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MIF                                                          J. Korhonen
Internet-Draft                                          Broadcom Limited
Intended status: Standards Track                             S. Krishnan
Expires: August 28, 2016                                        Ericsson
                                                           S. Gundavelli
                                                           Cisco Systems
                                                       February 25, 2016


  Support for multiple provisioning domains in IPv6 Neighbor Discovery
                                Protocol
                   draft-ietf-mif-mpvd-ndp-support-03

Abstract

   The MIF working group is producing a solution to solve the issues
   that are associated with nodes that can be attached to multiple
   networks.  One part of the solution requires associating
   configuration information with provisioning domains.  This document
   details how configuration information provided through IPv6 Neighbor
   Discovery Protocol can be associated with provisioning domains.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 28, 2016.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents



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   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  PVD Container option  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Set of allowable options  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Appendix A.  Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     A.1.  One implicit PVD and one explicit PVD . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10

1.  Introduction

   The MIF working group is producing a solution to solve the issues
   that are associated with nodes that can be attached to multiple
   networks based on the Multiple Provisioning Domains (MPVD)
   architecture work [RFC7556].  One part of the solution requires
   associating configuration information with Provisioning Domains
   (PVD).  This document describes an IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Protocol
   (NDP) [RFC4861] mechanism for explicitly indicating provisioning
   domain information along with any configuration which is associated
   with that provisioning domain.  The proposed mechanism uses an NDP
   option that indicates the identity of the provisioning domain and
   encapsulates the options that contain the configuration information
   as well as optional authentication/authorization information.  The
   solution defined in this document aligns as much as possible with the
   existing IPv6 Neighbor Discovery security, namely with Secure
   Neighbor Discovery (SeND) [RFC3971].

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].






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3.  PVD Container option

   The PVD container option (PVD_CO) is used to encapsulate the
   configuration options that belong to the explicitly identified
   provisioning domain.  The PVD container option always encapsulates
   exactly one PVD identity.  The PVD container option MAY occur
   multiple times in a Router Advertisement (RA) message.  In this case
   each PVD container MUST belong to a different provisioning domain.
   The PVD container options MUST NOT be nested.  The PVD Container
   option is defined only for the RA NDP message.

   Since implementations are required to ignore any unrecognized options
   [RFC4861], the backward compatibility and the reuse of existing NDP
   options is implicitly enabled.  Implementations that do not recognize
   the PVD container option will ignore it, and any PVD container option
   "encapsulated" NDP options without associating them into any
   provisioning domain (since the implementation has no notion of
   provisioning domains).  For example, the PVD container could
   "encapsulate" a Prefix Information Option (PIO), which would mark
   that this certain advertised IPv6 prefix belongs and originates from
   a specific provisioning domain.  However, if the implementation does
   not understand provisioning domains, then this specific PIO is also
   skipped and not configured on the interface.

   The optional security for the PVD container is based on X.509
   certificates [RFC6487] and reuses mechanisms already defined for SeND
   [RFC3971] [RFC6495].  However, the use of PVD containers does not
   assume or depend on SeND being deployed or even implemented.  The PVD
   containers SHOULD be signed per PVD certificates, which provides both
   integrity protection and proves that the configuration information
   source is authorized for advertising the given information.  See
   [RFC6494] for discussion how to enable deployments where the
   certificates needed to sign PVD containers belong to different
   administrative domains i.e., to different provisioning domains.

















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    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  Type=PVD_CO  |    Length     |   Name Type   | r |   Sec
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      Length |     ID Length       |     Key Hash (optional)       ~
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   ~                Digital Signature (optional)                   ~
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                          PVD Identity                         ~
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   ~       Possible zero padding to ensure 8 octets alignment      |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   ~           Zero or more  "encapsulated" NDP options            ~
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                      Figure 1: PVD Container Option

   Type

       PVD Container; Set to TBD1.

   Length

       Length of the PVD_CO.  The actual length depends on the number of
       "encapsulated" NDP options, length of the PVD Identity, and the
       optional Key Hash/Digital Signature/Padding.

   Name Type

       Names the algorithm used to identify a specific X.509 certificate
       using the method defined for the Subject Key Identifier (SKI)
       extension for the X.509 certificates.  The usage and the Name
       Type registry aligns with the mechanism defined for SeND
       [RFC6495].  Name Type values starting from 3 are supported and an
       implementation MUST at least support SHA-1 (value 3).  Note that
       if Sec Length=0 the Name field serves no use and MUST be set to
       0.

   r

       Reserved.  MUST be set to 0 and ignored when received.

   Sec Length

       11-bit length of the Key Hash and Digital Signature in a units of
       1 octet.  When no security is enabled the Sec Length MUST be set
       to value of 0.



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   ID Length

       11-bit length of the PVD Identity in a units of 1 octet.  The ID
       Length MUST be greater than 0.

   Key Hash

       This field is only present when Sec Length>0.  A hash of the
       public key using the algorithm identified by the Name Type.  The
       procedure how the Key Hash is calculated is defined in [RFC3971]
       and [RFC6495].

   Digital Signature

       This field is only present when Sec Length>0.  A signature
       calculated over the PVD_CO option including all option data from
       the beginning of the option until to the end of the container.
       The procedure of calculating the signature is identical to the
       one defined for SeND [RFC3971].  During the signature calculation
       the contents of the Digital Signature option MUST be treated as
       all zero.

   PVD Identity

       The provisioning domain identity.  The contents of this field is
       defined in a separate document [I-D.ietf-mif-mpvd-id].

   Implementations MUST ensure that the PVD container option meets the 8
   octets NDP option alignment requirement as described in [RFC4861].

   If the PVD_CO does not contain a digital signature, then other means
   to secure the integrity of the NDP message SHOULD be provided, such
   as utilizing SeND.  However, the security provided by SeND is for the
   entire NDP message and does not allow verifying whether the sender of
   the NDP message is actually authorized for the information for the
   provisioning domain.

   If the PVD_CO contains a signature and the verification fails, then
   the whole PVD_CO option MUST be silently ignored and the event SHOULD
   be logged.

4.  Set of allowable options

   The PVD container option MAY be used to encapsulate any allocated
   IPv6 NDP options, which may appear more than once in a NDP message.
   The PVD container option MUST NOT be used to encapsulate other PVD_CO
   option(s).




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5.  Security Considerations

   An attacker may attempt to modify the information provided inside the
   PVD container option.  These attacks can easily be prevented by using
   SeND [RFC3971] or per PVD container signature that would detect any
   form of tampering with the IPv6 NDP message contents.

   A compromised router may advertise configuration information related
   to provisioning domains it is not authorized to advertise. e.g.  A
   coffee shop router may provide configuration information purporting
   to be from an enterprise and may try to attract enterprise related
   traffic.  The only real way to avoid this is that the provisioning
   domain container contains embedded authentication and authorization
   information from the owner of the provisioning domain.  Then, this
   attack can be detected by the client by verifying the authentication
   and authorization information provided inside the PVD container
   option after verifying its trust towards the provisioning domain
   owner (e.g. a certificate with a well-known/common trust anchor).

   A compromised configuration source or an on-link attacker may try to
   capture advertised configuration information and replay it on a
   different link or at a future point in time.  This can be avoided by
   including some replay protection mechanism such as a timestamp or a
   nonce inside the PVD container to ensure freshness of the provided
   information.  This specification does not define a replay protection
   solution.  Rather it is assumed that if replay protection is
   required, the access network and hosts also deploy existing security
   solutions such as SeND [RFC3971].

6.  IANA Considerations

   This document defines two new IPv6 NDP options into the "IPv6
   Neighbor Discovery Option Formats" registry.  Option TBD1 is
   described in Section 3.

7.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank the members of the MIF architecture
   design team for their comments that led to the creation of this
   draft.

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References







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   [I-D.ietf-mif-mpvd-id]
              Krishnan, S., Korhonen, J., Bhandari, S., and S.
              Gundavelli, "Identification of provisioning domains",
              draft-ietf-mif-mpvd-id-02 (work in progress), October
              2015.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3971]  Arkko, J., Ed., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander,
              "SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3971, March 2005,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3971>.

   [RFC4861]  Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
              "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4861, September 2007,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4861>.

   [RFC6494]  Gagliano, R., Krishnan, S., and A. Kukec, "Certificate
              Profile and Certificate Management for SEcure Neighbor
              Discovery (SEND)", RFC 6494, DOI 10.17487/RFC6494,
              February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6494>.

   [RFC6495]  Gagliano, R., Krishnan, S., and A. Kukec, "Subject Key
              Identifier (SKI) SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) Name
              Type Fields", RFC 6495, DOI 10.17487/RFC6495, February
              2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6495>.

8.2.  Informative References

   [RFC6487]  Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
              X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.

   [RFC7556]  Anipko, D., Ed., "Multiple Provisioning Domain
              Architecture", RFC 7556, DOI 10.17487/RFC7556, June 2015,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7556>.

Appendix A.  Examples








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A.1.  One implicit PVD and one explicit PVD

   Figure 2 shows how the NDP options are laid out in an RA for one
   implicit provisioning domain and one explicit provisioning domain.
   The example does not include security (and signing of the PVD
   container).  The assumption is the PVD identity consumes total 18
   octets (for example encoding a NAI Realm string "dana.example.com").

   The explicit provisioning domain contains a specific PIO for
   2001:db8:abad:cafe::/64 and the MTU of 1337 octets.  The implicit
   provisioning domain configures a prefix 2001:db8:cafe:babe::/64 and
   the link MTU of 1500 octets.  There are two cases: 1) the host
   receiving the RA implements provisioning domains and 2) the host does
   not understand provisioning domains.


   1.  The host recognizes the PVD_CO and "starts" a provisioning domain
       specific configuration.  Security is disabled, thus there are no
       Key Hash or Digital Signature fields to process.  The prefix
       2001:db8:abad:cafe::/64 is found and configured on the interface.
       Once the PVD_ID option is located the interface prefix
       configuration for 2001:db8:abad:cafe::/64 and the MTU of 1337
       octets can be associated to the provisioning domain found in the
       PVD_CO option.

       The rest of the options are parsed and configured into the
       implicit provisioning domain since there is no encapsulating
       provisioning domain.  The interface is configured with prefix
       2001:db8:cafe:babe::/64.  The implicit provisioning domain uses
       the link MTU of 1500 octets, whereas the "dana.example.com"
       provisioning domain uses the MTU of 1337 octets (this means when
       packets are sourced using 2001:db8:abad:cafe::/64 prefix the link
       MTU is different than when sourcing packets using
       2001:db8:cafe:babe::/64 prefix).


   2.  The host ignores the PVD_CO and ends up configuring one prefix on
       its interface ( 2001:db8:cafe:babe::/64) with a link MTU of 1500
       octets.












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    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |      134      |       0       |          Checksum             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | Cur Hop Limit |0|1|  Reserved |       Router Lifetime         |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                         Reachable Time                        |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                          Retrans Timer                        |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ <+
   |  Type=PVD_CO  |       8       |      0        | 0 |     0     ~  |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+  |
   ~         |        18           | PVD_ID consuming 18 octets    |  |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+  |
   |       3       |       4       |      64       |1|1| Reserved1 |  |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                         Valid Lifetime                        |  P
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+  V
   |                       Preferred Lifetime                      |  D
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                           Reserved2                           |  |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+  |
   |                      2001:db8:abad:cafe::                     ~  |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+  |
   |        5      |       1       |           Reserved            |  |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+  |
   |                            1337                               |  |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ <+
   |       3       |       4       | Prefix Length |1|1| Reserved1 |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                         Valid Lifetime                        |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                       Preferred Lifetime                      |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                           Reserved2                           |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                      2001:db8:cafe:babe::                     ~
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |        5      |      1        |           Reserved            |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                            1500                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

        Figure 2: An RA with one implicit PVD and one explicit PVD






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Authors' Addresses

   Jouni Korhonen
   Broadcom Limited
   3151 Zanker Road
   San Jose, CA  95134
   USA

   Email: jouni.nospam@gmail.com


   Suresh Krishnan
   Ericsson
   8400 Decarie Blvd.
   Town of Mount Royal, QC
   Canada

   Phone: +1 514 345 7900 x42871
   Email: suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com


   Sri Gundavelli
   Cisco Systems
   170 West Tasman Drive
   San Jose, CA  95134
   USA

   Email: sgundave@cisco.com























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