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Versions: (draft-ignjatic-msec-mikey-rsa-r) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 RFC 4738

MSEC WG                                                      D. Ignjatic
Internet-Draft                                                   Polycom
Expires: August 4, 2006                                       L. Dondeti
                                                                F. Audet
                                                                  P. Lin
                                                            JAN 31, 2006

      An additional mode of key distribution in MIKEY: MIKEY-RSA-R

Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
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   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).


   The Multimedia Internet Keying (MIKEY) specification describes
   several modes of key distribution to setup Secure Real-time Rransport
   Protocol (SRTP) sessions -- using pre-shared keys, public keys, and
   optionally a Diffie-Hellman key exchange.  In the public-key mode,

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   the Initiator encrypts a random key with the Responder's public key
   and sends it to the Responder.  In many communication scenarios, the
   Initiator may not know the Responder's public key, or in some cases
   the Responder's ID (e.g., call forwarding) in advance.  We propose a
   new MIKEY mode that works well in such scenarios.  This mode also
   enhances the group key management support in MIKEY; it supports
   member-initiated group key download (in contrast to group manager
   pushing the group keys to all members).

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Terminology used in this document  . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     2.1.  Description of the MIKEY modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     2.2.  Use case motivating the proposed mode  . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  A new MIKEY-RSA mode: MIKEY-RSA-R  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.1.  Outline  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.2.  Components of the I_MESSAGE  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.3.  Components of the R_MESSAGE  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.4.  Additions to RFC 3830 message types and other values . . .  8
       3.4.1.  Modified Table 6.1a from RFC 3830  . . . . . . . . . .  9
       3.4.2.  Modified Table 6.12 from RFC 3830  . . . . . . . . . .  9
       3.4.3.  Modified Table 6.15 from RFC 3830  . . . . . . . . . . 10
   4.  Applicability of the RSA-R and RSA modes . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     4.1.  Limitations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   5.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     5.1.  Impact of the Responder choosing the TGK . . . . . . . . . 12
   6.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   7.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   8.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     8.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     8.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 15

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1.  Introduction

   The MIKEY protocol [RFC3830] has three different methods for key
   transport or exchange: a pre-shared key mode (PSK), a public-key
   (RSA) mode, and an optional Diffie-Hellman exchange (DHE) mode.  In
   addition, there is also an optional DH-HMAC mode [I-D.ietf-msec-
   mikey-dhhmac], bringing the total number of modes to four.  The
   primary motivation for the MIKEY protocol design is low-latency
   requirements of real-time communication, and thus all the exchanges
   finish in one-half to 1 round-trip; note that this offers no room for
   security parameter negotiation of the key management protocol itself.
   In this document, we note that the MIKEY modes defined in RFC3830
   [RFC3830] and [I-D.ietf-msec-mikey-dhhmac] are insufficient to
   address some deployment scenarious and common use cases, and propose
   a new mode called MIKEY-RSA in Reverse mode, or simply as

1.1.  Terminology used in this document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC 2119

2.  Motivation

   As noted in the introduction, the MIKEY specification and other
   proposals define four different modes of efficient key management for
   real-time applications.  Those modes differ from each other in either
   the authentication method of choice (public-key, or symmetric shared
   key-based), or the key establishment method of choice (key download,
   or key agreement using a Diffie-Hellman exchange).  We summarize the
   modes, their advantages, and shortcomings in the following and also
   describe use cases where these modes are unusable or inefficient.

2.1.  Description of the MIKEY modes

   The PSK mode requires that the Initiator and the Responder have a
   common secret key established offline.  In this mode, the Initiator
   selects a TEK Generation Key (TGK), encrypts it with a key derived
   from the PSK, and sends it to the Responder as part of the first
   message, namely, I_MESSAGE.  The I_MESSAGE is replay protected with
   timestamps, and integrity protected with another key derived from the
   PSK.  An optional Verification message from the Responder to the
   Initiator provides mutual authentication.  This mode does not scale
   well as it requires pre-establishment of a shared key between
   communicating parties; for example, consider the use cases where any

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   user may want to communicate to any other user in an Enterprise or
   the Internet at large.  The RSA mode might be more suitable for such

   In the RSA mode, the Initiator selects a TGK, encrypts and
   authenticates it with an envelope key, and sends it to the Responder
   as part of the I_MESSAGE.  The Initiator includes the envelope key,
   encrypted with the Responder's public key, in I_MESSAGE.  The
   I_MESSAGE is replay protected with timestamps, and signed with the
   Initiator's public key.  The Initiator's ID, Certificate (CERT) and
   the Responder's ID that the Initiator intends to talk may be included
   in I_MESSAGE.  If the Initiator knows several public-keys of the
   Responder, it can indicate the key used in the optional CHASH
   payload.  An optional Verification message from the Responder to the
   Initiator provides mutual authentication.  The RSA mode works well if
   the Initiator knows the Responder's ID and the corresponding CERT (or
   can obtain the CERT independent of the MIKEY protocol).  RFC 3830
   suggests that an Initiator, in the event that it does not have the
   Responder's CERT, may obtain the CERT from a directory agent using
   one or more round trips.  However, in some cases, the Initiator may
   not even know the Responder's ID in advance, and because of that or
   for other reasons cannot obtain the Responder's CERT.

   In addition to the case where the Responder may have several IDs,
   some applications may allow for the Responder's ID to change
   unilaterally, as is typical in telephony (e.g., forwarding).  In
   those cases and in others, the Initiator might be willing to let the
   other party establish identity and prove it via an Initiator-trusted
   third party (e.g., a Certification Authority or CA).

   The DH mode or the DH-HMAC mode of MIKEY might be useful in cases
   where the Initiator does not have access to the Responder's exact
   identity and/or CERT.  In these modes, the two parties engage in an
   authenticated DH exchange to derive the TGK.  On the downside, the DH
   modes have higher computational and communication overhead compared
   to the RSA and the PSK modes.  More importantly, these modes are
   unsuitable for group key distribution.

   In summary, in some communication scenarios -- where the Initiator
   might not have the correct ID and/or the CERT of the Responder --
   none of the MIKEY modes described in [RFC3830] and [I-D.ietf-msec-
   mikey-dhhmac] are suitable/efficient for SRTP [RFC3711] key

2.2.  Use case motivating the proposed mode

   In addition to the issues listed above, there are some types of
   applications that motivate the new MIKEY mode design proposed in this

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   Note that in the MIKEY-RSA mode (as in case of the PSK mode), the
   Initiator proposes the SRTP security policy, and chooses the TGK.
   However, it is also possible that the Initiator wants to allow the
   Responder to specify the security policy and send the TGK.  Consider
   for example the case of a conferencing scenario where the convener
   sends an invitation to a group of people to attend a meeting.  The
   procedure then might be for the invitees to request the convener for
   group key material by sending a MIKEY I_MESSAGE.  Thus, in the MIKEY
   definition of initiators and responders, the Initiator is asking the
   Responder for keying material.  Note that this mode of operation is
   inline with the MSEC group key management architecture [RFC4046].

3.  A new MIKEY-RSA mode: MIKEY-RSA-R

3.1.  Outline

   The proposed MIKEY mode requires 1 full round trip.  The Initiator
   sends a signed I_MESSAGE to the intended Responder requesting the
   Responder to send the SRTP keying material.  The I_MESSAGE MAY
   contain the Initiator's CERT or a link (URL) to the CERT, and
   similarly the Responder's reply, R_MESSAGE MAY contain the
   Responder's CERT or a link to it.  The Responder can use the
   Initiator's public key from the CERT in the I_MESSAGE to send the
   encrypted TGK in the R_MESSAGE.  Upon receiving the R_MESSAGE, the
   Initiator can use the CERT in the R_MESSAGE to verify whether the
   Responder is in fact the party that it wants to communicate to, and
   accept the TGK.  We refer to this protocol as MIKEY-RSA in the
   reverse mode, or simply as MIKEY-RSA-R.

   The MIKEY-RSA-R mode exchange is defined as follows:

   Initiator                                            Responder
   ---------                                            ---------

   I_MESSAGE = HDR, T, [RAND], [IDi|CERTi], [IDr], {SP}, SIGNi

   R_MESSAGE = HDR, [GenExt(CSB-ID)], T, [RAND], [IDr|CERTr], [SP],

   Figure 1: MIKEY-RSA-R mode

3.2.  Components of the I_MESSAGE

   MIKEY-RSA-R requires a full round trip to download the TGKs.  The
   I_MESSAGE MUST have the MIKEY HDR and the timestamp payload for

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   replay protection.  The HDR field contains a CSB_ID (Crypto Session
   Bundle ID) randomly selected by the Initiator.  The V bit MUST be set
   to '1' and ignored by the Responder, as a response is MANDATORY in
   this mode.  The Initiator MAY indicate the number of CSs supported,
   and SHOULD/MUST fill in the CS ID map type and CS ID info fields for
   the RTP/RTCP streams it originates (This is because the sender of the
   streams chooses the SSRC which is carried in the CS ID info field;
   see Section 6.1.1 of RFC 3830).  The I_MESSAGE MUST be signed by the
   Initiator following the procedure to sign MIKEY messages specified in
   RFC 3830.  The SIGNi payload contains this signature.  Thus the
   I_MESSAGE is integrity and replay protected.

   The RAND payload SHOULD be included in the I_MESSAGE when MIKEY-RSA-R
   mode is used for unicast communication.  It MUST be omitted when this
   mode is used to establish group keys.  The reason for the inclusion
   of the RAND payload in unicast scenarios is to allow for the
   Initiator to contribute entropy to the key derivation process (in
   addition to the CSB_ID).

   IDi and CERTi SHOULD be included, but they MAY be left out when it is
   expected that the peer already knows the Initiating party's ID (or
   can obtain the certificate in some other manner).  For example, this
   could be the case if the ID is extracted from SIP.  For certificate
   handling, authorization, and policies, see Section 4.3. of RFC 3830.
   If CERTi is included, it MUST correspond to the private key used to
   sign the I_MESSAGE.

   If the Responder has multiple Identities, the Initiator MAY also
   include the specific ID, IDr, of the Responder that it wants to
   communicate with.

   The Initiator MAY also send security policy (SP) payload(s)
   containing all the security policies that it supports.  If the
   Responder does not support any of the policies included, it should
   reply with an Error message of type "Invalid SPpar" (Error no. 10).

   SIGNi is a signature covering the Initiator's MIKEY message,
   I_MESSAGE, using the Initiator's signature key (see Section 5.2 of
   RFC 3830 for the exact definition).  The I_MESSAGE is signed to
   protect against DoS attacks.

3.3.  Components of the R_MESSAGE

   Upon receiving an I_MESSAGE of the RSA-R format, the Responder MUST
   respond with one of the following messages:
   o  The Responder SHOULD send an Error message "Message type not
      supported" (Error no. 13), if it cannot correctly parse the
      received MIKEY message.  Error no. 13 is not defined in RFC 3830,

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      and so RFC 3830 compliant implementations MAY return "an
      unspecified error occurred" (Error no. 12).
   o  The Responder MUST send an Error message "Invalid SPpar" (Error
      no. 10), if it does not support any of the security policies
      included in the SP payload.
   o  The Responder MUST send an R_MESSAGE, if SIGNi can be correctly
      verified and the timestamp is current; if an SP payload is present
      in the I_MESSAGE the Responder MUST return one of the proposed
      security policies that matches the Responder's local policy.

   The HDR payload in the R_MESSAGE is formed following the procedure
   described in RFC 3830.  Specifically, the CSB ID in the HDR payload
   MUST be the same as the one in the HDR of the I_MESSAGE.  The
   Responder MUST fill in the number of CSs and the CS ID map type and
   CS ID info fields of the HDR payload.

   For group communication, all the members MUST use the same CSB ID and
   CS ID in computing the SRTP keying material.  Therefore, for group
   key establishment, the Responder MUST include a General Extension
   Payload containing a new CSB ID in the R_MESSAGE.  If a new CSB ID is
   present in the R_MESSAGE, the Initiator and the Responder MUST use
   that value in key material computation.  Furthermore, the complete CS
   map SHOULD be populated by the Responder.  The General Extension
   Payload carrying a CSB ID MUST NOT be present in case of one-to-one

   When used in group scenarios with bi-directional media, the Responder
   SHOULD include two TGKs or TEKs in the KEMAC payload.  The first TGK
   or TEK SHOULD be used for receiving media on the Initiator's side and
   the second one to encrypt/authenticate media originating on the
   Initiator's side.  This allows all the multicast traffic to be
   encrypted/authenticated by the same group key while keys used for
   unicast streams from all the group members can still be independent.

   The T payload is exactly the same as that received in the I_MESSAGE.

   If the I_MESSAGE did not include the RAND payload, it MUST be present
   in the R_MESSAGE.  In case it has been included in the I_MESSAGE, it
   MUST NOT be present in the R_MESSAGE.  In group communication, the
   RAND payload is always sent by the Responder and in unicast
   communication, either the Initiator or the Responder (but not both)
   generate and send the RAND payload.

   IDr and CERTr SHOULD be included, but they MAY be left out when it
   can be expected that the peer already knows the other party's ID (or
   can obtain the certificate in some other manner).  For example, this
   could be the case if the ID is extracted from SIP.  For certificate
   handling, authorization, and policies, see Section 4.3. of RFC 3830.

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   If CERTr is included, it MUST correspond to the private key used to
   sign the R_MESSAGE.

   An SP payload MAY be included in the R_MESSAGE.  If an SP payload was
   in the I_MESSAGE, then R_MESSAGE MUST contain an SP payload
   specifying the security policies of the secure RTP session being
   negotiated.  More specifically, the Initiator may have provided
   multiple options, but the Responder must choose one option per
   Security Policy Parameter.

   The KEMAC payload contains a set of encrypted sub-payloads and a MAC:
   KEMAC = E(encr_key, IDr || {TGK}) || MAC.  The first payload (IDr) in
   KEMAC is the identity of the Responder (not a certificate, but
   generally the same ID as the one specified in the certificate).  Each
   of the following payloads (TGK) includes a TGK randomly and
   independently chosen by the Responder (and possible other related
   parameters, e.g., the key lifetime).  The encrypted part is then
   followed by a MAC, which is calculated over the KEMAC payload.  The
   encr_key and the auth_key are derived from the envelope key, env_key,
   as specified in Section 4.1.4. of RFC 3830.  The payload definitions
   are specified in Section 6.2 of RFC 3830.

   The Responder encrypts and integrity protects the TGK with keys
   derived from a randomly/pseudo-randomly chosen envelope key, and
   encrypts the envelope key itself with the public key of the
   Initiator.  The PKE payload contains the encrypted envelope key: PKE
   = E(PKi, env_key).  It is encrypted using the Initiator's public key
   (PKi).  Note that, as suggested in RFC 3830, the envelope key MAY be
   cached and used as the PSK for re-keying.

   To compute the signature that goes in the SIGNr payload, the
   Responder MUST sign R_MESSAGE (excluding the SIGNr payload itself) ||
   IDi || IDr || T. Note that the added identities and timestamp are
   identical to those transported in the ID and T payloads.

3.4.  Additions to RFC 3830 message types and other values

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3.4.1.  Modified Table 6.1a from RFC 3830

   Modified Table 6.1a from RFC 3830:

   Data type   | Value |                           Comment
   Pre-shared  |   0   | Initiator's pre-shared key message
   PSK ver msg |   1   | Verification message of a Pre-shared key msg
   Public key  |   2   | Initiator's public-key transport message
   PK ver msg  |   3   | Verification message of a public-key message
   D-H init    |   4   | Initiator's DH exchange message
   D-H resp    |   5   | Responder's DH exchange message
   Error       |   6   | Error message
   DHHMAC init |   7   | DH HMAC message 1
   DHHMAC resp |   8   | DH HMAC message 2
   RSA-R I_MSG |   9   | Initiator's public-key message in RSA-R mode
   RSA-R R_MSG |   10  | Responder's public-key message in RSA-R mode

   Figure 2: Table 6.1a from RFC 3830 (Revised)

3.4.2.  Modified Table 6.12 from RFC 3830

   Modified Table 6.12 from RFC 3830:

         Error no          | Value | Comment
         Auth failure      |     0 | Authentication failure
         Invalid TS        |     1 | Invalid timestamp
         Invalid PRF       |     2 | PRF function not supported
         Invalid MAC       |     3 | MAC algorithm not supported
         Invalid EA        |     4 | Encryption algorithm not supported
         Invalid HA        |     5 | Hash function not supported
         Invalid DH        |     6 | DH group not supported
         Invalid ID        |     7 | ID not supported
         Invalid Cert      |     8 | Certificate not supported
         Invalid SP        |     9 | SP type not supported
         Invalid SPpar     |    10 | SP parameters not supported
         Invalid DT        |    11 | not supported Data type
         Unspecified error |    12 | an unspecified error occurred
         Unsupported       |       |
          message type     |    13 | unparseable MIKEY message

   Figure 3: Table 6.12 from RFC 3830 (Revised)

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3.4.3.  Modified Table 6.15 from RFC 3830

   Modified Table 6.15 from RFC 3830:

         Type      | Value | Comment
         Vendor ID |     0 | Vendor specific byte string
         SDP IDs   |     1 | List of SDP key mgmt IDs
                   |       |   (allocated for use in [KMASDP])
         CSB-ID    |     2 | Responder's modified CSB-ID (group mode)

   Figure 4: Table 6.15 from RFC 3830 (Revised)

4.  Applicability of the RSA-R and RSA modes

   MIKEY-RSA-R mode and RSA mode are both very useful: deciding on which
   mode to use depends on the application.

   The RSA-R mode is useful when you have reasons to believe that the
   Responder may be different from who you are sending the MIKEY message
   to.  This is quite common in telephony and multimedia applications
   where the session/call can be retargeted/forwarded.  When the
   security policy allows it, it may be appropriate for the Initiator to
   have some flexibility in who the Responder may turn out to be.  In
   such cases, the main objective of the Initiator's RSA-R message is to
   present its public key/certificate to the Responder.

   The second scenario is when the Initiator already has the Responder's
   certificate but wants to allow the Responder to come up with all the
   keying material.  This is applicable in conferences where the
   Responder is the key distributor and the Initiators contact the
   Responder to initiate key download.  Notice that this is quite
   similar to the group key download model as specified in GDOI
   [RFC3547], GSAKMP [I-D.ietf-msec-gsakmp-sec], and GKDP [I-D.ietf-
   msec-gkdp] protocols (also see [RFC4046]).  The catch however is that
   the participating entities must know that they need to contact a
   well-known address as far as that conferencing group is concerned.
   Note that they only need the Responder's address, not necessarily its
   CERT.  If the group members have the Responder's CERT, there is no
   harm; they simply do not need the CERT to compose I_MESSAGE.

   The RSA mode is useful when the Initiator knows the Responder's
   identity and CERT.  This mode is also useful when the key exchange is
   happening in an established session with a Responder (for example,
   when switching from a non-secure mode to a secure mode), and when the
   policy is such that it is only appropriate to establish a MIKEY
   session with the Responder that is targeted by the Initiator.

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4.1.  Limitations

   The RSA-R mode may not easily support 3-way calling, under the
   assumptions that motivated the design.  An extra message may be
   required compared to the MIKEY-RSA mode specified in RFC 3830.
   Consider that A wants to talk to B and C, but does not have B's or
   C's CERT.  A might contact B and request that B supply a key for a
   3-way call.  Now if B knows C's CERT, then B can simply use the
   MIKEY-RSA mode (as defined in RFC 3830) to send the TGK to C. If not,
   then the solution is not straightforward.  For instance, A might ask
   C to contact B or itself to get the TGK, in effect initiating a 3-way
   exchange.  It should be noted that 3-way calling is typically
   implemented using a bridge, in which case there are no issues (it
   looks like 3 point-to-point sessions, where one end of each session
   is a bridge mixing the traffic into a single stream).

5.  Security Considerations

   We offer a brief overview of the security properties of the exchange.
   There are two messages, viz., I_MESSAGE and R_MESSAGE.  I_MESSAGE is
   a signed request by an Initiator requesting the Responder to select a
   TGK to be used to protect SRTP and SRTCP sessions.

   The message is signed, which assures the Responder that the claimed
   Initiator has indeed generated the message.  This automatically
   provides message integrity as well.

   There is a timestamp in the I_MESSAGE, which when generated and
   interpreted in the context of the MIKEY specification, assures the
   Responder that the request is live and not a replay.  Indirectly,
   this also provides protection against a DoS attack in that the
   I_MESSAGE must itself be signed.  The Responder however would have to
   verify the Initiator's signature and the timestamp, and thus would
   spend significant computing resources.  It is possible to mitigate
   this by caching recently received and verified requests.

   Note that the I_MESSAGE in this method basically equals DoS
   protection properties of the DH method and not the public key method
   as there are no payloads encrypted by the Responder's public key in
   I_MESSAGE.  If IDr is not included in the I_MESSAGE, the Responder
   will accept the message and a response (and state) would be created
   for the malicious request.

   The R_MESSAGE is quite similar to the I_MESSAGE in the MIKEY-RSA mode
   and has all the same security properties.

   When using the RSA-R mode, the Responder may turn out to be different

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   from who the Initiator sent the MIKEY message to.  It is the
   responsibility of the Initiator to verify that the identity of the
   Responder is acceptable (based on its local policy) if it changes
   from the intended Responder, and to take appropriate action based on
   the outcome.  In some cases, it could be appropriate to accept
   Responder's identity if it can be strongly authenticated; in other
   cases, a blacklist or a whitelist may be appropriate.

   When both unicast and multicast streams are negotiated it is
   suggested to use multiple instances of MIKEY rather than a single
   instance in group mode.  Unicast and multicast keys have different
   security properties and should not be derived from the same pool.
   The authors believe that multiple TGK payloads can be used for this
   purpose but the exact method is not specified in MIKEY.

5.1.  Impact of the Responder choosing the TGK

   In the MIKEY-RSA or PSK modes, the Initiator chooses the TGK and the
   Responder has the option to accept the key or not.  In the RSA-R mode
   for unicast communication, the Initiator and the Responder contribute
   random information in generating the TEK (RAND from the Initiator and
   the TGK from the Responder).  For group communication, the sender
   will choose the TGK and the RAND; note that it is in the interest of
   the sender to provide sufficient entropy to TEK generation since the
   TEK protects data sent by the Responder.

   Thus, in case of one-to-one communication, the RSA-R mode is slightly
   better than the RSA mode in that it allows the Initiator as well as
   the Responder to contribute entropy to the TEK generation process.
   This comes at the expense of the additional message.  However, as
   noted earlier, the new mode needs the additional message to allow
   simpler provisioning.

   RFC 3830 has additional notes on the security properties of the MIKEY
   protocol, key derivation functions and other components.

6.  IANA Considerations

   This specification requires the following IANA assignments to the
   MIKEY registry :
      Add to "Error Payload namespace:"
         Unsupported message type ------- 13
      Add to "Common Header payload name spaces:"
         RSA-R I_MSG ------------ 9
         RSA-R R_MSG ------------- 10

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      General Extensions payload name spaces:
         CSB-ID ----------------- 2 (Note: another draft may use '2';
         please assign next available number)

7.  Acknowledgments

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3830]  Arkko, J., Carrara, E., Lindholm, F., Naslund, M., and K.
              Norrman, "MIKEY: Multimedia Internet KEYing", RFC 3830,
              August 2004.

8.2.  Informative References

   [RFC4046]  Baugher, M., Canetti, R., Dondeti, L., and F. Lindholm,
              "Multicast Security (MSEC) Group Key Management
              Architecture", RFC 4046, April 2005.

   [RFC3547]  Baugher, M., Weis, B., Hardjono, T., and H. Harney, "The
              Group Domain of Interpretation", RFC 3547, July 2003.

   [RFC3711]  Baugher, M., McGrew, D., Naslund, M., Carrara, E., and K.
              Norrman, "The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)",
              RFC 3711, March 2004.

              Euchner, M., "HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman for
              MIKEY", draft-ietf-msec-mikey-dhhmac-11 (work in
              progress), April 2005.

              Harney, H., "GSAKMP: Group Secure Association Group
              Management Protocol", draft-ietf-msec-gsakmp-sec-10 (work
              in progress), May 2005.

              Dondeti, L. and J. Xiang, "GKDP: Group Key Distribution
              Protocol", draft-ietf-msec-gkdp-00 (work in progress),
              September 2005.

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Authors' Addresses

   Dragan Ignjatic
   1000 W. 14th Street
   North Vancouver, BC  V7P 3P3

   Phone: +1 604 982 3424
   Email: dignjatic@polycom.com

   Lakshminath Dondeti
   5775 Morehouse drive
   San Diego, CA  92121

   Phone: +1 858 845 1267
   Email: ldondeti@qualcomm.com

   Francois Audet
   4655 Great America Parkway
   Santa Clara, CA  95054

   Phone: +1 408 495 3756
   Email: audet@nortel.com

   Ping Lin
   250 Sidney St.
   Belleville, Ontario  K8P3Z3

   Phone: +1 613 967 5343
   Email: linping@nortel.com

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