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Versions: (draft-dang-lamps-cms-shakes-hash) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11

LAMPS WG                                                         Q. Dang
Internet-Draft                                                      NIST
Intended status: Standards Track                           P. Kampanakis
Expires: August 19, 2018                                   Cisco Systems
                                                       February 15, 2018


  Use of the SHAKE One-way Hash Functions in the Cryptographic Message
                              Syntax (CMS)
                     draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-00

Abstract

   This document describes the conventions for using the SHAKE family of
   hash functions with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS).

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 19, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.




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Table of Contents

   1.  Change Log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Message Digest Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  One-way Extensible-Output-Function SHAKEs . . . . . . . .   3
     3.2.  Mask Generation SHAKEs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Signature Algorithms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.2.  ECDSA with SHAKEs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Message Authentication Codes with SHAKEs  . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Appendix A.  ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9

1.  Change Log

   [ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ]

   o  draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-00:

      *  Various updates to title and section names.

      *  Content changes filling in text and references.

   o  draft-dang-lamps-cms-shakes-hash-00:

      *  Initial version

2.  Introduction

   The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] is used to digitally
   sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary message contents.
   This specification describes the use of the SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
   specified in [SHA3] as new hash functions in CMS.  In addition, this
   specification describes the use of these one-way hash functions with
   the RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm [RFC8017] and the Elliptic Curve
   Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [X9.62] with the CMS signed-data
   content type.







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3.  Message Digest Algorithms

3.1.  One-way Extensible-Output-Function SHAKEs

   The SHA-3 family of one-way hash functions is specified in [SHA3].
   In the SHA-3 family, two extendable-output functions, called SHAKE128
   and SHAKE256 are defined.  Four hash functions, SHA3-224, SHA3-256,
   SHA3-384, and SHA3-512 are also defined but are out of scope for this
   document.

   In CMS, Digest algorithm identifiers are located in the SignedData
   digestAlgorithms field, the SignerInfo digestAlgorithm field, the
   DigestedData digestAlgorithm field, and the AuthenticatedData
   digestAlgorithm field.

   Digest values are located in the DigestedData digest field and the
   Message Digest authenticated attribute.  In addition, digest values
   are input to signature algorithms.

   SHAKE is a variable length hash function.  The output lengths, in
   bits, of the SHAKE hash functions is defined by the parameter d.  The
   corresponding collision and preimage resistance security levels for
   SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are respectively min(d/2,128) and min(d,128)
   and min(d/2,256) and min(d,256).  The Object Identifiers (OIDs) for
   these two hash functions are defined in [shake-nist-oids] and are
   included here for convenience:

    id-shake128-len OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
                     country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
                     nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 17 }

    id-shake128-len OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
                     country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
                     nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 18 }

    ShakeOutputLen ::= INTEGER -- Output length in octets

   When using the id-shake128-len id-shake256-len algorithm identifiers,
   the parameters MUST be present, and they MUST employ the
   ShakeOutputLen syntax that contains an encoded positive integer value
   at least 32 or 64 respectively.

3.2.  Mask Generation SHAKEs

   The RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm uses a mask generation function.
   A mask generation function takes an octet string of variable length
   and a desired output length as input, and outputs an octet string of
   the desired length.  The mask generation function used in RSASSA-PSS



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   is defined in [RFC8017], but we include it here as well for
   convenience:

       id-mgf1  OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=  { pkcs-1 8 }

   The parameters field associated with id-mgf1 MUST have a
   hashAlgorithm value that identifies the hash used with MGF1.  To use
   SHAKE as this hash, this parameter MUST be id-shake128-len or id-
   shake256-len as specified in Section 3.1 above.

4.  Signature Algorithms

   This section specifies the conventions employed by CMS
   implementations that support 2 SHAKE one-way hash functions with the
   RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm [RFC8017] and the Elliptic Curve
   Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [X9.62] with the CMS signed-data
   content type.

   In CMS, signature algorithm identifiers are located in the SignerInfo
   signatureAlgorithm field of SignedData and countersignature
   attributes.  Signature values are located in the SignerInfo signature
   field of SignedData and countersignature attributes.

4.1.  RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs

   The RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm identifier and its parameters are
   specifed in [RFC4055]:

       id-RSASSA-PSS  OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=  { pkcs-1 10 }

       RSASSA-PSS-params  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
            hashAlgorithm      HashAlgorithm,
            maskGenAlgorithm   MaskGenAlgorithm,
            saltLength         INTEGER,
            trailerField       INTEGER }

   This document adds two new hash algorithm choices and two new choices
   for mask generation functions.  These are the SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
   algorithm identifiers specified in Section 3.1.

   When SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 is used as the hashAlgorithm, it MUST also
   be used as the maskGenAlgorithm.

   When used as the hashAlgorithm, the SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 output-
   length must be either 32 or 64 bytes respectively.  In these cases,
   the parameters MUST be present, and they MUST employ the
   ShakeOutputLen syntax that contains an encoded positive integer value




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   of 32 or 64 for id-shake128-len or id-shake256-len algorithm
   identifier respectively.

   When id-shake128-len or id-shake256-len algorithm identifier is used
   as the id-mfg1 maskGenAlgorithm parameter, the ShakeOutputLen
   parameter must be (n - 264)/8 or (n - 520)/8 respectively for
   SHAKE128 and SHAKE256, where n is the RSA modulus in bits.  For
   example, when RSA modulus n is 2048, ShakeOutputLen must be 223 or
   191 when id-shake128-len or id-shake256-len is used respectively.

   The parameter saltLength MUST be 32 or 64 bytes respectively for the
   SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 OIDs.

   The conventions for RSA public keys are as specified in [RFC3279] and
   [RFC4055].  [RFC3279] defines the following OID for RSA with NULL
   parameters.

      rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { pkcs-1 1}

   Additionally, [RFC4055] adds the RSASSA-PSS OID and parameters shown
   above as a public key identifier.  The parameters may be either
   absent or present when RSASSA-PSS OID is used as subject public key
   information.  If id-RSASSA-PSS is used in the public key identifier
   with parameters, Section 3.3 of [RFC4055] describes that the
   signature algorithm parameters MUST match the parameters in the key
   structure algorithm identifier except the saltLength field.  The
   saltLength field in the signature parameters MUST be greater or equal
   to that in the key parameters field.  If the id-RSASSA-PSS parameters
   are NULL no further parameter validation is necessary.

4.2.  ECDSA with SHAKEs

   The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in
   [X9.62].  When ECDSA is used in conjunction with one of the SHAKE
   one-way hash functions, the object identifiers are:

     id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
         us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 3  x}

     id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
         us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 3  y}

   EDNOTE: x and y will be specified by NIST.

   When using the id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256
   algorithm identifier, the parameters field MUST be absent; not NULL
   but absent.




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   For simplicity and compliance with the ECDSA standard specification,
   the output size of the hash function must be explicitly determined.
   The ShakeOutputLen parameter of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 MUST be 32 or 64
   bytes respectively when it is used in ECDSA

   The conventions for ECDSA public keys is specified in [RFC5480] as

      id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
          iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 }

      ECParameters ::= CHOICE {
          namedCurve         OBJECT IDENTIFIER
          -- implicitCurve   NULL
          -- specifiedCurve  SpecifiedECDomain }

   The ECParameters associated with the ECDSA public key in the signers
   certificate SHALL apply to the verification of the signature.

5.  Message Authentication Codes with SHAKEs

   This section specifies the conventions employed by CMS
   implementations that support the KMAC specified in [SP800-185] as
   authentication code (MAC).

   In CMS, KMAC algorithm identifiers are located in the
   AuthenticatedData macAlgorithm field.  MAC values are located in the
   AuthenticatedData mac field.

   The object identifiers for KMACs with SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are:

   id-KmacWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
       us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 z }

   id-KmacWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
       us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 w }

   EDNOTE: z and w will be specified by NIST.

   When the id-KmacWithSHAKE128 or id-KmacWithSHAKE256 algorithm
   identifier is used, the parameters field MUST be absent; not NULL but
   absent.

   When calculating the KMAC output, the variable N is 0xD2B282C2, S is
   an empty string, and L, the integer representing the requested output
   length in bits, is 256 or 512 for KmacWithSHAKE128 or
   KmacWithSHAKE256 respectively in this specification.





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6.  Acknowledgement

   This document is based on Russ Housley's draft
   [I-D.housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash] It replaces SHA3 hash functions by
   SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as the LAMPS WG agreed.

7.  IANA Considerations

   This document uses several registries that were originally created in
   [shake-nist-oids].  No further registries are required. [ EDNOTE:
   Update here. ]

8.  Security Considerations

   SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are one-way extensible-output functions.  Their
   output length depends on a required length of the consuming
   application.

   The SHAKEs are deterministic functions.  Like any other deterministic
   functions, executing each function with the same input multiple times
   will produce the same output.  Therefore, users should not expect
   unrelated outputs (with the same or different output lengths) from
   excuting a SHAKE function with the same input multiple times.

   Implementations must protect the signer's private key.  Compromise of
   the signer's private key permits masquerade.

   When more than two parties share the same message-authentication key,
   data origin authentication is not provided.  Any party that knows the
   message-authentication key can compute a valid MAC, therefore the
   content could originate from any one of the parties.

   Implementations must randomly generate message-authentication keys
   and one-time values, such as the k value when generating a ECDSA
   signature.  In addition, the generation of public/private key pairs
   relies on random numbers.  The use of inadequate pseudo-random number
   generators (PRNGs) to generate such cryptographic values can result
   in little or no security.  The generation of quality random numbers
   is difficult.  [RFC4086] offers important guidance in this area, and
   [SP800-90A] series provide acceptable PRNGs.

   Implementers should be aware that cryptographic algorithms may become
   weaker with time.  As new cryptanalysis techniques are developed and
   computing performance improves, the work factor to break a particular
   cryptographic algorithm will reduce.  Therefore, cryptographic
   algorithm implementations should be modular allowing new algorithms
   to be readily inserted.  That is, implementers should be prepared to
   regularly update the set of algorithms in their implementations.



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9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC3279]  Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
              Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April
              2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>.

   [RFC4055]  Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
              Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in
              the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
              and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4055, June 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4055>.

   [RFC5480]  Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
              "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
              Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5480>.

   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
              RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.

   [RFC8017]  Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
              "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
              RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.

   [SHA3]     National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S.
              Department of Commerce, "SHA-3 Standard - Permutation-
              Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions", FIPS PUB 202,
              August 2015.

   [SP800-185]
              National Institute of Standards and Technology, "SHA-3
              Derived Functions: cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash and
              ParallelHash. NIST SP 800-185", December 2016,
              <http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
              NIST.SP.800-185.pdf>.

9.2.  Informative References







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   [I-D.housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash]
              Housley, R., "Use of the SHA3 One-way Hash Functions in
              the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", draft-housley-
              lamps-cms-sha3-hash-00 (work in progress), March 2017.

   [RFC4086]  Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
              "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.

   [shake-nist-oids]
              National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Computer
              Security Objects Register", October 2017,
              <https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Computer-Security-Objects-
              Register/Algorithm-Registration>.

   [SP800-90A]
              National Institute of Standards and Technology,
              "Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using
              Deterministic Random Bit Generators. NIST SP 800-90A",
              June 2015,
              <http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
              NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf>.

   [X9.62]    American National Standard for Financial Services (ANSI),
              "X9.62-2005 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial
              Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
              Standard (ECDSA)", November 2005.

Appendix A.  ASN.1 Module

   [EDNOTE: Update]

Authors' Addresses

   Quynh Dang
   NIST
   100 Bureau Drive
   Gaithersburg, MD 20899

   Email: quynh.Dang@nist.gov


   Panos Kampanakis
   Cisco Systems

   Email: pkampana@cisco.com




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