       4.5.3.  Key Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
       4.5.4.  Encrypting the Content  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
       4.5.5.  Output Results  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
     4.6.  Direct Encryption using AES-GCM . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53
       4.6.1.  Input Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53
       4.6.2.  Generated Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53
       4.6.3.  Encrypting the Content  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53
       4.6.4.  Output Results  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
     4.7.  Key Wrap using AES-GCM KeyWrap with AES-CBC-HMAC-SHA2 . .  55
       4.7.1.  Input Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  56
       4.7.2.  Generated Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  56
       4.7.3.  Encrypting the Key  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  56
       4.7.4.  Encrypting the Content  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57
       4.7.5.  Output Results  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58
     4.8.  Key Wrap using AES-KeyWrap with AES-GCM . . . . . . . . .  60
       4.8.1.  Input Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
       4.8.2.  Generated Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
       4.8.3.  Encrypting the Key  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
       4.8.4.  Encrypting the Content  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
       4.8.5.  Output Results  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
     4.9.  Compressed Content  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  64
       4.9.1.  Input Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  64
       4.9.2.  Generated Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  64
       4.9.3.  Encrypting the Key  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  65
       4.9.4.  Encrypting the Content  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  65
       4.9.5.  Output Results  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  66
     4.10. Including Additional Authenticated Data . . . . . . . . .  68



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       4.10.1.  Input Factors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  68
       4.10.2.  Generated Factors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  68
       4.10.3.  Encrypting the Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69
       4.10.4.  Encrypting the Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69
       4.10.5.  Output Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  70
     4.11. Protecting Specific Header Fields . . . . . . . . . . . .  71
       4.11.1.  Input Factors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  71
       4.11.2.  Generated Factors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  72
       4.11.3.  Encrypting the Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  72
       4.11.4.  Encrypting the Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  72
       4.11.5.  Output Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  73
     4.12. Protecting Content Only . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  74
       4.12.1.  Input Factors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  74
       4.12.2.  Generated Factors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  75
       4.12.3.  Encrypting the Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  75
       4.12.4.  Encrypting the Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  75
       4.12.5.  Output Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  76
     4.13. Encrypting to Multiple Recipients . . . . . . . . . . . .  77
       4.13.1.  Input Factors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  77
       4.13.2.  Generated Factors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  78
       4.13.3.  Encrypting the Key to the First Recipient  . . . . .  78
       4.13.4.  Encrypting the Key to the Second Recipient . . . . .  79
       4.13.5.  Encrypting the Key to the Third Recipient  . . . . .  81
       4.13.6.  Encrypting the Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  82
       4.13.7.  Output Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  84
   5.  Nesting Signatures and Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  85
     5.1.  Signing Input Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  85
     5.2.  Signing Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  87
     5.3.  Signing Output  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  88
     5.4.  Encryption Input Factors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  89
     5.5.  Encryption Generated Factors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  89
     5.6.  Encrypting the Key  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  89
     5.7.  Encrypting the Content  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  90
     5.8.  Encryption Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  91
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  93
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  94
   8.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  94
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  94
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  95

1.  Introduction

   The JavaScript Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) technologies -
   JSON Web Key (JWK) [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-key], JSON Web Signature
   (JWS) [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-signature], JSON Web Encryption (JWE)
   [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-encryption], and JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)
   [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms] - collectively can be used to




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   protect content in a myriad of ways.  The full set of permutations is
   extremely large, and might be daunting to some.

   This document provides a number of examples of signing or encrypting
   content using JOSE.  While not exhaustive, it does compile together a
   representative sample of JOSE features.  As much as possible, the
   same signature payload or encryption plaintext content is used to
   illustrate differences in various signing and encryption results.

1.1.  Conventions Used in this Document

   All instances of binary octet strings are represented using [RFC4648]
   base64url encoding.

   Wherever possible, the examples include both the Compact and JSON
   serializations.

   All of the examples in this document have whitespace added to improve
   formatting and readability.  Except for plaintext or payload content,
   whitespace is not part of the cryptographic operations.  Plaintext or
   payload content does include whitespace (unless otherwise noted),
   with line breaks (U+000A LINE FEED) added to improve readability.

2.  Terminology

   This document inherits terminology regarding JSON Web Key (JWK)
   technology from [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-key], terminology regarding
   JSON Web Signature (JWS) technology from
   [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-signature], terminology regarding JSON Web
   Encryption (JWE) technology from [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-encryption],
   and terminology regarding algorithms from
   [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms].

3.  JSON Web Signature Examples

   The following sections demonstrate how to generate various JWS
   objects.

   All of the succeeding examples use the following payload plaintext,
   serialized as UTF-8; the sequence "\xe2\x80\x99" substituted for
   (U+2019 RIGHT SINGLE QUOTATION MARK) and line breaks (U+000A LINE
   FEED) replacing some " " (U+0020 SPACE) to improve readability:









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   It\xe2\x80\x99s a dangerous business, Frodo, going out your
   door. You step onto the road, and if you don't keep your feet,
   there\xe2\x80\x99s no knowing where you might be swept off
   to.

                    Figure 1: Payload content plaintext

   The Payload - with the sequence "\xe2\x80\x99" replaced with (U+2019
   RIGHT SINGLE QUOTATION MARK) and line breaks (U+000A LINE FEED)
   replaced with " " (U+0020 SPACE) - encoded as UTF-8 then as [RFC4648]
   base64url:

   SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywgZ29pbmcgb3V0IH
   lvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9hZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBk
   b24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXigJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcm
   UgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9mZiB0by4

               Figure 2: Payload content, base64url-encoded

3.1.  RSA v1.5 Signature

   This example illustrates signing content using the "RS256" (RSASSA-
   PKCS1-v1_5 with SHA-256) algorithm.

3.1.1.  Input Factors

   The following are supplied before beginning the signing operation:

   o  Payload content; this example uses the content from Figure 1,
      encoded using [RFC4648] base64url to produce Figure 2.

   o  RSA private key; this example uses the key from Figure 3.

   o  "alg" parameter of "RS256".

















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   {
     "kty": "RSA",
     "kid": "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example",
     "use": "sig",
     "n": "n4EPtAOCc9AlkeQHPzHStgAbgs7bTZLwUBZdR8_KuKPEHLd4rHVTeT
         -O-XV2jRojdNhxJWTDvNd7nqQ0VEiZQHz_AJmSCpMaJMRBSFKrKb2wqV
         wGU_NsYOYL-QtiWN2lbzcEe6XC0dApr5ydQLrHqkHHig3RBordaZ6Aj-
         oBHqFEHYpPe7Tpe-OfVfHd1E6cS6M1FZcD1NNLYD5lFHpPI9bTwJlsde
         3uhGqC0ZCuEHg8lhzwOHrtIQbS0FVbb9k3-tVTU4fg_3L_vniUFAKwuC
         LqKnS2BYwdq_mzSnbLY7h_qixoR7jig3__kRhuaxwUkRz5iaiQkqgc5g
         HdrNP5zw",
     "e": "AQAB",
     "d": "bWUC9B-EFRIo8kpGfh0ZuyGPvMNKvYWNtB_ikiH9k20eT-O1q_I78e
         iZkpXxXQ0UTEs2LsNRS-8uJbvQ-A1irkwMSMkK1J3XTGgdrhCku9gRld
         Y7sNA_AKZGh-Q661_42rINLRCe8W-nZ34ui_qOfkLnK9QWDDqpaIsA-b
         MwWWSDFu2MUBYwkHTMEzLYGqOe04noqeq1hExBTHBOBdkMXiuFhUq1BU
         6l-DqEiWxqg82sXt2h-LMnT3046AOYJoRioz75tSUQfGCshWTBnP5uDj
         d18kKhyv07lhfSJdrPdM5Plyl21hsFf4L_mHCuoFau7gdsPfHPxxjVOc
         OpBrQzwQ",
     "p": "3Slxg_DwTXJcb6095RoXygQCAZ5RnAvZlno1yhHtnUex_fp7AZ_9nR
         aO7HX_-SFfGQeutao2TDjDAWU4Vupk8rw9JR0AzZ0N2fvuIAmr_WCsmG
         peNqQnev1T7IyEsnh8UMt-n5CafhkikzhEsrmndH6LxOrvRJlsPp6Zv8
         bUq0k",
     "q": "uKE2dh-cTf6ERF4k4e_jy78GfPYUIaUyoSSJuBzp3Cubk3OCqs6grT
         8bR_cu0Dm1MZwWmtdqDyI95HrUeq3MP15vMMON8lHTeZu2lmKvwqW7an
         V5UzhM1iZ7z4yMkuUwFWoBvyY898EXvRD-hdqRxHlSqAZ192zB3pVFJ0
         s7pFc",
     "dp": "B8PVvXkvJrj2L-GYQ7v3y9r6Kw5g9SahXBwsWUzp19TVlgI-YV85q
         1NIb1rxQtD-IsXXR3-TanevuRPRt5OBOdiMGQp8pbt26gljYfKU_E9xn
         -RULHz0-ed9E9gXLKD4VGngpz-PfQ_q29pk5xWHoJp009Qf1HvChixRX
         59ehik",
     "dq": "CLDmDGduhylc9o7r84rEUVn7pzQ6PF83Y-iBZx5NT-TpnOZKF1pEr
         AMVeKzFEl41DlHHqqBLSM0W1sOFbwTxYWZDm6sI6og5iTbwQGIC3gnJK
         bi_7k_vJgGHwHxgPaX2PnvP-zyEkDERuf-ry4c_Z11Cq9AqC2yeL6kdK
         T1cYF8",
     "qi": "3PiqvXQN0zwMeE-sBvZgi289XP9XCQF3VWqPzMKnIgQp7_Tugo6-N
         ZBKCQsMf3HaEGBjTVJs_jcK8-TRXvaKe-7ZMaQj8VfBdYkssbu0NKDDh
         jJ-GtiseaDVWt7dcH0cfwxgFUHpQh7FoCrjFJ6h6ZEpMF6xmujs4qMpP
         z8aaI4"
   }

             Figure 3: RSA 2048-bit Private Key, in JWK format

3.1.2.  Signing Operation

   The following are generated to complete the signing operation:





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   o  Protected JWS Header; this example uses the header from Figure 4,
      encoded using [RFC4648] base64url to produce Figure 5.

   {
     "alg": "RS256",
     "kid": "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example"
   }

                    Figure 4: Protected JWS Header JSON

   eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImJpbGJvLmJhZ2dpbnNAaG9iYml0b24uZX
   hhbXBsZSJ9

             Figure 5: Protected JWS Header, base64url-encoded

   Performing the signature operation over the combined protected JWS
   header (Figure 5) and Payload content (Figure 2) produces the
   following signature:

   MRjdkly7_-oTPTS3AXP41iQIGKa80A0ZmTuV5MEaHoxnW2e5CZ5NlKtainoFmK
   ZopdHM1O2U4mwzJdQx996ivp83xuglII7PNDi84wnB-BDkoBwA78185hX-Es4J
   IwmDLJK3lfWRa-XtL0RnltuYv746iYTh_qHRD68BNt1uSNCrUCTJDt5aAE6x8w
   W1Kt9eRo4QPocSadnHXFxnt8Is9UzpERV0ePPQdLuW3IS_de3xyIrDaLGdjluP
   xUAhb6L2aXic1U12podGU0KLUQSE_oI-ZnmKJ3F4uOZDnd6QZWJushZ41Axf_f
   cIe8u9ipH84ogoree7vjbU5y18kDquDg

                  Figure 6: Signature, base64url-encoded

3.1.3.  Output Results

   The following compose the resulting JWS object:

   o  Protected JWS header (Figure 4)

   o  Payload content (Figure 2)

   o  Signature (Figure 6)

   The resulting JWS object using the Compact serialization:












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   eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImJpbGJvLmJhZ2dpbnNAaG9iYml0b24uZX
   hhbXBsZSJ9
   .
   SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywgZ29pbmcgb3V0IH
   lvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9hZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBk
   b24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXigJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcm
   UgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9mZiB0by4
   .
   MRjdkly7_-oTPTS3AXP41iQIGKa80A0ZmTuV5MEaHoxnW2e5CZ5NlKtainoFmK
   ZopdHM1O2U4mwzJdQx996ivp83xuglII7PNDi84wnB-BDkoBwA78185hX-Es4J
   IwmDLJK3lfWRa-XtL0RnltuYv746iYTh_qHRD68BNt1uSNCrUCTJDt5aAE6x8w
   W1Kt9eRo4QPocSadnHXFxnt8Is9UzpERV0ePPQdLuW3IS_de3xyIrDaLGdjluP
   xUAhb6L2aXic1U12podGU0KLUQSE_oI-ZnmKJ3F4uOZDnd6QZWJushZ41Axf_f
   cIe8u9ipH84ogoree7vjbU5y18kDquDg

                      Figure 7: Compact Serialization

   The resulting JWS object using the JSON serialization:

   {
     "payload": "SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywg
         Z29pbmcgb3V0IHlvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9h
         ZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBkb24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXi
         gJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcmUgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9m
         ZiB0by4",
     "signatures": [
       {
         "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImJpbGJvLmJhZ2
             dpbnNAaG9iYml0b24uZXhhbXBsZSJ9",
         "signature": "MRjdkly7_-oTPTS3AXP41iQIGKa80A0ZmTuV5MEaHo
             xnW2e5CZ5NlKtainoFmKZopdHM1O2U4mwzJdQx996ivp83xuglII
             7PNDi84wnB-BDkoBwA78185hX-Es4JIwmDLJK3lfWRa-XtL0Rnlt
             uYv746iYTh_qHRD68BNt1uSNCrUCTJDt5aAE6x8wW1Kt9eRo4QPo
             cSadnHXFxnt8Is9UzpERV0ePPQdLuW3IS_de3xyIrDaLGdjluPxU
             Ahb6L2aXic1U12podGU0KLUQSE_oI-ZnmKJ3F4uOZDnd6QZWJush
             Z41Axf_fcIe8u9ipH84ogoree7vjbU5y18kDquDg"
       }
     ]
   }

                       Figure 8: JSON Serialization

3.2.  RSA-PSS Signature

   This example illustrates signing content using the "PS256" (RSASSA-
   PSS with SHA-256) algorithm.





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3.2.1.  Input Factors

   The following are supplied before beginning the signing operation:

   o  Payload content; this example uses the content from Figure 1,
      encoded using [RFC4648] base64url to produce Figure 2.

   o  RSA private key; this example uses the key from Figure 3.

   o  "alg" parameter of "PS384".

3.2.2.  Signing Operation

   The following are generated to complete the signing operation:

   o  Protected JWS Header; this example uses the header from Figure 9,
      encoded using [RFC4648] base64url to produce Figure 10.

   {
     "alg": "PS384",
     "kid": "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example"
   }

                    Figure 9: Protected JWS Header JSON

   eyJhbGciOiJQUzM4NCIsImtpZCI6ImJpbGJvLmJhZ2dpbnNAaG9iYml0b24uZX
   hhbXBsZSJ9

            Figure 10: Protected JWS Header, base64url-encoded

   Performing the signature operation over the combined protected JWS
   header (Figure 10) and Payload content (Figure 2) produces the
   following signature:

   cu22eBqkYDKgIlTpzDXGvaFfz6WGoz7fUDcfT0kkOy42miAh2qyBzk1xEsnk2I
   pN6-tPid6VrklHkqsGqDqHCdP6O8TTB5dDDItllVo6_1OLPpcbUrhiUSMxbbXU
   vdvWXzg-UD8biiReQFlfz28zGWVsdiNAUf8ZnyPEgVFn442ZdNqiVJRmBqrYRX
   e8P_ijQ7p8Vdz0TTrxUeT3lm8d9shnr2lfJT8ImUjvAA2Xez2Mlp8cBE5awDzT
   0qI0n6uiP1aCN_2_jLAeQTlqRHtfa64QQSUmFAAjVKPbByi7xho0uTOcbH510a
   6GYmJUAfmWjwZ6oD4ifKo8DYM-X72Eaw

                  Figure 11: Signature, base64url-encoded

3.2.3.  Output Results

   The following compose the resulting JWS object:

   o  Protected JWS header (Figure 10)



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   o  Payload content (Figure 2)

   o  Signature (Figure 11)

   The resulting JWS object using the Compact serialization:

   eyJhbGciOiJQUzM4NCIsImtpZCI6ImJpbGJvLmJhZ2dpbnNAaG9iYml0b24uZX
   hhbXBsZSJ9
   .
   SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywgZ29pbmcgb3V0IH
   lvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9hZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBk
   b24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXigJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcm
   UgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9mZiB0by4
   .
   cu22eBqkYDKgIlTpzDXGvaFfz6WGoz7fUDcfT0kkOy42miAh2qyBzk1xEsnk2I
   pN6-tPid6VrklHkqsGqDqHCdP6O8TTB5dDDItllVo6_1OLPpcbUrhiUSMxbbXU
   vdvWXzg-UD8biiReQFlfz28zGWVsdiNAUf8ZnyPEgVFn442ZdNqiVJRmBqrYRX
   e8P_ijQ7p8Vdz0TTrxUeT3lm8d9shnr2lfJT8ImUjvAA2Xez2Mlp8cBE5awDzT
   0qI0n6uiP1aCN_2_jLAeQTlqRHtfa64QQSUmFAAjVKPbByi7xho0uTOcbH510a
   6GYmJUAfmWjwZ6oD4ifKo8DYM-X72Eaw

                     Figure 12: Compact Serialization

   The resulting JWS object using the JSON serialization:

   {
     "payload": "SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywg
         Z29pbmcgb3V0IHlvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9h
         ZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBkb24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXi
         gJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcmUgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9m
         ZiB0by4",
     "signatures": [
       {
         "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJQUzM4NCIsImtpZCI6ImJpbGJvLmJhZ2
             dpbnNAaG9iYml0b24uZXhhbXBsZSJ9",
         "signature": "cu22eBqkYDKgIlTpzDXGvaFfz6WGoz7fUDcfT0kkOy
             42miAh2qyBzk1xEsnk2IpN6-tPid6VrklHkqsGqDqHCdP6O8TTB5
             dDDItllVo6_1OLPpcbUrhiUSMxbbXUvdvWXzg-UD8biiReQFlfz2
             8zGWVsdiNAUf8ZnyPEgVFn442ZdNqiVJRmBqrYRXe8P_ijQ7p8Vd
             z0TTrxUeT3lm8d9shnr2lfJT8ImUjvAA2Xez2Mlp8cBE5awDzT0q
             I0n6uiP1aCN_2_jLAeQTlqRHtfa64QQSUmFAAjVKPbByi7xho0uT
             OcbH510a6GYmJUAfmWjwZ6oD4ifKo8DYM-X72Eaw"
       }
     ]
   }

                       Figure 13: JSON Serialization




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3.3.  ECDSA Signature

   This example illustrates signing content using the "ES512" (ECDSA
   with curve P-521 and SHA-512) algorithm.

3.3.1.  Input Factors

   The following are supplied before beginning the signing operation:

   o  Payload content; this example uses the content from Figure 1,
      encoded using [RFC4648] base64url to produce Figure 2.

   o  EC private key on the curve P-521; this example uses the key from
      Figure 14.

   o  "alg" parameter of "ES512"

   {
     "kty": "EC",
     "kid": "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example",
     "use": "sig",
     "crv": "P-521",
     "x": "AHKZLLOsCOzz5cY97ewNUajB957y-C-U88c3v13nmGZx6sYl_oJXu9
         A5RkTKqjqvjyekWF-7ytDyRXYgCF5cj0Kt",
     "y": "AdymlHvOiLxXkEhayXQnNCvDX4h9htZaCJN34kfmC6pV5OhQHiraVy
         SsUdaQkAgDPrwQrJmbnX9cwlGfP-HqHZR1",
     "d": "AAhRON2r9cqXX1hg-RoI6R1tX5p2rUAYdmpHZoC1XNM56KtscrX6zb
         KipQrCW9CGZH3T4ubpnoTKLDYJ_fF3_rJt"
   }

                Figure 14: Elliptic Curve P-521 Private Key

3.3.2.  Signing Operation

   The following are generated before beginning the signature process:

   o  Protected JWS Header; this example uses the header from Figure 15,
      encoded using [RFC4648] base64url to produce Figure 16.

   {
     "alg": "ES512",
     "kid": "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example"
   }

                   Figure 15: Protected JWS Header JSON






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   eyJhbGciOiJFUzUxMiIsImtpZCI6ImJpbGJvLmJhZ2dpbnNAaG9iYml0b24uZX
   hhbXBsZSJ9

            Figure 16: Protected JWS Header, base64url-encoded

   Performing the signature operation over the combined protected JWS
   header (Figure 16) and Payload content (Figure 2) produces the
   following signature:

   AE_R_YZCChjn4791jSQCrdPZCNYqHXCTZH0-JZGYNlaAjP2kqaluUIIUnC9qvb
   u9Plon7KRTzoNEuT4Va2cmL1eJAQy3mtPBu_u_sDDyYjnAMDxXPn7XrT0lw-kv
   AD890jl8e2puQens_IEKBpHABlsbEPX6sFY8OcGDqoRuBomu9xQ2

                  Figure 17: Signature, base64url-encoded

3.3.3.  Output Results

   The following compose the resulting JWS object:

   o  Protected JWS header (Figure 16)

   o  Payload content (Figure 2)

   o  Signature (Figure 17)

   The resulting JWS object using the Compact serialization:

   eyJhbGciOiJFUzUxMiIsImtpZCI6ImJpbGJvLmJhZ2dpbnNAaG9iYml0b24uZX
   hhbXBsZSJ9
   .
   SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywgZ29pbmcgb3V0IH
   lvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9hZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBk
   b24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXigJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcm
   UgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9mZiB0by4
   .
   AE_R_YZCChjn4791jSQCrdPZCNYqHXCTZH0-JZGYNlaAjP2kqaluUIIUnC9qvb
   u9Plon7KRTzoNEuT4Va2cmL1eJAQy3mtPBu_u_sDDyYjnAMDxXPn7XrT0lw-kv
   AD890jl8e2puQens_IEKBpHABlsbEPX6sFY8OcGDqoRuBomu9xQ2

                     Figure 18: Compact Serialization

   The resulting JWS object using the JSON serialization:









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   {
     "payload": "SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywg
         Z29pbmcgb3V0IHlvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9h
         ZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBkb24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXi
         gJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcmUgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9m
         ZiB0by4",
     "signatures": [
       {
         "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJFUzUxMiIsImtpZCI6ImJpbGJvLmJhZ2
             dpbnNAaG9iYml0b24uZXhhbXBsZSJ9",
         "signature": "AE_R_YZCChjn4791jSQCrdPZCNYqHXCTZH0-JZGYNl
             aAjP2kqaluUIIUnC9qvbu9Plon7KRTzoNEuT4Va2cmL1eJAQy3mt
             PBu_u_sDDyYjnAMDxXPn7XrT0lw-kvAD890jl8e2puQens_IEKBp
             HABlsbEPX6sFY8OcGDqoRuBomu9xQ2"
       }
     ]
   }

                       Figure 19: JSON Serialization

3.4.  HMAC-SHA2 Integrity Protection

   This example illustrates integrity protecting content using the
   "HS256" (HMAC-SHA-256) algorithm.

3.4.1.  Input Factors

   The following are supplied before beginning the signing operation:

   o  Payload content; this example uses the content from Figure 1,
      encoded using [RFC4648] base64url to produce Figure 2.

   o  HMAC symmetric key; this example uses the key from Figure 20.

   o  "alg" parameter of "HS256".

   {
     "kty": "oct",
     "kid": "018c0ae5-4d9b-471b-bfd6-eef314bc7037",
     "use": "sig",
     "k": "hJtXIZ2uSN5kbQfbtTNWbpdmhkV8FJG-Onbc6mxCcYg"
   }

                   Figure 20: AES 256-bit symmetric key







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3.4.2.  Signing Operation

   The following are generated before completing the signing operation:

   o  Protected JWS Header; this example uses the header from Figure 21,
      encoded using [RFC4648] base64url to produce Figure 22.

   {
     "alg": "HS256",
     "kid": "018c0ae5-4d9b-471b-bfd6-eef314bc7037"
   }

                   Figure 21: Protected JWS Header JSON

   eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjAxOGMwYWU1LTRkOWItNDcxYi1iZmQ2LW
   VlZjMxNGJjNzAzNyJ9

            Figure 22: Protected JWS Header, base64url-encoded

   Performing the signature operation over the combined protected JWS
   header (Figure 22) and Payload content (Figure 2) produces the
   following signature:

   s0h6KThzkfBBBkLspW1h84VsJZFTsPPqMDA7g1Md7p0

                  Figure 23: Signature, base64url-encoded

3.4.3.  Output Results

   The following compose the resulting JWS object:

   o  Protected JWS header (Figure 22)

   o  Payload content (Figure 2)

   o  Signature (Figure 23)

   The resulting JWS object using the Compact serialization:













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   eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjAxOGMwYWU1LTRkOWItNDcxYi1iZmQ2LW
   VlZjMxNGJjNzAzNyJ9
   .
   SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywgZ29pbmcgb3V0IH
   lvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9hZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBk
   b24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXigJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcm
   UgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9mZiB0by4
   .
   s0h6KThzkfBBBkLspW1h84VsJZFTsPPqMDA7g1Md7p0

                     Figure 24: Compact Serialization

   The resulting JWS object using the JSON serialization:

   {
     "payload": "SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywg
         Z29pbmcgb3V0IHlvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9h
         ZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBkb24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXi
         gJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcmUgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9m
         ZiB0by4",
     "signatures": [
       {
         "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjAxOGMwYWU1LT
             RkOWItNDcxYi1iZmQ2LWVlZjMxNGJjNzAzNyJ9",
         "signature": "s0h6KThzkfBBBkLspW1h84VsJZFTsPPqMDA7g1Md7p
             0"
       }
     ]
   }

                       Figure 25: JSON Serialization

3.5.  Detached Signature

   This example illustrates a detached signature.  This example is
   identical others, except the resulting JWS objects do not include the
   Payload content.  Instead, the application is expected to locate it
   elsewhere.  For example, the signature might be in a meta-data
   section, with the payload being the content.

3.5.1.  Input Factors

   The following are supplied before beginning the signing operation:

   o  Payload content; this example uses the content from Figure 1,
      encoded using [RFC4648] base64url to produce Figure 2.





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   o  Signing key; this example uses the AES symmetric key from
      Figure 20.

   o  Signing algorithm; this example uses "HS256".

3.5.2.  Signing Operation

   The following are generated before completing the signing operation:

   o  Protected JWS Header; this example uses the header from Figure 26,
      encoded using [RFC4648] base64url to produce Figure 27.

   The protected JWS header parameters:

   {
     "alg": "HS256",
     "kid": "018c0ae5-4d9b-471b-bfd6-eef314bc7037"
   }

                   Figure 26: Protected JWS Header JSON

   eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjAxOGMwYWU1LTRkOWItNDcxYi1iZmQ2LW
   VlZjMxNGJjNzAzNyJ9

            Figure 27: Protected JWS Header, base64url-encoded

   Performing the signature operation over the combined protected JWS
   header (Figure 27) and Payload content (Figure 2) produces the
   following signature:

   s0h6KThzkfBBBkLspW1h84VsJZFTsPPqMDA7g1Md7p0

                  Figure 28: Signature, base64url-encoded

3.5.3.  Output Results

   The following compose the resulting JWS object:

   o  Protected JWS header (Figure 27)

   o  Signature (Figure 28)

   The resulting JWS object using the Compact serialization:








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   eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjAxOGMwYWU1LTRkOWItNDcxYi1iZmQ2LW
   VlZjMxNGJjNzAzNyJ9
   .
   .
   s0h6KThzkfBBBkLspW1h84VsJZFTsPPqMDA7g1Md7p0

                       Figure 29: JSON Serialization

   The resulting JWS object using the JSON serialization:

   {
     "signatures": [
       {
         "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjAxOGMwYWU1LT
             RkOWItNDcxYi1iZmQ2LWVlZjMxNGJjNzAzNyJ9",
         "signature": "s0h6KThzkfBBBkLspW1h84VsJZFTsPPqMDA7g1Md7p
             0"
       }
     ]
   }

                       Figure 30: JSON Serialization

3.6.  Protecting Specific Header Fields

   This example illustrates a signature where only certain header
   parameters are protected.  Since this example contains both
   unprotected and protected header parameters, only the JSON
   serialization is possible.

3.6.1.  Input Factors

   The following are supplied before beginning the signing operation:

   o  Payload content; this example uses the content from Figure 1,
      encoded using [RFC4648] base64url to produce Figure 2.

   o  Signing key; this example uses the AES symmetric key from
      Figure 20.

   o  Signing algorithm; this example uses "HS256".

3.6.2.  Signing Operation

   The following are generated before completing the signing operation:

   o  Protected JWS Header; this example uses the header from Figure 31,
      encoded using [RFC4648] base64url to produce Figure 32.



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   o  Unprotected JWS Header; this example uses the header from
      Figure 33.

   The protected JWS header parameters:

   {
     "alg": "HS256"
   }

                   Figure 31: Protected JWS Header JSON

   eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9

            Figure 32: Protected JWS Header, base64url-encoded

   {
     "kid": "018c0ae5-4d9b-471b-bfd6-eef314bc7037"
   }

                  Figure 33: Unprotected JWS Header JSON

   Performing the signature operation over the combined protected JWS
   header (Figure 32) and Payload content (Figure 2) produces the
   following signature:

   bWUSVaxorn7bEF1djytBd0kHv70Ly5pvbomzMWSOr20

                  Figure 34: Signature, base64url-encoded

3.6.3.  Output Results

   The following compose the resulting JWS object:

   o  Protected JWS header (Figure 32)

   o  Unprotected JWS header (Figure 33)

   o  Payload content (Figure 2)

   o  Signature (Figure 34)

   The resulting JWS object using the JSON serialization:









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   {
     "payload": "SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywg
         Z29pbmcgb3V0IHlvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9h
         ZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBkb24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXi
         gJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcmUgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9m
         ZiB0by4",
     "signatures": [
       {
         "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9",
         "header": {
           "kid": "018c0ae5-4d9b-471b-bfd6-eef314bc7037"
         },
         "signature": "bWUSVaxorn7bEF1djytBd0kHv70Ly5pvbomzMWSOr2
             0"
       }
     ]
   }

                       Figure 35: JSON Serialization

3.7.  Protecting Content Only

   This example illustrates a signature where none of the header
   parameters are protected.  Since this example contains only
   unprotected header parameters, only the JSON serialization is
   possible.

3.7.1.  Input Factors

   The following are supplied before beginning the signing operation:

   o  Payload content; this example uses the content from Figure 1,
      encoded using [RFC4648] base64url to produce Figure 2.

   o  Signing key; this example uses the AES key from Figure 20.

   o  Signing algorithm; this example uses "HS256"

3.7.2.  Signing Operation

   The following are generated before completing the signing operation:

   o  Unprotected JWS Header; this example uses the header from
      Figure 36.







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   {
     "alg": "HS256",
     "kid": "018c0ae5-4d9b-471b-bfd6-eef314bc7037"
   }

                  Figure 36: Unprotected JWS Header JSON

   Performing the signature operation over the combined empty string (as
   there is no protected JWS header) and Payload content (Figure 2)
   produces the following signature:

   xuLifqLGiblpv9zBpuZczWhNj1gARaLV3UxvxhJxZuk

                  Figure 37: Signature, base64url-encoded

3.7.3.  Output Results

   The following compose the resulting JWS object:

   o  Unprotected JWS header (Figure 36)

   o  Payload content (Figure 2)

   o  Signature (Figure 37)

   The resulting JWS object using the JSON serialization:

   {
     "payload": "SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywg
         Z29pbmcgb3V0IHlvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9h
         ZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBkb24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXi
         gJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcmUgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9m
         ZiB0by4",
     "signatures": [
       {
         "header": {
           "alg": "HS256",
           "kid": "018c0ae5-4d9b-471b-bfd6-eef314bc7037"
         },
         "signature": "xuLifqLGiblpv9zBpuZczWhNj1gARaLV3UxvxhJxZu
             k"
       }
     ]
   }

                            JSON Serialization





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3.8.  Multiple Signatures

   This example illustrates multiple signatures applied to the same
   payload.  Since this example contains more than one signature, only
   the JSON serialization is possible.

3.8.1.  Input Factors

   The following are supplied before beginning the signing operation:

   o  Payload content; this example uses the content from Figure 1,
      encoded using [RFC4648] base64url to produce Figure 2.

   o  Signing keys; this example uses the following:

      *  RSA private key from Figure 3 for the first signature

      *  EC private key from Figure 14 for the second signature

      *  AES symmetric key from Figure 20 for the third signature

   o  Signing algorithms; this example uses the following:

      *  "RS256" for the first signature

      *  "ES512" for the second signature

      *  "HS256" for the third signature

3.8.2.  First Signing Operation

   The following are generated before completing the first signing
   operation:

   o  Protected JWS Header; this example uses the header from Figure 38,
      encoded using [RFC4648] base64url to produce Figure 39.

   o  Unprotected JWS Header; this example uses the header from
      Figure 40.

   {
     "alg": "RS256"
   }

             Figure 38: Signature #1 Protected JWS Header JSON






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   eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9

      Figure 39: Signature #1 Protected JWS Header, base64url-encoded

   {
     "kid": "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example"
   }

                  Figure 40: Signature #1 JWS Header JSON

   Performing the first signature operation over the combined protected
   JWS header (Figure 39) and the Payload content (Figure 2) produces
   the following signature:

   MIsjqtVlOpa71KE-Mss8_Nq2YH4FGhiocsqrgi5NvyG53uoimic1tcMdSg-qpt
   rzZc7CG6Svw2Y13TDIqHzTUrL_lR2ZFcryNFiHkSw129EghGpwkpxaTn_THJTC
   glNbADko1MZBCdwzJxwqZc-1RlpO2HibUYyXSwO97BSe0_evZKdjvvKSgsIqjy
   tKSeAMbhMBdMma622_BG5t4sdbuCHtFjp9iJmkio47AIwqkZV1aIZsv33uPUqB
   BCXbYoQJwt7mxPftHmNlGoOSMxR_3thmXTCm4US-xiNOyhbm8afKK64jU6_TPt
   QHiJeQJxz9G3Tx-083B745_AfYOnlC9w

                Figure 41: Signature #1, base64url-encoded

   The following is the assembled first signature serialized as JSON:

   {
     "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9",
     "header": {
       "kid": "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example"
     },
     "signature": "MIsjqtVlOpa71KE-Mss8_Nq2YH4FGhiocsqrgi5NvyG53u
         oimic1tcMdSg-qptrzZc7CG6Svw2Y13TDIqHzTUrL_lR2ZFcryNFiHkS
         w129EghGpwkpxaTn_THJTCglNbADko1MZBCdwzJxwqZc-1RlpO2HibUY
         yXSwO97BSe0_evZKdjvvKSgsIqjytKSeAMbhMBdMma622_BG5t4sdbuC
         HtFjp9iJmkio47AIwqkZV1aIZsv33uPUqBBCXbYoQJwt7mxPftHmNlGo
         OSMxR_3thmXTCm4US-xiNOyhbm8afKK64jU6_TPtQHiJeQJxz9G3Tx-0
         83B745_AfYOnlC9w"
   }

                       Figure 42: Signature #1 JSON

3.8.3.  Second Signing Operation

   The following are generated before completing the second signing
   operation:

   o  Unprotected JWS Header; this example uses the header from
      Figure 43.



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   {
     "alg": "ES512",
     "kid": "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example"
   }

                  Figure 43: Signature #2 JWS Header JSON

   Performing the second signature operation over the combined empty
   string (as there is no protected JWS header) and Payload content
   (Figure 2) produces the following signature:

   ARcVLnaJJaUWG8fG-8t5BREVAuTY8n8YHjwDO1muhcdCoFZFFjfISu0Cdkn9Yb
   dlmi54ho0x924DUz8sK7ZXkhc7AFM8ObLfTvNCrqcI3Jkl2U5IX3utNhODH6v7
   xgy1Qahsn0fyb4zSAkje8bAWz4vIfj5pCMYxxm4fgV3q7ZYhm5eD

                Figure 44: Signature #2, base64url-encoded

   The following is the assembled second signature serialized as JSON:

   {
     "header": {
       "alg": "ES512",
       "kid": "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example"
     },
     "signature": "ARcVLnaJJaUWG8fG-8t5BREVAuTY8n8YHjwDO1muhcdCoF
         ZFFjfISu0Cdkn9Ybdlmi54ho0x924DUz8sK7ZXkhc7AFM8ObLfTvNCrq
         cI3Jkl2U5IX3utNhODH6v7xgy1Qahsn0fyb4zSAkje8bAWz4vIfj5pCM
         Yxxm4fgV3q7ZYhm5eD"
   }

                       Figure 45: Signature #2 JSON

3.8.4.  Third Signing Operation

   The following are generated before completing the third signing
   operation:

   o  Protected JWS Header; this example uses the header from Figure 46,
      encoded using [RFC4648] base64url to produce Figure 47.

   {
     "alg": "HS256",
     "kid": "018c0ae5-4d9b-471b-bfd6-eef314bc7037"
   }

             Figure 46: Signature #3 Protected JWS Header JSON





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   eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjAxOGMwYWU1LTRkOWItNDcxYi1iZmQ2LW
   VlZjMxNGJjNzAzNyJ9

      Figure 47: Signature #3 Protected JWS Header, base64url-encoded

   Performing the third signature operation over the combined protected
   JWS header (Figure 47) and Payload content (Figure 2) produces the
   following signature:

   s0h6KThzkfBBBkLspW1h84VsJZFTsPPqMDA7g1Md7p0

                Figure 48: Signature #3, base64url-encoded

   The following is the assembled third signature serialized as JSON:

   {
     "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjAxOGMwYWU1LTRkOW
         ItNDcxYi1iZmQ2LWVlZjMxNGJjNzAzNyJ9",
     "signature": "s0h6KThzkfBBBkLspW1h84VsJZFTsPPqMDA7g1Md7p0"
   }

                       Figure 49: Signature #3 JSON

3.8.5.  Output Results

   The following compose the resulting JWS object:

   o  Payload content (Figure 2)

   o  Signature #1 JSON (Figure 42)

   o  Signature #2 JSON (Figure 45)

   o  Signature #3 JSON (Figure 49)

   The resulting JWS object using the JSON serialization:















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   {
     "payload": "SXTigJlzIGEgZGFuZ2Vyb3VzIGJ1c2luZXNzLCBGcm9kbywg
         Z29pbmcgb3V0IHlvdXIgZG9vci4gWW91IHN0ZXAgb250byB0aGUgcm9h
         ZCwgYW5kIGlmIHlvdSBkb24ndCBrZWVwIHlvdXIgZmVldCwgdGhlcmXi
         gJlzIG5vIGtub3dpbmcgd2hlcmUgeW91IG1pZ2h0IGJlIHN3ZXB0IG9m
         ZiB0by4",
     "signatures": [
       {
         "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9",
         "header": {
           "kid": "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example"
         },
         "signature": "MIsjqtVlOpa71KE-Mss8_Nq2YH4FGhiocsqrgi5Nvy
             G53uoimic1tcMdSg-qptrzZc7CG6Svw2Y13TDIqHzTUrL_lR2ZFc
             ryNFiHkSw129EghGpwkpxaTn_THJTCglNbADko1MZBCdwzJxwqZc
             -1RlpO2HibUYyXSwO97BSe0_evZKdjvvKSgsIqjytKSeAMbhMBdM
             ma622_BG5t4sdbuCHtFjp9iJmkio47AIwqkZV1aIZsv33uPUqBBC
             XbYoQJwt7mxPftHmNlGoOSMxR_3thmXTCm4US-xiNOyhbm8afKK6
             4jU6_TPtQHiJeQJxz9G3Tx-083B745_AfYOnlC9w"
       },
       {
         "header": {
           "alg": "ES512",
           "kid": "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example"
         },
         "signature": "ARcVLnaJJaUWG8fG-8t5BREVAuTY8n8YHjwDO1muhc
             dCoFZFFjfISu0Cdkn9Ybdlmi54ho0x924DUz8sK7ZXkhc7AFM8Ob
             LfTvNCrqcI3Jkl2U5IX3utNhODH6v7xgy1Qahsn0fyb4zSAkje8b
             AWz4vIfj5pCMYxxm4fgV3q7ZYhm5eD"
       },
       {
         "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjAxOGMwYWU1LT
             RkOWItNDcxYi1iZmQ2LWVlZjMxNGJjNzAzNyJ9",
         "signature": "s0h6KThzkfBBBkLspW1h84VsJZFTsPPqMDA7g1Md7p
             0"
       }
     ]
   }

                       Figure 50: JSON Serialization

4.  JSON Web Encryption Examples

   The following sections demonstrate how to generate various JWE
   objects.

   All of the succeeding examples (unless otherwise noted) use the
   following plaintext content, serialized as UTF-8, with the sequence



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   "\xe2\x80\x93" replacing (U+2013 EN DASH) and line breaks (U+000A
   LINE FEED) replacing some " " (U+0020 SPACE) characters to improve
   formatting:

   You can trust us to stick with you through thick and
   thin\xe2\x80\x93to the bitter end. And you can trust us to
   keep any secret of yours\xe2\x80\x93closer than you keep it
   yourself. But you cannot trust us to let you face trouble
   alone, and go off without a word. We are your friends, Frodo.

                       Figure 51: Plaintext content

4.1.  Key Encryption using RSA v1.5 and AES-HMAC-SHA2

   This example illustrates encrypting content using the "RSA1_5"
   (RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5) key encryption algorithm and the "A128CBC-HS256"
   (AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA-256) content encryption algorithm.

4.1.1.  Input Factors

   The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process:

   o  Plaintext content; this example uses the content from Figure 51.

   o  RSA public key; this example uses the key from Figure 52.

   o  "alg" parameter of "RSA1_5".

   o  "enc" parameter of "A128CBC-HS256".






















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   {
     "kty": "RSA",
     "kid": "frodo.baggins@hobbiton.example",
     "use": "enc",
     "n": "maxhbsmBtdQ3CNrKvprUE6n9lYcregDMLYNeTAWcLj8NnPU9XIYegT
         HVHQjxKDSHP2l-F5jS7sppG1wgdAqZyhnWvXhYNvcM7RfgKxqNx_xAHx
         6f3yy7s-M9PSNCwPC2lh6UAkR4I00EhV9lrypM9Pi4lBUop9t5fS9W5U
         NwaAllhrd-osQGPjIeI1deHTwx-ZTHu3C60Pu_LJIl6hKn9wbwaUmA4c
         R5Bd2pgbaY7ASgsjCUbtYJaNIHSoHXprUdJZKUMAzV0WOKPfA6OPI4oy
         pBadjvMZ4ZAj3BnXaSYsEZhaueTXvZB4eZOAjIyh2e_VOIKVMsnDrJYA
         VotGlvMQ",
     "e": "AQAB",
     "d": "Kn9tgoHfiTVi8uPu5b9TnwyHwG5dK6RE0uFdlpCGnJN7ZEi963R7wy
         bQ1PLAHmpIbNTztfrheoAniRV1NCIqXaW_qS461xiDTp4ntEPnqcKsyO
         5jMAji7-CL8vhpYYowNFvIesgMoVaPRYMYT9TW63hNM0aWs7USZ_hLg6
         Oe1mY0vHTI3FucjSM86Nff4oIENt43r2fspgEPGRrdE6fpLc9Oaq-qeP
         1GFULimrRdndm-P8q8kvN3KHlNAtEgrQAgTTgz80S-3VD0FgWfgnb1PN
         miuPUxO8OpI9KDIfu_acc6fg14nsNaJqXe6RESvhGPH2afjHqSy_Fd2v
         pzj85bQQ",
     "p": "2DwQmZ43FoTnQ8IkUj3BmKRf5Eh2mizZA5xEJ2MinUE3sdTYKSLtaE
         oekX9vbBZuWxHdVhM6UnKCJ_2iNk8Z0ayLYHL0_G21aXf9-unynEpUsH
         7HHTklLpYAzOOx1ZgVljoxAdWNn3hiEFrjZLZGS7lOH-a3QQlDDQoJOJ
         2VFmU",
     "q": "te8LY4-W7IyaqH1ExujjMqkTAlTeRbv0VLQnfLY2xINnrWdwiQ93_V
         F099aP1ESeLja2nw-6iKIe-qT7mtCPozKfVtUYfz5HrJ_XY2kfexJINb
         9lhZHMv5p1skZpeIS-GPHCC6gRlKo1q-idn_qxyusfWv7WAxlSVfQfk8
         d6Et0",
     "dp": "UfYKcL_or492vVc0PzwLSplbg4L3-Z5wL48mwiswbpzOyIgd2xHTH
         QmjJpFAIZ8q-zf9RmgJXkDrFs9rkdxPtAsL1WYdeCT5c125Fkdg317JV
         RDo1inX7x2Kdh8ERCreW8_4zXItuTl_KiXZNU5lvMQjWbIw2eTx1lpsf
         lo0rYU",
     "dq": "iEgcO-QfpepdH8FWd7mUFyrXdnOkXJBCogChY6YKuIHGc_p8Le9Mb
         pFKESzEaLlN1Ehf3B6oGBl5Iz_ayUlZj2IoQZ82znoUrpa9fVYNot87A
         CfzIG7q9Mv7RiPAderZi03tkVXAdaBau_9vs5rS-7HMtxkVrxSUvJY14
         TkXlHE",
     "qi": "kC-lzZOqoFaZCr5l0tOVtREKoVqaAYhQiqIRGL-MzS4sCmRkxm5vZ
         lXYx6RtE1n_AagjqajlkjieGlxTTThHD8Iga6foGBMaAr5uR1hGQpSc7
         Gl7CF1DZkBJMTQN6EshYzZfxW08mIO8M6Rzuh0beL6fG9mkDcIyPrBXx
         2bQ_mM"
   }

                Figure 52: RSA 2048-bit Key, in JWK format

   (*NOTE*: While the key includes the private parameters, only the
   public parameters "e" and "n" are necessary for the encryption
   operation.)





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4.1.2.  Generated Factors

   The following are generated before encrypting:

   o  AES symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key (CEK); this
      example uses the key from Figure 53

   o  Initialization vector/nonce; this example uses the initialization
      vector from Figure 54

   3qyTVhIWt5juqZUCpfRqpvauwB956MEJL2Rt-8qXKSo

           Figure 53: Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded

   bbd5sTkYwhAIqfHsx8DayA

            Figure 54: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded

4.1.3.  Encrypting the Key

   Performing the key encryption operation over the CEK (Figure 53) with
   the RSA key (Figure 52) results in the following encrypted key:

   laLxI0j-nLH-_BgLOXMozKxmy9gffy2gTdvqzfTihJBuuzxg0V7yk1WClnQePF
   vG2K-pvSlWc9BRIazDrn50RcRai__3TDON395H3c62tIouJJ4XaRvYHFjZTZ2G
   Xfz8YAImcc91Tfk0WXC2F5Xbb71ClQ1DDH151tlpH77f2ff7xiSxh9oSewYrcG
   TSLUeeCt36r1Kt3OSj7EyBQXoZlN7IxbyhMAfgIe7Mv1rOTOI5I8NQqeXXW8Vl
   zNmoxaGMny3YnGir5Wf6Qt2nBq4qDaPdnaAuuGUGEecelIO1wx1BpyIfgvfjOh
   MBs9M8XL223Fg47xlGsMXdfuY-4jaqVw

                Figure 55: Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded

4.1.4.  Encrypting the Content

   The following are generated before encrypting the plaintext:

   o  Protected JWE Header; this example uses the header from Figure 56,
      encoded using [RFC4648] base64url to produce Figure 57.

   {
     "alg": "RSA1_5",
     "kid": "frodo.baggins@hobbiton.example",
     "enc": "A128CBC-HS256"
   }

                   Figure 56: Protected JWE Header JSON





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   eyJhbGciOiJSU0ExXzUiLCJraWQiOiJmcm9kby5iYWdnaW5zQGhvYmJpdG9uLm
   V4YW1wbGUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0

            Figure 57: Protected JWE Header, base64url-encoded

   Performing the content encryption operation on the Plaintext
   (Figure 51) using the following:

   o  CEK (Figure 53);

   o  Initialization vector/nonce (Figure 54); and

   o  Protected JWE header (Figure 56) as authenticated data

   produces the following:

   o  Ciphertext from Figure 58.

   o  Authentication tag from Figure 59.

   0fys_TY_na7f8dwSfXLiYdHaA2DxUjD67ieF7fcVbIR62JhJvGZ4_FNVSiGc_r
   aa0HnLQ6s1P2sv3Xzl1p1l_o5wR_RsSzrS8Z-wnI3Jvo0mkpEEnlDmZvDu_k8O
   WzJv7eZVEqiWKdyVzFhPpiyQU28GLOpRc2VbVbK4dQKPdNTjPPEmRqcaGeTWZV
   yeSUvf5k59yJZxRuSvWFf6KrNtmRdZ8R4mDOjHSrM_s8uwIFcqt4r5GX8TKaI0
   zT5CbL5Qlw3sRc7u_hg0yKVOiRytEAEs3vZkcfLkP6nbXdC_PkMdNS-ohP78T2
   O6_7uInMGhFeX4ctHG7VelHGiT93JfWDEQi5_V9UN1rhXNrYu-0fVMkZAKX3VW
   i7lzA6BP430m

                 Figure 58: Ciphertext, base64url-encoded

   kvKuFBXHe5mQr4lqgobAUg

             Figure 59: Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded

4.1.5.  Output Results

   The following compose the resulting JWE object:

   o  Protected JWE header (Figure 57).

   o  Encrypted Key (Figure 55).

   o  Initialization vector/nonce (Figure 54).

   o  Ciphertext (Figure 58).

   o  Authentication Tag (Figure 59).




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   The resulting JWE object using the Compact serialization:

   eyJhbGciOiJSU0ExXzUiLCJraWQiOiJmcm9kby5iYWdnaW5zQGhvYmJpdG9uLm
   V4YW1wbGUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0
   .
   laLxI0j-nLH-_BgLOXMozKxmy9gffy2gTdvqzfTihJBuuzxg0V7yk1WClnQePF
   vG2K-pvSlWc9BRIazDrn50RcRai__3TDON395H3c62tIouJJ4XaRvYHFjZTZ2G
   Xfz8YAImcc91Tfk0WXC2F5Xbb71ClQ1DDH151tlpH77f2ff7xiSxh9oSewYrcG
   TSLUeeCt36r1Kt3OSj7EyBQXoZlN7IxbyhMAfgIe7Mv1rOTOI5I8NQqeXXW8Vl
   zNmoxaGMny3YnGir5Wf6Qt2nBq4qDaPdnaAuuGUGEecelIO1wx1BpyIfgvfjOh
   MBs9M8XL223Fg47xlGsMXdfuY-4jaqVw
   .
   bbd5sTkYwhAIqfHsx8DayA
   .
   0fys_TY_na7f8dwSfXLiYdHaA2DxUjD67ieF7fcVbIR62JhJvGZ4_FNVSiGc_r
   aa0HnLQ6s1P2sv3Xzl1p1l_o5wR_RsSzrS8Z-wnI3Jvo0mkpEEnlDmZvDu_k8O
   WzJv7eZVEqiWKdyVzFhPpiyQU28GLOpRc2VbVbK4dQKPdNTjPPEmRqcaGeTWZV
   yeSUvf5k59yJZxRuSvWFf6KrNtmRdZ8R4mDOjHSrM_s8uwIFcqt4r5GX8TKaI0
   zT5CbL5Qlw3sRc7u_hg0yKVOiRytEAEs3vZkcfLkP6nbXdC_PkMdNS-ohP78T2
   O6_7uInMGhFeX4ctHG7VelHGiT93JfWDEQi5_V9UN1rhXNrYu-0fVMkZAKX3VW
   i7lzA6BP430m
   .
   kvKuFBXHe5mQr4lqgobAUg

                     Figure 60: Compact Serialization

   The resulting JWE object using the JSON serialization:
























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   {
     "recipients": [
       {
         "encrypted_key": "laLxI0j-nLH-_BgLOXMozKxmy9gffy2gTdvqzf
             TihJBuuzxg0V7yk1WClnQePFvG2K-pvSlWc9BRIazDrn50RcRai_
             _3TDON395H3c62tIouJJ4XaRvYHFjZTZ2GXfz8YAImcc91Tfk0WX
             C2F5Xbb71ClQ1DDH151tlpH77f2ff7xiSxh9oSewYrcGTSLUeeCt
             36r1Kt3OSj7EyBQXoZlN7IxbyhMAfgIe7Mv1rOTOI5I8NQqeXXW8
             VlzNmoxaGMny3YnGir5Wf6Qt2nBq4qDaPdnaAuuGUGEecelIO1wx
             1BpyIfgvfjOhMBs9M8XL223Fg47xlGsMXdfuY-4jaqVw"
       }
     ],
     "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJSU0ExXzUiLCJraWQiOiJmcm9kby5iYWdnaW
         5zQGhvYmJpdG9uLmV4YW1wbGUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In
         0",
     "iv": "bbd5sTkYwhAIqfHsx8DayA",
     "ciphertext": "0fys_TY_na7f8dwSfXLiYdHaA2DxUjD67ieF7fcVbIR62
         JhJvGZ4_FNVSiGc_raa0HnLQ6s1P2sv3Xzl1p1l_o5wR_RsSzrS8Z-wn
         I3Jvo0mkpEEnlDmZvDu_k8OWzJv7eZVEqiWKdyVzFhPpiyQU28GLOpRc
         2VbVbK4dQKPdNTjPPEmRqcaGeTWZVyeSUvf5k59yJZxRuSvWFf6KrNtm
         RdZ8R4mDOjHSrM_s8uwIFcqt4r5GX8TKaI0zT5CbL5Qlw3sRc7u_hg0y
         KVOiRytEAEs3vZkcfLkP6nbXdC_PkMdNS-ohP78T2O6_7uInMGhFeX4c
         tHG7VelHGiT93JfWDEQi5_V9UN1rhXNrYu-0fVMkZAKX3VWi7lzA6BP4
         30m",
     "tag": "kvKuFBXHe5mQr4lqgobAUg"
   }

                       Figure 61: JSON Serialization

4.2.  Key Encryption using RSA-OAEP with A256GCM

   This example illustrates encrypting content using the "RSA-OAEP"
   (RSAES-OAEP) key encryption algorithm and the "A256GCM" (AES-GCM)
   content encryption algorithm.

4.2.1.  Input Factors

   The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process:

   o  Plaintext content; this example uses the plaintext from Figure 51.

   o  RSA public key; this example uses the key from Figure 62.

   o  "alg" parameter of "RSA-OAEP"

   o  "enc" parameter of "A256GCM"

   {



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     "kty": "RSA",
     "kid": "samwise.gamgee@hobbiton.example",
     "use": "enc",
     "n": "wbdxI55VaanZXPY29Lg5hdmv2XhvqAhoxUkanfzf2-5zVUxa6prHRr
         I4pP1AhoqJRlZfYtWWd5mmHRG2pAHIlh0ySJ9wi0BioZBl1XP2e-C-Fy
         XJGcTy0HdKQWlrfhTm42EW7Vv04r4gfao6uxjLGwfpGrZLarohiWCPnk
         Nrg71S2CuNZSQBIPGjXfkmIy2tl_VWgGnL22GplyXj5YlBLdxXp3XeSt
         sqo571utNfoUTU8E4qdzJ3U1DItoVkPGsMwlmmnJiwA7sXRItBCivR4M
         5qnZtdw-7v4WuR4779ubDuJ5nalMv2S66-RPcnFAzWSKxtBDnFJJDGIU
         e7Tzizjg1nms0Xq_yPub_UOlWn0ec85FCft1hACpWG8schrOBeNqHBOD
         FskYpUc2LC5JA2TaPF2dA67dg1TTsC_FupfQ2kNGcE1LgprxKHcVWYQb
         86B-HozjHZcqtauBzFNV5tbTuB-TpkcvJfNcFLlH3b8mb-H_ox35FjqB
         SAjLKyoeqfKTpVjvXhd09knwgJf6VKq6UC418_TOljMVfFTWXUxlnfhO
         OnzW6HSSzD1c9WrCuVzsUMv54szidQ9wf1cYWf3g5qFDxDQKis99gcDa
         iCAwM3yEBIzuNeeCa5dartHDb1xEB_HcHSeYbghbMjGfasvKn0aZRsnT
         yC0xhWBlsolZE",
     "e": "AQAB",
     "alg": "RSA-OAEP",
     "d": "n7fzJc3_WG59VEOBTkayzuSMM780OJQuZjN_KbH8lOZG25ZoA7T4Bx
         cc0xQn5oZE5uSCIwg91oCt0JvxPcpmqzaJZg1nirjcWZ-oBtVk7gCAWq
         -B3qhfF3izlbkosrzjHajIcY33HBhsy4_WerrXg4MDNE4HYojy68TcxT
         2LYQRxUOCf5TtJXvM8olexlSGtVnQnDRutxEUCwiewfmmrfveEogLx9E
         A-KMgAjTiISXxqIXQhWUQX1G7v_mV_Hr2YuImYcNcHkRvp9E7ook0876
         DhkO8v4UOZLwA1OlUX98mkoqwc58A_Y2lBYbVx1_s5lpPsEqbbH-nqIj
         h1fL0gdNfihLxnclWtW7pCztLnImZAyeCWAG7ZIfv-Rn9fLIv9jZ6r7r
         -MSH9sqbuziHN2grGjD_jfRluMHa0l84fFKl6bcqN1JWxPVhzNZo01yD
         F-1LiQnqUYSepPf6X3a2SOdkqBRiquE6EvLuSYIDpJq3jDIsgoL8Mo1L
         oomgiJxUwL_GWEOGu28gplyzm-9Q0U0nyhEf1uhSR8aJAQWAiFImWH5W
         _IQT9I7-yrindr_2fWQ_i1UgMsGzA7aOGzZfPljRy6z-tY_KuBG00-28
         S_aWvjyUc-Alp8AUyKjBZ-7CWH32fGWK48j1t-zomrwjL_mnhsPbGs0c
         9WsWgRzI-K8gE",
     "p": "7_2v3OQZzlPFcHyYfLABQ3XP85Es4hCdwCkbDeltaUXgVy9l9etKgh
         vM4hRkOvbb01kYVuLFmxIkCDtpi-zLCYAdXKrAK3PtSbtzld_XZ9nlsY
         a_QZWpXB_IrtFjVfdKUdMz94pHUhFGFj7nr6NNxfpiHSHWFE1zD_AC3m
         Y46J961Y2LRnreVwAGNw53p07Db8yD_92pDa97vqcZOdgtybH9q6uma-
         RFNhO1AoiJhYZj69hjmMRXx-x56HO9cnXNbmzNSCFCKnQmn4GQLmRj9s
         fbZRqL94bbtE4_e0Zrpo8RNo8vxRLqQNwIy85fc6BRgBJomt8QdQvIgP
         gWCv5HoQ",
     "q": "zqOHk1P6WN_rHuM7ZF1cXH0x6RuOHq67WuHiSknqQeefGBA9PWs6Zy
         KQCO-O6mKXtcgE8_Q_hA2kMRcKOcvHil1hqMCNSXlflM7WPRPZu2qCDc
         qssd_uMbP-DqYthH_EzwL9KnYoH7JQFxxmcv5An8oXUtTwk4knKjkIYG
         RuUwfQTus0w1NfjFAyxOOiAQ37ussIcE6C6ZSsM3n41UlbJ7TCqewzVJ
         aPJN5cxjySPZPD3Vp01a9YgAD6a3IIaKJdIxJS1ImnfPevSJQBE79-EX
         e2kSwVgOzvt-gsmM29QQ8veHy4uAqca5dZzMs7hkkHtw1z0jHV90epQJ
         JlXXnH8Q",
     "dp": "19oDkBh1AXelMIxQFm2zZTqUhAzCIr4xNIGEPNoDt1jK83_FJA-xn
         x5kA7-1erdHdms_Ef67HsONNv5A60JaR7w8LHnDiBGnjdaUmmuO8XAxQ
         J_ia5mxjxNjS6E2yD44USo2JmHvzeeNczq25elqbTPLhUpGo1IZuG72F



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         ZQ5gTjXoTXC2-xtCDEUZfaUNh4IeAipfLugbpe0JAFlFfrTDAMUFpC3i
         XjxqzbEanflwPvj6V9iDSgjj8SozSM0dLtxvu0LIeIQAeEgT_yXcrKGm
         pKdSO08kLBx8VUjkbv_3Pn20Gyu2YEuwpFlM_H1NikuxJNKFGmnAq9Lc
         nwwT0jvoQ",
     "dq": "S6p59KrlmzGzaQYQM3o0XfHCGvfqHLYjCO557HYQf72O9kLMCfd_1
         VBEqeD-1jjwELKDjck8kOBl5UvohK1oDfSP1DleAy-cnmL29DqWmhgwM
         1ip0CCNmkmsmDSlqkUXDi6sAaZuntyukyflI-qSQ3C_BafPyFaKrt1fg
         dyEwYa08pESKwwWisy7KnmoUvaJ3SaHmohFS78TJ25cfc10wZ9hQNOrI
         ChZlkiOdFCtxDqdmCqNacnhgE3bZQjGp3n83ODSz9zwJcSUvODlXBPc2
         AycH6Ci5yjbxt4Ppox_5pjm6xnQkiPgj01GpsUssMmBN7iHVsrE7N2iz
         nBNCeOUIQ",
     "qi": "FZhClBMywVVjnuUud-05qd5CYU0dK79akAgy9oX6RX6I3IIIPckCc
         iRrokxglZn-omAY5CnCe4KdrnjFOT5YUZE7G_Pg44XgCXaarLQf4hl80
         oPEf6-jJ5Iy6wPRx7G2e8qLxnh9cOdf-kRqgOS3F48Ucvw3ma5V6KGMw
         QqWFeV31XtZ8l5cVI-I3NzBS7qltpUVgz2Ju021eyc7IlqgzR98qKONl
         27DuEES0aK0WE97jnsyO27Yp88Wa2RiBrEocM89QZI1seJiGDizHRUP4
         UZxw9zsXww46wy0P6f9grnYp7t8LkyDDk8eoI4KX6SNMNVcyVS9IWjlq
         8EzqZEKIA"
   }

                        Figure 62: RSA 4096-bit Key

   (*NOTE*: While the key includes the private parameters, only the
   public parameters "e" and "n" are necessary for the encryption
   operation.)

4.2.2.  Generated Factors

   The following are generated before encrypting:

   o  AES symmetric key as the Content Encryption CEK (CEK); this
      example uses the key from Figure 63.

   o  Initialization vector/nonce; this example uses the initialization
      vector/nonce from Figure 64.

   mYMfsggkTAm0TbvtlFh2hyoXnbEzJQjMxmgLN3d8xXA

           Figure 63: Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded

   -nBoKLH0YkLZPSI9

            Figure 64: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded








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4.2.3.  Encrypting the Key

   Performing the key encryption operation over the CEK (Figure 63))
   with the RSA key (Figure 62) produces the following encrypted key:

   rT99rwrBTbTI7IJM8fU3Eli7226HEB7IchCxNuh7lCiud48LxeolRdtFF4nzQi
   beYOl5S_PJsAXZwSXtDePz9hk-BbtsTBqC2UsPOdwjC9NhNupNNu9uHIVftDyu
   cvI6hvALeZ6OGnhNV4v1zx2k7O1D89mAzfw-_kT3tkuorpDU-CpBENfIHX1Q58
   -Aad3FzMuo3Fn9buEP2yXakLXYa15BUXQsupM4A1GD4_H4Bd7V3u9h8Gkg8Bpx
   KdUV9ScfJQTcYm6eJEBz3aSwIaK4T3-dwWpuBOhROQXBosJzS1asnuHtVMt2pK
   IIfux5BC6huIvmY7kzV7W7aIUrpYm_3H4zYvyMeq5pGqFmW2k8zpO878TRlZx7
   pZfPYDSXZyS0CfKKkMozT_qiCwZTSz4duYnt8hS4Z9sGthXn9uDqd6wycMagnQ
   fOTs_lycTWmY-aqWVDKhjYNRf03NiwRtb5BE-tOdFwCASQj3uuAgPGrO2AWBe3
   8UjQb0lvXn1SpyvYZ3WFc7WOJYaTa7A8DRn6MC6T-xDmMuxC0G7S2rscw5lQQU
   06MvZTlFOt0UvfuKBa03cxA_nIBIhLMjY2kOTxQMmpDPTr6Cbo8aKaOnx6ASE5
   Jx9paBpnNmOOKH35j_QlrQhDWUN6A2Gg8iFayJ69xDEdHAVCGRzN3woEI2ozDR
   s

                Figure 65: Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded

4.2.4.  Encrypting the Content

   The following are generated before encrypting the plaintext:

   o  Protected JWE Header; this example uses the the header from
      Figure 66, encoded using [RFC4648] base64url to produce Figure 67.

   {
     "alg": "RSA-OAEP",
     "kid": "samwise.gamgee@hobbiton.example",
     "enc": "A256GCM"
   }

                   Figure 66: Protected JWE Header JSON

   eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUCIsImtpZCI6InNhbXdpc2UuZ2FtZ2VlQGhvYmJpdG
   9uLmV4YW1wbGUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMjU2R0NNIn0

            Figure 67: Protected JWE Header, base64url-encoded

   Performing the content encryption operation over the Plaintext
   (Figure 51) with the following:

   o  CEK (Figure 63);

   o  Initialization vector/nonce (Figure 64); and

   o  Protected JWE Header (Figure 67) as authenticated data



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   produces the following:

   o  Ciphertext from Figure 68.

   o  Authentication tag from Figure 69.

   o4k2cnGN8rSSw3IDo1YuySkqeS_t2m1GXklSgqBdpACm6UJuJowOHC5ytjqYgR
   L-I-soPlwqMUf4UgRWWeaOGNw6vGW-xyM01lTYxrXfVzIIaRdhYtEMRBvBWbEw
   P7ua1DRfvaOjgZv6Ifa3brcAM64d8p5lhhNcizPersuhw5f-pGYzseva-TUaL8
   iWnctc-sSwy7SQmRkfhDjwbz0fz6kFovEgj64X1I5s7E6GLp5fnbYGLa1QUiML
   7Cc2GxgvI7zqWo0YIEc7aCflLG1-8BboVWFdZKLK9vNoycrYHumwzKluLWEbSV
   maPpOslY2n525DxDfWaVFUfKQxMF56vn4B9QMpWAbnypNimbM8zVOw

                 Figure 68: Ciphertext, base64url-encoded

   UCGiqJxhBI3IFVdPalHHvA

             Figure 69: Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded

4.2.5.  Output Results

   The following compose the resulting JWE object:

   o  Protected JWE header (Figure 67)

   o  Encrypted key (Figure 65)

   o  Initialization vector/nonce (Figure 64)

   o  Ciphertext (Figure 68)

   o  Authentication tag (Figure 69)

   The resulting JWE object using the Compact serialization:

















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   eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUCIsImtpZCI6InNhbXdpc2UuZ2FtZ2VlQGhvYmJpdG
   9uLmV4YW1wbGUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMjU2R0NNIn0
   .
   rT99rwrBTbTI7IJM8fU3Eli7226HEB7IchCxNuh7lCiud48LxeolRdtFF4nzQi
   beYOl5S_PJsAXZwSXtDePz9hk-BbtsTBqC2UsPOdwjC9NhNupNNu9uHIVftDyu
   cvI6hvALeZ6OGnhNV4v1zx2k7O1D89mAzfw-_kT3tkuorpDU-CpBENfIHX1Q58
   -Aad3FzMuo3Fn9buEP2yXakLXYa15BUXQsupM4A1GD4_H4Bd7V3u9h8Gkg8Bpx
   KdUV9ScfJQTcYm6eJEBz3aSwIaK4T3-dwWpuBOhROQXBosJzS1asnuHtVMt2pK
   IIfux5BC6huIvmY7kzV7W7aIUrpYm_3H4zYvyMeq5pGqFmW2k8zpO878TRlZx7
   pZfPYDSXZyS0CfKKkMozT_qiCwZTSz4duYnt8hS4Z9sGthXn9uDqd6wycMagnQ
   fOTs_lycTWmY-aqWVDKhjYNRf03NiwRtb5BE-tOdFwCASQj3uuAgPGrO2AWBe3
   8UjQb0lvXn1SpyvYZ3WFc7WOJYaTa7A8DRn6MC6T-xDmMuxC0G7S2rscw5lQQU
   06MvZTlFOt0UvfuKBa03cxA_nIBIhLMjY2kOTxQMmpDPTr6Cbo8aKaOnx6ASE5
   Jx9paBpnNmOOKH35j_QlrQhDWUN6A2Gg8iFayJ69xDEdHAVCGRzN3woEI2ozDR
   s
   .
   -nBoKLH0YkLZPSI9
   .
   o4k2cnGN8rSSw3IDo1YuySkqeS_t2m1GXklSgqBdpACm6UJuJowOHC5ytjqYgR
   L-I-soPlwqMUf4UgRWWeaOGNw6vGW-xyM01lTYxrXfVzIIaRdhYtEMRBvBWbEw
   P7ua1DRfvaOjgZv6Ifa3brcAM64d8p5lhhNcizPersuhw5f-pGYzseva-TUaL8
   iWnctc-sSwy7SQmRkfhDjwbz0fz6kFovEgj64X1I5s7E6GLp5fnbYGLa1QUiML
   7Cc2GxgvI7zqWo0YIEc7aCflLG1-8BboVWFdZKLK9vNoycrYHumwzKluLWEbSV
   maPpOslY2n525DxDfWaVFUfKQxMF56vn4B9QMpWAbnypNimbM8zVOw
   .
   UCGiqJxhBI3IFVdPalHHvA

                     Figure 70: Compact Serialization

   The resulting JWE object using the JSON serialization:





















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   {
     "recipients": [
       {
         "encrypted_key": "rT99rwrBTbTI7IJM8fU3Eli7226HEB7IchCxNu
             h7lCiud48LxeolRdtFF4nzQibeYOl5S_PJsAXZwSXtDePz9hk-Bb
             tsTBqC2UsPOdwjC9NhNupNNu9uHIVftDyucvI6hvALeZ6OGnhNV4
             v1zx2k7O1D89mAzfw-_kT3tkuorpDU-CpBENfIHX1Q58-Aad3FzM
             uo3Fn9buEP2yXakLXYa15BUXQsupM4A1GD4_H4Bd7V3u9h8Gkg8B
             pxKdUV9ScfJQTcYm6eJEBz3aSwIaK4T3-dwWpuBOhROQXBosJzS1
             asnuHtVMt2pKIIfux5BC6huIvmY7kzV7W7aIUrpYm_3H4zYvyMeq
             5pGqFmW2k8zpO878TRlZx7pZfPYDSXZyS0CfKKkMozT_qiCwZTSz
             4duYnt8hS4Z9sGthXn9uDqd6wycMagnQfOTs_lycTWmY-aqWVDKh
             jYNRf03NiwRtb5BE-tOdFwCASQj3uuAgPGrO2AWBe38UjQb0lvXn
             1SpyvYZ3WFc7WOJYaTa7A8DRn6MC6T-xDmMuxC0G7S2rscw5lQQU
             06MvZTlFOt0UvfuKBa03cxA_nIBIhLMjY2kOTxQMmpDPTr6Cbo8a
             KaOnx6ASE5Jx9paBpnNmOOKH35j_QlrQhDWUN6A2Gg8iFayJ69xD
             EdHAVCGRzN3woEI2ozDRs"
       }
     ],
     "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUCIsImtpZCI6InNhbXdpc2UuZ2
         FtZ2VlQGhvYmJpdG9uLmV4YW1wbGUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMjU2R0NNIn0",
     "iv": "-nBoKLH0YkLZPSI9",
     "ciphertext": "o4k2cnGN8rSSw3IDo1YuySkqeS_t2m1GXklSgqBdpACm6
         UJuJowOHC5ytjqYgRL-I-soPlwqMUf4UgRWWeaOGNw6vGW-xyM01lTYx
         rXfVzIIaRdhYtEMRBvBWbEwP7ua1DRfvaOjgZv6Ifa3brcAM64d8p5lh
         hNcizPersuhw5f-pGYzseva-TUaL8iWnctc-sSwy7SQmRkfhDjwbz0fz
         6kFovEgj64X1I5s7E6GLp5fnbYGLa1QUiML7Cc2GxgvI7zqWo0YIEc7a
         CflLG1-8BboVWFdZKLK9vNoycrYHumwzKluLWEbSVmaPpOslY2n525Dx
         DfWaVFUfKQxMF56vn4B9QMpWAbnypNimbM8zVOw",
     "tag": "UCGiqJxhBI3IFVdPalHHvA"
   }

                       Figure 71: JSON Serialization

4.3.  Key Wrap using PBES2-AES-KeyWrap with AES-CBC-HMAC-SHA2

   The example illustrates encrypting content using the
   "PBES2-HS512+A256KW" (PBES2 Password-based Encryption using HMAC-
   SHA-512 and AES-256-KeyWrap) key encryption algorithm with the
   "A128CBC-HS256" (AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA-256) content encryption
   algorithm.

4.3.1.  Input Factors

   The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process:

   o  Plaintext content; this example uses the plaintext from Figure 72
      (*NOTE* all whitespace added for readability)



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   o  Password; this example uses the password from Figure 73

   o  "alg" parameter of "PBES2-HS512+A256KW"

   o  "enc" parameter of "A128CBC-HS256"

   {
     "keys": [
       {
         "kty": "oct",
         "kid": "77c7e2b8-6e13-45cf-8672-617b5b45243a",
         "use": "enc",
         "alg": "A128GCM",
         "k": "XctOhJAkA-pD9Lh7ZgW_2A"
       },
       {
         "kty": "oct",
         "kid": "81b20965-8332-43d9-a468-82160ad91ac8",
         "use": "enc",
         "alg": "A128KW",
         "k": "GZy6sIZ6wl9NJOKB-jnmVQ"
       },
       {
         "kty": "oct",
         "kid": "18ec08e1-bfa9-4d95-b205-2b4dd1d4321d",
         "use": "enc",
         "alg": "A256GCMKW",
         "k": "qC57l_uxcm7Nm3K-ct4GFjx8tM1U8CZ0NLBvdQstiS8"
       }
     ]
   }

                       Figure 72: Plaintext Content

   entrap_o_peter_long_credit_tun

                            Figure 73: Password

4.3.2.  Generated Factors

   The following are generated before encrypting:

   o  AES symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key (CEK); this
      example uses the key from Figure 74.

   o  Initialization vector/nonce; this example uses the initialization
      vector/nonce from Figure 75.




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   uwsjJXaBK407Qaf0_zpcpmr1Cs0CC50hIUEyGNEt3m0

           Figure 74: Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded

   VBiCzVHNoLiR3F4V82uoTQ

            Figure 75: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded

4.3.3.  Encrypting the Key

   The following are generated before encrypting the CEK:

   o  Salt; this example uses the salt from Figure 76.

   o  Iteration count; this example uses the interaction count 8192.

   8Q1SzinasR3xchYz6ZZcHA

                    Figure 76: Salt, base64url-encoded

   Performing the key encryption operation over the CEK (Figure 74))
   with the following:

   o  Password (Figure 73;

   o  Salt (Figure 76), encoded as an octet string; and

   o  Iteration count (8192)

   produces the following encrypted key:

   YKbKLsEoyw_JoNvhtuHo9aaeRNSEhhAW2OVHcuF_HLqS0n6hA_fgCA

                Figure 77: Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded

4.3.4.  Encrypting the Content

   The following are generated before encrypting the content:

   o  Protected JWE Header; this example uses the header from Figure 78,
      encoded using [RFC4648] base64url to produce Figure 79.










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   {
     "alg": "PBES2-HS256+A128KW",
     "p2s": "8Q1SzinasR3xchYz6ZZcHA",
     "p2c": 8192,
     "cty": "jwk-set+json",
     "enc": "A128CBC-HS256"
   }

                   Figure 78: Protected JWE Header JSON

   eyJhbGciOiJQQkVTMi1IUzI1NitBMTI4S1ciLCJwMnMiOiI4UTFTemluYXNSM3
   hjaFl6NlpaY0hBIiwicDJjIjo4MTkyLCJjdHkiOiJqd2stc2V0K2pzb24iLCJl
   bmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0

            Figure 79: Protected JWE Header, base64url-encoded

   Performing the content encryption operation over the Plaintext
   (Figure 72) with the the following:

   o  CEK (Figure 74);

   o  Initialization vector/nonce (Figure 75); and

   o  Protected JWE header (Figure 79) as authenticated data

   produces the following:

   o  Ciphertext from Figure 80.

   o  Authentication tag from Figure 81.

   23i-Tb1AV4n0WKVSSgcQrdg6GRqsUKxjruHXYsTHAJLZ2nsnGIX86vMXqIi6IR
   sfywCRFzLxEcZBRnTvG3nhzPk0GDD7FMyXhUHpDjEYCNA_XOmzg8yZR9oyjo6l
   TF6si4q9FZ2EhzgFQCLO_6h5EVg3vR75_hkBsnuoqoM3dwejXBtIodN84PeqMb
   6asmas_dpSsz7H10fC5ni9xIz424givB1YLldF6exVmL93R3fOoOJbmk2GBQZL
   _SEGllv2cQsBgeprARsaQ7Bq99tT80coH8ItBjgV08AtzXFFsx9qKvC982KLKd
   PQMTlVJKkqtV4Ru5LEVpBZXBnZrtViSOgyg6AiuwaS-rCrcD_ePOGSuxvgtrok
   AKYPqmXUeRdjFJwafkYEkiuDCV9vWGAi1DH2xTafhJwcmywIyzi4BqRpmdn_N-
   zl5tuJYyuvKhjKv6ihbsV_k1hJGPGAxJ6wUpmwC4PTQ2izEm0TuSE8oMKdTw8V
   3kobXZ77ulMwDs4p

                 Figure 80: Ciphertext, base64url-encoded

   ALTKwxvAefeL-32NY7eTAQ

             Figure 81: Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded





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4.3.5.  Output Results

   The following compose the resulting JWE object:

   o  Protected JWE header (Figure 79)

   o  Encrypted key (Figure 77)

   o  Initialization vector/nonce (Figure 75)

   o  Ciphertext (Figure 80)

   o  Authentication tag (Figure 81)

   The resulting JWE object using the Compact serialization:

   eyJhbGciOiJQQkVTMi1IUzI1NitBMTI4S1ciLCJwMnMiOiI4UTFTemluYXNSM3
   hjaFl6NlpaY0hBIiwicDJjIjo4MTkyLCJjdHkiOiJqd2stc2V0K2pzb24iLCJl
   bmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0
   .
   YKbKLsEoyw_JoNvhtuHo9aaeRNSEhhAW2OVHcuF_HLqS0n6hA_fgCA
   .
   VBiCzVHNoLiR3F4V82uoTQ
   .
   23i-Tb1AV4n0WKVSSgcQrdg6GRqsUKxjruHXYsTHAJLZ2nsnGIX86vMXqIi6IR
   sfywCRFzLxEcZBRnTvG3nhzPk0GDD7FMyXhUHpDjEYCNA_XOmzg8yZR9oyjo6l
   TF6si4q9FZ2EhzgFQCLO_6h5EVg3vR75_hkBsnuoqoM3dwejXBtIodN84PeqMb
   6asmas_dpSsz7H10fC5ni9xIz424givB1YLldF6exVmL93R3fOoOJbmk2GBQZL
   _SEGllv2cQsBgeprARsaQ7Bq99tT80coH8ItBjgV08AtzXFFsx9qKvC982KLKd
   PQMTlVJKkqtV4Ru5LEVpBZXBnZrtViSOgyg6AiuwaS-rCrcD_ePOGSuxvgtrok
   AKYPqmXUeRdjFJwafkYEkiuDCV9vWGAi1DH2xTafhJwcmywIyzi4BqRpmdn_N-
   zl5tuJYyuvKhjKv6ihbsV_k1hJGPGAxJ6wUpmwC4PTQ2izEm0TuSE8oMKdTw8V
   3kobXZ77ulMwDs4p
   .
   ALTKwxvAefeL-32NY7eTAQ

                     Figure 82: Compact Serialization

   The resulting JWE object using the JSON serialization:












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   {
     "recipients": [
       {
         "encrypted_key": "YKbKLsEoyw_JoNvhtuHo9aaeRNSEhhAW2OVHcu
             F_HLqS0n6hA_fgCA"
       }
     ],
     "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJQQkVTMi1IUzI1NitBMTI4S1ciLCJwMnMiOi
         I4UTFTemluYXNSM3hjaFl6NlpaY0hBIiwicDJjIjo4MTkyLCJjdHkiOi
         Jqd2stc2V0K2pzb24iLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0",
     "iv": "VBiCzVHNoLiR3F4V82uoTQ",
     "ciphertext": "23i-Tb1AV4n0WKVSSgcQrdg6GRqsUKxjruHXYsTHAJLZ2
         nsnGIX86vMXqIi6IRsfywCRFzLxEcZBRnTvG3nhzPk0GDD7FMyXhUHpD
         jEYCNA_XOmzg8yZR9oyjo6lTF6si4q9FZ2EhzgFQCLO_6h5EVg3vR75_
         hkBsnuoqoM3dwejXBtIodN84PeqMb6asmas_dpSsz7H10fC5ni9xIz42
         4givB1YLldF6exVmL93R3fOoOJbmk2GBQZL_SEGllv2cQsBgeprARsaQ
         7Bq99tT80coH8ItBjgV08AtzXFFsx9qKvC982KLKdPQMTlVJKkqtV4Ru
         5LEVpBZXBnZrtViSOgyg6AiuwaS-rCrcD_ePOGSuxvgtrokAKYPqmXUe
         RdjFJwafkYEkiuDCV9vWGAi1DH2xTafhJwcmywIyzi4BqRpmdn_N-zl5
         tuJYyuvKhjKv6ihbsV_k1hJGPGAxJ6wUpmwC4PTQ2izEm0TuSE8oMKdT
         w8V3kobXZ77ulMwDs4p",
     "tag": "ALTKwxvAefeL-32NY7eTAQ"
   }

                       Figure 83: JSON Serialization

4.4.  Key Agreement with Key Wrapping using ECDH-ES and AES-KeyWrap with
      AES-GCM

   This example illustrates encrypting content using the "ECDH-
   ES+A128KW" (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral-Static with
   AES-128-KeyWrap) key encryption algorithm and the "A128GCM" (AES-GCM)
   content encryption algorithm.

4.4.1.  Input Factors

   The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process:

   o  Plaintext content; this example uses the content from Figure 51

   o  EC public key; this example uses the public key from Figure 84

   o  "alg" parameter of "ECDH-ES+A128KW"

   o  "enc" parameter of "A128GCM"






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   {
     "kty": "EC",
     "kid": "peregrin.took@tuckborough.example",
     "use": "enc",
     "crv": "P-384",
     "x": "YU4rRUzdmVqmRtWOs2OpDE_T5fsNIodcG8G5FWPrTPMyxpzsSOGaQL
         pe2FpxBmu2",
     "y": "A8-yxCHxkfBz3hKZfI1jUYMjUhsEveZ9THuwFjH2sCNdtksRJU7D5-
         SkgaFL1ETP",
     "d": "iTx2pk7wW-GqJkHcEkFQb2EFyYcO7RugmaW3mRrQVAOUiPommT0Idn
         YK2xDlZh-j"
   }

            Figure 84: Elliptic Curve P-384 Key, in JWK format

   (*NOTE*: While the key includes the private parameters, only the
   public parameters "crv", "x", and "y" are necessary for the
   encryption operation.)

4.4.2.  Generated Factors

   The following are generated before encrypting:

   o  Symmetric AES key as the Content Encryption Key (CEK); this
      example uses the key from Figure 85.

   o  Initialization vector/nonce; this example uses the initialization
      vector/nonce from Figure 86

   Nou2ueKlP70ZXDbq9UrRwg

           Figure 85: Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded

   mH-G2zVqgztUtnW_

            Figure 86: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded

4.4.3.  Encrypting the Key

   To encrypt the Content Encryption Key, the following are generated:

   o  Ephemeral EC private key on the same curve as the EC public key;
      this example uses the private key from Figure 87.








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   {
     "kty": "EC",
     "crv": "P-384",
     "x": "uBo4kHPw6kbjx5l0xowrd_oYzBmaz-GKFZu4xAFFkbYiWgutEK6iuE
         DsQ6wNdNg3",
     "y": "sp3p5SGhZVC2faXumI-e9JU2Mo8KpoYrFDr5yPNVtW4PgEwZOyQTA-
         JdaY8tb7E0",
     "d": "D5H4Y_5PSKZvhfVFbcCYJOtcGZygRgfZkpsBr59Icmmhe9sW6nkZ8W
         fwhinUfWJg"
   }

       Figure 87: Ephemeral Elliptic Curve P-384 Key, in JWK format

   Performing the key encryption operation over the CEK (Figure 85) with
   the following:

   o  The static Elliptic Curve public key (Figure 84); and

   o  The ephemeral Elliptic Curve private key (Figure 87);

   produces the following JWE encrypted key:

   0DJjBXri_kBcC46IkU5_Jk9BqaQeHdv2

                Figure 88: Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded

4.4.4.  Encrypting the Content

   The following are generated before encrypting the content:

   o  Protected JWE header; this example uses the header from Figure 89,
      encoded to [RFC4648] base64url as Figure 90.

   {
     "alg": "ECDH-ES+A128KW",
     "kid": "peregrin.took@tuckborough.example",
     "epk": {
       "kty": "EC",
       "crv": "P-384",
       "x": "uBo4kHPw6kbjx5l0xowrd_oYzBmaz-GKFZu4xAFFkbYiWgutEK6i
           uEDsQ6wNdNg3",
       "y": "sp3p5SGhZVC2faXumI-e9JU2Mo8KpoYrFDr5yPNVtW4PgEwZOyQT
           A-JdaY8tb7E0"
     },
     "enc": "A128GCM"
   }

                   Figure 89: Protected JWE Header JSON



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   eyJhbGciOiJFQ0RILUVTK0ExMjhLVyIsImtpZCI6InBlcmVncmluLnRvb2tAdH
   Vja2Jvcm91Z2guZXhhbXBsZSIsImVwayI6eyJrdHkiOiJFQyIsImNydiI6IlAt
   Mzg0IiwieCI6InVCbzRrSFB3Nmtiang1bDB4b3dyZF9vWXpCbWF6LUdLRlp1NH
   hBRkZrYllpV2d1dEVLNml1RURzUTZ3TmROZzMiLCJ5Ijoic3AzcDVTR2haVkMy
   ZmFYdW1JLWU5SlUyTW84S3BvWXJGRHI1eVBOVnRXNFBnRXdaT3lRVEEtSmRhWT
   h0YjdFMCJ9LCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0

            Figure 90: Protected JWE Header, base64url-encoded

   Performing the content encryption operation on the Plaintext
   (Figure 51) using the following:

   o  CEK (Figure 85);

   o  Initialization vector/nonce (Figure 86); and

   o  Protected JWE header (Figure 90) as authenticated data

   produces the following:

   o  Ciphertext from Figure 91.

   o  Authentication tag from Figure 92.

   tkZuOO9h95OgHJmkkrfLBisku8rGf6nzVxhRM3sVOhXgz5NJ76oID7lpnAi_cP
   WJRCjSpAaUZ5dOR3Spy7QuEkmKx8-3RCMhSYMzsXaEwDdXta9Mn5B7cCBoJKB0
   IgEnj_qfo1hIi-uEkUpOZ8aLTZGHfpl05jMwbKkTe2yK3mjF6SBAsgicQDVCkc
   Y9BLluzx1RmC3ORXaM0JaHPB93YcdSDGgpgBWMVrNU1ErkjcMqMoT_wtCex3w0
   3XdLkjXIuEr2hWgeP-nkUZTPU9EoGSPj6fAS-bSz87RCPrxZdj_iVyC6QWcqAu
   07WNhjzJEPc4jVntRJ6K53NgPQ5p99l3Z408OUqj4ioYezbS6vTPlQ

                 Figure 91: Ciphertext, base64url-encoded

   WuGzxmcreYjpHGJoa17EBg

             Figure 92: Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded

4.4.5.  Output Results

   The following compose the resulting JWE object:

   o  Protected JWE header (Figure 90)

   o  Encrypted key (Figure 88)

   o  Initialization vector/nonce (Figure 86)

   o  Ciphertext (Figure 91)



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   o  Authentication tag (Figure 92)

   The resulting JWE object using the Compact serialization:

   eyJhbGciOiJFQ0RILUVTK0ExMjhLVyIsImtpZCI6InBlcmVncmluLnRvb2tAdH
   Vja2Jvcm91Z2guZXhhbXBsZSIsImVwayI6eyJrdHkiOiJFQyIsImNydiI6IlAt
   Mzg0IiwieCI6InVCbzRrSFB3Nmtiang1bDB4b3dyZF9vWXpCbWF6LUdLRlp1NH
   hBRkZrYllpV2d1dEVLNml1RURzUTZ3TmROZzMiLCJ5Ijoic3AzcDVTR2haVkMy
   ZmFYdW1JLWU5SlUyTW84S3BvWXJGRHI1eVBOVnRXNFBnRXdaT3lRVEEtSmRhWT
   h0YjdFMCJ9LCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0
   .
   0DJjBXri_kBcC46IkU5_Jk9BqaQeHdv2
   .
   mH-G2zVqgztUtnW_
   .
   tkZuOO9h95OgHJmkkrfLBisku8rGf6nzVxhRM3sVOhXgz5NJ76oID7lpnAi_cP
   WJRCjSpAaUZ5dOR3Spy7QuEkmKx8-3RCMhSYMzsXaEwDdXta9Mn5B7cCBoJKB0
   IgEnj_qfo1hIi-uEkUpOZ8aLTZGHfpl05jMwbKkTe2yK3mjF6SBAsgicQDVCkc
   Y9BLluzx1RmC3ORXaM0JaHPB93YcdSDGgpgBWMVrNU1ErkjcMqMoT_wtCex3w0
   3XdLkjXIuEr2hWgeP-nkUZTPU9EoGSPj6fAS-bSz87RCPrxZdj_iVyC6QWcqAu
   07WNhjzJEPc4jVntRJ6K53NgPQ5p99l3Z408OUqj4ioYezbS6vTPlQ
   .
   WuGzxmcreYjpHGJoa17EBg

                     Figure 93: Compact Serialization

   The resulting JWE object using the JSON serialization:
























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   {
     "recipients": [
       {
         "encrypted_key": "0DJjBXri_kBcC46IkU5_Jk9BqaQeHdv2"
       }
     ],
     "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJFQ0RILUVTK0ExMjhLVyIsImtpZCI6InBlcm
         VncmluLnRvb2tAdHVja2Jvcm91Z2guZXhhbXBsZSIsImVwayI6eyJrdH
         kiOiJFQyIsImNydiI6IlAtMzg0IiwieCI6InVCbzRrSFB3Nmtiang1bD
         B4b3dyZF9vWXpCbWF6LUdLRlp1NHhBRkZrYllpV2d1dEVLNml1RURzUT
         Z3TmROZzMiLCJ5Ijoic3AzcDVTR2haVkMyZmFYdW1JLWU5SlUyTW84S3
         BvWXJGRHI1eVBOVnRXNFBnRXdaT3lRVEEtSmRhWTh0YjdFMCJ9LCJlbm
         MiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0",
     "iv": "mH-G2zVqgztUtnW_",
     "ciphertext": "tkZuOO9h95OgHJmkkrfLBisku8rGf6nzVxhRM3sVOhXgz
         5NJ76oID7lpnAi_cPWJRCjSpAaUZ5dOR3Spy7QuEkmKx8-3RCMhSYMzs
         XaEwDdXta9Mn5B7cCBoJKB0IgEnj_qfo1hIi-uEkUpOZ8aLTZGHfpl05
         jMwbKkTe2yK3mjF6SBAsgicQDVCkcY9BLluzx1RmC3ORXaM0JaHPB93Y
         cdSDGgpgBWMVrNU1ErkjcMqMoT_wtCex3w03XdLkjXIuEr2hWgeP-nkU
         ZTPU9EoGSPj6fAS-bSz87RCPrxZdj_iVyC6QWcqAu07WNhjzJEPc4jVn
         tRJ6K53NgPQ5p99l3Z408OUqj4ioYezbS6vTPlQ",
     "tag": "WuGzxmcreYjpHGJoa17EBg"
   }

                       Figure 94: JSON Serialization

4.5.  Key Agreement using ECDH-ES with AES-CBC-HMAC-SHA2

   This example illustrates encrypting content using the "ECDH-ES"
   (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral-Static) key agreement
   algorithm and the "A128CBC-HS256" (AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA-256) content
   encryption algorithm.

4.5.1.  Input Factors

   The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process:

   o  Plaintext content; this example uses the content from Figure 51.

   o  EC public key; this example uses the public key from Figure 95.

   o  "alg" parameter of "ECDH-ES"

   o  "enc" parameter of "A128CBC-HS256"







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   {
     "kty": "EC",
     "kid": "meriadoc.brandybuck@buckland.example",
     "use": "enc",
     "crv": "P-256",
     "x": "Ze2loSV3wrroKUN_4zhwGhCqo3Xhu1td4QjeQ5wIVR0",
     "y": "HlLtdXARY_f55A3fnzQbPcm6hgr34Mp8p-nuzQCE0Zw",
     "d": "r_kHyZ-a06rmxM3yESK84r1otSg-aQcVStkRhA-iCM8"
   }

                    Figure 95: Elliptic Curve P-256 Key

   (*NOTE*: While the key includes the private parameters, only the
   public parameters "crv", "x", and "y" are necessary for the
   encryption operation.)

4.5.2.  Generated Factors

   The following are generated before encrypting:

   o  Initialization vector/nonce; this examples uses the initialization
      vector/nonce from Figure 96.

   yc9N8v5sYyv3iGQT926IUg

            Figure 96: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded

   *NOTE*: The Content Encryption Key (CEK) is not randomly generated;
   instead it is determined using key agreement.

4.5.3.  Key Agreement

   The following are generated to agree on a CEK:

   o  Ephemeral private key; this example uses the private key from
      Figure 97.

   {
     "kty": "EC",
     "crv": "P-256",
     "x": "mPUKT_bAWGHIhg0TpjjqVsP1rXWQu_vwVOHHtNkdYoA",
     "y": "8BQAsImGeAS46fyWw5MhYfGTT0IjBpFw2SS34Dv4Irs",
     "d": "AtH35vJsQ9SGjYfOsjUxYXQKrPH3FjZHmEtSKoSN8cM"
   }

              Figure 97: Ephemeral public key, in JWK format





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   Performing the ECDH operation using the static EC public key
   (Figure 95) over the ephemeral private key Figure 97) produces the
   following CEK:

   hzHdlfQIAEehb8Hrd_mFRhKsKLEzPfshfXs9l6areCc

      Figure 98: Agreed-to Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded

4.5.4.  Encrypting the Content

   The following are generated before encrypting the content:

   o  Protected JWE Header; this example uses the header from Figure 99,
      encoded to [RFC4648] as Figure 100.

   {
     "alg": "ECDH-ES",
     "kid": "meriadoc.brandybuck@buckland.example",
     "epk": {
       "kty": "EC",
       "crv": "P-256",
       "x": "mPUKT_bAWGHIhg0TpjjqVsP1rXWQu_vwVOHHtNkdYoA",
       "y": "8BQAsImGeAS46fyWw5MhYfGTT0IjBpFw2SS34Dv4Irs"
     },
     "enc": "A128CBC-HS256"
   }

                   Figure 99: Protected JWE Header JSON

   eyJhbGciOiJFQ0RILUVTIiwia2lkIjoibWVyaWFkb2MuYnJhbmR5YnVja0BidW
   NrbGFuZC5leGFtcGxlIiwiZXBrIjp7Imt0eSI6IkVDIiwiY3J2IjoiUC0yNTYi
   LCJ4IjoibVBVS1RfYkFXR0hJaGcwVHBqanFWc1AxclhXUXVfdndWT0hIdE5rZF
   lvQSIsInkiOiI4QlFBc0ltR2VBUzQ2ZnlXdzVNaFlmR1RUMElqQnBGdzJTUzM0
   RHY0SXJzIn0sImVuYyI6IkExMjhDQkMtSFMyNTYifQ

            Figure 100: Protected JWE Header, base64url-encoded

   Performing the content encryption operation on the Plaintext
   (Figure 51) using the following:

   o  CEK (Figure 98);

   o  Initialization vector/nonce (Figure 96); and

   o  Protected JWE header (Figure 100) as authenticated data

   produces the following:




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   o  Ciphertext from Figure 101.

   o  Authentication tag from Figure 102.

   BoDlwPnTypYq-ivjmQvAYJLb5Q6l-F3LIgQomlz87yW4OPKbWE1zSTEFjDfhU9
   IPIOSA9Bml4m7iDFwA-1ZXvHteLDtw4R1XRGMEsDIqAYtskTTmzmzNa-_q4F_e
   vAPUmwlO-ZG45Mnq4uhM1fm_D9rBtWolqZSF3xGNNkpOMQKF1Cl8i8wjzRli7-
   IXgyirlKQsbhhqRzkv8IcY6aHl24j03C-AR2le1r7URUhArM79BY8soZU0lzwI
   -sD5PZ3l4NDCCei9XkoIAfsXJWmySPoeRb2Ni5UZL4mYpvKDiwmyzGd65KqVw7
   MsFfI_K767G9C9Azp73gKZD0DyUn1mn0WW5LmyX_yJ-3AROq8p1WZBfG-ZyJ61
   95_JGG2m9Csg

                 Figure 101: Ciphertext, base64url-encoded

   WCCkNa-x4BeB9hIDIfFuhg

             Figure 102: Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded

4.5.5.  Output Results

   The following compose the resulting JWE object:

   o  Protected JWE header (Figure 90)

   o  Initialization vector/nonce (Figure 86)

   o  Ciphertext (Figure 91)

   o  Authentication tag (Figure 92)

   the resulting JWE object using the Compact serialization:




















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   eyJhbGciOiJFQ0RILUVTIiwia2lkIjoibWVyaWFkb2MuYnJhbmR5YnVja0BidW
   NrbGFuZC5leGFtcGxlIiwiZXBrIjp7Imt0eSI6IkVDIiwiY3J2IjoiUC0yNTYi
   LCJ4IjoibVBVS1RfYkFXR0hJaGcwVHBqanFWc1AxclhXUXVfdndWT0hIdE5rZF
   lvQSIsInkiOiI4QlFBc0ltR2VBUzQ2ZnlXdzVNaFlmR1RUMElqQnBGdzJTUzM0
   RHY0SXJzIn0sImVuYyI6IkExMjhDQkMtSFMyNTYifQ
   .
   .
   yc9N8v5sYyv3iGQT926IUg
   .
   BoDlwPnTypYq-ivjmQvAYJLb5Q6l-F3LIgQomlz87yW4OPKbWE1zSTEFjDfhU9
   IPIOSA9Bml4m7iDFwA-1ZXvHteLDtw4R1XRGMEsDIqAYtskTTmzmzNa-_q4F_e
   vAPUmwlO-ZG45Mnq4uhM1fm_D9rBtWolqZSF3xGNNkpOMQKF1Cl8i8wjzRli7-
   IXgyirlKQsbhhqRzkv8IcY6aHl24j03C-AR2le1r7URUhArM79BY8soZU0lzwI
   -sD5PZ3l4NDCCei9XkoIAfsXJWmySPoeRb2Ni5UZL4mYpvKDiwmyzGd65KqVw7
   MsFfI_K767G9C9Azp73gKZD0DyUn1mn0WW5LmyX_yJ-3AROq8p1WZBfG-ZyJ61
   95_JGG2m9Csg
   .
   WCCkNa-x4BeB9hIDIfFuhg

                     Figure 103: Compact Serialization

   the resulting JWE object using the JSON serialization:

   {
     "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJFQ0RILUVTIiwia2lkIjoibWVyaWFkb2MuYn
         JhbmR5YnVja0BidWNrbGFuZC5leGFtcGxlIiwiZXBrIjp7Imt0eSI6Ik
         VDIiwiY3J2IjoiUC0yNTYiLCJ4IjoibVBVS1RfYkFXR0hJaGcwVHBqan
         FWc1AxclhXUXVfdndWT0hIdE5rZFlvQSIsInkiOiI4QlFBc0ltR2VBUz
         Q2ZnlXdzVNaFlmR1RUMElqQnBGdzJTUzM0RHY0SXJzIn0sImVuYyI6Ik
         ExMjhDQkMtSFMyNTYifQ",
     "iv": "yc9N8v5sYyv3iGQT926IUg",
     "ciphertext": "BoDlwPnTypYq-ivjmQvAYJLb5Q6l-F3LIgQomlz87yW4O
         PKbWE1zSTEFjDfhU9IPIOSA9Bml4m7iDFwA-1ZXvHteLDtw4R1XRGMEs
         DIqAYtskTTmzmzNa-_q4F_evAPUmwlO-ZG45Mnq4uhM1fm_D9rBtWolq
         ZSF3xGNNkpOMQKF1Cl8i8wjzRli7-IXgyirlKQsbhhqRzkv8IcY6aHl2
         4j03C-AR2le1r7URUhArM79BY8soZU0lzwI-sD5PZ3l4NDCCei9XkoIA
         fsXJWmySPoeRb2Ni5UZL4mYpvKDiwmyzGd65KqVw7MsFfI_K767G9C9A
         zp73gKZD0DyUn1mn0WW5LmyX_yJ-3AROq8p1WZBfG-ZyJ6195_JGG2m9
         Csg",
     "tag": "WCCkNa-x4BeB9hIDIfFuhg"
   }

                      Figure 104: JSON Serialization








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4.6.  Direct Encryption using AES-GCM

   This example illustrates encrypting content using a previously
   exchanged key directly and the "A128GCM" (AES-GCM) content encryption
   algorithm.

4.6.1.  Input Factors

   The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process:

   o  Plaintext content; this example uses the content from Figure 51.

   o  AES symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key (CEK); this
      example uses the key from Figure 105.

   o  "alg" parameter of "dir"

   o  "enc" parameter of "A128GCM"

   {
     "kty": "oct",
     "kid": "77c7e2b8-6e13-45cf-8672-617b5b45243a",
     "use": "enc",
     "alg": "A128GCM",
     "k": "XctOhJAkA-pD9Lh7ZgW_2A"
   }

                Figure 105: AES 128-bit key, in JWK format

4.6.2.  Generated Factors

   The following are generated before encrypting:

   o  Initialization vector/nonce; this example uses the initialization
      vector/nonce from Figure 106.

   refa467QzzKx6QAB

           Figure 106: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded

4.6.3.  Encrypting the Content

   The following are generated before encrypting the content:

   o  Protected JWE Header; this example uses the header from
      Figure 107, encoded as [RFC4648] base64url to produce Figure 108.





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   {
     "alg": "dir",
     "kid": "77c7e2b8-6e13-45cf-8672-617b5b45243a",
     "enc": "A128GCM"
   }

                   Figure 107: Protected JWE Header JSON

   Encoded as [RFC4648] base64url:

   eyJhbGciOiJkaXIiLCJraWQiOiI3N2M3ZTJiOC02ZTEzLTQ1Y2YtODY3Mi02MT
   diNWI0NTI0M2EiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0

            Figure 108: Protected JWE Header, base64url-encoded

   Performing the encryption operation on the Plaintext (Figure 51)
   using the following:

   o  CEK (Figure 105);

   o  Initialization vector/nonce (Figure 106); and

   o  Protected JWE header (Figure 108) as authenticated data

   produces the following:

   o  Ciphertext from Figure 109.

   o  Authentication tag from Figure 110.

   JW_i_f52hww_ELQPGaYyeAB6HYGcR559l9TYnSovc23XJoBcW29rHP8yZOZG7Y
   hLpT1bjFuvZPjQS-m0IFtVcXkZXdH_lr_FrdYt9HRUYkshtrMmIUAyGmUnd9zM
   DB2n0cRDIHAzFVeJUDxkUwVAE7_YGRPdcqMyiBoCO-FBdE-Nceb4h3-FtBP-c_
   BIwCPTjb9o0SbdcdREEMJMyZBH8ySWMVi1gPD9yxi-aQpGbSv_F9N4IZAxscj5
   g-NJsUPbjk29-s7LJAGb15wEBtXphVCgyy53CoIKLHHeJHXex45Uz9aKZSRSIn
   ZI-wjsY0yu3cT4_aQ3i1o-tiE-F8Ios61EKgyIQ4CWao8PFMj8TTnp

                 Figure 109: Ciphertext, base64url-encoded

   vbb32Xvllea2OtmHAdccRQ

             Figure 110: Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded

4.6.4.  Output Results

   The following compose the resulting JWE object:

   o  Protected JWE header (Figure 108)



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   o  Initialization vector/nonce (Figure 106)

   o  Ciphertext (Figure 109)

   o  Authentication tag (Figure 110)

   The resulting JWE object using the Compact serialization:

   eyJhbGciOiJkaXIiLCJraWQiOiI3N2M3ZTJiOC02ZTEzLTQ1Y2YtODY3Mi02MT
   diNWI0NTI0M2EiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0
   .
   .
   refa467QzzKx6QAB
   .
   JW_i_f52hww_ELQPGaYyeAB6HYGcR559l9TYnSovc23XJoBcW29rHP8yZOZG7Y
   hLpT1bjFuvZPjQS-m0IFtVcXkZXdH_lr_FrdYt9HRUYkshtrMmIUAyGmUnd9zM
   DB2n0cRDIHAzFVeJUDxkUwVAE7_YGRPdcqMyiBoCO-FBdE-Nceb4h3-FtBP-c_
   BIwCPTjb9o0SbdcdREEMJMyZBH8ySWMVi1gPD9yxi-aQpGbSv_F9N4IZAxscj5
   g-NJsUPbjk29-s7LJAGb15wEBtXphVCgyy53CoIKLHHeJHXex45Uz9aKZSRSIn
   ZI-wjsY0yu3cT4_aQ3i1o-tiE-F8Ios61EKgyIQ4CWao8PFMj8TTnp
   .
   vbb32Xvllea2OtmHAdccRQ

                     Figure 111: Compact Serialization

   The resulting JWE object using the JSON serialization:

   {
     "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJkaXIiLCJraWQiOiI3N2M3ZTJiOC02ZTEzLT
         Q1Y2YtODY3Mi02MTdiNWI0NTI0M2EiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0",
     "iv": "refa467QzzKx6QAB",
     "ciphertext": "JW_i_f52hww_ELQPGaYyeAB6HYGcR559l9TYnSovc23XJ
         oBcW29rHP8yZOZG7YhLpT1bjFuvZPjQS-m0IFtVcXkZXdH_lr_FrdYt9
         HRUYkshtrMmIUAyGmUnd9zMDB2n0cRDIHAzFVeJUDxkUwVAE7_YGRPdc
         qMyiBoCO-FBdE-Nceb4h3-FtBP-c_BIwCPTjb9o0SbdcdREEMJMyZBH8
         ySWMVi1gPD9yxi-aQpGbSv_F9N4IZAxscj5g-NJsUPbjk29-s7LJAGb1
         5wEBtXphVCgyy53CoIKLHHeJHXex45Uz9aKZSRSInZI-wjsY0yu3cT4_
         aQ3i1o-tiE-F8Ios61EKgyIQ4CWao8PFMj8TTnp",
     "tag": "vbb32Xvllea2OtmHAdccRQ"
   }

                      Figure 112: JSON Serialization

4.7.  Key Wrap using AES-GCM KeyWrap with AES-CBC-HMAC-SHA2

   This example illustrates encrypting content using the "A256GCMKW"
   (AES-256-GCM-KeyWrap) key encryption algorithm with the "A128CBC-
   HS256" (AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA-256) content encryption algorithm.



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4.7.1.  Input Factors

   The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process:

   o  Plaintext content; this example uses the content from Figure 51.

   o  AES symmetric key; this example uses the key from Figure 113.

   o  "alg" parameter of "A256GCMKW"

   o  "enc" parameter of "A128CBC-HS256"

   {
     "kty": "oct",
     "kid": "18ec08e1-bfa9-4d95-b205-2b4dd1d4321d",
     "use": "enc",
     "alg": "A256GCMKW",
     "k": "qC57l_uxcm7Nm3K-ct4GFjx8tM1U8CZ0NLBvdQstiS8"
   }

                        Figure 113: AES 256-bit Key

4.7.2.  Generated Factors

   The following are generated before encrypting:

   o  AES symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key (CEK); this
      example uses the key from Figure 114.

   o  Initialization vector/nonce for content encryption; this example
      uses the initialization vector/nonce from Figure 115.

   UWxARpat23nL9ReIj4WG3D1ee9I4r-Mv5QLuFXdy_rE

           Figure 114: Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded

   gz6NjyEFNm_vm8Gj6FwoFQ

           Figure 115: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded

4.7.3.  Encrypting the Key

   The following are generated before encrypting the CEK:

   o  Initialization vector/nonce for key wrapping; this example uses
      the initialization vector/nonce from Figure 116.





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   KkYT0GX_2jHlfqN_

       Figure 116: Key Wrap Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded

   Performing the key encryption operation over the CEK (Figure 114)
   with the following:

   o  AES symmetric key (Figure 113);

   o  Key wrap initialization vector/nonce (Figure 116); and

   o  The empty string as authenticated data

   produces the following:

   o  Encrypted Key from Figure 117.

   o  Key wrap authentication tag from Figure 118.

   lJf3HbOApxMEBkCMOoTnnABxs_CvTWUmZQ2ElLvYNok

               Figure 117: Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded

   kfPduVQ3T3H6vnewt--ksw

        Figure 118: Key Wrap Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded

4.7.4.  Encrypting the Content

   The following are generated before encrypting the content:

   o  Protected JWE Header; this example uses the header from
      Figure 119, encoded to [RFC4648] base64url as Figure 120.

   {
     "alg": "A256GCMKW",
     "kid": "18ec08e1-bfa9-4d95-b205-2b4dd1d4321d",
     "tag": "kfPduVQ3T3H6vnewt--ksw",
     "iv": "KkYT0GX_2jHlfqN_",
     "enc": "A128CBC-HS256"
   }

                   Figure 119: Protected JWE Header JSON








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   eyJhbGciOiJBMjU2R0NNS1ciLCJraWQiOiIxOGVjMDhlMS1iZmE5LTRkOTUtYj
   IwNS0yYjRkZDFkNDMyMWQiLCJ0YWciOiJrZlBkdVZRM1QzSDZ2bmV3dC0ta3N3
   IiwiaXYiOiJLa1lUMEdYXzJqSGxmcU5fIiwiZW5jIjoiQTEyOENCQy1IUzI1Ni
   J9

            Figure 120: Protected JWE Header, base64url-encoded

   Performing the content encryption operation over the Plaintext
   (Figure 51) with the following:

   o  CEK (Figure 114);

   o  Initialization vector/nonce (Figure 115); and

   o  Protected JWE header (Figure 120) as authenticated data

   produces the following:

   o  Ciphertext from Figure 121.

   o  Authentication tag from Figure 122.

   Jf5p9-ZhJlJy_IQ_byKFmI0Ro7w7G1QiaZpI8OaiVgD8EqoDZHyFKFBupS8iaE
   eVIgMqWmsuJKuoVgzR3YfzoMd3GxEm3VxNhzWyWtZKX0gxKdy6HgLvqoGNbZCz
   LjqcpDiF8q2_62EVAbr2uSc2oaxFmFuIQHLcqAHxy51449xkjZ7ewzZaGV3eFq
   hpco8o4DijXaG5_7kp3h2cajRfDgymuxUbWgLqaeNQaJtvJmSMFuEOSAzw9Hde
   b6yhdTynCRmu-kqtO5Dec4lT2OMZKpnxc_F1_4yDJFcqb5CiDSmA-psB2k0Jtj
   xAj4UPI61oONK7zzFIu4gBfjJCndsZfdvG7h8wGjV98QhrKEnR7xKZ3KCr0_qR
   1B-gxpNk3xWU

                 Figure 121: Ciphertext, base64url-encoded

   DKW7jrb4WaRSNfbXVPlT5g

             Figure 122: Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded

4.7.5.  Output Results

   The following compose the resulting JWE object:

   o  Protected JWE header (Figure 120)

   o  encrypted key (Figure 117)

   o  Initialization vector/nonce (Figure 115)

   o  Ciphertext (Figure 121)




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   o  Authentication tag (Figure 122)

   The resulting JWE object using the Compact serialization:

   eyJhbGciOiJBMjU2R0NNS1ciLCJraWQiOiIxOGVjMDhlMS1iZmE5LTRkOTUtYj
   IwNS0yYjRkZDFkNDMyMWQiLCJ0YWciOiJrZlBkdVZRM1QzSDZ2bmV3dC0ta3N3
   IiwiaXYiOiJLa1lUMEdYXzJqSGxmcU5fIiwiZW5jIjoiQTEyOENCQy1IUzI1Ni
   J9
   .
   lJf3HbOApxMEBkCMOoTnnABxs_CvTWUmZQ2ElLvYNok
   .
   gz6NjyEFNm_vm8Gj6FwoFQ
   .
   Jf5p9-ZhJlJy_IQ_byKFmI0Ro7w7G1QiaZpI8OaiVgD8EqoDZHyFKFBupS8iaE
   eVIgMqWmsuJKuoVgzR3YfzoMd3GxEm3VxNhzWyWtZKX0gxKdy6HgLvqoGNbZCz
   LjqcpDiF8q2_62EVAbr2uSc2oaxFmFuIQHLcqAHxy51449xkjZ7ewzZaGV3eFq
   hpco8o4DijXaG5_7kp3h2cajRfDgymuxUbWgLqaeNQaJtvJmSMFuEOSAzw9Hde
   b6yhdTynCRmu-kqtO5Dec4lT2OMZKpnxc_F1_4yDJFcqb5CiDSmA-psB2k0Jtj
   xAj4UPI61oONK7zzFIu4gBfjJCndsZfdvG7h8wGjV98QhrKEnR7xKZ3KCr0_qR
   1B-gxpNk3xWU
   .
   DKW7jrb4WaRSNfbXVPlT5g

                     Figure 123: Compact Serialization

   The resulting JWE object using the JSON serialization:

























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   {
     "recipients": [
       {
         "encrypted_key": "lJf3HbOApxMEBkCMOoTnnABxs_CvTWUmZQ2ElL
             vYNok"
       }
     ],
     "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJBMjU2R0NNS1ciLCJraWQiOiIxOGVjMDhlMS
         1iZmE5LTRkOTUtYjIwNS0yYjRkZDFkNDMyMWQiLCJ0YWciOiJrZlBkdV
         ZRM1QzSDZ2bmV3dC0ta3N3IiwiaXYiOiJLa1lUMEdYXzJqSGxmcU5fIi
         wiZW5jIjoiQTEyOENCQy1IUzI1NiJ9",
     "iv": "gz6NjyEFNm_vm8Gj6FwoFQ",
     "ciphertext": "Jf5p9-ZhJlJy_IQ_byKFmI0Ro7w7G1QiaZpI8OaiVgD8E
         qoDZHyFKFBupS8iaEeVIgMqWmsuJKuoVgzR3YfzoMd3GxEm3VxNhzWyW
         tZKX0gxKdy6HgLvqoGNbZCzLjqcpDiF8q2_62EVAbr2uSc2oaxFmFuIQ
         HLcqAHxy51449xkjZ7ewzZaGV3eFqhpco8o4DijXaG5_7kp3h2cajRfD
         gymuxUbWgLqaeNQaJtvJmSMFuEOSAzw9Hdeb6yhdTynCRmu-kqtO5Dec
         4lT2OMZKpnxc_F1_4yDJFcqb5CiDSmA-psB2k0JtjxAj4UPI61oONK7z
         zFIu4gBfjJCndsZfdvG7h8wGjV98QhrKEnR7xKZ3KCr0_qR1B-gxpNk3
         xWU",
     "tag": "DKW7jrb4WaRSNfbXVPlT5g"
   }

                      Figure 124: JSON Serialization

4.8.  Key Wrap using AES-KeyWrap with AES-GCM

   The following example illustrates content encryption using the
   "A128KW" (AES-128-KeyWrap) key encryption algorithm and the "A128GCM"
   (AES-128-GCM) content encryption algorithm.

4.8.1.  Input Factors

   The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process:

   o  Plaintext content; this example uses the content from Figure 51.

   o  AES symmetric key; this example uses the key from Figure 125.

   o  "alg" parameter of "A128KW"

   o  "enc" parameter of "A128GCM"









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   {
     "kty": "oct",
     "kid": "81b20965-8332-43d9-a468-82160ad91ac8",
     "use": "enc",
     "alg": "A128KW",
     "k": "GZy6sIZ6wl9NJOKB-jnmVQ"
   }

                        Figure 125: AES 128-Bit Key

4.8.2.  Generated Factors

   The following are generated before encrypting:

   o  AES symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key; this example uses
      the key from Figure 126.

   o  Initialization vector/nonce; this example uses the initialization
      vector/nonce from Figure 127.

   aY5_Ghmk9KxWPBLu_glx1w

           Figure 126: Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded

   Qx0pmsDa8KnJc9Jo

           Figure 127: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded

4.8.3.  Encrypting the Key

   Performing the key encryption operation over the CEK (Figure 126)
   with the AES key (Figure 125) produces the following encrypted key:

   CBI6oDw8MydIx1IBntf_lQcw2MmJKIQx

               Figure 128: Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded

4.8.4.  Encrypting the Content

   The following are generated before encrypting the content:

   o  Protected JWE Header; this example uses the header from
      Figure 129, encoded to [RFC4648] base64url as Figure 130.








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   {
     "alg": "A128KW",
     "kid": "81b20965-8332-43d9-a468-82160ad91ac8",
     "enc": "A128GCM"
   }

                   Figure 129: Protected JWE Header JSON

   eyJhbGciOiJBMTI4S1ciLCJraWQiOiI4MWIyMDk2NS04MzMyLTQzZDktYTQ2OC
   04MjE2MGFkOTFhYzgiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0

            Figure 130: Protected JWE Header, base64url-encoded

   Performing the content encryption over the Plaintext (Figure 51) with
   the following:

   o  CEK (Figure 126);

   o  Initialization vector/nonce (Figure 127); and

   o  Protected JWE header (Figure 130) as authenticated data

   produces the following:

   o  Ciphertext from Figure 131.

   o  Authentication tag from Figure 132.

   AwliP-KmWgsZ37BvzCefNen6VTbRK3QMA4TkvRkH0tP1bTdhtFJgJxeVmJkLD6
   1A1hnWGetdg11c9ADsnWgL56NyxwSYjU1ZEHcGkd3EkU0vjHi9gTlb90qSYFfe
   F0LwkcTtjbYKCsiNJQkcIp1yeM03OmuiYSoYJVSpf7ej6zaYcMv3WwdxDFl8RE
   wOhNImk2Xld2JXq6BR53TSFkyT7PwVLuq-1GwtGHlQeg7gDT6xW0JqHDPn_H-p
   uQsmthc9Zg0ojmJfqqFvETUxLAF-KjcBTS5dNy6egwkYtOt8EIHK-oEsKYtZRa
   a8Z7MOZ7UGxGIMvEmxrGCPeJa14slv2-gaqK0kEThkaSqdYw0FkQZF

                 Figure 131: Ciphertext, base64url-encoded

   And authentication tag:

   ER7MWJZ1FBI_NKvn7Zb1Lw

             Figure 132: Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded

4.8.5.  Output Results

   The following compose the resulting JWE object:

   o  Protected JWE header (Figure 130)



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   o  encrypted key (Figure 128)

   o  Initialization vector/nonce (Figure 127)

   o  Ciphertext (Figure 131)

   o  Authentication tag (Figure 132)

   The resulting JWE object using the Compact serialization:

   eyJhbGciOiJBMTI4S1ciLCJraWQiOiI4MWIyMDk2NS04MzMyLTQzZDktYTQ2OC
   04MjE2MGFkOTFhYzgiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0
   .
   CBI6oDw8MydIx1IBntf_lQcw2MmJKIQx
   .
   Qx0pmsDa8KnJc9Jo
   .
   AwliP-KmWgsZ37BvzCefNen6VTbRK3QMA4TkvRkH0tP1bTdhtFJgJxeVmJkLD6
   1A1hnWGetdg11c9ADsnWgL56NyxwSYjU1ZEHcGkd3EkU0vjHi9gTlb90qSYFfe
   F0LwkcTtjbYKCsiNJQkcIp1yeM03OmuiYSoYJVSpf7ej6zaYcMv3WwdxDFl8RE
   wOhNImk2Xld2JXq6BR53TSFkyT7PwVLuq-1GwtGHlQeg7gDT6xW0JqHDPn_H-p
   uQsmthc9Zg0ojmJfqqFvETUxLAF-KjcBTS5dNy6egwkYtOt8EIHK-oEsKYtZRa
   a8Z7MOZ7UGxGIMvEmxrGCPeJa14slv2-gaqK0kEThkaSqdYw0FkQZF
   .
   ER7MWJZ1FBI_NKvn7Zb1Lw

                     Figure 133: Compact Serialization

   The resulting JWE object using the JSON serialization:






















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   {
     "recipients": [
       {
         "encrypted_key": "CBI6oDw8MydIx1IBntf_lQcw2MmJKIQx"
       }
     ],
     "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJBMTI4S1ciLCJraWQiOiI4MWIyMDk2NS04Mz
         MyLTQzZDktYTQ2OC04MjE2MGFkOTFhYzgiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn
         0",
     "iv": "Qx0pmsDa8KnJc9Jo",
     "ciphertext": "AwliP-KmWgsZ37BvzCefNen6VTbRK3QMA4TkvRkH0tP1b
         TdhtFJgJxeVmJkLD61A1hnWGetdg11c9ADsnWgL56NyxwSYjU1ZEHcGk
         d3EkU0vjHi9gTlb90qSYFfeF0LwkcTtjbYKCsiNJQkcIp1yeM03OmuiY
         SoYJVSpf7ej6zaYcMv3WwdxDFl8REwOhNImk2Xld2JXq6BR53TSFkyT7
         PwVLuq-1GwtGHlQeg7gDT6xW0JqHDPn_H-puQsmthc9Zg0ojmJfqqFvE
         TUxLAF-KjcBTS5dNy6egwkYtOt8EIHK-oEsKYtZRaa8Z7MOZ7UGxGIMv
         EmxrGCPeJa14slv2-gaqK0kEThkaSqdYw0FkQZF",
     "tag": "ER7MWJZ1FBI_NKvn7Zb1Lw"
   }

                      Figure 134: JSON Serialization

4.9.  Compressed Content

   This example illustrates encrypting content that is first compressed.
   It reuses the AES key, key encryption algorithm, and content
   encryption algorithm from Section 4.8.

4.9.1.  Input Factors

   The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process:

   o  Plaintext content; this example uses the content from Figure 51.

   o  Recipient encryption key; this example uses the key from
      Figure 125.

   o  Key encryption algorithm; this example uses "A128KW".

   o  Content encryption algorithm; this example uses "A128GCM".

   o  "zip" parameter as "DEF".

4.9.2.  Generated Factors

   The following are generated before encrypting:





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   o  Compressed plaintext from the original plaintext content;
      compressing Figure 51 using the DEFLATE [RFC1951] algorithm
      produces the compressed plaintext from Figure 135.

   o  AES symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key (CEK); this
      example uses the key from Figure 136.

   o  Initialization vector/nonce; this example uses the initialization
      vector/nonce from Figure 137.

   bY_BDcIwDEVX-QNU3QEOrIA4pqlDokYxchxVvbEDGzIJbioOSJwc-f___HPjBu
   8KVFpVtAplVE1-wZo0YjNZo3C7R5v72pV5f5X382VWjYQpqZKAyjziZOr2B7kQ
   PSy6oZIXUnDYbVKN4jNXi2u0yB7t1qSHTjmMODf9QgvrDzfTIQXnyQRuUya4zI
   WG3vTOdir0v7BRHFYWq3k1k1A_gSDJqtcBF-GZxw8

            Figure 135: Compressed Plaintext, base64url-encoded

   hC-MpLZSuwWv8sexS6ydfw

           Figure 136: Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded

   p9pUq6XHY0jfEZIl

           Figure 137: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded

4.9.3.  Encrypting the Key

   Performing the key encryption operation over the CEK (Figure 136)
   with the AES key (Figure 125) produces the following encrypted key:

   5vUT2WOtQxKWcekM_IzVQwkGgzlFDwPi

               Figure 138: Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded

4.9.4.  Encrypting the Content

   The following are generated before encrypting the content:

   o  Protected JWE Header; this example uses the header from
      Figure 139, encoded as [RFC4648] base64url as Figure 140.











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   {
     "alg": "A128KW",
     "kid": "81b20965-8332-43d9-a468-82160ad91ac8",
     "enc": "A128GCM",
     "zip": "DEF"
   }

                   Figure 139: Protected JWE Header JSON

   eyJhbGciOiJBMTI4S1ciLCJraWQiOiI4MWIyMDk2NS04MzMyLTQzZDktYTQ2OC
   04MjE2MGFkOTFhYzgiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIiwiemlwIjoiREVGIn0

            Figure 140: Protected JWE Header, base64url-encoded

   Performing the content encryption operation over the compressed
   Plaintext (Figure 135, encoded as an octet string) with the
   following:

   o  CEK (Figure 136);

   o  Initialization vector/nonce (Figure 137); and

   o  Protected JWE header (Figure 140) as authenticated data

   produces the following:

   o  Ciphertext from Figure 141.

   o  Authentication tag from Figure 142.

   HbDtOsdai1oYziSx25KEeTxmwnh8L8jKMFNc1k3zmMI6VB8hry57tDZ61jXyez
   SPt0fdLVfe6Jf5y5-JaCap_JQBcb5opbmT60uWGml8blyiMQmOn9J--XhhlYg0
   m-BHaqfDO5iTOWxPxFMUedx7WCy8mxgDHj0aBMG6152PsM-w5E_o2B3jDbrYBK
   hpYA7qi3AyijnCJ7BP9rr3U8kxExCpG3mK420TjOw

                 Figure 141: Ciphertext, base64url-encoded

   And authentication tag:

   VILuUwuIxaLVmh5X-T7kmA

             Figure 142: Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded

4.9.5.  Output Results

   The following compose the resulting JWE object:

   o  Protected JWE header (Figure 140)



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   o  encrypted key (Figure 138)

   o  Initialization vector/nonce (Figure 137)

   o  Ciphertext (Figure 141)

   o  Authentication tag (Figure 142)

   The resulting JWE object using the Compact serialization:

   eyJhbGciOiJBMTI4S1ciLCJraWQiOiI4MWIyMDk2NS04MzMyLTQzZDktYTQ2OC
   04MjE2MGFkOTFhYzgiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIiwiemlwIjoiREVGIn0
   .
   5vUT2WOtQxKWcekM_IzVQwkGgzlFDwPi
   .
   p9pUq6XHY0jfEZIl
   .
   HbDtOsdai1oYziSx25KEeTxmwnh8L8jKMFNc1k3zmMI6VB8hry57tDZ61jXyez
   SPt0fdLVfe6Jf5y5-JaCap_JQBcb5opbmT60uWGml8blyiMQmOn9J--XhhlYg0
   m-BHaqfDO5iTOWxPxFMUedx7WCy8mxgDHj0aBMG6152PsM-w5E_o2B3jDbrYBK
   hpYA7qi3AyijnCJ7BP9rr3U8kxExCpG3mK420TjOw
   .
   VILuUwuIxaLVmh5X-T7kmA

                     Figure 143: Compact Serialization

   The resulting JWE object using the JSON serialization:

   {
     "recipients": [
       {
         "encrypted_key": "5vUT2WOtQxKWcekM_IzVQwkGgzlFDwPi"
       }
     ],
     "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJBMTI4S1ciLCJraWQiOiI4MWIyMDk2NS04Mz
         MyLTQzZDktYTQ2OC04MjE2MGFkOTFhYzgiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIi
         wiemlwIjoiREVGIn0",
     "iv": "p9pUq6XHY0jfEZIl",
     "ciphertext": "HbDtOsdai1oYziSx25KEeTxmwnh8L8jKMFNc1k3zmMI6V
         B8hry57tDZ61jXyezSPt0fdLVfe6Jf5y5-JaCap_JQBcb5opbmT60uWG
         ml8blyiMQmOn9J--XhhlYg0m-BHaqfDO5iTOWxPxFMUedx7WCy8mxgDH
         j0aBMG6152PsM-w5E_o2B3jDbrYBKhpYA7qi3AyijnCJ7BP9rr3U8kxE
         xCpG3mK420TjOw",
     "tag": "VILuUwuIxaLVmh5X-T7kmA"
   }

                      Figure 144: JSON Serialization




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4.10.  Including Additional Authenticated Data

   This example illustrates encrypting content that includes additional
   authenticated data.  As this example includes an additional top-level
   property not present in the Compact serialization, only the JSON
   serialization is possible.

4.10.1.  Input Factors

   The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process:

   o  Plaintext content; this example uses the content from Figure 51.

   o  Recipient encryption key; this example uses the key from
      Figure 125.

   o  Key encryption algorithm; this example uses "A128KW".

   o  Content encryption algorithm; this example uses "A128GCM".

   o  Additional authenticated data; this example uses a [RFC7095] vCard
      from Figure 145, serialized to UTF-8.

   [
     "vcard",
     [
       [ "version", {}, "text", "4.0" ],
       [ "fn", {}, "text", "Meriadoc Brandybuck" ],
       [ "n", {},
         "text", [
           "Brandybuck", "Meriadoc", "Mr.", ""
         ]
       ],
       [ "bday", {}, "text", "TA 2982" ],
       [ "gender", {}, "text", "M" ]
     ]
   ]

         Figure 145: Additional Authenticated Data, in JSON format

   *NOTE* whitespace between JSON values added for readability.

4.10.2.  Generated Factors

   The following are generated before encrypting:

   o  AES symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key (CEK); this
      example uses the key from Figure 146.



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   o  Initialization vector/nonce; this example uses the initialization
      vector/nonce from Figure 147.

   o  Encoded additional authenticated data (AAD); this example uses the
      additional authenticated data from Figure 145, encoded to
      [RFC4648] base64url as Figure 148.

   75m1ALsYv10pZTKPWrsqdg

           Figure 146: Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded

   veCx9ece2orS7c_N

           Figure 147: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded

   WyJ2Y2FyZCIsW1sidmVyc2lvbiIse30sInRleHQiLCI0LjAiXSxbImZuIix7fS
   widGV4dCIsIk1lcmlhZG9jIEJyYW5keWJ1Y2siXSxbIm4iLHt9LCJ0ZXh0Iixb
   IkJyYW5keWJ1Y2siLCJNZXJpYWRvYyIsIk1yLiIsIiJdXSxbImJkYXkiLHt9LC
   J0ZXh0IiwiVEEgMjk4MiJdLFsiZ2VuZGVyIix7fSwidGV4dCIsIk0iXV1d

       Figure 148: Additional Authenticated Data, base64url-encoded

4.10.3.  Encrypting the Key

   Performing the key encryption operation over the CEK (Figure 146)
   with the AES key (Figure 125) produces the following encrypted key:

   4YiiQ_ZzH76TaIkJmYfRFgOV9MIpnx4X

               Figure 149: Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded

4.10.4.  Encrypting the Content

   The following are generated before encrypting the content:

   o  Protected JWE Header; this example uses the header from
      Figure 150, encoded to [RFC4648] base64url as Figure 151.

   {
     "alg": "A128KW",
     "kid": "81b20965-8332-43d9-a468-82160ad91ac8",
     "enc": "A128GCM"
   }

                   Figure 150: Protected JWE Header JSON






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   eyJhbGciOiJBMTI4S1ciLCJraWQiOiI4MWIyMDk2NS04MzMyLTQzZDktYTQ2OC
   04MjE2MGFkOTFhYzgiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0

            Figure 151: Protected JWE Header, base64url-encoded

   Performing the content encryption operation over the Plaintext with
   the following:

   o  CEK (Figure 146);

   o  Initialization vector/nonce (Figure 147); and

   o  Concatenation of the protected JWE header (Figure 151), ".", and
      the [RFC4648] base64url encoding of Figure 145 as authenticated
      data

   produces the following:

   o  Ciphertext from Figure 152.

   o  Authentication tag from Figure 153.

   Z_3cbr0k3bVM6N3oSNmHz7Lyf3iPppGf3Pj17wNZqteJ0Ui8p74SchQP8xygM1
   oFRWCNzeIa6s6BcEtp8qEFiqTUEyiNkOWDNoF14T_4NFqF-p2Mx8zkbKxI7oPK
   8KNarFbyxIDvICNqBLba-v3uzXBdB89fzOI-Lv4PjOFAQGHrgv1rjXAmKbgkft
   9cB4WeyZw8MldbBhc-V_KWZslrsLNygon_JJWd_ek6LQn5NRehvApqf9ZrxB4a
   q3FXBxOxCys35PhCdaggy2kfUfl2OkwKnWUbgXVD1C6HxLIlqHhCwXDG59weHr
   RDQeHyMRoBljoV3X_bUTJDnKBFOod7nLz-cj48JMx3SnCZTpbQAkFV

                 Figure 152: Ciphertext, base64url-encoded

   vOaH_Rajnpy_3hOtqvZHRA

             Figure 153: Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded

4.10.5.  Output Results

   The following compose the resulting JWE object:

   o  Protected JWE header (Figure 151)

   o  encrypted key (Figure 149)

   o  Initialization vector/nonce (Figure 147)

   o  Additional authenticated data (Figure 148)

   o  Ciphertext (Figure 152)



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   o  Authentication tag (Figure 153)

   The resulting JWE object using the JSON serialization:

   {
     "recipients": [
       {
         "encrypted_key": "4YiiQ_ZzH76TaIkJmYfRFgOV9MIpnx4X"
       }
     ],
     "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJBMTI4S1ciLCJraWQiOiI4MWIyMDk2NS04Mz
         MyLTQzZDktYTQ2OC04MjE2MGFkOTFhYzgiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn
         0",
     "iv": "veCx9ece2orS7c_N",
     "aad": "WyJ2Y2FyZCIsW1sidmVyc2lvbiIse30sInRleHQiLCI0LjAiXSxb
         ImZuIix7fSwidGV4dCIsIk1lcmlhZG9jIEJyYW5keWJ1Y2siXSxbIm4i
         LHt9LCJ0ZXh0IixbIkJyYW5keWJ1Y2siLCJNZXJpYWRvYyIsIk1yLiIs
         IiJdXSxbImJkYXkiLHt9LCJ0ZXh0IiwiVEEgMjk4MiJdLFsiZ2VuZGVy
         Iix7fSwidGV4dCIsIk0iXV1d",
     "ciphertext": "Z_3cbr0k3bVM6N3oSNmHz7Lyf3iPppGf3Pj17wNZqteJ0
         Ui8p74SchQP8xygM1oFRWCNzeIa6s6BcEtp8qEFiqTUEyiNkOWDNoF14
         T_4NFqF-p2Mx8zkbKxI7oPK8KNarFbyxIDvICNqBLba-v3uzXBdB89fz
         OI-Lv4PjOFAQGHrgv1rjXAmKbgkft9cB4WeyZw8MldbBhc-V_KWZslrs
         LNygon_JJWd_ek6LQn5NRehvApqf9ZrxB4aq3FXBxOxCys35PhCdaggy
         2kfUfl2OkwKnWUbgXVD1C6HxLIlqHhCwXDG59weHrRDQeHyMRoBljoV3
         X_bUTJDnKBFOod7nLz-cj48JMx3SnCZTpbQAkFV",
     "tag": "vOaH_Rajnpy_3hOtqvZHRA"
   }

                      Figure 154: JSON Serialization

4.11.  Protecting Specific Header Fields

   This example illustrates encrypting content where only certain JWE
   header parameters are protected.  As this example includes
   unprotected JWE header parameters, only the JSON serialization is
   possible.

4.11.1.  Input Factors

   The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process:

   o  Plaintext content; this example uses the content from Figure 51.

   o  Recipient encryption key; this example uses the key from
      Figure 125.

   o  Key encryption algorithm; this example uses "A128KW".



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   o  Content encryption algorithm; this example uses "A128GCM".

4.11.2.  Generated Factors

   The following are generated before encrypting:

   o  AES symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key (CEK); this
      example uses the key from Figure 155.

   o  Initialization vector/nonce; this example uses the initialization
      vector/nonce from Figure 156.

   WDgEptBmQs9ouUvArz6x6g

           Figure 155: Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded

   WgEJsDS9bkoXQ3nR

           Figure 156: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded

4.11.3.  Encrypting the Key

   Performing the key encryption operation over the CEK (Figure 155)
   with the AES key (Figure 125) produces the following encrypted key:

   jJIcM9J-hbx3wnqhf5FlkEYos0sHsF0H

               Figure 157: Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded

4.11.4.  Encrypting the Content

   The following are generated before encrypting the content:

   o  Protected JWE Header; this example uses the header from
      Figure 158, encoded to [RFC4648] base64url as Figure 159.

   {
     "enc": "A128GCM"
   }

                   Figure 158: Protected JWE Header JSON

   eyJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0

            Figure 159: Protected JWE Header, base64url-encoded

   Performing the content encryption operation over the Plaintext with
   the following:



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   o  CEK (Figure 155);

   o  Initialization vector/nonce (Figure 156); and

   o  Protected JWE header (Figure 159) as authenticated data

   produces the following:

   o  Ciphertext from Figure 160.

   o  Authentication tag from Figure 161.

   lIbCyRmRJxnB2yLQOTqjCDKV3H30ossOw3uD9DPsqLL2DM3swKkjOwQyZtWsFL
   YMj5YeLht_StAn21tHmQJuuNt64T8D4t6C7kC9OCCJ1IHAolUv4MyOt80MoPb8
   fZYbNKqplzYJgIL58g8N2v46OgyG637d6uuKPwhAnTGm_zWhqc_srOvgiLkzyF
   XPq1hBAURbc3-8BqeRb48iR1-_5g5UjWVD3lgiLCN_P7AW8mIiFvUNXBPJK3nO
   WL4teUPS8yHLbWeL83olU4UAgL48x-8dDkH23JykibVSQju-f7e-1xreHWXzWL
   Hs1NqBbre0dEwK3HX_xM0LjUz77Krppgegoutpf5qaKg3l-_xMINmf

                 Figure 160: Ciphertext, base64url-encoded

   fNYLqpUe84KD45lvDiaBAQ

             Figure 161: Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded

4.11.5.  Output Results

   The following compose the resulting JWE object:

   o  Unprotected JWE header (Figure 162)

   o  Protected JWE header (Figure 159)

   o  encrypted key (Figure 157)

   o  Initialization vector/nonce (Figure 156)

   o  Ciphertext (Figure 160)

   o  Authentication tag (Figure 161)

   The following unprotected JWE header is generated before assembling
   the output results:








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   {
     "alg": "A128KW",
     "kid": "81b20965-8332-43d9-a468-82160ad91ac8"
   }

                  Figure 162: Unprotected JWE Header JSON

   The resulting JWE object using the JSON serialization:

   {
     "recipients": [
       {
         "encrypted_key": "jJIcM9J-hbx3wnqhf5FlkEYos0sHsF0H"
       }
     ],
     "unprotected": {
       "alg": "A128KW",
       "kid": "81b20965-8332-43d9-a468-82160ad91ac8"
     },
     "protected": "eyJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0",
     "iv": "WgEJsDS9bkoXQ3nR",
     "ciphertext": "lIbCyRmRJxnB2yLQOTqjCDKV3H30ossOw3uD9DPsqLL2D
         M3swKkjOwQyZtWsFLYMj5YeLht_StAn21tHmQJuuNt64T8D4t6C7kC9O
         CCJ1IHAolUv4MyOt80MoPb8fZYbNKqplzYJgIL58g8N2v46OgyG637d6
         uuKPwhAnTGm_zWhqc_srOvgiLkzyFXPq1hBAURbc3-8BqeRb48iR1-_5
         g5UjWVD3lgiLCN_P7AW8mIiFvUNXBPJK3nOWL4teUPS8yHLbWeL83olU
         4UAgL48x-8dDkH23JykibVSQju-f7e-1xreHWXzWLHs1NqBbre0dEwK3
         HX_xM0LjUz77Krppgegoutpf5qaKg3l-_xMINmf",
     "tag": "fNYLqpUe84KD45lvDiaBAQ"
   }

                      Figure 163: JSON Serialization

4.12.  Protecting Content Only

   This example illustrates encrypting content where none of the JWE
   header parameters are protected.  As this example includes only
   unprotected JWE header parameters, only the JSON serialization is
   possible.

4.12.1.  Input Factors

   The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process:

   o  Plaintext content; this example uses the content from Figure 51.

   o  Recipient encryption key; this example uses the key from
      Figure 125.



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   o  Key encryption algorithm; this example uses "A128KW".

   o  Content encryption algorithm; this example uses "A128GCM".

4.12.2.  Generated Factors

   The following are generated before encrypting:

   o  AES symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key; this example the
      key from Figure 164.

   o  Initialization vector/nonce; this example uses the initialization
      vector/nonce from Figure 165.

   KBooAFl30QPV3vkcZlXnzQ

           Figure 164: Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded

   YihBoVOGsR1l7jCD

           Figure 165: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded

4.12.3.  Encrypting the Key

   Performing the key encryption operation over the CEK (Figure 164 with
   the AES key (Figure 125 produces the following encrypted key:

   244YHfO_W7RMpQW81UjQrZcq5LSyqiPv

               Figure 166: Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded

4.12.4.  Encrypting the Content

   Performing the content encryption operation over the Plaintext
   (Figure 51) using the following:

   o  CEK (Figure 164);

   o  Initialization vector/nonce (Figure 165); and

   o  Empty string as authenticated data

   produces the following:

   o  Ciphertext from Figure 167.

   o  Authenticated data from Figure 168.




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   qtPIMMaOBRgASL10dNQhOa7Gqrk7Eal1vwht7R4TT1uq-arsVCPaIeFwQfzrSS
   6oEUWbBtxEasE0vC6r7sphyVziMCVJEuRJyoAHFSP3eqQPb4Ic1SDSqyXjw_L3
   svybhHYUGyQuTmUQEDjgjJfBOifwHIsDsRPeBz1NomqeifVPq5GTCWFo5k_MNI
   QURR2Wj0AHC2k7JZfu2iWjUHLF8ExFZLZ4nlmsvJu_mvifMYiikfNfsZAudISO
   a6O73yPZtL04k_1FI7WDfrb2w7OqKLWDXzlpcxohPVOLQwpA3mFNRKdY-bQz4Z
   4KX9lfz1cne31N4-8BKmojpw-OdQjKdLOGkC445Fb_K1tlDQXw2sBF

                 Figure 167: Ciphertext, base64url-encoded

   e2m0Vm7JvjK2VpCKXS-kyg

             Figure 168: Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded

4.12.5.  Output Results

   The following unprotected JWE header is generated before assembling
   the output results:

   {
     "alg": "A128KW",
     "kid": "81b20965-8332-43d9-a468-82160ad91ac8",
     "enc": "A128GCM"
   }

                  Figure 169: Unprotected JWE Header JSON

   The following compose the resulting JWE object:

   o  Unprotected JWE header (Figure 169)

   o  encrypted key (Figure 166)

   o  Initialization vector/nonce (Figure 165)

   o  Ciphertext (Figure 167)

   o  Authentication tag (Figure 168)

   The resulting JWE object using the JSON serialization:












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   {
     "recipients": [
       {
         "encrypted_key": "244YHfO_W7RMpQW81UjQrZcq5LSyqiPv"
       }
     ],
     "unprotected": {
       "alg": "A128KW",
       "kid": "81b20965-8332-43d9-a468-82160ad91ac8",
       "enc": "A128GCM"
     },
     "iv": "YihBoVOGsR1l7jCD",
     "ciphertext": "qtPIMMaOBRgASL10dNQhOa7Gqrk7Eal1vwht7R4TT1uq-
         arsVCPaIeFwQfzrSS6oEUWbBtxEasE0vC6r7sphyVziMCVJEuRJyoAHF
         SP3eqQPb4Ic1SDSqyXjw_L3svybhHYUGyQuTmUQEDjgjJfBOifwHIsDs
         RPeBz1NomqeifVPq5GTCWFo5k_MNIQURR2Wj0AHC2k7JZfu2iWjUHLF8
         ExFZLZ4nlmsvJu_mvifMYiikfNfsZAudISOa6O73yPZtL04k_1FI7WDf
         rb2w7OqKLWDXzlpcxohPVOLQwpA3mFNRKdY-bQz4Z4KX9lfz1cne31N4
         -8BKmojpw-OdQjKdLOGkC445Fb_K1tlDQXw2sBF",
     "tag": "e2m0Vm7JvjK2VpCKXS-kyg"
   }

                      Figure 170: JSON Serialization

4.13.  Encrypting to Multiple Recipients

   This example illustrates encryption content for multiple recipients.
   As this example has multiple recipients, only the JSON serialization
   is possible.

4.13.1.  Input Factors

   The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process:

   o  Plaintext content; this example uses the plaintext from Figure 51.

   o  Recipient keys; this example uses the following:

      *  The RSA public key from Figure 52 for the first recipient.

      *  The EC public key from Figure 84 for the second recipient.

      *  The AES symmetric key from Figure 113 for the third recipient.

   o  Key encryption algorithms; this example uses the following:

      *  "RSA1_5" for the first recipient.




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      *  "ECDH-ES+A256KW" for the second recipient.

      *  "A256GCMKW" for the third recipient.

   o  Content encryption algorithm; this example uses "A128CBC-HS256"

4.13.2.  Generated Factors

   The following are generated before encrypting:

   o  AES symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key (CEK); this
      example uses the key from Figure 171.

   o  Initialization vector/nonce; this example uses the initialization
      vector/nonce from Figure 172.

   zXayeJ4gvm8NJr3IUInyokTUO-LbQNKEhe_zWlYbdpQ

           Figure 171: Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded

   VgEIHY20EnzUtZFl2RpB1g

           Figure 172: Initialization Vector, base64url-encoded

4.13.3.  Encrypting the Key to the First Recipient

   Performing the "RSA1_5" key encryption operation over the CEK
   (Figure 171 with the first recipient's RSA key (Figure 52 produces
   the following encrypted key:

   dYOD28kab0Vvf4ODgxVAJXgHcSZICSOp8M51zjwj4w6Y5G4XJQsNNIBiqyvUUA
   OcpL7S7-cFe7Pio7gV_Q06WmCSa-vhW6me4bWrBf7cHwEQJdXihidAYWVajJIa
   KMXMvFRMV6iDlRr076DFthg2_AV0_tSiV6xSEIFqt1xnYPpmP91tc5WJDOGb-w
   qjw0-b-S1laS11QVbuP78dQ7Fa0zAVzzjHX-xvyM2wxj_otxr9clN1LnZMbeYS
   rRicJK5xodvWgkpIdkMHo4LvdhRRvzoKzlic89jFWPlnBq_V4n5trGuExtp_-d
   bHcGlihqc_wGgho9fLMK8JOArYLcMDNQ

         Figure 173: Recipient #1 Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded

   The following are generated after encrypting the CEK for the first
   recipient:

   o  Recipient JWE header from Figure 174








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   {
     "alg": "RSA1_5",
     "kid": "frodo.baggins@hobbiton.example"
   }

                 Figure 174: Recipient #1 JWE Header JSON

   The following is the assembled first recipient JSON:

   {
     "encrypted_key": "dYOD28kab0Vvf4ODgxVAJXgHcSZICSOp8M51zjwj4w
         6Y5G4XJQsNNIBiqyvUUAOcpL7S7-cFe7Pio7gV_Q06WmCSa-vhW6me4b
         WrBf7cHwEQJdXihidAYWVajJIaKMXMvFRMV6iDlRr076DFthg2_AV0_t
         SiV6xSEIFqt1xnYPpmP91tc5WJDOGb-wqjw0-b-S1laS11QVbuP78dQ7
         Fa0zAVzzjHX-xvyM2wxj_otxr9clN1LnZMbeYSrRicJK5xodvWgkpIdk
         MHo4LvdhRRvzoKzlic89jFWPlnBq_V4n5trGuExtp_-dbHcGlihqc_wG
         gho9fLMK8JOArYLcMDNQ",
     "header": {
       "alg": "RSA1_5",
       "kid": "frodo.baggins@hobbiton.example"
     }
   }

                       Figure 175: Recipient #1 JSON

4.13.4.  Encrypting the Key to the Second Recipient

   The following are generated before encrypting the CEK for the second
   recipient:

   o  Ephemeral EC private key on the same curve as the EC public key;
      this example uses the private key from Figure 176.

   {
     "kty": "EC",
     "crv": "P-384",
     "x": "Uzdvk3pi5wKCRc1izp5_r0OjeqT-I68i8g2b8mva8diRhsE2xAn2Dt
         MRb25Ma2CX",
     "y": "VDrRyFJh-Kwd1EjAgmj5Eo-CTHAZ53MC7PjjpLioy3ylEjI1pOMbw9
         1fzZ84pbfm",
     "d": "1DKHfTv-PiifVw2VBHM_ZiVcwOMxkOyANS_lQHJcrDxVY3jhVCvZPw
         MxJKIE793C"
   }

     Figure 176: Ephemeral public key for Recipient #2, in JWK format

   Performing the "ECDH-ES+A256KW" key encryption operation over the CEK
   (Figure 171 with the following:



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   o  Static Elliptic Curve public key (Figure 84).

   o  Ephemeral Elliptic Curve private key (Figure 176.

   produces the following encrypted key:

   ExInT0io9BqBMYF6-maw5tZlgoZXThD1zWKsHixJuw_elY4gSSId_w

         Figure 177: Recipient #2 Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded

   The following are generated after encrypting the CEK for the second
   recipient:

   o  Recipient JWE Header from Figure 178.

   {
     "alg": "ECDH-ES+A256KW",
     "kid": "peregrin.took@tuckborough.example",
     "epk": {
       "kty": "EC",
       "crv": "P-384",
       "x": "Uzdvk3pi5wKCRc1izp5_r0OjeqT-I68i8g2b8mva8diRhsE2xAn2
           DtMRb25Ma2CX",
       "y": "VDrRyFJh-Kwd1EjAgmj5Eo-CTHAZ53MC7PjjpLioy3ylEjI1pOMb
           w91fzZ84pbfm"
     }
   }

                 Figure 178: Recipient #2 JWE Header JSON

   The following is the assembled second recipient JSON:




















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   {
     "encrypted_key": "ExInT0io9BqBMYF6-maw5tZlgoZXThD1zWKsHixJuw
         _elY4gSSId_w",
     "header": {
       "alg": "ECDH-ES+A256KW",
       "kid": "peregrin.took@tuckborough.example",
       "epk": {
         "kty": "EC",
         "crv": "P-384",
         "x": "Uzdvk3pi5wKCRc1izp5_r0OjeqT-I68i8g2b8mva8diRhsE2xA
             n2DtMRb25Ma2CX",
         "y": "VDrRyFJh-Kwd1EjAgmj5Eo-CTHAZ53MC7PjjpLioy3ylEjI1pO
             Mbw91fzZ84pbfm"
       }
     }
   }

                       Figure 179: Recipient #2 JSON

4.13.5.  Encrypting the Key to the Third Recipient

   The following are generated before encrypting the CEK for the third
   recipient:

   o  Initialization vector/nonce for key wrapping; this example uses
      the initialization vector/nonce from Figure 180

   AvpeoPZ9Ncn9mkBn

                                Figure 180

   Performing the "A256GCMKW" key encryption operation over the CEK
   (Figure 171) with the following:

   o  AES symmetric key (Figure 113; and

   o  Initialization vector/nonce ((Figure 180

   produces the following:

   o  Encrypted key from Figure 181.

   o  Key wrap authentication tag from Figure 182

   a7CclAejo_7JSuPB8zeagxXRam8dwCfmkt9-WyTpS1E

         Figure 181: Recipient #3 Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded




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   59Nqh1LlYtVIhfD3pgRGvw

      Figure 182: Recipient #3 Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded

   The following are generated after encrypting the CEK for the third
   recipient:

   o  Recipient JWE header; this example uses the header from
      Figure 183.

   {
     "alg": "A256GCMKW",
     "kid": "18ec08e1-bfa9-4d95-b205-2b4dd1d4321d",
     "tag": "59Nqh1LlYtVIhfD3pgRGvw",
     "iv": "AvpeoPZ9Ncn9mkBn"
   }

                 Figure 183: Recipient #3 JWE Header JSON

   The following is the assembled third recipient JSON:

   {
     "encrypted_key": "a7CclAejo_7JSuPB8zeagxXRam8dwCfmkt9-WyTpS1
         E",
     "header": {
       "alg": "A256GCMKW",
       "kid": "18ec08e1-bfa9-4d95-b205-2b4dd1d4321d",
       "tag": "59Nqh1LlYtVIhfD3pgRGvw",
       "iv": "AvpeoPZ9Ncn9mkBn"
     }
   }

                       Figure 184: Recipient #3 JSON

4.13.6.  Encrypting the Content

   The following are generated before encrypting the content:

   o  Protected JWE Header; this example uses the header from
      Figure 185, encoded to [RFC4648] base64url as Figure 186.

   {
     "enc": "A128CBC-HS256"
   }

                   Figure 185: Protected JWE Header JSON





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   eyJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0

            Figure 186: Protected JWE Header, base64url-encoded

   Performing the content encryption operation over the Plaintext
   (Figure 51) with the following:

   o  CEK (Figure 171),

   o  Initialization vector/nonce (Figure 172), and

   o  Protected JWE header (Figure 186) as the authenticated data

   produces the following:

   o  Ciphertext from Figure 187

   o  Authentication tag from Figure 188

   ajm2Q-OpPXCr7-MHXicknb1lsxLdXxK_yLds0KuhJzfWK04SjdxQeSw2L9mu3a
   _k1C55kCQ_3xlkcVKC5yr__Is48VOoK0k63_QRM9tBURMFqLByJ8vOYQX0oJW4
   VUHJLmGhF-tVQWB7Kz8mr8zeE7txF0MSaP6ga7-siYxStR7_G07Thd1jh-zGT0
   wxM5g-VRORtq0K6AXpLlwEqRp7pkt2zRM0ZAXqSpe1O6FJ7FHLDyEFnD-zDIZu
   kLpCbzhzMDLLw2-8I14FQrgi-iEuzHgIJFIJn2wh9Tj0cg_kOZy9BqMRZbmYXM
   Y9YQjorZ_P_JYG3ARAIF3OjDNqpdYe-K_5Q5crGJSDNyij_ygEiItR5jssQVH2
   ofDQdLChtazE

                 Figure 187: Ciphertext, base64url-encoded

   BESYyFN7T09KY7i8zKs5_g

             Figure 188: Authentication Tag, base64url-encoded

   The following is generated after encrypting the plaintext:

   o  Unprotected JWE header parameters; this example uses the header
      from Figure 189.

   {
     "cty": "text/plain"
   }

                  Figure 189: Unprotected JWE Header JSON








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4.13.7.  Output Results

   The following compose the resulting JWE object:

   o  Recipient #1 JSON (Figure 175)

   o  Recipient #2 JSON (Figure 179)

   o  Recipient #3 JSON (Figure 184)

   o  Initialization vector/nonce (Figure 172)

   o  Ciphertext (Figure 187)

   o  Authentication tag (Figure 188)

   The resulting JWE object using the JSON serialization:

   {
     "recipients": [
       {
         "encrypted_key": "dYOD28kab0Vvf4ODgxVAJXgHcSZICSOp8M51zj
             wj4w6Y5G4XJQsNNIBiqyvUUAOcpL7S7-cFe7Pio7gV_Q06WmCSa-
             vhW6me4bWrBf7cHwEQJdXihidAYWVajJIaKMXMvFRMV6iDlRr076
             DFthg2_AV0_tSiV6xSEIFqt1xnYPpmP91tc5WJDOGb-wqjw0-b-S
             1laS11QVbuP78dQ7Fa0zAVzzjHX-xvyM2wxj_otxr9clN1LnZMbe
             YSrRicJK5xodvWgkpIdkMHo4LvdhRRvzoKzlic89jFWPlnBq_V4n
             5trGuExtp_-dbHcGlihqc_wGgho9fLMK8JOArYLcMDNQ",
         "header": {
           "alg": "RSA1_5",
           "kid": "frodo.baggins@hobbiton.example"
         }
       },
       {
         "encrypted_key": "ExInT0io9BqBMYF6-maw5tZlgoZXThD1zWKsHi
             xJuw_elY4gSSId_w",
         "header": {
           "alg": "ECDH-ES+A256KW",
           "kid": "peregrin.took@tuckborough.example",
           "epk": {
             "kty": "EC",
             "crv": "P-384",
             "x": "Uzdvk3pi5wKCRc1izp5_r0OjeqT-I68i8g2b8mva8diRhs
                 E2xAn2DtMRb25Ma2CX",
             "y": "VDrRyFJh-Kwd1EjAgmj5Eo-CTHAZ53MC7PjjpLioy3ylEj
                 I1pOMbw91fzZ84pbfm"
           }
         }



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       },
       {
         "encrypted_key": "a7CclAejo_7JSuPB8zeagxXRam8dwCfmkt9-Wy
             TpS1E",
         "header": {
           "alg": "A256GCMKW",
           "kid": "18ec08e1-bfa9-4d95-b205-2b4dd1d4321d",
           "tag": "59Nqh1LlYtVIhfD3pgRGvw",
           "iv": "AvpeoPZ9Ncn9mkBn"
         }
       }
     ],
     "unprotected": {
       "cty": "text/plain"
     },
     "protected": "eyJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0",
     "iv": "VgEIHY20EnzUtZFl2RpB1g",
     "ciphertext": "ajm2Q-OpPXCr7-MHXicknb1lsxLdXxK_yLds0KuhJzfWK
         04SjdxQeSw2L9mu3a_k1C55kCQ_3xlkcVKC5yr__Is48VOoK0k63_QRM
         9tBURMFqLByJ8vOYQX0oJW4VUHJLmGhF-tVQWB7Kz8mr8zeE7txF0MSa
         P6ga7-siYxStR7_G07Thd1jh-zGT0wxM5g-VRORtq0K6AXpLlwEqRp7p
         kt2zRM0ZAXqSpe1O6FJ7FHLDyEFnD-zDIZukLpCbzhzMDLLw2-8I14FQ
         rgi-iEuzHgIJFIJn2wh9Tj0cg_kOZy9BqMRZbmYXMY9YQjorZ_P_JYG3
         ARAIF3OjDNqpdYe-K_5Q5crGJSDNyij_ygEiItR5jssQVH2ofDQdLCht
         azE",
     "tag": "BESYyFN7T09KY7i8zKs5_g"
   }

                      Figure 190: JSON Serialization

5.  Nesting Signatures and Encryption

   This example illustrates nesting a JSON Web Signature (JWS) structure
   within a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) structure.  The signature uses the
   "PS256" (RSASSA-PSS) algorithm; the encryption uses the "RSA-OAEP"
   (RSAES-OAEP) key encryption algorithm and the "A128GCM" (AES-GCM)
   content encryption algorithm.

5.1.  Signing Input Factors

   The following are supplied before beginning the signing operation:

   o  Payload content; this example uses the JSON Web Token (JWT)
      [I-D.ietf-oauth-json-web-token] content from Figure 191, encoded
      as [RFC4648] base64url to produce Figure 192.

   o  RSA private key; this example uses the key from Figure 193




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   {
     "iss": "hobbiton.example",
     "exp": 1300819380,
     "http://example.com/is_root": true
   }

                Figure 191: Payload content, in JSON format

   eyJpc3MiOiJob2JiaXRvbi5leGFtcGxlIiwiZXhwIjoxMzAwODE5MzgwLCJodH
   RwOi8vZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vaXNfcm9vdCI6dHJ1ZX0

              Figure 192: Payload content, base64url-encoded







































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   {
     "kty": "RSA",
     "kid": "hobbiton.example",
     "use": "sig",
     "n": "kNrPIBDXMU6fcyv5i-QHQAQ-K8gsC3HJb7FYhYaw8hXbNJa-t8q0lD
         KwLZgQXYV-ffWxXJv5GGrlZE4GU52lfMEegTDzYTrRQ3tepgKFjMGg6I
         y6fkl1ZNsx2gEonsnlShfzA9GJwRTmtKPbk1s-hwx1IU5AT-AIelNqBg
         cF2vE5W25_SGGBoaROVdUYxqETDggM1z5cKV4ZjDZ8-lh4oVB07bkac6
         LQdHpJUUySH_Er20DXx30Kyi97PciXKTS-QKXnmm8ivyRCmux22ZoPUi
         nd2BKC5OiG4MwALhaL2Z2k8CsRdfy-7dg7z41Rp6D0ZeEvtaUp4bX4aK
         raL4rTfw",
     "e": "AQAB",
     "d": "ZLe_TIxpE9-W_n2VBa-HWvuYPtjvxwVXClJFOpJsdea8g9RMx34qEO
         EtnoYc2un3CZ3LtJi-mju5RAT8YSc76YJds3ZVw0UiO8mMBeG6-iOnvg
         obobNx7K57-xjTJZU72EjOr9kB7z6ZKwDDq7HFyCDhUEcYcHFVc7iL_6
         TibVhAhOFONWlqlJgEgwVYd0rybNGKifdnpEbwyHoMwY6HM1qvnEFgP7
         iZ0YzHUT535x6jj4VKcdA7ZduFkhUauysySEW7mxZM6fj1vdjJIy9LD1
         fIz30Xv4ckoqhKF5GONU6tNmMmNgAD6gIViyEle1PrIxl1tBhCI14bRW
         -zrpHgAQ",
     "p": "yKWYoNIAqwMRQlgIBOdT1NIcbDNUUs2Rh-pBaxD_mIkweMt4Mg-0-B
         2iSYvMrs8horhonV7vxCQagcBAATGW-hAafUehWjxWSH-3KccRM8toL4
         e0q7M-idRDOBXSoe7Z2-CV2x_ZCY3RP8qp642R13WgXqGDIM4MbUkZSj
         cY9-c",
     "q": "uND4o15V30KDzf8vFJw589p1vlQVQ3NEilrinRUPHkkxaAzDzccGgr
         WMWpGxGFFnNL3w5CqPLeU76-5IVYQq0HwYVl0hVXQHr7sgaGu-483Ad3
         ENcL23FrOnF45m7_2ooAstJDe49MeLTTQKrSIBl_SKvqpYvfSPTczPcZ
         kh9Kk",
     "dp": "jmTnEoq2qqa8ouaymjhJSCnsveUXnMQC2gAneQJRQkFqQu-zV2PKP
         KNbPvKVyiF5b2-L3tM3OW2d2iNDyRUWXlT7V5l0KwPTABSTOnTqAmYCh
         Gi8kXXdlhcrtSvXldBakC6saxwI_TzGGY2MVXzc2ZnCvCXHV4qjSxOrf
         P3pHFU",
     "dq": "R9FUvU88OVzEkTkXl3-5-WusE4DjHmndeZIlu3rifBdfLpq_P-iWP
         BbGaq9wzQ1c-J7SzCdJqkEJDv5yd2C7rnZ6kpzwBh_nmL8zscAk1qsun
         nt9CJGAYz7-sGWy1JGShFazfP52ThB4rlCJ0YuEaQMrIzpY77_oLAhpm
         DA0hLk",
     "qi": "S8tC7ZknW6hPITkjcwttQOPLVmRfwirRlFAViuDb8NW9CrV_7F2Oq
         UZCqmzHTYAumwGFHI1WVRep7anleWaJjxC_1b3fq_al4qH3Pe-EKiHg6
         IMazuRtZLUROcThrExDbF5dYbsciDnfRUWLErZ4N1Be0bnxYuPqxwKd9
         QZwMo0"
   }

            Figure 193: RSA 2048-bit Private Key, in JWK format

5.2.  Signing Operation

   The following are generated to complete the signing operation:





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   o  Protected JWS Header; this example uses header from Figure 194,
      encoded using [RFC4648] base64url to produce Figure 195.

   {
     "alg": "PS256",
     "typ": "JWT"
   }

                   Figure 194: Protected JWS Header JSON

   eyJhbGciOiJQUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9

            Figure 195: Protected JWS Header, base64url-encoded

   Performing the signature operation over the combined protected JWS
   header (Figure 195) and Payload content (Figure 191) produces the
   following signature:

   dPpMqwRZxFYi1UfcDAaf8M99o7kwUWtiXZ-ByvVuJih4MhJ_aZqciprz0OWaIA
   kIvn1qskChirjKvY9ESZNUCP4JjvfyPS-nqjJxYoA5ztWOyFk2cZNIPXjcJXSQ
   wXPO9tEe-v4VSqgD0aKHqPxYog4N6Cz1lKph1U1sYDSI67_bLL7elg_vkjfMp5
   _W5l5LuUYGMeh6hxQIaIUXf9EwV2JmvTMuZ-vBOWy0Sniy1EFo72CRTvmtrIf5
   AROo5MNliY3KtUxeP-SOmD-LEYwW9SlkohYzMVAZDDOrVbv7KVRHpeYNaK75KE
   QqdCEEkS_rskZS-Qtt_nlegTWh1mEYaA

                 Figure 196: Signature, base64url-encoded

5.3.  Signing Output

   The following compose the resulting JWS object:

   o  Protected JWS header (Figure 195))

   o  Payload content (Figure 192)

   o  Signature (Figure 196)

   The resulting JWS object using the Compact Serialization (which is
   the plaintext input to the proceeding encryption operation):












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   eyJhbGciOiJQUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9
   .
   eyJpc3MiOiJob2JiaXRvbi5leGFtcGxlIiwiZXhwIjoxMzAwODE5MzgwLCJodH
   RwOi8vZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vaXNfcm9vdCI6dHJ1ZX0
   .
   dPpMqwRZxFYi1UfcDAaf8M99o7kwUWtiXZ-ByvVuJih4MhJ_aZqciprz0OWaIA
   kIvn1qskChirjKvY9ESZNUCP4JjvfyPS-nqjJxYoA5ztWOyFk2cZNIPXjcJXSQ
   wXPO9tEe-v4VSqgD0aKHqPxYog4N6Cz1lKph1U1sYDSI67_bLL7elg_vkjfMp5
   _W5l5LuUYGMeh6hxQIaIUXf9EwV2JmvTMuZ-vBOWy0Sniy1EFo72CRTvmtrIf5
   AROo5MNliY3KtUxeP-SOmD-LEYwW9SlkohYzMVAZDDOrVbv7KVRHpeYNaK75KE
   QqdCEEkS_rskZS-Qtt_nlegTWh1mEYaA

                     Figure 197: Compact Serialization

5.4.  Encryption Input Factors

   The following are supplied before beginning the encryption process:

   o  Plaintext content; this example uses the content from Figure 197.

   o  RSA public key; this example use the key from Figure 62.

5.5.  Encryption Generated Factors

   The following are generated before encrypting:

   o  AES symmetric key as the Content Encryption CEK (CEK); this
      example uses the key from Figure 198.

   o  Initialization vector/nonce; this example uses the initialization
      vector/nonce from Figure 199.

   0RHSNYwN-6-2QBGsYTZLSQ

           Figure 198: Content Encryption Key, base64url-encoded

   GbX1i9kXz0sxXPmA

           Figure 199: Initialization vector, base64url-encoded

5.6.  Encrypting the Key

   Performing the key encryption operation over the CEK (Figure 198)
   with the RSA key (Figure 62) produces the following encrypted key:







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   a0JHRoITfpX4qRewImjlStn8m3CPxBV1ueYlVhjurCyrBg3I7YhCRYjphDOOS4
   E7rXbr2Fn6NyQq-A-gqT0FXqNjVOGrG-bi13mwy7RoYhjTkBEC6P7sMYMXXx4g
   zMedpiJHQVeyI-zkZV7A9matpgevAJWrXzOUysYGTtwoSN6gtUVtlLaivjvb21
   O0ul4YxSHV-ByK1kyeetRp_fuYJxHoKLQL9P424sKx2WGYb4zsBIPF4ssl_e5I
   R7nany-25_UmC2urosNkoFz9cQ82MypZP8gqbQJyPN-Fpp4Z-5o6yV64x6yzDU
   F_5JCIdl-Qv6H5dMVIY7q1eKpXcV1lWO_2FefEBqXxXvIjLeZivjNkzogCq3-I
   apSjVFnMjBxjpYLT8muaawo1yy1XXMuinIpNcOY3n4KKrXLrCcteX85m4IIHMZ
   a38s1Hpr56fPPseMA-Jltmt-a9iEDtOzhtxz8AXy9tsCAZV2XBWNG8c3kJusAa
   mBKOYwfk7JhLRDgOnJjlJLhn7TI4UxDp9dCmUXEN6z0v23W15qJIEXNJtqnblp
   ymooeWAHCT4e_Owbim1g0AEpTHUdA2iiLNs9WTX_H_TXuPC8yDDhi1smxS_X_x
   pkIHkiIHWDOLx03BpqDTivpKkBYwqP2UZkcxqX2Fo_GnVrNwlK7Lgxw6FSQvDO
   0

               Figure 200: Encrypted Key, base64url-encoded

5.7.  Encrypting the Content

   The following are generated before encrypting the plaintext:

   o  Protected JWE Header; this example uses the the header from
      Figure 201, encoded using [RFC4648] base64url to produce
      Figure 202.

   {
     "alg": "RSA-OAEP",
     "cty": "JWT",
     "enc": "A128GCM"
   }

                   Figure 201: Protected JWE Header JSON

   eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUCIsImN0eSI6IkpXVCIsImVuYyI6IkExMjhHQ00ifQ

            Figure 202: Protected JWE Header, base64url-encoded

   Performing the content encryption operation over the Plaintext
   (Figure 197) with the following:

   o  CEK (Figure 198);

   o  Initialization vector/nonce (Figure 199); and

   o  Protected JWE Header (Figure 202) as authenticated data.

   produces the following:

   o  Ciphertext from Figure 203.




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   o  Authentication tag from Figure 204.

   SZI4IvKHmwpazl_pJQXX3mHv1ANnOU4Wf9-utWYUcKrBNgCe2OFMf66cSJ8k2Q
   kxaQD3_R60MGE9ofomwtky3GFxMeGRjtpMt9OAvVLsAXB0_UTCBGyBg3C2bWLX
   qZlfJAAoJRUPRk-BimYZY81zVBuIhc7HsQePCpu33SzMsFHjn4lP_idrJz_glZ
   TNgKDt8zdnUPauKTKDNOH1DD4fuzvDYfDIAfqGPyL5sVRwbiXpXdGokEszM-9C
   hMPqW1QNhzuX_Zul3bvrJwr7nuGZs4cUScY3n8yE3AHCLurgls-A9mz1X38xEa
   ulV18l4Fg9tLejdkAuQZjPbqeHQBJe4IwGD5Ee0dQ-Mtz4NnhkIWx-YKBb_Xo2
   zI3Q_1sYjKUuis7yWW-HTr_vqvFt0bj7WJf2vzB0TZ3dvsoGaTvPH2dyWwumUr
   lx4gmPUzBdwTO6ubfYSDUEEz5py0d_OtWeUSYcCYBKD-aM7tXg26qJo21gYjLf
   hn9zy-W19sOCZGuzgFjPhawXHpvnj_t-0_ES96kogjJLxS1IMU9Y5XmnwZMyNc
   9EIwnogsCg-hVuvzyP0sIruktmI94_SL1xgMl7o03phcTMxtlMizR88NKU1WkB
   siXMCjy1Noue7MD-ShDp5dmM

                 Figure 203: Ciphertext, base64url-encoded

   KnIKEhN8U-3C9s4gtSpjSw

             Figure 204: Authentication tag, base64url-encoded

5.8.  Encryption Output

   The following compose the resulting JWE object:

   o  Protected JWE Header (Figure 202)

   o  Encrypted key (Figure 200)

   o  Initialization vector/nonce (Figure 199)

   o  Ciphertext (Figure 203)

   o  Authentication Tag (Figure 204)

   The resulting JWE object using the Compact serialization:
















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   eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUCIsImN0eSI6IkpXVCIsImVuYyI6IkExMjhHQ00ifQ
   .
   a0JHRoITfpX4qRewImjlStn8m3CPxBV1ueYlVhjurCyrBg3I7YhCRYjphDOOS4
   E7rXbr2Fn6NyQq-A-gqT0FXqNjVOGrG-bi13mwy7RoYhjTkBEC6P7sMYMXXx4g
   zMedpiJHQVeyI-zkZV7A9matpgevAJWrXzOUysYGTtwoSN6gtUVtlLaivjvb21
   O0ul4YxSHV-ByK1kyeetRp_fuYJxHoKLQL9P424sKx2WGYb4zsBIPF4ssl_e5I
   R7nany-25_UmC2urosNkoFz9cQ82MypZP8gqbQJyPN-Fpp4Z-5o6yV64x6yzDU
   F_5JCIdl-Qv6H5dMVIY7q1eKpXcV1lWO_2FefEBqXxXvIjLeZivjNkzogCq3-I
   apSjVFnMjBxjpYLT8muaawo1yy1XXMuinIpNcOY3n4KKrXLrCcteX85m4IIHMZ
   a38s1Hpr56fPPseMA-Jltmt-a9iEDtOzhtxz8AXy9tsCAZV2XBWNG8c3kJusAa
   mBKOYwfk7JhLRDgOnJjlJLhn7TI4UxDp9dCmUXEN6z0v23W15qJIEXNJtqnblp
   ymooeWAHCT4e_Owbim1g0AEpTHUdA2iiLNs9WTX_H_TXuPC8yDDhi1smxS_X_x
   pkIHkiIHWDOLx03BpqDTivpKkBYwqP2UZkcxqX2Fo_GnVrNwlK7Lgxw6FSQvDO
   0
   .
   GbX1i9kXz0sxXPmA
   .
   SZI4IvKHmwpazl_pJQXX3mHv1ANnOU4Wf9-utWYUcKrBNgCe2OFMf66cSJ8k2Q
   kxaQD3_R60MGE9ofomwtky3GFxMeGRjtpMt9OAvVLsAXB0_UTCBGyBg3C2bWLX
   qZlfJAAoJRUPRk-BimYZY81zVBuIhc7HsQePCpu33SzMsFHjn4lP_idrJz_glZ
   TNgKDt8zdnUPauKTKDNOH1DD4fuzvDYfDIAfqGPyL5sVRwbiXpXdGokEszM-9C
   hMPqW1QNhzuX_Zul3bvrJwr7nuGZs4cUScY3n8yE3AHCLurgls-A9mz1X38xEa
   ulV18l4Fg9tLejdkAuQZjPbqeHQBJe4IwGD5Ee0dQ-Mtz4NnhkIWx-YKBb_Xo2
   zI3Q_1sYjKUuis7yWW-HTr_vqvFt0bj7WJf2vzB0TZ3dvsoGaTvPH2dyWwumUr
   lx4gmPUzBdwTO6ubfYSDUEEz5py0d_OtWeUSYcCYBKD-aM7tXg26qJo21gYjLf
   hn9zy-W19sOCZGuzgFjPhawXHpvnj_t-0_ES96kogjJLxS1IMU9Y5XmnwZMyNc
   9EIwnogsCg-hVuvzyP0sIruktmI94_SL1xgMl7o03phcTMxtlMizR88NKU1WkB
   siXMCjy1Noue7MD-ShDp5dmM
   .
   KnIKEhN8U-3C9s4gtSpjSw

                     Figure 205: Compact Serialization

   The resulting JWE object using the JSON serialization:

















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   {
     "recipients": [
       {
         "encrypted_key": "a0JHRoITfpX4qRewImjlStn8m3CPxBV1ueYlVh
             jurCyrBg3I7YhCRYjphDOOS4E7rXbr2Fn6NyQq-A-gqT0FXqNjVO
             GrG-bi13mwy7RoYhjTkBEC6P7sMYMXXx4gzMedpiJHQVeyI-zkZV
             7A9matpgevAJWrXzOUysYGTtwoSN6gtUVtlLaivjvb21O0ul4YxS
             HV-ByK1kyeetRp_fuYJxHoKLQL9P424sKx2WGYb4zsBIPF4ssl_e
             5IR7nany-25_UmC2urosNkoFz9cQ82MypZP8gqbQJyPN-Fpp4Z-5
             o6yV64x6yzDUF_5JCIdl-Qv6H5dMVIY7q1eKpXcV1lWO_2FefEBq
             XxXvIjLeZivjNkzogCq3-IapSjVFnMjBxjpYLT8muaawo1yy1XXM
             uinIpNcOY3n4KKrXLrCcteX85m4IIHMZa38s1Hpr56fPPseMA-Jl
             tmt-a9iEDtOzhtxz8AXy9tsCAZV2XBWNG8c3kJusAamBKOYwfk7J
             hLRDgOnJjlJLhn7TI4UxDp9dCmUXEN6z0v23W15qJIEXNJtqnblp
             ymooeWAHCT4e_Owbim1g0AEpTHUdA2iiLNs9WTX_H_TXuPC8yDDh
             i1smxS_X_xpkIHkiIHWDOLx03BpqDTivpKkBYwqP2UZkcxqX2Fo_
             GnVrNwlK7Lgxw6FSQvDO0"
       }
     ],
     "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUCIsImN0eSI6IkpXVCIsImVuYy
         I6IkExMjhHQ00ifQ",
     "iv": "GbX1i9kXz0sxXPmA",
     "ciphertext": "SZI4IvKHmwpazl_pJQXX3mHv1ANnOU4Wf9-utWYUcKrBN
         gCe2OFMf66cSJ8k2QkxaQD3_R60MGE9ofomwtky3GFxMeGRjtpMt9OAv
         VLsAXB0_UTCBGyBg3C2bWLXqZlfJAAoJRUPRk-BimYZY81zVBuIhc7Hs
         QePCpu33SzMsFHjn4lP_idrJz_glZTNgKDt8zdnUPauKTKDNOH1DD4fu
         zvDYfDIAfqGPyL5sVRwbiXpXdGokEszM-9ChMPqW1QNhzuX_Zul3bvrJ
         wr7nuGZs4cUScY3n8yE3AHCLurgls-A9mz1X38xEaulV18l4Fg9tLejd
         kAuQZjPbqeHQBJe4IwGD5Ee0dQ-Mtz4NnhkIWx-YKBb_Xo2zI3Q_1sYj
         KUuis7yWW-HTr_vqvFt0bj7WJf2vzB0TZ3dvsoGaTvPH2dyWwumUrlx4
         gmPUzBdwTO6ubfYSDUEEz5py0d_OtWeUSYcCYBKD-aM7tXg26qJo21gY
         jLfhn9zy-W19sOCZGuzgFjPhawXHpvnj_t-0_ES96kogjJLxS1IMU9Y5
         XmnwZMyNc9EIwnogsCg-hVuvzyP0sIruktmI94_SL1xgMl7o03phcTMx
         tlMizR88NKU1WkBsiXMCjy1Noue7MD-ShDp5dmM",
     "tag": "KnIKEhN8U-3C9s4gtSpjSw"
   }

                       Figure 206: JSON Serialiation

6.  Security Considerations

   This document introduces no new security considerations over those
   stated in [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms],
   [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-encryption], [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-key],
   and [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-signature].






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7.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no actions for IANA.

8.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms]
              Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", draft-ietf-jose-
              json-web-algorithms-25 (work in progress), March 2014.

   [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-encryption]
              Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
              draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-25 (work in progress),
              March 2014.

   [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-key]
              Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", draft-ietf-jose-json-web-
              key-25 (work in progress), March 2014.

   [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-signature]
              Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
              Signature (JWS)", draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature-25
              (work in progress), March 2014.

   [I-D.ietf-oauth-json-web-token]
              Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
              (JWT)", draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-19 (work in
              progress), March 2014.

   [RFC1951]  Deutsch, P., "DEFLATE Compressed Data Format Specification
              version 1.3", RFC 1951, May 1996.

   [RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006.

   [RFC7095]  Kewisch, P., "jCard: The JSON Format for vCard", RFC 7095,
              January 2014.

Appendix A.  Acknowledgements

   All of the examples herein use quotes and character names found in
   the novels "The Hobbit"; "The Fellowship of the Ring"; "The Two
   Towers"; and "Return of the King", written by J. R. R. Tolkien.

   Thanks to Richard Barnes and Jim Schaad for providing for their input
   on the outline for this document.  Thanks to Brian Campbell for
   reviewing text and verifying most of the examples.




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Author's Address

   Matthew Miller
   Cisco Systems, Inc.

   Email: mamille2@cisco.com













































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