[Docs] [txt|pdf|xml|html] [Tracker] [WG] [Email] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Nits]

Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 RFC 8070

Kitten Working Group                                       M. Short, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                  S. Moore
Intended status: Standards Track                               P. Miller
Expires: November 24, 2016                         Microsoft Corporation
                                                            May 23, 2016


Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT)
                          Freshness Extension
                 draft-ietf-kitten-pkinit-freshness-07

Abstract

   This document describes how to further extend the Public Key
   Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT)
   extension [RFC4556] to exchange an opaque data blob that a KDC can
   validate to ensure that the client is currently in possession of the
   private key during a PKINIT AS exchange.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 24, 2016.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of



Short, et al.           Expires November 24, 2016               [Page 1]


Internet-Draft              PKINIT Freshness                    May 2016


   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Kerberos message flow using KRB_AS_REQ without pre-
           authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Message Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Generation of KRB_AS_REQ Message  . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  Generation of KRB_ERROR Message . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.3.  Generation of KRB_AS_REQ Message  . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.4.  Receipt of KRB_AS_REQ Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.5.  Receipt of second KRB_ERROR Message . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  PreAuthentication Data Types  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Extended PKAuthenticator  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.  Interoperability Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   9.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Introduction

   The Kerberos PKINIT extension [RFC4556] defines two schemes for using
   asymmetric cryptography in a Kerberos preauthenticator.  One uses
   Diffie-Hellman key exchange and the other depends on public key
   encryption.  The public key encryption scheme is less commonly used
   for two reasons:

   o  Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Support for PKINIT [RFC5349]
      only specified Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement,
      so it cannot be used for public key encryption.

   o  Public key encryption requires certificates with an encryption
      key, that is not deployed on many existing smart cards.

   In the Diffie-Hellman exchange, the client uses its private key only
   to sign the AuthPack structure (specified in Section 3.2.1 of
   [RFC4556]), that is performed before any traffic is sent to the KDC.
   Thus a client can generate requests with future times in the
   PKAuthenticator, and then send those requests at those future times.
   Unless the time is outside the validity period of the client's
   certificate, the KDC will validate the PKAuthenticator and return a
   TGT the client can use without possessing the private key.




Short, et al.           Expires November 24, 2016               [Page 2]


Internet-Draft              PKINIT Freshness                    May 2016


   As a result, a client performing PKINIT with the Diffie-Hellman key
   exchange does not prove current possession of the private key being
   used for authentication.  It proves only prior use of that key.
   Ensuring that the client has current possession of the private key
   requires that the signed PKAuthenticator data include information
   that the client could not have predicted.

1.1.  Kerberos message flow using KRB_AS_REQ without pre-authentication

   Today, password-based AS exchanges [RFC4120] often begin with the
   client sending a KRB_AS_REQ without pre-authentication.  When the
   principal requires pre-authentication, the KDC responds with a
   KRB_ERROR containing information needed to complete an AS exchange,
   such as the supported encryption types and salt values.  This message
   flow is illustrated below:

   KDC                     Client

                 <----     AS-REQ without pre-authentication
   KRB-ERROR     ---->

                 <----     AS-REQ
   AS-REP        ---->

                 <----     TGS-REQ
   TGS-REP       ---->

                                 Figure 1

   We can use a similar message flow with PKINIT, allowing the KDC to
   provide a token for the client to include in its KRB_AS_REQ to ensure
   that the PA_PK_AS_REQ [RFC4556] was not pregenerated.

1.2.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

2.  Message Exchanges

   The following summarizes the message flow with extensions to
   [RFC4120] and [RFC4556] required to support a KDC-provided freshness
   token during the initial request for a ticket:

   1.  The client generates a KRB_AS_REQ as specified in Section 2.9.3
       of [RFC4120] that contains no PA_PK_AS_REQ and includes a
       freshness token request.



Short, et al.           Expires November 24, 2016               [Page 3]


Internet-Draft              PKINIT Freshness                    May 2016


   2.  The KDC generates a KRB_ERROR as specified in Section 3.1.3 of
       [RFC4120] providing a freshness token.

   3.  The client receives the error as specified in Section 3.1.4 of
       [RFC4120], extracts the freshness token, and includes it as part
       of the KRB_AS_REQ as specified in [RFC4120] and [RFC4556].

   4.  The KDC receives and validates the KRB_AS_REQ as specified in
       Section 3.2.2 of [RFC4556], then additionally validates the
       freshness token.

   5.  The KDC and client continue as specified in [RFC4120] and
       [RFC4556].

2.1.  Generation of KRB_AS_REQ Message

   The client indicates support of freshness tokens by adding a padata
   element with padata-type PA_AS_FRESHNESS and padata-value of an empty
   octet string.

2.2.  Generation of KRB_ERROR Message

   The KDC will respond with a KRB_ERROR [RFC4120] message with the
   error-code KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED [RFC4120] adding a padata element
   with padata-type PA_AS_FRESHNESS and padata-value of the freshness
   token to the METHOD-DATA object.

2.3.  Generation of KRB_AS_REQ Message

   After the client receives the KRB-ERROR message containing a
   freshness token, it extracts the PA_AS_FRESHNESS padata-value field
   of the PA-DATA structure as an opaque data blob.  The PA_AS_FRESHNESS
   padata-value field of the PA-DATA structure SHALL then be added as an
   opaque blob in the freshnessToken field when the client generates the
   PKAuthenticator specified in Section 4 for the PA_PK_AS_REQ message.
   This ensures that the freshness token value will be included in the
   signed data portion of the KRB_AS_REQ value.

2.4.  Receipt of KRB_AS_REQ Message

   If the realm requires freshness and the PA_PK_AS_REQ message does not
   contain the freshness token, the KDC MUST return a KRB_ERROR
   [RFC4120] message with the error-code KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED
   [RFC4120] with a padata element with padata-type PA_AS_FRESHNESS and
   padata-value of the freshness token to the METHOD-DATA object.

   When the PA_PK_AS_REQ message contains a freshness token, after
   validating the PA_PK_AS_REQ message normally, the KDC will validate



Short, et al.           Expires November 24, 2016               [Page 4]


Internet-Draft              PKINIT Freshness                    May 2016


   the freshnessToken value in the PKAuthenticator in an implementation-
   specific way.  If the freshness token is not valid, the KDC MUST
   return a KRB_ERROR [RFC4120] message with the error-code
   KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_EXPIRED [RFC6113].  The e-data field of the error
   contains a METHOD-DATA object [RFC4120] which specifies a valid
   PA_AS_FRESHNESS padata-value.  Since the freshness tokens are
   validated by KDCs in the same realm, standardizing the contents of
   the freshness token is not a concern for interoperability.

2.5.  Receipt of second KRB_ERROR Message

   If a client receives a KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_EXPIRED KRB_ERROR message that
   includes a freshness token, it SHOULD retry using the new freshness
   token.

3.  PreAuthentication Data Types

          The following are the new PreAuthentication data types:

               +----------------------+-------------------+
               | Padata and Data Type | Padata-type Value |
               +----------------------+-------------------+
               |   PA_AS_FRESHNESS    |        150        |
               +----------------------+-------------------+

4.  Extended PKAuthenticator

























Short, et al.           Expires November 24, 2016               [Page 5]


Internet-Draft              PKINIT Freshness                    May 2016


   The PKAuthenticator structure specified in Section 3.2.1 of [RFC4556]
   is extended to include a new freshnessToken as follows:

   PKAuthenticator ::= SEQUENCE {
      cusec        [0] INTEGER (0..999999),
      ctime        [1] KerberosTime,
                -- cusec and ctime are used as in [RFC4120], for
                -- replay prevention.
      nonce        [2] INTEGER (0..4294967295),
                -- Chosen randomly;  this nonce does not need to
                -- match with the nonce in the KDC-REQ-BODY.
      paChecksum   [3] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
                -- MUST be present.
                -- Contains the SHA1 checksum, performed over
                -- KDC-REQ-BODY.
      ...,
      freshnessToken     [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
                -- PA_AS_FRESHNESS padata value as recieved from the
                -- KDC. MUST be present if sent by KDC
      ...
   }


5.  Acknowledgements

   Douglas E.  Engert, Sam Hartman, Henry B.  Hotz, Nikos
   Mavrogiannopoulos, Martin Rex, Nico Williams, and Tom Yu were key
   contributors to the discovery of the freshness issue in PKINIT.

   Sam Hartman, Greg Hudson, Jeffrey Hutzelman, Nathan Ide, Benjamin
   Kaduk, Bryce Nordgren, Magnus Nystrom, Nico Williams and Tom Yu
   reviewed the document and provided suggestions for improvements.

6.  IANA Considerations

   IANA is requested to assign numbers for PA_AS_FRESHNESS listed in the
     Kerberos Parameters registry Pre-authentication and Typed Data as
                                 follows:

                  +------+-----------------+------------+
                  | Type |      Value      | Reference  |
                  +------+-----------------+------------+
                  | 150  | PA_AS_FRESHNESS | [This RFC] |
                  +------+-----------------+------------+







Short, et al.           Expires November 24, 2016               [Page 6]


Internet-Draft              PKINIT Freshness                    May 2016


7.  Security Considerations

   The freshness token SHOULD include signing, encrypting or sealing
   data from the KDC to determine authenticity and prevent tampering.

   Freshness tokens serve to guarantee that the client had the key when
   constructing the AS-REQ.  They are not required to be single use
   tokens or bound to specific AS exchanges.  Part of the reason the
   token is opaque is to allow KDC implementers the freedom to add
   additional functionality as long as the "freshness" guarantee
   remains.

8.  Interoperability Considerations

   Since the client treats the KDC-provided data blob as opaque,
   changing the contents will not impact existing clients.  Thus
   extensions to the freshness token do not impact client
   interoperability.

   Clients SHOULD NOT reuse freshness tokens across multiple exchanges.
   There is no guarantee that a KDC will allow a once-valid token to be
   used again.  Thus clients that do not retry with a new freshness
   token may not be compatible with KDCs, depending on how they choose
   to implement freshness validation.

   Since upgrading clients takes time, implementers may consider
   allowing both freshness-token based exchanges and "legacy" exchanges
   without use of freshness tokens.  However, until freshness tokens are
   required by the realm, the existing risks of pre-generated
   PKAuthenticators will remain.

9.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC4120]  Neuman, C., Yu, T., Hartman, S., and K. Raeburn, "The
              Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 4120,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4120, July 2005,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4120>.

   [RFC4556]  Zhu, L. and B. Tung, "Public Key Cryptography for Initial
              Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT)", RFC 4556,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4556, June 2006,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4556>.




Short, et al.           Expires November 24, 2016               [Page 7]


Internet-Draft              PKINIT Freshness                    May 2016


   [RFC5349]  Zhu, L., Jaganathan, K., and K. Lauter, "Elliptic Curve
              Cryptography (ECC) Support for Public Key Cryptography for
              Initial Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT)", RFC 5349,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5349, September 2008,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5349>.

   [RFC6113]  Hartman, S. and L. Zhu, "A Generalized Framework for
              Kerberos Pre-Authentication", RFC 6113,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6113, April 2011,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6113>.

Authors' Addresses

   Michiko Short (editor)
   Microsoft Corporation
   USA

   Email: michikos@microsoft.com


   Seth Moore
   Microsoft Corporation
   USA

   Email: sethmo@microsoft.com


   Paul Miller
   Microsoft Corporation
   USA

   Email: paumil@microsoft.com



















Short, et al.           Expires November 24, 2016               [Page 8]


Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.124, available from https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/