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Versions: (draft-allan-mpls-oam-frmwk) 00 01 02 03 04 05 RFC 4378

 Internet Draft                                   David Allan, Editor
 Document: draft-ietf-mpls-oam-frmwk-00.txt           Nortel Networks
                                             Thomas D. Nadeau, Editor
                                                   Cisco Systems, Inc.
 Category: Informational
 Expires: May 2005                                      November 2004

                 A Framework for MPLS Operations
                       and Management (OAM)

 Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, we certify that any applicable
   patent or other IPR claims of which we are aware have been disclosed,
   or will be disclosed, and any of which we become aware will be
   disclosed, in accordance with RFC 3668.

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is subject to all
   provisions of section 3 of RFC 3667.  By submitting this
   Internet-Draft, each author represents that any applicable patent
   or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware have been or will
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    This document is a framework for how data plane OAM functions can be
    applied to operations and maintenance procedures. The document is
    structured to outline how OAM functionality can be used to assist in
    fault management, configuration, accounting, performance management
    and security, commonly known by the acronym FCAPS.

 Table of Contents

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 1.    Introduction and Scope ........................................2
 2.    Terminology....................................................2
 3.    Fault Management...............................................2
    3.1 Fault detection...............................................2
    3.1.1 Enumeration and detection of types of data plane faults.....3
    3.1.2 Timeliness..................................................5
    3.2 Diagnosis.....................................................5
    3.2.1 Characterization............................................5
    3.2.2 Isolation...................................................5
    3.3 Availability..................................................5
 4.    Configuration Management.......................................5
 5.    Accounting.....................................................6
 6.    Performance measurement........................................6
 7.    Security.......................................................6
 8.    Full Copyright Statement.......................................7
 9.    Intellectual Property Rights Notices...........................7
 10.   References.....................................................7
 11.   Editors Address................................................8

 1. Introduction and Scope

    This memo outlines in broader terms how data plane OAM functionality
    can assist in meeting the operations and management (OAM)
    requirements outlined in [REQ] and can apply to the operational
    functions of fault, configuration, accounting, performance and
    security (commonly known as FCAPS). The approach of the document is
    to outline the requisite functionality, the potential mechanisms to
    provide the function and the applicability of data plane OAM

 2. Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.

    OAM          Operations and Management
    FCAPS        Fault, Administration, Configuration,
                 Provisioning, and Security
    ILM          Incoming Label Map
    NHLFE        Next Hop Label Forwarding Entry
    MIB          Management Information Base
    LSR          Label Switching Router
    RTT          Round Trip Time

 3. Fault Management

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 3.1 Fault detection

    Fault detection encompasses identifying all causes of failure to
    transfer information between the ingress and egress of an LSP
    ingress.  This section will enumerate common failure scenarios and
    explain how one might (or might not) detect the situation.

 3.1.1 Enumeration and detection of types of data plane faults

    Physical layer faults:

         Lower layer faults are those that impact the physical layer or
         link layer that transports MPLS between adjacent LSRs. Some
         physical links (such as SONET/SDH) may have link layer OAM
         functionality and detect and notify the LSR of link layer
         faults directly. Some physical links (such as Ethernet) may not
         have this capability and require MPLS or IP layer heartbeats to
         detect failures. However, once detected, reaction to these
         fault notifications is often the same as those described in the
         first case.

    Node failures:

         Node failures are those that impact the forwarding capability
         of an entire node, including its entire set of links. This can
         be due to component failure, power outage, or reset of control
         processor in an LSR employing a distributed architecture, etc.

    MPLS LSP misbranching:

         Misbranching occurs when there is a loss of synchronization
         between the data and the control planes. This can occur due to
         hardware failure, software failure or configuration problems.
         It will manifest itself in one of two forms:

         - packets belonging to a particular LSP are cross connected
           into a an NHLFE for which there is no corresponding ILM at
           the next downstream LSR. This can occur in cases where the
           NHLFE entry is corrupted. Therefore the packet arrives at
           the next LSR with a top label value for which the LSR has no
           corresponding forwarding information, and is typically
           dropped. This is a No Incoming Label Map (ILM) condition and
           can be detected directly by the downstream LSR which
           receives the incorrectly labeled packet.

         - packets belonging to a particular LSP are cross connected
           into an incorrect NHLFE entry for which there is a
           corresponding ILM at the next downstream LSR, but which was
           is associated with a different L
SP. This may be detected by
           a number of means:

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              o some or all of the misdirected traffic is not routable
                at the egress node.
              o Or OAM probing is able to detect the fault by detecting
                the inconsistency between the path and the control

    Discontinuities in the MPLS Encapsulation
         The forwarding path of the FEC carried by an LSP may transit
         nodes for which MPLS is not configured. This may result in a
         number of behaviors (most undesirable). When there was only one
         label in the stack and the payload was IP, IP forwarding will
         direct the packet to the correct interface. This would be the
         same if PHP is employed. Packets with a label stack will be
         discarded (Tom: can you confirm this for your end).

    MTU problems
         MTU problems occur when client traffic cannot be fragmented by
         intermediate LSRs, and is dropped somewhere along the path of
         the LSP. MTU problems should appear as a discrepancy in the
         traffic count between the set of ingresses and the egresses for
         a FEC and will appear in the corresponding MIB performance
         tables in the transit LSRs as discarded packets.

    TTL Mishandling
         Some Penultimate hop LSRs may consistently process TTL expiry
         and propagation at penultimate hop LSRs. In these cases, it is
         possible for tools that rely on consistent processing to fail.

         Congestion occurs when the offered load on any interface
         exceeds the link capacity for sufficient time that the
         interface buffering is exhausted. Congestion problems will
         appear as a discrepancy in the traffic count between the set of
         ingresses and the egresses for a FEC and will appear in the MIB
         performance tables in the transit LSRs as discarded packets.

         Misordering of LSP traffic occurs when incorrect or
         inappropriate load sharing is implemented within an MPLS
         network. Load sharing typically takes place when equal cost
         paths exist between the ingress and egress of an LSP. In these
         cases, traffic is split among these equal cost paths using a
         variety of algorithms. One such algorithm relies on splitting
         traffic between each path on a per-packet basis. When this is
         done, it is possible for some packets along the path to be
         delayed due to congestion or slower links, which may result in
         packets being received out of order at the egress. Detection
         and remedy of this situation may be left up to client
         applications that use the LSPs. For instance, TCP is capable of
         re-ordering packets belonging to a specific flow. Detection of

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         mis-ordering can also be determined by sending probe traffic
         along the path and verifying that all probe traffic is indeed
         received in the order it was transmitted.

         LSRs do not normally implement mechanisms to detect misordering
         of flows.

    Payload Corruption
         Payload corruption may occur and be undetectable by LSRs. Such
         errors are typically detected by client payload integrity

 3.1.2 Timeliness

    The design of SLAs and systems requires that ample headroom be
    alloted in terms of their processing capabilites in order to
    to process and handle all necessary fault conditions within the
    bounds stipulated in the SLA. This includes planning for event hand
    ling using a time budget which takes into account the over-all SLA
    and time to address any defects which arise. However, it is
    possible that some fault conditions may surpass this budget due
    their catastrophic nature (i.e.: fibre cut) or due to misplanning
    of the time processing budget.

        ^    --------------
        |    |           ^
        |    |           |----  Time to notify NOC + process/correct
  SLA   |    |           v      defect
  Max - |    -------------
  Time  |    |           ^
        |    |           |-----  Time to detect/diagnose fault
        |    |           v
        v    -------------

        Figure 1: Fault Correction Budget

    In figure 1, we represent the overall fault correction time budget
    by the maximum time as specified in an SLA for the service in
    question. This time is then divided into two subsections, the first
    encompassing the total time required to detect a fault and notify an
    operator (or optionally automatically correct the defect). This
    section may have an explicit maximum time to detect defects arising
    from either the application or a need to do alarm management (i.e.:
    supression) and this will be reflected in the frequency of OAM
    execution. The second section indicates the time required to notify
    the operational systems used to diagnose and correct the defect
    (if they cannot be corrected automatically).

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 3.2 Diagnosis

 3.2.1 Characterization

    Characterization is defined as determining the forwarding path of a
    packet (which may not be necessarily known). Characterization may be
    performed on a working path through the network. This is done for
    example, to determine ECMP paths, the MTU of a path, or simply to
    know the path occupied by a specific FEC. Characterization will be
    able to leverage mechanisms used for isolation.

 3.2.2 Isolation

    Isolation of a fault can occur in two forms. In the first case, the
    local failure is detected, and the node where the failure occurred
    is capable of issuing an alarm for such an event. The node should
    attempt to withdraw the defective resources and/or rectify the
    situation prior to raising an alarm. Active data plane OAM
    mechanisms may also detect the failure conditions remotely and issue
    their own alarms if the situation is not rectified quickly enough.

    In the second case, the fault has not been detected locally. In this
    case, the local node cannot raise an alarm, nor can it be expected
    to rectify the situation. In this case, the failure may be detected
    remotely via data plane OAM.  This mechanism should also be able to
    determine the location of the fault, perhaps on the basis of limited
    information such as a customer complaint. This mechanism may also be
    able to automatically remove the defective resources from and the
    network and restore service, but should at least provide a network
    operator with enough information by which they can perform this
    operation. Given that detection of faults is desired to happen as
    quickly as possible, tools which posses the ability to incrementally
    test LSP health should be used to uncover faults.

 3.3 Availability

    Availability is the measure of the percentage of time that a service
    is operating within specification, often specified by an SLA.

    MPLS has several forwarding modes (depending on the control plane
    used). As such more than one availability models may be defined.

 4.  Configuration Management

    Data plane OAM can assist in configuration management by providing
    the ability to verify configuration of an LSP or of applications
    that may utilize that LSP. This would be an ad-hoc data plane probe

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    that should both verify path integrity (a complete path exists) as
    well as verifying that the path function is synchronized with the
    control plane. The probe would carry as part of the payload relevant
    control plane information that the receiver would be able to compare
    with the local control plane configuration.

 5. Accounting

    The requirements for accounting as specified in [MPLSREQS] do not
    place any requirements on data plane OAM.

 6.  Performance measurement

    Performance measurement permits the information transfer
    characteristics of LSPs to be measured, perhaps in order to
    compare against an SLA. This falls into two categories, latency
    (where jitter is considered a variation in latency) and information

    Latency can be measured in two ways: one is to have precisely
    synchronized clocks at the ingress and egress such that timestamps
    in PDUs flowing from the ingress to the egress can be compared. The
    other is to use an exchange of PING type PDUs that gives a round
    trip time (RTT) measurement, and an estimate of the one way latency
    can be inferred with some loss of precision. Use of load spreading
    techniques such as ECMP mean that any individual RTT measurement is
    only representative of the typical RTT for a FEC.

    To measure information loss, a common practice is to periodically
    read ingress and egress counters (i.e.: MIB module counters). This
    information may also be used for offline correlation. Another common
    practice is to send explicit probe traffic which traverses the data
    plane path in question. This probe traffic can also be used to
    measure jitter and delay.

 7. Security

    Support for intra-provider data plane OAM messaging does not
    introduce any new security concerns to the MPLS architecture.
    Though it does actually address some that already exist, i.e.
    through rigorous defect handling operator's can offer their
    customers a greater degree of integrity protection that their
    traffic will not be misdelivered (for example by being able to
    detect leaking LSP traffic from a VPN).

    Support for inter-provider data plane OAM messaging introduces a
    number of security concerns as by definition, portions of LSPs will
    not be in trusted space, the provider has no control over who may
    inject traffic into the LSP which can be exploited for denial of

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    service attacks. This creates opportunity for malicious
    or poorly behaved users to disrupt network operations. Attempts to
    introduce filtering on target LSP OAM flows may be problematic if
    flows are not visible to intermediate LSRs. However it may be
    possible to interdict flows on the return path between providers (as
    faithfulness to the forwarding path is not a return path
    requirement) to mitigate aspects of this vulnerability.

    OAM tools may permit unauthorized or malicious users to extract
    significant amounts of information about network configuration. This
    would be especially true of IP based tools as in many network
    configurations, MPLS does not typically extend to untrusted hosts,
    but IP does. For example, TTL hiding at ingress and egress LSRs will
    prevent external users from using TTL-based mechanisms to probe an
    operator's network. This suggests that tools used for problem
    diagnosis or which by design are capable of extracting significant
    amounts of information will require authentication and authorization
    of the originator. This may impact the scalability of such tools
    when employed for monitoring instead of diagnosis.

8. Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.

9. Intellectual Property Statement

   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
   Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
   pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
   this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
   might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
   made any independent effort to identify any such rights.  Information
   on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
   found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
   assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
   attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
   such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
   specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at

   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
   rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
   this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF at

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10. Disclaimer of Validity

   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an

11. Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004).  This document is subject
   to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
   except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.

12. Acknowledgment

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
   Internet Society.

 13. References

 13.1  Normative References

 13.2  Informative References

    [RFC3031] Rosen, E., Viswanathan, A., and R. Callon,
              "Multiprotocol Label Switching Architecture", RFC
              3031, January 2001.

    [ALLAN] Allan, D., "Guidelines for MPLS Load Balancing",
            draft-allan-mpls-loadbal-05.txt, IETF work in progress,
            October 2003

    [MPLSREQS] Nadeau et.al., "OAM Requirements for MPLS Networks",
      draft-ietf-mpls-oam-requirements-01.txt, June 2003

    [Y1710] ITU-T Recommendation Y.1710(2002), "Requirements for OAM
      Functionality for MPLS Networks"

 14. Editors' Address

    David Allan
    Nortel Networks              Phone: +1-613-763-6362
    3500 Carling Ave.            Email: dallan@nortelnetworks.com

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    Ottawa, Ontario, CANADA

    Thomas D. Nadeau
    Cisco Systems                Phone: +1-978-936-1470
    300 Beaver Brook Drive       Email: tnadeau@cisco.com
    Boxborough, MA 01824

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