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Versions: (draft-bierman-netconf-access-control) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 RFC 6536

Internet Engineering Task Force                               A. Bierman
Internet-Draft                                                   Brocade
Intended status: Standards Track                            M. Bjorklund
Expires: December 16, 2011                                Tail-f Systems
                                                           June 14, 2011


          Network Configuration Protocol Access Control Model
                  draft-ietf-netconf-access-control-04

Abstract

   The standardization of network configuration interfaces for use with
   the NETCONF protocol requires a structured and secure operating
   environment that promotes human usability and multi-vendor
   interoperability.  There is a need for standard mechanisms to
   restrict NETCONF protocol access for particular users to a pre-
   configured subset of all available NETCONF operations and content.
   This document discusses requirements for a suitable access control
   model, and provides one solution that meets these requirements.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 16, 2011.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect



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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.1.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
       1.1.1.  Requirements Notation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
       1.1.2.  NETCONF Terms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
       1.1.3.  YANG Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       1.1.4.  NACM Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   2.  Access Control Design Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     2.1.  Protocol Control Points  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     2.2.  Simplicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     2.3.  Procedural Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     2.4.  Datastore Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       2.4.1.  Access Rights  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       2.4.2.  <get> and <get-config> Operations  . . . . . . . . . .  8
       2.4.3.  <edit-config> Operation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       2.4.4.  <copy-config> Operation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     2.5.  Users and Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     2.6.  Maintenance  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     2.7.  Configuration Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     2.8.  Identifying Security Holes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     2.9.  Data Shadowing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     2.10. NETCONF Specific Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   3.  NETCONF Access Control Model (NACM)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     3.1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
       3.1.1.  Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
       3.1.2.  External Dependencies  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
       3.1.3.  Message Processing Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     3.2.  Model Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
       3.2.1.  Users  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
       3.2.2.  Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
       3.2.3.  Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
       3.2.4.  Access Permissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
       3.2.5.  Global Enforcement Controls  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
         3.2.5.1.  enable-nacm Switch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
         3.2.5.2.  read-default Switch  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
         3.2.5.3.  write-default Switch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
         3.2.5.4.  exec-default Switch  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
       3.2.6.  Access Control Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
     3.3.  Access Control Enforcement Procedures  . . . . . . . . . . 20
       3.3.1.  Initial Operation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
       3.3.2.  Session Establishment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21



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       3.3.3.  "access-denied" Error Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
       3.3.4.  Incoming RPC Message Validation  . . . . . . . . . . . 21
       3.3.5.  Data Node Access Validation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
       3.3.6.  Outgoing <notification> Authorization  . . . . . . . . 26
     3.4.  Data Model Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
       3.4.1.  Data Organization  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
       3.4.2.  YANG Module  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
     3.5.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
     3.6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
   4.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
     4.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
     4.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
   Appendix A.  Usage Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
     A.1.  <groups> Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
     A.2.  Module Rule Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
     A.3.  RPC Rule Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
     A.4.  Data Rule Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
     A.5.  Notification Rule Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
   Appendix B.  Change Log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
     B.1.  03-04  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
     B.2.  02-03  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
     B.3.  01-02  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
     B.4.  00-01  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
     B.5.  00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52


























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1.  Introduction

   The NETCONF protocol does not provide any standard mechanisms to
   restrict the operations and content that each user is authorized to
   use.

   There is a need for inter-operable management of the controlled
   access to operator selected portions of the available NETCONF content
   within a particular server.

   This document addresses access control mechanisms for the Operation
   and Content layers of NETCONF, as defined in
   [I-D.ietf-netconf-4741bis], and [RFC5277].  It contains three main
   sections:

   1.  Access Control Design Objectives

   2.  NETCONF Access Control Model (NACM)

   3.  YANG Data Model (ietf-netconf-acm.yang)

1.1.  Terminology

1.1.1.  Requirements Notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

1.1.2.  NETCONF Terms

   The following terms are defined in [I-D.ietf-netconf-4741bis] and are
   not redefined here:

   o  client

   o  datastore

   o  operation

   o  protocol operation

   o  server

   o  session

   o  user




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1.1.3.  YANG Terms

   The following terms are defined in [RFC6020] and are not redefined
   here:

   o  data node

   o  data definition statement

1.1.4.  NACM Terms

   The following terms are used throughout this documentation:

   access control:  A security feature provided by the NETCONF server,
      that allows an operator to restrict access to a subset of all
      NETCONF protocol operations and data, based on various criteria.

   access control model (ACM):  A conceptual model used to configure and
      monitor the access control procedures desired by the operator to
      enforce a particular access control policy.

   access control rule:  The conceptual criteria used to determine if a
      particular NETCONF protocol operation will be permitted or denied.

   access operation:  How a request attempts to access a conceptual
      object.  One of "read", "create", "delete", "update", and
      "execute".

   recovery session:  A special administrative session that is given
      unlimited NETCONF access, and is exempt from all access control
      enforcement.  The specific mechanism(s) used by an implementation
      to control and identify whether a session is a recovery session or
      not are outside the scope of this document.


















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2.  Access Control Design Objectives

   [Editor's note: some things described here are requirements (MUST,
   SHOULD, etc), but some things are descriptions how NACM works, e.g.
   2.4.1, 2.4.3...]

2.1.  Protocol Control Points

   The NETCONF protocol allows new operations to be added at any time,
   and the YANG data modeling language supports this feature.  It is not
   possible to design an ACM for NETCONF which only focuses on a static
   set of operations, like some other protocols.  Since few assumptions
   can be made about an arbitrary protocol operation, the NETCONF
   architectural server components need to be protected at several
   conceptual control points.


                 +-------------+          +-------------+
    client       |  protocol   |          |   prune     |      client
    request -->  |  operation  |          | restricted  | ---> reply
                 |  allowed?   |          | <rpc-reply> |
                 +-------------+          |   nodes?    |
                       |                  +-------------+
                       | if any datastore or
                       | state data is accessed
                       | by the operation
                       V
                 +-------------+          +----------------+
                 |  data node  |          |   prune        |
                 |   access    |          | restricted     |
                 |  allowed?   |          | <notification> | ---> client
                 +-------------+          | event or data? |     session
                                          +----------------+


                                 Figure 1

   The following access control points are defined:

   protocol operation:  Configurable permission to invoke specific
      protocol operations is required.  Wildcard or multiple target
      mechanisms to reduce configuration and effort are also required.

   NETCONF datastore:  Configurable permission to read and/or alter
      specific data nodes within any conceptual datastore is required.
      Wildcard or multiple target mechanisms to reduce configuration and
      effort are also required.




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   RPC Reply Content:  Configurable permission to read specific data
      nodes within any conceptual RPC output section is required.
      Unauthorized data is silently omitted from the reply, instead of
      dropping the reply or sending an "access-denied" error.

   Notification Content:  Configurable permission to receive specific
      notification event types is required.

2.2.  Simplicity

   Experience has shown that a complicated ACM will not be widely
   deployed, because it is too hard to use.  The key factor that is
   ignored in such solutions is the concept of "localized cost".  It
   needs to be easy to do simple things, and possible to do complex
   things, instead of hard to do everything.

   Configuration of the access control system needs to be as simple as
   possible.  Simple and common tasks need to be easy to configure, and
   require little expertise or domain-specific knowledge.  Complex tasks
   are possible using additional mechanisms, which may require
   additional expertise.

   A single set of access control rules SHOULD be able to control all
   types of NETCONF protocol operation invocation, all conceptual
   datastore access, and all NETCONF session output.

   Access control SHOULD be defined with a small and familiar set of
   permissions, while still allowing full control of NETCONF datastore
   access.

   Access control does not need to be applied to NETCONF <hello>
   messages.

2.3.  Procedural Interface

   The NETCONF protocol uses a procedural interface model, and an
   extensible set of protocol operations.  Access control for any
   possible protocol operation is required.

   It MUST be possible to configure the ACM to permit or deny access to
   specific NETCONF operations.

   YANG modules SHOULD be designed so that different access levels for
   input parameters to protocol operations is not required.  Use of
   generic operations should be avoided, and separate operations defined
   instead, if different access levels are needed.





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2.4.  Datastore Access

   It MUST be possible to control access to specific nodes and subtrees
   within the conceptual NETCONF datastore.

   The same access control rules apply to all conceptual datastores.
   For example, the candidate configuration or the running
   configuration.

   Only the standard NETCONF datastores (candidate, running, and
   startup) are controlled by the ACM.  Local or remote files or
   datastores accessed via the <url> parameter are optional to support.

   The non-volatile startup configuration needs to be loaded at boot-
   time into the running configuration without applying any access
   control rules.  Access control is applied after the server has
   booted, and user sessions are active.

2.4.1.  Access Rights

   A small set of hard-wired datastore access rights is needed to
   control access to all possible NETCONF datastore operations,
   including vendor extensions to the standard operation set.

   The familiar "CRUDX" model can support all NETCONF operations:

   o  Create: Allows the client to add a new data node instance to a
      datastore.

   o  Read: Allows the client to read a data node instance from a
      datastore, or receive the notification event type.

   o  Update: Allows the client to update an existing data node instance
      in a datastore.

   o  Delete: Allows the client to delete a data node instance from a
      datastore.

   o  eXec: Allows the client to execute the protocol operation.

2.4.2.  <get> and <get-config> Operations

   Data nodes to which the client does not have read access, either
   directly or via wildcard access, are silently omitted from the <rpc-
   reply> message.  This is done to allow NETCONF filters for <get> and
   <get-config> to function properly, instead of causing an "access-
   denied" error because the filter criteria would otherwise include
   unauthorized read access to some data nodes.  For NETCONF filtering



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   purposes, the selection criteria is applied to the subset of nodes
   that the client is authorized to read, not the entire datastore.

2.4.3.  <edit-config> Operation

   The NACM access rights are not directly coupled to the <edit-config>
   "operation" attribute, although they are similar.  Instead, a NACM
   access right applies to all operations which would result in a
   particular access operation to the target datastore.  This section
   describes how these access rights apply to the specific datastore
   operations supported by the <edit-config> operation.

   If the effective operation is "none" (i.e., default-operation="none")
   for a particular data node, then no access control is applied to that
   data node.

   A "create", "merge", or "replace" operation on a datastore node which
   would result in the creation of a new data node instance, for which
   the user does not have "create" access permission, is rejected with
   an "access-denied" error.

   A "merge" or "replace" operation on a datastore node which would
   result in the modification of an existing data node instance, for
   which the user does not have "update" access permission, is rejected
   with an "access-denied" error.

   A "replace", "delete", or "remove" operation on a datastore node
   which would result in the deletion of an existing data node instance,
   for which the user does not have "delete" access permission, is
   rejected with an "access-denied" error.

   A "merge" operation may include data nodes which do not alter
   portions of the existing datastore.  For example, a container or list
   node may be present for naming purposes, but does not actually alter
   the corresponding datastore node.  These unaltered data nodes within
   the scope of a "merge" operation are ignored by the server, and do
   not require any access rights by the client.

   [Editor's note: ditto for "replace" (and copy-config...)  Note that
   with this rule, a client w/o read access can guess db content by
   sending merge requests - if access-denied is not returned, it means
   the db has that value.]

   A "merge" operation may include data nodes, but not include
   particular child data nodes that are present in the datastore.  These
   missing data nodes within the scope of a "merge" operation are
   ignored by the server, and do not require any access rights by the
   client.



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   The contents of specific restricted datastore nodes MUST NOT be
   exposed in any <rpc-error> elements within the reply.

2.4.4.  <copy-config> Operation

   Access control for the <copy-config> operation requires special
   consideration because the operator is replacing the entire target
   datastore.  Read access to the entire source datastore, and write
   access to the entire target datastore is needed for this operation to
   succeed.

   The server SHOULD determine the exact nodes in the target datastore
   which are actually different, and only check write access permissions
   for this set of nodes, which could be empty.  For example, if a
   session can read the entire datastore, but only change one leaf, that
   session SHOULD be able to edit and save that one leaf.  E.g., the
   <copy-config> operation from <running> to <startup> SHOULD succeed if
   the only effective changes are for data nodes that session is
   authorized to change.

   A client MUST have access to every datastore node, even ones that are
   not present in the source configuration data.

   For example, consider a common use-case such as a simple backup and
   restore procedure.  The operator (client) MUST have full read access
   to the datastore in order to receive a complete copy of its contents.
   If the server simply omits these subtrees from the reply, and that
   copy is later used to restore the server datastore, the server will
   interpret the missing nodes as a request to delete those nodes, and
   return an error.

2.5.  Users and Groups

   The server MUST obtain a user name from the underlying NETCONF
   transport, such as an SSH user name.

   It MUST be possible to specify access control rules for a single user
   or a configurable group of users.

   The ACM MUST support the concept of administrative groups, to support
   the well-established distinction between a root account and other
   types of less-privileged conceptual user accounts.  These groups MUST
   be configurable by the operator.

   It MUST be possible to delegate the user-to-group mapping to a
   central server, such as a RADIUS server [RFC2865] [RFC5607].  Since
   authentication is performed by the NETCONF transport layer, and
   RADIUS performs authentication and service authorization at the same



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   time, it MUST be possible for the underlying NETCONF transport to
   report a set of group names associated with the user to the server.

2.6.  Maintenance

   It SHOULD be possible to disable part or all of the access control
   model without deleting any configuration.

2.7.  Configuration Capabilities

   Suitable control and monitoring mechanisms are needed to allow an
   operator to easily manage all aspects of the ACM behavior.  A
   standard data model, suitable for use with the <edit-config>
   operation MUST be available for this purpose.

   Access control rules to restrict operations on specific subtrees
   within the configuration datastore MUST be supported.  Existing
   mechanisms can be used to identify the subtree(s) for this purpose.

2.8.  Identifying Security Holes

   One of the most important aspects of the data model documentation,
   and biggest concerns during deployment, is the identification of
   security-sensitive content.  This applies to operations in NETCONF,
   not just data and notifications.

   It is mandatory for security-sensitive objects to be documented in
   the Security Considerations section of an RFC.  This is nice, but it
   is not good enough, for the following reasons:

   o  This documentation-only approach forces operators to study the RFC
      and determine if there are any potential security holes introduced
      by a new YANG module.

   o  If any security holes are identified, then the operator can study
      some more RFC text, and determine how to close the security
      hole(s).

   o  The ACM on each server can be configured to close the security
      holes, e.g., require privileged access to read or write the
      specific data identified in the Security Considerations section.

   o  If the ACM is not pre-configured, then there will be a time window
      of vulnerability, after the new module is loaded, and before the
      new access control rules for that module are configured, enabled,
      and debugged.

   Often, the operator just wants to disable default access to the



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   secure content, so no inadvertent or malicious changes can be made to
   the server.  This allows the default rules to be more lenient,
   without significantly increasing the security risk.

   A data model designer needs to be able to use machine-readable
   statements to identify NETCONF content which needs to be protected by
   default.  This will allow client and server tools to automatically
   close data-model specific security holes, by denying access to
   sensitive data unless the user is explicitly authorized to perform
   the requested operation.

2.9.  Data Shadowing

   One of the more complicated security administration problems is
   identifying data nodes which shadow or mirror the content of another
   data node.  An access control rule to prevent read operations for a
   particular node may be insufficient to prevent access to the data
   node with the copied value.

   If the description statement, other documentation, or no
   documentation exists to identify a data shadow problem, then it may
   not be detected.

   Since NETCONF allows any vendor operation to be added to the
   protocol, there is no way to reliably identify all of the operations
   that may expose copies of sensitive data nodes in <rpc-reply>
   messages.

   A NETCONF server MUST ensure that unauthorized access to its
   conceptual datastores and non-configuration data nodes is prevented.

   It is beyond the scope of this document to define access control
   enforcement procedures for underlying device instrumentation that may
   exist to support the NETCONF server operation.  An operator can
   identify each operation that the server provides, and decide if it
   needs any access control applied to it.

   Proprietary protocol operations SHOULD be properly documented by the
   vendor, so it is clear to operators what data nodes (if any) are
   affected by the operation, and what information (if any) is returned
   in the <rpc-reply> message.

2.10.  NETCONF Specific Requirements

   The server MUST be able to identify the specific protocol access
   request at the 4 access control points defined above.

   The server MUST be able to identify any datastore access request,



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   even for proprietary operations.

   A client MUST always be authorized to invoke the <close-session>
   operation, defined in [I-D.ietf-netconf-4741bis].

   A client MUST always be authorized to receive the <replayComplete>
   and <notificationComplete> notification events, defined in [RFC5277]

   The set of module name strings used within one particular server MUST
   be unique.









































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3.  NETCONF Access Control Model (NACM)

3.1.  Introduction

   This section provides a high-level overview of the access control
   model structure.  It describes the NETCONF protocol message
   processing model, and the conceptual access control requirements
   within that model.

3.1.1.  Features

   The NACM data model provides the following features:

   o  Independent control of RPC, data, and notification access.

   o  Simple access control rules configuration data model that is easy
      to use.

   o  The concept of an emergency recovery session is supported, but
      configuration of the server for this purpose is beyond the scope
      of this document.  An emergency recovery session will bypass all
      access control enforcement, in order to allow it to initialize or
      repair the NACM configuration.

   o  A simple and familiar set of datastore permissions is used.

   o  Support for YANG security tagging (e.g., nacm:secure extension)
      allows default security modes to automatically exclude sensitive
      data.

   o  Separate default access modes for read, write, and execute
      permissions.

   o  Access control rules are applied to configurable groups of users.

   o  The entire ACM can be disabled during operation, in order to debug
      operational problems.

   o  Access control rules are simple to configure.

   o  The number of denied protocol operation requests and denied
      datastore write requests can be monitored by the client.

   o  Simple unconstrained YANG instance identifiers are used to
      configure access control rules for specific data nodes.






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3.1.2.  External Dependencies

   The NETCONF [I-D.ietf-netconf-4741bis] protocol is used for all
   management purposes within this document.  It is expected that the
   mandatory transport mapping NETCONF Over SSH
   [I-D.ietf-netconf-rfc4742bis] is also supported by the server, and
   that the server has access to the user name associated with each
   session.

   The YANG Data Modeling Language [RFC6020] is used to define the
   NETCONF data models specified in this document.

3.1.3.  Message Processing Model

   The following diagram shows the NETCONF message flow model, including
   the points at which access control is applied, during NETCONF message
   processing.


































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                    +-------------------------+
                    |       session           |
                    |      (username)         |
                    +-------------------------+
                       |                 ^
                       V                 |
             +--------------+     +---------------+
             |   message    |     |   message     |
             | dispatcher   |     |   generator   |
             +--------------+     +---------------+
                  |                  ^         ^
                  V                  |         |
         +===========+     +-------------+   +----------------+
         |   <rpc>   |---> | <rpc-reply> |   | <notification> |
         | acc. ctl  |     |  generator  |   |  generator     |
         +===========+     +-------------+   +----------------+
               |              ^    ^                ^
               V       +------+    |                |
         +-----------+ |   +=============+  +================+
         |   <rpc>   | |   | <rpc-reply> |  | <notification> |
         | processor |-+   |  acc. ctl   |  |  access ctl    |
         +-----------+     +=============+  +================+
               |   |                  ^        ^
               V   +----------------+ |        |
         +===========+              | |        |
         | data node |              | |        |
         | acc. ctl  | -----------+ | |        |
         +===========+            | | |        |
               |                  | | |        |
               V                  V V |        |
         +---------------+      +-----------------+
         | configuration | ---> |     server      |
         |   datastore   |      | instrumentation |
         |               | <--- |                 |
         +---------------+      +-----------------+



                                 Figure 2

   The following high-level sequence of conceptual processing steps is
   executed for each received <rpc> message, if access control
   enforcement is enabled:

   o  Access control is applied to all <rpc> messages (except <close-
      session>) received by the server, individually, for each active
      session, unless the session is identified as a "recovery session".




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   o  If the session is authorized to execute the specified RPC
      operation, then processing continues, otherwise the request is
      rejected with an "access-denied" error.

   o  If the configuration datastore or conceptual state data is
      accessed by the protocol operation, then the data node access MUST
      be authorized.  If the session is authorized to perform the
      requested operation on the requested data, then processing
      continues.

   The following sequence of conceptual processing steps is executed for
   each generated notification event, if access control enforcement is
   enabled:

   o  Server instrumentation generates a conceptual notification, for a
      particular subscription.

   o  The notification access control enforcer checks the notification
      event type, and if it is one which the session is not authorized
      to read, then the notification is dropped for that subscription.

3.2.  Model Components

   This section defines the conceptual components related to access
   control model.

3.2.1.  Users

   A "user" is the conceptual entity that is associated with the access
   permissions granted to a particular session.  A user is identified by
   a string which MUST be unique within the server.

   As described in [I-D.ietf-netconf-4741bis], the user name string is
   derived from the transport layer during session establishment.  If
   the transport layer cannot authenticate the user, the session is
   terminated.

   The server MAY support a "recovery session" mechanism, which will
   bypass all access control enforcement.  This is useful for
   restricting initial access and repairing a broken access control
   configuration.

3.2.2.  Groups

   Access to a specific NETCONF operation is granted to a session,
   associated with a group, not a user.

   A group is identified by its name.  All group names MUST be unique



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   within the server.

   A group member is identified by a user name string.

   The same user may be configured in multiple groups.

3.2.3.  Sessions

   A session is simply a NETCONF session, which is the entity that is
   granted access to specific NETCONF operations.

   A session is associated with a single user name for the lifetime of
   the session.

3.2.4.  Access Permissions

   The access permissions are the NETCONF protocol specific set of
   permissions that have been assigned to a particular session.

   The same access permissions MUST stay in effect for the processing of
   a particular message.

   The server MUST use the access control rules in effect at the time
   the message is processed.

   The access control model treats protocol operation execution
   separately from configuration datastore access and outgoing messages:

   create:  Permission to create conceptual server data.

   read:  Read access to conceptual server data, <rpc-reply> and
      <notification> content.

   update:  Permission to modify existing conceptual server data.

   delete:  Permission to delete existing conceptual server data.

   exec:  Permission to invoke a protocol operation.

3.2.5.  Global Enforcement Controls

   There are four global controls that are used to help control how
   access control is enforced.

3.2.5.1.  enable-nacm Switch

   A global "enable-nacm" on/off switch is provided to enable or disable
   all access control enforcement.  When this global switch is set to



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   "true", then all access requested are checked against the access
   control rules, and only permitted if configured to allow the specific
   access request.  When this global switch is set to "false", then all
   access requested are permitted.

3.2.5.2.  read-default Switch

   An on/off "read-default" switch is provided to enable or disable
   default access to receive data in replies and notifications.  When
   the "enable-nacm" global switch is set to "true", then this global
   switch is relevant, if no matching access control rule is found to
   explicitly permit or deny read access to the requested NETCONF
   datastore data or notification event type.

   When this global switch is set to "permit", and no matching access
   control rule is found for the NETCONF datastore read or notification
   event requested, then access is permitted.

   When this global switch is set to "deny", and no matching access
   control rule is found for the NETCONF datastore read or notification
   event requested, then access is denied.

3.2.5.3.  write-default Switch

   An on/off "write-default" switch is provided to enable or disable
   default access to alter configuration data.  When the "enable-nacm"
   global switch is set to "true", then this global switch is relevant,
   if no matching access control rule is found to explicitly permit or
   deny write access to the requested NETCONF datastore data.

   When this global switch is set to "permit", and no matching access
   control rule is found for the NETCONF datastore write requested, then
   access is permitted.

   When this global switch is set to "deny", and no matching access
   control rule is found for the NETCONF datastore write requested, then
   access is denied.

3.2.5.4.  exec-default Switch

   An on/off "exec-default" switch is provided to enable or disable
   default access to execute protocol operations.  When the "enable-
   nacm" global switch is set to "true", then this global switch is
   relevant, if no matching access control rule is found to explicitly
   permit or deny access to the requested NETCONF protocol operation.

   When this global switch is set to "permit", and no matching access
   control rule is found for the NETCONF protocol operation requested,



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   then access is permitted.

   When this global switch is set to "deny", and no matching access
   control rule is found for the NETCONF protocol operation requested,
   then access is denied.

3.2.6.  Access Control Rules

   There are 4 types of rules available in NACM:

   module rule:  Controls access for definitions in a specific module,
      identified by its name.

   protocol operation rule:  Controls access for a specific protocol
      operation, identified by its module and name.

   data node rule:  Controls access for a specific data node, identified
      by its path location within the conceptual XML document for the
      data node.

   notification rule:  Controls access for a specific notification event
      type, identified by its module and name.

3.3.  Access Control Enforcement Procedures

   There are seven separate phases that need to be addressed, four of
   which are related to the NETCONF message processing model.  In
   addition, the initial start-up mode for a NETCONF server, session
   establishment, and "access-denied" error handling procedures also
   need to be considered.

3.3.1.  Initial Operation

   Upon the very first start-up of the NETCONF server, the access
   control configuration will probably not be present.  If it isn't, a
   server MUST NOT allow any write access to any session role except a
   "recovery session", if supported.

   Access control rules are not enforced before or while the non-
   volatile configuration data is processed and loaded into the running
   configuration, when the server is booting or rebooting.  Access rules
   are enforced any time a request is initiated from a user session.
   Access control is not enforced for server-initiated access requests,
   such as the initial load of the running datastore, during bootup.







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3.3.2.  Session Establishment

   The access control model applies specifically to the well-formed XML
   content transferred between a client and a server, after session
   establishment has been completed, and after the <hello> exchange has
   been successfully completed.

   A server SHOULD NOT include any sensitive information in any
   <capability> elements within the <hello> exchange.

   Once session establishment is completed, and a user has been
   authenticated, the NETCONF transport layer reports the user name and
   a possibly empty set of group names associated with the user to the
   NETCONF server.  The NETCONF server will enforce the access control
   rules, based on the supplied user name, group names, and the
   configuration data stored on the server.

3.3.3.  "access-denied" Error Handling

   The "access-denied" error-tag is generated when the access control
   system denies access to either a request to invoke a protocol
   operation or a request to perform a particular operation on the
   configuration datastore.

   A server MUST NOT include any sensitive information in any <error-
   info> elements within the <rpc-error> response.

3.3.4.  Incoming RPC Message Validation

   The diagram below shows the basic conceptual structure of the access
   control processing model for incoming NETCONF <rpc> messages, within
   a server.



















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                   NETCONF server
                  +------------+
                  |    XML     |
                  |   message  |
                  | dispatcher |
                  +------------+
                         |
                         |
                         V
                  +------------+
                  | NC-base NS |
                  |   <rpc>    |
                  +------------+
                    |   |  |
                    |   |  +-------------------------+
                    |   +------------+               |
                    V                V               V
               +-----------+ +---------------+ +------------+
               | acme NS   | | NC-base NS    | | NC-base NS |
               | <my-edit> | | <edit-config> | | <unlock>   |
               +-----------+ +---------------+ +------------+
                      |               |
                      |               |
                      V               V
                    +----------------------+
                    |                      |
                    |    configuration     |
                    |      datastore       |
                    +----------------------+



                                 Figure 3

   Access control begins with the message dispatcher.

   After the server validates the <rpc> element, and determines the
   namespace URI and the element name of the protocol operation being
   requested, the RPC access control enforcer verifies that the session
   is authorized to invoke the protocol operation.

   The protocol operation is authorized by following these steps:

   1.   If the "enable-nacm" leaf is set to "false", then the protocol
        operation is permitted.

   2.   If the requesting session is identified as a "recovery session",
        then the protocol operation is permitted.



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   3.   If the requested operation is the NETCONF <close-session>
        operation, then the protocol operation is permitted.

   4.   Check all the "group" entries for ones that contain a "user-
        name" entry that equals the user name for the session making the
        request.  Add to these groups the set of groups provided by the
        transport layer.

   5.   If no groups are found, continue with step 10.

   6.   Process all rule-list entries, in order.  If a rule-list's
        "group" leaf-list does not match any of the user's groups,
        proceed to the next rule-list entry.

   7.   For each rule-list entry found, process all rules, in order,
        until a rule that matches the requested operation is found.  A
        rule matches if all of the following criteria are met:

        *  The rule's "module-name" leaf is "*", or equals the name of
           the YANG module where the protocol operation is defined.

        *  The rule does not have a "rule-type" defined, or the "rule-
           type" is "protocol-operation" and the "rpc-name" is "*" or
           equals the name of the requested protocol operation.

        *  The rule's "access-operations" leaf has the "exec" bit set,
           or has the special value "*".

   8.   If a matching rule is found, then the "action" leaf is checked.
        If it is equal to "permit", then the protocol operation is
        permitted, otherwise it is denied.

   9.   Otherwise, no matching rule was found in any rule-list entry.

   10.  If the requested protocol operation is defined in a YANG module
        advertised in the server capabilities, and the "rpc" statement
        contains a "nacm:secure" or a "nacm:very-secure" statement, then
        the protocol operation is denied.

   11.  If the "exec-default" leaf is set to "permit", then permit the
        protocol operation, otherwise deny the request.

   If the session is not authorized to invoke the protocol operation
   then an <rpc-error> is generated with the following information:







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   error-tag:  access-denied

   error-path:  Identifies the requested protocol operation.  For
      example:


         <error-path
           xmlns:nc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
             /nc:rpc/nc:edit-config
         </error-path>

      represents the <edit-config> operation in the NETCONF base
      namespace.

   If a datastore is accessed, either directly or as a side effect of
   the protocol operation, then the server MUST intercept the operation
   and make sure the session is authorized to perform the requested
   operation on the specified data, as defined in Section 3.3.5.

3.3.5.  Data Node Access Validation

   If a data node within a datastore is accessed, then the server MUST
   ensure that the client session is authorized to perform the requested
   read, create, update, or delete operation on the specified data node.

   The data node access request is authorized by following these steps:

   1.   If the "enable-nacm" leaf is set to "false", then the protocol
        operation is permitted.

   2.   If the requesting session is identified as a "recovery session",
        then the protocol operation is permitted.

   3.   Check all the "group" entries for ones that contain a "user-
        name" entry that equals the user name for the session making the
        request.  Add to these groups the set of groups provided by the
        transport layer.

   4.   If no groups are found, continue with step 9.

   5.   Process all rule-list entries, in order.  If a rule-list's
        "group" leaf-list does not match any of the user's groups,
        proceed to the next rule-list entry.

   6.   For each rule-list entry found, process all rules, in order,
        until a rule that matches the requested operation is found.  A
        rule matches if all of the following criteria are met:




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        *  The rule's "module-name" leaf is "*", or equals the name of
           the YANG module where the protocol operation is defined.

        *  The rule does not have a "rule-type" defined, or the "rule-
           type" is "data-node" and the "path" matches the requested
           data node.

        *  For a read operation, the rule's "access-operations" leaf has
           the "read" bit set, or has the special value "*".

        *  For a creation operation, the rule's "access-operations" leaf
           has the "create" bit set, or has the special value "*".

        *  For a deletion operation, the rule's "access-operations" leaf
           has the "delete" bit set, or has the special value "*".

        *  For an update operation, the rule's "access-operations" leaf
           has the "update" bit set, or has the special value "*".

   7.   If a matching rule is found, then the "action" leaf is checked.
        If it is equal to "permit", then the data node access is
        permitted, otherwise it is denied.  For a read operation,
        "denied" means that the requested data is not returned in the
        reply.

   8.   Otherwise, no matching rule was found in any rule-list entry.

   9.   For a read operation, if the requested data node is defined in a
        YANG module advertised in the server capabilities, and the data
        definition statement contains a "nacm:very-secure" statement,
        then the requested data node is not included in the reply.

   10.  For a write operation, if the requested data node is defined in
        a YANG module advertised in the server capabilities, and the
        data definition statement contains a "nacm:secure" or a "nacm:
        very-secure" statement, then the data node access request is
        denied.

   11.  For a read operation, if the "read-default" leaf is set to
        "permit", then include the requested data node in the reply,
        otherwise do not include the requested data node in the reply.

   12.  For a write operation, if the "write-default" leaf is set to
        "permit", then permit the data node access request, otherwise
        deny the request.






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3.3.6.  Outgoing <notification> Authorization

   Configuration of access control rules specifically for descendant
   nodes of the notification event type element are outside the scope of
   this document.  If the session is authorized to receive the
   notification event type, then it is also authorized to receive any
   data it contains.

   The following figure shows the conceptual message processing model
   for outgoing <notification> messages.




                   NETCONF server
                  +------------+
                  |    XML     |
                  |   message  |
                  | generator  |
                  +------------+
                        ^
                        |
                +----------------+
                | <notification> |
                |  generator     |
                +----------------+
                        ^
                        |
               +=================+
               | <notification>  |
               |  access control |
               |  <eventType>    |
               +=================+
                        ^
                        |
            +------------------------+
            | server instrumentation |
            +------------------------+
                      |     ^
                      V     |
             +----------------------+
             |    configuration     |
             |      datastore       |
             +----------------------+



                                 Figure 4



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   The generation of a notification for a specific subscription is
   authorized by following these steps:

   1.   If the "enable-nacm" leaf is set to "false", then the
        notification is permitted.

   2.   If the session is identified as a "recovery session", then the
        notification is permitted.

   3.   If the notification is the NETCONF <replayComplete> or
        <notificationComplete> event type, then the notification is
        permitted.

   4.   Check all the "group" entries for ones that contain a "user-
        name" entry that equals the user name for the session making the
        request.  Add to these groups the set of groups provided by the
        transport layer.

   5.   If no groups are found, continue with step 10.

   6.   Process all rule-list entries, in order.  If a rule-list's
        "group" leaf-list does not match any of the user's groups,
        proceed to the next rule-list entry.

   7.   For each rule-list entry found, process all rules, in order,
        until a rule that matches the requested operation is found.  A
        rule matches if all of the following criteria are met:

        *  The rule's "module-name" leaf is "*", or equals the name of
           the YANG module where the protocol operation is defined.

        *  The rule does not have a "rule-type" defined, or the "rule-
           type" is "notification" and the "notification-name" is "*",
           equals the name of the notification.

        *  The rule's "access-operations" leaf has the "read" bit set,
           or has the special value "*".

   8.   If a matching rule is found, then the "action" leaf is checked.
        If it is equal to "permit", then permit the notification,
        otherwise drop the notification for the associated subscription.

   9.   Otherwise, no matching rule was found in any rule-list entry.

   10.  If the requested notification is defined in a YANG module
        advertised in the server capabilities, and the "notification"
        statement contains a "nacm:very-secure" statement, then the
        notification is dropped for the associated subscription.



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   11.  If the "read-default" leaf is set to "permit", then permit the
        notification, otherwise drop the notification for the associated
        subscription.

3.4.  Data Model Definitions

   This section defines the semantics of the conceptual data structures
   found in the data model in Section 3.4.

3.4.1.  Data Organization

   The top-level element is called <nacm>, and it is defined in the
   "ietf-netconf-acm" module's namespace.

   There are several data structures defined as child nodes of the
   <nacm> element:

   leaf <enable-nacm>:  On/off boolean switch to enable or disable
      access control enforcement.

   leaf <read-default>:  Enumeration to permit or deny default read
      access requests.

   leaf <write-default>:  Enumeration to permit or deny default write
      access requests.

   leaf <exec-default>:  Enumeration to permit or deny default protocol
      operation execution requests.

   leaf <denied-rpcs>:  Read-only counter of the number of times the
      server has denied an RPC operation request, since the last reboot
      of the server.

   leaf <denied-data-writes>:  Read-only counter of the number of times
      the server has denied a data node write request, since the last
      reboot of the server.

   leaf <denied-notifications>:  Read-only counter of the number of
      times the server has denied a notification, since the last reboot
      of the server.

   container <groups>:  Configures the groups used within the access
      control system.

      list <group>:  A list of user names belonging to the same
         administrative group.





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   container <rules>:  Configures the access control rules used within
      the server.

      list <rule-list>:  An ordered collection of related access control
         rules.

         list <rule>:  Configures the access control rules for protocol
            operation invocation, configuration datastore access, and
            for controlling delivery of <notification> events.

3.4.2.  YANG Module

   The following YANG module specifies the normative NETCONF content
   that MUST by supported by the server.

   The ietf-netconf-acm YANG module imports typedefs from [RFC6021].


 // RFC Ed.: please update the date to the date of publication
 <CODE BEGINS> file="ietf-netconf-acm@2011-06-14.yang"

 module ietf-netconf-acm {

   namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-acm";

   prefix "nacm";

   import ietf-yang-types {
     prefix yang;
   }

   organization
     "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";


   contact
     "WG Web:   <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
      WG List:  <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>

      WG Chair: Mehmet Ersue
                <mailto:mehmet.ersue@nsn.com>

      WG Chair: Bert Wijnen
                <mailto:bertietf@bwijnen.net>

      Editor:   Andy Bierman
                <mailto:andy.bierman@brocade.com>




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      Editor:   Martin Bjorklund
                <mailto:mbj@tail-f.com>";

   description
     "NETCONF Server Access Control Model.

      Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
      authors of the code. All rights reserved.

      Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
      without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
      to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD
      License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
      Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
      (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).

      This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
      the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
   // RFC Ed.: replace XXXX with actual RFC number and
   // remove this note

   // RFC Ed.: remove this note
   // Note: extracted from draft-ietf-netconf-access-control-04.txt

   // RFC Ed.: please update the date to the date of publication
   revision "2011-06-14" {
     description
       "Initial version";
     reference
       "RFC XXXX: Network Configuration Protocol
                  Access Control Model";
   }

   /*
    * Extension statements
    */

   extension secure {
     description
       "Used to indicate that the data model node
        represents a sensitive security system parameter.

        If present, and the NACM module is enabled (i.e.,
        /nacm/enable-nacm object equals 'true'), the NETCONF server
        will only allow the designated 'recovery session' to have
        write or execute access to the node.  An explicit access
        control rule is required for all other users.




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        The 'secure' extension MAY appear within a data definition
        statement or rpc statement.  It is ignored otherwise.";
   }

   extension very-secure {
     description
       "Used to indicate that the data model node
        controls a very sensitive security system parameter.

        If present, and the NACM module is enabled (i.e.,
        /nacm/enable-nacm object equals 'true'), the NETCONF server
        will only allow the designated 'recovery session' to have
        read, write, or execute access to the node.  An explicit
        access control rule is required for all other users.

        The 'very-secure' extension MAY appear within a data
        definition statement, rpc statement, or notification
        statement.  It is ignored otherwise.";
   }

   /*
    * Derived types
    */

   typedef user-name-type {
     type string {
       length "1..max";
     }
     description
       "General Purpose User Name string.";
   }

   typedef matchall-string-type {
     type string {
       pattern "\*";
     }
     description
       "The string containing a single asterisk '*' is used
        to conceptually represent all possible values
        for the particular leaf using this data type.";
   }

   typedef access-operations-type {
     type bits {
       bit create {
         description
           "Any operation that creates a
            new instance of the specified data is a create



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            operation.";
       }
       bit read {
         description
           "Any operation or notification that
            returns data to an application is a read
            operation.";
       }
       bit update {
         description
           "Any operation that alters an existing
            data node is an update operation.";
       }
       bit delete {
         description
           "Any operation that removes a datastore
            node instance is a delete operation.";
       }
       bit exec {
         description
           "Execution access to the specified RPC operation.
            Any RPC operation invocation is an exec operation.";
       }
     }
     description
       "NETCONF Access Operation.";
   }

   typedef group-name-type {
     type string {
       length "1..max";
       pattern "[^\*].*";
     }
     description
       "Name of administrative group that can be
        assigned to the user, and specified in
        an access control rule-list.";
   }

   typedef action-type {
     type enumeration {
       enum permit {
         description
           "Requested action is permitted.";
       }
       enum deny {
         description
           "Requested action is denied.";



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       }
     }
     description
       "Action taken by the server when a particular
        rule matches.";
   }

   typedef node-instance-identifier {
     type yang:xpath1.0;
     description
       "Path expression used to represent a special
        data node instance identifier string.

        A node-instance-identifier value is an
        unrestricted YANG instance-identifier expression.
        All the same rules as an instance-identifier apply
        except predicates for keys are optional.  If a key
        predicate is missing, then the node-instance-identifier
        represents all possible server instances for that key.

        This XPath expression is evaluated in the following context:

          o  The set of namespace declarations are those in scope on
             the leaf element where this type is used.

          o  The set of variable bindings contains one variable,
             'USER', which contains the name of user of the current
              session.

          o  The function library is the core function library, but
             note that due to the syntax restrictions of an
             instance-identifier, no functions are allowed.

          o  The context node is the root node in the data tree.";
   }

   container nacm {
     nacm:very-secure;

     description
       "Parameters for NETCONF Access Control Model.";

     leaf enable-nacm {
       type boolean;
       default true;
       description
         "Enable or disable all NETCONF access control
          enforcement.  If 'true', then enforcement



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          is enabled.  If 'false', then enforcement
          is disabled.";
     }

     leaf read-default {
       type action-type;
       default "permit";
       description
         "Controls whether read access is granted if
          no appropriate rule is found for a
          particular read request.";
     }

     leaf write-default {
       type action-type;
       default "deny";
       description
         "Controls whether create, update, or delete access
          is granted if no appropriate rule is found for a
          particular write request.";
     }

     leaf exec-default {
       type action-type;
       default "permit";
       description
         "Controls whether exec access is granted if no appropriate
          rule is found for a particular RPC operation request.";
     }

     leaf denied-rpcs {
       type yang:zero-based-counter32;
       config false;
       mandatory true;
       description
         "Number of times an RPC operation request was denied
          since the server last restarted.";
     }

     leaf denied-data-writes {
       type yang:zero-based-counter32;
       config false;
       mandatory true;
       description
         "Number of times a request to alter a data node
          was denied, since the server last restarted.";
     }




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     leaf denied-notifications {
       type yang:zero-based-counter32;
       config false;
       mandatory true;
       description
         "Number of times a notification was denied
          since the server last restarted.";
     }

     container groups {
       description
         "NETCONF Access Control Groups.";

       list group {
         key name;

         description
           "One NACM Group Entry.";

         leaf name {
           type group-name-type;
           description
             "Group name associated with this entry.";
         }

         leaf-list user-name {
           type user-name-type;
           description
             "Each entry identifies the user name of
              a member of the group associated with
              this entry.";
         }
       }
     }

     list rule-list {
       key "name";
       ordered-by user;
       description
         "An ordered collection of access control rules.";

       leaf name {
         type string {
           length "1..256";
         }
         description
           "Arbitrary name assigned to the rule-list.";
       }



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       leaf-list group {
         type union {
           type matchall-string-type;
           type group-name-type;
         }
         description
           "List of administrative groups that will be
            assigned the associated access rights
            defined by the 'rule' list.

            The string '*' indicates that all groups apply to the
            entry.";
       }

       list rule {
         key "name";
         ordered-by user;
         description
           "One access control rule.

            Rules are processed in user-defined order until a match is
            found.  A rule matches if 'module-name', 'rule-type', and
            'access-operations' matches the request.  If a rule
            matches, the 'action' leaf determines if access is granted
            or not.";

         leaf name {
           type string {
             length "1..256";
           }
           description
             "Arbitrary name assigned to the rule.";
         }

         leaf module-name {
           type union {
             type matchall-string-type;
             type string;
           }
           default "*";
           description
             "Name of the module associated with this rule.

              This leaf matches if it has the value '*', or if the
              object being accessed is defined in the module with the
              specified module name.";
         }
         choice rule-type {



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           description
             "This choice matches if all leafs present in the rule
              matches the request.  If no leafs are present, the
              choice matches all requests.";
           case protocol-operation {
             leaf rpc-name {
               type union {
                 type matchall-string-type;
                 type string;
               }
               description
                 "This leaf matches if it has the value '*', or if its
                  value equals the requested RPC operation name.";
             }
           }
           case notification {
             leaf notification-name {
               type union {
                 type matchall-string-type;
                 type string;
               }
               description
                 "This leaf matches if it has the value '*', or if its
                  value equals the requested notification name.";
             }
           }
           case data-node {
             leaf path {
               type node-instance-identifier;
               mandatory true;
               description
                 "Data Node Instance Identifier associated with the data
                  node controlled by this rule.

                  Configuration data or state data instance
                  identifiers start with a top-level data node.  A
                  complete instance identifier is required for this
                  type of path value.

                  The special value '/' refers to all possible data
                  store contents.";
             }
           }
         }

         leaf access-operations {
           type union {
             type matchall-string-type;



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             type access-operations-type;
           }
           default "*";
           description
             "Access operations associated with this rule.

              This leaf matches if it has the value '*', or if the
              bit corresponding to the requested operation is set.";
         }

         leaf action {
           type action-type;
           mandatory true;
           description
             "The access control action associated with the
              rule.  If a rule is determined to match a
              particular request, then this object is used
              to determine whether to permit or deny the
              request.";
         }

         leaf comment {
           type string;
           description
             "A textual description of the access rule.";
         }
       }
     }
   }
 }


 <CODE ENDS>

                                 Figure 5

3.5.  IANA Considerations

   There are two actions that are requested of IANA: This document
   registers one URI in "The IETF XML Registry".  Following the format
   in [RFC3688], the following has been registered.


        URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-acm
        Registrant Contact: The IESG.
        XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.

   This document registers one module in the "YANG Module Names"



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   registry.  Following the format in [RFC6020], the following has been
   registered.

        name: ietf-netconf-acm
        namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-acm
        prefix: nacm
        reference: RFC XXXX
           // RFC Ed.: Replace XXX with actual RFC number
           // and remove this note

3.6.  Security Considerations

   This entire document discusses access control requirements and
   mechanisms for restricting NETCONF protocol behavior within a given
   session.

   Configuration of the access control system is highly sensitive to
   system security.  A server may choose not to allow any user
   configuration to some portions of it, such as the global security
   level, or the groups which allowed access to system resources.

   This document incorporates the optional use of a "recovery session"
   mechanism, which can be used to bypass access control enforcement in
   emergencies, such as NACM configuration errors which disable all
   access to the server.  The configuration and identification of such a
   recovery session mechanism are outside the scope of this document.

   There is a risk that invocation of non-standard protocol operations
   will have undocumented side effects.  An administrator needs to
   construct access control rules such that the configuration datastore
   is protected from such side effects.  Also, such protocol operations
   SHOULD never be invoked by a session during a "recovery session".

   There is a risk that non-standard protocol operations, or even the
   standard <get> operation, may return data which "aliases" or "copies"
   sensitive data from a different data object.  In this case, the
   namespace and/or the element name will not match the values for the
   sensitive data, which is then fully or partially copied into a
   different namespace and/or element.  An administrator needs to avoid
   using data models which use this practice.

   An administrator needs to restrict write access to all configurable
   objects within this data model.

   If write access is allowed for configuration of access control rules,
   then care needs to be taken not to disrupt the access control
   enforcement.




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   An administrator needs to restrict read access to the following
   objects within this data model, which reveal access control
   configuration which could be considered sensitive.

   o  enable-nacm

   o  read-default

   o  write-default

   o  exec-default

   o  groups

   o  rules




































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4.  References

4.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3688]  Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
              January 2004.

   [RFC5277]  Chisholm, S. and H. Trevino, "NETCONF Event
              Notifications", RFC 5277, July 2008.

   [RFC6020]  Bjorklund, M., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for the
              Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
              October 2010.

   [RFC6021]  Schoenwaelder, J., "Common YANG Data Types", RFC 6021,
              October 2010.

   [I-D.ietf-netconf-4741bis]
              Enns, R., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., and A.
              Bierman, "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)",
              draft-ietf-netconf-4741bis-10 (work in progress),
              March 2011.

   [I-D.ietf-netconf-rfc4742bis]
              Wasserman, M. and T. Goddard, "Using the NETCONF
              Configuration Protocol over Secure Shell (SSH)",
              draft-ietf-netconf-rfc4742bis-08 (work in progress),
              March 2011.

4.2.  Informative References

   [RFC2865]  Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
              "Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)",
              RFC 2865, June 2000.

   [RFC5607]  Nelson, D. and G. Weber, "Remote Authentication Dial-In
              User Service (RADIUS) Authorization for Network Access
              Server (NAS) Management", RFC 5607, July 2009.










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Appendix A.  Usage Examples

   The following XML snippets are provided as examples only, to
   demonstrate how NACM can be configured to perform some access control
   tasks.

A.1.  <groups> Example

   There needs to be at least one <group> entry in order for any of the
   access control rules to be useful.

   The following XML shows arbitrary groups, and is not intended to
   represent any particular use-case.


   <nacm xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-acm">
     <groups>
       <group>
         <name>admin</name>
         <user-name>admin</user-name>
         <user-name>andy</user-name>
       </group>

       <group>
         <name>monitor</name>
         <user-name>wilma</user-name>
         <user-name>bam-bam</user-name>
       </group>

       <group>
         <name>guest</name>
         <user-name>guest</user-name>
         <user-name>guest@example.com</user-name>
       </group>
     </groups>
   </nacm>




   This example shows 3 groups:

   1.  The "admin" group contains 2 users named "admin" and "andy".

   2.  The "monitor" group contains 2 users named "wilma" and "bam-bam".

   3.  The "guest" group contains 2 users named "guest" and
       "guest@example.com".



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A.2.  Module Rule Example

   Module rules are used to control access to all the content defined in
   a specific module.  A module rule has the <module-name> leaf set, but
   no case in the "rule-type" choice.


   <nacm xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-acm">
     <rule-list>
       <name>guest</name>
       <group>guest</group>

       <rule>
         <name>mod-1</name>
         <module-name>ietf-netconf-monitoring</module-name>
         <access-operations>*</access-operations>
         <action>deny</action>
         <comment>
             Do not allow guests any access to the netconf
             monitoring information.
         </comment>
       </rule>
     </rule-list>

     <rule-list>
       <name>monitor example</name>
       <group>monitor</group>

       <rule>
         <name>mod-2</name>
         <module-name>ietf-netconf-monitoring</module-name>
         <access-operations>read</access-operations>
         <action>permit</action>
         <comment>
             Allow read access to the netconf
             monitoring information.
         </comment>
       </rule>
       <rule>
         <name>mod-3</name>
         <module-name>*</module-name>
         <access-operations>exec</access-operations>
         <action>permit</action>
         <comment>
             Allow invocation of the
             supported server operations.
         </comment>
       </rule>



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     </rule-list>

     <rule-list>
       <name>admin example</name>
       <group>admin</group>

       <rule>
         <name>mod-4</name>
         <module-name>*</module-name>
         <access-operations>*</access-operations>
         <action>permit</action>
         <comment>
             Allow the admin group complete access to all
             operations and data.
         </comment>
       </rule>
     </rule-list>
   </nacm>




   This example shows 4 module rules:

   mod-1:  This rule prevents the guest group from reading any
      monitoring information in the ietf-netconf-monitoring YANG module.

   mod-2:  This rule allows the monitor group to read the ietf-netconf-
      monitoring YANG module.

   mod-3:  This rule allows the monitor group to invoke any protocol
      operation supported by the server.

   mod-4:  This rule allows the admin group complete access to all
      content in the server.  No subsequent rule will match for the
      admin group, because of this module rule.

A.3.  RPC Rule Example

   RPC rules are used to control access to a specific protocol
   operation.










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   <nacm xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-acm">
     <rule-list>
       <name>guest</name>
       <group>monitor</group>
       <group>guest</group>

       <rule>
         <name>rpc-1</name>
         <module-name>ietf-netconf</module-name>
         <rpc-name>kill-session</rpc-name>
         <access-operations>exec</access-operations>
         <action>deny</action>
         <comment>
           Do not allow the monitor or guest group
           to kill another session.
         </comment>
       </rule>
       <rule>
         <name>rpc-2</name>
         <module-name>ietf-netconf</module-name>
         <rpc-name>delete-config</rpc-name>
         <access-operations>exec</access-operations>
         <action>deny</action>
         <comment>
           Do not allow monitor or guest group
           to delete any configurations.
         </comment>
       </rule>
     </rule-list>

     <rule-list>
       <name>monitor</name>
       <group>monitor</group>

       <rule>
         <name>rpc-3</name>
         <module-name>ietf-netconf</module-name>
         <rpc-name>edit-config</rpc-name>
         <access-operations>exec</access-operations>
         <action>permit</action>
         <comment>
           Allow the monitor group to edit the configuration.
         </comment>
       </rule>
     </rule-list>

   </nacm>




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   This example shows 3 protocol operation rules:

   rpc-1:  This rule prevents the monitor or guest groups from invoking
      the NETCONF <kill-session> protocol operation.

   rpc-2:  This rule prevents the monitor or guest groups from invoking
      the NETCONF <delete-config> protocol operation.

   rpc-3:  This rule allows the monitor group to invoke the NETCONF
      <edit-config> protocol operation.  This rule will have no real
      effect unless the "exec-default" leaf is set to "deny".

A.4.  Data Rule Example

   Data rules are used to control access to specific (config and non-
   config) data nodes within the NETCONF content provided by the server.


   <nacm xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-acm">
     <rule-list>
       <name>guest rules</name>
       <group>guest</group>

       <rule>
         <name>data-1</name>
         <path xmlns:n="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-acm">
           /n:nacm
         </path>
         <access-operations>*</access-operations>
         <action>deny</action>
         <comment>
           Deny the guest group any access to the /nacm data.
         </comment>
       </rule>
     </rule-list>

     <rule-list>
       <name>monitor rules</name>
       <group>monitor</group>

       <rule>
         <name>data-acme-config</name>
         <path xmlns:acme="http://example.com/ns/netconf">
           /acme:acme-netconf/acme:config-parameters
         </path>
         <access-operations>
           read create update delete
         </access-operations>



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         <action>permit</action>
         <comment>
           Allow the monitor group complete access to the acme
           netconf configuration parameters.  Showing long form
           of 'access-operations' instead of shorthand.
         </comment>
       </rule>
     </rule-list>

     <rule-list>
       <name>dummy-itf</name>
       <group>guest monitor</group>

       <rule>
         <name>dummy-itf</name>
         <path xmlns:acme="http://example.com/ns/itf">
           /acme:interfaces/acme:interface[acme:name='dummy']
         </path>
         <access-operations>read update</access-operations>
         <action>permit</action>
         <comment>
           Allow the monitor and guest groups read
           and update access to the dummy interface.
         </comment>
       </rule>
     </rule-list>

     <rule-list>
       <name>admin rules</name>
       <rule>
         <name>admin-itf</name>
         <path xmlns:acme="http://example.com/ns/itf">
           /acme:interfaces/acme:interface
         </path>
         <access-operations>*</access-operations>
         <action>permit</action>
         <comment>
           Allow admin full access to all acme interfaces.
         </comment>
       </rule>
     </rule-list>
   </nacm>



   This example shows 4 data rules:





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   data-1:  This rule denies the guest group any access to the <nacm>
      subtree.  Note that the default namespace is only applicable
      because this subtree is defined in the same namespace as the
      <data-rule> element.

   data-acme-config:  This rule gives the monitor group read-write
      access to the acme <config-parameters>.

   dummy-itf:  This rule gives the monitor and guest groups read-update
      access to the acme <interface>. entry named "dummy".  This entry
      cannot be created or deleted by these groups, just altered.

   admin-itf:  This rule gives the admin group read-write access to all
      acme <interface>. entries.  This is an example of an unreachable
      rule because the "mod-3" rule already gives the admin group full
      access to this data.

A.5.  Notification Rule Example

   Notification rules are used to control access to a specific
   notification event type.


   <nacm xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-acm">
     <rule-list>
       <name>sys</name>
       <group>monitor</group>
       <group>guest</group>

       <rule>
         <name>notif-1</name>
         <module-name>acme-system</module-name>
         <notification-name>sys-config-change</notification-name>
         <access-operations>read</access-operations>
         <action>deny</action>
         <comment>
           Do not allow the guest or monitor groups
           to receive config change events.
         </comment>
       </rule>
     </rule-list>
   </nacm>



   This example shows 1 notification rule:





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   notif-1:  This rule prevents the monitor or guest groups from
      receiving the acme <sys-config-change> event type.

















































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Appendix B.  Change Log

   -- RFC Ed.: remove this section before publication.

B.1.  03-04

   Introduced rule-lists to group related rules together.

   Moved "module-rule", "rpc-rule", "notification-rule", and "data-rule"
   into one common "rule", with a choice to select between the four
   variants.

   Changed "superuser" to "recovery session", and adjusted text
   throughout document for this change.

   Clarified behavior of global default NACM parameters, enable-nacm,
   read-default, write-default, exec-default.

   Clarified when access control is applied during system
   initialization.

B.2.  02-03

   Fixed improper usage of RFC 2119 keywords.

   Changed term usage of "database" to "datastore".

   Clarified that "secure" and "very-secure" extensions only apply if
   the /nacm/enable-nacm object is "true".

B.3.  01-02

   Removed authentication text and objects.

   Changed module name from ietf-nacm to ietf-netconf-acm.

   Updated NETCONF and YANG terminology.

   Removed open issues section.

   Changed some must to MUST in requirements section.

B.4.  00-01

   Updated YANG anf YANG Types references.

   Updated module namespace URI to standard format.




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   Updated module header meta-data to standard format.

   Filled in IANA section.

B.5.  00

   Initial version cloned from
   draft-bierman-netconf-access-control-02.txt.











































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Authors' Addresses

   Andy Bierman
   Brocade

   Email: andy.bierman@brocade.com


   Martin Bjorklund
   Tail-f Systems

   Email: mbj@tail-f.com







































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