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INTERNET-DRAFT                                                R. Housley
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                    Vigil Security
Intended Status: Proposed Standard
Expires: 26 August 2019                                 26 February 2019


           Use of the HSS/LMS Hash-based Signature Algorithm
               in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
                   <draft-ietf-lamps-cms-hash-sig-06>


Abstract

   This document specifies the conventions for using the the HSS/LMS
   hash-based signature algorithm with the Cryptographic Message Syntax
   (CMS).  In addition, the algorithm identifier and public key syntax
   are provided.  The HSS/LMS algorithm is one form of hash-based
   digital signature; it is described in [HASHSIG].

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html












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Copyright and License Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors. All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  ASN.1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.2.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  HSS/LMS Hash-based Signature Algorithm Overview  . . . . . . .  3
     2.1.  Hierarchical Signature System (HSS)  . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.2.  Leighton-Micali Signature (LMS)  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.3.  Leighton-Micali One-time Signature Algorithm (LM-OTS)  . .  5
   3.  Algorithm Identifiers and Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   4.  HSS/LMS Public Key Identifier  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   5.  Signed-data Conventions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     6.1.  Implementation Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . .  9
     6.2.  Algorithm Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   7.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   8.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   9.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     9.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     9.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   Appendix: ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16














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1.  Introduction

   This document specifies the conventions for using the HSS/LMS hash-
   based signature algorithm with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
   [CMS] signed-data content type.  The Leighton-Micali Signature (LMS)
   system provides a one-time digital signature that is a variant of
   Merkle Tree Signatures (MTS).  The Hierarchical Signature System
   (HSS) is built on top of the LMS system to efficiently scale for a
   larger  numbers of signatures.  The HSS/LMS algorithm is one form of
   hash-based digital signature, and it is described in [HASHSIG].  The
   HSS/LMS signature algorithm can only be used for a fixed number of
   signing operations.  The number of signing operations depends upon
   the size of the tree.  The HSS/LMS signature algorithm uses small
   public keys, and it has low computational cost; however, the
   signatures are quite large.  The HSS/LMS private key can be very
   small when the signer is willing to perform additional computation at
   signing time; alternatively, the private key can consume additional
   memory and provide a faster signing time.

1.1.  ASN.1

   CMS values are generated using ASN.1 [ASN1-B], using the Basic
   Encoding Rules (BER) and the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)
   [ASN1-E].

1.2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

1.3.  Algorithm Considerations

   At Black Hat USA 2013, some researchers gave a presentation on the
   current state of public key cryptography.  They said: "Current
   cryptosystems depend on discrete logarithm and factoring which has
   seen some major new developments in the past 6 months" [BH2013].
   They encouraged preparation for a day when RSA and DSA cannot be
   depended upon.

   A post-quantum cryptosystem is a system that is secure against
   quantum computers that have more than a trivial number of quantum
   bits.  It is open to conjecture when it will be feasible to build
   such a machine.  RSA, DSA, and ECDSA are not post-quantum secure.

   The LM-OTS one-time signature, LMS, and HSS do not depend on discrete



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   logarithm or factoring, as a result these algorithms are considered
   to be post-quantum secure.

   Hash-based signatures [HASHSIG] are currently defined to use
   exclusively SHA-256 [SHS].  An IANA registry is defined so that other
   hash functions could be used in the future.  LM-OTS signature
   generation prepends a random string as well as other metadata before
   computing the hash value.  The inclusion of the random value reduces
   the chances of an attacker being able to find collisions, even if the
   attacker has a large-scale quantum computer.

   Today, RSA is often used to digitally sign software updates.  This
   means that the distribution of software updates could be compromised
   if a significant advance is made in factoring or a quantum computer
   is invented.  The use of HSS/LMS hash-based signatures to protect
   software update distribution, perhaps using the format described in
   [FWPROT], will allow the deployment of software that implements new
   cryptosystems.

2.  HSS/LMS Hash-based Signature Algorithm Overview

   Merkle Tree Signatures (MTS) are a method for signing a large but
   fixed number of messages.  An MTS system depends on a one-time
   signature method and a collision-resistant hash function.

   This specification makes use of the hash-based algorithm specified in
   [HASHSIG], which is the Leighton and Micali adaptation [LM] of the
   original Lamport-Diffie-Winternitz-Merkle one-time signature system
   [M1979][M1987][M1989a][M1989b].

   As implied by the name, the hash-based signature algorithm depends on
   a collision-resistant hash function.  The hash-based signature
   algorithm specified in [HASHSIG] currently uses only the SHA-256 one-
   way hash function [SHS], but it also establishes an IANA registry to
   permit the registration of additional one-way hash functions in the
   future.

2.1.  Hierarchical Signature System (HSS)

   The MTS system specified in [HASHSIG] uses a hierarchy of trees.  The
   Hierarchical N-time Signature System (HSS) allows subordinate trees
   to be generated when needed by the signer.  Otherwise, generation of
   the entire tree might take weeks or longer.

   An HSS signature as specified in [HASHSIG] carries the number of
   signed public keys (Nspk), followed by that number of signed public
   keys, followed by the LMS signature as described in Section 2.2.  The
   public key for the top-most LMS tree is the public key of the HSS



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   system.  The LMS private key in the parent tree signs the LMS public
   key in the child tree, and the LMS private key in the bottom-most
   tree signs the actual message. The signature over the public key and
   the signature over the actual message are LMS signatures as described
   in Section 2.2.

   The elements of the HSS signature value for a stand-alone tree (a top
   tree with no children) can be summarized as:

      u32str(0) ||
      lms_signature  /* signature of message */

   The elements of the HSS signature value for a tree with Nspk signed
   public keys can be summarized as:

      u32str(Nspk) ||
      signed_public_key[0] ||
      signed_public_key[1] ||
         ...
      signed_public_key[Nspk-2] ||
      signed_public_key[Nspk-1] ||
      lms_signature  /* signature of message */

   where, as defined in Section 3.3 of [HASHSIG], a signed_public_key is
   the lms_signature over the public key followed by the public key
   itself.  Note that Nspk is the number of levels in the hierarchy of
   trees minus 1.

2.2.  Leighton-Micali Signature (LMS)

   Each tree in the system specified in [HASHSIG] uses the Leighton-
   Micali Signature (LMS) system.  LMS systems have two parameters.  The
   first parameter is the height of the tree, h, which is the number of
   levels in the tree minus one.  The [HASHSIG] specification supports
   five values for this parameter: h=5; h=10; h=15; h=20; and h=25.
   Note that there are 2^h leaves in the tree.  The second parameter is
   the number of bytes output by the hash function, m, which is the
   amount of data associated with each node in the tree.  The [HASHSIG]
   specification supports only the SHA-256 hash function [SHS], with
   m=32.











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   The [HASHSIG] specification supports five tree sizes:

      LMS_SHA256_M32_H5;
      LMS_SHA256_M32_H10;
      LMS_SHA256_M32_H15;
      LMS_SHA256_M32_H20; and
      LMS_SHA256_M32_H25.

   The [HASHSIG] specification establishes an IANA registry to permit
   the registration of additional tree sizes in the future.

   The LMS public key is the string consists of four elements: the
   lms_algorithm_type from the list above, the otstype to identify the
   LM-OTS type as discussed in Section 2.3, the private key identifier
   (I) as described in Section 5.3 of [HASHSIG], and the m-byte string
   associated with the root node of the tree.

   The LMS public key can be summarized as:

      u32str(lms_algorithm_type) || u32str(otstype) || I || T[1]

   An LMS signature consists of four elements: the number of the leaf
   (q) associated with the LM-OTS signature, an LM-OTS signature as
   described in Section 2.3, a typecode indicating the particular LMS
   algorithm, and an array of values that is associated with the path
   through the tree from the leaf associated with the LM-OTS signature
   to the root.  The array of values contains the siblings of the nodes
   on the path from the leaf to the root but does not contain the nodes
   on the path itself.  The array for a tree with height h will have h
   values.  The first value is the sibling of the leaf, the next value
   is the sibling of the parent of the leaf, and so on up the path to
   the root.

   The four elements of the LMS signature value can be summarized as:

      u32str(q) ||
      ots_signature ||
      u32str(type) ||
      path[0] || path[1] || ... || path[h-1]

2.3.  Leighton-Micali One-time Signature Algorithm (LM-OTS)

   Merkle Tree Signatures (MTS) depend on a one-time signature method.
   [HASHSIG] specifies the use of the LM-OTS.  An LM-OTS has five
   parameters.

      n -  The number of bytes associated with the hash function.
           [HASHSIG] supports only SHA-256 [SHS], with n=32.



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      H -  A preimage-resistant hash function that accepts byte strings
           of any length, and returns an n-byte string.

      w -  The width in bits of the Winternitz coefficients.  [HASHSIG]
           supports four values for this parameter: w=1; w=2; w=4; and
           w=8.

      p -  The number of n-byte string elements that make up the LM-OTS
           signature.

      ls - The number of left-shift bits used in the checksum function,
           which is defined in Section 4.4 of [HASHSIG].

   The values of p and ls are dependent on the choices of the parameters
   n and w, as described in Appendix B of [HASHSIG].

   The [HASHSIG] specification supports four LM-OTS variants:

      LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W1;
      LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W2;
      LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W4; and
      LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8.

   The [HASHSIG] specification establishes an IANA registry to permit
   the registration of additional variants in the future.

   Signing involves the generation of C, an n-byte random value.

   The LM-OTS signature value can be summarized as the identifier of the
   LM-OTS variant, the random value, and a sequence of hash values that
   correspond to the elements of the public key as described in Section
   4.5 of [HASHSIG]:

      u32str(otstype) || C || y[0] || ... || y[p-1]

3.  Algorithm Identifiers and Parameters

   The algorithm identifier for an HSS/LMS hash-based signatures is:

      id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
          member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
          smime(16) alg(3) 17 }

   When this object identifier is used for a HSS/LMS signature, the
   AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field MUST be absent (that is, the
   parameters are not present; the parameters are not set to NULL).

   The signature value is a large OCTET STRING.  The signature format is



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   designed for easy parsing.  Each format includes a counter and type
   codes that indirectly providing all of the information that is needed
   to parse the value during signature validation.

   The signature value identifies the hash function used in the HSS/LMS
   tree.  In [HASHSIG] only the SHA-256 hash function [SHS] is
   supported, but it also establishes an IANA registry to permit the
   registration of additional hash functions in the future.

4.  HSS/LMS Public Key Identifier

   The AlgorithmIdentifier for an HSS/LMS public key uses the id-alg-
   hss-lms-hashsig object identifier, and the parameters field MUST be
   absent.

   When this AlgorithmIdentifier appears in the SubjectPublicKeyInfo
   field of an X.509 certificate [RFC5280], the certificate key usage
   extension MAY contain digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign,
   and cRLSign; however, it MUST NOT contain other values.

      pk-HSS-LMS-HashSig PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
          IDENTIFIER id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig
          KEY HSS-LMS-HashSig-PublicKey
          PARAMS ARE absent
          CERT-KEY-USAGE
            { digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, cRLSign } }

      HSS-LMS-HashSig-PublicKey ::= OCTET STRING

   Note that the id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig algorithm identifier is also
   referred to as id-alg-mts-hashsig.  This synonym is based on the
   terminology used in an early draft of the document that became
   [HASHSIG].

   The public key value is an OCTET STRING.  Like the signature format,
   it is designed for easy parsing.  The value is the number of levels
   in the public key, L, followed by the LMS public key.

   The HSS/LMS public key value can be summarized as:

      u32str(L) || lms_public_key

   Note that the public key for the top-most LMS tree is the public key
   of the HSS system.  When L=1, the HSS system is a single tree.







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5.  Signed-data Conventions

   As specified in [CMS], the digital signature is produced from the
   message digest and the signer's private key.  The signature is
   computed over different value depending on whether signed attributes
   are absent or present.  When signed attributes are absent, the
   HSS/LMS signature is computed over the content.  When signed
   attributes are present, a hash is computed over the content using the
   same hash function that is used in the HSS/LMS tree, and then a
   message-digest attribute is constructed with the resulting hash
   value, and then DER encode the set of signed attributes, which MUST
   include a content-type attribute and a message-digest attribute, and
   then the HSS/LMS signature is computed over the output of the DER-
   encode operation.  In summary:

      IF (signed attributes are absent)
      THEN HSS_LMS_Sign(content)
      ELSE message-digest attribute = Hash(content);
           HSS_LMS_Sign(DER(SignedAttributes))

   When using [HASHSIG], the fields in the SignerInfo are used as
   follows:

      digestAlgorithm MUST contain the one-way hash function used to in
         the HSS/LMS tree.  In [HASHSIG], SHA-256 is the only supported
         hash function, but other hash functions might be registered in
         the future.  For convenience, the AlgorithmIdentifier for
         SHA-256 from [PKIXASN1] is repeated here:

            mda-sha256 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
                IDENTIFIER id-sha256
                PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE preferredAbsent }

            id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
                country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
                nistAlgorithms(4) hashalgs(2) 1 }

      signatureAlgorithm MUST contain id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig, and the
         algorithm parameters field MUST be absent.

      signature contains the single HSS signature value resulting from
         the signing operation as specified in [HASHSIG].

6.  Security Considerations

   Implementations MUST protect the private keys.  Compromise of the
   private keys may result in the ability to forge signatures.  Along
   with the private key, the implementation MUST keep track of which



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   leaf nodes in the tree have been used.  Loss of integrity of this
   tracking data can cause an one-time key to be used more than once.
   As a result, when a private key and the tracking data are stored on
   non-volatile media or stored in a virtual machine environment, care
   must be taken to preserve confidentiality and integrity.

   When generating a LMS key pair, an implementation MUST generate each
   key pair independently of all other key pairs in the HSS tree.

   An implementation MUST ensure that a LM-OTS private key is used to
   generate a signature only one time, and ensure that it cannot be used
   for any other purpose.

   The generation of private keys relies on random numbers.  The use of
   inadequate pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) to generate these
   values can result in little or no security.  An attacker may find it
   much easier to reproduce the PRNG environment that produced the keys,
   searching the resulting small set of possibilities, rather than brute
   force searching the whole key space.  The generation of quality
   random numbers is difficult, and [RFC4086] offers important guidance
   in this area.

   The generation of hash-based signatures also depends on random
   numbers.  While the consequences of an inadequate pseudo-random
   number generator (PRNGs) to generate these values is much less severe
   than the generation of private keys, the guidance in [RFC4086]
   remains important.

   When computing signatures, the same hash function SHOULD be used to
   compute the message digest of the content and the signed attributes,
   if they are present.

7.  IANA Considerations

   SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)
   registry, change the reference for value 64 to point to this
   document.

   In the SMI Security for S/MIME Algorithms (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.3)
   registry, change the description for value 17 to
   "id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig" and change the reference to point to this
   document.

   Also, add the following note to the registry:

      Value 17, "id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig", is also referred to as
      "id-alg-mts-hashsig".




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8.  Acknowledgements

   Many thanks to Scott Fluhrer, Jonathan Hammell, Panos Kampanakis, Jim
   Schaad, Sean Turner, and Daniel Van Geest for their careful review
   and comments.

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [ASN1-B]   ITU-T, "Information technology -- Abstract Syntax Notation
              One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation", ITU-T
              Recommendation X.680, 2015.

   [ASN1-E]   ITU-T, "Information technology -- ASN.1 encoding rules:
              Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
              Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
              (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, 2015.

   [CMS]      Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
              RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.

   [HASHSIG]  McGrew, D., M. Curcio, and S. Fluhrer, "Hash-Based
              Signatures", Work in progress.
              <draft-mcgrew-hash-sigs-12>

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI
              10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <http://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in
              RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI
              10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, <https://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [SHS]      National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
              FIPS Publication 180-3: Secure Hash Standard, October
              2008.





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9.2.  Informative References

   [BH2013]   Ptacek, T., T. Ritter, J. Samuel, and A. Stamos, "The
              Factoring Dead: Preparing for the Cryptopocalypse", August
              2013.  <https://media.blackhat.com/us-13/us-13-Stamos-The-
              Factoring-Dead.pdf>

   [CMSASN1]  Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for
              Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and S/MIME", RFC 5911,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5911, June 2010, <http://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc5911>.

   [CMSASN1U] Schaad, J. and S. Turner, "Additional New ASN.1 Modules
              for the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and the Public
              Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 6268, DOI
              10.17487/RFC6268, July 2011, <http://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc6268>.

   [FWPROT]   Housley, R., "Using Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) to
              Protect Firmware Packages", RFC 4108, DOI
              10.17487/RFC4108, August 2005, <http://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc4108>.

   [LM]       Leighton, T. and S. Micali, "Large provably fast and
              secure digital signature schemes from secure hash
              functions", U.S. Patent 5,432,852, July 1995.

   [M1979]    Merkle, R., "Secrecy, Authentication, and Public Key
              Systems", Stanford University Information Systems
              Laboratory Technical Report 1979-1, 1979.

   [M1987]    Merkle, R., "A Digital Signature Based on a Conventional
              Encryption Function", Lecture Notes in Computer Science
              crypto87, 1988.

   [M1989a]   Merkle, R., "A Certified Digital Signature", Lecture Notes
              in Computer Science crypto89, 1990.

   [M1989b]  Merkle, R., "One Way Hash Functions and DES", Lecture Notes
              in Computer Science crypto89, 1990.

   [PKIXASN1] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
              Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010, <http://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc5912>.






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   [PQC]      Bernstein, D., "Introduction to post-quantum
              cryptography", 2009.
              <http://www.pqcrypto.org/www.springer.com/cda/content/
              document/cda_downloaddocument/9783540887010-c1.pdf>

   [RFC4086]   Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
              "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005, <http://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc4086>.


Appendix: ASN.1 Module

   MTS-HashSig-2013
     { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
       id-smime(16) id-mod(0) id-mod-mts-hashsig-2013(64) }

   DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN

   EXPORTS ALL;

   IMPORTS
     PUBLIC-KEY, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, SMIME-CAPS
       FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009  -- RFC 5911 [CMSASN1]
         { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
           security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
           id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) }
     mda-sha256
       FROM PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms-2009  -- RFC 5912 [PKIXASN1]
         { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
           internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
           id-mod-pkix1-rsa-pkalgs-02(54) } ;

   --
   -- Object Identifiers
   --

   id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
       member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
       smime(16) alg(3) 17 }

   id-alg-mts-hashsig OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig









Housley                                                        [Page 13]


INTERNET-DRAFT                                             February 2019


   --
   -- Signature Algorithm and Public Key
   --

   sa-HSS-LMS-HashSig SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
       IDENTIFIER id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig
       PARAMS ARE absent
       HASHES { mda-sha256 }
       PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-HSS-LMS-HashSig }
       SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig } }

   pk-HSS-LMS-HashSig PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
       IDENTIFIER id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig
       KEY HSS-LMS-HashSig-PublicKey
       PARAMS ARE absent
       CERT-KEY-USAGE
           { digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, cRLSign } }

   HSS-LMS-HashSig-PublicKey ::= OCTET STRING

   --
   -- Expand the signature algorithm set used by CMS [CMSASN1U]
   --

   SignatureAlgorithmSet SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=
       { sa-HSS-LMS-HashSig, ... }

   --
   -- Expand the S/MIME capabilities set used by CMS [CMSASN1]
   --

   SMimeCaps SMIME-CAPS ::=
       { sa-HSS-LMS-HashSig.&smimeCaps, ... }

   END


Author's Address

   Russ Housley
   Vigil Security, LLC
   516 Dranesville Road
   Herndon, VA 20170
   USA

   EMail: housley@vigilsec.com





Housley                                                        [Page 14]


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