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Versions: (draft-ietf-keyprov-portable-symmetric-key-container) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 RFC 6030

keyprov                                                         P. Hoyer
Internet-Draft                                             ActivIdentity
Intended status: Standards Track                                  M. Pei
Expires: July 17, 2009                                          VeriSign
                                                              S. Machani
                                                              Diversinet
                                                        January 13, 2009


                Portable Symmetric Key Container (PSKC)
                     draft-ietf-keyprov-pskc-00.txt

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 17, 2009.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.





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Abstract

   This document specifies a symmetric key format for transport and
   provisioning of symmetric keys (for example One Time Password (OTP)
   shared secrets or symmetric cryptographic keys) to different types of
   crypto modules, such as a strong authentication device.  The standard
   key transport format enables enterprises to deploy best-of-breed
   solutions combining components from different vendors into the same
   infrastructure.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  Portable Key Container Entities Overview and Relationships . .  6
   4.  <KeyContainer> Element: The Basics . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     4.1.  <DeviceInfo> Element: Unique Device Identification . . . .  9
     4.2.  <Key>: Embedding Keying Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     4.3.  <User> Element: User Identification  . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     4.4.  <Usage> Element: Supplementary Information for OTP and
           CR Algorithms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   5.  Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   6.  Protection of Keys and Related Data  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     6.1.  Encryption based on Pre-Shared Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     6.2.  Encryption based on Passphrase-based Keys  . . . . . . . . 21
     6.3.  Encryption based on Asymmetric Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . 24
     6.4.  Transmission of Key Derivation Values  . . . . . . . . . . 26
   7.  Digital Signature  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
   8.  Bulk Provisioning  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
   9.  Extensibility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
   10. PSKC Algorithm Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
     10.1. HOTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
     10.2. KEYPROV-PIN  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
   11. XML Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
   12. IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
     12.1. Content-type registration for 'application/pskc+xml' . . . 43
     12.2. XML Schema Registration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
     12.3. URN Sub-Namespace Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
     12.4. PSKC Algorithm Profile Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
     12.5. PSKC Version Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
     12.6. Key Usage Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
   13. Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
     13.1. Payload confidentiality  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
     13.2. Payload integrity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
     13.3. Payload authenticity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
   14. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
   15. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50



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   16. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
     16.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
     16.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
   Appendix A.  Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
     A.1.  Online Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
       A.1.1.  Transport of keys from Server to Cryptographic
               Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
       A.1.2.  Transport of keys from Cryptographic Module to
               Cryptographic Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
       A.1.3.  Transport of keys from Cryptographic Module to
               Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
       A.1.4.  Server to server Bulk import/export of keys  . . . . . 54
     A.2.  Offline Use Cases  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
       A.2.1.  Server to server Bulk import/export of keys  . . . . . 54
   Appendix B.  Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58



































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1.  Introduction

   With increasing use of symmetric key based authentication systems
   such as systems based one time password (OTP) and challenge response
   mechanisms, there is a need for vendor interoperability and a
   standard format for importing, exporting or provisioning symmetric
   keys from one system to another.  Traditionally authentication server
   vendors and service providers have used proprietary formats for
   importing, exporting and provisioning these keys into their systems
   making it hard to use tokens from vendor A with a server from vendor
   B.

   This document describes a standard format for serializing symmetric
   keys such as OTP shared secrets for system import, export or network/
   protocol transport.  The goal is that the format will facilitate
   dynamic provisioning and transfer of symmetric keys such as OTP
   shared secrets or encryption keys of different types.  In the case of
   OTP shared secrets, the format will facilitate dynamic provisioning
   using an online provisioning protocol to different flavors of
   embedded tokens or allow customers to import new or existing tokens
   in batch or single instances into a compliant system.

   This draft also specifies the key attributes required for computation
   such as the initial event counter used in the HOTP algorithm [HOTP].
   It is also applicable for other time-based or proprietary algorithms.

   To provide an analogy, in public key environments the PKCS#12 format
   [PKCS12] is commonly used for importing and exporting private keys
   and certificates between systems.  In the environments outlined in
   this document where OTP keys may be transported directly down to
   smartcards or devices with limited computing capabilities and
   explicit shared secret, configuration attribute information is
   desirable.  With PKCS#12, one would have to use opaque data to carry
   shared secret attributes used for OTP calculations, whereas a more
   explicit attribute schema definition is better for interoperability
   and efficiency.















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2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   In subsequent sections of the document we highlight mandatory
   elements and attributes.  Optional elements and attributes are not
   explicitly indicated.










































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3.  Portable Key Container Entities Overview and Relationships

   The portable key container is based on an XML schema definition and
   contains the following main conceptual entities:

   1.  KeyContainer entity - representing the container that carries the
       keys

   2.  Device entity - representing a physical or virtual device where
       the keys reside optionally bound to a specific user

   3.  DeviceInfo entity - representing the information about the device
       and criteria to uniquely identify the device

   4.  Key entity - representing the key transmitted

   5.  KeyData entity - representing data related to the key including
       value either in plain or encrypted

   The figure below represents the entity relationship diagram (brackets
   () denote optional elements).






























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      -----------------
      | KeyContainer  |
      |---------------|
      | EncryptionKey |
      | Signature     |
      | ...           |
      -----------------
              |
              |
             /|\ 1..n
      ----------------     ----------------
      | Device       |    1| DeviceInfo   |
      |--------------|-----|--------------|
      | (User)       |     | SerialNumber |
      ----------------     | Manufacturer |
              |            | ....         |
              |            ----------------
             /|\ 1..n
      ----------------
      | Key          |
      |--------------|
      | ID           |
      | Algorithm    |
      | (User)       |
      | ....         |
      ----------------
              |
              |
             /|\ 1..n      --------------
      ----------------     | Plainvalue |
      | KeyData      |     --------------
      |--------------|          |
      | name         |    either|
      | value        |----------|
      | .....        |   ------------------
      ----------------   | EncryptedValue |
                         ------------------


   The following sections describe in detail all the entities and
   related XML schema elements and attributes.










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4.  <KeyContainer> Element: The Basics

   In it's most basic form a PSKC document uses the top-level element
   <KeyContainer> and a single <Device> element to carry key
   information.

   The following example shows such a simple PSKC document.  We will use
   it to describe the structure of the <KeyContainer> element and it's
   child elements.

   <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
   <KeyContainer Version="1" id="exampleID1"
   xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc">
       <Device>
           <DeviceInfo>
               <Manufacturer>Manufacturer</Manufacturer>
               <SerialNo>987654321</SerialNo>
           </DeviceInfo>
           <Key KeyId="12345678"
           KeyAlgorithm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#hotp">
               <Issuer>Issuer</Issuer>
               <Usage>
                   <ResponseFormat Length="8" Encoding="DECIMAL"/>
               </Usage>
               <Data>
                   <Secret>
                       <PlainValue>MTIzNDU2Nzg5MDEyMzQ1Njc4OTA=
                       </PlainValue>
                   </Secret>
                   <Counter>
                       <PlainValue>0</PlainValue>
                   </Counter>
               </Data>
           </Key>
       </Device>
   </KeyContainer>

                Figure 1: Basic PSKC Key Container Example

   The attributes of the <KeyContainer> element have the following
   semantic:

   'Version:'  The 'Version' attribute is used to identify the version
      of the PSKC schema version.  This specification defines the
      initial version ("1") of the PSKC schema.  This attribute is
      mandatory.





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   'ID:'  The 'ID' attribute carries a unique identifier for the
      container.  This is useful when needing to refer to an individual
      key container when more than one container is embedded into a
      larger XML document.

   A <KeyContainer> element MUST contain at least one <Device> elements.
   Multiple <Device> elements may be used when for bulk provisioning,
   see Section 8.  A <Device> MUST contain at least one <Key> element.
   A <Device> MAY be bound to a user.  A key SHOULD be bound to only one
   <Device> element.

4.1.  <DeviceInfo> Element: Unique Device Identification

   The <DeviceInfo> element allows to uniquely identify the device the
   <Key> element refers to.  Since devices can come in different form
   factors, such as hardware tokens, smart-cards, soft tokens in a
   mobile phone or as a PC, this element allows different criteria to be
   used.  Combined though the criteria MUST uniquely identify the
   device.  For example, for hardware tokens the combination of SerialNo
   and Manufacturer will uniquely identify a device but not SerialNo
   alone since two different token manufacturers might issue devices
   with the same serial number (similar to the IssuerDN and serial
   number of a certificate).  Symmetric keys used in the payment
   industry are usually stored on Integrated Circuit Smart Cards.

   The <DeviceInfo> element has the following child elements:

   <Manufacturer>:  This element indicates the manufacturer of the
      device.

   <SerialNo>:  This element contains the serial number of the device

   <Model>:  This element describes the model of the device (e.g., one-
      button-HOTP-token-V1)

   <IssueNo>:  This element contains the issue number in case devices
      with the same serial number that are distinguished by different
      issue numbers

   <DeviceBinding>:  This element carries the identifier that can be
      used to bind keys to the device or class of device.  When loading
      keys into a device, this identifier can be checked against
      information obtained from the device to ensure that the correct
      device or class of device is being used.







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   <StartDate>:  This element indicates the start date of a device (such
      as the one on a payment card, used when issue numbers are not
      printed on cards).  The date MUST be expressed in UTC form with no
      timezone component.  Implementations SHOULD NOT rely on time
      resolution finer than milliseconds and MUST NOT generate time
      instants that specify leap seconds.

   <ExpiryDate>:  This field contains the expiry date of a device (such
      as the one on a payment card, used when issue numbers are not
      printed on cards).  It MUST be expressed in UTC form with no
      timezone component.  Implementations SHOULD NOT rely on time
      resolution finer than milliseconds and MUST NOT generate time
      instants that specify leap seconds.

4.2.  <Key>: Embedding Keying Material

   The following attributes of the <Key> element MUST be included at a
   minimum:

   'KeyId':  This attribute carries a globally unique identifier for the
      symmetric key.  The identifier is defined as a string of
      alphanumeric characters.

   'KeyAlgorithm':  This attribute contains a unique identifier for the
      PSKC algorithm profile.  This profile associates a specific
      semantic to the elements and attributes contained in the <Key>
      element.  More information about the PSKC algorithm profile
      defined in this document can be found in Section 10.

   The <Key> element has a number of optional child elements.  An
   initial set is described below:

   <Issuer>:  The key issuer name, this is normally the name of the
      organization that issues the key to the end user of the key.  For
      example MyBank issuing hardware tokens to their retail banking
      users 'MyBank' would be the issuer.

   <FriendlyName>:  A human readable name for the secret key for easier
      reference.  This element serves informational purposes only.

   <Usage>:  This element defines the intended usage of the key and
      related metadata as defined in Section 4.4 There are cases where
      the specific context in which the key is used can be inferred but
      typically the context is provided explicitly.







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   <Data>:  This element carries data about and related to the key.
      Further description about the <Data> element can be found
      subsequent to this list.

   This document defines a few child element for the <Data> element,
   namely

   <Secret>:  This element carries the value of the key itself in a
      binary representation.

   <Counter>:  This element contains the event counter for event based
      OTP algorithms.

   <Time>:  This element contains the time for time based OTP
      algorithms.  (If time interval is used, this element carries the
      number of time intervals passed from a specific start point,
      normally algorithm dependent)

   <TimeInterval>:  This element carries the time interval value for
      time based OTP algorithms.

   <TimeDrift>:  This element contains the device clock drift value for
      time based OTP algorithms.  The value indicates number of seconds
      that the device clock may drift each day.

   All these elements listed above (and those defined in the future)
   obey a simple structure in that they must support child element to
   convey the content in plaintext or in encrypted format:

   Plain Text:  The <PlainValue> element carries plaintext content that
      is typed, for example to xs:integer.

   Encrypted Content:  The <EncryptedValue> element carries encrypted
      content.

   Additionally, an optional <ValueMac> element, which is populated with
   a MAC generated from the unencrypted value in case the encryption
   algorithm does not support integrity checks, may be included as a
   child element.

   The example shown at Figure 1 illustrates the usage of the <Data>
   element with two child elements, namely <Secret> and <Counter>.  Both
   elements carry plaintext value within the <PlainValue> child element.

4.3.  <User> Element: User Identification

   <User> element identifies the owner or the user of the device using a
   distinguished name, as defined in [RFC4514].  For example:



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   UID=jsmith,DC=example,DC=net

   There is no semantic associated with this element, i.e., there are no
   checks enforcing that only a specific user can use this key.  As
   such, this element is for informational purposes only.

4.4.  <Usage> Element: Supplementary Information for OTP and CR
      Algorithms

   The <Usage> element is a child element of the <Key> element.

   The optional <ChallengeFormat> element defines the characteristics of
   the challenge in a CR usage scenario whereby the following attributes
   are defined:

   'Encoding':  This mandatory attribute defines the encoding of the
      challenge accepted by the device and MUST be one of the following
      values:

      DECIMAL  Only numerical digits

      HEXADECIMAL  Hexadecimal response

      ALPHANUMERIC  All letters and numbers (case sensitive)

      BASE64  Base 64 encoded

      BINARY  Binary data

   'CheckDigit':  This optional attribute indicates whether a device
      needs to check the appended Luhn check digit, as defined in
      [LUHN], contained in a provided challenge.  This is only valid if
      the 'Encoding' attribute is 'DECIMAL'.  A value of TRUE indicates
      that the device will check the appended Luhn check digit in a
      provided challenge.  A value of indicates that the device will not
      check appended Luhn check digit in challenge.

   'Min':  This mandatory attribute defines the minimum size of the
      challenge accepted by the device for CR mode.  If the 'Encoding'
      attribute is 'DECIMAL', 'HEXADECIMAL' or 'ALPHANUMERIC' this value
      indicates the minimum number of digits/characters.  If the
      'Encoding' attribute is 'BASE64' or 'BINARY', this value indicates
      the minimum number of bytes of the unencoded value.

   'Max':  This mandatory attribute defines the maximum size of the
      challenge accepted by the device for CR mode.  If the 'Encoding'
      attribute is 'DECIMAL', 'HEXADECIMAL' or 'ALPHANUMERIC' this value
      indicates the maximum number of digits/characters.  If the



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      'Encoding' attribute is 'BASE64' or 'BINARY', this value indicates
      the maximum number of bytes of the unencoded value.

   The <ResponseFormat> element defines the characteristics of the
   result of a computation and defines the format of the OTP or the
   response to a challenge.  For cases where the key is a PIN value,
   this element contains the format of the PIN itself (e.g., DECIMAL,
   length 4 for a 4 digit PIN).  The following attributes are defined:

   'Encoding':  This mandatory attribute defines the encoding of the
      response generated by the device and MUST be one of the following
      values: DECIMAL, HEXADECIMAL, ALPHANUMERIC, BASE64, or BINARY

   'CheckDigit':  This optional attribute indicates whether the device
      needs to append a Luhn check digit, as defined in [LUHN], to the
      response.  This is only valid if the 'Encoding' attribute is
      'DECIMAL'.  If the value is TRUE then the device will append a
      Luhn check digit to the response.  If the value is FALSE then the
      device will not append a Luhn check digit to the response.

   'Length':  This mandatory attribute defines the length of the
      response generated by the device.  If the 'Encoding' attribute is
      'DECIMAL', 'HEXADECIMAL' or 'ALPHANUMERIC' this value indicates
      the number of digits/characters.  If the 'Encoding' attribute is
      'BASE64' or 'BINARY', this value indicates the number of bytes of
      the unencoded value.

























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5.  Policy

   This section illustrates the functionality of the <Policy> element
   within PSKC that allows policy to be attached to a key and related
   meta data.  This element is a child element of the <Key> element.

   If the <Policy> element contains child elements or values within
   elements/attributes that are not understood by the recipient of the
   PSKC document then the recipient MUST assume that key usage is not
   permitted.  This statement ensures that the lack of understanding of
   certain extension does not lead to unintended key usage.

   We will start our description with an example that expands the
   example shown in Figure 2.





































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   <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
   <KeyContainer Version="1" id="exampleID1"
     xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc">
       <Device>
           <DeviceInfo>
               <Manufacturer>Manufacturer</Manufacturer>
               <SerialNo>987654321</SerialNo>
           </DeviceInfo>
           <Key KeyId="12345678"
           KeyAlgorithm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#hotp">
               <Issuer>Issuer</Issuer>
               <Usage>
                   <ResponseFormat Length="8" Encoding="DECIMAL"/>
               </Usage>
               <Data>
                   <Secret>
                       <PlainValue>MTIzNDU2Nzg5MDEyMzQ1Njc4OTA=
                       </PlainValue>
                   </Secret>
                   <Counter>
                       <PlainValue>0</PlainValue>
                   </Counter>
               </Data>
               <Policy>
                   <PINPolicy MinLength="4" MaxLength="4"
                   PINKeyId="123456781" PINEncoding="DECIMAL"
                   PINUsageMode="Local"/>
                   <KeyUsage>OTP</KeyUsage>
               </Policy>
           </Key>
           <Key KeyId="123456781"
             KeyAlgorithm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#pin">
               <Issuer>Issuer</Issuer>
               <Usage>
                   <ResponseFormat Length="4" Encoding="DECIMAL"/>
               </Usage>
               <Data>
                   <Secret>
                       <PlainValue>MTIzNA==</PlainValue>
                   </Secret>
               </Data>
           </Key>
       </Device>
   </KeyContainer>

         Figure 2: Non-Encrypted HOTP Secret Key protected by PIN

   This document defines the following elements:



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   <StartDate>:  This element denotes the start date of the key.  It
      MUST NOT be possible to use this key before this date.  The value
      MUST be expressed in UTC form, with no time zone component.
      Implementations SHOULD NOT rely on time resolution finer than
      milliseconds and MUST NOT generate time instants that specify leap
      seconds.  When this element is absent then the current time is
      assumed as a start time.

   <ExpiryDate>:  This element denotes the expiry date of the key.  It
      MUST NOT be possible to use this key after this date.  The value
      MUST be expressed in UTC form, with no time zone component.
      Implementations SHOULD NOT rely on time resolution finer than
      milliseconds and MUST NOT generate time instants that specify leap
      seconds.  When this element is absent then no expiry date is
      assumed.

   <KeyUsage>:  The <KeyUsage> element allows to indicate the intended
      usage of the key.  The recipient of the PSKC document is expected
      to enforce the key usage.  Currently, the following tokens are
      registered by this document:

      OTP:  The key MUST only be used for OTP generation.

      CR:  The key MUST only be used for Challenge/Response purposes.

      Encrypt:  The key MUST only be used for data encryption purposes.

      Integrity:  The key MUST only be used to generate a keyed message
         digest for data integrity or authentication purposes.

      Unlock:  The key MUST only be used for an inverse challenge
         response in the case a user has locked the device by entering a
         wrong PIN too many times (for devices with PIN-input
         capability).

      Decrypt:  The key MUST only be used for data decryption purposes.

      KeyWrap:  The key MUST only be used for key wrap purposes.

      The element may also be repeated to allow several key usages to be
      expressed.  When this element is absent then no key usage
      constraint is assumed, i.e., the key may be utilized for every
      usage.

   <PINPolicy>:  The <PINPolicy> element allows policy about the PIN
      usage to be associated to the key.  The following attributes are
      specified:




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      'PINKeyId':  This attribute contains the unique key id of the key
         held within this container that contains the value of the PIN
         that protects the key.

      'PINUsageMode':  This mandatory attribute indicates the way the
         PIN is used during the usage of the key.  The following values
         are defined:

         Local:  This value indicates that the PIN is checked locally on
            the device before allowing the key to be used in executing
            the algorithm.

         Prepend:  This value indicates that the PIN is prepended to the
            OTP or response hence it MUST be checked by the validation
            server.

         Append:  This value indicates that the PIN is appended to the
            OTP or response hence it MUST be checked by the validation
            server.

         Algorithmic:  This value indicates that the PIN is used as part
            of the algorithm computation.

      'MaxFailedAttempts':  This attribute indicates the maximum number
         of times the PIN can be entered wrongly before it MUST not be
         possible to use the key anymore.  If the 'PinUsageMode'="Local"
         then the device MUST enforce this value, otherwise it MUST be
         enforced by the validation server.

      'MinLength':  This attribute indicates the minimum length of a PIN
         that can be set to protect this key.  It MUST NOT be possible
         to set a PIN shorter than this value.  If the 'PINFormat'
         attribute is 'DECIMAL', 'HEXADECIMAL' or 'ALPHANUMERIC' this
         value indicates the number of digits/characters.  If the
         'PINFormat' attribute is 'BASE64' or 'BINARY', this value
         indicates the number of bytes of the unencoded value.  If the
         'PinUsageMode' attribute is set to "Local" then the device MUST
         enforce this value, otherwise it MUST be enforced by the
         validation server.

      'MaxLength':  This attribute indicates the maximum lenght of a PIN
         that can be set to protect this key.  It MUST NOT be possible
         to set a PIN longer than this value.  If the 'PINFormat'
         attribute is 'DECIMAL', 'HEXADECIMAL' or 'ALPHANUMERIC' this
         value indicates the number of digits/characters.  If the
         'PINFormat' attribute is 'BASE64' or 'BINARY', this value
         indicates the number of bytes of the unencoded value.  If the
         'PinUsageMode' attribute is set to "Local" then the device MUST



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         enforce this value, otherwise it MUST be enforced by the
         validation server.

      'PINEncoding':  This attribute indicates the encoding of the PIN
         and MUST be one of the values: DECIMAL, HEXADECIMAL,
         ALPHANUMERIC, BASE64, or BINARY.  If the 'PINUsageMode'
         attribute is set to "Local" then the device MUST enforce that
         the entered value is of this format, otherwise it MUST be
         enforced by the validation server.










































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6.  Protection of Keys and Related Data

   With the functionality described in the previous sections information
   related to keys had to be transmitted in clear text.  With the help
   of the <EncryptionKey> element, which is a child element of the
   <KeyContainer> element, it is possible to encrypt keys and associated
   information.  The level of encryption is applied to each individual
   element and the indicated encryption method MUST be the same for
   elements.  In subsequent sections key encryption based on pre-shared
   keys, based on passphrase-based keys, and based on asymmetric keys
   will be discussed.

6.1.  Encryption based on Pre-Shared Keys

   Figure 3 shows an example that illustrates the encryption of the
   content of the <Secret> element using AES128-CBC, the plaintext value
   of <Secret> is '3132333435363738393031323334353637383930'.  The name
   of the pre-shared secret is "Example-Key1", as set in the <KeyName>
   element (which is a child element of the <EncryptionKey> element).
   The value of the key used is '12345678901234567890123456789012'.
   Since AES128-CBC does not provide integrity checks a keyed MAC is
   applied to the encrypted value using the algorithm indicated in
   <MACAlgorithm> element (in our example
   "http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#hmac-sha1" is used).  The result
   of the keyed MAC computation is placed in the <ValueMAC> element.


























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 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
 <KeyContainer Version="1" xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc"
 xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
 xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#">
     <EncryptionKey>
         <ds:KeyName>Pre-shared-key</ds:KeyName>
     </EncryptionKey>
     <MACAlgorithm>http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#hmac-sha1
     </MACAlgorithm>
     <Device>
         <DeviceInfo>
             <Manufacturer>Manufacturer</Manufacturer>
             <SerialNo>987654321</SerialNo>
         </DeviceInfo>
         <Key KeyId="12345678"
         KeyAlgorithm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#hotp">
             <Issuer>Issuer</Issuer>
             <Usage>
                 <ResponseFormat Length="8" Encoding="DECIMAL"/>
             </Usage>
             <Data>
                 <Secret>
                     <EncryptedValue>
                         <xenc:EncryptionMethod
                         Algorithm=
                         "http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc"/>
                         <xenc:CipherData>
                         <xenc:CipherValue>
                         pgznhXdDh4LJ2G3mOY2RL7UA47yizMlXX3ADDcZd8Vs=
                         </xenc:CipherValue>
                         </xenc:CipherData>
                     </EncryptedValue>
                     <ValueMAC>zdrZbGBj9BDZJzunbfAG3kyZyYc=
                     </ValueMAC>
                 </Secret>
                 <Counter>
                     <PlainValue>0</PlainValue>
                 </Counter>
             </Data>
         </Key>
     </Device>
 </KeyContainer>

           Figure 3: AES-128-CBC Encrypted Pre-Shared Secret Key

   When protecting the payload with pre-shared keys implementations
   SHOULD set the name of the specific pre-shared key in the <KeyName>
   element inside the <EncryptionKey> element.



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   The following is the list of symmetric key encryption algorithm and
   possible parameters for usage with pre-shared secret based
   encryption.  Systems implementing PSKC MUST support AES128-CBC (with
   the URI of http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc).

   An example list of optionally-to-implement encryption algorithms can
   be found below:


  Algorithm      | URL
  ---------------+------------------------------------------------------
  AES192-CBC     | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes192-cbc
  AES256-CBC     | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes256-cbc
  TripleDES-CBC  | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#tripledes-cbc
  Camellia128    | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#camellia128
  Camellia192    | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#camellia192
  Camellia256    | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#camellia256
  KW-AES128      | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128
  KW-AES192      | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes192
  KW-AES256      | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes256
  KW-TripleDES   | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-tripledes
  KW-Camellia128 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#kw-camellia128
  KW-Camellia192 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#kw-camellia192
  KW-Camellia256 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#kw-camellia256

   When algorithms without integrity checks are used, such as AES12-CBC,
   a keyed MAC value using the same key as the key encryption key MUST
   be placed in the <ValueMAC> element of the <Data> element.  In this
   case the MAC algorithm type MUST be set in the <MACAlgorithm> element
   of the <KeyContainer> element.  Implementations of PSKC MUST support
   HMAC-SHA1 (with the URI of
   http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#hmac-sha1) as the mandatory-to-
   implement MAC algorithm.  An example list of optionally-to-implement
   MAC algorithms can be found below:


  Algorithm      | URL
  ---------------+------------------------------------------------------
  HMAC-SHA256    | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#hmac-sha256
  HMAC-SHA384    | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#hmac-sha384
  HMAC-SHA512    | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#hmac-sha512

6.2.  Encryption based on Passphrase-based Keys

   To be able to support passphrase based key encryption keys as defined
   in PKCS#5 the following PBE related parameters have been introduced
   into PSKC.  Implementations of PSKC MUST support the PKCS#5
   recommended PBKDF2 and PBES2 algorithms.  Differing from the PKCS#5



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   XML schema definition, the PBKDF2 and PBES2 are specified in two
   separate elements in a <KeyContainer> element:

      (a) PBKDF2 is specified via the <DerivedKey> element, which is a
      child element of the <EncryptionKey> element.

      (b) PBES2 is specified by the 'Algorithm' attribute (with the
      value set to
      http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/schemas/pkcs-5#pbes2) of
      the <EncryptionMethod> element used inside the encrypted data
      elements.

   The attributes of the <DerivedKey> element have the following
   semantic:

   'xml:id':  This attribute carries the unique identifier for this key.

   'Type':  This attribute was included for conformance with XML
      encryption.  It is an optional attribute identifying type
      information about the plaintext form of the encrypted content.
      Please see Section 3.1 of [XMLENC] for more details.

   The elements of the <DerivedKey> element have the following semantic:

   <CarriedKeyName>:  This element carries a friendly name of the key.

   <KeyDerivationMethod>:  This element defines how key encryption key
      is derived.  The 'Algorithm' attribute is used to indicate the key
      derivation method.  When PBKDF2 is used, the URI
      http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/schemas/pkcs-5#pbkdf2 MUST
      be used.  When PBKDF2 is used, it MUST include the <PBKDF2-params>
      child element to indicate the PBKDF2 parameters, such as salt and
      iteration count.

   <ReferenceList>:  This element contains a list of IDs of the elements
      that have been encrypted by this key.

   When PBES2 is used for encryption, the URL
   http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/schemas/pkcs-5#pbes2 MUST be
   specified as the 'Algorithm' attribute of <xenc:EncryptionMethod>
   element.  The underlying encryption scheme and initialization vector
   MUST be expressed in the <pskc:EncryptionScheme> element, which is a
   child element of <xenc:EncryptionMethod>.

   When PKCS#5 password based encryption is used, the <EncryptionKey>
   element and <xenc:EncryptionMethod> element MUST be used in exactly
   the form as shown in Figure 4.




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   In the example below, the following data is used.

   Password:   qwerty

   Salt:   0x123eff3c4a72129c

   Iteration Count:  1000

   OTP Secret:   12345678901234567890

   The derived encryption key is "0x651e63cd57008476af1ff6422cd02e41".
   This key is also used to calculate MAC value of the secret key
   "12345678901234567890".  The encryption with algorithm "AES-128-CBC"
   follows the specification defined in [XMLENC].


 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
 <KeyContainer
     xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc"
     xmlns:pkcs5=
      "http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/schemas/pkcs-5v2-0#"
     xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"
     Version="1">
     <EncryptionKey>
         <DerivedKey>
             <CarriedKeyName>Passphrase1</CarriedKeyName>
             <KeyDerivationMethod
                 Algorithm=
 "http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/schemas/pkcs-5v2-0#pbkdf2">
                 <pkcs5:PBKDF2-params>
                     <pkcs5:Salt>
                         <pkcs5:Specified>Ej7/PEpyEpw=</pkcs5:Specified>
                     </pkcs5:Salt>
                     <pkcs5:IterationCount>1000</pkcs5:IterationCount>
                     <pkcs5:KeyLength>16</pkcs5:KeyLength>
                     <pkcs5:PRF/>
                 </pkcs5:PBKDF2-params>
             </KeyDerivationMethod>
             <xenc:ReferenceList>
                 <xenc:DataReference URI="#ED"/>
             </xenc:ReferenceList>
         </DerivedKey>
     </EncryptionKey>
     <Device>
         <DeviceInfo>
             <Manufacturer>TokenVendorAcme</Manufacturer>
             <SerialNo>987654321</SerialNo>
         </DeviceInfo>



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         <Key KeyAlgorithm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#hotp"
         KeyId="123456">
             <Issuer>Example-Issuer</Issuer>
             <Usage>
                 <ResponseFormat Length="8" Encoding="DECIMAL"/>
             </Usage>
             <Data>
             <Secret>
                 <EncryptedValue Id="ED">
                     <xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm=
 "http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/schemas/pkcs-5#pbes2">
                         <EncryptionScheme Algorithm=
 "http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc">
                         </EncryptionScheme>
                     </xenc:EncryptionMethod>
                     <xenc:CipherData>
                         <xenc:CipherValue>
       oTvo+S22nsmS2Z/RtcoF8Hfh+jzMe0RkiafpoDpnoZTjPYZu6V+A4aEn032yCr4f
                         </xenc:CipherValue>
                     </xenc:CipherData>
                     <ns2:ValueMAC>cOpiQ/H7Zlj6ywiYWtwgz9cRaOA=
                     </ns2:ValueMAC>
                 </EncryptedValue>
             </Secret>
             </Data>
         </Key>
     </Device>
 </KeyContainer>

      Figure 4: Example of a PSKC Document using Encryption based on
                           Passphrase-based Keys

6.3.  Encryption based on Asymmetric Keys

   When using asymmetric keys to encrypt child element of the <Data>
   element information about the certificate being used MUST be stated
   in the <X509Data> element, which is a child element of the
   <EncryptionKey> element.  The encryption algorithm MUST be indicated
   in the 'Algorithm' attribute of the <EncryptionMethod> element.  In
   the example shown in Figure 5 the algorithm is set to
   "http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa_1_5".










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 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
 <KeyContainer Version="1"
     xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc"
     xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
     xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#">
     <EncryptionKey>
         <ds:X509Data>
             <ds:X509Certificate>miib</ds:X509Certificate>
         </ds:X509Data>
     </EncryptionKey>
     <Device>
         <DeviceInfo>
             <Manufacturer>Manufacturer</Manufacturer>
             <SerialNo>0755225266</SerialNo>
         </DeviceInfo>
         <Key KeyAlgorithm=
             "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#hotp"
             KeyId="0755225266">
             <Issuer>AnIssuer</Issuer>
             <Usage>
                 <ResponseFormat Length="8"
                     Encoding="DECIMAL"/>
             </Usage>
             <Data>
                 <Secret>
                     <EncryptedValue Id="ED">
                         <xenc:EncryptionMethod
                          Algorithm=
                          "http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa_1_5"/>
                         <xenc:CipherData>
                          <xenc:CipherValue>rf4dx3rvEPO0vKtKL14NbeVu8nk=
                          </xenc:CipherValue>
                         </xenc:CipherData>
                     </EncryptedValue>
                 </Secret>
                 <Counter>
                     <PlainValue>0</PlainValue>
                 </Counter>
             </Data>
         </Key>
     </Device>
 </KeyContainer>

      Figure 5: Example of a PSKC Document using Encryption based on
                              Asymmetric Keys

   Systems implementing PSKC MUST support the
   http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-1_5 algorithm.



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   http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-oaep-mgf1p is an example of an
   optional-to-implement algorithm.

6.4.  Transmission of Key Derivation Values

   <KeyProfileId> element, which is a child element of the <Key>
   element, carries a unique identifier used between the sending and
   receiving party to establish a set of key attribute values that are
   not transmitted within the container but agreed between the two
   parties out of band.  This element will then represent the unique
   reference to a set of attribute values.  For example, a smart card
   application personalisation profile id related to attributes present
   on a smart card application that have influence when computing a
   response.  The sending and the receiving party would agree to a set
   of values related to the MasterCard's Chip Authentication Protocol
   (CAP) [CAP].

   For example, sending and receiving party would agree that
   KeyProfileId='1' would represent a certain set of values (e.g.,
   Internet authentication flag set to a specific value).  When sending
   keys these values would not be transmitted as key attributes but only
   referred to via the <KeyProfileId> element set to the specific agreed
   profile (in this case '1').  When the receiving party receives the
   keys it can then associate all relevant key attributes contained in
   the out of band agreed profile with the imported keys.  Often this
   methodology is used between the manufacturing and the validation
   service to avoid transmission of mainly the same set of values.

   <MasterKeyId> element uniquely references an external master key when
   key derivation schemes are used and no specific key is transported
   but only the reference to the master key used to derive a specific
   key and some derivation data (e.g., the PKCS#11 key label).



















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   <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
   <KeyContainer Version="1" id="exampleID1"
   xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc">
       <Device>
           <DeviceInfo>
               <Manufacturer>Manufacturer</Manufacturer>
               <SerialNo>987654321</SerialNo>
           </DeviceInfo>
           <Key KeyId="12345678"
           KeyAlgorithm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#hotp">
               <Issuer>Issuer</Issuer>
               <Usage>
                   <ResponseFormat Length="8" Encoding="DECIMAL"/>
               </Usage>
               <KeyProfileId>keyProfile1</KeyProfileId>
               <MasterKeyId>MasterKeyLabel</MasterKeyId>
               <Data>
                   <Counter>
                       <PlainValue>0</PlainValue>
                   </Counter>
               </Data>
               <Policy>
                   <KeyUsage>OTP</KeyUsage>
               </Policy>
           </Key>
       </Device>
   </KeyContainer>

   Figure 6: Example of a PSKC Document transmitting a HOTP key via key
        derivation values (the key value will be derived using the
           serialnumber and a pre-shared masterkey identified by
                            'MasterKeyLabel' )



















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7.  Digital Signature

   PSKC allows a digital signature to be added to the XML document, as a
   child element of the <KeyContainer> element.  The description of the
   XML digital signature can be found in [XMLDSIG].


   <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
   <KeyContainer
       xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc"
       xmlns:pkcs5=
       "http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/schemas/pkcs-5v2-0#"
       xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
       xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"
       Version="1">
       <Device>
           <DeviceInfo>
               <Manufacturer>TokenVendorAcme</Manufacturer>
               <SerialNo>0755225266</SerialNo>
           </DeviceInfo>
           <Key KeyAlgorithm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#hotp"
           KeyId="123">
               <Issuer>Example-Issuer</Issuer>
               <Usage>
                   <ResponseFormat Length="6" Encoding="DECIMAL"/>
               </Usage>
               <Data>
                   <Secret>
                       <PlainValue>
                           MTIzNDU2Nzg5MDEyMzQ1Njc4OTA=
                       </PlainValue>
                   </Secret>
                   <Counter>
                       <PlainValue>0</PlainValue>
                   </Counter>
               </Data>
           </Key>
       </Device>
       <Signature>
           <ds:SignedInfo>
               <ds:CanonicalizationMethod
                Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
               <ds:SignatureMethod
                Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1"/>
               <ds:Reference URI="#Device">
                   <ds:DigestMethod
                Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
                   <ds:DigestValue>



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                       j6lwx3rvEPO0vKtMup4NbeVu8nk=
                   </ds:DigestValue>
               </ds:Reference>
           </ds:SignedInfo>
           <ds:SignatureValue>
               j6lwx3rvEPO0vKtMup4NbeVu8nk=
           </ds:SignatureValue>
           <ds:KeyInfo>
               <ds:X509Data>
                   <ds:X509IssuerSerial>
                       <ds:X509IssuerName>
                           CN=Example.com,C=US
                       </ds:X509IssuerName>
                       <ds:X509SerialNumber>
                           12345678
                       </ds:X509SerialNumber>
                   </ds:X509IssuerSerial>
               </ds:X509Data>
           </ds:KeyInfo>
       </Signature>
   </KeyContainer>

                    Figure 7: Digital Signature Example




























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8.  Bulk Provisioning

   The functionality of bulk provisioning can be accomplished by
   repeating the <Device> element multiple times within the
   <KeyContainer> element indicating that multiple keys are provided to
   different devices.  The <EncryptionKey> element then applies to all
   <Device> elements.  Furthermore, within a single <Device> element the
   <Key> element may also be repeated providing different keys and meta
   data for a single device.

   Figure 8 shows an example utilizing these capabilities.


   <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
   <KeyContainer Version="1"
       xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc">
       <Device>
           <DeviceInfo>
               <Manufacturer>TokenVendorAcme</Manufacturer>
               <SerialNo>654321</SerialNo>
           </DeviceInfo>
           <Key KeyAlgorithm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#hotp"
           KeyId="1">
               <Issuer>Issuer</Issuer>
               <Usage>
                   <ResponseFormat Length="8" Encoding="DECIMAL"/>
               </Usage>
               <Data>
                   <Secret>
                       <PlainValue>
                           MTIzNDU2Nzg5MDEyMzQ1Njc4OTA=
                       </PlainValue>
                   </Secret>
                   <Counter>
                       <PlainValue>0</PlainValue>
                   </Counter>
               </Data>
               <Policy>
                   <StartDate>2006-05-01T00:00:00Z</StartDate>
                   <ExpiryDate>2006-05-31T00:00:00Z</ExpiryDate>
               </Policy>
           </Key>
       </Device>
       <Device>
           <DeviceInfo>
               <Manufacturer>TokenVendorAcme</Manufacturer>
               <SerialNo>123456</SerialNo>
           </DeviceInfo>



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           <Key KeyAlgorithm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#hotp"
           KeyId="2">
               <Issuer>Issuer</Issuer>
               <Usage>
                   <ResponseFormat Length="8" Encoding="DECIMAL"/>
               </Usage>
               <Data>
                   <Secret>
                       <PlainValue>
                           MTIzNDU2Nzg5MDEyMzQ1Njc4OTA=
                       </PlainValue>
                   </Secret>
                   <Counter>
                       <PlainValue>0</PlainValue>
                   </Counter>
               </Data>
               <Policy>
                   <StartDate>2006-05-01T00:00:00Z</StartDate>
                   <ExpiryDate>2006-05-31T00:00:00Z</ExpiryDate>
               </Policy>
           </Key>
       </Device>
       <Device>
           <DeviceInfo>
               <Manufacturer>TokenVendorAcme</Manufacturer>
               <SerialNo>9999999</SerialNo>
           </DeviceInfo>
           <Key KeyAlgorithm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#hotp"
           KeyId="3">
               <Issuer>Issuer</Issuer>
               <Usage>
                   <ResponseFormat Length="8" Encoding="DECIMAL"/>
               </Usage>
               <Data>
                   <Secret>
                       <PlainValue>
                           MTIzNDU2Nzg5MDEyMzQ1Njc4OTA=
                       </PlainValue>
                   </Secret>
                   <Counter>
                       <PlainValue>0</PlainValue>
                   </Counter>
               </Data>
               <Policy>
                   <StartDate>2006-03-01T00:00:00Z</StartDate>
                   <ExpiryDate>2006-03-31T00:00:00Z</ExpiryDate>
               </Policy>
           </Key>



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           <Key KeyAlgorithm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#hotp"
           KeyId="4">
               <Issuer>Issuer</Issuer>
               <Usage>
                   <ResponseFormat Length="8" Encoding="DECIMAL"/>
               </Usage>
               <Data>
                   <Secret>
                       <PlainValue>
                           MTIzNDU2Nzg5MDEyMzQ1Njc4OTA=
                       </PlainValue>
                   </Secret>
                   <Counter>
                       <PlainValue>0</PlainValue>
                   </Counter>
               </Data>
               <Policy>
                   <StartDate>2006-04-01T00:00:00Z</StartDate>
                   <ExpiryDate>2006-04-30T00:00:00Z</ExpiryDate>
               </Policy>
           </Key>
       </Device>
   </KeyContainer>

                    Figure 8: Bulk Provisioning Example


























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9.  Extensibility

   This section lists a few common extension points provided by PSKC:

   New PSKC Version:  Whenever it is necessary to define a new version
      of this document then a new version number has to be allocated to
      refer to the new specification version.  The version number is
      carried inside the 'Algorithm' attribute, as described in
      Section 4, and rules for extensibililty are defined in Section 12.

   New XML Elements:  The usage of the XML schema and the available
      extension points allows new XML elements to be added.  Depending
      of type of XML elements different ways for extensibility are
      offered.  In some places the <Extensions> element can be used and
      elsewhere the "<xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="lax"
      minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>" XML extension point is
      utilized.

   New XML Attributes:  The XML schema allows new XML attributes to be
      added where XML extension points have been defined (see "<xs:
      anyAttribute namespace="##other"/>" in Section 11).

   New PSKC Algorithm Profiles:  This document defines two PSKC
      algorithm profiles, see Section 10.  Further PSKC algorithm
      profiles can be registered as described in Section 12.4.

   Algorithm URIs:  Section 6 defines how keys and related data can be
      protected.  A number of algorithms can be used.  The usage of new
      algorithms can be used by pointing to a new algorithm URI.

   Policy:  Section 5 defines policies that can be attached to a key and
      keying related data.  The <Policy> element is one such item that
      allows to restrict the usage of the key to certain functions, such
      as "OTP usage only".  Further values may be registered as
      described in Section 12.
















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10.  PSKC Algorithm Profile

10.1.  HOTP

   Common Name:  HOTP

   Class:  OTP

   URN:  urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#hotp

   Algorithm Definition:  http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4226.txt

   Identifier Definition:  (this RFC)

   Registrant Contact:  IESG

   Profiling:

         The <Usage> element MUST be present.  The <ResponseFormat>
         element of the <Usage> element MUST be used to indicate the OTP
         length and the value format.

         The <Counter> element (see Section 4.2) MUST be provided as
         meta-data for the key.

         The following additional constraints apply:

         +  The value of the <Secret> element MUST contain key material
            with a length of at least 16 octets (128 bits), if it is
            present.

         +  The <ResponseFormat> element MUST have the 'Format'
            attribute set to "DECIMAL", and the 'Length' attribute MUST
            indicate a length value between 6 and 9.

         +  The <PINPolicy> element MAY be present but the
            'PINUsageMode' attribute cannot be set to "Algorithmic".

         An example can be found in Figure 1.

10.2.  KEYPROV-PIN

   Common Name:  KEYPROV-PIN

   Class:  Symmetric static credential comparison






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   URN:  urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#pin

   Algorithm Definition:  (this document)

   Identifier Definition  (this document)

   Registrant Contact:  IESG

   Profiling:

         The <Usage> element MAY be present but no attribute of the
         <Usage> element is required.  The <ResponseFormat> element MAY
         be used to indicate the PIN value format.

         The <Secret> element (see Section 4.2) MUST be provided.

         See the example in Figure 2


































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11.  XML Schema

   This section defines the XML schema for PSKC.


  <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
  <xs:schema
    targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc"
    xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
    xmlns:pskc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc"
    xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
    xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"
    elementFormDefault="qualified"
    attributeFormDefault="unqualified">
    <xs:import namespace="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
  schemaLocation=
  "http://www.w3.org/TR/2002/REC-xmldsig-core-20020212/
  xmldsig-core-schema.xsd"/>
    <xs:import namespace="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"
        schemaLocation=
  "http://www.w3.org/TR/2002/REC-xmlenc-core-20021210/
  xenc-schema.xsd"/>
          <xs:import namespace="http://www.w3.org/XML/1998/namespace"/>

      <xs:complexType name="KeyContainerType">
      <xs:sequence>
          <xs:element name="EncryptionKey" type="ds:KeyInfoType"
            minOccurs="0"/>
          <xs:element name="MACAlgorithm" type="pskc:KeyAlgorithmType"
            minOccurs="0"/>
          <xs:element name="Device" type="pskc:DeviceType"
            minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
          <xs:element name="Signature" type="ds:SignatureType"
            minOccurs="0"/>
          <xs:element name="Extensions"
          type="pskc:ExtensionsType" minOccurs="0"
          maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      </xs:sequence>
          <xs:attribute name="Version" type="xs:unsignedInt"
              use="required"/>
          <xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:ID" use="optional"/>
      </xs:complexType>
      <xs:complexType name="KeyType">
          <xs:sequence>
              <xs:element name="Issuer"
              type="xs:string" minOccurs="0"/>
              <xs:element name="Usage"
              type="pskc:UsageType"/>



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                          <xs:element name="KeyProfileId"
                          type="xs:string" minOccurs="0"/>
                          <xs:element name="MasterKeyId"
                          type="xs:string" minOccurs="0"/>
              <xs:element name="FriendlyName"
              type="xs:string" minOccurs="0"/>
              <xs:element name="Data" type="pskc:KeyDataType"
              minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
              <xs:element name="UserId" type="xs:string"
                  minOccurs="0"/>
              <xs:element name="Policy"
                  type="pskc:PolicyType" minOccurs="0"/>
              <xs:element name="Extensions"
              type="pskc:ExtensionsType" minOccurs="0"
              maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
          </xs:sequence>
          <xs:attribute name="KeyId"
          type="xs:string" use="required"/>
          <xs:attribute name="KeyAlgorithm"
          type="pskc:KeyAlgorithmType"
            use="optional"/>
          <xs:attribute name="KeyProperties"
          type="xs:IDREF" use="optional"/>
      </xs:complexType>

      <xs:complexType name="PolicyType">
          <xs:sequence>
              <xs:element name="StartDate"
                       type="xs:dateTime" minOccurs="0"/>
              <xs:element name="ExpiryDate"
                  type="xs:dateTime" minOccurs="0"/>
              <xs:element name="PINPolicy"
                  type="pskc:PINPolicyType" minOccurs="0"/>
              <xs:element name="KeyUsage"
                  type="pskc:KeyUsageType" minOccurs="0"/>
              <xs:any namespace="##other"
                  minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
          </xs:sequence>
      </xs:complexType>

          <xs:complexType name="KeyDataType">
              <xs:sequence>
              <xs:element name="Secret"
              type="pskc:binaryDataType"
              minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
              <xs:element name="Counter"
              type="pskc:longDataType"
              minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>



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              <xs:element name="Time"
              type="pskc:intDataType"
              minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
              <xs:element name="TimeInterval"
              type="pskc:intDataType"
              minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
              <xs:element name="TimeDrift"
              type="pskc:intDataType"
              minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
              <xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="lax"
              minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
              </xs:sequence>
          </xs:complexType>
      <xs:complexType name="binaryDataType">
          <xs:sequence>
              <xs:choice>
                  <xs:element name="PlainValue"
                  type="xs:base64Binary"/>
                  <xs:element name="EncryptedValue"
                  type="xenc:EncryptedDataType"/>
              </xs:choice>
                          <xs:element name="ValueMAC"
                          type="xs:base64Binary" minOccurs="0"/>
          </xs:sequence>
      </xs:complexType>
      <xs:complexType name="intDataType">
          <xs:sequence>
              <xs:choice>
                  <xs:element name="PlainValue"
                  type="xs:int"/>
                  <xs:element name="EncryptedValue"
                  type="xenc:EncryptedDataType"/>
              </xs:choice>
                          <xs:element name="ValueMAC"
                          type="xs:base64Binary" minOccurs="0"/>
          </xs:sequence>
      </xs:complexType>
      <xs:complexType name="stringDataType">
          <xs:sequence>
              <xs:choice>
                  <xs:element name="PlainValue"
                  type="xs:string"/>
                  <xs:element name="EncryptedValue"
                  type="xenc:EncryptedDataType"/>
              </xs:choice>
                          <xs:element name="ValueMAC"
                          type="xs:base64Binary" minOccurs="0"/>
          </xs:sequence>



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      </xs:complexType>
      <xs:complexType name="longDataType">
          <xs:sequence>
              <xs:choice>
                  <xs:element name="PlainValue"
                  type="xs:long"/>
                  <xs:element name="EncryptedValue"
                  type="xenc:EncryptedDataType"/>
              </xs:choice>
                          <xs:element name="ValueMAC"
                          type="xs:base64Binary" minOccurs="0"/>
          </xs:sequence>
      </xs:complexType>
      <xs:complexType name="DerivedKeyType">
          <xs:sequence>
              <xs:element name="KeyDerivationMethod"
                type="pskc:KeyDerivationMethodType" minOccurs="0"/>
              <xs:element ref="xenc:ReferenceList" minOccurs="0"/>
              <xs:element name="CarriedKeyName" type="xs:string"
                  minOccurs="0"/>
          </xs:sequence>
          <xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:ID" use="optional"/>
          <xs:attribute name="Type" type="xs:anyURI" use="optional"/>
      </xs:complexType>
      <xs:complexType name="KeyDerivationMethodType">
          <xs:sequence>
              <xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="lax"
                                                  minOccurs="0"
              maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
          </xs:sequence>
          <xs:attribute name="Algorithm" type="xs:anyURI"
          use="required"/>
      </xs:complexType>
      <xs:complexType name="PINPolicyType">
          <xs:attribute name="PINKeyId" type="xs:string"
              use="optional"/>
          <xs:attribute name="PINUsageMode"
              type="pskc:PINUsageModeType"/>
          <xs:attribute name="MaxFailedAttempts" type="xs:unsignedInt"
              use="optional"/>
          <xs:attribute name="MinLength"
              type="xs:unsignedInt" use="optional"/>
          <xs:attribute name="MaxLength"
              type="xs:unsignedInt" use="optional"/>
          <xs:attribute name="PINEncoding"
              type="pskc:ValueFormatType" use="optional"/>
          <xs:anyAttribute namespace="##other"/>
      </xs:complexType>



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      <xs:simpleType name="PINUsageModeType">
          <xs:restriction base="xs:string">
              <xs:enumeration value="Local"/>
              <xs:enumeration value="Prepend"/>
              <xs:enumeration value="Append"/>
              <xs:enumeration value="Algorithmic"/>
          </xs:restriction>
      </xs:simpleType>
      <xs:simpleType name="KeyUsageType">
          <xs:restriction base="xs:string">
              <xs:enumeration value="OTP"/>
              <xs:enumeration value="CR"/>
              <xs:enumeration value="Encrypt"/>
              <xs:enumeration value="Integrity"/>
              <xs:enumeration value="Unlock"/>
              <xs:enumeration value="Decrypt"/>
              <xs:enumeration value="KeyWrap"/>
          </xs:restriction>
      </xs:simpleType>
      <xs:complexType name="DeviceInfoType">
          <xs:sequence>
          <xs:element name="Manufacturer" type="xs:string"
          minOccurs="0"/>
          <xs:element name="SerialNo" type="xs:string"
          minOccurs="0"/>
          <xs:element name="Model" type="xs:string"
          minOccurs="0"/>
          <xs:element name="IssueNo" type="xs:string"
          minOccurs="0"/>
          <xs:element name="DeviceBinding" type="xs:string"
          minOccurs="0"/>
          <xs:element name="StartDate" type="xs:dateTime"
          minOccurs="0"/>
          <xs:element name="ExpiryDate" type="xs:dateTime"
          minOccurs="0"/>
          <xs:element name="Extensions"
          type="pskc:ExtensionsType" minOccurs="0"
          maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
          </xs:sequence>
      </xs:complexType>
      <xs:complexType name="DeviceType">
          <xs:sequence>
          <xs:element name="DeviceInfo" type="pskc:DeviceInfoType"
            minOccurs="0"/>
          <xs:element name="Key" type="pskc:KeyType"
            maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
          <xs:element name="User" type="xs:string"
          minOccurs="0"/>



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          <xs:element name="Extensions"
          type="pskc:ExtensionsType" minOccurs="0"
          maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
          </xs:sequence>
      </xs:complexType>
      <xs:complexType name="UsageType">
          <xs:choice>
              <xs:element name="ChallengeFormat" minOccurs="0">
                  <xs:complexType>
                      <xs:attribute name="Encoding"
                        type="pskc:ValueFormatType" use="required"/>
                      <xs:attribute name="Min" type="xs:unsignedInt"
                        use="required"/>
                      <xs:attribute name="Max" type="xs:unsignedInt"
                        use="required"/>
                      <xs:attribute name="CheckDigits" type="xs:boolean"
                        default="false"/>
                  </xs:complexType>
              </xs:element>
              <xs:element name="ResponseFormat" minOccurs="0">
                  <xs:complexType>
                      <xs:attribute name="Encoding"
                        type="pskc:ValueFormatType" use="required"/>
                      <xs:attribute name="Length" type="xs:unsignedInt"
                        use="required"/>
                      <xs:attribute name="CheckDigits" type="xs:boolean"
                        default="false"/>
                  </xs:complexType>
              </xs:element>
          <xs:element name="Extensions"
          type="pskc:ExtensionsType" minOccurs="0"
          maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
              </xs:choice>
      </xs:complexType>
      <xs:complexType name="ExtensionsType">
        <xs:sequence>
          <xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="lax"
          maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
        </xs:sequence>
        <xs:attribute name="definition" type="xs:anyURI"
        use="optional"/>
      </xs:complexType>
      <xs:simpleType name="KeyAlgorithmType">
          <xs:restriction base="xs:anyURI"/>
      </xs:simpleType>
      <xs:simpleType name="ValueFormatType">
          <xs:restriction base="xs:string">
              <xs:enumeration value="DECIMAL"/>



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              <xs:enumeration value="HEXADECIMAL"/>
              <xs:enumeration value="ALPHANUMERIC"/>
              <xs:enumeration value="BASE64"/>
              <xs:enumeration value="BINARY"/>
          </xs:restriction>
      </xs:simpleType>

      <xs:element name="DerivedKey" type="pskc:DerivedKeyType"/>
      <xs:element name="EncryptionScheme"
          type="xenc:EncryptionMethodType"/>
      <xs:element name="KeyContainer" type="pskc:KeyContainerType"/>
  </xs:schema>







































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12.  IANA Considerations

12.1.  Content-type registration for 'application/pskc+xml'

   This specification requests the registration of a new MIME type
   according to the procedures of RFC 4288 [RFC4288] and guidelines in
   RFC 3023 [RFC3023].

   MIME media type name:  application

   MIME subtype name:  pskc+xml

   Mandatory parameters:  none

   Optional parameters:  charset

      Indicates the character encoding of enclosed XML.

   Encoding considerations:  Uses XML, which can employ 8-bit
      characters, depending on the character encoding used.  See RFC
      3023 [RFC3023], Section 3.2.

   Security considerations:  This content type is designed to carry PSKC
      protocol payloads.

   Interoperability considerations:  None

   Published specification:  RFCXXXX [NOTE TO IANA/RFC-EDITOR: Please
      replace XXXX with the RFC number of this specification.]

   Applications which use this media type:  This MIME type is being used
      as a symmetric key container format for transport and provisioning
      of symmetric keys (One Time Password (OTP) shared secrets or
      symmetric cryptographic keys) to different types of strong
      authentication devices.  As such, it is used for key provisioning
      systems.

   Additional information:

      Magic Number:  None

      File Extension:  .pskcxml

      Macintosh file type code:  'TEXT'







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   Personal and email address for further information:  Philip Hoyer,
      Philip.Hoyer@actividentity.com

   Intended usage:  LIMITED USE

   Author:  This specification is a work item of the IETF KEYPROV
      working group, with mailing list address <keyprov@ietf.org>.

   Change controller:  The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>

12.2.  XML Schema Registration

   This section registers an XML schema as per the guidelines in
   [RFC3688].

   URI:  urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc

   Registrant Contact:  IETF KEYPROV Working Group, Philip Hoyer
      (Philip.Hoyer@actividentity.com).

   XML Schema:  The XML schema to be registered is contained in
      Section 11.  Its first line is

   <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>

      and its last line is

   </xs:schema>

12.3.  URN Sub-Namespace Registration

   This section registers a new XML namespace,
   "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc", per the guidelines in
   [RFC3688].

   URI:  urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc

   Registrant Contact:  IETF KEYPROV Working Group, Philip Hoyer
      (Philip.Hoyer@actividentity.com).

   XML:










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   BEGIN
   <?xml version="1.0"?>
   <!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML Basic 1.0//EN"
     "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml-basic/xhtml-basic10.dtd">
   <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
   <head>
     <meta http-equiv="content-type"
           content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1"/>
     <title>PSKC Namespace</title>
   </head>
   <body>
     <h1>Namespace for PSKC</h1>
     <h2>urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc:1.0</h2>
   <p>See <a href="[URL of published RFC]">RFCXXXX
       [NOTE TO IANA/RFC-EDITOR:
        Please replace XXXX with the RFC number of this
       specification.]</a>.</p>
   </body>
   </html>
   END

12.4.  PSKC Algorithm Profile Registry

   This specification requests the creation of a new IANA registry for
   PSKC algorithm profiles in accordance with the principles set out in
   RFC 5226 [RFC5226].

   As part of this registry IANA will maintain the following
   information:

   Common Name:  The name by which the PSKC algorithm profile is
      generally referred.

   Class:  The type of PSKC algorithm profile registry entry being
      created, such as encryption, Message Authentication Code (MAC),
      One Time Password (OTP), Digest.

   URN:  The URN to be used to identify the profile.

   Identifier Definition:  IANA will be asked to add a pointer to the
      specification containing information about the PSKC algorithm
      profile registration.

   Algorithm Definition:  A reference to the stable document in which
      the algorithm being used with the PSKC is defined.






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   Registrant Contact:  Contact information about the party submitting
      the registration request.

   PSKC Profiling:  Information about PSKC XML elements and attributes
      being used (or not used) with this specific profile of PSKC.

   PSKC algorithm profile identifier registrations are to be subject to
   Expert Review as per RFC 5226 [RFC5226].

   IANA is asked to add an initial value to the registry based on the
   PSKC HOTP algorithm profile described in Section 10.

12.5.  PSKC Version Registry

   IANA is requested to create a registry for PSKC version numbers.  The
   registry has the following structure:

     PSKC Version              | Specification
   +---------------------------+----------------
   | 1                         | [This document]

   Standards action is required to define new versions of PSKC.  It is
   not envisioned to depreciate, delete, or modify existing PSKC
   versions.

12.6.  Key Usage Registry

   IANA is requested to create a registry for key usage.  A description
   of the 'KeyUsage' element can be found in Section 5.  The registry
   has the following structure:

     Key Usage Token           | Specification
   +---------------------------+-------------------------------
   | OTP                       | [Section 5 of this document ]
   | CR                        | [Section 5 of this document ]
   | Encrypt                   | [Section 5 of this document ]
   | Integrity                 | [Section 5 of this document ]
   | Unlock                    | [Section 5 of this document ]
   | Decrypt                   | [Section 5 of this document ]
   | KeyWrap                   | [Section 5 of this document ]
   +---------------------------+-------------------------------

   Expert Review is required to define new key usage tokens.  Each
   registration request has to provide a description of the semantic.
   Using the same procedure it is possible to depreciate, delete, or
   modify existing key usage tokens.





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13.  Security Considerations

   The portable key container carries sensitive information (e.g.,
   cryptographic keys) and may be transported across the boundaries of
   one secure perimeter to another.  For example, a container residing
   within the secure perimeter of a back-end provisioning server in a
   secure room may be transported across the internet to an end-user
   device attached to a personal computer.  This means that special care
   must be taken to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and
   authenticity of the information contained within.

13.1.  Payload confidentiality

   By design, the container allows two main approaches to guaranteeing
   the confidentiality of the information it contains while transported.

   First, the container key data payload may be encrypted.

   In this case no transport layer security is required.  However,
   standard security best practices apply when selecting the strength of
   the cryptographic algorithm for payload encryption.  Symmetric
   cryptographic cipher should be used - the longer the cryptographic
   key, the stronger the protection.  At the time of this writing both
   3DES and AES are mandatory algorithms but 3DES may be dropped in the
   relatively near future.  Applications concerned with algorithm
   longevity are advised to use AES-256-CBC.  In cases where the
   exchange of key encryption keys between the sender and the receiver
   is not possible, asymmetric encryption of the secret key payload may
   be employed.  Similarly to symmetric key cryptography, the stronger
   the asymmetric key, the more secure the protection is.

   If the payload is encrypted with a method that uses one of the
   password-based encryption methods provided above, the payload may be
   subjected to password dictionary attacks to break the encryption
   password and recover the information.  Standard security best
   practices for selection of strong encryption passwords apply
   [Schneier].

   Practical implementations should use PBESalt and PBEIterationCount
   when PBE encryption is used.  Different PBESalt value per key
   container should be used for best protection.

   The second approach to protecting the confidentiality of the payload
   is based on using transport layer security.  The secure channel
   established between the source secure perimeter (the provisioning
   server from the example above) and the target perimeter (the device
   attached to the end-user computer) utilizes encryption to transport
   the messages that travel across.  No payload encryption is required



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   in this mode.  Secure channels that encrypt and digest each message
   provide an extra measure of security, especially when the signature
   of the payload does not encompass the entire payload.

   Because of the fact that the plain text payload is protected only by
   the transport layer security, practical implementation must ensure
   protection against man-in-the-middle attacks [Schneier].  Validating
   the secure channel end-points is critically important for eliminating
   intruders that may compromise the confidentiality of the payload.

13.2.  Payload integrity

   The portable symmetric key container provides a mean to guarantee the
   integrity of the information it contains through digital signatures.
   For best security practices, the digital signature of the container
   should encompass the entire payload.  This provides assurances for
   the integrity of all attributes.  It also allows verification of the
   integrity of a given payload even after the container is delivered
   through the communication channel to the target perimeter and channel
   message integrity check is no longer possible.

13.3.  Payload authenticity

   The digital signature of the payload is the primary way of showing
   its authenticity.  The recipient of the container may use the public
   key associated with the signature to assert the authenticity of the
   sender by tracing it back to a preloaded public key or certificate.
   Note that the digital signature of the payload can be checked even
   after the container has been delivered through the secure channel of
   communication.

   A weaker payload authenticity guarantee may be provided by the
   transport layer if it is configured to digest each message it
   transports.  However, no authenticity verification is possible once
   the container is delivered at the recipient end.  This approach may
   be useful in cases where the digital signature of the container does
   not encompass the entire payload.














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14.  Contributors

   We would like Hannes Tschofenig for his text contributions to this
   document.















































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15.  Acknowledgements

   The authors of this draft would like to thank the following people
   for their contributions and support to make this a better
   specification: Apostol Vassilev, Shuh Chang, Jon Martinson, Siddhart
   Bajaj, Stu Veath, Kevin Lewis, Philip Hallam-Baker, Andrea Doherty,
   Magnus Nystrom, Tim Moses, Anders Rundgren, Sean Turner and
   especially Robert Philpott.

   This work is based on earlier work by the members of OATH (Initiative
   for Open AuTHentication) to specify a format that can be freely
   distributed to the technical community.







































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16.  References

16.1.  Normative References

   [LUHN]     Luhn, H., "Luhn algorithm", US Patent 2950048,
              August 1960, <http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/
              nph-Parser?patentnumber=2950048>.

   [PKCS1]    Kaliski, B., "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
              Version 2.0.", RFC 2437, October 1998.

   [PKCS5]    RSA Laboratories, "PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography
              Standard", Version 2.0,
              URL: http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/, March 1999.

   [RFC2119]  "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
              Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3023]  Murata, M., St. Laurent, S., and D. Kohn, "XML Media
              Types", RFC 3023, January 2001.

   [RFC3553]  Mealling, M., Masinter, L., Hardie, T., and G. Klyne, "An
              IETF URN Sub-namespace for Registered Protocol
              Parameters", BCP 73, RFC 3553, June 2003.

   [RFC3688]  Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
              January 2004.

   [RFC4288]  Freed, N. and J. Klensin, "Media Type Specifications and
              Registration Procedures", BCP 13, RFC 4288, December 2005.

   [RFC4514]  Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
              (LDAP): String Representation of Distinguished Names",
              RFC 4514, June 2006.

   [RFC5226]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
              IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
              May 2008.

   [XMLDSIG]  Eastlake, D., "XML-Signature Syntax and Processing",
              URL: http://www.w3.org/TR/2002/REC-xmldsig-core-20020212/,
              W3C Recommendation, February 2002.

   [XMLENC]   Eastlake, D., "XML Encryption Syntax and Processing.",
              URL: http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core/,
              W3C Recommendation, December 2002.





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16.2.  Informative References

   [AlgorithmURIs]
              Eastlake, D., "Additional XML Security Uniform Resource
              Identifiers", RFC 4051, April 2005.

   [CAP]      MasterCard International, "Chip Authentication Program
              Functional Architecture", September 2004.

   [DSKPP]    Doherty, A., Pei, M., Machani, S., and M. Nystrom,
              "Dynamic Symmetric Key Provisioning Protocol", Internet
              Draft Informational, URL: http://www.ietf.org/
              internet-drafts/draft-ietf-keyprov-dskpp-05.txt,
              February 2008.

   [HOTP]     MRaihi, D., Bellare, M., Hoornaert, F., Naccache, D., and
              O. Ranen, "HOTP: An HMAC-Based One Time Password
              Algorithm", RFC 4226, December 2005.

   [NIST-SP800-57]
              National Institute of Standards and Technology,
              "Recommendation for Key Management - Part I: General
              (Revised)", NIST 800-57, URL: http://csrc.nist.gov/
              publications/nistpubs/800-57/
              sp800-57-Part1-revised2_Mar08-2007.pdf, March 2007.

   [OATH]     "Initiative for Open AuTHentication",
              URL: http://www.openauthentication.org.

   [OCRA]     MRaihi, D., Rydell, J., Naccache, D., Machani, S., and S.
              Bajaj, "OCRA: OATH Challenge Response Algorithm", Internet
              Draft Informational, URL: http://www.ietf.org/
              internet-drafts/
              draft-mraihi-mutual-oath-hotp-variants-06.txt,
              December 2007.

   [PKCS12]   RSA Laboratories, "PKCS #12: Personal Information Exchange
              Syntax Standard", Version 1.0,
              URL: http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/.

   [Schneier]
              Schneier, B., "Secrets and Lies: Digitial Security in a
              Networked World",  Wiley Computer Publishing, ISBN 0-8493-
              8253-7, 2000.







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Appendix A.  Use Cases

   This section describes a comprehensive list of use cases that
   inspired the development of this specification.  These requirements
   were used to derive the primary requirement that drove the design.
   These requirements are covered in the next section.

   These use cases also help in understanding the applicability of this
   specification to real world situations.

A.1.  Online Use Cases

   This section describes the use cases related to provisioning the keys
   using an online provisioning protocol such as [DSKPP]

A.1.1.  Transport of keys from Server to Cryptographic Module

   For example, a mobile device user wants to obtain a symmetric key for
   use with a Cryptographic Module on the device.  The Cryptographic
   Module from vendor A initiates the provisioning process against a
   provisioning system from vendor B using a standards-based
   provisioning protocol such as [DSKPP].  The provisioning entity
   delivers one or more keys in a standard format that can be processed
   by the mobile device.

   For example, in a variation of the above, instead of the user's
   mobile phone, a key is provisioned in the user's soft token
   application on a laptop using a network-based online protocol.  As
   before, the provisioning system delivers a key in a standard format
   that can be processed by the soft token on the PC.

   For example, the end-user or the key issuer wants to update or
   configure an existing key in the Cryptographic Module and requests a
   replacement key container.  The container may or may not include a
   new key and may include new or updated key attributes such as a new
   counter value in HOTP key case, a modified response format or length,
   a new friendly name, etc.

A.1.2.  Transport of keys from Cryptographic Module to Cryptographic
        Module

   For example, a user wants to transport a key from one Cryptographic
   Module to another.  There may be two cryptographic modules, one on a
   computer one on a mobile phone, and the user wants to transport a key
   from the computer to the mobile phone.  The user can export the key
   and related data in a standard format for input into the other
   Cryptographic Module.




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A.1.3.  Transport of keys from Cryptographic Module to Server

   For example, a user wants to activate and use a new key and related
   data against a validation system that is not aware of this key.  This
   key may be embedded in the Cryptographic Module (e.g.  SD card, USB
   drive) that the user has purchased at the local electronics retailer.
   Along with the Cryptographic Module, the user may get the key on a CD
   or a floppy in a standard format.  The user can now upload via a
   secure online channel or import this key and related data into the
   new validation system and start using the key.

A.1.4.  Server to server Bulk import/export of keys

   From time to time, a key management system may be required to import
   or export keys in bulk from one entity to another.

   For example, instead of importing keys from a manufacturer using a
   file, a validation server may download the keys using an online
   protocol.  The keys can be downloaded in a standard format that can
   be processed by a validation system.

   For example, in a variation of the above, an Over-The-Aire (OTA) key
   provisioning gateway that provisions keys to mobile phones may obtain
   key material from a key issuer using an online protocol.  The keys
   are delivered in a standard format that can be processed by the key
   provisioning gateway and subsequently sent to the end-user's mobile
   phone.

A.2.  Offline Use Cases

   This section describes the use cases relating to offline transport of
   keys from one system to another, using some form of export and import
   model.

A.2.1.  Server to server Bulk import/export of keys

   For example, Cryptographic Modules such as OTP authentication tokens,
   may have their symmetric keys initialized during the manufacturing
   process in bulk, requiring copies of the keys and algorithm data to
   be loaded into the authentication system through a file on portable
   media.  The manufacturer provides the keys and related data in the
   form of a file containing records in standard format, typically on a
   CD.  Note that the token manufacturer and the vendor for the
   validation system may be the same or different.  Some crypto modules
   will allow local PIN management (the device will have a PIN pad)
   hence random initial PINs set at manufacturing should be transmitted
   together with the respective keys they protect.




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   For example, an enterprise wants to port keys and related data from
   an existing validation system A into a different validation system B.
   The existing validation system provides the enterprise with a
   functionality that enables export of keys and related data (e.g. for
   OTP authentication tokens) in a standard format.  Since the OTP
   tokens are in the standard format, the enterprise can import the
   token records into the new validation system B and start using the
   existing tokens.  Note that the vendors for the two validation
   systems may be the same or different.










































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Appendix B.  Requirements

   This section outlines the most relevant requirements that are the
   basis of this work.  Several of the requirements were derived from
   use cases described above.

   R1:   The format MUST support transport of multiple types of
         symmetric keys and related attributes for algorithms including
         HOTP, other OTP, challenge-response, etc.

   R2:   The format MUST handle the symmetric key itself as well of
         attributes that are typically associated with symmetric keys.
         Some of these attributes may be

         *  Unique Key Identifier

         *  Issuer information

         *  Algorithm ID

         *  Algorithm mode

         *  Issuer Name

         *  Key friendly name

         *  Event counter value (moving factor for OTP algorithms)

         *  Time value

   R3:   The format SHOULD support both offline and online scenarios.
         That is it should be serializable to a file as well as it
         should be possible to use this format in online provisioning
         protocols such as [DSKPP]

   R4:   The format SHOULD allow bulk representation of symmetric keys

   R5:   The format SHOULD allow bulk representation of PINs related to
         specific keys

   R6:   The format SHOULD be portable to various platforms.
         Furthermore, it SHOULD be computationally efficient to process.

   R7:   The format MUST provide appropriate level of security in terms
         of data encryption and data integrity.






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   R8:   For online scenarios the format SHOULD NOT rely on transport
         level security (e.g., SSL/TLS) for core security requirements.

   R9:   The format SHOULD be extensible.  It SHOULD enable extension
         points allowing vendors to specify additional attributes in the
         future.

   R10:  The format SHOULD allow for distribution of key derivation data
         without the actual symmetric key itself.  This is to support
         symmetric key management schemes that rely on key derivation
         algorithms based on a pre-placed master key.  The key
         derivation data typically consists of a reference to the key,
         rather than the key value itself.

   R11:  The format SHOULD allow for additional lifecycle management
         operations such as counter resynchronization.  Such processes
         require confidentiality between client and server, thus could
         use a common secure container format, without the transfer of
         key material.

   R12:  The format MUST support the use of pre-shared symmetric keys to
         ensure confidentiality of sensitive data elements.

   R13:  The format MUST support a password-based encryption (PBE)
         [PKCS5] scheme to ensure security of sensitive data elements.
         This is a widely used method for various provisioning
         scenarios.

   R14:  The format SHOULD support asymmetric encryption algorithms such
         as RSA to ensure end-to-end security of sensitive data
         elements.  This is to support scenarios where a pre-set shared
         key encryption key is difficult to use.



















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Authors' Addresses

   Philip Hoyer
   ActivIdentity, Inc.
   117 Waterloo Road
   London, SE1  8UL
   UK

   Phone: +44 (0) 20 7744 6455
   Email: Philip.Hoyer@actividentity.com


   Mingliang Pei
   VeriSign, Inc.
   487 E. Middlefield Road
   Mountain View, CA  94043
   USA

   Phone: +1 650 426 5173
   Email: mpei@verisign.com


   Salah Machani
   Diversinet, Inc.
   2225 Sheppard Avenue East
   Suite 1801
   Toronto, Ontario  M2J 5C2
   Canada

   Phone: +1 416 756 2324 Ext. 321
   Email: smachani@diversinet.com




















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