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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 RFC 6952

Routing Working Group                                    M. Jethanandani
Internet-Draft                                         Ciena Corporation
Intended status: Informational                                  K. Patel
Expires: January 31, 2013                             Cisco Systems, Inc
                                                                L. Zheng
                                                                  Huawei
                                                           July 30, 2012


  Analysis of BGP, LDP, PCEP and MSDP Issues According to KARP Design
                                 Guide
              draft-ietf-karp-routing-tcp-analysis-04.txt

Abstract

   This document analyzes BGP, LDP, PCEP and MSDP according to
   guidelines set forth in section 4.2 of Keying and Authentication for
   Routing Protocols Design Guidelines [RFC6518].

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]..

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 31, 2013.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of



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   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Contributing Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.2.  Abbreviations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Current State of BGP, LDP, PCEP and MSDP . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     2.1.  Transport layer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     2.2.  Keying mechanisms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     2.3.  LDP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       2.3.1.  Spoofing attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       2.3.2.  Privacy Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       2.3.3.  Denial of Service Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     2.4.  PCEP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     2.5.  MSDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   3.  Optimal State for BGP, LDP, PCEP, and MSDP . . . . . . . . . . 10
     3.1.  LDP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   4.  Gap Analysis for BGP, LDP, PCEP and MSDP . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     4.1.  LDP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     4.2.  PCEP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   5.  Transition and Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   6.  Security Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   7.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   8.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     8.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     8.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

















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1.  Introduction

   In March 2006 the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) in its "Unwanted
   Internet Traffic" workshop documented in Report from the IAB workshop
   on Unwanted Traffic March 9-10, 2006 [RFC4948] described an attack on
   core routing infrastructure as an ideal attack with the most amount
   of damage.  Four main steps were identified for that tightening:

   1.  Create secure mechanisms and practices for operating routers.

   2.  Clean up the Internet Routing Registry [IRR] repository, and
       securing both the database and the access, so that it can be used
       for routing verifications.

   3.  Create specifications for cryptographic validation of routing
       message content.

   4.  Secure the routing protocols' packets on the wire.

   This document looking at the last bullet performs an initial analysis
   of the current state of BGP, LDP, PCEP and MSDP according to the
   requirements of KARP Design Guidelines [RFC6518].  This draft builds
   on several previous analysis efforts into routing security.  The
   OPSEC working group published Issues with existing Cryptographic
   Protection Methods for Routing Protocols [RFC6039] an analysis of
   cryptographic issues with routing protocols and Analysis of OSPF
   Security According to KARP Design Guide
   [draft-ietf-karp-ospf-analysis-03].

   Section 2 of this document looks at the current state of security for
   the four routing protocols.  Section 3 examines what the optimal
   state would be for the four routing protocols according to KARP
   Design Guidelines [RFC6518] and Section 4 does a analysis of the gap
   between the existing state and the optimal state of the protocols and
   suggests some areas where improvement is needed.

1.1.  Contributing Authors

   Anantha Ramaiah, Mach Chen

1.2.  Abbreviations

   BGP - Border Gateway Protocol

   DoS - Denial of Service

   KARP - Key and Authentication for Routing Protocols




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   KDF - Key Derivation Function

   KEK - Key Encrypting Key

   KMP - Key Management Protocol

   LDP - Label Distribution Protocol

   LSR - Label Switch Routers

   MAC - Message Authentication Code

   MKT - Master Key Tuple

   MSDP - Multicast Source Distribution Protocol

   MD5 - Message Digest algorithm 5

   OSPF - OPen Shortest Path First

   PCEP - Path Computation Element Protocol

   TCP - Transmission Control Protocol

   UDP - User Datagram Protocol


























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2.  Current State of BGP, LDP, PCEP and MSDP

   This section looks at the current state of transport protocol and any
   authentication mechanisms used by the protocol.  It describes the
   current security mechanisms if any used by BGP, LDP, PCEP and MSDP.

2.1.  Transport layer

   At a transport layer, routing protocols are subject to a variety of
   DoS attacks as outlined in Internet Denial-of-Service Considerations
   [RFC4732].  Such attacks can cause the routing protocol to become
   congested with the result that routing updates are supplied too
   slowly to be useful.  In extreme cases, these attacks prevent routes
   from converging after a change.

   Routing protocols use several methods to protect themselves.  Those
   that use TCP as a transport protocol use access lists to accept
   packets only from known sources.  These access lists also help
   protect edge routers from attacks originating from outside the
   protected domain.  In addition for edge routers running eBGP, TCP
   LISTEN is run only on interfaces on which its peers have been
   discovered or via which routing sessions are expected (as specified
   in router configuration databases).

   GTSM [RFC5082] describes a generalized Time to Live (TTL) security
   mechanism to protect a protocol stack from CPU-utilization based
   attacks.TCP Robustness [RFC5961] recommends some TCP level
   mitigations against spoofing attacks targeted towards long-lived
   routing protocol sessions.

   Even when BGP, LDP, PCEP and MSDP sessions use access lists they are
   subject to spoofing and man in the middle attacks.  Authentication
   and integrity checks allow the receiver of a routing protocol update
   to know that the message genuinely comes from the node that purports
   to have sent it, and to know whether the message has been modified.
   Sometimes routers can be subjected to a large number of
   authentication and integrity requests, exhausting connection
   resources on the router in a way that deny genuine requests.

   TCP MD5 [RFC2385] deprecated, but widely used, specifies a mechanism
   to protect BGP and other TCP based routing protocols via the TCP MD5
   option.  TCP MD5 option provides a way for carrying an MD5 digest in
   a TCP segment.  This digest acts like a signature for that segment,
   computed using information known only to the connection end points.
   The MD5 key used to compute the digest is stored locally on the
   router.  This option is used by routing protocols to provide for
   session level protection against the introduction of spoofed TCP
   segments into any existing TCP streams, in particular TCP Reset



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   segments.  TCP MD5 does not provide a generic mechanism to support
   key roll-over.

   The Message Authentication Codes (MACs) used by the TCP MD5 option is
   considered too weak both because of the use of the hash function and
   because of the way the secret key used by TCP MD5 is managed.  TCP-AO
   [RFC5925] and its companion document Crypto Algorithms for TCP-AO
   [RFC5926] describe steps towards correcting both the MAC weakness and
   the management of secret keys.  For MAC it specifies two MAC
   algorithms that MUST be supported.  They are HMAC-SHA-1-96 as
   specified in HMAC [RFC2104] and AES-128-CMAC-96 as specified in NIST-
   SP800-38B [NIST-SP800-38B].  Cryptographic research suggests that
   both these MAC algorithms defined are fairly secure.  TCP-AO allows
   additional MACs to be added in the future.

2.2.  Keying mechanisms

   For TCP-AO [RFC5925] there is no Key Management Protocol (KMP) used
   to manage the keys that are employed to generate the Message
   Authentication Code (MAC).  TCP-AO allows for a master key to be
   configured manually or for it to be managed via a out of band
   mechanism.

   It should be noted that most routers configured with static keys have
   not seen the key changed ever.  The common reason given for not
   changing the key is the difficulty in coordinating the change between
   pairs of routers when using TCP MD5.  It is well known that longer
   the same key is used, higher is the chance that it can be guessed or
   exposed e.g. when an administrator with knowledge of the keys leaves
   the company.

   For point-to-point key management IKEv2 [RFC5996] provides for
   automated key exchange under a SA and can be used for a comprehensive
   Key Management Protocol (KMP) solution.

2.3.  LDP

   Section 5 of LDP [RFC5036] states that LDP is subject to two
   different types of attacks: spoofing, and denial of service attacks.
   In addition, labels are distributed in the clear, enabling hackers to
   see what labels are being exchanged that could then be used to launch
   an attack.

2.3.1.  Spoofing attacks

   A spoofing attack against LDP can occur both during the discovery
   phase and during the session communication phase.




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2.3.1.1.  Discovery exchanges using UDP

   Label Switching Routers (LSRs) indicate their willingness to
   establish and maintain LDP sessions by periodically sending Hello
   messages.  Receipt of a Hello message serves to create a new "Hello
   adjacency", if one does not already exist, or to refresh an existing
   one.

   Unlike all other LDP messages, the Hello messages are sent using UDP.
   This means that they cannot benefit from the security mechanisms
   available with TCP.  LDP [RFC5036] does not provide any security
   mechanisms for use with Hello messages except for some configuration
   which may help protect against bogus discovery events.  These
   configurations include directly connected links and interfaces.
   Routers that do not use directly connected links have to use Extended
   Hello messages.

   Spoofing a Hello packet for an existing adjacency can cause the
   adjacency to time out and result in termination of the associated
   session.  This can occur when the spoofed Hello message specifies a
   small Hold Time, causing the receiver to expect Hello messages within
   this interval, while the true neighbor continues sending Hello
   messages at the lower, previously agreed to frequency.

   Spoofing a Hello packet can also cause the LDP session to be
   terminated.  This can occur when the spoofed Hello specifies a
   different Transport Address from the previously agreed one between
   neighbors.  Spoofed Hello messages are observed and reported as real
   problem in production networks.

2.3.1.2.  Session communication using TCP

   LDP like other TCP based routing protocols specifies use of the TCP
   MD5 Signature Option to provide for the authenticity and integrity of
   session messages.  As stated above, MD5 authentication is considered
   too weak for this application.  A stronger hashing algorithm e.g
   SHA1, which is supported by TCP-AO [RFC5925] could be deployed to
   take care of the weakness.

   Alternatively, one could move to using TCP-AO which provides for
   stronger MACs, makes it easier to setup manual keys and protects
   against replays.

2.3.2.  Privacy Issues

   LDP provides no mechanism for protecting the privacy of label
   distribution.  The security requirements of label distribution are
   similar to other routing protocols that need to distribute routing



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   information and as such LDP is vulnerable to the same extent as other
   routing protocols that distribute their routing information in the
   clear.

2.3.3.  Denial of Service Attacks

   LDP is subject to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks both in its
   discovery mode and in session mode.

   The discovery mode attack is similar to the spoofing attack except
   that when the spoofed Hello messages are sent with a high enough
   frequency, it can cause the adjacency to time out.

2.4.  PCEP

   Attacks on PCEP [RFC5440] may result in damage to active networks.
   These include computation responses, which if changed can cause
   protocols like LDP to setup sub-optimal or inappropriate LSPs.  In
   addition, PCE itself can be attacked by a variety of DoS attacks.
   Such attacks can cause path computations to be supplied too slowly to
   be of any value particularly as it relates to recovery or
   establishment of LSPs.

   As the RFC states, PCEP could be the target of the following attacks.

   o  Spoofing (PCC or PCE implementation)

   o  Snooping (message interception)

   o  Falsification

   o  Denial of Service

   According to the RFC, inter-AS scenarios when PCE-to-PCE
   communication is required, attacks may be particularly significant
   with commercial as well as service-level implications.

   Additionally, snooping of PCEP requests and responses may give an
   attacker information about the operation of the network.  By viewing
   the PCEP messages an attacker can determine the pattern of service
   establishment in the network and can know where traffic is being
   routed, thereby making the network susceptible to targeted attacks
   and the data within specific LSPs vulnerable.

   Ensuring PCEP communication privacy is of key importance, especially
   in an inter-AS context, where PCEP communication end-points do not
   reside in the same AS.  An attacker that intercepts a PCE message
   could obtain sensitive information related to computed paths and



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   resources.

2.5.  MSDP

   Similar to BGP and LDP, MSDP uses TCP MD5 [RFC2385] to protect TCP
   sessions via the TCP MD5 option.  But with a weak MD5 authentication,
   TCP MD5 is not considered strong enough for this application.

   MSDP also advocates imposing a limit on number of source address and
   group addresses (S,G) that can be stored within the protocol and
   thereby mitigate state explosion due to any denial of service and
   other attacks.







































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3.  Optimal State for BGP, LDP, PCEP, and MSDP

   The ideal state for BGP, LDP, PCEP and MSDP protocols are when they
   can withstand any of the known types of attacks.

   Additionally, Key Management Protocol (KMP) for the routing sessions
   should help negotiate unique, pair wise random keys without
   administrator involvement.  It should also negotiate Security
   Association (SA) parameter required for the session connection,
   including key life times.  It should keep track of those lifetimes
   and negotiate new keys and parameters before they expire and do so
   without administrator involvement.  In the event of a breach,
   including when an administrator with knowledge of the keys leaves the
   company, the keys should be changed immediately.

   The DoS attacks for BGP, LDP, PCEP and MSDP are attacks to the
   transport protocol, TCP for the most part and UDP in case of
   discovery phase of LDP.  TCP and UDP should be able to withstand any
   of DoS scenarios by dropping packets that are attack packets in a way
   that does not impact legitimate packets.

   The routing protocols should provide a mechanism to authenticate the
   routing information carried within the payload.

3.1.  LDP

   For spoofing attacks that LDP is vulnerable to during the discovery
   phase, LDP should be able to determine the authenticity of the
   neighbors sending the Hello message.

   There is currently no requirement to protect the privacy of label
   distribution as labels are carried in the clear like other routing
   information.


















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4.  Gap Analysis for BGP, LDP, PCEP and MSDP

   This section outlines the differences between the current state of
   the routing protocol and the desired state as outlined in section 4.2
   of KARP Design Guidelines [RFC6518].  As that document states, these
   routing protocols fall into the category of one-to-one peering
   messages and will use peer keying protocol.  It covers issues that
   are common to the four protocols in this section, leaving protocol
   specific issues to sub-sections.

   At a transport level the routing protocols are subject to some of the
   same attacks that TCP applications are subject to.  These include DoS
   and spoofing attacks.  Internet Denial-of-Service Considerations
   [RFC4732] outlines some solutions.  Defending TCP Against Spoofing
   Attacks [RFC4953] recommends ways to prevent spoofing attacks.  In
   addition Improving TCP's Robustness to Blind In-Window Attacks.
   [RFC5961] should also be followed and implemented to strengthen TCP.

   From a security perspective there is lack of comprehensive KMP.  As
   an example TCP-AO [RFC5925], talks about coordinating keys derived
   from MKT between endpoints, but the MKT itself has to be configured
   manually or through a out of band mechanism.  Also TCP-AO does not
   address the issue of connectionless reset, as it applies to routers
   that do not store MKT across reboots.

   Authentication, tamper protection, and encryption all require the use
   of keys by sender and receiver.  An automated KMP therefore has to
   include a way to distribute MKT between two end points with little or
   no administration overhead.  It has to cover automatic key rollover.
   It is expected that authentication will cover the packet, i.e. the
   payload and the TCP header and will not cover the frame i.e. the link
   layer 2 header.

   There are two methods of automatic key rollover.  Implicit key
   rollover can be initiated after certain volume of data gets exchanged
   or when a certain time has elapsed.  This does not require explicit
   signaling nor should it result in a reset of the TCP connection in a
   way that the links/adjacencies are affected.  On the other hand,
   explicit key rollover requires a out of band key signaling mechanism.
   It can be triggered by either side and can be done anytime a security
   parameter changes e.g. an attack has happened, or a system
   administrator with access to the keys has left the company.  An
   example of this is IKEv2 [RFC5996] but it could be any other new
   mechanisms also.

   As stated earlier TCP-AO [RFC5925] and its accompanying document
   Crypto Algorithms for TCP-AO [RFC5926] suggest that two MAC
   algorithms that MUST be supported are HMAC-SHA-1-96 as specified in



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   HMAC [RFC2104] and AES-128-CMAC-96 as specified in NIST-SP800-38B
   [NIST-SP800-38B].

   There is a need to protect authenticity and validity of the routing/
   label information that is carried in the payload of the sessions.
   However, that is outside the scope of this document at this time and
   is being addressed by SIDR WG.  Similar mechanisms could be used for
   intra-domain protocols.

4.1.  LDP

   As described in LDP [RFC5036], the threat of spoofed Basic Hellos can
   be reduced by accepting Basic Hellos on interfaces that LSRs trust,
   employing GTSM [RFC5082] and ignoring Basic Hellos not addressed to
   the "all routers on this subnet" multicast group.  Spoofing attacks
   via Extended Hellos are potentially a more serious threat.  An LSR
   can reduce the threat of spoofed Extended Hellos by filtering them
   and accepting Hellos from sources permitted by an access lists.
   However, performing the filtering using access lists requires LSR
   resource, and the LSR is still vulnerable to the IP source address
   spoofing.  Spoofing attacks can be solved by being able to
   authenticate the Hello messages, and an LSR can be configured to only
   accept Hello messages from specific peers when authentication is in
   use.

   LDP Hello Cryptographic Authentication
   [draft-zheng-mpls-ldp-hello-crypto-auth-04] suggest a new
   Cryptographic Authentication TLV that can be used as an
   authentication mechanism to secure Hello messages.

4.2.  PCEP

   PCE discovery according to its RFC is a significant feature for the
   successful deployment of PCEP in large networks.  This mechanism
   allows a PCC to discover the existence of suitable PCEs within the
   network without the necessity of configuration.  It should be obvious
   that, where PCEs are discovered and not configured, the PCC cannot
   know the correct key to use.  There are different approaches to
   retain some aspect of security, but all of them require use of a keys
   and a keying mechanism, the need for which has been discussed above.











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5.  Transition and Deployment Considerations

   As stated in KARP Design Guidelines [RFC6518] it is imperative that
   the new authentication and security mechanisms defined support
   incremental deployment, as it is not feasible to deploy the new
   routing protocol authentication mechanism overnight.

   Typically authentication and security in a peer-to-peer protocol
   requires that both parties agree to the mechanisms that will be used.
   If an agreement is not reached the setup of the new mechanism will
   fail or will be deferred.  Upon failure, the routing protocols can
   fallback to the mechanisms that were already in place e.g. use static
   keys if that was the mechanism in place.  It is usually not possible
   for one end to use the new mechanism while the other end uses the
   old.  Policies can be put in place to retry upgrading after a said
   period of time, so a manual coordination is not required.

   If the automatic KMP requires use of public/private keys to exchange
   key material, the required CA root certificates may need to be
   installed to verify authenticity of requests initiated by a peer.
   Such a step does not require coordination with the peer except to
   decide what CA authority will be used.





























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6.  Security Requirements

   This section describes requirements for BGP, LDP, PCEP and MSDP
   security that should be met within the routing protocol.

   As with all routing protocols, they need protection from both on-path
   and off-path blind attacks.  A better way to protect them would be
   with per-packet protection using a cryptographic MAC.  In order to
   provide for the MAC, keys are needed.

   Once keys are used, mechanisms are required to support key rollover.
   This should cover both manual and automatic key rollover.  Multiple
   approaches could be used.  However since the existing mechanisms
   provide a protocol field to identify the key as well as management
   mechanisms to introduce and retire new keys, focusing on the existing
   mechanism as a starting point is prudent.

   Finally, replay protection is required.  The replay mechanism needs
   to be sufficient to prevent an attacker from creating a denial of
   service or disrupting the integrity of the routing protocol by
   replaying packets.  It is important that an attacker not be able to
   disrupt service by capturing packets and waiting for replay state to
   be lost.




























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7.  Acknowledgements

   We would like to thank Brian Weis for encouraging us to write this
   draft and providing comments on it.















































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8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2385]  Heffernan, A., "Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP MD5
              Signature Option", RFC 2385, August 1998.

   [RFC5926]  Lebovitz, G. and E. Rescorla, "Cryptographic Algorithms
              for the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO)", RFC 5926,
              June 2010.

   [RFC6518]  Lebovitz, G. and M. Bhatia, "Keying and Authentication for
              Routing Protocols (KARP) Design Guidelines", RFC 6518,
              February 2012.

   [draft-ietf-karp-threats-reqs]
              Lebovitz, G. and M. Bhatia, "KARP Threats and
              Requirements", March 2012.

8.2.  Informative References

   [NIST-SP800-38B]
              Dworking, "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
              Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication", May 2005.

   [RFC2104]  Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
              Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
              February 1997.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2409]  Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange
              (IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998.

   [RFC3547]  Baugher, M., Weis, B., Hardjono, T., and H. Harney, "The
              Group Domain of Interpretation", RFC 3547, July 2003.

   [RFC4271]  Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
              Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.

   [RFC4732]  Handley, M., Rescorla, E., and IAB, "Internet Denial-of-
              Service Considerations", RFC 4732, December 2006.

   [RFC4948]  Andersson, L., Davies, E., and L. Zhang, "Report from the
              IAB workshop on Unwanted Traffic March 9-10, 2006",
              RFC 4948, August 2007.




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   [RFC4953]  Touch, J., "Defending TCP Against Spoofing Attacks",
              RFC 4953, July 2007.

   [RFC5036]  Andersson, L., Minei, I., and B. Thomas, "LDP
              Specification", RFC 5036, October 2007.

   [RFC5082]  Gill, V., Heasley, J., Meyer, D., Savola, P., and C.
              Pignataro, "The Generalized TTL Security Mechanism
              (GTSM)", RFC 5082, October 2007.

   [RFC5440]  Vasseur, JP. and JL. Le Roux, "Path Computation Element
              (PCE) Communication Protocol (PCEP)", RFC 5440,
              March 2009.

   [RFC5925]  Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP
              Authentication Option", RFC 5925, June 2010.

   [RFC5961]  Ramaiah, A., Stewart, R., and M. Dalal, "Improving TCP's
              Robustness to Blind In-Window Attacks", RFC 5961,
              August 2010.

   [RFC5996]  Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen,
              "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)",
              RFC 5996, September 2010.

   [RFC6039]  Manral, V., Bhatia, M., Jaeggli, J., and R. White, "Issues
              with Existing Cryptographic Protection Methods for Routing
              Protocols", RFC 6039, October 2010.

   [draft-ietf-karp-ospf-analysis-03]
              Hartman, S., "Analysis of OSPF Security According to KARP
              Design Guide", March 2012.

   [draft-zheng-mpls-ldp-hello-crypto-auth-04]
              Zheng, "LDP Hello Cryptographic Authentication", May 2012.
















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Authors' Addresses

   Mahesh Jethanandani
   Ciena Corporation
   1741 Technology Drive
   San Jose, CA  95110
   USA

   Phone: + (408) 436-3313
   Email: mjethanandani@gmail.com


   Keyur Patel
   Cisco Systems, Inc
   170 Tasman Drive
   San Jose, CA  95134
   USA

   Phone: +1 (408) 526-7183
   Email: keyupate@cisco.com


   Lianshu Zheng
   Huawei
   No. 3 Xinxi Road, Hai-Dian District
   Beijing,   100085
   China

   Phone: +86 (10) 82882008
   Fax:
   Email: verozheng@huawei.com
   URI:



















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