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Versions: (draft-farinacci-lisp-ecdsa-auth) 00 01 02

Network Working Group                                       D. Farinacci
Internet-Draft                                               lispers.net
Intended status: Experimental                                E. Nordmark
Expires: March 28, 2019                                           Zededa
                                                      September 24, 2018


       LISP Control-Plane ECDSA Authentication and Authorization
                     draft-ietf-lisp-ecdsa-auth-00

Abstract

   This draft describes how LISP control-plane messages can be
   individually authenticated and authorized without a a priori shared-
   key configuration.  Public-key cryptography is used with no new PKI
   infrastructure required.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 28, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.



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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Definition of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Public-Key Hash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Hash-EID Mapping Entry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Hash-EID Structure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  Keys and Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   8.  Signed Map-Register Encoding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   9.  Signed Map-Request Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   10. Signed Map-Notify Encoding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   11. Other Uses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   12. EID Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   14. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   15. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     15.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     15.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Appendix B.  Document Change Log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     B.1.  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-ecdsa-auth-00  . . . . . . . .  16
     B.2.  Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-ecdsa-auth-03 . . . . . .  16
     B.3.  Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-ecdsa-auth-02 . . . . . .  16
     B.4.  Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-ecdsa-auth-01 . . . . . .  16
     B.5.  Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-ecdsa-auth-00 . . . . . .  16
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17

1.  Introduction

   The LISP architecture and protocols [RFC6830] introduces two new
   numbering spaces, Endpoint Identifiers (EIDs) and Routing Locators
   (RLOCs) which provide an architecture to build overlays on top of the
   underlying Internet.  Mapping EIDs to RLOC-sets is accomplished with
   a Mapping Database System.  EIDs and RLOCs come in many forms than
   just IP addresses, using a general syntax that includes Address
   Family Identifier (AFI) [RFC1700].  Not only IP addresses, but other
   addressing information have privacy requirements.  Access to private
   information is granted only to those who are authorized and
   authenticated.  Using asymmetric keying with public key cryptography
   enforces authentication for entities that read from and write to the
   mapping system.  The proposal described in this document takes
   advantage of the latest in Elliptic Curve Cryptography.

   In this proposal the EID is derived from a public key, and the
   corresponding private key is used to authenticate and authorize Map-
   Register messages.  Thus only the owner of the corresponding private
   key can create and update mapping entries from the EID.  Furthermore,



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   the same approach is used to authenticate Map-Request messages.  This
   in combination with the mapping database containing authorization
   information for Map-Requests is used to restrict which EIDs can
   lookup up the RLOCs for another EID.

   This specification introduces how to use the Distinguished-Name AFI
   [AFI] and the [RFC8060] LCAF JSON Type to encode public keys and
   signatures in the LISP mapping database.  The information in the
   mapping database is used to verify cryptographic signatures in LISP
   control-plane messages such as the Map-Request and Map-Register.









































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2.  Definition of Terms

   Crypto-EID:  is an IPv6 EID where part of the EID includes a hash
      value of a public-key.  An IPv6 EID is a Crypto-EID when the Map-
      Server is configured with an Crypto-EID Prefix that matches the
      IPv6 EID.

   Crypto-EID Hash Length:  is the number of low-order bits in a Crypto-
      EID which make up the hash of a public-key.  The hash length is
      determined by the Map-Server when it is configured with a Crypto-
      EID Prefix.

   Crypto-EID Prefix:  is a configuration parameter on the Map-Server
      that indicates which IPv6 EIDs are Crypto-EIDs and what is the
      Crypto-EID Hash Length for the IPv6 EID.  This can be different
      for different LISP Instance-IDs.

   Hash-EID:  is a distinguished name EID-record stored in the mapping
      database.  The EID format is 'hash-<pubkey-hash>'.  When a key-
      pair is generated for an endpoint, the produced private-key does
      not leave the xTR that will register the Crypto-EID.  A hash of
      the public-key is used to produce a Crypto-EID and a Hash-EID.
      The Crypto-EID is assigned to the endpoint and the xTR that
      supports the LISP-site registers the Crypto-EID.  Another entity
      registers the Hash-EID mapping with the public-key as an RLOC-
      record.

   Public-Key RLOC:  is a JSON string that encodes a public-key as an
      RLOC-record for a Hash-EID mapping entry.  The format of the JSON
      string is '{ "public-key" : "<pubkey>" }'.

   Control-Plane Signature:  a Map-Request or Map-Register sender signs
      the message with its private key.  The format of the signature is
      a JSON string that includes sender information and the signature
      value.  The JSON string is included in Map-Request and Map-
      Register messages.

   Signature-ID:  is a Crypto-EID used for a Control-Plane signature to
      register or request any type of EID.  The Signature-ID is included
      with the JSON-encoded signature in Map-Request and Map-Register
      messages.

   Multi-Signatures:  multiple signatures are used in LISP when an
      entity allows and authorized another entity to register an EID.
      There can be more than one authorizing entities that allow a
      registering entity to register an EID.  The authorizing entities
      sign their own RLOC-records that are registered and merged into
      the registering entity's Hash-EID public-key mapping.  And when



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      the registering entity registers the EID, all authorizing entity
      signatures must be verified by the Map-Server before the EID is
      accepted.































3.  Overview

   LISP already has several message authentication mechanisms.  They can
   be found in [I-D.ietf-lisp-rfc6833bis], [I-D.ietf-lisp-sec], and
   [RFC8061].  The mechanisms in this draft are providing a more
   granular level of authentication as well as a simpler way to manage
   keys and passwords.

   A client of the mapping system can be authenticated using public-key
   cryptography.  The client is required to have a private/public key-
   pair where it uses the private-key to sign Map-Requests and Map-
   Registers.  The server, or the LISP entity, that processes Map-
   Requests and Map-Registers uses the public-key to verify signatures.




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   The following describes how the mapping system is used to implement
   the public-key crypto system:

   1.  An entity registers Hash-EID to Public-Key RLOC mappings.  A
       third-party entity that provides a service can register or the
       client itself can register.

   2.  Anyone can lookup the Hash-EID mappings.  These mappings are not
       usually authenticated with the mechanisms in this draft but use
       the shared configured password mechanisms from
       [I-D.ietf-lisp-rfc6833bis] that provide group level
       authentication.

   3.  When a Crypto-EID, or any EID type, is registered to the mapping
       system, a signature is included in the Map-Register message.
       When a non-Crypto-EID is registered a Signature-ID is also
       included in the Map-Register message.

   4.  The Map-Server processes the registration by constructing the
       Hash-EID from the registered Crypto-EID, looks up the Hash-EID in
       the mapping system, obtains the public-key from the RLOC-record
       and verifies the signature.  If Hash-EID lookup fails or the
       signature verification fails, the Map-Register is not accepted.

   5.  When a Crypto-EID, or any EID type, is looked up in the mapping
       system, a signature is included with a Signature-ID in the Map-
       Request message.

   6.  The Map-Server processes the request for a Crypto-EID by
       constructing the Hash-EID from the Signature-ID included in the
       Map-Request.  The signer-ID is a Crypto-EID that accompanies a
       signature in the Map-Request.  The Hash-EID is looked up in the
       mapping system, obtains the public-key from the RLOC-record and
       verifies the Map-Request signature.  If the Hash-EID lookup fails
       or the signature verification fails, the Map-Request is not
       accepted and a Negative Map-Reply is sent back with an action of
       "auth-failure".

4.  Public-Key Hash

   When a private/public key-pair is created for a node, its IPv6 EID is
   pre-determined based on the public key generated.  Note if the key-
   pair is compromised or is changed for the node, a new IPv6 EID is
   assigned for the node.

   The sha256 [RFC6234] hex digest function is used to compute the hash.
   The hash is run over the following hex byte string:




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   <iid><prefix><pubkey>

   Where each field is defined to be:

   <iid>:  is a 4-byte (leading zeroes filled) binary value of the
      Instance-ID the EID will be registered with in the mapping
      database.  For example, if the instance-id is 171, then the 4-byte
      value is 0x000000ab.

   <prefix>:  is a variable length IPv6 prefix in binary format (with no
      colons) and IS quad-nibble zero-filled.  The length of the prefix
      is 128 minus the Crypto-EID hash bit length.  For example, if the
      prefix is 2001:5:3::/48, then the 6 byte value is 0x200100050003.

   <pubkey>:  is a DER [RFC7468] encoded public-key.

   The public-key hash is used to construct the Crypto-EID and Hash-EID.

5.  Hash-EID Mapping Entry

   A Hash-EID is formatted in an EID-record as a Distinguished-Name AFI
   as specified in [I-D.farinacci-lisp-name-encoding].  The format of
   the string is:

   EID-record: 'hash-<hash-eid>'

   Where <hash-eid> is a public-key hash as described in Section 4.  The
   RLOC-record to encode and store the public-key is in LCAF JSON Type
   format of the form:

   RLOC-record: '{ "public-key" : "<pubkey-base64>" }'

   Where <pubkey-base64> is a base64 [RFC4648] encoding of the public-
   key generated for the system that is assigned the Hash-EID.

6.  Hash-EID Structure

   Since the Hash-EID is formatted as a distinguished-name AFI, the
   format of the <hash-eid> for EID 'hash-<hash-eid>' needs to be
   specified.  The format will be an IPv6 address [RFC3513] where colons
   are used between quad-nibble characters when the hash bit length is a
   multiple of 4.  And when the hash bit length is not a multiple of 4
   but a multiple of 2, a leading 2 character nibble-pair is present.
   Here are some examples for different hash bit lengths:







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   Crypto-EID: 2001:5::1111:2222:3333:4444, hash length 64:
     Hash-EID is: 'hash-1111:2222:3333:4444'

   Crypto-EID: 2001:5::11:22:33:44, hash length 64:
     Hash-EID is: 'hash-0011:0022:0033:0044'

   Crypto-EID: 2001:5:aaaa:bbbb:1111:2222:3333:4444, hash length 80:
     Hash-EID is: 'hash-bbbb:1111:2222:3333:4444'

   Crypto-EID: 2001:5:aaaa:bbbb:1111:2222:3333:4444, hash length 72:
     Hash-EID is: 'hash-bb:1111:2222:3333:4444'

   Crypto-EID: 2001:5:aaaa:bbbb:1111:22:33:4444, hash length 72:
     Hash-EID is: 'hash-bb:1111:0022:0033:4444'

   Note when leading zeroes exist in a IPv6 encoded quad between colons,
   the zeros are included in the quad for the Hash-EID string.

   The entity that creates the hash, the entity that registers the
   Crypto-EID and the Map-Server that uses the hash for Hash-EID lookups
   MUST agree on the hash bit length.

7.  Keys and Signatures

   Key generation, message authentication with digital signatures, and
   signature verification will use the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
   Algorithm or ECDSA [X9.62].  For key generation curve 'NIST256p' is
   used and recommended.

   Signatures are computed over signature data that depends on the type
   of LISP message sent.  See Section 8 and Section 9 for each message
   type.  The signature data is passed through a sha256 hash function
   before it is signed or verified.

8.  Signed Map-Register Encoding

   When a ETR registers its Crypto-EID or any EID type to the mapping
   system, it builds a LISP Map-Register message.  The mapping includes
   an EID-record which encodes the Crypto-EID, or any EID type, and an
   RLOC-set.  One of the RLOC-records in the RLOC-set includes the the
   ETR's signature and signature-ID.  The RLOC-record is formatted with
   a LCAF JSON Type, in the following format:

  { "signature" : "<signature-base64>", "signature-id" : "<signer-id>" }

   Where <signature-base64> is a base64 [RFC4648] encoded string over
   the following ascii [RFC0020] string signature data:




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   [<iid>]<crypto-eid>

   Where <iid> is the decimal value of the instance-ID the Crypto-EID is
   registering to and the <crypto-eid> is in the form of [RFC3513] where
   quad-nibbles between colons ARE NOT zero-filled.

   The Map-Server that process an EID-record with a Crypto-EID and a
   RLOC-record with a signature extracts the public-key hash value from
   the Crypto-EID to build a Hash-EID.  The Map-Server looks up the
   Hash-EID in the mapping system to obtain the public-key RLOC-record.
   The Map-Server verifies the signature over the signature data to
   determine if it should accept the EID-record registration.

9.  Signed Map-Request Encoding

   When an xTR (an ITR, PITR, or RTR), sends a Map-Request to the
   mapping system to request the RLOC-set for a Crypto-EID, it signs the
   Map-Request so it can authenticate itself to the Map-Server the
   Crypto-EID is registered to.  The Map-Request target-EID field will
   contain the Crypto-EID and the source-EID field will contain an LCAF
   JSON Type string with the following signature information:

   {
     "source-eid" : "<seid>",
     "signature-id" : "<signer-id>",
     "signature" : "<signature-base64>"
   }

   Where <signer-id> is an IPv6 encoded string according to [RFC3513]
   where quad-nibbles between colons ARE NOT zero-filled.  The <seid> is
   the source EID from the data packet that is invoking the Map-Request
   or the entire key/value pair for "source-eid" can be excluded when a
   data packet did not invoke the Map-Request (i.e. lig or an API
   request).  The <signer-id> is the IPv6 Crypto-EID of the xTR that is
   providing the Map-Request signature.

   The signature string <signature-base64> is a base64 [RFC4648] encoded
   string over the following signature data:

   <nonce><source-eid><crypto-eid>

   Where <nonce> is a hex string [RFC0020] of the nonce used in the Map-
   Request and the <source-eid> and <crypto-eid> are hex strings
   [RFC0020] of an IPv6 address in the form of [RFC3513] where quad-
   nibbles between colons ARE NOT zero-filled.  When <seid> is not
   included in the Map-Request, string "0::0" is used for <source-eid>.





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10.  Signed Map-Notify Encoding

   When a Map-Server originates a Map-Notify message either as an
   acknowledgment to a Map-Register message, as a solicited
   [I-D.ietf-lisp-pubsub] notification, or an unsolicited [RFC8378]
   notification, the receiver of the Map-Notify can verify the message
   is from an authenticated Map-Server.

   An RLOC-record similar to the one used to sign Map-Register messages
   is used to sign the Map-Notify message:

  { "signature" : "<signature-base64>", "signature-id" : "<signer-id>" }

   Where the "signature-id" is an IPv6 crypto-EID used by the Map-Server
   to sign the RLOC-record.  The signature data and the encoding format
   of the signature is the same as for a Map-Register message.  See
   details in Section 8.

   A receiver of a Map-Notify message will lookup the signature-id in
   the mapping system to obtain a public-key to verify the signature.
   The Map-Notify is accepted only if the verification is successful.

11.  Other Uses

   The mechanisms described within this document can be used to sign
   other types of LISP messages.  And for further study is how to use
   these mechanisms to sign LISP encapsulated data packets in a
   compressed manner to reduce data packet header overhead.

   In addition to authenticating other types of LISP messages, other
   types of EID-records can be encoded as well and is not limited to
   IPv6 EIDs.  It is possible for a LISP xTR to register and request non
   IPv6 EIDs but use IPv6 Crypto-EIDs for the sole purpose of signing
   and verifying EID-records.

   Examples of other EID types that can be authenticated in Map-Request
   and Map-Register messages are:














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      +-----------------------+------------------------------------+
      | EID-Type              | Format Definition                  |
      +-----------------------+------------------------------------+
      | IPv4 address prefixes | [RFC1123]                          |
      |                       |                                    |
      | Distinguished-Names   | [I-D.farinacci-lisp-name-encoding] |
      |                       |                                    |
      | Geo-Coordinates       | [I-D.farinacci-lisp-geo]           |
      |                       |                                    |
      | LCAF defined EIDs     | [RFC8060]                          |
      +-----------------------+------------------------------------+

12.  EID Authorization

   When a Crypto-EID is being used for IPv6 communication, it is
   implicit that the owner has the right to use the EID since it was
   generated from the key-pair provisioned for the owner.  For other EID
   types that are not directly associated with signature keys, they must
   be validated for use by the mapping system they are registered to.
   This policy information for the mapping system must be configured in
   the Map-Servers the EID owner registers to or a signed authorization
   provided by a third-party entity.

   To achieve signed authorization, an entity that allows another entity
   to register an EID, must authorize the registering entity.  It does
   so by adding RLOC-records to the registering entity's Hash-EID
   public-key mapping.  The format of the RLOC-record is a JSON encoded
   record as follows:

   {
     "allow-eid" : "<eid>",
     "signature-id" : "<signer-id>",
     "signature" : "<signature-base64>"
   }

   The format of the <signer-id> and <signature-base64> values are the
   same as described in Section 8.  The <eid> value is in the same
   string format as the signature data described in Section 8.  For
   other non-IPv6 EID types, the conventions in [RFC8060] are used.  In
   all cases, the string encoding format of instance-ID '[<iid>]'
   prepended is to the EID string.

   This entry is added to the RLOC-set of the registering entity's Hash-
   EID 'hash-<hash>' registration.  The authorizing entity does signs
   the Map-Register and sends it with merge-semantics.  The Map-Server
   accepts the registration after the signature is verified and merges
   the RLOC-record into the existing RLOC-set.  The 'signature' is
   optional and when not included means the authorizing entity has not



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   yet allowed the registering entity to register the EID <eid>.  Note
   multiple entities can register RLOC-records with the same <eid>
   meaning that signature verification for all of them is required
   before the Map-Server accepts the registration.

   When the Map-Server receives a Map-Register for <eid>, it looks up
   'hash-<hash>' EID in the mapping system.  If not found, the Map-
   Register EID-record is not processed and the next EID-record is
   retrieved from the Map-Register message, if it exists.  If the Hash-
   EID entry is found, the registering entity's signature is verified
   first.  If the verification fails, the Map-Register EID-record is not
   accepted.  Otherwise, a search for the RLOC-set is done to look for
   all matches of the EID being registered with <eid>, for those entries
   found, if any of them do not have a "signature" JSON item, the EID-
   record is not accepted.  Otherwise, the signature-id is looked up in
   the mapping system to retrieve the public-key of the authorizing
   entity.  If the verification is successful, then a lookup for the
   next RLOC-record signature-id is done.  Only when all signature
   verifications are verified, the Map-Register EID-record is accepted.

   The Map-Server should reject an RLOC-record with a signature-id that
   contains the Hash-EID of the entry disallowing a registering entity
   to self authorize itself.

   Here is an example of a Hash-EID mapping stored in the mapping
   system:

EID-record: [1000]'hash-1111:2222:3333:4444', RLOC-Set (count is 4):

  RLOC-record: { "public-key" : "<pubkey-base64>" }
  RLOC-record: { "allow-eid" : "[1000]1.1.1.1/32", "signature" : "<sig>",
                 "signature-id" : "[1000]2001:5:3::1111" }
  RLOC-record: { "allow-eid" : "[1000]1.1.1.1/32", "signature" : "<sig>",
                 "signature-id" : "[1000]2001:5:3::2222" }
  RLOC-record: { "allow-eid" : "37-16-46-N-121-52-4-W",
                 "signature-id" : "[1000]2001:5:3::5555" }

   This mapping stores the public-key of the registering entity with
   Hash-EID 1111:2222:3333:4444.  The registering entry registered this
   RLOC-record.  There are two authorizing entities, :1111 and :2222,
   who allow it to register IPv4 EID 1.1.1.1/32.  They each registered
   their respective RLOC-records.  And a third authorizing entity :5555
   that registers an RLOC-record that has not yet authorized the
   registering entity to register Geo-Coordinate 37-16-46-N-121-52-4-W.
   Note the mapping and the signature-IDs are all within the context of
   instance-ID 1000.





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13.  Security Considerations

   The mechanisms within this specification are intentionally using
   accepted practices and state of the art public-key cryptography.

   Crypto-EIDs can be made private when control messages are encrypted,
   for instance, using [RFC8061].

   The topological or physical location of a Crypto-EID is only
   available to the other Crypto-EIDs that register in the same LISP
   Instance-ID and have their corresponding Hash-EIDs registered.

   This draft doesn't address reply attacks directly.  If a man-in-the-
   middle captures Map-Register messages, it could send such captured
   packets at a later time which contains signatures of the source.  In
   which case, the Map-Server verifies the signature as good and
   interprets the contents to be valid where in fact the contents can
   contain old mapping information.  This problem can be solved by
   encrypting the contents of Map-Registers using a third-party protocol
   like DTLS [RFC6347] or LISP-Crypto [RFC8061] directly by
   encapsulating Map-Registers in LISP data packets (using port 4341).

   Map-Reply message signatures and authentication are not in scope for
   this document.  This document focuses on authentication between xTRs
   and mapping system components.  Map-Reply authentication, which is
   performed between xTRs is described in [I-D.ietf-lisp-sec].

14.  IANA Considerations

   Since there are no new packet formats introduced for the
   functionality in this specification, there are no specific requests
   for IANA.

15.  References

15.1.  Normative References

   [RFC0020]  Cerf, V., "ASCII format for network interchange", STD 80,
              RFC 20, DOI 10.17487/RFC0020, October 1969,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc20>.

   [RFC1123]  Braden, R., Ed., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
              Application and Support", STD 3, RFC 1123,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC1123, October 1989,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1123>.






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   [RFC1700]  Reynolds, J. and J. Postel, "Assigned Numbers", RFC 1700,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC1700, October 1994,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1700>.

   [RFC3513]  Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "Internet Protocol Version 6
              (IPv6) Addressing Architecture", RFC 3513,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3513, April 2003,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3513>.

   [RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.

   [RFC6234]  Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
              (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6234>.

   [RFC6347]  Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
              Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
              January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.

   [RFC6830]  Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Meyer, D., and D. Lewis, "The
              Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP)", RFC 6830,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6830, January 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6830>.

   [RFC6833]  Fuller, V. and D. Farinacci, "Locator/ID Separation
              Protocol (LISP) Map-Server Interface", RFC 6833,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6833, January 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6833>.

   [RFC7468]  Josefsson, S. and S. Leonard, "Textual Encodings of PKIX,
              PKCS, and CMS Structures", RFC 7468, DOI 10.17487/RFC7468,
              April 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7468>.

   [RFC8060]  Farinacci, D., Meyer, D., and J. Snijders, "LISP Canonical
              Address Format (LCAF)", RFC 8060, DOI 10.17487/RFC8060,
              February 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8060>.

   [RFC8061]  Farinacci, D. and B. Weis, "Locator/ID Separation Protocol
              (LISP) Data-Plane Confidentiality", RFC 8061,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8061, February 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8061>.







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   [RFC8378]  Moreno, V. and D. Farinacci, "Signal-Free Locator/ID
              Separation Protocol (LISP) Multicast", RFC 8378,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8378, May 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8378>.

15.2.  Informative References

   [AFI]      IANA, "Address Family Identifier (AFIs)", ADDRESS FAMILY
              NUMBERS http://www.iana.org/assignments/address-family-
              numbers/address-family-numbers.xhtml?, February 2007.

   [I-D.farinacci-lisp-geo]
              Farinacci, D., "LISP Geo-Coordinate Use-Cases", draft-
              farinacci-lisp-geo-05 (work in progress), April 2018.

   [I-D.farinacci-lisp-name-encoding]
              Farinacci, D., "LISP Distinguished Name Encoding", draft-
              farinacci-lisp-name-encoding-06 (work in progress),
              September 2018.

   [I-D.ietf-lisp-pubsub]
              Rodriguez-Natal, A., Ermagan, V., Leong, J., Maino, F.,
              Cabellos-Aparicio, A., Barkai, S., Farinacci, D.,
              Boucadair, M., Jacquenet, C., and S. Secci, "Publish/
              Subscribe Functionality for LISP", draft-ietf-lisp-
              pubsub-00 (work in progress), April 2018.

   [I-D.ietf-lisp-rfc6833bis]
              Fuller, V., Farinacci, D., and A. Cabellos-Aparicio,
              "Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP) Control-Plane",
              draft-ietf-lisp-rfc6833bis-15 (work in progress),
              September 2018.

   [I-D.ietf-lisp-sec]
              Maino, F., Ermagan, V., Cabellos-Aparicio, A., and D.
              Saucez, "LISP-Security (LISP-SEC)", draft-ietf-lisp-sec-15
              (work in progress), April 2018.

   [X9.62]    American National Standards Institute, "Public Key
              Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: The
              Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)",
              NIST ANSI X9.62-2005, November 2005.

Appendix A.  Acknowledgments

   A special thanks goes to Sameer Merchant and Colin Cantrell for their
   ideas and technical contributions to the ideas in this draft.




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Appendix B.  Document Change Log

   [RFC Editor: Please delete this section on publication as RFC.]

B.1.  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-ecdsa-auth-00

   o  Posted mid-September 2018.

   o  Make draft-farinacci-lisp-ecdsa-auth-03 a LISP working group
      docuemnt.

B.2.  Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-ecdsa-auth-03

   o  Posted September 2018.

   o  Change all occurrences of signature-EID to signature-ID.

   o  Document how Map-Servers sign Map-Notify messages so they can be
      verified by xTRs.

   o  Add multi-signatures to mappings so a 3rd-party can allow an
      entity to register any type of EID.

B.3.  Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-ecdsa-auth-02

   o  Draft posted April 2018.

   o  Generalize text to allow Map-Requesting and Map-Registering for
      any EID type with a proper signature-EID and signature encoded
      together.

B.4.  Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-ecdsa-auth-01

   o  Draft posted October 2017.

   o  Make it more clear what values and format the EID hash is run
      over.

   o  Update references to newer RFCs and Internet Drafts.

B.5.  Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-ecdsa-auth-00

   o  Initial draft posted July 2017.








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Authors' Addresses

   Dino Farinacci
   lispers.net
   San Jose, CA
   USA

   Email: farinacci@gmail.com


   Erik Nordmark
   Zededa
   Santa Clara, CA
   USA

   Email: erik@zededa.com



































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