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MARID D. Crocker
Internet-Draft Brandenburg InternetWorking
Expires: August 19, 2005 J. Leslie
JLC.net
D. Otis
Mail Abuse Prevention System
February 18, 2005
Certified Server Validation (CSV)
draft-ietf-marid-csv-intro-02
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is subject to all provisions
of section 3 of RFC 3667. By submitting this Internet-Draft, each
author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of
which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of
which he or she become aware will be disclosed, in accordance with
RFC 3668.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on August 19, 2005.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
Abstract
Internet mail relies on exchanges between systems that have made no
prior arrangement with each other. Widespread abuse of the email
system has led operators to demand accountability for the email their
receiving SMTP servers are being asked to process. Certified Server
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Validation (CSV) provides an economical service that permits a
receiving SMTP server to decide whether a sending SMTP client is
likely to produce well-behaved traffic, or at least to decide whether
the client is sufficiently accountable for its actions. CSV provides
a small, simple and useful improvement to Internet mail service
accountability. It builds upon the existing practise of service
providers that accredit the networks from which sending systems are
connecting.
Table of Contents
1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Service Goal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1 Assessing Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2 Assessing Accreditation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Certified Server Validation Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1 Assessing Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2 Assessing Accreditation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.1 References - Normative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.2 References - Informative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
B. Host Name Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
B.1 DNS-based Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
B.2 Reverse DNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
B.3 Forward DNS Lookup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 16
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1. Overview
CSV considers two questions at the start of each SMTP session:
Does a domain's management authorize the connecting, client MTA to
be sending email?
Do independent accreditation services consider that domain's
policies and practices sufficient for controlling email abuse?
To validate an SMTP session from an unknown sending SMTP client using
CSV, a typical sequence for the receiving SMTP server is:
1. Obtain the remote IP address of the TCP connection.
2. Extract the domain name from the EHLO command sent by the SMTP
client
3. Query a chosen Accreditation Service for the EHLO domain name
(see [ID-CSVDNA])
4. Query DNS for a SRV record under the EHLO domain name (see
[ID-CSVCSA])
5. Check the SRV reply for flags returned, and check for a match in
the list of returned IP addresses
6. Determines the level of trust to give to the sending SMTP client,
based on the results of (3) and (5)
Using whatever thresholds are set by the receiving site's policies:
o If the level of trust is high enough, process all email from that
session in the traditional manner, delivering or forwarding
without the need for further validation.
o If the level of trust is too low, return an error showing the
reason for not trusting the sending SMTP client.
o If the level of trust is in between, document the result in a
header in each email delivered or forwarded, and/or perform
additional checks.
Terminology:
Terminology conforms to [ID-mail-arch].
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Discussion:
The venue for discussing this proposal is the CLEAR mailing list:
<http://mipassoc.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-clear>.
Changes from previous Internet-Draft version:
replaces "Client SMTP Validation" with "Certified Server
Validation". updates the date.
refers to the example in the Overview as "a typical sequence",
changing à third-person verbs to second-person verbs in items 1-5
(but not 6).
changes the venue for discussion to CLEAR.
adds a few inconsequential words to Section 2 paragraph 8.
applies third-level number in section 4.
adds text to Section 5 stating that CSV can be used without DNA.
2. Background
Internet mail suffers from the operation of hosts acting as mail
transfer agents (MTA) without any meaningful cross-net
accountability. This makes it impossible to vet MTAs or find
recourse when their operations cause problems. Many of these hosts
have been compromised and have been turned into unwilling
participants in large networks of hostile MTAs that send spam and
worms, and contribute to denial of service attacks.
When a server MTA receives a connection, it decides whether to accept
the message traffic that is being sent to it, trusting that its
delivery will not be problematic to the operation of the provider or
their users. How can it do this, when operating in the open
Internet? Certified Server Validation (CSV) defines a service that
permits the receiving SMTP server to decide whether messages sent by
the sending SMTP client are likely to be well-behaved, or at least to
decide whether that client is sufficiently accountable for its
actions.
The process of deciding on this trust of the client requires
performing a series of conceptually discrete steps:
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Identification:
What is the "name" of the client to be trusted? How is it
referenced?
CSV uses the domain name supplied by a client in the SMTP HELO/
EHLO.
Authentication:
Is the client MTA legitimately associated with that name? Can we
prove that the client is who it purports to be?
By finding the sending SMTP client's actual IP address, in the
list of IP addresses returned by a DNS Address query on the EHLO
domain-name, CSV satisfies the minimal authentication needs of
this task.
Authorization:
Is the remote host permitted to act as a sending SMTP client? Has
the domain management authorized it to perform this function?
CSV specifies a DNS-based record that states whether an associated
host has permission to operate as a client MTA.
Accreditation:
What is the trust that is to be extended to the entity that
authorized the sending SMTP client? Does the receiving SMTP server
have a basis for deciding that the entity providing authorization
for the client MTA can, itself, be trusted to make accountable
authorizations?
CSV defines a DNS record that permits domains to announce the
accreditation services in which they are listed. It also defines
a separate record by which accreditation services publish their
assessments of sending domains.
A proposal or its implementation well might combine some of these
steps. However it is important to consider them independently, in
order to ensure that the proposal specifies that they are performed
in a valid manner, or at least that the constraints of the proposal
are clear for each of these conceptual functions. This specification
distinguishes each of these logical steps and defines their operation
separately. It is based on validation of the EHLO domain name. The
proposed mechanism is small, simple and useful. In particular it
permits detecting machines that are prohibited from acting as Client
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MTAs and those that are permitted. The mechanism is designed to be
useful between peer MTAs and only requires use of well-established
mechanisms.
Address-based Accreditation:
Service providers often maintain lists of remote networks that are
known to be trustworthy or untrustworthy as sending SMTP clients.
Typically, these lists are based on the use of IP Addresses of the
clients. The IP Addresses serve as identifiers. The list
specifies positive or negative authorization, and the source of
the list is an organization that the operator of the receiving
SMTP server deems worthy to assess other sites.
When used in this way, IP Addresses are authenticated by relying
on their use in the IP routing infrastructure. Packets are routed
to the specified IP Address, over the open Internet. A continuing
TCP session using that IP Address is therefore presumed to be an
interaction with the host legitimately associated with that IP
Address.
Increased topological, transfer and access complexities on the
Internet are making IP Addresses increasingly problematic for use
as persistent identifiers. Instead they are viewed as appropriate
only for the most transient task of delivering individual packets.
CSV builds upon this popular model. Besides the considerable benefit
of having operational practice, the model can be extremely efficient.
It permits the service provider to assess the source of an entire
message stream, rather than having to evaluate each message. Also,
CSV makes its assessment before messages cross the Internet, thereby
saving bandwidth and reducing the impact of a distributed denial of
service attack.
3. Service Goal
CSV verifies that a host is authorized to act as an SMTP client and
that the client is likely to be operated acceptably. CSV enhances
current practice with:
o Identification by persistent domain name rather than transient IP
Address.
o A standardized method of documenting authorization to operate as a
sending SMTP client.
o A standardized method of referencing accreditation services.
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o A standardized method of querying an accreditation service.
4. Requirements
4.1 Assessing Authorization
For a receiving SMTP server to determine whether a host has
authorization to act as a sending SMTP client, it is necessary to
identify the host and verify its association with that identity.
Given that, a DNS query on the name can return an explicit
authorization.
4.1.1 Identification
The means of identifying a remote host or service requires uniqueness
and is aided by persistence. The identifier must not be ambiguous
and its use is made far more efficient if it is stable over time.
The two usual choices are IP Addresses and Domain Names.
An IP Address typically refers to a single host and can change
relatively frequently, as the host's connection to the Internet
changes. IP Addresses are reported by the Internet infrastructure
and for simple security requirements, transactional use of an IP
Address through the Internet's routing fabric is taken as validation
of the Address.
Domain Names are longer-lived but require new administrative effort.
They can be used to refer to multiple hosts simultaneously. The DNS
administrator for a domain will maintain record(s) listing one or
more IP addresses associated with that name, even though reverse-DNS
records (not controlled by the same DNS administrator) may give
conflicting information. The forward-DNS is considered the valid
authority for CSV purposes. Therefore, authentication of a domain
name's reference to a particular IP Address requires an explicit
authentication step.
4.1.2 Authentication
If the sending SMTP client of a connection can be authenticated, then
it is possible to develop an accountability mechanism based on that
authentication. MUA-MSA exchanges have a substantial number of
useful authentication mechanisms available. These are often very
strong, and involve significant prior arrangement. The same holds
true for MDA-MUA exchanges, and often for MSA-MTA and MTA-MDA
exchanges, such as within an organization's local network.
What is missing is a useful means of authenticating MTA-MTA exchanges
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over the open Internet. Prior arrangement between such a pair of
MTAs is antithetical to the history and operation of Internet mail.
Spontaneous communications are at the core of Internet design and
operation. So the challenge is to develop an authentication
mechanism that permits the necessary amount of accountability,
without imposing undue overhead or restrictions.
A number of strong authentication mechanisms are possible, but none
has yet attained widespread adoption among MTAs with no prior
relationship. CSV specifies a weaker authentication scheme that
meets the modest requirements for this service. Stronger methods can
be supported later, if necessary. However they must be tied to a
domain name and must not require any prior relationship.
4.1.3 Authorization
Internet operation has typically required no public mechanism for
restricting or permitting particular hosts to operate clients or
servers for particular services on behalf of particular domains. The
DNS MX record states where to route email that is destined for a
specific domain; this implies a degree of authorization for the host
referenced in the MX. However the record is really for routing and
there is no equivalent means of specifying authorization of other
hosts that might act as email relays. Similarly there is no means
for checking the authorization of World Wide Web servers, DNS
servers, telnet clients or other Internet applications.
What is missing is an open, interoperable means by which accountable
domain management can announce its authorization of a particular host
to operate a particular service. CSV defines such a mechanism for
sending SMTP clients.
4.2 Assessing Accreditation
This portion of CSV determines accreditations for the sending SMTP
client or for the administration under which it operates. The basis
for deciding that an authorizing agency is, itself, to be trusted can
be highly varied. Often, well-established practices are not that
well-understood. This makes it difficult to predict what methods of
accreditation will be most appropriate and successful for Internet
mail. It is expected that this portion of an Internet mail
validation service will therefore need to support be a variety of
accreditation service styles.
What is needed is a standard means for:
o referencing different accreditation services, and
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o querying a service to obtain information about the domain it is
accrediting.
5. Certified Server Validation Details
CSV defines a mechanism for session-time, domain-based validation of
a sending SMTP client. It is useful across the open Internet,
between MTAs that have made no prior arrangement with each other.
Validation establishes that the operation of the MTA is authorized by
an accredited administrator of the declared domain name.
The validation requirements are modest, because the system does not
seek to provide long-term vetting of the client host, nor does it
assess the actual content being exchanged. Techniques that would be
wholly inadequate for classic, strong authentication and validation
can be entirely sufficient for CSV's needs.
Validation has two separate phases: assessing authorization and
assessing accreditation. The first is performed between the
receiving SMTP server and the sending SMTP client. The second is
performed between the receiving SMTP server and one or more
accrediting services.
5.1 Assessing Authorization
This phase provides a means for a network administrator to publicly
state what hosts are authorized by it to act as client MTAs. Absent
such a statement of authority, it is possible that the client is a
rogue or compromised host.
The assessment requires three steps:
Identification:
The sending SMTP client host is identified by a Domain Name. The
domain name serves as a unique, topologically-independent,
persistent identifier that is registered in the Domain Name
Service.
A sending SMTP client MUST supply a published domain name as the
parameter to an SMTP HELO or EHLO. The sending SMTP client MAY
issue multiple EHLO's over the course of a session, such as for
isolating email flows for accreditation, with different domain
names to represent different users on the client system. If an
EHLO is issued, the entire CSV process MUST be restarted without
needing to make a new connection.
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For CSV, a sending SMTP client places the domain name into the
<Domain> field specified for a SMTP HELO or EHLO [RFC2821]
command. The domain name is any name under which it is claiming
authorization to act as a sending SMTP client. A receiving SMTP
server will extract this name and use it as the identification for
the client seeking to send email, upon which CSV assessments are
then made.
Authentication:
There is no universal, strong method to authenticate that a host
is correctly identifying itself. For most email transport
purposes, it will be sufficient to show that the EHLO domain name
forward-resolves to the IP address of the sending SMTP client.
The response to a CSV authentication query usually includes the
list of associated IP addresses in the Additional Information
section. Formally, this additional information is the same as
would be obtained from additional queries for that information. A
server includes it in the CSV query for efficiency, to avoid
additional DNS queries.
If the list is returned and the actual IP address of the sending
SMTP client is in it, the receiving SMTP server SHOULD consider
the EHLO domain name to be authenticated. Conversely, if the list
is returned and the actual IP address is not in it, the assertion
of the EHLO domain name SHOULD be considered incorrect, and result
in an error being returned.
Authorization:
In CSV, the purpose of authorization is to establish that an
accountable authority has given permission for the sending SMTP
client host to operate in that role.
CSV participants MUST use the Certified Server Authorization
method, as defined in [ID-CSVCSA]. It specifies a DNS record that
is associated with the domain name offered by the sending SMTP
client host.
5.2 Assessing Accreditation
The CSV authorization phase provides a basis for trusting that the
sending SMTP client is under the control of a domain's management;
but this says nothing about the policies and practices of that
management. Separate accreditation services are needed for that. It
is expected that there will be numerous services that provide
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accreditation. CSV is intended to support use of any service that
gains credibility among operators of SMTP servers.
One form of accreditation service is particularly easy to use
initially: a private list, maintained by the user of the information.
That is, a receiving SMTP server can manage its own, private list of
trusted domains. This is not viable for the long-term, given the
number of possible, valid client MTAs and the rate of on-going
changes.
Long term use is expected employ queries to independent, third-party
services. CSV provides a set of capabilities for using external
accreditation. (See "Domain Name Accreditation" in [ID-CSVDNA].)
Sending SMTP clients SHOULD publish CSV records referring to
accreditation services in which they are listed. Accreditation
services MUST publish DNA-conformant records.
6. Security Considerations
CSV defines a security mechanism. The nature of the security
requirements for CSV are significantly different from typical,
"strong" methods required for most Internet security functions.
The proposal relies on the integrity and authenticity of DNS data.
7. References
7.1 References - Normative
[ID-CSVCSA]
Otis, D., Crocker, D. and J. Leslie, "sending SMTP client
Authorization (CSA)", June 2004.
[ID-CSVDNA]
Leslie, J., Crocker, D. and D. Otis, "Domain Name
Accreditation (DNA)", June 2004.
[RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, September
1981.
[RFC0821] Postel, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", STD 10, RFC
821, August 1982.
[RFC0822] Crocker, D., "Standard for the format of ARPA Internet
text messages", STD 11, RFC 822, August 1982.
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
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[RFC1122] Braden, R., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
Communication Layers", STD 3, RFC 1122, October 1989.
[RFC2554] Myers, J., "SMTP Service Extension for Authentication",
RFC 2554, March 1999.
[RFC2782] Gulbrandsen, A., Vixie, P. and L. Esibov, "A DNS RR for
specifying the location of services (DNS SRV)", RFC 2782,
February 2000.
[RFC2821] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 2821,
April 2001.
[RFC2822] Resnick, P., "Internet Message Format", RFC 2822, April
2001.
[RFC3207] Hoffman, P., "SMTP Service Extension for Secure SMTP over
Transport Layer Security", RFC 3207, February 2002.
7.2 References - Informative
[ID-brand-drip]
Brand, R. and L. Sherzer, "Designated Relays Inquiry
Protocol (DRIP)", draft-brand-drip-02 (work in progress),
October 2003.
[ID-mail-arch]
Crocker, D., "Internet Mail Architecture", May 2004.
Authors' Addresses
Dave Crocker
Brandenburg InternetWorking
675 Spruce Drive
Sunnyvale, CA 94086
USA
Phone: +1.408.246.8253
EMail: dcrocker@bbiw.net
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John Leslie
JLC.net
10 Souhegan Street
Milford, NH 03055
USA
Phone: +1.603.673.6132
EMail: john@jlc.net
Douglas Otis
Mail Abuse Prevention System
1737 North First Street, Suite 680
San Jose, CA 94043
USA
Phone: +1.408.453.6277
EMail: dotis@mail-abuse.org
Appendix A. Acknowledgements
This proposal is similar to DRIP [ID-brand-drip], however it uses a
different DNS [RFC1035] record.
Review comments and suggestions, on previous versions of CSV, have
been made by: Tony Finch, Carl Hutzler, Meng Weng Wong, Greg Connor.
Appendix B. Host Name Authentication
The routing infrastructure of the Internet distinguishes hosts by
their topological attachment, noted as its IP Address. Because IP
Addresses change periodically and users prefer references that can be
mnemonic, hosts on the Internet generally have one or more Domain
Names (DNS) [RFC1035] assigned to them. A Domain Name is globally
unique. The core function of the DNS is to map from a name supplied
by the user, to an IP Address associated with that name. Internet
protocols often permit a host to identify itself with its domain
name.
But what if a host is programmed incorrectly, or even maliciously.
We need a way to authenticate that a host is reporting its name
correctly. Establishing this authentication is separate from
determining its authorization to perform any particular service.
Until the relationship is authenticated, we cannot apply policies
associated with the name.
A number of methods for authenticating the relationship between the
host and its reported name might be used. The current CSV
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specification supports authentication through Domain Name Service
mappings between a domain name and an IP Address. Other equally
valid methods are possible. However none has yet proved practical
for authenticating a client to a server, without prior arrangement
between them.
B.1 DNS-based Mapping
The Domain Name System has a common mapping mechanism that can be
used in a variety of ways, based on the schema for assigning names
and the types of data listed under those names. The two most popular
schemas are forward mapping and Reverse-DNS. Forward looks up a
"regular" domain name and receives information about it, such as a
list of IP Addresses associated with that name. Reverse DNS starts
with an IP Address and maps it to a pointer to a "regular" domain
name.
Often when contacted by a remote host, a host uses a reverse-DNS
query to get the name of the remote host. This can be followed by a
forward-DNS query to see if the name reported by the reverse-DNS
query matches an IP address reported by the forward-DNS query. If
so, this is generally considered an authentication of the
relationship of the name to the host. This method is often used by
receiving SMTP servers to decide whether to trust the sending SMTP
client.
Closing the circle in this manner permits verifying both that the
domain assigning the name and the service provider assigning IP
addresses agree that this is the appropriate name for that remote
host. Although this process has known limitations, it is considered
sufficient for many basic uses.
Use of an IP Address returned by the DNS is sufficient for
CSV-related authentication requirements of this service. However it
MUST NOT be considered a strong form of authentication as to allow
otherwise privileged access. The use of this mechanism is to aid
selection of accreditation services, such as whether to query using
the domain name or the client address. Other measures may be taken
intended to limit exposure to unknown clients but are beyond the
scope of this specification.
B.2 Reverse DNS
Reverse DNS can be used by itself to associate a domain name with an
IP address. It indicates that the entity responsible for allocating
that block of IP addresses has designated an IP address to be used by
the domain name. Unfortunately, the reverse-IP branch of the DNS has
a long history of being poorly maintained, and often does not match
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the forward-DNS information even when the relationship of host to
name is genuine.
Reverse DNS by itself SHOULD NOT be considered sufficient
authentication.
B.3 Forward DNS Lookup
An isolated forward lookup is sufficient for simple sending SMTP
client authentication, if an IP Address returned for that name
matches the IP Address reported by the underlying IP service for that
remote host. This indicates that the domain in question currently
designates that IP Address as an IP address entitled to respond for
that domain name.
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