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JOSE Working Group M. Jones
Internet-Draft Microsoft
Intended status: Standards Track E. Rescorla
Expires: October 27, 2013 RTFM
J. Hildebrand
Cisco
April 25, 2013
JSON Web Encryption (JWE)
draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-10
Abstract
JSON Web Encryption (JWE) is a means of representing encrypted
content using JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) data structures.
Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this
specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)
specification. Related digital signature and MAC capabilities are
described in the separate JSON Web Signature (JWS) specification.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 27, 2013.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. JSON Web Encryption (JWE) Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1. Example JWE using RSAES OAEP and AES GCM . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2. Example JWE using RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5 and
AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4. JWE Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1. Reserved Header Parameter Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1.2. "enc" (Encryption Method) Header Parameter . . . . . . 12
4.1.3. "epk" (Ephemeral Public Key) Header Parameter . . . . 13
4.1.4. "zip" (Compression Algorithm) Header Parameter . . . . 13
4.1.5. "jku" (JWK Set URL) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1.6. "jwk" (JSON Web Key) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . 13
4.1.7. "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1.8. "x5t" (X.509 Certificate Thumbprint) Header
Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.1.9. "x5c" (X.509 Certificate Chain) Header Parameter . . . 14
4.1.10. "kid" (Key ID) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.1.11. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.1.12. "cty" (Content Type) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . 15
4.1.13. "apu" (Agreement PartyUInfo) Header Parameter . . . . 15
4.1.14. "apv" (Agreement PartyVInfo) Header Parameter . . . . 16
4.1.15. "crit" (Critical) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.2. Public Header Parameter Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.3. Private Header Parameter Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5. Producing and Consuming JWEs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.1. Message Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.2. Message Decryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.3. String Comparison Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6. Encrypting JWEs with Cryptographic Algorithms . . . . . . . . 21
6.1. CEK Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7. JSON Serialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7.1. Example JWE-JS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
9.1. Registration of JWE Header Parameter Names . . . . . . . . 25
9.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
9.2. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Type Values
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Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
9.2.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
9.3. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
9.3.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Appendix A. JWE Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
A.1. Example JWE using RSAES OAEP and AES GCM . . . . . . . . . 31
A.1.1. JWE Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
A.1.2. Encoded JWE Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
A.1.3. Content Encryption Key (CEK) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
A.1.4. Key Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
A.1.5. Encoded JWE Encrypted Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
A.1.6. Initialization Vector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
A.1.7. Additional Authenticated Data Parameter . . . . . . . 35
A.1.8. Plaintext Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
A.1.9. Encoded JWE Ciphertext . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
A.1.10. Encoded JWE Authentication Tag . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
A.1.11. Complete Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
A.1.12. Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
A.2. Example JWE using RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5 and
AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
A.2.1. JWE Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
A.2.2. Encoded JWE Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
A.2.3. Content Encryption Key (CEK) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
A.2.4. Key Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
A.2.5. Encoded JWE Encrypted Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
A.2.6. Initialization Vector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
A.2.7. Additional Authenticated Data Parameter . . . . . . . 41
A.2.8. Plaintext Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
A.2.9. Encoded JWE Ciphertext . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
A.2.10. Encoded JWE Authentication Tag . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
A.2.11. Complete Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
A.2.12. Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
A.3. Example JWE using AES Key Wrap and AES GCM . . . . . . . . 43
A.3.1. JWE Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
A.3.2. Encoded JWE Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
A.3.3. Content Encryption Key (CEK) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
A.3.4. Key Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
A.3.5. Encoded JWE Encrypted Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
A.3.6. Initialization Vector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
A.3.7. Additional Authenticated Data Parameter . . . . . . . 45
A.3.8. Plaintext Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
A.3.9. Encoded JWE Ciphertext . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
A.3.10. Encoded JWE Authentication Tag . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
A.3.11. Complete Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
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A.3.12. Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Appendix B. Example AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 Computation . . . . 47
B.1. Extract MAC_KEY and ENC_KEY from Key . . . . . . . . . . . 47
B.2. Encrypt Plaintext to Create Ciphertext . . . . . . . . . . 47
B.3. Create 64 Bit Big Endian Representation of AAD Length . . 48
B.4. Initialization Vector Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
B.5. Create Input to HMAC Computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
B.6. Compute HMAC Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
B.7. Truncate HMAC Value to Create Authentication Tag . . . . . 49
Appendix C. Possible Compact Serialization for Multiple
Recipients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Appendix D. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Appendix E. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
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1. Introduction
JSON Web Encryption (JWE) is a compact encryption format intended for
space constrained environments such as HTTP Authorization headers and
URI query parameters. It represents this content using JavaScript
Object Notation (JSON) [RFC4627] based data structures. The JWE
cryptographic mechanisms encrypt and provide integrity protection for
arbitrary sequences of octets.
Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this
specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)
[JWA] specification. Related digital signature and MAC capabilities
are described in the separate JSON Web Signature (JWS) [JWS]
specification.
1.1. Notational Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in Key words for use in
RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels [RFC2119].
2. Terminology
JSON Web Encryption (JWE) A data structure representing an encrypted
message. The structure represents five values: the JWE Header,
the JWE Encrypted Key, the JWE Initialization Vector, the JWE
Ciphertext, and the JWE Authentication Tag.
Authenticated Encryption An Authenticated Encryption algorithm is
one that provides an integrated content integrity check.
Authenticated Encryption algorithms accept two inputs, the
Plaintext and the Additional Authenticated Data value, and produce
two outputs, the Ciphertext and the Authentication Tag value. AES
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) is one such algorithm.
Plaintext The sequence of octets to be encrypted -- a.k.a., the
message. The plaintext can contain an arbitrary sequence of
octets.
Ciphertext An encrypted representation of the Plaintext.
Additional Associated Data (AAD) An input to an Authenticated
Encryption operation that is integrity protected but not
encrypted.
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Authentication Tag An output of an Authenticated Encryption
operation that ensures the integrity of the Ciphertext and the
Additional Associated Data.
Content Encryption Key (CEK) A symmetric key for the Authenticated
Encryption algorithm used to encrypt the Plaintext for the
recipient to produce the Ciphertext and the Authentication Tag.
JSON Text Object A UTF-8 [RFC3629] encoded text string representing
a JSON object; the syntax of JSON objects is defined in Section
2.2 of [RFC4627].
JWE Header A JSON Text Object that describes the encryption
operations applied to create the JWE Encrypted Key, the JWE
Ciphertext, and the JWE Authentication Tag.
JWE Encrypted Key The result of encrypting the Content Encryption
Key (CEK) with the intended recipient's key using the specified
algorithm. Note that for some algorithms, the JWE Encrypted Key
value is specified as being the empty octet sequence.
JWE Initialization Vector A sequence of octets containing the
Initialization Vector used when encrypting the Plaintext. Note
that some algorithms may not use an Initialization Vector, in
which case this value is the empty octet sequence.
JWE Ciphertext A sequence of octets containing the Ciphertext for a
JWE.
JWE Authentication Tag A sequence of octets containing the
Authentication Tag for a JWE.
Base64url Encoding The URL- and filename-safe Base64 encoding
described in RFC 4648 [RFC4648], Section 5, with the (non URL-
safe) '=' padding characters omitted, as permitted by Section 3.2.
(See Appendix C of [JWS] for notes on implementing base64url
encoding without padding.)
Encoded JWE Header Base64url encoding of the JWE Header.
Encoded JWE Encrypted Key Base64url encoding of the JWE Encrypted
Key.
Encoded JWE Initialization Vector Base64url encoding of the JWE
Initialization Vector.
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Encoded JWE Ciphertext Base64url encoding of the JWE Ciphertext.
Encoded JWE Authentication Tag Base64url encoding of the JWE
Authentication Tag.
Header Parameter Name The name of a member of the JWE Header.
Header Parameter Value The value of a member of the JWE Header.
JWE Compact Serialization A representation of the JWE as the
concatenation of the Encoded JWE Header, the Encoded JWE Encrypted
Key, the Encoded JWE Initialization Vector, the Encoded JWE
Ciphertext, and the Encoded JWE Authentication Tag in that order,
with the five strings being separated by four period ('.')
characters. This results in a compact, URL-safe representation.
JWE JSON Serialization A representation of the JWE as a JSON
structure containing Encoded JWE Header, Encoded JWE Encrypted
Key, Encoded JWE Initialization Vector, Encoded JWE Ciphertext,
and Encoded JWE Authentication Tag values. Unlike the JWE Compact
Serialization, the JWE JSON Serialization enables the same content
to be encrypted to multiple parties. This representation is
neither compact nor URL-safe.
Collision Resistant Namespace A namespace that allows names to be
allocated in a manner such that they are highly unlikely to
collide with other names. For instance, collision resistance can
be achieved through administrative delegation of portions of the
namespace or through use of collision-resistant name allocation
functions. Examples of Collision Resistant Namespaces include:
Domain Names, Object Identifiers (OIDs) as defined in the ITU-T
X.660 and X.670 Recommendation series, and Universally Unique
IDentifiers (UUIDs) [RFC4122]. When using an administratively
delegated namespace, the definer of a name needs to take
reasonable precautions to ensure they are in control of the
portion of the namespace they use to define the name.
StringOrURI A JSON string value, with the additional requirement
that while arbitrary string values MAY be used, any value
containing a ":" character MUST be a URI [RFC3986]. StringOrURI
values are compared as case-sensitive strings with no
transformations or canonicalizations applied.
Key Management Mode A method of determining the Content Encryption
Key (CEK) value to use. Each algorithm used for determining the
CEK value uses a specific Key Management Mode. Key Management
Modes employed by this specification are Key Encryption, Key
Wrapping, Direct Key Agreement, Key Agreement with Key Wrapping,
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and Direct Encryption.
Key Encryption A Key Management Mode in which the Content Encryption
Key (CEK) value is encrypted to the intended recipient using an
asymmetric encryption algorithm.
Key Wrapping A Key Management Mode in which the Content Encryption
Key (CEK) value is encrypted to the intended recipient using a
symmetric key wrapping algorithm.
Direct Key Agreement A Key Management Mode in which a key agreement
algorithm is used to agree upon the Content Encryption Key (CEK)
value.
Key Agreement with Key Wrapping A Key Management Mode in which a key
agreement algorithm is used to agree upon a symmetric key used to
encrypt the Content Encryption Key (CEK) value to the intended
recipient using a symmetric key wrapping algorithm.
Direct Encryption A Key Management Mode in which the Content
Encryption Key (CEK) value used is the secret symmetric key value
shared between the parties.
3. JSON Web Encryption (JWE) Overview
JWE represents encrypted content using JSON data structures and
base64url encoding. Five values are represented in a JWE: the JWE
Header, the JWE Encrypted Key, the JWE Initialization Vector, the JWE
Ciphertext, and the JWE Authentication Tag. In the Compact
Serialization, the five values are base64url-encoded for
transmission, and represented as the concatenation of the encoded
strings in that order, with the five strings being separated by four
period ('.') characters. A JSON Serialization for this information
is also defined in Section 7.
JWE utilizes authenticated encryption to ensure the confidentiality
and integrity of the Plaintext.
3.1. Example JWE using RSAES OAEP and AES GCM
This example encrypts the plaintext "The true sign of intelligence is
not knowledge but imagination." to the recipient using RSAES OAEP and
AES GCM.
The following example JWE Header declares that:
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o the Content Encryption Key is encrypted to the recipient using the
RSAES OAEP algorithm to produce the JWE Encrypted Key and
o the Plaintext is encrypted using the AES GCM algorithm with a 256
bit key to produce the Ciphertext.
{"alg":"RSA-OAEP","enc":"A256GCM"}
Base64url encoding the octets of the UTF-8 representation of the JWE
Header yields this Encoded JWE Header value:
eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUCIsImVuYyI6IkEyNTZHQ00ifQ
The remaining steps to finish creating this JWE are:
o Generate a random Content Encryption Key (CEK)
o Encrypt the CEK with the recipient's public key using the RSAES
OAEP algorithm to produce the JWE Encrypted Key
o Base64url encode the JWE Encrypted Key to produce the Encoded JWE
Encrypted Key
o Generate a random JWE Initialization Vector
o Base64url encode the JWE Initialization Vector to produce the
Encoded JWE Initialization Vector
o Concatenate the Encoded JWE Header value, a period ('.')
character, and the Encoded JWE Encrypted Key to create the
Additional Authenticated Data parameter
o Encrypt the Plaintext with AES GCM using the CEK as the encryption
key, the JWE Initialization Vector, and the Additional
Authenticated Data value, requesting a 128 bit Authentication Tag
output
o Base64url encode the Ciphertext to create the Encoded JWE
Ciphertext
o Base64url encode the Authentication Tag to create the Encoded JWE
Authentication Tag
o Assemble the final representation: The Compact Serialization of
this result is the concatenation of the Encoded JWE Header, the
Encoded JWE Encrypted Key, the Encoded JWE Initialization Vector,
the Encoded JWE Ciphertext, and the Encoded JWE Authentication Tag
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in that order, with the five strings being separated by four
period ('.') characters.
The final result in this example (with line breaks for display
purposes only) is:
eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUCIsImVuYyI6IkEyNTZHQ00ifQ.
ApfOLCaDbqs_JXPYy2I937v_xmrzj-Iss1mG6NAHmeJViM6j2l0MHvfseIdHVyU2
BIoGVu9ohvkkWiRq5DL2jYZTPA9TAdwq3FUIVyoH-Pedf6elHIVFi2KGDEspYMtQ
ARMMSBcS7pslx6flh1Cfh3GBKysztVMEhZ_maFkm4PYVCsJsvq6Ct3fg2CJPOs0X
1DHuxZKoIGIqcbeK4XEO5a0h5TAuJObKdfO0dKwfNSSbpu5sFrpRFwV2FTTYoqF4
zI46N9-_hMIznlEpftRXhScEJuZ9HG8C8CHB1WRZ_J48PleqdhF4o7fB5J1wFqUX
BtbtuGJ_A2Xe6AEhrlzCOw.
48V1_ALb6US04U3b.
5eym8TW_c8SuK0ltJ3rpYIzOeDQz7TALvtu6UG9oMo4vpzs9tX_EFShS8iB7j6ji
SdiwkIr3ajwQzaBtQD_A.
ghEgxninkHEAMp4xZtB2mA
See Appendix A.1 for the complete details of computing this JWE.
3.2. Example JWE using RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5 and AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256
This example encrypts the plaintext "Live long and prosper." to the
recipient using RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5 and AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256.
The following example JWE Header (with line breaks for display
purposes only) declares that:
o the Content Encryption Key is encrypted to the recipient using the
RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5 algorithm to produce the JWE Encrypted Key and
o the Plaintext is encrypted using the AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256
algorithm to produce the Ciphertext.
{"alg":"RSA1_5","enc":"A128CBC-HS256"}
Base64url encoding the octets of the UTF-8 representation of the JWE
Header yields this Encoded JWE Header value:
eyJhbGciOiJSU0ExXzUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDK0hTMjU2In0
The remaining steps to finish creating this JWE are the same as for
the previous example, but using RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 instead of RSAES
OAEP and using the AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 algorithm (which is
specified in Sections 4.8 and 4.8.3 of JWA) instead of AES GCM.
The final result in this example (with line breaks for display
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purposes only) is:
eyJhbGciOiJSU0ExXzUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0.
nJa_uE2D0wlKz-OcwSbKFzj302xYSI-RLBM6hbVGmP4axtJQPA9S0po3s3NMkmOm
kkawnfwPNjpc0mc3z79cuQWkQPFQo-mDxmogz8dxBcheaTUg3ZvpbGCXxZjDYENR
WiZ5M9BiLy09BIF5mHp85QL6XED1JEZMOh-1uT1lqPDcDD79qWtrCfEJmNmfsx5f
cB2PfAcVtQ0t_YmOXx5_Gu0it1nILKXLR2Ynf9mfLhEcC5LebpWyEHW6WzQ4iH9S
IcIupPV1iKCzmJcPrDBJ5Fc_KMBcXBinaS__wftNywaGgfi_NSsx24LxtK6fIkej
RlMBmCfxv0Tg8CtxpURigg.
AxY8DCtDaGlsbGljb3RoZQ.
KDlTtXchhZTGufMYmOYGS4HffxPSUrfmqCHXaI9wOGY.
fY2U_Hx5VcfXmipEldHhMA
See Appendix A.2 for the complete details of computing this JWE.
4. JWE Header
The members of the JSON object represented by the JWE Header describe
the encryption applied to the Plaintext and optionally additional
properties of the JWE. The Header Parameter Names within this object
MUST be unique; JWEs with duplicate Header Parameter Names MUST be
rejected.
Implementations are required to understand the specific header
parameters defined by this specification that are designated as "MUST
be understood" and process them in the manner defined in this
specification. All other header parameters defined by this
specification that are not so designated MUST be ignored when not
understood. Unless listed as a critical header parameter, per
Section 4.1.15, all other header parameters MUST be ignored when not
understood.
There are two ways of distinguishing whether a header is a JWS Header
or a JWE Header. The first is by examining the "alg" (algorithm)
header parameter value. If the value represents a digital signature
or MAC algorithm, or is the value "none", it is for a JWS; if it
represents a Key Encryption, Key Wrapping, Direct Key Agreement, Key
Agreement with Key Wrapping, or Direct Encryption algorithm, it is
for a JWE. A second method is determining whether an "enc"
(encryption method) member exists. If the "enc" member exists, it is
a JWE; otherwise, it is a JWS. Both methods will yield the same
result for all legal input values.
There are three classes of Header Parameter Names: Reserved Header
Parameter Names, Public Header Parameter Names, and Private Header
Parameter Names.
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4.1. Reserved Header Parameter Names
The following Header Parameter Names are reserved with meanings as
defined below. All the names are short because a core goal of this
specification is for the resulting representations using the JWE
Compact Serialization to be compact.
Additional reserved Header Parameter Names MAY be defined via the
IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters registry
[JWS]. As indicated by the common registry, JWSs and JWEs share a
common header parameter space; when a parameter is used by both
specifications, its usage must be compatible between the
specifications.
4.1.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter
The "alg" (algorithm) header parameter identifies the cryptographic
algorithm used to encrypt or determine the value of the Content
Encryption Key (CEK). The algorithm specified by the "alg" value
MUST be supported by the implementation and there MUST be a key for
use with that algorithm associated with the intended recipient or the
JWE MUST be rejected. "alg" values SHOULD either be registered in the
IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms registry [JWA] or
be a value that contains a Collision Resistant Namespace. The "alg"
value is a case sensitive string containing a StringOrURI value. Use
of this header parameter is REQUIRED. This header parameter MUST be
understood by implementations.
A list of defined "alg" values can be found in the IANA JSON Web
Signature and Encryption Algorithms registry [JWA]; the initial
contents of this registry are the values defined in Section 4.1 of
the JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) [JWA] specification.
4.1.2. "enc" (Encryption Method) Header Parameter
The "enc" (encryption method) header parameter identifies the block
encryption algorithm used to encrypt the Plaintext to produce the
Ciphertext. This algorithm MUST be an Authenticated Encryption
algorithm with a specified key length. The algorithm specified by
the "enc" value MUST be supported by the implementation or the JWE
MUST be rejected. "enc" values SHOULD either be registered in the
IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms registry [JWA] or
be a value that contains a Collision Resistant Namespace. The "enc"
value is a case sensitive string containing a StringOrURI value. Use
of this header parameter is REQUIRED. This header parameter MUST be
understood by implementations.
A list of defined "enc" values can be found in the IANA JSON Web
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Signature and Encryption Algorithms registry [JWA]; the initial
contents of this registry are the values defined in Section 4.2 of
the JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) [JWA] specification.
4.1.3. "epk" (Ephemeral Public Key) Header Parameter
The "epk" (ephemeral public key) value created by the originator for
the use in key agreement algorithms. This key is represented as a
JSON Web Key [JWK] value. Use of this header parameter is OPTIONAL,
although its use is REQUIRED with some "alg" algorithms. When its
use is REQUIRED, this header parameter MUST be understood by
implementations.
4.1.4. "zip" (Compression Algorithm) Header Parameter
The "zip" (compression algorithm) applied to the Plaintext before
encryption, if any. If present, the value of the "zip" header
parameter MUST be the case sensitive string "DEF". Compression is
performed with the DEFLATE [RFC1951] algorithm. If no "zip"
parameter is present, no compression is applied to the Plaintext
before encryption. Use of this header parameter is OPTIONAL. This
header parameter MUST be understood by implementations.
4.1.5. "jku" (JWK Set URL) Header Parameter
The "jku" (JWK Set URL) header parameter is a URI [RFC3986] that
refers to a resource for a set of JSON-encoded public keys, one of
which is the key to which the JWE was encrypted; this can be used to
determine the private key needed to decrypt the JWE. The keys MUST
be encoded as a JSON Web Key Set (JWK Set) [JWK]. The protocol used
to acquire the resource MUST provide integrity protection; an HTTP
GET request to retrieve the certificate MUST use TLS [RFC2818]
[RFC5246]; the identity of the server MUST be validated, as per
Section 3.1 of HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818]. Use of this header parameter
is OPTIONAL.
4.1.6. "jwk" (JSON Web Key) Header Parameter
The "jwk" (JSON Web Key) header parameter is the public key to which
the JWE was encrypted; this can be used to determine the private key
needed to decrypt the JWE. This key is represented as a JSON Web Key
[JWK]. Use of this header parameter is OPTIONAL.
4.1.7. "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter
The "x5u" (X.509 URL) header parameter is a URI [RFC3986] that refers
to a resource for the X.509 public key certificate or certificate
chain [RFC5280] containing the key to which the JWE was encrypted;
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this can be used to determine the private key needed to decrypt the
JWE. The identified resource MUST provide a representation of the
certificate or certificate chain that conforms to RFC 5280 [RFC5280]
in PEM encoded form [RFC1421]. The certificate containing the public
key to which the JWE was encrypted MUST be the first certificate.
This MAY be followed by additional certificates, with each subsequent
certificate being the one used to certify the previous one. The
protocol used to acquire the resource MUST provide integrity
protection; an HTTP GET request to retrieve the certificate MUST use
TLS [RFC2818] [RFC5246]; the identity of the server MUST be
validated, as per Section 3.1 of HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818]. Use of
this header parameter is OPTIONAL.
4.1.8. "x5t" (X.509 Certificate Thumbprint) Header Parameter
The "x5t" (X.509 Certificate Thumbprint) header parameter provides a
base64url encoded SHA-1 thumbprint (a.k.a. digest) of the DER
encoding of the X.509 certificate [RFC5280] containing the key to
which the JWE was encrypted; this can be used to determine the
private key needed to decrypt the JWE. Use of this header parameter
is OPTIONAL.
If, in the future, certificate thumbprints need to be computed using
hash functions other than SHA-1, it is suggested that additional
related header parameters be defined for that purpose. For example,
it is suggested that a new "x5t#S256" (X.509 Certificate Thumbprint
using SHA-256) header parameter could be defined by registering it in
the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters registry
[JWS].
4.1.9. "x5c" (X.509 Certificate Chain) Header Parameter
The "x5c" (X.509 Certificate Chain) header parameter contains the
X.509 public key certificate or certificate chain [RFC5280]
containing the key to which the JWE was encrypted; this can be used
to determine the private key needed to decrypt the JWE. The
certificate or certificate chain is represented as an array of
certificate value strings. Each string is a base64 encoded
([RFC4648] Section 4 -- not base64url encoded) DER [ITU.X690.1994]
PKIX certificate value. The certificate containing the public key to
which the JWE was encrypted MUST be the first certificate. This MAY
be followed by additional certificates, with each subsequent
certificate being the one used to certify the previous one. Use of
this header parameter is OPTIONAL.
See Appendix B of [JWS] for an example "x5c" value.
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4.1.10. "kid" (Key ID) Header Parameter
The "kid" (key ID) header parameter is a hint indicating which key to
which the JWE was encrypted; this can be used to determine the
private key needed to decrypt the JWE. This parameter allows
originators to explicitly signal a change of key to recipients.
Should the recipient be unable to locate a key corresponding to the
"kid" value, they SHOULD treat that condition as an error. The
interpretation of the "kid" value is unspecified. Its value MUST be
a string. Use of this header parameter is OPTIONAL.
When used with a JWK, the "kid" value can be used to match a JWK
"kid" parameter value.
4.1.11. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter
The "typ" (type) header parameter is used to declare the type of this
object. The type value "JWE" is used to indicate that this object is
a JWE using the JWE Compact Serialization. The type value "JWE-JS"
is used to indicate that this object is a JWE using the JWE JSON
Serialization. The "typ" value is a case sensitive string. Use of
this header parameter is OPTIONAL.
MIME Media Type [RFC2046] values MAY be used as "typ" values.
"typ" values SHOULD either be registered in the IANA JSON Web
Signature and Encryption Type Values registry [JWS] or be a value
that contains a Collision Resistant Namespace.
4.1.12. "cty" (Content Type) Header Parameter
The "cty" (content type) header parameter is used to declare the type
of the encrypted content (the Plaintext). For example, the JSON Web
Token (JWT) [JWT] specification uses the "cty" value "JWT" to
indicate that the Plaintext is a JSON Web Token (JWT). The "cty"
value is a case sensitive string. Use of this header parameter is
OPTIONAL.
The values used for the "cty" header parameter come from the same
value space as the "typ" header parameter, with the same rules
applying.
4.1.13. "apu" (Agreement PartyUInfo) Header Parameter
The "apu" (agreement PartyUInfo) value for key agreement algorithms
using it (such as "ECDH-ES"), represented as a base64url encoded
string. Use of this header parameter is OPTIONAL. When the "alg"
value used identifies an algorithm for which "apu" is a parameter,
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this header parameter MUST be understood by implementations.
4.1.14. "apv" (Agreement PartyVInfo) Header Parameter
The "apv" (agreement PartyVInfo) value for key agreement algorithms
using it (such as "ECDH-ES"), represented as a base64url encoded
string. Use of this header parameter is OPTIONAL. When the "alg"
value used identifies an algorithm for which "apv" is a parameter,
this header parameter MUST be understood by implementations.
4.1.15. "crit" (Critical) Header Parameter
The "crit" (critical) header parameter is array listing the names of
header parameters that are present in the JWE Header that MUST be
understood and processed by the implementation or if not understood,
MUST cause the JWE to be rejected. This list MUST NOT include header
parameters defined by this specification, duplicate names, or names
that do not occur as header parameters within the JWE. Use of this
header parameter is OPTIONAL. This header parameter MUST be
understood by implementations.
An example use, along with a hypothetical "exp" (expiration-time)
field is:
{"alg":"RSA-OAEP",
"enc":"A256GCM",
"crit":["exp"],
"exp":1363284000
}
4.2. Public Header Parameter Names
Additional Header Parameter Names can be defined by those using JWEs.
However, in order to prevent collisions, any new Header Parameter
Name SHOULD either be registered in the IANA JSON Web Signature and
Encryption Header Parameters registry [JWS] or be a Public Name: a
value that contains a Collision Resistant Namespace. In each case,
the definer of the name or value needs to take reasonable precautions
to make sure they are in control of the part of the namespace they
use to define the Header Parameter Name.
New header parameters should be introduced sparingly, as they can
result in non-interoperable JWEs.
4.3. Private Header Parameter Names
A producer and consumer of a JWE may agree to use Header Parameter
Names that are Private Names: names that are not Reserved Names
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Section 4.1 or Public Names Section 4.2. Unlike Public Names,
Private Names are subject to collision and should be used with
caution.
5. Producing and Consuming JWEs
5.1. Message Encryption
The message encryption process is as follows. The order of the steps
is not significant in cases where there are no dependencies between
the inputs and outputs of the steps.
1. Determine the Key Management Mode employed by the algorithm used
to determine the Content Encryption Key (CEK) value. (This is
the algorithm recorded in the "alg" (algorithm) header parameter
of the resulting JWE.)
2. When Key Wrapping, Key Encryption, or Key Agreement with Key
Wrapping are employed, generate a random Content Encryption Key
(CEK) value. See RFC 4086 [RFC4086] for considerations on
generating random values. The CEK MUST have a length equal to
that required for the block encryption algorithm.
3. When Direct Key Agreement or Key Agreement with Key Wrapping are
employed, use the key agreement algorithm to compute the value
of the agreed upon key. When Direct Key Agreement is employed,
let the Content Encryption Key (CEK) be the agreed upon key.
When Key Agreement with Key Wrapping is employed, the agreed
upon key will be used to wrap the CEK.
4. When Key Wrapping, Key Encryption, or Key Agreement with Key
Wrapping are employed, encrypt the CEK to the recipient (see
Section 6.1) and let the result be the JWE Encrypted Key.
5. Otherwise, when Direct Key Agreement or Direct Encryption are
employed, let the JWE Encrypted Key be the empty octet sequence.
6. When Direct Encryption is employed, let the Content Encryption
Key (CEK) be the shared symmetric key.
7. Base64url encode the JWE Encrypted Key to create the Encoded JWE
Encrypted Key.
8. Generate a random JWE Initialization Vector of the correct size
for the block encryption algorithm (if required for the
algorithm); otherwise, let the JWE Initialization Vector be the
empty octet sequence.
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9. Base64url encode the JWE Initialization Vector to create the
Encoded JWE Initialization Vector.
10. Compress the Plaintext if a "zip" parameter was included.
11. Serialize the (compressed) Plaintext into an octet sequence M.
12. Create a JWE Header containing the encryption parameters used.
Note that white space is explicitly allowed in the
representation and no canonicalization need be performed before
encoding.
13. Base64url encode the octets of the UTF-8 representation of the
JWE Header to create the Encoded JWE Header.
14. If the JWE JSON Serialization is being used, repeat this process
for each recipient.
15. Let the value X be the concatenation of the Encoded JWE Header
values computed above, with a tilde ('~') character between each
Encoded JWE Header value. (In the single recipient case, X is
simply the single Encoded JWE Header value.)
16. Let the value Y be the concatenation of the Encoded JWE
Encrypted Key values computed above, with a tilde ('~')
character between each Encoded JWE Encrypted Key value. The
order of the Encoded JWE Encrypted Key values MUST be the same
as the order of the corresponding Encoded JWE Header values in
the previous step. (In the single recipient case, Y is simply
the single Encoded JWE Encrypted Key value.)
17. Let the Additional Authenticated Data value be the octets of the
ASCII representation of the concatenation of X, a period ('.')
character, and Y.
18. Encrypt M using the CEK, the JWE Initialization Vector, and the
Additional Authenticated Data value using the specified block
encryption algorithm to create the JWE Ciphertext value and the
JWE Authentication Tag (which is the Authentication Tag output
from the encryption operation).
19. Base64url encode the JWE Ciphertext to create the Encoded JWE
Ciphertext.
20. Base64url encode the JWE Authentication Tag to create the
Encoded JWE Authentication Tag.
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21. The five encoded parts are the result values used in both the
JWE Compact Serialization and the JWE JSON Serialization
representations.
22. Create the desired serialized output. The JWE Compact
Serialization of this result is the concatenation of the Encoded
JWE Header, the Encoded JWE Encrypted Key, the Encoded JWE
Initialization Vector, the Encoded JWE Ciphertext, and the
Encoded JWE Authentication Tag in that order, with the five
strings being separated by four period ('.') characters. The
JWE JSON Serialization is described in Section 7.
5.2. Message Decryption
The message decryption process is the reverse of the encryption
process. The order of the steps is not significant in cases where
there are no dependencies between the inputs and outputs of the
steps. If any of these steps fails, the JWE MUST be rejected.
1. Parse the serialized input to determine the values of the
Encoded JWE Header, the Encoded JWE Encrypted Key, the Encoded
JWE Initialization Vector, the Encoded JWE Ciphertext, and the
Encoded JWE Authentication Tag. When using the JWE Compact
Serialization, these five values are represented as text strings
in that order, separated by four period ('.') characters. The
JWE JSON Serialization is described in Section 7.
2. The Encoded JWE Header, the Encoded JWE Encrypted Key, the
Encoded JWE Initialization Vector, the Encoded JWE Ciphertext,
and the Encoded JWE Authentication Tag MUST be successfully
base64url decoded following the restriction that no padding
characters have been used.
3. The resulting JWE Header MUST be completely valid JSON syntax
conforming to RFC 4627 [RFC4627].
4. The resulting JWE Header MUST be validated to only include
parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are both
understood and supported or that are specified as being ignored
when not understood.
5. Determine the Key Management Mode employed by the algorithm
specified by the "alg" (algorithm) header parameter.
6. Verify that the JWE uses a key known to the recipient.
7. When Direct Key Agreement or Key Agreement with Key Wrapping are
employed, use the key agreement algorithm to compute the value
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of the agreed upon key. When Direct Key Agreement is employed,
let the Content Encryption Key (CEK) be the agreed upon key.
When Key Agreement with Key Wrapping is employed, the agreed
upon key will be used to decrypt the JWE Encrypted Key.
8. When Key Wrapping, Key Encryption, or Key Agreement with Key
Wrapping are employed, decrypt the JWE Encrypted Key to produce
the Content Encryption Key (CEK). The CEK MUST have a length
equal to that required for the block encryption algorithm. Note
that when there are multiple recipients, each recipient will
only be able decrypt any JWE Encrypted Key values that were
encrypted to a key in that recipient's possession. It is
therefore normal to only be able to decrypt one of the per-
recipient JWE Encrypted Key values to obtain the CEK value. To
mitigate against attacks described in RFC 3218 [RFC3218], the
recipient MUST NOT distinguish between format, padding, and
length errors of encrypted keys. It is strongly recommended, in
the event of receiving an improperly formatted key, that the
receiver substitute a randomly generated CEK and proceed to the
next step, to mitigate timing attacks.
9. Otherwise, when Direct Key Agreement or Direct Encryption are
employed, verify that the JWE Encrypted Key value is empty octet
sequence.
10. When Direct Encryption is employed, let the Content Encryption
Key (CEK) be the shared symmetric key.
11. If the JWE JSON Serialization is being used, repeat this process
for each recipient contained in the representation.
12. Let the value X be the concatenation of the Encoded JWE Header
values identified above, with a tilde ('~') character between
each Encoded JWE Header value. (In the single recipient case, X
is simply the single Encoded JWE Header value.)
13. Let the value Y be the concatenation of the Encoded JWE
Encrypted Key values identified above, with a tilde ('~')
character between each Encoded JWE Encrypted Key value. The
order of the Encoded JWE Encrypted Key values MUST be the same
as the order of the corresponding Encoded JWE Header values in
the previous step. (In the single recipient case, Y is simply
the single Encoded JWE Encrypted Key value.)
14. Let the Additional Authenticated Data value be the octets of the
ASCII representation of the concatenation of X, a period ('.')
character, and Y.
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15. Decrypt the JWE Ciphertext using the CEK, the JWE Initialization
Vector, the Additional Authenticated Data value, and the JWE
Authentication Tag (which is the Authentication Tag input to the
calculation) using the specified block encryption algorithm,
returning the decrypted plaintext and verifying the JWE
Authentication Tag in the manner specified for the algorithm,
rejecting the input without emitting any decrypted output if the
JWE Authentication Tag is incorrect.
16. Uncompress the decrypted plaintext if a "zip" parameter was
included.
17. Output the resulting Plaintext.
5.3. String Comparison Rules
Processing a JWE inevitably requires comparing known strings to
values in JSON objects. For example, in checking what the encryption
method is, the Unicode string encoding "enc" will be checked against
the member names in the JWE Header to see if there is a matching
Header Parameter Name.
Comparisons between JSON strings and other Unicode strings MUST be
performed by comparing Unicode code points without normalization as
specified in the String Comparison Rules in Section 5.3 of [JWS].
6. Encrypting JWEs with Cryptographic Algorithms
JWE uses cryptographic algorithms to encrypt the Plaintext and the
Content Encryption Key (CEK) and to provide integrity protection for
the JWE Header, JWE Encrypted Key, and JWE Ciphertext. The JSON Web
Algorithms (JWA) [JWA] specification specifies a set of cryptographic
algorithms and identifiers to be used with this specification and
defines registries for additional such algorithms. Specifically,
Section 4.1 specifies a set of "alg" (algorithm) header parameter
values and Section 4.2 specifies a set of "enc" (encryption method)
header parameter values intended for use this specification. It also
describes the semantics and operations that are specific to these
algorithms.
Public keys employed for encryption can be identified using the
Header Parameter methods described in Section 4.1 or can be
distributed using methods that are outside the scope of this
specification.
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6.1. CEK Encryption
JWE supports three forms of Content Encryption Key (CEK) encryption:
o Asymmetric encryption under the recipient's public key.
o Symmetric encryption under a key shared between the sender and
receiver.
o Symmetric encryption under a key agreed upon between the sender
and receiver.
See the algorithms registered for "enc" usage in the IANA JSON Web
Signature and Encryption Algorithms registry [JWA] and Section 4.1 of
the JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) [JWA] specification for lists of
encryption algorithms that can be used for CEK encryption.
7. JSON Serialization
The JWE JSON Serialization represents encrypted content as a JSON
object with a "recipients" member containing an array of per-
recipient information, an "initialization_vector" member containing a
shared Encoded JWE Initialization Vector value, a "ciphertext" member
containing a shared Encoded JWE Ciphertext value, and an
"authentication_tag" member containing a shared Encoded JWE
Authentication Tag value. Each member of the "recipients" array is a
JSON object with a "header" member containing an Encoded JWE Header
value and an "encrypted_key" member containing an Encoded JWE
Encrypted Key value.
Unlike the JWE Compact Serialization, content using the JWE JSON
Serialization MAY be encrypted to more than one recipient. Each
recipient requires:
o a JWE Header value specifying the cryptographic parameters used to
encrypt the JWE Encrypted Key to that recipient and the parameters
used to encrypt the plaintext to produce the JWE Ciphertext; this
is represented as an Encoded JWE Header value in the "header"
member of an object in the "recipients" array.
o a JWE Encrypted Key value used to encrypt the ciphertext; this is
represented as an Encoded JWE Encrypted Key value in the
"encrypted_key" member of the same object in the "recipients"
array.
Therefore, the syntax is:
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{"recipients":[
{"header":"<header 1 contents>",
"encrypted_key":"<encrypted key 1 contents>"},
...
{"header":"<header N contents>",
"encrypted_key":"<encrypted key N contents>"}],
"initialization_vector":"<initialization vector contents>",
"ciphertext":"<ciphertext contents>",
"authentication_tag":"<authentication tag contents>"
}
The contents of the Encoded JWE Header, Encoded JWE Encrypted Key,
Encoded JWE Initialization Vector, Encoded JWE Ciphertext, and
Encoded JWE Authentication Tag values are exactly as specified in the
rest of this specification. They are interpreted and validated in
the same manner, with each corresponding "header" and "encrypted_key"
value being created and validated together.
All recipients use the same JWE Ciphertext, JWE Initialization
Vector, and JWE Authentication Tag values, resulting in potentially
significant space savings if the message is large. Therefore, all
header parameters that specify the treatment of the JWE Ciphertext
value MUST be the same for all recipients. This primarily means that
the "enc" (encryption method) header parameter value in the JWE
Header for each recipient MUST be the same.
7.1. Example JWE-JS
This section contains an example using the JWE JSON Serialization.
This example demonstrates the capability for encrypting the same
plaintext to multiple recipients.
Two recipients are present in this example: the first using the
RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5 algorithm to encrypt the Content Encryption Key
(CEK) and the second using RSAES OAEP to encrypt the CEK. The
Plaintext is encrypted using the AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 algorithm
and the same block encryption parameters to produce the common JWE
Ciphertext value. The two Decoded JWE Header Segments used are:
{"alg":"RSA1_5","enc":"A128CBC-HS256"}
and:
{"alg":"RSA-OAEP","enc":"A128CBC-HS256"}
The keys used for the first recipient are the same as those in
Appendix A.2, as is the Plaintext used. The encryption key used for
the second recipient is the same as that used in Appendix A.3; the
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block encryption keys and parameters for the second recipient are the
same as those for the first recipient (which must be the case, since
the Initialization Vector and Ciphertext are shared). Thus, the same
two Encoded JWE Header and JWE Encoded Encrypted Key values are used
in this example as are used in those examples.
The value X used as part of the AAD value is the concatenation of the
Encoded JWE Header values, separated by a tilde ('~') character. In
this example, the value of X (with line breaks for display purposes
only) is:
eyJhbGciOiJSU0ExXzUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0
~
eyJhbGciOiJBMTI4S1ciLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0
The value Y used as part of the AAD value is the concatenation of the
Encoded JWE Encrypted Key values, separated by a tilde ('~')
character. In this example, the value of Y (with line breaks for
display purposes only) is:
nJa_uE2D0wlKz-OcwSbKFzj302xYSI-RLBM6hbVGmP4axtJQPA9S0po3s3NMk
mOmkkawnfwPNjpc0mc3z79cuQWkQPFQo-mDxmogz8dxBcheaTUg3ZvpbGCXxZ
jDYENRWiZ5M9BiLy09BIF5mHp85QL6XED1JEZMOh-1uT1lqPDcDD79qWtrCfE
JmNmfsx5fcB2PfAcVtQ0t_YmOXx5_Gu0it1nILKXLR2Ynf9mfLhEcC5LebpWy
EHW6WzQ4iH9SIcIupPV1iKCzmJcPrDBJ5Fc_KMBcXBinaS__wftNywaGgfi_N
Ssx24LxtK6fIkejRlMBmCfxv0Tg8CtxpURigg
~
6KB707dM9YTIgHtLvtgWQ8mKwboJW3of9locizkDTHzBC2IlrT1oOQ
The AAD value used for the block encryption is the octets of the
ASCII representation of the concatenation of X, a period ('.')
character, and Y. This concatenation (with line breaks for display
purposes only) is:
eyJhbGciOiJSU0ExXzUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0
~
eyJhbGciOiJBMTI4S1ciLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0
.
nJa_uE2D0wlKz-OcwSbKFzj302xYSI-RLBM6hbVGmP4axtJQPA9S0po3s3NMk
mOmkkawnfwPNjpc0mc3z79cuQWkQPFQo-mDxmogz8dxBcheaTUg3ZvpbGCXxZ
jDYENRWiZ5M9BiLy09BIF5mHp85QL6XED1JEZMOh-1uT1lqPDcDD79qWtrCfE
JmNmfsx5fcB2PfAcVtQ0t_YmOXx5_Gu0it1nILKXLR2Ynf9mfLhEcC5LebpWy
EHW6WzQ4iH9SIcIupPV1iKCzmJcPrDBJ5Fc_KMBcXBinaS__wftNywaGgfi_N
Ssx24LxtK6fIkejRlMBmCfxv0Tg8CtxpURigg
~
6KB707dM9YTIgHtLvtgWQ8mKwboJW3of9locizkDTHzBC2IlrT1oOQ
The complete JSON Web Encryption JSON Serialization (JWE-JS) for
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these values is as follows (with line breaks for display purposes
only):
{"recipients":[
{"header":
"eyJhbGciOiJSU0ExXzUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0",
"encrypted_key":
"nJa_uE2D0wlKz-OcwSbKFzj302xYSI-RLBM6hbVGmP4axtJQPA9S0po3s3NMk
mOmkkawnfwPNjpc0mc3z79cuQWkQPFQo-mDxmogz8dxBcheaTUg3ZvpbGCXxZ
jDYENRWiZ5M9BiLy09BIF5mHp85QL6XED1JEZMOh-1uT1lqPDcDD79qWtrCfE
JmNmfsx5fcB2PfAcVtQ0t_YmOXx5_Gu0it1nILKXLR2Ynf9mfLhEcC5LebpWy
EHW6WzQ4iH9SIcIupPV1iKCzmJcPrDBJ5Fc_KMBcXBinaS__wftNywaGgfi_N
Ssx24LxtK6fIkejRlMBmCfxv0Tg8CtxpURigg"},
{"header":
"eyJhbGciOiJBMTI4S1ciLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0",
"encrypted_key":
"6KB707dM9YTIgHtLvtgWQ8mKwboJW3of9locizkDTHzBC2IlrT1oOQ"}],
"initialization_vector":
"AxY8DCtDaGlsbGljb3RoZQ",
"ciphertext":
"KDlTtXchhZTGufMYmOYGS4HffxPSUrfmqCHXaI9wOGY",
"authentication_tag":
"LlhRZFfphc2f5X3nTTJP6g"
}
8. Implementation Considerations
The JWE Compact Serialization is mandatory to implement.
Implementation of the JWE JSON Serialization is OPTIONAL.
9. IANA Considerations
9.1. Registration of JWE Header Parameter Names
This specification registers the Header Parameter Names defined in
Section 4.1 in the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header
Parameters registry [JWS].
9.1.1. Registry Contents
o Header Parameter Name: "alg"
o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE
o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.1 of [[ this document ]]
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o Header Parameter Name: "enc"
o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE
o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.2 of [[ this document ]]
o Header Parameter Name: "epk"
o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE
o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.3 of [[ this document ]]
o Header Parameter Name: "zip"
o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE
o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.4 of [[ this document ]]
o Header Parameter Name: "jku"
o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE
o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.5 of [[ this document ]]
o Header Parameter Name: "jwk"
o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE
o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification document(s): Section 4.1.6 of [[ this document ]]
o Header Parameter Name: "x5u"
o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE
o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.7 of [[ this document ]]
o Header Parameter Name: "x5t"
o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE
o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.8 of [[ this document ]]
o Header Parameter Name: "x5c"
o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE
o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.9 of [[ this document ]]
o Header Parameter Name: "kid"
o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE
o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.10 of [[ this document ]]
o Header Parameter Name: "typ"
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o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE
o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.11 of [[ this document ]]
o Header Parameter Name: "cty"
o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE
o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.12 of [[ this document ]]
o Header Parameter Name: "apu"
o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE
o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.13 of [[ this document ]]
o Header Parameter Name: "apv"
o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE
o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.14 of [[ this document ]]
o Header Parameter Name: "crit"
o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS
o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.15 of [[ this document ]]
9.2. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Type Values Registration
9.2.1. Registry Contents
This specification registers the "JWE" and "JWE-JS" type values in
the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Type Values registry
[JWS]:
o "typ" Header Parameter Value: "JWE"
o Abbreviation for MIME Type: application/jwe
o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.11 of [[ this document ]]
o "typ" Header Parameter Value: "JWE-JS"
o Abbreviation for MIME Type: application/jwe-js
o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.11 of [[ this document ]]
9.3. Media Type Registration
9.3.1. Registry Contents
This specification registers the "application/jwe" and
"application/jwe-js" Media Types [RFC2046] in the MIME Media Type
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registry [RFC4288] to indicate, respectively, that the content is a
JWE using the JWE Compact Serialization or a JWE using the JWE JSON
Serialization.
o Type Name: application
o Subtype Name: jwe
o Required Parameters: n/a
o Optional Parameters: n/a
o Encoding considerations: JWE values are encoded as a series of
base64url encoded values (some of which may be the empty string)
separated by period ('.') characters
o Security Considerations: See the Security Considerations section
of [[ this document ]]
o Interoperability Considerations: n/a
o Published Specification: [[ this document ]]
o Applications that use this media type: OpenID Connect and other
applications using encrypted JWTs
o Additional Information: Magic number(s): n/a, File extension(s):
n/a, Macintosh file type code(s): n/a
o Person & email address to contact for further information: Michael
B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com
o Intended Usage: COMMON
o Restrictions on Usage: none
o Author: Michael B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com
o Change Controller: IETF
o Type Name: application
o Subtype Name: jwe-js
o Required Parameters: n/a
o Optional Parameters: n/a
o Encoding considerations: JWE-JS values are represented as a JSON
Object; UTF-8 encoding SHOULD be employed for the JSON object.
o Security Considerations: See the Security Considerations section
of [[ this document ]]
o Interoperability Considerations: n/a
o Published Specification: [[ this document ]]
o Applications that use this media type: TBD
o Additional Information: Magic number(s): n/a, File extension(s):
n/a, Macintosh file type code(s): n/a
o Person & email address to contact for further information: Michael
B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com
o Intended Usage: COMMON
o Restrictions on Usage: none
o Author: Michael B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com
o Change Controller: IETF
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10. Security Considerations
All of the security issues faced by any cryptographic application
must be faced by a JWS/JWE/JWK agent. Among these issues are
protecting the user's private and symmetric keys, preventing various
attacks, and helping the user avoid mistakes such as inadvertently
encrypting a message for the wrong recipient. The entire list of
security considerations is beyond the scope of this document.
All the security considerations in the JWS specification also apply
to this specification. Likewise, all the security considerations in
XML Encryption 1.1 [W3C.CR-xmlenc-core1-20120313] also apply, other
than those that are XML specific.
When decrypting, particular care must be taken not to allow the JWE
recipient to be used as an oracle for decrypting messages. RFC 3218
[RFC3218] should be consulted for specific countermeasures to attacks
on RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5. An attacker might modify the contents of the
"alg" parameter from "RSA-OAEP" to "RSA1_5" in order to generate a
formatting error that can be detected and used to recover the CEK
even if RSAES OAEP was used to encrypt the CEK. It is therefore
particularly important to report all formatting errors to the CEK,
Additional Authenticated Data, or ciphertext as a single error when
the JWE is rejected.
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[ITU.X690.1994]
International Telecommunications Union, "Information
Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic
Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and
Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation
X.690, 1994.
[JWA] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)",
draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms (work in progress),
April 2013.
[JWK] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)",
draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key (work in progress),
April 2013.
[JWS] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature (work
in progress), April 2013.
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[RFC1421] Linn, J., "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic
Mail: Part I: Message Encryption and Authentication
Procedures", RFC 1421, February 1993.
[RFC1951] Deutsch, P., "DEFLATE Compressed Data Format Specification
version 1.3", RFC 1951, May 1996.
[RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046,
November 1996.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, January 2005.
[RFC4086] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.
[RFC4288] Freed, N. and J. Klensin, "Media Type Specifications and
Registration Procedures", RFC 4288, December 2005.
[RFC4627] Crockford, D., "The application/json Media Type for
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)", RFC 4627, July 2006.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[W3C.CR-xmlenc-core1-20120313]
Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., Roessler, T., and F. Hirsch,
"XML Encryption Syntax and Processing Version 1.1", World
Wide Web Consortium CR CR-xmlenc-core1-20120313,
March 2012,
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<http://www.w3.org/TR/2012/CR-xmlenc-core1-20120313>.
11.2. Informative References
[I-D.mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2]
McGrew, D. and K. Paterson, "Authenticated Encryption with
AES-CBC and HMAC-SHA",
draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-01 (work in progress),
October 2012.
[I-D.rescorla-jsms]
Rescorla, E. and J. Hildebrand, "JavaScript Message
Security Format", draft-rescorla-jsms-00 (work in
progress), March 2011.
[JSE] Bradley, J. and N. Sakimura (editor), "JSON Simple
Encryption", September 2010.
[JWT] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token (work in
progress), April 2013.
[RFC3218] Rescorla, E., "Preventing the Million Message Attack on
Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC 3218, January 2002.
[RFC4122] Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally
Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122,
July 2005.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, September 2009.
Appendix A. JWE Examples
This section provides examples of JWE computations.
A.1. Example JWE using RSAES OAEP and AES GCM
This example encrypts the plaintext "The true sign of intelligence is
not knowledge but imagination." to the recipient using RSAES OAEP and
AES GCM. The representation of this plaintext is:
[84, 104, 101, 32, 116, 114, 117, 101, 32, 115, 105, 103, 110, 32,
111, 102, 32, 105, 110, 116, 101, 108, 108, 105, 103, 101, 110, 99,
101, 32, 105, 115, 32, 110, 111, 116, 32, 107, 110, 111, 119, 108,
101, 100, 103, 101, 32, 98, 117, 116, 32, 105, 109, 97, 103, 105,
110, 97, 116, 105, 111, 110, 46]
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A.1.1. JWE Header
The following example JWE Header declares that:
o the Content Encryption Key is encrypted to the recipient using the
RSAES OAEP algorithm to produce the JWE Encrypted Key and
o the Plaintext is encrypted using the AES GCM algorithm with a 256
bit key to produce the Ciphertext.
{"alg":"RSA-OAEP","enc":"A256GCM"}
A.1.2. Encoded JWE Header
Base64url encoding the octets of the UTF-8 representation of the JWE
Header yields this Encoded JWE Header value:
eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUCIsImVuYyI6IkEyNTZHQ00ifQ
A.1.3. Content Encryption Key (CEK)
Generate a 256 bit random Content Encryption Key (CEK). In this
example, the value is:
[177, 161, 244, 128, 84, 143, 225, 115, 63, 180, 3, 255, 107, 154,
212, 246, 138, 7, 110, 91, 112, 46, 34, 105, 47, 130, 203, 46, 122,
234, 64, 252]
A.1.4. Key Encryption
Encrypt the CEK with the recipient's public key using the RSAES OAEP
algorithm to produce the JWE Encrypted Key. In this example, the RSA
key parameters are:
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+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
| Parameter | Value |
| Name | |
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
| Modulus | [161, 168, 84, 34, 133, 176, 208, 173, 46, 176, 163, |
| | 110, 57, 30, 135, 227, 9, 31, 226, 128, 84, 92, 116, |
| | 241, 70, 248, 27, 227, 193, 62, 5, 91, 241, 145, 224, |
| | 205, 141, 176, 184, 133, 239, 43, 81, 103, 9, 161, |
| | 153, 157, 179, 104, 123, 51, 189, 34, 152, 69, 97, |
| | 69, 78, 93, 140, 131, 87, 182, 169, 101, 92, 142, 3, |
| | 22, 167, 8, 212, 56, 35, 79, 210, 222, 192, 208, 252, |
| | 49, 109, 138, 173, 253, 210, 166, 201, 63, 102, 74, |
| | 5, 158, 41, 90, 144, 108, 160, 79, 10, 89, 222, 231, |
| | 172, 31, 227, 197, 0, 19, 72, 81, 138, 78, 136, 221, |
| | 121, 118, 196, 17, 146, 10, 244, 188, 72, 113, 55, |
| | 221, 162, 217, 171, 27, 57, 233, 210, 101, 236, 154, |
| | 199, 56, 138, 239, 101, 48, 198, 186, 202, 160, 76, |
| | 111, 234, 71, 57, 183, 5, 211, 171, 136, 126, 64, 40, |
| | 75, 58, 89, 244, 254, 107, 84, 103, 7, 236, 69, 163, |
| | 18, 180, 251, 58, 153, 46, 151, 174, 12, 103, 197, |
| | 181, 161, 162, 55, 250, 235, 123, 110, 17, 11, 158, |
| | 24, 47, 133, 8, 199, 235, 107, 126, 130, 246, 73, |
| | 195, 20, 108, 202, 176, 214, 187, 45, 146, 182, 118, |
| | 54, 32, 200, 61, 201, 71, 243, 1, 255, 131, 84, 37, |
| | 111, 211, 168, 228, 45, 192, 118, 27, 197, 235, 232, |
| | 36, 10, 230, 248, 190, 82, 182, 140, 35, 204, 108, |
| | 190, 253, 186, 186, 27] |
| Exponent | [1, 0, 1] |
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| Private | [144, 183, 109, 34, 62, 134, 108, 57, 44, 252, 10, |
| Exponent | 66, 73, 54, 16, 181, 233, 92, 54, 219, 101, 42, 35, |
| | 178, 63, 51, 43, 92, 119, 136, 251, 41, 53, 23, 191, |
| | 164, 164, 60, 88, 227, 229, 152, 228, 213, 149, 228, |
| | 169, 237, 104, 71, 151, 75, 88, 252, 216, 77, 251, |
| | 231, 28, 97, 88, 193, 215, 202, 248, 216, 121, 195, |
| | 211, 245, 250, 112, 71, 243, 61, 129, 95, 39, 244, |
| | 122, 225, 217, 169, 211, 165, 48, 253, 220, 59, 122, |
| | 219, 42, 86, 223, 32, 236, 39, 48, 103, 78, 122, 216, |
| | 187, 88, 176, 89, 24, 1, 42, 177, 24, 99, 142, 170, |
| | 1, 146, 43, 3, 108, 64, 194, 121, 182, 95, 187, 134, |
| | 71, 88, 96, 134, 74, 131, 167, 69, 106, 143, 121, 27, |
| | 72, 44, 245, 95, 39, 194, 179, 175, 203, 122, 16, |
| | 112, 183, 17, 200, 202, 31, 17, 138, 156, 184, 210, |
| | 157, 184, 154, 131, 128, 110, 12, 85, 195, 122, 241, |
| | 79, 251, 229, 183, 117, 21, 123, 133, 142, 220, 153, |
| | 9, 59, 57, 105, 81, 255, 138, 77, 82, 54, 62, 216, |
| | 38, 249, 208, 17, 197, 49, 45, 19, 232, 157, 251, |
| | 131, 137, 175, 72, 126, 43, 229, 69, 179, 117, 82, |
| | 157, 213, 83, 35, 57, 210, 197, 252, 171, 143, 194, |
| | 11, 47, 163, 6, 253, 75, 252, 96, 11, 187, 84, 130, |
| | 210, 7, 121, 78, 91, 79, 57, 251, 138, 132, 220, 60, |
| | 224, 173, 56, 224, 201] |
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
The resulting JWE Encrypted Key value is:
[2, 151, 206, 44, 38, 131, 110, 171, 63, 37, 115, 216, 203, 98, 61,
223, 187, 255, 198, 106, 243, 143, 226, 44, 179, 89, 134, 232, 208,
7, 153, 226, 85, 136, 206, 163, 218, 93, 12, 30, 247, 236, 120, 135,
71, 87, 37, 54, 4, 138, 6, 86, 239, 104, 134, 249, 36, 90, 36, 106,
228, 50, 246, 141, 134, 83, 60, 15, 83, 1, 220, 42, 220, 85, 8, 87,
42, 7, 248, 247, 157, 127, 167, 165, 28, 133, 69, 139, 98, 134, 12,
75, 41, 96, 203, 80, 1, 19, 12, 72, 23, 18, 238, 155, 37, 199, 167,
229, 135, 80, 159, 135, 113, 129, 43, 43, 51, 181, 83, 4, 133, 159,
230, 104, 89, 38, 224, 246, 21, 10, 194, 108, 190, 174, 130, 183,
119, 224, 216, 34, 79, 58, 205, 23, 212, 49, 238, 197, 146, 168, 32,
98, 42, 113, 183, 138, 225, 113, 14, 229, 173, 33, 229, 48, 46, 36,
230, 202, 117, 243, 180, 116, 172, 31, 53, 36, 155, 166, 238, 108,
22, 186, 81, 23, 5, 118, 21, 52, 216, 162, 161, 120, 204, 142, 58,
55, 223, 191, 132, 194, 51, 158, 81, 41, 126, 212, 87, 133, 39, 4,
38, 230, 125, 28, 111, 2, 240, 33, 193, 213, 100, 89, 252, 158, 60,
62, 87, 170, 118, 17, 120, 163, 183, 193, 228, 157, 112, 22, 165, 23,
6, 214, 237, 184, 98, 127, 3, 101, 222, 232, 1, 33, 174, 92, 194, 59]
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A.1.5. Encoded JWE Encrypted Key
Base64url encode the JWE Encrypted Key to produce the Encoded JWE
Encrypted Key. This result (with line breaks for display purposes
only) is:
ApfOLCaDbqs_JXPYy2I937v_xmrzj-Iss1mG6NAHmeJViM6j2l0MHvfseIdHVyU2
BIoGVu9ohvkkWiRq5DL2jYZTPA9TAdwq3FUIVyoH-Pedf6elHIVFi2KGDEspYMtQ
ARMMSBcS7pslx6flh1Cfh3GBKysztVMEhZ_maFkm4PYVCsJsvq6Ct3fg2CJPOs0X
1DHuxZKoIGIqcbeK4XEO5a0h5TAuJObKdfO0dKwfNSSbpu5sFrpRFwV2FTTYoqF4
zI46N9-_hMIznlEpftRXhScEJuZ9HG8C8CHB1WRZ_J48PleqdhF4o7fB5J1wFqUX
BtbtuGJ_A2Xe6AEhrlzCOw
A.1.6. Initialization Vector
Generate a random 96 bit JWE Initialization Vector. In this example,
the value is:
[227, 197, 117, 252, 2, 219, 233, 68, 180, 225, 77, 219]
Base64url encoding this value yields the Encoded JWE Initialization
Vector value:
48V1_ALb6US04U3b
A.1.7. Additional Authenticated Data Parameter
Concatenate the Encoded JWE Header value, a period ('.') character,
and the Encoded JWE Encrypted Key to create the Additional
Authenticated Data parameter. This result (with line breaks for
display purposes only) is:
eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUCIsImVuYyI6IkEyNTZHQ00ifQ.
ApfOLCaDbqs_JXPYy2I937v_xmrzj-Iss1mG6NAHmeJViM6j2l0MHvfseIdHVyU2
BIoGVu9ohvkkWiRq5DL2jYZTPA9TAdwq3FUIVyoH-Pedf6elHIVFi2KGDEspYMtQ
ARMMSBcS7pslx6flh1Cfh3GBKysztVMEhZ_maFkm4PYVCsJsvq6Ct3fg2CJPOs0X
1DHuxZKoIGIqcbeK4XEO5a0h5TAuJObKdfO0dKwfNSSbpu5sFrpRFwV2FTTYoqF4
zI46N9-_hMIznlEpftRXhScEJuZ9HG8C8CHB1WRZ_J48PleqdhF4o7fB5J1wFqUX
BtbtuGJ_A2Xe6AEhrlzCOw
The representation of this value is:
[101, 121, 74, 104, 98, 71, 99, 105, 79, 105, 74, 83, 85, 48, 69,
116, 84, 48, 70, 70, 85, 67, 73, 115, 73, 109, 86, 117, 89, 121, 73,
54, 73, 107, 69, 121, 78, 84, 90, 72, 81, 48, 48, 105, 102, 81, 46,
65, 112, 102, 79, 76, 67, 97, 68, 98, 113, 115, 95, 74, 88, 80, 89,
121, 50, 73, 57, 51, 55, 118, 95, 120, 109, 114, 122, 106, 45, 73,
115, 115, 49, 109, 71, 54, 78, 65, 72, 109, 101, 74, 86, 105, 77, 54,
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106, 50, 108, 48, 77, 72, 118, 102, 115, 101, 73, 100, 72, 86, 121,
85, 50, 66, 73, 111, 71, 86, 117, 57, 111, 104, 118, 107, 107, 87,
105, 82, 113, 53, 68, 76, 50, 106, 89, 90, 84, 80, 65, 57, 84, 65,
100, 119, 113, 51, 70, 85, 73, 86, 121, 111, 72, 45, 80, 101, 100,
102, 54, 101, 108, 72, 73, 86, 70, 105, 50, 75, 71, 68, 69, 115, 112,
89, 77, 116, 81, 65, 82, 77, 77, 83, 66, 99, 83, 55, 112, 115, 108,
120, 54, 102, 108, 104, 49, 67, 102, 104, 51, 71, 66, 75, 121, 115,
122, 116, 86, 77, 69, 104, 90, 95, 109, 97, 70, 107, 109, 52, 80, 89,
86, 67, 115, 74, 115, 118, 113, 54, 67, 116, 51, 102, 103, 50, 67,
74, 80, 79, 115, 48, 88, 49, 68, 72, 117, 120, 90, 75, 111, 73, 71,
73, 113, 99, 98, 101, 75, 52, 88, 69, 79, 53, 97, 48, 104, 53, 84,
65, 117, 74, 79, 98, 75, 100, 102, 79, 48, 100, 75, 119, 102, 78, 83,
83, 98, 112, 117, 53, 115, 70, 114, 112, 82, 70, 119, 86, 50, 70, 84,
84, 89, 111, 113, 70, 52, 122, 73, 52, 54, 78, 57, 45, 95, 104, 77,
73, 122, 110, 108, 69, 112, 102, 116, 82, 88, 104, 83, 99, 69, 74,
117, 90, 57, 72, 71, 56, 67, 56, 67, 72, 66, 49, 87, 82, 90, 95, 74,
52, 56, 80, 108, 101, 113, 100, 104, 70, 52, 111, 55, 102, 66, 53,
74, 49, 119, 70, 113, 85, 88, 66, 116, 98, 116, 117, 71, 74, 95, 65,
50, 88, 101, 54, 65, 69, 104, 114, 108, 122, 67, 79, 119]
A.1.8. Plaintext Encryption
Encrypt the Plaintext with AES GCM using the CEK as the encryption
key, the JWE Initialization Vector, and the Additional Authenticated
Data value above, requesting a 128 bit Authentication Tag output.
The resulting Ciphertext is:
[229, 236, 166, 241, 53, 191, 115, 196, 174, 43, 73, 109, 39, 122,
233, 96, 140, 206, 120, 52, 51, 237, 48, 11, 190, 219, 186, 80, 111,
104, 50, 142, 47, 167, 59, 61, 181, 127, 196, 21, 40, 82, 242, 32,
123, 143, 168, 226, 73, 216, 176, 144, 138, 247, 106, 60, 16, 205,
160, 109, 64, 63, 192]
The resulting Authentication Tag value is:
[130, 17, 32, 198, 120, 167, 144, 113, 0, 50, 158, 49, 102, 208, 118,
152]
A.1.9. Encoded JWE Ciphertext
Base64url encode the Ciphertext to create the Encoded JWE Ciphertext.
This result (with line breaks for display purposes only) is:
5eym8TW_c8SuK0ltJ3rpYIzOeDQz7TALvtu6UG9oMo4vpzs9tX_EFShS8iB7j6ji
SdiwkIr3ajwQzaBtQD_A
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A.1.10. Encoded JWE Authentication Tag
Base64url encode the Authentication Tag to create the Encoded JWE
Authentication Tag. This result is:
ghEgxninkHEAMp4xZtB2mA
A.1.11. Complete Representation
Assemble the final representation: The Compact Serialization of this
result is the concatenation of the Encoded JWE Header, the Encoded
JWE Encrypted Key, the Encoded JWE Initialization Vector, the Encoded
JWE Ciphertext, and the Encoded JWE Authentication Tag in that order,
with the five strings being separated by four period ('.')
characters.
The final result in this example (with line breaks for display
purposes only) is:
eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUCIsImVuYyI6IkEyNTZHQ00ifQ.
ApfOLCaDbqs_JXPYy2I937v_xmrzj-Iss1mG6NAHmeJViM6j2l0MHvfseIdHVyU2
BIoGVu9ohvkkWiRq5DL2jYZTPA9TAdwq3FUIVyoH-Pedf6elHIVFi2KGDEspYMtQ
ARMMSBcS7pslx6flh1Cfh3GBKysztVMEhZ_maFkm4PYVCsJsvq6Ct3fg2CJPOs0X
1DHuxZKoIGIqcbeK4XEO5a0h5TAuJObKdfO0dKwfNSSbpu5sFrpRFwV2FTTYoqF4
zI46N9-_hMIznlEpftRXhScEJuZ9HG8C8CHB1WRZ_J48PleqdhF4o7fB5J1wFqUX
BtbtuGJ_A2Xe6AEhrlzCOw.
48V1_ALb6US04U3b.
5eym8TW_c8SuK0ltJ3rpYIzOeDQz7TALvtu6UG9oMo4vpzs9tX_EFShS8iB7j6ji
SdiwkIr3ajwQzaBtQD_A.
ghEgxninkHEAMp4xZtB2mA
A.1.12. Validation
This example illustrates the process of creating a JWE with RSA OAEP
and AES GCM. These results can be used to validate JWE decryption
implementations for these algorithms. Note that since the RSAES OAEP
computation includes random values, the encryption results above will
not be completely reproducible. However, since the AES GCM
computation is deterministic, the JWE Encrypted Ciphertext values
will be the same for all encryptions performed using these inputs.
A.2. Example JWE using RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5 and AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256
This example encrypts the plaintext "Live long and prosper." to the
recipient using RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5 and AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256. The
representation of this plaintext is:
[76, 105, 118, 101, 32, 108, 111, 110, 103, 32, 97, 110, 100, 32,
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112, 114, 111, 115, 112, 101, 114, 46]
A.2.1. JWE Header
The following example JWE Header (with line breaks for display
purposes only) declares that:
o the Content Encryption Key is encrypted to the recipient using the
RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5 algorithm to produce the JWE Encrypted Key and
o the Plaintext is encrypted using the AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256
algorithm to produce the Ciphertext.
{"alg":"RSA1_5","enc":"A128CBC-HS256"}
A.2.2. Encoded JWE Header
Base64url encoding the octets of the UTF-8 representation of the JWE
Header yields this Encoded JWE Header value:
eyJhbGciOiJSU0ExXzUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0
A.2.3. Content Encryption Key (CEK)
Generate a 256 bit random Content Encryption Key (CEK). In this
example, the key value is:
[4, 211, 31, 197, 84, 157, 252, 254, 11, 100, 157, 250, 63, 170, 106,
206, 107, 124, 212, 45, 111, 107, 9, 219, 200, 177, 0, 240, 143, 156,
44, 207]
A.2.4. Key Encryption
Encrypt the CEK with the recipient's public key using the RSAES-
PKCS1-V1_5 algorithm to produce the JWE Encrypted Key. In this
example, the RSA key parameters are:
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+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
| Parameter | Value |
| Name | |
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
| Modulus | [177, 119, 33, 13, 164, 30, 108, 121, 207, 136, 107, |
| | 242, 12, 224, 19, 226, 198, 134, 17, 71, 173, 75, 42, |
| | 61, 48, 162, 206, 161, 97, 108, 185, 234, 226, 219, |
| | 118, 206, 118, 5, 169, 224, 60, 181, 90, 85, 51, 123, |
| | 6, 224, 4, 122, 29, 230, 151, 12, 244, 127, 121, 25, |
| | 4, 85, 220, 144, 215, 110, 130, 17, 68, 228, 129, |
| | 138, 7, 130, 231, 40, 212, 214, 17, 179, 28, 124, |
| | 151, 178, 207, 20, 14, 154, 222, 113, 176, 24, 198, |
| | 73, 211, 113, 9, 33, 178, 80, 13, 25, 21, 25, 153, |
| | 212, 206, 67, 154, 147, 70, 194, 192, 183, 160, 83, |
| | 98, 236, 175, 85, 23, 97, 75, 199, 177, 73, 145, 50, |
| | 253, 206, 32, 179, 254, 236, 190, 82, 73, 67, 129, |
| | 253, 252, 220, 108, 136, 138, 11, 192, 1, 36, 239, |
| | 228, 55, 81, 113, 17, 25, 140, 63, 239, 146, 3, 172, |
| | 96, 60, 227, 233, 64, 255, 224, 173, 225, 228, 229, |
| | 92, 112, 72, 99, 97, 26, 87, 187, 123, 46, 50, 90, |
| | 202, 117, 73, 10, 153, 47, 224, 178, 163, 77, 48, 46, |
| | 154, 33, 148, 34, 228, 33, 172, 216, 89, 46, 225, |
| | 127, 68, 146, 234, 30, 147, 54, 146, 5, 133, 45, 78, |
| | 254, 85, 55, 75, 213, 86, 194, 218, 215, 163, 189, |
| | 194, 54, 6, 83, 36, 18, 153, 53, 7, 48, 89, 35, 66, |
| | 144, 7, 65, 154, 13, 97, 75, 55, 230, 132, 3, 13, |
| | 239, 71] |
| Exponent | [1, 0, 1] |
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| Private | [84, 80, 150, 58, 165, 235, 242, 123, 217, 55, 38, |
| Exponent | 154, 36, 181, 221, 156, 211, 215, 100, 164, 90, 88, |
| | 40, 228, 83, 148, 54, 122, 4, 16, 165, 48, 76, 194, |
| | 26, 107, 51, 53, 179, 165, 31, 18, 198, 173, 78, 61, |
| | 56, 97, 252, 158, 140, 80, 63, 25, 223, 156, 36, 203, |
| | 214, 252, 120, 67, 180, 167, 3, 82, 243, 25, 97, 214, |
| | 83, 133, 69, 16, 104, 54, 160, 200, 41, 83, 164, 187, |
| | 70, 153, 111, 234, 242, 158, 175, 28, 198, 48, 211, |
| | 45, 148, 58, 23, 62, 227, 74, 52, 117, 42, 90, 41, |
| | 249, 130, 154, 80, 119, 61, 26, 193, 40, 125, 10, |
| | 152, 174, 227, 225, 205, 32, 62, 66, 6, 163, 100, 99, |
| | 219, 19, 253, 25, 105, 80, 201, 29, 252, 157, 237, |
| | 69, 1, 80, 171, 167, 20, 196, 156, 109, 249, 88, 0, |
| | 3, 152, 38, 165, 72, 87, 6, 152, 71, 156, 214, 16, |
| | 71, 30, 82, 51, 103, 76, 218, 63, 9, 84, 163, 249, |
| | 91, 215, 44, 238, 85, 101, 240, 148, 1, 82, 224, 91, |
| | 135, 105, 127, 84, 171, 181, 152, 210, 183, 126, 24, |
| | 46, 196, 90, 173, 38, 245, 219, 186, 222, 27, 240, |
| | 212, 194, 15, 66, 135, 226, 178, 190, 52, 245, 74, |
| | 65, 224, 81, 100, 85, 25, 204, 165, 203, 187, 175, |
| | 84, 100, 82, 15, 11, 23, 202, 151, 107, 54, 41, 207, |
| | 3, 136, 229, 134, 131, 93, 139, 50, 182, 204, 93, |
| | 130, 89] |
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
The resulting JWE Encrypted Key value is:
[156, 150, 191, 184, 77, 131, 211, 9, 74, 207, 227, 156, 193, 38,
202, 23, 56, 247, 211, 108, 88, 72, 143, 145, 44, 19, 58, 133, 181,
70, 152, 254, 26, 198, 210, 80, 60, 15, 82, 210, 154, 55, 179, 115,
76, 146, 99, 166, 146, 70, 176, 157, 252, 15, 54, 58, 92, 210, 103,
55, 207, 191, 92, 185, 5, 164, 64, 241, 80, 163, 233, 131, 198, 106,
32, 207, 199, 113, 5, 200, 94, 105, 53, 32, 221, 155, 233, 108, 96,
151, 197, 152, 195, 96, 67, 81, 90, 38, 121, 51, 208, 98, 47, 45, 61,
4, 129, 121, 152, 122, 124, 229, 2, 250, 92, 64, 245, 36, 70, 76, 58,
31, 181, 185, 61, 101, 168, 240, 220, 12, 62, 253, 169, 107, 107, 9,
241, 9, 152, 217, 159, 179, 30, 95, 112, 29, 143, 124, 7, 21, 181,
13, 45, 253, 137, 142, 95, 30, 127, 26, 237, 34, 183, 89, 200, 44,
165, 203, 71, 102, 39, 127, 217, 159, 46, 17, 28, 11, 146, 222, 110,
149, 178, 16, 117, 186, 91, 52, 56, 136, 127, 82, 33, 194, 46, 164,
245, 117, 136, 160, 179, 152, 151, 15, 172, 48, 73, 228, 87, 63, 40,
192, 92, 92, 24, 167, 105, 47, 255, 193, 251, 77, 203, 6, 134, 129,
248, 191, 53, 43, 49, 219, 130, 241, 180, 174, 159, 34, 71, 163, 70,
83, 1, 152, 39, 241, 191, 68, 224, 240, 43, 113, 165, 68, 98, 130]
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A.2.5. Encoded JWE Encrypted Key
Base64url encode the JWE Encrypted Key to produce the Encoded JWE
Encrypted Key. This result (with line breaks for display purposes
only) is:
nJa_uE2D0wlKz-OcwSbKFzj302xYSI-RLBM6hbVGmP4axtJQPA9S0po3s3NMkmOm
kkawnfwPNjpc0mc3z79cuQWkQPFQo-mDxmogz8dxBcheaTUg3ZvpbGCXxZjDYENR
WiZ5M9BiLy09BIF5mHp85QL6XED1JEZMOh-1uT1lqPDcDD79qWtrCfEJmNmfsx5f
cB2PfAcVtQ0t_YmOXx5_Gu0it1nILKXLR2Ynf9mfLhEcC5LebpWyEHW6WzQ4iH9S
IcIupPV1iKCzmJcPrDBJ5Fc_KMBcXBinaS__wftNywaGgfi_NSsx24LxtK6fIkej
RlMBmCfxv0Tg8CtxpURigg
A.2.6. Initialization Vector
Generate a random 128 bit JWE Initialization Vector. In this
example, the value is:
[3, 22, 60, 12, 43, 67, 104, 105, 108, 108, 105, 99, 111, 116, 104,
101]
Base64url encoding this value yields the Encoded JWE Initialization
Vector value:
AxY8DCtDaGlsbGljb3RoZQ
A.2.7. Additional Authenticated Data Parameter
Concatenate the Encoded JWE Header value, a period ('.') character,
and the Encoded JWE Encrypted Key to create the Additional
Authenticated Data parameter. This result (with line breaks for
display purposes only) is:
eyJhbGciOiJSU0ExXzUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0.
nJa_uE2D0wlKz-OcwSbKFzj302xYSI-RLBM6hbVGmP4axtJQPA9S0po3s3NMkmOm
kkawnfwPNjpc0mc3z79cuQWkQPFQo-mDxmogz8dxBcheaTUg3ZvpbGCXxZjDYENR
WiZ5M9BiLy09BIF5mHp85QL6XED1JEZMOh-1uT1lqPDcDD79qWtrCfEJmNmfsx5f
cB2PfAcVtQ0t_YmOXx5_Gu0it1nILKXLR2Ynf9mfLhEcC5LebpWyEHW6WzQ4iH9S
IcIupPV1iKCzmJcPrDBJ5Fc_KMBcXBinaS__wftNywaGgfi_NSsx24LxtK6fIkej
RlMBmCfxv0Tg8CtxpURigg
The representation of this value is:
[101, 121, 74, 104, 98, 71, 99, 105, 79, 105, 74, 83, 85, 48, 69,
120, 88, 122, 85, 105, 76, 67, 74, 108, 98, 109, 77, 105, 79, 105,
74, 66, 77, 84, 73, 52, 81, 48, 74, 68, 76, 85, 104, 84, 77, 106, 85,
50, 73, 110, 48, 46, 110, 74, 97, 95, 117, 69, 50, 68, 48, 119, 108,
75, 122, 45, 79, 99, 119, 83, 98, 75, 70, 122, 106, 51, 48, 50, 120,
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89, 83, 73, 45, 82, 76, 66, 77, 54, 104, 98, 86, 71, 109, 80, 52, 97,
120, 116, 74, 81, 80, 65, 57, 83, 48, 112, 111, 51, 115, 51, 78, 77,
107, 109, 79, 109, 107, 107, 97, 119, 110, 102, 119, 80, 78, 106,
112, 99, 48, 109, 99, 51, 122, 55, 57, 99, 117, 81, 87, 107, 81, 80,
70, 81, 111, 45, 109, 68, 120, 109, 111, 103, 122, 56, 100, 120, 66,
99, 104, 101, 97, 84, 85, 103, 51, 90, 118, 112, 98, 71, 67, 88, 120,
90, 106, 68, 89, 69, 78, 82, 87, 105, 90, 53, 77, 57, 66, 105, 76,
121, 48, 57, 66, 73, 70, 53, 109, 72, 112, 56, 53, 81, 76, 54, 88,
69, 68, 49, 74, 69, 90, 77, 79, 104, 45, 49, 117, 84, 49, 108, 113,
80, 68, 99, 68, 68, 55, 57, 113, 87, 116, 114, 67, 102, 69, 74, 109,
78, 109, 102, 115, 120, 53, 102, 99, 66, 50, 80, 102, 65, 99, 86,
116, 81, 48, 116, 95, 89, 109, 79, 88, 120, 53, 95, 71, 117, 48, 105,
116, 49, 110, 73, 76, 75, 88, 76, 82, 50, 89, 110, 102, 57, 109, 102,
76, 104, 69, 99, 67, 53, 76, 101, 98, 112, 87, 121, 69, 72, 87, 54,
87, 122, 81, 52, 105, 72, 57, 83, 73, 99, 73, 117, 112, 80, 86, 49,
105, 75, 67, 122, 109, 74, 99, 80, 114, 68, 66, 74, 53, 70, 99, 95,
75, 77, 66, 99, 88, 66, 105, 110, 97, 83, 95, 95, 119, 102, 116, 78,
121, 119, 97, 71, 103, 102, 105, 95, 78, 83, 115, 120, 50, 52, 76,
120, 116, 75, 54, 102, 73, 107, 101, 106, 82, 108, 77, 66, 109, 67,
102, 120, 118, 48, 84, 103, 56, 67, 116, 120, 112, 85, 82, 105, 103,
103]
A.2.8. Plaintext Encryption
Encrypt the Plaintext with AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 using the CEK as
the encryption key, the JWE Initialization Vector, and the Additional
Authenticated Data value above. The steps for doing this using the
values from Appendix A.3 are detailed in Appendix B. The resulting
Ciphertext is:
[40, 57, 83, 181, 119, 33, 133, 148, 198, 185, 243, 24, 152, 230, 6,
75, 129, 223, 127, 19, 210, 82, 183, 230, 168, 33, 215, 104, 143,
112, 56, 102]
The resulting Authentication Tag value is:
[125, 141, 148, 252, 124, 121, 85, 199, 215, 154, 42, 68, 149, 209,
225, 48]
A.2.9. Encoded JWE Ciphertext
Base64url encode the Ciphertext to create the Encoded JWE Ciphertext.
This result is:
KDlTtXchhZTGufMYmOYGS4HffxPSUrfmqCHXaI9wOGY
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A.2.10. Encoded JWE Authentication Tag
Base64url encode the Authentication Tag to create the Encoded JWE
Authentication Tag. This result is:
fY2U_Hx5VcfXmipEldHhMA
A.2.11. Complete Representation
Assemble the final representation: The Compact Serialization of this
result is the concatenation of the Encoded JWE Header, the Encoded
JWE Encrypted Key, the Encoded JWE Initialization Vector, the Encoded
JWE Ciphertext, and the Encoded JWE Authentication Tag in that order,
with the five strings being separated by four period ('.')
characters.
The final result in this example (with line breaks for display
purposes only) is:
eyJhbGciOiJSU0ExXzUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0.
nJa_uE2D0wlKz-OcwSbKFzj302xYSI-RLBM6hbVGmP4axtJQPA9S0po3s3NMkmOm
kkawnfwPNjpc0mc3z79cuQWkQPFQo-mDxmogz8dxBcheaTUg3ZvpbGCXxZjDYENR
WiZ5M9BiLy09BIF5mHp85QL6XED1JEZMOh-1uT1lqPDcDD79qWtrCfEJmNmfsx5f
cB2PfAcVtQ0t_YmOXx5_Gu0it1nILKXLR2Ynf9mfLhEcC5LebpWyEHW6WzQ4iH9S
IcIupPV1iKCzmJcPrDBJ5Fc_KMBcXBinaS__wftNywaGgfi_NSsx24LxtK6fIkej
RlMBmCfxv0Tg8CtxpURigg.
AxY8DCtDaGlsbGljb3RoZQ.
KDlTtXchhZTGufMYmOYGS4HffxPSUrfmqCHXaI9wOGY.
fY2U_Hx5VcfXmipEldHhMA
A.2.12. Validation
This example illustrates the process of creating a JWE with RSAES-
PKCS1-V1_5 and AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2. These results can be used to
validate JWE decryption implementations for these algorithms. Note
that since the RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5 computation includes random values,
the encryption results above will not be completely reproducible.
However, since the AES CBC computation is deterministic, the JWE
Encrypted Ciphertext values will be the same for all encryptions
performed using these inputs.
A.3. Example JWE using AES Key Wrap and AES GCM
This example encrypts the plaintext "Live long and prosper." to the
recipient using AES Key Wrap and AES GCM. The representation of this
plaintext is:
[76, 105, 118, 101, 32, 108, 111, 110, 103, 32, 97, 110, 100, 32,
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112, 114, 111, 115, 112, 101, 114, 46]
A.3.1. JWE Header
The following example JWE Header declares that:
o the Content Encryption Key is encrypted to the recipient using the
AES Key Wrap algorithm with a 128 bit key to produce the JWE
Encrypted Key and
o the Plaintext is encrypted using the AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256
algorithm to produce the Ciphertext.
{"alg":"A128KW","enc":"A128CBC-HS256"}
A.3.2. Encoded JWE Header
Base64url encoding the octets of the UTF-8 representation of the JWE
Header yields this Encoded JWE Header value:
eyJhbGciOiJBMTI4S1ciLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0
A.3.3. Content Encryption Key (CEK)
Generate a 256 bit random Content Encryption Key (CEK). In this
example, the value is:
[4, 211, 31, 197, 84, 157, 252, 254, 11, 100, 157, 250, 63, 170, 106,
206, 107, 124, 212, 45, 111, 107, 9, 219, 200, 177, 0, 240, 143, 156,
44, 207]
A.3.4. Key Encryption
Encrypt the CEK with the shared symmetric key using the AES Key Wrap
algorithm to produce the JWE Encrypted Key. In this example, the
shared symmetric key value is:
[25, 172, 32, 130, 225, 114, 26, 181, 138, 106, 254, 192, 95, 133,
74, 82]
The resulting JWE Encrypted Key value is:
[232, 160, 123, 211, 183, 76, 245, 132, 200, 128, 123, 75, 190, 216,
22, 67, 201, 138, 193, 186, 9, 91, 122, 31, 246, 90, 28, 139, 57, 3,
76, 124, 193, 11, 98, 37, 173, 61, 104, 57]
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A.3.5. Encoded JWE Encrypted Key
Base64url encode the JWE Encrypted Key to produce the Encoded JWE
Encrypted Key. This result is:
6KB707dM9YTIgHtLvtgWQ8mKwboJW3of9locizkDTHzBC2IlrT1oOQ
A.3.6. Initialization Vector
Generate a random 128 bit JWE Initialization Vector. In this
example, the value is:
[3, 22, 60, 12, 43, 67, 104, 105, 108, 108, 105, 99, 111, 116, 104,
101]
Base64url encoding this value yields the Encoded JWE Initialization
Vector value:
AxY8DCtDaGlsbGljb3RoZQ
A.3.7. Additional Authenticated Data Parameter
Concatenate the Encoded JWE Header value, a period ('.') character,
and the Encoded JWE Encrypted Key to create the Additional
Authenticated Data parameter. This result (with line breaks for
display purposes only) is:
eyJhbGciOiJBMTI4S1ciLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0.
6KB707dM9YTIgHtLvtgWQ8mKwboJW3of9locizkDTHzBC2IlrT1oOQ
The representation of this value is:
[101, 121, 74, 104, 98, 71, 99, 105, 79, 105, 74, 66, 77, 84, 73, 52,
83, 49, 99, 105, 76, 67, 74, 108, 98, 109, 77, 105, 79, 105, 74, 66,
77, 84, 73, 52, 81, 48, 74, 68, 76, 85, 104, 84, 77, 106, 85, 50, 73,
110, 48, 46, 54, 75, 66, 55, 48, 55, 100, 77, 57, 89, 84, 73, 103,
72, 116, 76, 118, 116, 103, 87, 81, 56, 109, 75, 119, 98, 111, 74,
87, 51, 111, 102, 57, 108, 111, 99, 105, 122, 107, 68, 84, 72, 122,
66, 67, 50, 73, 108, 114, 84, 49, 111, 79, 81]
A.3.8. Plaintext Encryption
Encrypt the Plaintext with AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 using the CEK as
the encryption key, the JWE Initialization Vector, and the Additional
Authenticated Data value above. The steps for doing this using the
values from this example are detailed in Appendix B. The resulting
Ciphertext is:
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[40, 57, 83, 181, 119, 33, 133, 148, 198, 185, 243, 24, 152, 230, 6,
75, 129, 223, 127, 19, 210, 82, 183, 230, 168, 33, 215, 104, 143,
112, 56, 102]
The resulting Authentication Tag value is:
[8, 65, 248, 101, 45, 185, 28, 218, 232, 112, 83, 79, 84, 221, 18,
172]
A.3.9. Encoded JWE Ciphertext
Base64url encode the Ciphertext to create the Encoded JWE Ciphertext.
This result is:
KDlTtXchhZTGufMYmOYGS4HffxPSUrfmqCHXaI9wOGY
A.3.10. Encoded JWE Authentication Tag
Base64url encode the Authentication Tag to create the Encoded JWE
Authentication Tag. This result is:
CEH4ZS25HNrocFNPVN0SrA
A.3.11. Complete Representation
Assemble the final representation: The Compact Serialization of this
result is the concatenation of the Encoded JWE Header, the Encoded
JWE Encrypted Key, the Encoded JWE Initialization Vector, the Encoded
JWE Ciphertext, and the Encoded JWE Authentication Tag in that order,
with the five strings being separated by four period ('.')
characters.
The final result in this example (with line breaks for display
purposes only) is:
eyJhbGciOiJBMTI4S1ciLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0.
6KB707dM9YTIgHtLvtgWQ8mKwboJW3of9locizkDTHzBC2IlrT1oOQ.
AxY8DCtDaGlsbGljb3RoZQ.
KDlTtXchhZTGufMYmOYGS4HffxPSUrfmqCHXaI9wOGY.
CEH4ZS25HNrocFNPVN0SrA
A.3.12. Validation
This example illustrates the process of creating a JWE with symmetric
key wrap and AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2. These results can be used to
validate JWE decryption implementations for these algorithms. Also,
since both the AES Key Wrap and AES GCM computations are
deterministic, the resulting JWE value will be the same for all
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encryptions performed using these inputs. Since the computation is
reproducible, these results can also be used to validate JWE
encryption implementations for these algorithms.
Appendix B. Example AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 Computation
This example shows the steps in the AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256
authenticated encryption computation using the values from the
example in Appendix A.3. As described where this algorithm is
defined in Sections 4.8 and 4.8.3 of JWA, the AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2
family of algorithms are implemented using Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode with PKCS #5
padding to perform the encryption and an HMAC SHA-2 function to
perform the integrity calculation - in this case, HMAC SHA-256.
B.1. Extract MAC_KEY and ENC_KEY from Key
The 256 bit AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 key K used in this example is:
[4, 211, 31, 197, 84, 157, 252, 254, 11, 100, 157, 250, 63, 170, 106,
206, 107, 124, 212, 45, 111, 107, 9, 219, 200, 177, 0, 240, 143, 156,
44, 207]
Use the first 128 bits of this key as the HMAC SHA-256 key MAC_KEY,
which is:
[4, 211, 31, 197, 84, 157, 252, 254, 11, 100, 157, 250, 63, 170, 106,
206]
Use the last 128 bits of this key as the AES CBC key ENC_KEY, which
is:
[107, 124, 212, 45, 111, 107, 9, 219, 200, 177, 0, 240, 143, 156, 44,
207]
Note that the MAC key comes before the encryption key in the input
key K; this is in the opposite order of the algorithm names in the
identifiers "AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256" and "A128CBC-HS256".
B.2. Encrypt Plaintext to Create Ciphertext
Encrypt the Plaintext with AES in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode
using PKCS #5 padding using the ENC_KEY above. The Plaintext in this
example is:
[76, 105, 118, 101, 32, 108, 111, 110, 103, 32, 97, 110, 100, 32,
112, 114, 111, 115, 112, 101, 114, 46]
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The encryption result is as follows, which is the Ciphertext output:
[40, 57, 83, 181, 119, 33, 133, 148, 198, 185, 243, 24, 152, 230, 6,
75, 129, 223, 127, 19, 210, 82, 183, 230, 168, 33, 215, 104, 143,
112, 56, 102]
B.3. Create 64 Bit Big Endian Representation of AAD Length
The Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) in this example is:
[101, 121, 74, 104, 98, 71, 99, 105, 79, 105, 74, 66, 77, 84, 73, 52,
83, 49, 99, 105, 76, 67, 74, 108, 98, 109, 77, 105, 79, 105, 74, 66,
77, 84, 73, 52, 81, 48, 74, 68, 76, 85, 104, 84, 77, 106, 85, 50, 73,
110, 48, 46, 54, 75, 66, 55, 48, 55, 100, 77, 57, 89, 84, 73, 103,
72, 116, 76, 118, 116, 103, 87, 81, 56, 109, 75, 119, 98, 111, 74,
87, 51, 111, 102, 57, 108, 111, 99, 105, 122, 107, 68, 84, 72, 122,
66, 67, 50, 73, 108, 114, 84, 49, 111, 79, 81]
This AAD is 106 bytes long, which is 848 bits long. The octet string
AL, which is the number of bits in AAD expressed as a big endian 64
bit unsigned integer is:
[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 80]
B.4. Initialization Vector Value
The Initialization Vector value used in this example is:
[3, 22, 60, 12, 43, 67, 104, 105, 108, 108, 105, 99, 111, 116, 104,
101]
B.5. Create Input to HMAC Computation
Concatenate the AAD, the Initialization Vector, the Ciphertext, and
the AL value. The result of this concatenation is:
[101, 121, 74, 104, 98, 71, 99, 105, 79, 105, 74, 66, 77, 84, 73, 52,
83, 49, 99, 105, 76, 67, 74, 108, 98, 109, 77, 105, 79, 105, 74, 66,
77, 84, 73, 52, 81, 48, 74, 68, 76, 85, 104, 84, 77, 106, 85, 50, 73,
110, 48, 46, 54, 75, 66, 55, 48, 55, 100, 77, 57, 89, 84, 73, 103,
72, 116, 76, 118, 116, 103, 87, 81, 56, 109, 75, 119, 98, 111, 74,
87, 51, 111, 102, 57, 108, 111, 99, 105, 122, 107, 68, 84, 72, 122,
66, 67, 50, 73, 108, 114, 84, 49, 111, 79, 81, 3, 22, 60, 12, 43, 67,
104, 105, 108, 108, 105, 99, 111, 116, 104, 101, 40, 57, 83, 181,
119, 33, 133, 148, 198, 185, 243, 24, 152, 230, 6, 75, 129, 223, 127,
19, 210, 82, 183, 230, 168, 33, 215, 104, 143, 112, 56, 102, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 3, 80]
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B.6. Compute HMAC Value
Compute the HMAC SHA-256 of the concatenated value above. This
result M is:
[8, 65, 248, 101, 45, 185, 28, 218, 232, 112, 83, 79, 84, 221, 18,
172, 50, 145, 207, 8, 14, 74, 44, 220, 100, 117, 32, 57, 239, 149,
173, 226]
B.7. Truncate HMAC Value to Create Authentication Tag
Use the first half (128 bits) of the HMAC output M as the
Authentication Tag output T. This truncated value is:
[8, 65, 248, 101, 45, 185, 28, 218, 232, 112, 83, 79, 84, 221, 18,
172]
Appendix C. Possible Compact Serialization for Multiple Recipients
The JWE encryption process in Section 5.1, and in particular in steps
15 and 16, hint at a possible compact serialization when there are
multiple recipients. This possible compact serialization
concatenates instances of the per-recipient fields, separating them
with tilde ('~') characters, which are URL-safe.
The concatenation of the Encoded JWE Header values goes before the
first period ('.') character in the compact serialization. The
concatenation of the corresponding Encoded JWE Encoded Key values
goes between the first and second period ('.') characters in the
compact serialization.
A complete compact serialization of the multi-recipient JWE in
Section 7.1 (with line breaks for display purposes only) would be:
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eyJhbGciOiJSU0ExXzUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0
~
eyJhbGciOiJBMTI4S1ciLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0
.
nJa_uE2D0wlKz-OcwSbKFzj302xYSI-RLBM6hbVGmP4axtJQPA9S0po3s3NMk
mOmkkawnfwPNjpc0mc3z79cuQWkQPFQo-mDxmogz8dxBcheaTUg3ZvpbGCXxZ
jDYENRWiZ5M9BiLy09BIF5mHp85QL6XED1JEZMOh-1uT1lqPDcDD79qWtrCfE
JmNmfsx5fcB2PfAcVtQ0t_YmOXx5_Gu0it1nILKXLR2Ynf9mfLhEcC5LebpWy
EHW6WzQ4iH9SIcIupPV1iKCzmJcPrDBJ5Fc_KMBcXBinaS__wftNywaGgfi_N
Ssx24LxtK6fIkejRlMBmCfxv0Tg8CtxpURigg
~
6KB707dM9YTIgHtLvtgWQ8mKwboJW3of9locizkDTHzBC2IlrT1oOQ
.
AxY8DCtDaGlsbGljb3RoZQ
.
KDlTtXchhZTGufMYmOYGS4HffxPSUrfmqCHXaI9wOGY
.
LlhRZFfphc2f5X3nTTJP6g
Note that the octets of the UTF-8 representation of the first two
parts of this serialization, including the period ('.') character
separating them, are used as the AAD value in step 17 of the JWE
encryption process in Section 5.1.
This representation is suggested for those who may desire or require
a compact, URL-safe serialization of JWEs with multiple recipients.
It is a suggestion to implementers for whom this functionality would
be valuable, and not a normative part of this specification.
Appendix D. Acknowledgements
Solutions for encrypting JSON content were also explored by JSON
Simple Encryption [JSE] and JavaScript Message Security Format
[I-D.rescorla-jsms], both of which significantly influenced this
draft. This draft attempts to explicitly reuse as many of the
relevant concepts from XML Encryption 1.1
[W3C.CR-xmlenc-core1-20120313] and RFC 5652 [RFC5652] as possible,
while utilizing simple compact JSON-based data structures.
Special thanks are due to John Bradley and Nat Sakimura for the
discussions that helped inform the content of this specification and
to Eric Rescorla and Joe Hildebrand for allowing the reuse of text
from [I-D.rescorla-jsms] in this document.
Thanks to Axel Nennker, Emmanuel Raviart, Brian Campbell, and Edmund
Jay for validating the examples in this specification.
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This specification is the work of the JOSE Working Group, which
includes dozens of active and dedicated participants. In particular,
the following individuals contributed ideas, feedback, and wording
that influenced this specification:
Richard Barnes, John Bradley, Brian Campbell, Breno de Medeiros, Dick
Hardt, Jeff Hodges, Edmund Jay, James Manger, Tony Nadalin, Axel
Nennker, Emmanuel Raviart, Nat Sakimura, Jim Schaad, Hannes
Tschofenig, and Sean Turner.
Jim Schaad and Karen O'Donoghue chaired the JOSE working group and
Sean Turner and Stephen Farrell served as Security area directors
during the creation of this specification.
Appendix E. Document History
[[ to be removed by the RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]
-10
o Changed the JWE processing rules for multiple recipients so that a
single AAD value contains the header parameters and encrypted key
values for all the recipients, enabling AES GCM to be safely used
for multiple recipients.
o Added an appendix suggesting a possible compact serialization for
JWEs with multiple recipients.
-09
o Added JWE JSON Serialization, as specified by
draft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serialization-04.
o Registered "application/jwe-js" MIME type and "JWE-JS" typ header
parameter value.
o Defined that the default action for header parameters that are not
understood is to ignore them unless specifically designated as
"MUST be understood" or included in the new "crit" (critical)
header parameter list. This addressed issue #6.
o Corrected "x5c" description. This addressed issue #12.
o Changed from using the term "byte" to "octet" when referring to 8
bit values.
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o Added Key Management Mode definitions to terminology section and
used the defined terms to provide clearer key management
instructions. This addressed issue #5.
o Added text about preventing the recipient from behaving as an
oracle during decryption, especially when using RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5.
o Changed from using the term "Integrity Value" to "Authentication
Tag".
o Changed member name from "integrity_value" to "authentication_tag"
in the JWE JSON Serialization.
o Removed Initialization Vector from the AAD value since it is
already integrity protected by all of the authenticated encryption
algorithms specified in the JWA specification.
o Replaced "A128CBC+HS256" and "A256CBC+HS512" with "A128CBC-HS256"
and "A256CBC-HS512". The new algorithms perform the same
cryptographic computations as [I-D.mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2],
but with the Initialization Vector and Authentication Tag values
remaining separate from the Ciphertext value in the output
representation. Also deleted the header parameters "epu"
(encryption PartyUInfo) and "epv" (encryption PartyVInfo), since
they are no longer used.
-08
o Replaced uses of the term "AEAD" with "Authenticated Encryption",
since the term AEAD in the RFC 5116 sense implied the use of a
particular data representation, rather than just referring to the
class of algorithms that perform authenticated encryption with
associated data.
o Applied editorial improvements suggested by Jeff Hodges and Hannes
Tschofenig. Many of these simplified the terminology used.
o Clarified statements of the form "This header parameter is
OPTIONAL" to "Use of this header parameter is OPTIONAL".
o Added a Header Parameter Usage Location(s) field to the IANA JSON
Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters registry.
o Added seriesInfo information to Internet Draft references.
-07
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o Added a data length prefix to PartyUInfo and PartyVInfo values.
o Updated values for example AES CBC calculations.
o Made several local editorial changes to clean up loose ends left
over from to the decision to only support block encryption methods
providing integrity. One of these changes was to explicitly state
that the "enc" (encryption method) algorithm must be an
Authenticated Encryption algorithm with a specified key length.
-06
o Removed the "int" and "kdf" parameters and defined the new
composite Authenticated Encryption algorithms "A128CBC+HS256" and
"A256CBC+HS512" to replace the former uses of AES CBC, which
required the use of separate integrity and key derivation
functions.
o Included additional values in the Concat KDF calculation -- the
desired output size and the algorithm value, and optionally
PartyUInfo and PartyVInfo values. Added the optional header
parameters "apu" (agreement PartyUInfo), "apv" (agreement
PartyVInfo), "epu" (encryption PartyUInfo), and "epv" (encryption
PartyVInfo). Updated the KDF examples accordingly.
o Promoted Initialization Vector from being a header parameter to
being a top-level JWE element. This saves approximately 16 bytes
in the compact serialization, which is a significant savings for
some use cases. Promoting the Initialization Vector out of the
header also avoids repeating this shared value in the JSON
serialization.
o Changed "x5c" (X.509 Certificate Chain) representation from being
a single string to being an array of strings, each containing a
single base64 encoded DER certificate value, representing elements
of the certificate chain.
o Added an AES Key Wrap example.
o Reordered the encryption steps so CMK creation is first, when
required.
o Correct statements in examples about which algorithms produce
reproducible results.
-05
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o Support both direct encryption using a shared or agreed upon
symmetric key, and the use of a shared or agreed upon symmetric
key to key wrap the CMK.
o Added statement that "StringOrURI values are compared as case-
sensitive strings with no transformations or canonicalizations
applied".
o Updated open issues.
o Indented artwork elements to better distinguish them from the body
text.
-04
o Refer to the registries as the primary sources of defined values
and then secondarily reference the sections defining the initial
contents of the registries.
o Normatively reference XML Encryption 1.1
[W3C.CR-xmlenc-core1-20120313] for its security considerations.
o Reference draft-jones-jose-jwe-json-serialization instead of
draft-jones-json-web-encryption-json-serialization.
o Described additional open issues.
o Applied editorial suggestions.
-03
o Added the "kdf" (key derivation function) header parameter to
provide crypto agility for key derivation. The default KDF
remains the Concat KDF with the SHA-256 digest function.
o Reordered encryption steps so that the Encoded JWE Header is
always created before it is needed as an input to the
Authenticated Encryption "additional authenticated data"
parameter.
o Added the "cty" (content type) header parameter for declaring type
information about the secured content, as opposed to the "typ"
(type) header parameter, which declares type information about
this object.
o Moved description of how to determine whether a header is for a
JWS or a JWE from the JWT spec to the JWE spec.
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o Added complete encryption examples for both Authenticated
Encryption and non-Authenticated Encryption algorithms.
o Added complete key derivation examples.
o Added "Collision Resistant Namespace" to the terminology section.
o Reference ITU.X690.1994 for DER encoding.
o Added Registry Contents sections to populate registry values.
o Numerous editorial improvements.
-02
o When using Authenticated Encryption algorithms (such as AES GCM),
use the "additional authenticated data" parameter to provide
integrity for the header, encrypted key, and ciphertext and use
the resulting "authentication tag" value as the JWE Authentication
Tag.
o Defined KDF output key sizes.
o Generalized text to allow key agreement to be employed as an
alternative to key wrapping or key encryption.
o Changed compression algorithm from gzip to DEFLATE.
o Clarified that it is an error when a "kid" value is included and
no matching key is found.
o Clarified that JWEs with duplicate Header Parameter Names MUST be
rejected.
o Clarified the relationship between "typ" header parameter values
and MIME types.
o Registered application/jwe MIME type and "JWE" typ header
parameter value.
o Simplified JWK terminology to get replace the "JWK Key Object" and
"JWK Container Object" terms with simply "JSON Web Key (JWK)" and
"JSON Web Key Set (JWK Set)" and to eliminate potential confusion
between single keys and sets of keys. As part of this change, the
Header Parameter Name for a public key value was changed from
"jpk" (JSON Public Key) to "jwk" (JSON Web Key).
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o Added suggestion on defining additional header parameters such as
"x5t#S256" in the future for certificate thumbprints using hash
algorithms other than SHA-1.
o Specify RFC 2818 server identity validation, rather than RFC 6125
(paralleling the same decision in the OAuth specs).
o Generalized language to refer to Message Authentication Codes
(MACs) rather than Hash-based Message Authentication Codes (HMACs)
unless in a context specific to HMAC algorithms.
o Reformatted to give each header parameter its own section heading.
-01
o Added an integrity check for non-Authenticated Encryption
algorithms.
o Added "jpk" and "x5c" header parameters for including JWK public
keys and X.509 certificate chains directly in the header.
o Clarified that this specification is defining the JWE Compact
Serialization. Referenced the new JWE-JS spec, which defines the
JWE JSON Serialization.
o Added text "New header parameters should be introduced sparingly
since an implementation that does not understand a parameter MUST
reject the JWE".
o Clarified that the order of the encryption and decryption steps is
not significant in cases where there are no dependencies between
the inputs and outputs of the steps.
o Made other editorial improvements suggested by JOSE working group
participants.
-00
o Created the initial IETF draft based upon
draft-jones-json-web-encryption-02 with no normative changes.
o Changed terminology to no longer call both digital signatures and
HMACs "signatures".
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Authors' Addresses
Michael B. Jones
Microsoft
Email: mbj@microsoft.com
URI: http://self-issued.info/
Eric Rescorla
RTFM, Inc.
Email: ekr@rtfm.com
Joe Hildebrand
Cisco Systems, Inc.
Email: jhildebr@cisco.com
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