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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 RFC 4877
MIP6 Working Group V. Devarapalli
Internet-Draft Nokia
Expires: April 18, 2005 October 18, 2004
Mobile IPv6 Operation with IKEv2 and the revised IPsec Architecture
draft-ietf-mip6-ikev2-ipsec-00.txt
Status of this Memo
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004).
Abstract
This document describes Mobile IPv6 operation with the revised IPsec
architecture and IKEv2.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. What is applicavble from RFC 3776? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1 Packet Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.1 Home Agent Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.2 Mobile Node Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Manual Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1 Binding Update and Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2 Return Routabililty Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3 Mobile Prefix Discovery Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.4 Payload Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Dynamic Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1 Security Policy Database Entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1.1 Binding Updates and Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1.2 Return Routability Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.1.3 Mobile Prefix Discovery Messages . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.1.4 Payload Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.2 Security Association negotiation using IKEv2 . . . . . . . 12
6. The use of EAP authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. Dynamic Home Address Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
11.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
11.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 21
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1. Introduction
RFC 3776 describes how IPsec [7] is used with Mobile IPv6 [2] to
protect the signaling messages. It also illustrates the Security
Policy Database and Security Association Database entries required to
protect Mobile IPv6 signaling messages.
The IPsec architecture has been revised [5]. Among the many changes,
the list of selectors has been expanded to included the Mobility
Header message type. This has an impact on how security policies and
security associations are configured for protecting mobility header
messages. It becomes easier to differentiate between the various
Mobility Header messages based on the type value instead of checking
if a particular mobility header message is being sent on a tunnel
interface between the MN and the HA, as it was in RFC 3776. The
revised IPsec architecture specification also includes ICMP message
type and code as selectors. This makes it possible to protect Mobile
Prefix Discovery messages without applying the same security
associations to all ICMPv6 messages.
This document discusses new requirements for the Home Agent and the
Mobile Node to use the revised IPsec architecture and IKEv2. Section
3.2 lists the requirements. Section 3 describes the differences with
RFC 3776. Section 4 describes the required Security Policy Database
(SPD) and Security Association Database (SAD) entries.
The Internet Key Exchange (IKE) has also been substantially revised
and simplified [4]. This document describes how IKEv2 can be used to
setup security associations for Mobile IPv6.
The use of EAP within IKEv2 is allowed to authenticate the Mobile
Node to the Home Agent. This is described in Section 6. A method
for dynamically configuring a Home Address from the Home Agent using
the Configuration Payload in IKEv2 is described in Section 7.
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2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [1].
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3. What is applicavble from RFC 3776?
3.1 Packet Formats
The Mobile Node and the Home Agent MUST support the packet formats as
defined in Seciton 3 of RFC 3776.
3.2 Requirements
The Mobile Node and the Home Agent MUST support the requirements
listed in Section 4 of RFC 3776 with the following exceptions.
o It is not required to configure security policies per interface in
order to protect return routability signaling messages. Since the
Mobility Header message type is a selector, it is easy to
differentiate HoTi and HoT messages from other Mobility Header
messages.
o It is necessary to avoid a condition where a mobile ndoe could use
its security association to send a Binding Update on behalf of
another Mobile Node. With manual IPsec configuration, the Home
Agent MUST be able to verify that a security association was
created for a particular Home Address. With dynamic keying, it
should be possible for the Home Agent to verify that the identity
presented in the IKE_AUTH exchange is allowed to create security
associations for a particular home address.
o The Mobile Node should use its Care-of Address as source address
in protocol exchanges, when using dynamic keying. However, the
security associations MUST be created for the Home Address of the
Mobile Node.
o The Mobile Node and the Home Agent MUST create security
associations based on the Home Address, so that the security
associations survive change in Care-of Address. When using IKEv2
as the key exchange protocol, the TSi payload during the
CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange [4] MUST carry the Home Address of the
Mobile Node.
3.2.1 Home Agent Requirements
This section describes some new and additional requirements on the
Home Agent.
o The Home Agent MUST support Mobility Header message type as an
IPsec selector.
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o The Home Agent MUST support ICMPv6 message type as an IPsec
selector.
o The Home Agent MUST be able to distinguish between HoTi messages
sent to itself, when it is acting as a Correspondent Node) from
those sent to Correspondent Nodes when it is acting as a Home
Agent, based on the destination address of the packet.
o The Home Agent MUST have an entry for each Mobile Node in its Peer
Authorization Database (PAD), [5]. The PAD entry for a Mobile
Node contains either a shared key or a trust anchor to verify the
Mobile Node's certificate.
o The Home Agent MUST support remote configuration of Home Address
as descrined in Section 7. When the Home Agent receives a
configuration payload with a CFG_REQUEST for INTERNAL_IP6_ADDR, it
must reply with a valid Home Address for the Mobile Node. The
Home Agent could pick a Home Address from a local database or from
a DHCPv6 server on the home link.
o The Home Agent MAY support authentication using EAP in IKEv2 as
described in Section 2.16 of [4].
3.2.2 Mobile Node Requirements
This section describes new additional requirements on the Mobile
Node.
o The Mobile Node MUST support Mobility Header message type as an
IPsec selector.
o The Mobile Node MUST supprt ICMPv6 message type as an IPsec
selector.
o The Mobile Node MAY support EAP as an authentication mechanism
when using IKEv2 to setup security associations for protecting
Mobile IPv6 signaling messages.
o The Mobile Node MAY support the mechanism described in Section 7
to dynamically configure a Home Address.
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4. Manual Configuration
This section describes the SPD and SAD entries necessary to protect
the Mobile IPv6 signaling messages. The format used to describe the
SPD and SAD entries is the same as described in RFC 3776.
For the examples described in this document, a Mobile Node with home
address, "home_address_1", a Home Agent with addres, "home_agent_1"
and a user of the Mobile Node with identity "user_1" are assumed.
4.1 Binding Update and Acknowledgements
mobile node SPD-S:
- IF source = home_address_1 & destination = home_agent_1 &
proto = MH & mh_type = BU
THEN USE SA SA1
mobile node SPD-I:
- IF source = home_agent_1 & destination = home_address_1 &
proto = MH & mh_type = BAck
THEN USE SA SA2
mobile node SAD:
- SA1(OUT, spi_a, home_agent_1, ESP, TRANSPORT):
source = home_address_1 & destination = home_agent_1 &
proto = MH & mh_type = BU
- SA2(IN, spi_b, home_address_1, ESP, TRANSPORT):
source = home_agent_1 & destination = home_address_1 &
proto = MH & mh_type = BAck
home agent SPD-S:
- IF source = home_agent_1 & destination = home_address_1 &
proto = MH & mh_type = BAck
THEN USE SA SA2
home agent SPD-I:
- IF source = home_address_1 & destination = home_agent_1 &
proto = MH & mh_type = BU
THEN USE SA SA1
home agent SAD:
- SA2(OUT, spi_b, home_address_1, ESP, TRANSPORT):
source = home_agent_1 & destination = home_address_1 &
proto = MH & mh_type = BAck
- SA1(IN, spi_a, home_agent_1, ESP, TRANSPORT):
source = home_address_1 & destination = home_agent_1 &
proto = MH & mh_type = BU
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4.2 Return Routabililty Messages
mobile node SPD-S:
- IF source = home_address_1 & destination = any &
proto = MH & mh_type = HoTi
THEN USE SA SA3
mobile node SPD-I:
- IF destination = home_address_1 & source = any &
proto = MH & mh_type = HoT
THEN USE SA SA4
mobile node SAD:
- SA3(OUT, spi_c, home_agent_1, ESP, TUNNEL):
source = home_address_1 & destination = any & proto = MH &
mh_type = HoTi
- SA4(IN, spi_d, care_of_address_1, ESP, TUNNEL):
source = any & destination = home_address_1 & proto = MH &
mh_type = HoT
home agent SPD-S:
- IF destination = home_address_1 & source = any &
proto = MH & mh_type = HoT
THEN USE SA SA4
home agent SPD-I:
- IF source = home_address_1 & destination = any &
proto = MH & mh_type = HoTi
THEN USE SA SA3
home agent SAD:
- SA4(OUT, spi_d, care_of_address_1, ESP, TUNNEL):
source = any & destination = home_address_1 & proto = MH &
mh_type = HoT
- SA3(IN, spi_c, home_agent_1, ESP, TUNNEL):
source = home_address_1 & destination = any & proto = MH &
mh_type = HoTi
4.3 Mobile Prefix Discovery Messages
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mobile node SPD-S:
- IF source = home_address_1 & destination = home_agent_1 &
proto = ICMPv6 & icmp6_type = MPS
THEN USE SA SA5.
mobile node SPD-I:
- IF source = home_agent_1 & destination = home_address_1 &
proto = ICMPv6 & icmp6_type = MPA
THEN USE SA SA6
mobile node SAD:
- SA5(OUT, spi_e, home_agent_1, ESP, TRANSPORT):
source = home_address_1 & destination = home_agent_1 &
proto = ICMPv6 & icmp6_type = MPS
- SA6(IN, spi_f, home_address_1, ESP, TRANSPORT):
source = home_agent_1 & destination = home_address_1 &
proto = ICMPv6 & icmp6_type = MPA
home agent SPD-S:
- IF source = home_agent_1 & destination = home_address_1 &
proto = ICMPv6 & icmp6_type = MPA
THEN USE SA SA6
home agent SPD-I:
- IF source = home_address_1 & destination = home_agent_1 &
proto = ICMPv6 & icmp6_type = MPS
THEN USE SA SA5
home agent SAD:
- SA6(OUT, spi_f, home_address_1, ESP, TRANSPORT):
source = home_agent_1 & destination = home_address_1 &
proto = ICMPv6 & icmp6_type = MPA
- SA5(IN, spi_e, home_agent_1, ESP, TRANSPORT):
source = home_address_1 & destination = home_agent_1 &
proto = ICMPv6 & icmp6_type = MPS
4.4 Payload Packets
Payload traffic tunneled through the Home Agent can be protected by
IPsec, if required. The Mobile Node and the Home Agent use ESP in
tunnel mode to protect the tunneled traffic. The SPD and SAD entries
shown in Section 5.2.4 of [3] are applicable here.
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5. Dynamic Configuration
This section describes the use of IKEv2 to setup the required
security associatiosn.
5.1 Security Policy Database Entries
5.1.1 Binding Updates and Acknowledgements
mobile node SPD-S:
- IF destination = home_agent_1 & proto = MH & mh_type = BU
THEN USE SA ESP TRANSPORT: local identity = user_1
mobile node SPD-I:
- IF source = home_agent_1 & proto = MH & mh_type = BAck
THEN USE SA ESP TRANSPORT: local identity = user_1
home agent SPD-S:
- IF source = home_agent_1 & proto = MH & mh_type = BAck
THEN USE SA ESP TRANSPORT: peer identity = user_1
home agent SPD-I:
- IF destination = home_agent_1 & proto = MH & mh_type = BU
THEN USE SA ESP TRANSPORT: peer identity = user_1
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5.1.2 Return Routability Messages
mobile node SPD-S:
- IF proto = MH & mh_type = HoTi
THEN USE SA ESP TUNNEL: outer destination = home_agent_1 &
local identity = user_1 &
inner source address =home_address_1
mobile node SPD-I:
- IF source = any & destination = home_address_1 &
proto = MH & mh_type = HoT
THEN USE SA ESP TUNNEL: outer destination = home_agent_1 &
local identity = user_1
home agent SPD-S:
- IF source = any & destination = home_address_1 &
proto = MH & mh_type = HoT
THEN USE SA ESP TUNNEL: inner destination = home_address_1
& peer identity = user_1
home agent SPD-I:
- IF source = home_address_1 & destination = any &
proto = MH & mh_type = HoTi
THEN USE SA ESP TUNNEL: inner destination = home_address_1
& peer identity = user_1
5.1.3 Mobile Prefix Discovery Messages
mobile node SPD-S:
- IF destination = home_agent_1 & proto = ICMPv6 &
icmp6_type = MPS
THEN USE SA ESP TRANSPORT: local identity = user_1
mobile node SPD-I:
- IF source = home_agent_1 & proto = ICMPv6 & icmp6_type = MPA
THEN USE SA ESP TRANSPORT: local identity = user_1
home agent SPD-S:
- IF source = home_agent_1 & proto = ICMPv6 & icmp6_type = MPA
THEN USE SA ESP TRANSPORT: peer identity = user_1
home agent SPD-I:
- IF destination = home_agent_1 & proto = ICMPv6 &
icmp6_type = MPS
THEN USE SA ESP TRANSPORT: peer identity = user_1
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5.1.4 Payload Packets
The SPD and SAD entries shown in Section 5.3.4 of [3] are applicable
here. This document does not update the SPD and SAD entries
described in RFC3776 for protecting payload packets.
5.2 Security Association negotiation using IKEv2
Mobile IPv6 signaling messages are always first initiated by the
Mobile Node. The Mobile Node sends a Binding Update to the Home
Agent whenever it moves and acquires a new Care-of Address.
The Mobile Node initiates an IKEv2 protocol exchange if the required
security associations are not present. For authenticating the Home
Agent, public key based mechanisms MUST be used. The Mobile Node
includes a Certificate Request payload in the first message sent in
the IKE_AUTH exchange. If the Mobile Node is using a shared key for
authentication, it uses the shared key to generate the AUTH payload
in the IKE_AUTH exchange. If the Mobile Node is using a public key
based mechanism, then it uses its private key to generate the AUTH
payload in the IKE_AUTH exchange. The Mobile Node MUST always
includes its identity in the IDi payload in the IKE_AUTH exchange.
The Mobile Node could use a FQDN or RFC 822 [13] identifier as
identities. In case the Mobile Node uses FQDN, it sets the IDi type
to ID_FQDN. In case, the Mobile Nodes uses a RFC 822 kind of
identifier, it sets the IDi type to ID_RFC822_ADDR.
Mobile Node Home Agent
----------- ----------
HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni -->
<-- HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr, [CERTREQ]
HDR, SK {IDi, [CERT,] [CERTREQ,] [IDr,]
AUTH, SAi2, TSi, TSr}
-->
<-- HDR, SK {IDr, [CERT,] AUTH,
SAr2, TSi, TSr}
After the IKE_AUTH exchange completes, the Mobile Node and the Home
Agent initiate CREATE_CHILD_SA exchanges to negotiate security
associations for protecting Binding Update/Binding Ack messages,
Return Routability signaling, Mobile Prefix Discovery messages and
optionally payload traffic. The CREATE_CHILD_SA exchanges are
protected by the security association created during the IKE_AUTH
exchange.
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It is important that the security associations are created based on
the Home Address of the Mobile Node, so that the security
associations survive Care-of Address change. The Mobile Node MUST
set the TSi (Traffic Selector-initiator) payload to its Home Address
in the CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange in order to create the security
associations for the Home Address.
Mobile Node Home Agent
----------- ----------
HDR, SK {[N], SA, Ni, [KEi],
[TSi, TSr]} -->
<-- HDR, SK {SA, Nr, [KEr],
[TSi, TSr]}
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6. The use of EAP authentication
In addition to using public key signatures and shared secrets, EAP
[14] can be used with IKEv2 for authenticating the Mobile Node to the
Home Agent.
The Mobile Node indicates that it wants to use EAP by including the
IDi payload but leaving out the AUTH payload in the first message
during the IKE_AUTH exchange. The Home Agent includes an EAP payload
if it is willing to use an extensible authentication method.
Security associations are not created until the subsequent IKE_AUTH
exchange after successful EAP authentication.
Mobile Node Home Agent
------------ ----------
HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni -->
<-- HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr, [CERTREQ]
HDR, SK {IDi, [CERTREQ,] [IDr,]
SAi2, TSi, TSr}-->
<-- HDR, SK {IDr, [CERT,] AUTH,
EAP }
HDR, SK {EAP} -->
<-- HDR, SK {EAP (success)}
HDR, SK {AUTH} -->
<-- HDR, SK {AUTH, SAr2, TSi,
TSr}
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7. Dynamic Home Address Configuration
The Mobile Node can dynamically configure a Home Address by including
a Configuration Payload with a request for an address from the home
link. The Mobile Node MUST include an INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS and
INTERNAL_IP6_SUBNET attributes in the Configuration Payload. The
Mobile Node MAY also include an INTERNAL_IP6_DNS attribute.
When the Home Agent receives a configuration payload with a
CFG_REQUEST for INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS, it replies with a valid Home
Address for the Mobile Node. The Home Agent could use a local
database or contact a DHCPv6 server on the home link to allocate a
Home Address. The Home Agent MUST also include an
INTERNAL_ADDRESS_EXPIRY attribute to indicate to the Mobile Node, the
duration for which the dynamically allocated Home Address is valid.
In case the Home Agent is unable to allocate a Home Address for the
Mobile Node during the IKE_AUTH exhcange, it MUST send a Notify
Payload with an INTERNAL_ADDRESS_FAILURE message.
Mobile Node Home Agent
----------- ----------
HDR, SK {IDi, [CERT,] [CERTREQ,]
[IDr,] AUTH, CP(CFG_REQUEST),
SAi2, TSi, TSr}
-->
<-- HDR, SK {IDr, [CERT,] AUTH,
CP(CFG_REPLY), SAr2,
TSi, TSr}
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8. Security Considerations
This document describes how IPsec can be used to secure Mobile IPv6
signaling messages. Please refer to RFC 3775 and RFC 3776 for
security considerations related to the use of IPsec with Mobile IPv6.
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9. IANA Considerations
This document requires no action from IANA.
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10. Acknowledgements
TBD
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11. References
11.1 Normative References
[1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[2] Johnson, D., Perkins, C. and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support in
IPv6", RFC 3775, June 2004.
[3] Arkko, J., Devarapalli, V. and F. Dupont, "Using IPsec to
Protect Mobile IPv6 Signaling Between Mobile Nodes and Home
Agents", RFC 3776, June 2004.
[4] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
draft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-17 (work in progress), October 2004.
[5] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the Internet
Protocol", draft-ietf-ipsec-rfc2401bis-03 (work in progress),
September 2004.
[6] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
draft-ietf-ipsec-esp-v3-09 (work in progress), October 2004.
11.2 Informative References
[7] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.
[8] Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)",
RFC 2409, November 1998.
[9] Giaretta, G., Guardini, I., Demaria, E., Bournelle, J. and M.
Laurent-Maknavicius, "MIPv6 Authorization and Configuration
based on EAP", draft-giaretta-mip6-authorization-eap (work in
progress), October 2004.
[10] Giaretta, G., "Goals for AAA-HA interface",
draft-giaretta-mip6-aaa-ha-goals-00 (work in progress),
September 2004.
[11] Yegin, A., "AAA Mobile IPv6 Application Framework",
draft-yegin-mip6-aaa-fwk-00 (work in progress), September 2004.
[12] Patel, A., "Problem Statement for bootstrapping Mobile IPv6",
draft-ietf-mip6-bootstrap-ps-01 (work in progress), October
2004.
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[13] Crocker, D., "Standard for the format of ARPA Internet text
messages", STD 11, RFC 822, August 1982.
[14] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J. and H.
Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC
3748, June 2004.
Author's Address
Vijay Devarapalli
Nokia Research Center
313 Fairchild Drive
Mountain View, CA 94043
USA
EMail: vijay.devarapalli@nokia.com
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