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Versions: (draft-dearlove-manet-ibs) 00 01 02 03 04 05 RFC 7859

Mobile Ad hoc Networking (MANET)                             C. Dearlove
Internet-Draft                          BAE Systems Applied Intelligence
Intended status: Experimental                               Laboratories
Expires: September 22, 2016                               March 21, 2016


         Identity-Based Signatures for MANET Routing Protocols
                        draft-ietf-manet-ibs-05

Abstract

   This document extends RFC7182, which specifies a framework for, and
   specific examples of, integrity check values (ICVs) for packets and
   messages using the generalized packet/message format specified in
   RFC5444.  It does so by defining an additional cryptographic function
   that allows the creation of an ICV that is an identity-based
   signature, defined according to the ECCSI (Elliptic Curve-Based
   Certificateless Signatures for Identity-Based Encryption) algorithm
   specified in RFC6507.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 22, 2016.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must



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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  Applicability Statement  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   4.  Specification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     4.1.  Cryptographic Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     4.2.  ECCSI parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     4.3.  Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   5.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     6.1.  Experimental Status  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   7.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   8.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     8.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     8.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   Appendix A.  Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15




























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1.  Introduction

   [RFC7182] defines ICV (integrity check value) TLVs for use in packets
   and messages that use the generalized MANET packet/message format
   defined in [RFC5444].  This specification extends the TLV definitions
   therein by defining two new cryptographic function code points from
   within the registries set up by [RFC7182].  This allows the use of an
   identity-based signature (IBS) as an ICV.  An IBS has an additional
   property that is not shared by all of the previously specified ICVs,
   it not only indicates that the protected packet or message is valid,
   but also verifies the originator of the packet/message.

   This specification assumes that each router (i.e., each originator of
   [RFC5444] format packets/messages) has an identity that may be tied
   to the packet or message.  The router may have more than one
   identity, but will only use one for each ICV TLV.  The cryptographic
   strength of the IBS is not dependent on the choice of identity.

   Two options for the choice of identity are supported (as reflected by
   the two code points allocated).  In the first the identity can be any
   octet sequence (up to 255 octets) included in the ICV TLV.  In the
   second, the octet sequence is preceded by an address, either the IP
   source address for a packet TLV, or the message originator address
   for a message or address block TLV.  In particular, the second option
   allows just the address to be used as an identity.

   Identity-based signatures allow identifying the originator of
   information in a packet or message.  They thus allow additional
   security functions, such as revocation of an identity, and removing
   all information with a specific originator, if this is recorded - as
   it is for OLSRv2 [RFC7181], an expected user of this specification.
   When applied to messages (rather than packets) this can significantly
   reduce the damage that a compromised router can inflict on the
   network.

   Identity-based signatures are based on forms of asymmetric (public
   key) cryptography - identity-based encryption (IBE).  Compared to
   symmetric cryptographic methods (such as HMAC and AES), IBE and IBS
   methods avoid requiring a shared secret key that results in a single
   point of failure vulnerability.  Compared to more widely used
   asymmetric (public key) cryptographic methods (such as RSA and
   ECDSA), IBE and IBS methods have a major advantage, and a major
   disadvantage.

   The advantage referred to is that each router can be configured once
   (for its key lifetime) by a trusted authority, independently of all
   other routers.  Thus a router can connect to the authority (typically
   in a secure environment) to receive a private key, or can have a



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   private key delivered securely (out of band) from the authority.
   During normal operation of the MANET, there is no need for the
   trusted authority to be connected to the MANET, or even to still
   exist.  Additional routers can be authorized, with no reference to
   previously authorized routers (the trusted authority must still exist
   in this case).  A router's public key is its identity, which when
   tied to a packet or message (as is the case when using an address as,
   or as part of, the identity) means that there is no need for public
   key certificates or a certificate authority, and a router need not
   retain key material for any other routers.

   The disadvantage referred to is that the trusted authority has
   complete authority, even more so than a conventional certificate
   authority.  Routers cannot generate their own private keys, only the
   trusted authority can do that.  Through the master secret held by the
   trusted authority, it could impersonate any router (existing or not).
   When used for identity-based encryption (not part of this
   specification) the trusted authority can decrypt anything.  However,
   note that the shared secret key options described in [RFC7182] also
   have this limitation.

   There are alternative mathematical realizations of identity-based
   signatures.  This specification uses one that has been previously
   published as [RFC6507], known as ECCSI (Elliptic Curve-Based
   Certificateless Signatures for Identity-Based Encryption).  In common
   with other identity-based encryption/signature approaches, it is
   based on the use of elliptic curves.  Unlike some, it does not use
   "pairings" (bilinear maps from a product of two elliptic curve groups
   to another group).  It thus may be easier to implement, and more
   efficient, than some alternatives, although with a greater signature
   size than some.  This specification allows the use of any elliptic
   curve that may be used by [RFC6507].

   The computational load imposed by ECCSI (and, perhaps more so, other
   IBS methods) is not trivial, though depending significantly on the
   quality of implementation of the required elliptic curve and other
   mathematical functions.  For a security level of 128 bits, the ICV
   data length is 129 octets, which is longer than for alternative ICVs
   specified in [RFC7182] (e.g., 32 octets for the similar strength
   HMAC-SHA-256).  The signature format used could have been slightly
   shortened (to 97 octets) by using a compressed representation of an
   elliptic curve point, however at the expense of some additional work
   when verifying a signature, and loss of direct compatibility with
   [RFC6507], and implementations thereof.

   The trusted authority is referred to in [RFC6507] as the KMS (Key
   Management Service).  That term will be used in the rest of this
   specification.



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2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   [RFC2119].

   Additionally, this document uses the terminology of [RFC5444],
   [RFC6507], and [RFC7182].


3.  Applicability Statement

   This specification adds an additional option to the framework
   specified in [RFC7182] for use by [RFC5444] formatted packets and
   messages.  It is applicable as described in [RFC7182], and subject to
   the additional comments in Section 6, particularly regarding the role
   of the trusted authority (KMS).

   Specific examples of protocols for which this specification is
   suitable are NHDP [RFC6130] and OLSRv2 [RFC7181].


4.  Specification

4.1.  Cryptographic Function

   This specification defines a cryptographic function named ECCSI that
   is implemented as specified as the "sign" function in Section 5.2.1
   of [RFC6507].  To use that specification:

   o  The ICV is not calculated as cryptographic-function(hash-
      function(content)) as defined in [RFC7182], but (like the HMAC
      ICVs defined in [RFC7182]) uses the hash function within the
      cryptographic function.  The option "none" is not permitted for
      hash-function, and the hash function must have a known fixed
      length of N octets, as specified in Section 4.2.

   o  M in [RFC6507] is "content" as specified in in [RFC7182].

   o  ID, used in [RFC6507], is as specified in Section 4.3.

   o  KPAK, SSK and PVT, used in [RFC6507], are as specified in Sections
      4.2 and 5.1.1 of [RFC6507], provided by the KMS.

   The length of the signature is 4N+1 octets, as specified in
   [RFC6507], whose affine coordinate format (including an octet valued
   0x04 to identify this) is used unchanged.



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   Verification of the ICV is not implemented by the receiver
   recalculating the ICV and comparing with the received ICV, as it is
   necessarily incapable of doing so.  Instead the receiver evaluates
   the "verify" function described in Section 5.2.2 of [RFC6507], which
   may pass or fail.

   To use that function M, KPAK, SSK and PVT are as specified above,
   while ID is deduced from the received packet or message, as specified
   in Section 4.3, using the <key-id> element in the <ICV-value>.  This
   element need not match that used by the receiver, and thus when using
   this cryptographic function, multiple ICV TLVs differing only in
   their <key-id>, or in the choice of cryptographic function from the
   two defined in this specification, SHOULD NOT be used unless routers
   are administratively configured to recognize which to verify.

   Routers MAY be administratively configured to reject a packet or
   message ICV TLV using ECCSI based on part or all of <key-id>; for
   example if this encodes a time after which this identity is no longer
   valid, as described in Section 4.3.

4.2.  ECCSI parameters

   Section 4.1 of [RFC6507] specifies parameters n, N, p, E, B, G, and
   q.  The first of these, n, is specified as "A security parameter; the
   size in bits of the prime p over which elliptic curve cryptography is
   to be performed."  For typical security levels (e.g., 128, 192 and
   256 bits), n must be at least twice the required bits of security,
   see Section 5.6.1 of [NIST-SP-800-57].

   Selection of an elliptic curve, and all related parameters, MUST be
   by administrative means, and known to all routers.  This
   specification follows [RFC6507] with a RECOMMENDED selection to
   follow Appendix D.1.2 of [NIST-FIPS-186-4].  (Note that n in that
   document is q in [RFC6507].)  However an alternative curve MAY be
   used.

   The parameter that is required by this specification is N, which is
   defined as Ceiling(n/8).  The hash function used must create an
   output of size N octets.  In particular for 128 bit security, and
   hence n = 256, N = 32, and the RECOMMENDED hash function is SHA-256.
   The signature (i.e. <ICV-data>) length is 4N + 1 octets, i.e., 129
   octets for N = 32.

   Note: [RFC6507] actually refers to the predecessor to
   [NIST-FIPS-186-4], but the latest version is specified here; there
   are no significant differences in this regard.





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4.3.  Identity

   There are two options for the identity ID used by [RFC6507], which
   are indicated by there being two code points allocated for this
   cryptographic function, see Section 5.

   o  For the cryptographic function ECCSI, ID is the element <key-id>
      defined in Section 12.1 of [RFC7182].  This MUST NOT be empty.

   o  For the cryptographic function ECCSI-ADDR, ID is the concatenation
      of an address (in network byte order) and the element <key-id>
      defined in Section 12.1 of [RFC7182], where the latter MAY be
      empty.

      *  For a packet TLV this address is the IP source address of the
         IP datagram in which this packet is included.

      *  For a message TLV or an address block TLV this address is the
         message originator address (the element <msg-orig-addr> defined
         in [RFC5444]) if that address is present, if not present and
         the message is known to have travelled only one hop, then the
         IP source address of the IP datagram in which this message is
         included is used, otherwise no address is defined and the
         message MUST be rejected.  (Note that HELLO messages specified
         in NHDP [RFC6130] and used in OLSRv2 [RFC7181] always only
         travel one hop, and hence their IP source address SHOULD be
         used if no originator address is present.)

   The element <key-id> MAY be (for the cryptographic function ECCSI-
   ADDR) or include (for either cryptographic function) a representation
   of the identity expiry time.  This MAY use one of the representations
   of time defined for the TIMESTAMP TLV in [RFC7182].  A RECOMMENDED
   approach is to use the cryptographic function ECCSI-ADDR with element
   <key-id> containing the single octet representing the type of the
   time, normally used as the TIMESTAMP TLV Type Extension, defined in
   [RFC7182] Table 9, or any extension thereof, followed by the time as
   so represented, normally used as the TIMESTAMP TLV Value.

   Note that the identity is formatted by [RFC6507], and thus does not
   need a length field incorporated into it by this specification.


5.  IANA Considerations

   IANA has, in accordance with [RFC7182], defined a registry
   "Cryptographic Functions" under "Mobile Ad Hoc NETwork Parameters".
   IANA is requested to make two new allocations from this registry, and
   modify the unassigned range, as indicated.



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   +-------+------------+------------------------------+---------------+
   | Value |  Algorithm |          Description         |   Reference   |
   +-------+------------+------------------------------+---------------+
   |   7   |    ECCSI   |        ECCSI [RFC6507]       |      This     |
   |       |            |                              | specification |
   |   8   | ECCSI-ADDR |    ECCSI [RFC6507] with an   |      This     |
   |       |            |      address (source or      | specification |
   |       |            |     originator) joined to    |               |
   |       |            |           identity           |               |
   | 9-251 |            |   Unassigned; Expert Review  |               |
   +-------+------------+------------------------------+---------------+

                 Table 1: Cryptographic Function Registry


6.  Security Considerations

   This specification extends the security framework for MANET routing
   protocols specified in [RFC7182] by the addition of an additional
   cryptographic function, in two forms according to how identity is
   specified.

   This cryptographic function implements a form of identity-based
   signature (IBS), a stronger form of integrity check value (ICV) that
   verifies not just that the received packet or message is valid but
   that the packet or message originated at a router that was assigned a
   private key for the specified identity.

   It is recommended that the identity includes an address unique to
   that router; for a message its originator address, for a packet the
   corresponding IP packet source address.  If additional information is
   included in the identity this may be to indicate an expiry time for
   signatures created using that identity.

   In common with other forms of IBS, a feature of the form of IBS
   (known as ECCSI) used in this specification is that it requires a
   trusted Key Management Service (KMS) that issues all private keys,
   and has complete cryptographic information about all possible private
   keys.  However to set against that, the solution is scalable, as all
   routers can be independently keyed, and does not need the KMS in the
   network.  If no future keys will be required, then the KMS's master
   secret can be destroyed.  As routers are individually keyed, key
   revocation (by blacklist and/or time expiry of keys) is possible.

   ECCSI is based on elliptic curve mathematics.  This specification
   follows [RFC6507] in its recommendation of elliptic curves, but any
   suitable (prime power) elliptic curve may be used; this must be
   administratively specified.  Implementation of this specification



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   will require an available implementation of suitable mathematical
   functions.  Unlike some other forms of IBS, ECCSI requires only basic
   elliptic curve operations, it does not require "pairings" (bilinear
   functions of a product of two elliptic curve groups).  This increases
   the available range of suitable mathematical libraries.

6.1.  Experimental Status

   The idea of using identity based signatures for authentication of ad
   hoc network signaling goes back at least as far as 2005 [Dearlove].
   The specific implementation of an identity based signature used in
   this specification, ECCSI, was published as an Internet Draft in
   2010, before publication as an informational RFC [RFC6507].  ECCSI is
   now part of standards such as [ETSI] for LTE Proximity-based
   Services.  An open source implementation of cryptographic software
   that includes ECCSI is available, see [SecureChorus].

   However, although this specification has been implemented for use in
   an OLSRv2 [RFC7181] routed network, there are only limited reports of
   such use.  There are also no reports of the use of ECCSI within the
   IETF, other than in this specification.  There are no reports of
   independent public scrutiny of the algorithm, although ECCSI is
   reported [RFC6507] as being based on [ECDSA] with similar properties.

   This specification is thus published as experimental, in order to
   encourage its use and reports on its use.  Once experiments have been
   carried out and reported, and when some public analysis of the
   underlying cryptographic algorithms is available, it is intended to
   advance this specification, with any changes identified by such
   experimentation and analysis, to standards track.


7.  Acknowledgments

   The author would like to thank his colleagues who have been involved
   in identity-based security for ad hoc networks, including (in
   alphabetical order) Alan Cullen, Peter Smith and Bill Williams.  He
   would also like to thank Benjamin Smith (INRIA/Ecole Polytechnique)
   for independently recreating the signature and other values in
   Appendix A to ensure their correctness, and Thomas Clausen (Ecole
   Polytechnique) for additional comments.


8.  References







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8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC5444]  Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., Dean, J., and C. Adjih,
              "Generalized Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) Packet/Message
              Format", RFC 5444, February 2009.

   [RFC6507]  Groves, M., "Elliptic Curve-Based Certificateless
              Signatures for Identity-Based Encryption (ECCSI)",
              RFC 6507, February 2012.

   [RFC7182]  Herberg, U., Clausen, T., and C. Dearlove, "Integrity
              Check Value and Timestamp TLV Definitions for Mobile Ad
              Hoc Networks (MANETs)", RFC 7182, April 2014.

8.2.  Informative References

   [Dearlove]
              Dearlove, C., "OLSR Developments and Extensions", 2nd OLSR
              Interop and Workshop, Ecole Polytechnique, Palaiseau,
              France, July 2005.

   [ECDSA]    ANSI, "Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services
              Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
              (ECDSA)", ANSI X9.62-2005, November 2005.

   [ETSI]     ETSI/3GPP, "Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
              (UMTS); LTE; Proximity-based Services (ProSe); Security
              aspects", ETSI TS 133 303 V13.2.0 (2016-01), January 2016.

   [NIST-FIPS-186-4]
              National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital
              Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS 186-4, July 2013.

   [NIST-SP-800-57]
              National Institute of Standards and Technology,
              "Recommendation for Key Management - Part 1: General
              (Revision 3)", SP 800-57, Part 1, Revision 3, July 2012.

   [RFC5497]  Clausen, T. and C. Dearlove, "Representing Multi-Value
              Time in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs)", RFC 5497,
              March 2009.

   [RFC6130]  Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., and J. Dean, "Mobile Ad Hoc
              Network (MANET) Neighborhood Discovery Protocol (NHDP)",
              RFC 6130, April 2011.



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   [RFC7181]  Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., Jacquet, P., and U. Herberg,
              "The Optimized Link State Routing Protocol Version 2",
              RFC 7181, April 2014.

   [SecureChorus]
              "Secure Chorus", <http://www.securechorus.com/>.


Appendix A.  Example

   Appendix C of [RFC6130] contains this example of a HELLO message.
   (Note that normally, a TIMESTAMP ICV would also be added before the
   ICV TLV, but for simplicity that step has been omitted here.)


      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |     HELLO     | MF=7  | MAL=3 |      Message Length = 45      |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Hop Limit = 1 | Hop Count = 0 |    Message Sequence Number    |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Message TLV Block Length = 8  | VALIDITY_TIME |  MTLVF = 16   |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Value Len = 1 | Value (Time)  | INTERVAL_TIME |  MTLVF = 16   |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Value Len = 1 | Value (Time)  | Num Addrs = 5 |   ABF = 128   |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Head Len = 3  |                     Head                      |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |     Mid 0     |     Mid 1     |     Mid 2     |     Mid 3     |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |     Mid 4     | Address TLV Block Length = 14 |   LOCAL_IF    |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |  ATLVF = 80   |   Index = 0   | Value Len = 1 |    THIS_IF    |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |  LINK_STATUS  |   ATLV = 52   | Strt Indx = 1 | Stop Indx = 4 |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Value Len = 4 |     HEARD     |     HEARD     |   SYMMETRIC   |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |     LOST      |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   In order to provide an example of an ECCSI ICV Message TLV that may
   be added to this message, the fields shown need to all have numerical
   values, both by inserting defined numerical values (e.g., 0 for
   HELLO) and by selecting example values where needed.  The latter
   consists of:



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   o  The message sequence number will be zero.

   o  The five addresses will be 192.0.2.1 to 192.0.2.5.

   o  The message validity time will be 6 seconds, and the message
      interval time will be 2 seconds, each encoded with a constant
      value C = 1/1024 seconds, as described in [RFC5497], as referenced
      from [RFC6130].

   In addition, when calculating an ICV, the hop count and hop limit are
   both set to zero.  This results in the message:


      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0|0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1|0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1|
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0|0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0|0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0|
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0|0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1|0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0|
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1|0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0|0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0|0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0|
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1|0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0|0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1|1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0|
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1|1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0|
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1|0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0|0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1|0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0|
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1|0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0|0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0|
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0|0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0|0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1|0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0|
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1|0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0|0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1|0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0|
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0|0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0|0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0|0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1|
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0|
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Or in hexadecimal form


      M         := 0x 0073002D  00000000  00080110  01640010
                      01580580  03C00002  01020304  05000E02
                      50000100  03340104  04020201  00




Dearlove               Expires September 22, 2016              [Page 12]


Internet-Draft          Identity-Based Signatures             March 2016


   The ICV TLV that will be added will have cryptographic function
   ECCSI-ADDR, and hash function SHA-256.  This message has no
   originator address, but it travels a single hop, and its IP source
   address can be used.  This will be assumed to be 192.0.2.0, with an
   empty <key-id>, thus the sender's identity will be, in hexadecimal
   form:


      ID        := 0x  C0000200

   Parameters for [RFC6507] will thus be n = 256, N = 32.  The same
   parameters and master key will be used as in Appendix A of [RFC6507],
   i.e., the elliptic curve P-256, with parameters:


      p         := 0x  FFFFFFFF 00000001 00000000 00000000
                       00000000 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF

      B         := 0x  5AC635D8 AA3A93E7 B3EBBD55 769886BC
                       651D06B0 CC53B0F6 3BCE3C3E 27D2604B

      q         := 0x  FFFFFFFF 00000000 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
                       BCE6FAAD A7179E84 F3B9CAC2 FC632551

      G         := 0x  04
                       6B17D1F2 E12C4247 F8BCE6E5 63A440F2
                       77037D81 2DEB33A0 F4A13945 D898C296
                       4FE342E2 FE1A7F9B 8EE7EB4A 7C0F9E16
                       2BCE3357 6B315ECE CBB64068 37BF51F5

      KSAK      := 0x  12345;

      KPAK      := 0x  04
                       50D4670B DE75244F 28D2838A 0D25558A
                       7A72686D 4522D4C8 273FB644 2AEBFA93
                       DBDD3755 1AFD263B 5DFD617F 3960C65A
                       8C298850 FF99F203 66DCE7D4 367217F4

   The remaining steps to creating a private key for ID use the same
   "random" value v as Appendix A of [RFC6507] and are:











Dearlove               Expires September 22, 2016              [Page 13]


Internet-Draft          Identity-Based Signatures             March 2016


      v         := 0x  23456

      PVT       := 0x  04
                       758A1427 79BE89E8 29E71984 CB40EF75
                       8CC4AD77 5FC5B9A3 E1C8ED52 F6FA36D9
                       A79D2476 92F4EDA3 A6BDAB77 D6AA6474
                       A464AE49 34663C52 65BA7018 BA091F79

      HS        := hash( 0x 04
                            6B17D1F2 E12C4247 F8BCE6E5 63A440F2
                            77037D81 2DEB33A0 F4A13945 D898C296
                            4FE342E2 FE1A7F9B 8EE7EB4A 7C0F9E16
                            2BCE3357 6B315ECE CBB64068 37BF51F5
                            04
                            50D4670B DE75244F 28D2838A 0D25558A
                            7A72686D 4522D4C8 273FB644 2AEBFA93
                            DBDD3755 1AFD263B 5DFD617F 3960C65A
                            8C298850 FF99F203 66DCE7D4 367217F4
                            C0000200
                            04
                            758A1427 79BE89E8 29E71984 CB40EF75
                            8CC4AD77 5FC5B9A3 E1C8ED52 F6FA36D9
                            A79D2476 92F4EDA3 A6BDAB77 D6AA6474
                            A464AE49 34663C52 65BA7018 BA091F79 )

                 = 0x  F64FFD76 D2EC3E87 BA670866 C0832B80
                       B740C2BA 016034C8 1A6F5E5B 5F9AD8F3

   The remaining steps to creating a signature for M use the same
   "random" value j as Appendix A of [RFC6507] and are:





















Dearlove               Expires September 22, 2016              [Page 14]


Internet-Draft          Identity-Based Signatures             March 2016


      j         := 0x  34567

      J         := 0x  04
                       269D4C8F DEB66A74 E4EF8C0D 5DCC597D
                       DFE6029C 2AFFC493 6008CD2C C1045D81
                       6DDA6A13 10F4B067 BD5DABDA D741B7CE
                       F36457E1 96B1BFA9 7FD5F8FB B3926ADB

      r         := 0x  269D4C8F DEB66A74 E4EF8C0D 5DCC597D
                       DFE6029C 2AFFC493 6008CD2C C1045D81

      HE        := hash( 0x
                         F64FFD76 D2EC3E87 BA670866 C0832B80
                         B740C2BA 016034C8 1A6F5E5B 5F9AD8F3
                         269D4C8F DEB66A74 E4EF8C0D 5DCC597D
                         DFE6029C 2AFFC493 6008CD2C C1045D81
                         0073002D 00000000 00080110 01640010
                         01580580 03C00002 01020304 05000E02
                         50000100 03340104 04020201 00       )

                 = 0x  FE236B30 CF72E060 28E229ED 5751D796
                       91DED33C 24D2F661 28EA0804 30D8A832

      s'        := 0x  C8C739D5 FB3EFB75 221CB818 8CAAB86A
                       2E2669CF 209EA622 7D7072BA A83C2509

      s         := 0x  C8C739D5 FB3EFB75 221CB818 8CAAB86A
                       2E2669CF 209EA622 7D7072BA A83C2509

      Signature := 0x  269D4C8F DEB66A74 E4EF8C0D 5DCC597D
                       DFE6029C 2AFFC493 6008CD2C C1045D81
                       C8C739D5 FB3EFB75 221CB818 8CAAB86A
                       2E2669CF 209EA622 7D7072BA A83C2509
                       04
                       758A1427 79BE89E8 29E71984 CB40EF75
                       8CC4AD77 5FC5B9A3 E1C8ED52 F6FA36D9
                       A79D2476 92F4EDA3 A6BDAB77 D6AA6474
                       A464AE49 34663C52 65BA7018 BA091F79













Dearlove               Expires September 22, 2016              [Page 15]


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Author's Address

   Christopher Dearlove
   BAE Systems Applied Intelligence Laboratories
   West Hanningfield Road
   Great Baddow, Chelmsford
   United Kingdom

   Phone: +44 1245 242194
   Email: chris.dearlove@baesystems.com
   URI:   http://www.baesystems.com/








































Dearlove               Expires September 22, 2016              [Page 16]


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