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Versions: (draft-dang-lamps-cms-shakes-hash) 00 01

LAMPS WG                                                         Q. Dang
Internet-Draft                                                      NIST
Intended status: Standards Track                           P. Kampanakis
Expires: December 31, 2018                                 Cisco Systems
                                                           June 29, 2018


  Use of the SHAKE One-way Hash Functions in the Cryptographic Message
                              Syntax (CMS)
                     draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-01

Abstract

   This document describes the conventions for using the SHAKE family of
   hash functions with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS).

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 31, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   described in the Simplified BSD License.




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Table of Contents

   1.  Change Log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Use in CMS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  Message Digests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.2.  Signatures  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       4.2.1.  RSASSA-PSS Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       4.2.2.  ECDSA Signatures  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.3.  Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       4.3.1.  RSASSA-PSS Public Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       4.3.2.  ECDSA Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.4.  Message Authentication Codes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Appendix A.  ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10

1.  Change Log

   [ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ]

   o  draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-01:

      *  Significant reorganization of the sections to simplify the
         introduction, the new OIDs and their use in CMS.

      *  Added new OIDs for RSASSA-PSS that hardcodes hash, salt and
         MFG, according the WG consensus.

      *  Updated Public Key section to use the new RSASSA-PSS OIDs and
         clarify the algorithm identifier usage.

      *  Removed the no longer used SHAKE OIDs from section 3.1.

   o  draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-00:

      *  Various updates to title and section names.

      *  Content changes filling in text and references.

   o  draft-dang-lamps-cms-shakes-hash-00:




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      *  Initial version

2.  Introduction

   The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] is used to digitally
   sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary message contents.
   This specification describes the use of the SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
   specified in [SHA3] as new hash functions in CMS.  In addition, it
   describes the use of these functions with the RSASSA-PSS signature
   algorithm [RFC8017] and the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
   Algorithm (ECDSA) [X9.62] with the CMS signed-data content type.

   The SHA-3 family of one-way hash functions is specified in [SHA3].
   In the SHA-3 family, two extendable-output functions, called SHAKE128
   and SHAKE256 are defined.  Four hash functions, SHA3-224, SHA3-256,
   SHA3-384, and SHA3-512 are also defined but are out of scope for this
   document.  A SHAKE is a variable length hash function.  The output
   lengths, in bits, of the SHAKE hash functions are defined by the d
   parameter.  The corresponding collision and preimage resistance
   security levels for SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are respectively
   min(d/2,128) and min(d,128) and min(d/2,256) and min(d,256) bits.

   A SHAKE can be used in CMS as a message digest, message
   authentication code or a mask generation function (in RSASSA-PSS).
   In this document we define six new OIDs using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
   in CMS.

3.  Identifiers

   The object identifiers for SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 hash functions are
   defined in [shake-nist-oids] and we include them here for
   convenience.

  id-shake128-len OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
       us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 17 }

  id-shake256-len OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
       us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 18 }

   In this specification, when using the id-shake128-len or id-
   shake256-len algorithm identifiers, the parameters MUST be absent.
   That is, the identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the
   OID.

   The new identifiers for RSASSA-PSS signatures using SHAKEs are below.

     id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128  OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=  { TBD }




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     id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256  OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=  { TBD }

     [ EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST later. ]

   The new algorithm identifiers of ECDSA signatures using SHAKEs are
   below.

  id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
      us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 3  TBD }

  id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
      us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 3  TBD }

  [ EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST. ]

   The same RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA with SHAKEs algorithm identifiers are
   used for identifying public keys and signatures.

   The parameters for the four RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA identifiers MUST be
   absent.  That is, each identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one
   component, the OID.

   The new object identifiers for KMACs using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are
   below.

   id-KmacWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
       us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 TBD }

   id-KmacWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
       us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 TBD }

   EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST.

   The parameters for id-KmacWithSHAKE128 and id-KmacWithSHAKE256 MUST
   be absent.  That is, each identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one
   component, the OID.

4.  Use in CMS

4.1.  Message Digests

   The id-shake128-len and id-shake256-len OIDs (Section 3) can be used
   as the digest algorithm identifiers located in the SignedData,
   SignerInfo, DigestedData, and the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithm
   fields in CMS [RFC5652].  The encoding MUST omit the parameters field
   and the output size, d, for the SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 message digest
   MUST be 256 or 512 bits respectively.




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   The digest values are located in the DigestedData field and the
   Message Digest authenticated attribute included in the
   signedAttributes of the SignedData signerInfo.  In addition, digest
   values are input to signature algorithms.

4.2.  Signatures

   In CMS, signature algorithm identifiers are located in the SignerInfo
   signatureAlgorithm field of SignedData content type and
   countersignature attribute.  Signature values are located in the
   SignerInfo signature field of SignedData and countersignature.

   Conforming implementations that process RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA with
   SHAKE signatures when processing CMS data MUST recognize the
   corresponding OIDs specified in Section 3.

4.2.1.  RSASSA-PSS Signatures

   The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in [RFC8017].  When id-RSASSA-
   PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 specified in Section 3 is
   used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field.  That is, the
   AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, id-RSASSA-
   PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256.

   The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the hash
   algorithm in the maskGenAlgorithm used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be the
   same, SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 respectively.  The output-length of the
   SHAKE which hashes the message SHALL be 32 or 64 bytes respectively.

   The maskGenAlgorithm is the MGF1 specified in Section B.2.1 of
   [RFC8017].  A mask generation function in RSASSA-PSS takes an octet
   string of variable length and a desired output length as input, and
   outputs an octet string of the desired length.  The output length for
   SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 being used as the hash function in MGF1 is (n -
   264)/8 or (n - 520)/8 bytes respectively, where n is the RSA modulus
   in bits.  For example, when RSA modulus n is 2048, the output length
   for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 in the maskGenAlgorithm will be 223 or 191
   when id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 is used
   respectively.

   The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST be 32 or 64 bytes respectively.
   Finally, the trailerField MUST be 1, which represents the trailer
   field with hexadecimal value 0xBC [RFC8017].








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4.2.2.  ECDSA Signatures

   The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in
   [X9.62].  When the id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256
   (specified in Section 3) algorithm identifier appears, the respective
   SHAKE function is used as the hash.  The encoding MUST omit the
   parameters field.  That is, the AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a
   SEQUENCE of one component, the OID id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or id-
   ecdsa-with-SHAKE256.

   For simplicity and compliance with the ECDSA standard specification,
   the output size of the hash function must be explicitly determined.
   The output size, d, for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSA MUST be
   256 or 512 bits respectively.  The ECDSA message hash function is
   SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 respectively.

4.3.  Public Keys

   In CMS, the signer's public key algorithm identifiers are located in
   the OriginatorPublicKey's algorithm attribute.

   The conventions for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA public keys algorithm
   identifiers are as specified in [RFC3279], [RFC4055] and [RFC5480] ,
   but we include them below for convenience.

4.3.1.  RSASSA-PSS Public Keys

   [RFC3279] defines the following OID for RSA AlgorithmIdentifier in
   the SubjectPublicKeyInfo with NULL parameters.

     rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { pkcs-1 1}

   Additionally, when the RSA private key owner wishes to limit the use
   of the public key exclusively to RSASSA-PSS, the AlgorithmIdentifier
   for RSASSA-PSS defined in Section 3 can be used as the algorithm
   attribute in the OriginatorPublicKey sequence.  The identifier
   parameters, as explained in Section 3, MUST be absent.  The RSASSA-
   PSS algorithm functions and output lengths are the same as defined in
   Section 4.2.1.

   Regardless of what public key algorithm identifier is used, the RSA
   public key, which is composed of a modulus and a public exponent,
   MUST be encoded using the RSAPublicKey type [RFC4055].  The output of
   this encoding is carried in the CMS publicKey bit string.







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     RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
           modulus INTEGER, -- n
           publicExponent INTEGER  -- e
     }

4.3.2.  ECDSA Public Keys

   When id-ecdsa-with-shake128 or id-ecdsa-with-shake256 are used as the
   algorithm identitifier in the public key, the parameters, as
   explained in Section 3, MUST be absent.  The hash function and its
   output-length are the same as in Section 4.2.2.

   Additionally, the mandatory EC SubjectPublicKey is defined in
   Section 2.1.1 and its syntax in Section 2.2 of [RFC5480].  We also
   include them here for convenience:

      id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
          iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 }

      ECParameters ::= CHOICE {
          namedCurve         OBJECT IDENTIFIER
          -- implicitCurve   NULL
          -- specifiedCurve  SpecifiedECDomain
              }

   The ECParameters associated with the ECDSA public key in the signers
   certificate SHALL apply to the verification of the signature.

4.4.  Message Authentication Codes

   KMAC message authentication code (KMAC) is specified in [SP800-185].
   In CMS, KMAC algorithm identifiers are located in the
   AuthenticatedData macAlgorithm field.  The KMAC values are located in
   the AuthenticatedData mac field.

   When the id-KmacWithSHAKE128 or id-KmacWithSHAKE256 algorithm
   identifier is used as the KMAC algorithm identifier, the parameters
   field MUST be absent.

   Conforming implementations that process KMACs with the SHAKEs when
   processing CMS data MUST recognize these identifiers.

   When calculating the KMAC output, the variable N is 0xD2B282C2, S is
   an empty string, and L, the integer representing the requested output
   length in bits, is 256 or 512 for KmacWithSHAKE128 or
   KmacWithSHAKE256 respectively in this specification.





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5.  IANA Considerations

   This document uses several new registries [ EDNOTE: Update here. ]

6.  Security Considerations

   SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are one-way extensible-output functions.  Their
   output length depends on a required length of the consuming
   application.

   The SHAKEs are deterministic functions.  Like any other deterministic
   functions, executing each function with the same input multiple times
   will produce the same output.  Therefore, users should not expect
   unrelated outputs (with the same or different output lengths) from
   excuting a SHAKE function with the same input multiple times.

   Implementations must protect the signer's private key.  Compromise of
   the signer's private key permits masquerade.

   When more than two parties share the same message-authentication key,
   data origin authentication is not provided.  Any party that knows the
   message-authentication key can compute a valid MAC, therefore the
   content could originate from any one of the parties.

   Implementations must randomly generate message-authentication keys
   and one-time values, such as the k value when generating a ECDSA
   signature.  In addition, the generation of public/private key pairs
   relies on random numbers.  The use of inadequate pseudo-random number
   generators (PRNGs) to generate such cryptographic values can result
   in little or no security.  The generation of quality random numbers
   is difficult.  [RFC4086] offers important guidance in this area, and
   [SP800-90A] series provide acceptable PRNGs.

   Implementers should be aware that cryptographic algorithms may become
   weaker with time.  As new cryptanalysis techniques are developed and
   computing power increases, the work factor or time required to break
   a particular cryptographic algorithm may decrease.  Therefore,
   cryptographic algorithm implementations should be modular allowing
   new algorithms to be readily inserted.  That is, implementers should
   be prepared to regularly update the set of algorithms in their
   implementations.

7.  Acknowledgements

   This document is based on Russ Housley's draft
   [I-D.housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash] It replaces SHA3 hash functions by
   SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as the LAMPS WG agreed.




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8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC4055]  Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
              Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in
              the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
              and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4055, June 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4055>.

   [RFC5480]  Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
              "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
              Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5480>.

   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
              RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.

   [RFC8017]  Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
              "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
              RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.

   [SHA3]     National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S.
              Department of Commerce, "SHA-3 Standard - Permutation-
              Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions", FIPS PUB 202,
              August 2015.

   [SP800-185]
              National Institute of Standards and Technology, "SHA-3
              Derived Functions: cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash and
              ParallelHash. NIST SP 800-185", December 2016,
              <http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
              NIST.SP.800-185.pdf>.

8.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash]
              Housley, R., "Use of the SHA3 One-way Hash Functions in
              the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", draft-housley-
              lamps-cms-sha3-hash-00 (work in progress), March 2017.








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   [RFC3279]  Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
              Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April
              2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>.

   [RFC4086]  Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
              "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.

   [shake-nist-oids]
              National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Computer
              Security Objects Register", October 2017,
              <https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Computer-Security-Objects-
              Register/Algorithm-Registration>.

   [SP800-90A]
              National Institute of Standards and Technology,
              "Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using
              Deterministic Random Bit Generators. NIST SP 800-90A",
              June 2015,
              <http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
              NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf>.

   [X9.62]    American National Standard for Financial Services (ANSI),
              "X9.62-2005 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial
              Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
              Standard (ECDSA)", November 2005.

Appendix A.  ASN.1 Module

   [EDNOTE: Update]

Authors' Addresses

   Quynh Dang
   NIST
   100 Bureau Drive
   Gaithersburg, MD 20899

   Email: quynh.Dang@nist.gov


   Panos Kampanakis
   Cisco Systems

   Email: pkampana@cisco.com



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