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KARP Working Group                                           G. Lebovitz
Internet-Draft
Intended status: Informational                                 M. Bhatia
Expires: November 11, 2012                                Alcatel-Lucent
                                                            May 10, 2012


    Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP) Overview,
                       Threats, and Requirements
                    draft-ietf-karp-threats-reqs-05

Abstract

   Different routing protocols exist and each employs its own mechanism
   for securing the protocol packets on the wire.  While most already
   have some method for accomplishing cryptographic message
   authentication, in many cases the existing methods are dated,
   vulnerable to attack, and employ cryptographic algorithms that have
   been deprecated.  The "Keying and Authentication for Routing
   Protocols" (KARP) effort aims to overhaul and improve these
   mechanisms.

   This document does not contain protocol specifications.  Instead, it
   defines the areas where protocol specification work is needed and a
   set of requirements for KARP design teams to follow.  RFC 6518,
   "Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP) Design
   Guidelines" is a companion to this document; KARP design teams will
   use them together to review and overhaul routing protocols.  These
   two documents reflect the input of both the IETF's Security Area and
   Routing Area in order to form a mutually agreeable work plan.

   This document has three main parts.  The first part provides an
   overview of the KARP effort.  The second part lists the threats from
   RFC 4593, Generic Threats To Routing Protocols, that are in scope for
   attacks against routing protocols' transport systems, including any
   mechanisms built into the routing protocols themselves, which
   accomplish packet authentication.  The third part enumerates the
   requirements that routing protocol specifications must meet when
   addressing those threats for RFC 6518's "Work Phase 1", the update to
   a routing protocol's existing transport security.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute



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   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 11, 2012.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.



























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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.1.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     1.2.  Requirements Language  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8

   2.  KARP Effort Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     2.1.  KARP Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     2.2.  Incremental Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     2.3.  Goals  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     2.4.  Non-Goals  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     2.5.  Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

   3.  Threats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     3.1.  Threat Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
       3.1.1.  OUTSIDERS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
       3.1.2.  Stolen Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
         3.1.2.1.  Terminated Employee  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     3.2.  Threat Actions In Scope  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
     3.3.  Threat Actions Out of Scope  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

   4.  Requirements for KARP Work Phase 1, the Update to a
       Routing  Protocol's Existing Transport Security  . . . . . . . 21

   5.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

   6.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

   7.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

   8.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
     8.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
     8.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
















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1.  Introduction

   In March 2006 the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) held a workshop
   on the topic of "Unwanted Internet Traffic".  The report from that
   workshop is documented in [RFC4948].  Section 8.1 of that document
   states "A simple risk analysis would suggest that an ideal attack
   target of minimal cost but maximal disruption is the core routing
   infrastructure."  Section 8.2 calls for "[t]ightening the security of
   the core routing infrastructure."  Four main steps were identified
   for that tightening:

   o  Create secure mechanisms and practices for operating routers.

   o  Clean up the Internet Routing Registry repository (IRR), and
      securing both the database and the access, so that it can be used
      for routing verification.

   o  Create specifications for cryptographic validation of routing
      message content.

   o  Secure the routing protocols' packets on the wire

   The first bullet is being addressed in the OPSEC working group.  The
   second bullet should be addressed through liaisons with those running
   the IRR's globally.  The third bullet is being addressed in the SIDR
   working group.

   This document addresses the last item in the list above, securing the
   transmission of routing protocol packets on the wire, or rather
   securing the routing protocols' transport systems, including any
   mechanisms built into the routing protocols themselves which
   accomplish packet authentication.  This effort is referred to as
   Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols, or "KARP".  KARP is
   concerned with issues and techniques for protecting the messages and
   their contents between directly communicating peers.  This may
   overlap with, but is strongly distinct from, protection designed to
   ensure that routing information is properly authorized relative to
   sources of information.  Such assurances are provided by other
   mechanisms and are outside the scope of this document and work that
   relies on it.

   This document is one of two that together form the guidance and
   instructions for KARP design teams working to overhaul routing
   protocol transport security.  The other document is the KARP Design
   Guide [RFC6518].

   This document does not contain protocol specifications.  Instead, its
   goal is to define the areas where protocol specification work is



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   needed and to provide a set of requirements for KARP design teams to
   follow as they tackle [RFC6518], Section 4.1's "Work Phase 1", the
   update to a routing protocol's existing transport security.

   This document has three main parts.  The first part, found in Section
   2, provides an overview of the KARP effort.  Section 3 lists the
   threats from [RFC4593], Generic Threats To Routing Protocols, that
   are in scope for routing protocols' transport systems' per packet
   authentication.  Therefore, this document does not contain a complete
   threat model; it simply points to the parts of the governing threat
   model that KARP design teams must address, and explicitly states
   which parts are out of scope for KARP design teams.  Section 4
   enumerates the requirements that routing protocol specifications must
   meet when addressing those threats related to KARP's "Work Phase 1",
   the update to a routing protocol's existing transport security.
   ("Work Phase 2", a framework and usage of a KMP, will be addressed in
   a future document[s]).

   This document uses the terminology "on the wire" to refer to the
   information used by routing protocols' transport systems.  This term
   is widely used in IETF RFCs, but is used in several different ways.
   In this document, it is used to refer both to information exchanged
   between routing protocol instances, and to underlying protocols that
   may also need to be protected in specific circumstances.  Individual
   protocol analysis documents will need to be more specific in their
   usage."

1.1.  Terminology

   Within the scope of this document, the following words, when
   beginning with a capital letter, or spelled in all capitals, hold the
   meanings described to the right of each term.  If the same word is
   used uncapitalized, then it is intended to have its common English
   definition.

      Identifier

      The type and value used by a peer of an authenticated message
      exchange to signify who it is to another peer.  The Identifier is
      used by the receiver as an index into a table containing further
      information about the peer that is required to continue processing
      the message, for example a Security Association (SA) or keys.

      Identity Authentication







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      Once the identity is decided, then there must be a cryptographic
      proof of that identity, that the peer really is who it asserts to
      be.  Proof of identity can be arranged among peers in a few ways,
      for example symmetric and asymmetric pre-shared keys, or an
      assymetric key containted in a certificate.  Certificates can be
      used in ways that requires no additional supporting systems
      external to the routers themselves.  An example of this would be
      using self signed certificates and a flat file list of "approved
      thumbprints".  The use of these different identity authentication
      mechanisms vary in ease of deployment, ease of ongoing management,
      startup effort, ongoing effort and management, security strength,
      and consequences from loss of secrets from one part of the system
      to the rest of the system.  For example, they differ in resistance
      to a security breach, and the effort required to remediate the
      whole system in the event of such a breach.  The point here is
      that there are options, many of which are quite simple to employ
      and deploy.

      KDF (Key derivation function)

      A KDF is a function in which an input key and other input data is
      used to generate (or derive) keying material that can be employed
      by cryptographic algorithms.  The key that is input to a KDF is
      called a key derivation key.  KDFs can be used to generate one or
      more keys from either (i) a truly random or pseudorandom seed
      value or (ii) result of the Diffie-Hellman exchange or (iii) a
      non-uniform random source or (iv) a pre-shared key which may or
      may not be memorable by a human.

      KMP (Key Management Protocol)

      A protocol to establish a shared symmetric key between a pair (or
      a group) of users.  It determines how secret keys are generated
      and made available to both the parties.  If session or traffic
      keys are being used, KMP is responsible for generating them and
      determining when they should be renewed.

      A KMP is helpful because it negotiates unique, random keys without
      administrator involvement.  It also negotiates, as mentioned
      earlier, several of the SA parameters required for the secure
      connection, including key life times.  It keeps track of those
      lifetimes, and negotiates new keys and parameters before they
      expire, again, without administrator interaction.  Additionally,
      in the event of a security breach, changing KMP authentication
      credentials will immediately cause a rekey to occur for the
      Traffic Keys, and new Traffic Keys will be installed and used in
      the current connection.




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      KMP Function

      Any actual KMP used in the general KARP solution framework

      Peer Key

      Keys that are used among peers as a basis for identifying one
      another.  These keys may or may not be connection-specific,
      depending on how they were established, and what forms of identity
      and identity authentication mechanism used in the system.  A peer
      key generally would be provided by a KMP that would later be used
      to derive fresh traffic keys.

      PRF

      In cryptography, a pseudorandom function, abbreviated PRF, is a
      collection of efficiently-computable functions which emulate a
      random oracle in the following way: No efficient algorithm can
      distinguish (with significant advantage) between a function chosen
      randomly from the PRF family and a random oracle (a function whose
      outputs are determined at random).  Informally, a PRF takes a
      secret key and a set of input values and produces random-seeming
      output values for each input value.

      PSK (Pre-Shared Key)

      A key used to communicate with one or more peers in a secure
      configuration.  Always distributed out-of-band prior to a first
      connection.

      Routing Protocol

      When used with capital "R" and "P" in this document the term
      refers the Routing Protocol for which work is being done to
      provide or enhance its peer authentication mechanisms.

      SA (Security Association)

      A relationship established between two or more entities to enable
      them to protect data they exchange.  Examples of items that may
      exist in an SA include: Identifier, PSK, Traffic Key,
      cryptographic algorithms, key lifetimes.

      Traffic Key







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      The key (or one of a set of keys) used for protecting the routing
      protocol traffic.  Since the traffic keys used in a particular
      connection are not a fixed part of a device configuration no data
      exists anywhere else in the operator's systems which can be
      stolen, e.g. in the case of a terminated or turned employee.  If a
      server or other data store is stolen or compromised, the thieves
      gain no access to current traffic keys.  They may gain access to
      key derivation material, like a PSK, but not current traffic keys
      in use.

1.2.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [RFC2119].

   When used in lower case, these words convey their typical use in
   common language, and are not to be interpreted as described in
   RFC2119 [RFC2119].
































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2.  KARP Effort Overview

2.1.  KARP Scope

   Three basic services may be employed in order to secure any piece of
   data as it is transmitted over the wire: confidentiality,
   authenticity, or integrity.  The focus for the KARP working group
   will be message authentication and message integrity only.  This work
   explicitly excludes, at this point in time, privacy services.  Non-
   repudiation is also excluded as a goal at this time.  Since the
   objective of most routing protocols is to broadly advertise the
   routing topology, routing protocol packets are commonly sent in the
   clear; confidentiality is not normally required for routing
   protocols.  However, ensuring that routing peers are authentically
   identified, and that no rogue peers or unauthenticated packets can
   compromise the stability of the routing environment is critical, and
   thus our focus.  Confidentiality and non-repudiation may be addressed
   in future work.

   OSPF [RFC5709], IS-IS [RFC5310], LDP [RFC5036], and RIP [RFC2453]
   [RFC4822] already have existing mechanisms for cryptographically
   authenticating and integrity checking the messages on the wire.
   Products with these mechanisms have been produced, code has been
   written, and both have been optimized for these existing security
   mechanisms.  Rather than turn away from these mechanisms, this
   document aims to enhance them, updating them to modern and secure
   levels.

   Therefore, the scope of KARP's roadmap of work includes:

   o  Making use of existing routing protocol transport security
      mechanisms, where they exist, and enhancing or updating them as
      necessary for modern cryptographic best practices.  [RFC6518],
      Section 4.1 labels this KARP's "Work Phase 1."

   o  Developing a framework for using automatic key management in order
      to ease deployment, lower cost of operation, and allow for rapid
      responses to security breaches.  [RFC6518], Section 4.1 labels
      this KARP's "Work Phase 2."

   o  Specifying an automated key management protocol that may be
      combined with the bits-on-the-wire mechanisms.  [RFC6518], Section
      4.1 labels this KARP's "Work Phase 2."

   Neither this document nor [RFC6518] contain protocol specifications.
   Instead, they define the areas where protocol specification work is
   needed and set a direction, a set of requirements, and priorities for
   addressing that specification work.



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   There are a set of threats to routing protocols that are considered
   in-scope for KARP, and a set considered out-of- scope.  These are
   described in detail in the Threats (Section 3) section below.

2.2.  Incremental Approach

   The work also serves as an agreement between the Routing Area and the
   Security Area about the priorities and work plan for incrementally
   delivering the above work.  The principle of "crawl, walk, run" will
   be employed.  Thus routing protocol authentication mechanisms may not
   go immediately from their current state to a state reflecting the
   best possible, most modern security practices.  This point is
   important as there will be times when the best-security-possible will
   give way to vastly-improved-over-current-security-but-admittedly-not-
   yet-best- security-possible, in order that incremental progress
   toward a more secure Internet may be achieved.  As such, this
   document will call out places where agreement has been reached on
   such trade offs.

   Incremental steps will need to be taken for a few very practical
   reasons.  First, there are a considerable number of deployed routing
   devices in operating networks that will not be able to run the most
   modern cryptographic mechanisms without significant and unacceptable
   performance penalties.  The roadmap for any one routing protocol MUST
   allow for incremental improvements on existing operational devices.
   Second, current routing protocol performance on deployed devices has
   been achieved over the last 20 years through extensive tuning of
   software and hardware elements, and is a constant focus for
   improvement by vendors and operators alike.  The introduction of new
   security mechanisms affects this performance balance.  The
   performance impact of any incremental step of security improvement
   will need to be weighed by the community, and introduced in such a
   way that allows the vendor and operator community a path to adoption
   that upholds reasonable performance metrics.  Therefore, certain
   specification elements may be introduced carrying the "SHOULD"
   guidance, with the intention that the same mechanism will carry a
   "MUST" in a future release of the specification.  This approach gives
   the vendors and implementors the guidance they need to tune their
   software and hardware appropriately over time.  Last, some security
   mechanisms require the build out of other operational support
   systems, and this will take time.

   An example where these three reasons were at play in an incremental
   improvement roadmap was seen in the improvement of BGP's [RFC4271]
   security via the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO) [RFC5925] effort.
   It would have been ideal, and reflected best common security
   practice, to have a fully specified key management protocol for
   negotiating TCP-AO's keying material, e.g., using certificates for



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   peer authentication.  However,in the spirit of incremental
   deployment, we first addressed issues like cryptographic algorithm
   agility, replay attacks, and TCP session resetting in the base TCP-AO
   protocol, and then later began work to layer key management on top of
   it.

2.3.  Goals

   The goals and general guidance for the KARP work follow.

   1.  Provide authentication and integrity protection for messages on
       the wire of existing routing protocols.

   2.  Define a path to incrementally improve security of the routing
       infrastructure as explained in the earlier sections.

   3.  Ensure that the improved security solutions on currently running
       routing infrastructure equipment are deployable.  This begs the
       consideration of the current state of processing power available
       on routers in the network today.

   4.  Operational deployability - A solution's acceptability will also
       be measured by how deployable the solution is by common operator
       teams using common deployment processes and infrastructures.
       Specifically, we will try to make these solutions fit as well as
       possible into current operational practices and router
       deployment.  This will be heavily influenced by operator input,
       to ensure that what we specify can -- and, more importantly, will
       -- be deployed once specified and implemented by vendors.
       Deployment of incrementally more secure routing infrastructure in
       the Internet is the final measure of success.  Measurably, we
       would like to see an increase in the number of surveyed
       respondents who report deploying the updated authentication and
       integrity mechanisms in their networks, as well as a sharp rise
       in usage for the total percentage of their network's routers.

       Interviews with operators show several points about routing
       security.  First, over 70% of operators have deployed transport
       connection protection via TCP-MD5 [RFC3562] on their exterior
       Border Gateway Protocol (eBGP) [ISR2008] sessions.  Over 55% also
       deploy TCP-MD5 on their interior Border Gateway Protoco (iBGP
       connections, and 50% make use of TCP-MD5 offered on some other
       internal gateway protocol (IGP).  The survey states that "a
       considerable increase was observed over previous editions of the
       survey for use of TCP MD5 with external peers (eBGP), internal
       peers (iBGP) and MD5 extensions for IGPs."  Though the data is
       not captured in the report, the authors believe anecdotally that
       of those who have deployed TCP-MD5 somewhere in their network,



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       only about 25-30% of the routers in their network are deployed
       with the authentication enabled.  None report using IPsec
       [RFC4301] to protect the routing protocol, and this was a decline
       from the few that reported doing so in the previous year's
       report.  From our personal conversations with operators, of those
       using MD5, almost all report using one, manually-distributed key
       throughout the entire network.  These same operators report that
       the single key has not been changed since it was originally
       installed, sometimes five or more years ago.  When asked why,
       particularly for the case of protecting BGP sessions using TCP
       MD5, the following reasons are often given:

       A. Changing the keys triggers a TCP reset, and thus bounces the
          links/adjacencies, undermining Service Level Agreements
          (SLAs).

       B. For external peers, the difficulty of coordination with the
          other organization is an issue.  Once they find the correct
          contact at the other organization (not always so easy), the
          coordination function is serialized and on a per peer/AS
          basis.  The coordination is very cumbersome and tedious to
          execute in practice.

       C. Keys must be changed at precisely the same time, or at least
          within 60 seconds (as supported by two major vendors) in order
          to limit connectivity outage duration.  This is incredibly
          difficult to do, operationally, especially between different
          organizations.

       D. Key change is perceived as a relatively low priority compared
          to other operational issues.

       E. Lack of staff to implement the changes on a device-by-device
          basis.

       F. There are three use cases for operational peering at play
          here: peers and interconnection with other operators, iBGP,
          and other routing sessions within a single operator, and
          operator-to-customer devices.  All three have very different
          properties, and all are reported as cumbersome.  One operator
          reported that the same key is used for all customer premise
          equipment (CPE).  The same operator reported that if the
          customer mandated it, a unique key could be created, although
          the last time this occurred it created such an operational
          headache that the administrators now usually tell customers
          that the option doesn't even exist, to avoid the difficulties.
          These customer-unique keys are never changed, unless the
          customer demands so.  The main threat at play here is that a



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          terminated employee from such an operator who had access to
          the one (or several) keys used for authentication in these
          environments could easily wage an attack.  Alternatively, the
          operator could offer the keys to others who would wage the
          attack.  In either case, the attacker could then bring down
          many of the adjacencies, causing destabilization to the
          routing system.

   5.  Whatever mechanisms KARP specifies need to be easier to deploy
       than the current methods, and should provide obvious operational
       efficiency gains along with significantly better security and
       threat protection.  This combination of value may be enough to
       drive much broader adoption.

   6.  Address the threats enumerated below in the "Threats" section
       (Section 3) for each routing protocol.  Not all threats may be
       able to be addressed in the first specification update for any
       one protocol.  Roadmaps will be defined so that both the security
       area and the routing area agree on how the threats will be
       addressed completely over time.

   7.  Create a re-usable architecture, framework, and guidelines for
       various IETF working groups who will address these security
       improvements for various Routing Protocols.  The crux of the KARP
       work is to re-use the architecture, guidelines and the framework
       as much as possible across relevant Routing Protocols.  For
       example, designers should aim to re-use the key management
       protocol that will be defined for BGP's TCP-AO key establishment
       for as many other routing protocols as possible.

   8.  Bridge any gaps between IETF's Routing and Security Areas by
       recording agreements on work items, roadmaps, and guidance from
       the cognizant Area Directors and the Internet Architecture Board
       (IAB).

2.4.  Non-Goals

   The following two goals are considered out-of-scope for this effort:

   o  Confidentiality of the packets on the wire.  Once this roadmap is
      realized, we may revisit work on privacy.

   o  Message content validity (routing database validity).  This work
      is being addressed in other IETF efforts, like SIDR.







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2.5.  Audience

   The audience for this document includes:

   o  Routing Area working group chairs and participants - These people
      are charged with updates to the Routing Protocol specifications.
      Any and all cryptographic authentication work on these
      specifications will occur in Routing Area working groups, with
      close partnership with the Security Area.  Co-advisors from the
      Security Area may often be named for these partnership efforts.

   o  Security Area reviewers of routing area documents - These people
      are delegated by the Security Area Directors to perform reviews on
      routing protocol specifications as they pass through working group
      last call or IESG review.  They will pay particular attention to
      the use of cryptographic authentication and newly specified
      security mechanisms for the routing protocols.  They will ensure
      that incremental security improvements are being made, in line
      with this roadmap.

   o  Security Area engineers - These people partner with routing area
      authors/designers on the security mechanisms in routing protocol
      specifications.  Some of these security area engineers will be
      assigned by the Security Area Directors, while others will be
      interested parties in the relevant working groups.

   o  Operators - The operators are a key audience for this work, as the
      work is considered to have succeeded only if operators deploy the
      technology, presumably due to a perception of significantly
      improved security value coupled with relative similarity to
      deployment complexity and cost.  Conversely, the work will be
      considered a failure if the operators do not care to deploy it,
      either due to lack of value or perceived (or real) over-
      complexity of operations.  As a result, the GROW and OPSEC WGs
      should be kept squarely in the loop as well.
















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3.  Threats

   In this document we will use the definition of "threat" as defined in
   RFC4949 [RFC4949]: "a potential for violation of security, which
   exists when there is a circumstance, capability, action, or event
   that could breach security and cause harm."

   This section defines the threats that are in scope for the KARP
   effort.  It also lists those threats that are explicitly out of scope
   for the KARP effort.

   This document leverages the "Generic Threats to Routing Protocols"
   model, [RFC4593].  Specifically, the threats below were derived by
   reviewing [RFC4593], analyzing the KARP problem space relative to it,
   and simply listing the threats that are applicable to the KARP design
   teams' work.  This document categorizes [RFC4593] threats into those
   in scope and those out of scope for KARP.  Each in-scope threat is
   discussed below, and its applicability to the KARP problem space is
   described.  As such, the below text intentionally does not constitute
   a self-standing, complete threat analysis, but rather describes the
   applicability of the existing threat analysis [RFC4593]relevant to
   KARP.

   Note: terms from [RFC4593] appear capitalized below -- e.g.
   OUTSIDERS -- so as to make explicit the term's origin, and to enable
   rapid cross referencing to the source RFC.

   For convenience, a terse definition of most [RFC4593] terms is
   offered here.  Those interested in a more thorough description of
   routing protocol threat sources, motivations, consequences and
   actions will want to read [RFC4593] before continuing here.

3.1.  Threat Sources

3.1.1.  OUTSIDERS

   One of the threats that will be addressed in this roadmap are those
   where the source is an OUTSIDER.  An OUTSIDER attacker may reside
   anywhere in the Internet, have the ability to send IP traffic to the
   router, may be able to observe the router's replies, and may even
   control the path for a legitimate peer's traffic.  OUTSIDERS are not
   legitimate participants in the routing protocol.  The use of message
   authentication and integrity protection specifically aims to identify
   packets originating from OUTSIDERS.

   KARP design teams will consider two specific use cases of OUTSIDERS:
   those on-path, and those off-path.




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   o  On-Path - These sources have control of a network resource or a
      tap that sits along the path of packets between the two routing
      peers.  A "Man-in-the-Middle" (MitM) is an on-path attacker.  From
      this vantage point, the attacker can conduct either active or
      passive attacks.  An active attack occurs when the attacker
      actually places packets on the network as part of the attack.  One
      active MitM attack relevant to KARP, an active wiretapping attack,
      occurs when the attacker tampers with packets moving between two
      legitimate router peers in such a way that both peers think they
      are talking to each other directly, when in fact they are actually
      talking to the attacker only.  Protocols conforming to this
      roadmap will use cryptographic mechanisms to detect MitM attacks
      and reject packets from such attacks (i.e. treat them as not
      authentic).  Passive on-path attacks occur when the attacker
      silently gathers data and analyses it to gain advantage.  Passive
      activity by an on-path attacker may often eventually lead to an
      active attack.

   o  Off-Path - These sources sit on some network outside of that over
      which runs the packets between two routing peers.  The source may
      be one or several hops away.  Off-path attackers can launch active
      attacks, such as SPOOFING or denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, to
      name a few.

3.1.2.  Stolen Keys

   This threat source exists when an unauthorized entity somehow manages
   to gain access to keying material.  Using this material, the attacker
   could send packets that pass the authenticity checks based on message
   authentication codes (MACs).  The resulting traffic might appear to
   come from router A to router B, and thus the attacker could
   impersonate an authorized peer.  The attacker could then adversely
   affect network behavior by sending bogus messages that appear to be
   authentic.  The attack source possessing the stolen keys could be on-
   path, off-path, or both.

   The obvious mitigation for stolen keys is to change the keys
   currently in use by the legitimate routing peers.  This mitigation
   can be either reactive or pro-active.  Reactive mitigation occurs
   when keys are changed only after having discovered that the previous
   keys fell into the possession of unauthorized users.  The stolen
   keys, reactive mitigation case is highlighted here in order to
   explain a common operational situation where new keying material will
   become necessary with little or no advanced warning.  In such a case
   new keys must be able to be installed and put into use very quickly,
   and with little operational expense.  Pro-active mitigation occurs
   when an operator assumes that unauthorized possession will occur from
   time to time without being discovered, and the operator moves to new



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   keying material in order to cut short, or make nonexistent, an
   attacker's window of opportunity to use the stolen keys effectively.

   In KARP, we can address the attack source with stolen keys by
   creating specifications that make it practical for the operator to
   quickly change keys without disruption to the routing system, and
   with minimal operational overhead.  Operators can further mitigate
   the stolen keys case by habitually changing keys.

3.1.2.1.  Terminated Employee

   A terminated employee is an important example of a "stolen keys"
   threat source to consider.  Staff attrition is a reality in routing
   operations, and so regularly causes the potential for a threat
   source.  The threat source risk arises when a network operator who
   had been granted access to keys ceases to be an employee.  If new
   keys are deployed immediately, the situation of a terminated employee
   can become a "stolen keys, pro-active" case, as described above,
   rather than a "stolen keys, reactive" case.

   On one hand, terminated employees could be considered INSIDERS rather
   than OUTSIDERS, because at one point in time they were authorized to
   have the keys.  On the other hand, they aren't really a BYZANTINE
   attacker, which is defined to be an attack from an INSIDER, a
   legitimate router.  Further, once terminated, the authorization
   granted to the terminated employee regarding the keys is revoked.  If
   they maintain possession of the keys they are acting in an
   unauthorized way.  If they go on to use those keys to launch an
   attack they are definitely acting in an unauthorized way.  In this
   way the terminated employee becomes an OUTSIDER at the point of
   termination, they cease to be legitimate participants in the routing
   system.  It behooves the operator to change the keys, to enforce the
   revocation of authorization of the old keys, in order to minimize the
   threat source's window of opportunity.

   Regardless of whether one considers a terminated employee an
   "insider" or an OUTSIDER, it is important to consider them a threat
   source, study the use case, and address the threats therein.  In such
   a case within the KARP context, new keys must be able to be installed
   and made operational in the routing protocols very quickly, with zero
   impact to the routing system, and with little operational expense.

   The threat source of the terminated employee and/or the detected-
   stolen-keys drives the requirement for quick and easy key rollover.
   The threat actions associated with these sources are mitigated if the
   operator has mechanisms in place (both inherent in the protocol, as
   well as built into their management systems) that allow them to roll
   the keys quickly with minimal impact to the routing system, at low



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   operational cost.

3.2.  Threat Actions In Scope

   These ATTACK ACTIONS are in scope for KARP:

   o  SPOOFING - when an unauthorized device assumes the identity of an
      authorized one.  SPOOFING can be used, for example, to inject
      malicious routing information that causes the disruption of
      network services.  SPOOFING can also be used to cause a neighbor
      relationship to form that subsequently denies the formation of the
      relationship with the legitimate router.

   o  DoS attacks at the transport layer - This is an example of
      SPOOFING.  It can also be an example of FALSIFICATION and
      INTERFERENCE (see below).  It occurs when an attacker sends
      spoofed packets aimed at halting or preventing the underlying
      protocol over which the routing protocol runs.  For example, BGP
      running over TLS will still not solve the problem of being able to
      send a spoofed TCP FIN or TCP RST and causing the BGP session to
      go down.  Since this attack depends on spoofing, operators are
      encouraged to deploy proper authentication mechanisms to prevent
      such attacks.  Specification work should ensure that Routing
      Protocols can operate over transport sub-systems in a fashion that
      is resilient to such DoS attacks.

   o  FALSIFICATION - an action whereby an attacker sends false routing
      information.  To falsify the routing information, an attacker has
      to be either the originator or a forwarder of the routing
      information.  FALSIFICATION may occur by an ORIGINATOR, or a
      FORWARDER, and may involve OVERCLAIMING, MISCLAIMING, or
      MISTATEMENT of network resource reachability.  We must be careful
      to remember that in this work we are only targeting FALSIFICATION
      from OUTSIDERS as may occur from tampering with packets in flight,
      or sending entirely false messages.  FALSIFICATION from BYZANTINES
      (see the Threats Out of Scope section below) are not addressed by
      the KARP effort.

   o  INTERFERENCE - when an attacker inhibits the exchanges by
      legitimate routers.  The types of INTERFERENCE addressed by this
      work include:

      A.  ADDING NOISE

      B.  REPLAYING OUT-DATED PACKETS

      C.  INSERTING MESSAGES




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      D.  CORRUPTING MESSAGES

      E.  BREAKING SYNCHRONIZATION

      F.  Changing message content

   o  DoS attacks using the authentication mechanism - This includes an
      attacker sending packets that confuse or overwhelm a security
      mechanism itself.  An example is initiating an overwhelming load
      of spoofed routing protocol packets that contain a MAC, so that
      the receiver needs to spend the processing cycles to check the
      MAC, only to discard the spoofed packet, consuming substantial CPU
      resources.  Another example is when an attacker sends an
      overwhelming load of keying protocol initiations from bogus
      sources.

   o  Brute Force Attacks Against Password/Keys - This includes either
      online or offline attacks where attempts are made repeatedly using
      different keys/passwords until a match is found.  While it is
      impossible to make brute force attacks on keys completely
      unsuccessful, proper design can make such attacks much harder to
      succeed.  For example, the key length should be sufficiently long
      so that covering the entire space of possible keys is improbable
      using computational power expected to be available 10 years out or
      more.  Using per session keys is another widely used method for
      reducing the number of brute force attacks as this would make it
      difficult to guess the keys.

3.3.  Threat Actions Out of Scope

   Threats from BYZANTINE sources -- faulty, misconfigured, or subverted
   routers, i.e., legitimate participants in the routing protocol -- are
   out of scope for this roadmap.  Any of the attacks described in the
   above section (Section 2.1) that may be levied by a BYZANTINE source
   are therefore also out of scope, e.g.  FALSIFICATION, or unauthorized
   message content by a legitimate authorized peer.

   In addition, these other attack actions are out of scope for this
   work:

   o  SNIFFING - passive observation of route message contents in
      flight.  Data privacy, as achieved by data encryption, is the
      common mechanism for preventing SNIFFING.  While useful,
      especially to prevent the gathering of data needed to perform an
      off-path packet injection attack, data encryption is out-of-scope
      for KARP.





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   o  INTERFERENCE due to:

      A.  NOT FORWARDING PACKETS - cannot be prevented with
          cryptographic authentication.  Note: If sequence numbers with
          sliding windows are used in the solution (as is done, for
          example, in IPsec's ESP [RFC4303]and BFD [RFC5880], a receiver
          can at least detect the occurrence of this attack.

      B.  DELAYING MESSAGES - cannot be prevented with cryptographic
          authentication.  Note: Timestamps can be used to detect
          delays.

      C.  DENIAL OF RECEIPT - cannot be prevented with cryptographic
          authentication

      D.  UNAUTHORIZED MESSAGE CONTENT - the work of the IETF's SIDR
          working group
          (http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/sidr-charter.html).

      E.  DoS attacks not involving the routing protocol.  For example,
          a flood of traffic that fills the link ahead of the router, so
          that the router is rendered unusable and unreachable by valid
          packets is NOT an attack that KARP will address.  Many such
          examples could be contrived.



























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4.  Requirements for KARP Work Phase 1, the Update to a Routing
    Protocol's Existing Transport Security

   The KARP Design Guide [RFC6518], Section 4.1 describes two distinct
   work phases for the KARP effort.  This section addresses requirements
   for the first work phase only, "Work Phase 1", the update to a
   routing protocol's existing transport security.  "Work Phase 2", a
   framework and usage of a KMP, will be addressed in a future
   document(s)."

   The following list of requirements SHOULD be addressed by a KARP Work
   Phase 1 security update to any Routing Protocol (according to section
   4.1 of the KARP Design Guide [RFC6518]document).  IT IS RECOMMENDED
   that any Work Phase 1 security update to a Routing Protocol contain a
   section of the specification document that describes how each of the
   below requirements are met.  It is further RECOMMENDED that
   justification be presented for any requirements that are NOT
   addressed.

   1.   Clear definitions of which elements of the transmitted data
        (frame, packet, segment, etc.) are protected by the
        authentication mechanism

   2.   Strong cryptographic algorithms, as defined and accepted by the
        IETF security community, MUST be specified.  The use of non-
        standard or unpublished algorithms SHOULD BE avoided.

   3.   Algorithm agility for the cryptographic algorithms used in the
        authentication MUST be specified, i.e. more than one algorithm
        MUST be specified and it MUST be clear how new algorithms MAY be
        specified and used within the protocol.  This requirement exists
        because research identifying weaknesses in cryptographic
        algorithms can cause the security community to reduce confidence
        in some algorithms.  Breaking a cipher isn't a matter of if, but
        when it will occur.  Having the ability to specify alternate
        algorithms (algorithm agility) within the protocol specification
        to support such an event is essential.  Mandating two algorithms
        provides both a redundancy, and a mechanism for enacting that
        redundancy when needed.  Further, the mechanism MUST describe
        the generic interface for new cryptographic algorithms to be
        used, so that implementers can use algorithms other than those
        specified, and so that new algorithms may be specified and
        supported in the future.

   4.   Secure use of PSKs, offering both operational convenience and a
        baseline level of security, MUST be specified.





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   5.   Routing protocols (or the transport or network mechanism
        protecting routing protocols) should be able to detect and
        reject replayed messages.  For non TCP based protocols like OSPF
        [RFC2328], IS-IS [RFC1195] , etc., two routers are said to have
        a session up if they are able to exchange protocol packets.
        Packets captured from one session must not be able to be re-sent
        and accepted during a later session.  Additionally, replay
        mechanisms must work correctly even in the presence of routing
        protocol packet prioritization by the router.

        A.  There is a specific case of replay attack combined with
            spoofing that must be addressed.  In several routing
            protocols (e.g., OSPF [RFC2328], IS-IS [RFC1195], BFD
            [RFC5880], RIP [RFC2453], etc.), all speakers share the same
            key (K) on a broadcast segment.  The ability to run a MAC
            operation with K is used for identity validation, and
            (currently) no other identity validation check is performed.
            Assume there are four routers using authentication on a LAN,
            R1 - R4.  Also assume attacker "Z", who is NOT a legitimate
            neighbor, is observing and recording packets on the same LAN
            segment.  Z captures a packet from R1, and changes the
            source IP, spoofing it to that of R2, then sends the packet
            on the LAN.  Z does not have K, but in this case it does not
            matter because R1 already performed the MAC operation, and Z
            simply re-uses that MAC.  R3 and R4 will process the packet
            as if coming from R2, the MAC check will return valid, and
            they will update their route tables accordingly.  R3 and R4
            have confirmed that the MAC was created by someone holding
            K, but not that it was actually sent by R2.  This is a well
            known attack with known solutions.  Some string must be
            added into the MAC operation that uniquely identifies the
            sender.  Said string must also be located in the packet such
            that if that string were to be altered after the MAC
            operation, it would be detected by the receiver.  Examples
            of solutions used in other protocols include sequence
            numbers with sliding acceptance windows, time stamps, IP
            header info (SRC, DST), unique identifiers which are
            temporarily bound to an IP Address.

   6.   A change of security parameters REQUIRES, and even forces, a
        change of session traffic keys.  The specific security
        parameters for the various routing protocols will differ, and
        will be defined by each protocols design team.  Some examples
        may include: master key, key lifetime, cryptographic algorithm,
        etc.  If one of these configured parameters changes, then a new
        session traffic key must immediately be established using the
        updated parameters.  The routing protocol security mechanisms
        MUST support this behavior.



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   7.   Intra-session re-keying which occurs without a break or
        interruption to the current routing session, and, if possible,
        without data loss, MUST be specified.  Keys need to be changed
        periodically, for operational confidentiality (e.g. when an
        administrator who had access to the keys leaves an organization)
        and for entropy purposes, and a re-keying mechanism enables the
        operators to execute the change without productivity loss.

   8.   Efficient re-keying SHOULD be provided.  The specification
        SHOULD support rekeying during a session without needing to try/
        compute multiple keys on a given packet.  The rare exception
        will occur if a routing protocols design team can find no other
        way to re-key and still adhere to the other requirements in this
        section.

   9.   New mechanisms must resist DoS attacks described as in-scope in
        Section 3.2.  Routers protect the control plane by implementing
        mechanisms to filter completely or rate limit traffic not
        required at the control plane level (i.e., unwanted traffic).
        Typically line rate packet filtering capabilities look at
        information at or below the IP and transport (TCP or UDP)
        headers, but do not include higher layer information.  Therefore
        the new mechanisms shouldn't hide nor encrypt the information
        carried in the IP and transport layers in control plane packets.

   10.  Mandatory cryptographic algorithms and mechanisms MUST be
        specified for a routing protocol.  Further, the protocol
        specification MUST define default security mechanism settings
        for all implementations to use when no explicit configuration is
        provided.  To understand the need for this requirement, consider
        the case where a routing protocol mandates 3 different
        cryptographic algorithms for a MAC operation.  If company A
        implements algorithm 1 as the default for this protocol, while
        company B implements algorithm 2 as the default, then two
        operators who enable the security mechanism with no explicit
        configuration other than a PSK will experience a connection
        failure.  It is not enough that each implementation implement
        the 3 mandatory algorithms; one default must further be
        specified in order to gain maximum out-of-the-box
        interoperability.

   11.  For backward compatibility reasons manual keying MUST be
        supported.

   12.  Architecture of the specification SHOULD consider and allow for
        future use of a KMP.





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   13.  The authentication mechanism in the Routing Protocol MUST be
        decoupled from the key management system used.  It MUST be
        obvious how the keying material was obtained, and the process
        for obtaining the keying material MUST exist outside of the
        Routing Protocol.  This will allow for the various key
        generation methods, like manual keys and KMPs, to be used with
        the same Routing Protocol mechanism.

   14.  Convergence times of the Routing Protocols SHOULD NOT be
        materially affected.  "Materially" is defined here as anything
        greater than a 5% increase in convergence time.  Changes in the
        convergence time will be immediately verifiable by convergence
        performance test beds already in use by most router vendors and
        service providers.  Note that convergence is different than boot
        time.  Also note that convergence time has a lot to do with the
        speed of processors used on individual routing peers, and this
        processing power increases by Moore's law over time, meaning
        that the same route calculations and table population routines
        will decrease in duration over time.  Therefore, this
        requirement should be considered only in terms of total number
        of protocol packets that must be exchanged, and less for the
        computational intensity of processing any one message.
        Alternatively this can be simplified by saying that the new
        mechanisms should only result in a minimal increase in the
        number of routing protocol packets passed between the peers.

   15.  The changes to or addition of security mechanisms SHOULD NOT
        cause a refresh of route advertisements or cause additional
        route advertisments to be generated.

   16.  Router implementations provide prioritized treatment for certain
        protocol packets.  For example, OSPF HELLO packets and ACKs are
        prioritized for processing above other OSPF packets.  The
        security mechanism SHOULD NOT interfere with the ability to
        observe and enforce such prioritization.  Any effect on such
        priority mechanisms MUST be explicitly documented and justified.
        Replay protection mechanisms provided by the routing protocols
        MUST work even if certain protocol packets are offered
        prioritized treatment.

   17.  Routing protocols MUST only send minimal information regarding
        the authentication mechanisms and the parameters in its protocol
        packets.  One reason for this is to keep the Routing Protocols
        as clean and focused as possible, and load security negotiations
        into the future KMP as much as possible.  Another reason is to
        avoid exposing any security negotiation information
        unnecessarily to possible attackers on the path.




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   18.  Routing protocols that rely on the IP header (or information
        seperate from routing protocol payload) to identify the neighbor
        that originated the packet, MUST either protect the IP header or
        provide some other means to authenticate the neighbor.
        [RFC6039] describes some attacks that are based on this.

   19.  Every new KARP-developed security mechanisms MUST support
        incremental deployment.  It will not be feasible to deploy a new
        Routing Protocol authentication mechanism throughout a network
        instantaneously.  It also may not be possible to deploy such a
        mechanism to all routers in a large autonomous system (AS) at
        one time.  Proposed solutions MUST support an incremental
        deployment method that provides some benefit for those who
        participate.  Because of this, there are several requirements
        that any proposed KARP mechanism should consider.

        A.  The Routing Protocol security mechanism MUST enable each
            router to configure use of the security mechanism on a per-
            peer basis where the communication is peer-to-peer
            (unicast).

        B.  Every new KARP-developed security mechanism MUST provide
            backward compatibility in the message formatting,
            transmission, and processing of routing information carried
            through a mixed security environment.  Message formatting in
            a fully secured environment MAY be handled in a non-backward
            compatible fashion though care must be taken to ensure that
            routing protocol packets can traverse intermediate routers
            that don't support the new format.

        C.  In an environment where both secured and non-secured systems
            are interoperating, a mechanism MUST exist for secured
            systems to identify whether a peer intended the messages to
            be secured.

        D.  In an environment where secured service is in the process of
            being deployed, a mechanism MUST exist to support a
            transition free of service interruption (caused by the
            deployment per se).

   20.  The introduction of mechanisms to improve routing security may
        increase the processing performed by a router.  Since most of
        the currently deployed routers do not have hardware to
        accelerate cryptographic operations, these operations could
        impose a significant processing burden under some circumstances.
        Thus proposed solutions should be evaluated carefully with
        regard to the processing burden they may impose, since
        deployment may be impeded if network operators perceive that a



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        solution will impose a processing burden which either incurs
        substantial capital expense, or threatens to destabilize
        routers.

   21.  Given the number of routers that would require the new
        authentication mechanisms in a typical ISP deployment, solutions
        can increase their appeal by minimizing the burden imposed on
        all routers in favor of confining significant work loads to a
        relatively small number of devices.  Optional features or
        increased assurance that engenders more pervasive processing
        loads MAY be made available for deployments where the additional
        resources are economically justifiable.

   22.  New authentication and security mechanisms should not rely on
        systems external to the routing system (the equipment that is
        performing forwarding) in order for the routing system to
        function.  In order to ensure the rapid initialization and/or
        return to service of failed nodes it is important to reduce
        reliance on these external systems to the greatest extent
        possible.  Proposed solutions SHOULD NOT require connections to
        external systems, beyond those directly involved in peering
        relationships, in order to return to full service.  It is
        however acceptable for the proposed solutions to require post
        initialization synchronization with external systems in order to
        fully synchronize the security information.

        If authentication and security mechanisms rely on systems
        external to the routing system, then there MUST be one or more
        options available to avoid circular dependencies.  It is not
        acceptable to have a routing protocol (e.g., unicast routing)
        depend upon correct operation of a security protocol that, in
        turn, depends upon correct operation of the same instance of
        that routing protocol (i.e., the unicast routing).  However, it
        is okay to have operation of a routing protocol (e.g., multicast
        routing) depend upon operation of a security protocol, which
        depends upon an independent routing protocol (e.g., unicast
        routing).  Similarly it would be okay to have the operation of a
        routing protocol depend upon a security protocol, which in turn
        uses an out of band network to exchange information with remote
        systems.











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5.  Security Considerations

   This document is mostly about security considerations for the KARP
   efforts, both threats and requirements for addressing those threats.
   More detailed security considerations were placed in the Security
   Considerations section of the KARP Design Guide [RFC6518]document.

   Spoofing by a Legitimate Neighbor - In several routing protocols (e.g
   OSPF) all speakers share the same key, a group key, on a broadcast
   segment.  Possession of the group key itself is used for identity
   validation, and no other identity check is used.  Under these
   conditions an attack exists where one neighbor (E.g.  Router 1, or
   R1) can masquerade as a different neighbor, R2, by sending spoofed
   packets using R2 as the source IP address.  When other neighbors, R3
   and R4, receive these packets, they will calculate the MAC
   successfully, and process its contents as if it originated from R2.
   SPOOFING this way, the attacker can succeed in several different
   types of attacks, including FALSIFICATION and INTERFERENCE.  The
   source of such an attack is a BYZANTINE actor, since the attack
   originates from a legitimate actor in the routing system, and such
   sources are out of scope for KARP.  This type of attack has been well
   documented in the group keying problem space, and it's non-trivial to
   solve.  The common method used to prevent this type of attack is to
   use a unique key for each sender rather than a group key.  Other
   solutions exist within the group keying realm, but they come with
   significant increases in complexity and computational intensity.

























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6.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no actions for IANA.
















































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7.  Acknowledgements

   The majority of the text for version -00 of this document was taken
   from "Roadmap for Cryptographic Authentication of Routing Protocol
   Packets on the Wire", draft-lebovitz-karp-roadmap, authored by
   Gregory M. Lebovitz.

   Brian Weis provided significant assistance in handling the many
   comments that came back during IESG review.

   We would like to thank the following people for their thorough
   reviews and comments: Brian Weis, Yoshifumi Nishida, Stephen Kent,
   Vishwas Manral.

   Author Gregory M. Lebovitz was employed at Juniper Networks, Inc. for
   the majority of the time he worked on this document, though not at
   the time of its publishing.  Thus Juniper sponsored much of this
   effort.

































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8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC4593]  Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y. Yang, "Generic Threats to
              Routing Protocols", RFC 4593, October 2006.

   [RFC4948]  Andersson, L., Davies, E., and L. Zhang, "Report from the
              IAB workshop on Unwanted Traffic March 9-10, 2006",
              RFC 4948, August 2007.

8.2.  Informative References

   [ISR2008]  McPherson, D. and C. Labovitz, "Worldwide Infrastructure
              Security Report", October 2008,
              <http://www.arbornetworks.com/dmdocuments/ISR2008_US.pdf>.

   [RFC1195]  Callon, R., "Use of OSI IS-IS for routing in TCP/IP and
              dual environments", RFC 1195, December 1990.

   [RFC2328]  Moy, J., "OSPF Version 2", STD 54, RFC 2328, April 1998.

   [RFC2453]  Malkin, G., "RIP Version 2", STD 56, RFC 2453,
              November 1998.

   [RFC3562]  Leech, M., "Key Management Considerations for the TCP MD5
              Signature Option", RFC 3562, July 2003.

   [RFC4271]  Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
              Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.

   [RFC4301]  Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
              Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.

   [RFC4303]  Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
              RFC 4303, December 2005.

   [RFC4822]  Atkinson, R. and M. Fanto, "RIPv2 Cryptographic
              Authentication", RFC 4822, February 2007.

   [RFC4949]  Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
              RFC 4949, August 2007.

   [RFC5036]  Andersson, L., Minei, I., and B. Thomas, "LDP
              Specification", RFC 5036, October 2007.



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   [RFC5310]  Bhatia, M., Manral, V., Li, T., Atkinson, R., White, R.,
              and M. Fanto, "IS-IS Generic Cryptographic
              Authentication", RFC 5310, February 2009.

   [RFC5709]  Bhatia, M., Manral, V., Fanto, M., White, R., Barnes, M.,
              Li, T., and R. Atkinson, "OSPFv2 HMAC-SHA Cryptographic
              Authentication", RFC 5709, October 2009.

   [RFC5880]  Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
              (BFD)", RFC 5880, June 2010.

   [RFC5925]  Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP
              Authentication Option", RFC 5925, June 2010.

   [RFC6039]  Manral, V., Bhatia, M., Jaeggli, J., and R. White, "Issues
              with Existing Cryptographic Protection Methods for Routing
              Protocols", RFC 6039, October 2010.

   [RFC6518]  Lebovitz, G. and M. Bhatia, "Keying and Authentication for
              Routing Protocols (KARP) Design Guidelines", RFC 6518,
              February 2012.






























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Authors' Addresses

   Gregory Lebovitz
   Aptos, California  95003
   USA

   Email: gregory.ietf@gmail.com


   Manav Bhatia
   Alcatel-Lucent
   Bangalore,
   India

   Phone:
   Email: manav.bhatia@alcatel-lucent.com



































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