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Versions: (draft-bierman-netconf-rfc6536bis) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07

Internet Engineering Task Force                               A. Bierman
Internet-Draft                                                 YumaWorks
Obsoletes: 6536 (if approved)                               M. Bjorklund
Intended status: Standards Track                          Tail-f Systems
Expires: April 13, 2018                                 October 10, 2017


              Network Configuration Access Control Module
                    draft-ietf-netconf-rfc6536bis-06

Abstract

   The standardization of network configuration interfaces for use with
   the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) or RESTCONF protocol
   requires a structured and secure operating environment that promotes
   human usability and multi-vendor interoperability.  There is a need
   for standard mechanisms to restrict NETCONF or RESTCONF protocol
   access for particular users to a pre-configured subset of all
   available NETCONF or RESTCONF protocol operations and content.  This
   document defines such an access control model.

   This document obsoletes RFC 6536.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 13, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of



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   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.2.  Changes Since RFC 6536  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   2.  Access Control Design Objectives  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.1.  Access Control Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.2.  Simplicity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.3.  Procedural Interface  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.4.  Datastore Access  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.5.  Users and Groups  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.6.  Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.7.  Configuration Capabilities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.8.  Identifying Security-Sensitive Content  . . . . . . . . .   8
   3.  NETCONF Access Control Model (NACM) . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.1.1.  Features  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.1.2.  External Dependencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       3.1.3.  Message Processing Model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     3.2.  Datastore Access  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       3.2.1.  Mapping New Datastores to NACM  . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       3.2.2.  Access Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       3.2.3.  RESTCONF Methods  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       3.2.4.  <get> and <get-config> Operations . . . . . . . . . .  16
       3.2.5.  <edit-config> Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       3.2.6.  <copy-config> Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       3.2.7.  <delete-config> Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
       3.2.8.  <commit> Operation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
       3.2.9.  <discard-changes> Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
       3.2.10. <kill-session> Operation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     3.3.  Model Components  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       3.3.1.  Users . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       3.3.2.  Groups  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       3.3.3.  Emergency Recovery Session  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       3.3.4.  Global Enforcement Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
         3.3.4.1.  enable-nacm Switch  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
         3.3.4.2.  read-default Switch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
         3.3.4.3.  write-default Switch  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
         3.3.4.4.  exec-default Switch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
         3.3.4.5.  enable-external-groups Switch . . . . . . . . . .  21
       3.3.5.  Access Control Rules  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21



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     3.4.  Access Control Enforcement Procedures . . . . . . . . . .  21
       3.4.1.  Initial Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       3.4.2.  Session Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       3.4.3.  "access-denied" Error Handling  . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       3.4.4.  Incoming RPC Message Validation . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       3.4.5.  Data Node Access Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
       3.4.6.  Outgoing <notification> Authorization . . . . . . . .  27
     3.5.  Data Model Definitions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
       3.5.1.  Data Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
       3.5.2.  YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
     3.6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
     3.7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41
       3.7.1.  NACM Configuration and Monitoring Considerations  . .  41
       3.7.2.  General Configuration Issues  . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
       3.7.3.  Data Model Design Considerations  . . . . . . . . . .  44
   4.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
     4.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
     4.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46
   Appendix A.  Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
     A.1.  v05 to v06  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
     A.2.  v04 to v05  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
     A.3.  v03 to v04  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
     A.4.  v02 to v03  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
     A.5.  v01 to v02  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
     A.6.  v00 to v01  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
     A.7.  v00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
   Appendix B.  Usage Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
     B.1.  <groups> Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
     B.2.  Module Rule Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
     B.3.  Protocol Operation Rule Example . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
     B.4.  Data Node Rule Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52
     B.5.  Notification Rule Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55

1.  Introduction

   The NETCONF and RESTCONF protocols do not provide any standard
   mechanisms to restrict the protocol operations and content that each
   user is authorized to access.

   There is a need for interoperable management of the controlled access
   to administrator-selected portions of the available NETCONF or
   RESTCONF content within a particular server.

   This document addresses access control mechanisms for the Operations
   and Content layers of NETCONF, as defined in [RFC6241], and RESTCONF,
   as defined in [RFC8040].  It contains three main sections:




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   1.  Access Control Design Objectives

   2.  NETCONF Access Control Model (NACM)

   3.  YANG Data Model (ietf-netconf-acm.yang)

   YANG version 1.1 [RFC7950] adds two new constructs that need special
   access control handling.  The "action" statement is similar to the
   "rpc" statement, except it is located within a data node.  The
   "notification" statement can also be located within a data node.

1.1.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   The following terms are defined in
   [I-D.ietf-netmod-revised-datastores] and are not redefined here:

   o  datastore

   o  configuration datastore

   o  conventional configuration datastore

   o  candidate configuration datastore

   o  running configuration datastore

   o  startup configuration datastore

   o  operational state datastore

   o  client

   o  server

   The following terms are defined in [RFC6241] and are not redefined
   here:

   o  protocol operation

   o  session

   o  user





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   The following terms are defined in [RFC7950] and are not redefined
   here:

   o  action

   o  data node

   o  data definition statement

   The following terms are defined in [RFC8040] and are not redefined
   here:

   o  data resource

   o  datastore resource

   o  operation resource

   o  target resource

   The following term is defined in [RFC7230] and is not redefined here:

   o  request URI

   The following terms are used throughout this document:

   access control:  A security feature provided by the server that
      allows an administrator to restrict access to a subset of all
      protocol operations and data, based on various criteria.

   access control model (ACM):  A conceptual model used to configure and
      monitor the access control procedures desired by the administrator
      to enforce a particular access control policy.

   access control rule:  The criterion used to determine if a particular
      access operation will be permitted or denied.

   access operation:  How a request attempts to access a conceptual
      object.  One of "none", "read", "create", "delete", "update", or
      "execute".

   data node hierarchy:  The hierarchy of data nodes that identifies the
      specific "action" or "notification" node in the datastore.

   recovery session:  A special administrative session that is given
      unlimited NETCONF access and is exempt from all access control
      enforcement.  The mechanism(s) used by a server to control and




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      identify whether or not a session is a recovery session are
      implementation specific and outside the scope of this document.

   write access:  A shorthand for the "create", "delete", and "update"
      access operations.

1.2.  Changes Since RFC 6536

   The NACM procedures and data model have been updated to support new
   data modeling capabilities in the version 1.1. of the YANG data
   modeling language.  The "action" and "notification" statements can be
   used within data nodes to define data-model specific operations and
   notifications.

   An important use-case for these new YANG statements is the increased
   access control granularity that can be achieved over top-level "rpc"
   and "notification" statements.  The new "action" and "notification"
   statements are used within data nodes, and access to the action or
   notification can be restricted to specific instances of these data
   nodes.

   Support for the RESTCONF protocol has been added.  The RESTCONF
   operations are similar to the NETCONF operations, so a simple mapping
   to the existing NACM procedures and data model is possible.

2.  Access Control Design Objectives

   This section documents the design objectives for the NETCONF Access
   Control Model presented in Section 3.

2.1.  Access Control Points

   NETCONF allows server implementors to add new custom protocol
   operations, and the YANG Data Modeling Language supports this
   feature.  These operations can be defined in standard or proprietary
   YANG modules.

   It is not possible to design an ACM for NETCONF that only focuses on
   a static set of standard protocol operations defined by the NETCONF
   protocol itself, like some other protocols.  Since few assumptions
   can be made about an arbitrary protocol operation, the NETCONF
   architectural server components need to be protected at three
   conceptual control points.

   These access control points, described in Figure 1, are as follows:

   protocol operation:  Permission to invoke specific protocol
      operations.



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   datastore:  Permission to read and/or alter specific data nodes
      within any datastore.

   notification:  Permission to receive specific notification event
      types.

                 +-------------+                 +-------------+
    client       |  protocol   |                 |  data node  |
    request -->  |  operation  | ------------->  |   access    |
                 |  allowed?   |   datastore     |  allowed?   |
                 +-------------+   or state      +-------------+
                                   data access


                 +----------------+
                 |  notification  |
    event -->    |  allowed?      |
                 +----------------+

                                 Figure 1

2.2.  Simplicity

   There is concern that a complicated ACM will not be widely deployed
   because it is too hard to use.  It needs to be easy to do simple
   things and possible to do complex things, instead of hard to do
   everything.

   Configuration of the access control system needs to be as simple as
   possible.  Simple and common tasks need to be easy to configure and
   require little expertise or domain-specific knowledge.  Complex tasks
   are possible using additional mechanisms, which may require
   additional expertise.

   A single set of access control rules ought to be able to control all
   types of NETCONF protocol operation invocation, all datastore access,
   and all notification events.

   Access control ought to be defined with a small and familiar set of
   permissions, while still allowing full control of datastore access.

2.3.  Procedural Interface

   The NETCONF protocol uses a remote procedure call model and an
   extensible set of protocol operations.  Access control for any
   possible protocol operation is necessary.





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2.4.  Datastore Access

   It is necessary to control access to specific nodes and subtrees
   within the datastore, regardless of which protocol operation,
   standard or proprietary, was used to access the datastore.

2.5.  Users and Groups

   It is necessary that access control rules for a single user or a
   configurable group of users can be configured.

   The ACM needs to support the concept of administrative groups, to
   support the well-established distinction between a root account and
   other types of less-privileged conceptual user accounts.  These
   groups need to be configurable by the administrator.

   It is necessary that the user-to-group mapping can be delegated to a
   central server, such as a RADIUS server [RFC2865][RFC5607].  Since
   authentication is performed by the transport layer and RADIUS
   performs authentication and service authorization at the same time,
   the underlying transport protocol needs to be able to report a set of
   group names associated with the user to the server.  It is necessary
   that the administrator can disable the usage of these group names
   within the ACM.

2.6.  Maintenance

   It ought to be possible to disable part or all of the access control
   model enforcement procedures without deleting any access control
   rules.

2.7.  Configuration Capabilities

   Suitable configuration and monitoring mechanisms are needed to allow
   an administrator to easily manage all aspects of the ACM's behavior.
   A standard data model, suitable for use with the <edit-config>
   protocol operation, needs to be available for this purpose.

   Access control rules to restrict access operations on specific
   subtrees within the configuration datastore need to be supported.

2.8.  Identifying Security-Sensitive Content

   One of the most important aspects of the data model documentation,
   and biggest concerns during deployment, is the identification of
   security-sensitive content.  This applies to protocol operations in
   NETCONF, not just data and notifications.




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   It is mandatory for security-sensitive objects to be documented in
   the Security Considerations section of an RFC.  This is nice, but it
   is not good enough, for the following reasons:

   o  This documentation-only approach forces administrators to study
      the RFC and determine if there are any potential security risks
      introduced by a new data model.

   o  If any security risks are identified, then the administrator must
      study some more RFC text and determine how to mitigate the
      security risk(s).

   o  The ACM on each server must be configured to mitigate the security
      risks, e.g., require privileged access to read or write the
      specific data identified in the Security Considerations section.

   o  If the ACM is not pre-configured, then there will be a time window
      of vulnerability after the new data model is loaded and before the
      new access control rules for that data model are configured,
      enabled, and debugged.

   Often, the administrator just wants to disable default access to the
   secure content, so no inadvertent or malicious changes can be made to
   the server.  This allows the default rules to be more lenient,
   without significantly increasing the security risk.

   A data model designer needs to be able to use machine-readable
   statements to identify content that needs to be protected by default.
   This will allow client and server tools to automatically identify
   data-model-specific security risks, by denying access to sensitive
   data unless the user is explicitly authorized to perform the
   requested access operation.

3.  NETCONF Access Control Model (NACM)

3.1.  Introduction

   This section provides a high-level overview of the access control
   model structure.  It describes the NETCONF protocol message
   processing model and the conceptual access control requirements
   within that model.

3.1.1.  Features

   The NACM data model provides the following features:

   o  Independent control of remote procedure call (RPC), action, data,
      and notification access.



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   o  Simple access control rules configuration data model that is easy
      to use.

   o  The concept of an emergency recovery session is supported, but
      configuration of the server for this purpose is beyond the scope
      of this document.  An emergency recovery session will bypass all
      access control enforcement, in order to allow it to initialize or
      repair the NACM configuration.

   o  A simple and familiar set of datastore permissions is used.

   o  Support for YANG security tagging (e.g., "nacm:default-deny-write"
      statement) allows default security modes to automatically exclude
      sensitive data.

   o  Separate default access modes for read, write, and execute
      permissions.

   o  Access control rules are applied to configurable groups of users.

   o  The access control enforcement procedures can be disabled during
      operation, without deleting any access control rules, in order to
      debug operational problems.

   o  Access control rules are simple to configure.

   o  The number of denied protocol operation requests and denied
      datastore write requests can be monitored by the client.

   o  Simple unconstrained YANG instance identifiers are used to
      configure access control rules for specific data nodes.

3.1.2.  External Dependencies

   The NETCONF protocol [RFC6241] is used for network management
   purposes within this document.

   The RESTCONF protocol [RFC8040] is used for network management
   purposes within this document.

   The YANG Data Modeling Language [RFC7950] is used to define the data
   models for use with the NETCONF or RESTCONF protocols.  YANG is also
   used to define the data model in this document.








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3.1.3.  Message Processing Model

   The following diagram shows the conceptual message flow model,
   including the points at which access control is applied during
   NETCONF message processing.

   RESTCONF operations are mapped to the access control model based on
   the HTTP method and resource class used in the operation.  For
   example, a POST method on a data resource is considered "write data
   node" access, but a POST method on an operation resource is
   considered "operation" access.








































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                    +-------------------------+
                    |       session           |
                    |      (username)         |
                    +-------------------------+
                       |                 ^
                       V                 |
             +--------------+     +---------------+
             |   message    |     |   message     |
             | dispatcher   |     |   generator   |
             +--------------+     +---------------+
               |      |               ^         ^
               |      V               |         |
               |  +=============+     |         |
               |  | pre-read    |     |         |
               |  | data node   |     |         |
               |  | acc. ctl    |     |         |
               |  +=============+     |         |
               |    |                 |         |
               V    V                 |         |
         +===========+     +-------------+   +----------------+
         | operation |---> |    reply    |   | <notification> |
         | acc. ctl  |     |  generator  |   |  generator     |
         +===========+     +-------------+   +----------------+
               |              ^    ^                ^
               V       +------+    |                |
         +-----------+ |   +=============+  +================+
         | operation | |   |    read     |  | <notification> |
         | processor |-+   | data node   |  |  access ctl    |
         |           |     | acc. ctl    |  |                |
         +-----------+     +=============+  +================+
               |   |                  ^       ^     ^
               V   +----------------+ |       |     |
         +===========+              | |       | +============+
         |  write    |              | |       | | pre-read   |
         | data node |              | |       | | data node  |
         | acc. ctl  | -----------+ | |       | | acc. ctl   |
         +===========+            | | |       | +============+
               |                  | | |       |   ^
               V                  V V |       |   |
         +---------------+      +-------------------+
         | configuration | ---> |      server       |
         |   datastore   |      |  instrumentation  |
         |               | <--- |                   |
         +---------------+      +-------------------+

                                 Figure 2





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   The following high-level sequence of conceptual processing steps is
   executed for each received <rpc> message, if access control
   enforcement is enabled:

   o  For each active session, access control is applied individually to
      all <rpc> messages (except <close-session>) received by the
      server, unless the session is identified as a recovery session.

   o  If the <action> operation defined in [RFC7950] is invoked, then
      read access is required for all instances in the hierarchy of data
      nodes that identifies the specific action in the datastore, and
      execute access is required for the action node.  If the user is
      not authorized to read all the specified data nodes and execute
      the action, then the request is rejected with an "access-denied"
      error.

   o  Otherwise, if the user is not authorized to execute the specified
      protocol operation, then the request is rejected with an "access-
      denied" error.

   o  If a datastore is accessed by the protocol operation, then the
      server checks if the client is authorized to access the nodes in
      the datastore.  If the user is not authorized to perform the
      requested access operation on the requested data, then the request
      is rejected with an "access-denied" error.

   The following sequence of conceptual processing steps is executed for
   each generated notification event, if access control enforcement is
   enabled:

   o  Server instrumentation generates a notification for a particular
      subscription.

   o  If the notification statement is specified within a data subtree,
      as specified in [RFC7950], then read access is required for all
      instances in the hierarchy of data nodes that identifies the
      specific notification in the datastore, and read access is
      required for the notification node.  If the user is not authorized
      to read all the specified data nodes and the notification node,
      then the notification is dropped for that subscription.

   o  If the notification statement is a top-level statement, the
      notification access control enforcer checks the notification event
      type, and if it is one that the user is not authorized to read,
      then the notification is dropped for that subscription.






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3.2.  Datastore Access

   The same access control rules apply to all datastores that support
   NACM, for example, the candidate configuration datastore or the
   running configuration datastore.

   All conventional configuration datastores and the operational state
   datastore are controlled by NACM.  Local or remote files or
   datastores accessed via the <url> parameter are not controlled by
   NACM.

3.2.1.  Mapping New Datastores to NACM

   It is possible that new datastores will be defined over time for use
   with the NETCONF protocol.  NACM MAY be applied to other datastores
   that have similar access rights as defined in NACM.  To apply NACM to
   a new datastore, the new datastore specification needs to define how
   it maps to the NACM CRUDX access rights.  It is possible only a
   subset of the NACM access rights would be applicable.  For example,
   only retrieval access control would be needed for a read-only
   datastore.  Operations and access rights not supported by the NACM
   CRUDX model are outside the scope of this document.  A datastore does
   not need to use NACM, e.g., the datastore specification defines
   something else, or does not use access control.

3.2.2.  Access Rights

   A small set of hard-wired datastore access rights is needed to
   control access to all possible NETCONF protocol operations, including
   vendor extensions to the standard protocol operation set.

   The "CRUDX" model can support all NETCONF protocol operations:

   o  Create: allows the client to add a new data node instance to a
      datastore.

   o  Read: allows the client to read a data node instance from a
      datastore or receive the notification event type.

   o  Update: allows the client to update an existing data node instance
      in a datastore.

   o  Delete: allows the client to delete a data node instance from a
      datastore.

   o  eXec: allows the client to execute the operation.





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3.2.3.  RESTCONF Methods

   The RESTCONF protocol utilizes HTTP methods to perform datastore
   operations, similar to the NETCONF protocol.  The NACM procedures
   were originally written for NETCONF protocol operations so the
   RESTCONF methods are mapped to NETCONF operations for the purpose of
   access control processing.  The enforcement procedures described
   within this document apply to both protocols unless explicitly stated
   otherwise.

   The request URI needs to be considered when processing RESTCONF
   requests on data resources:

   o  For HEAD and GET requests, any data nodes which are ancestor nodes
      of the target resource are considered to be part of the retrieval
      request for access control purposes.

   o  For PUT, PATCH, and DELETE requests, any data nodes which are
      ancestor nodes of the target resource are not considered to be
      part of the edit request for access control purposes.  The access
      operation for these nodes is considered to be "none".  The edit
      begins at the target resource.

   o  For POST requests on data resources, any data nodes which are
      specified in the request URI, including the target resource, are
      not considered to be part of the edit request for access control
      purposes.  The access operation for these nodes is considered to
      be "none".  The edit begins at a child node of the target
      resource, specified in the message body.

   Not all RESTCONF methods are subject to access control.  The
   following table specifies how each method is mapped to NETCONF
   protocol operations.  The value "none" indicates that NACM is not
   applied at all to the specific RESTCONF method.

















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   +---------+-----------------+---------------------+-----------------+
   | method  | resource class  | NETCONF operation   | Access          |
   |         |                 |                     | operation       |
   +---------+-----------------+---------------------+-----------------+
   | OPTIONS | all             | none                | N/A             |
   | HEAD    | all             | <get>               | N/A             |
   | GET     | all             | <get>               | N/A             |
   | POST    | datastore, data | <edit-config>       | create          |
   | POST    | operation       | specified operation | N/A             |
   | PUT     | data            | <edit-config>       | create, replace |
   | PUT     | datastore       | <copy-config>       | replace         |
   | PATCH   | data, datastore | <edit-config>       | merge           |
   | DELETE  | data            | <edit-config>       | delete          |
   +---------+-----------------+---------------------+-----------------+

               Table 1: Mapping RESTCONF Methods to NETCONF

3.2.4.  <get> and <get-config> Operations

   The NACM access rights are not directly coupled to the <get> and
   <get-config> protocol operations, but apply to all <rpc> operations
   that would result in a "read" access operation to the target
   datastore.  This section describes how these access rights apply to
   the specific access operations supported by the <get> and <get-
   config> protocol operations.

   Data nodes to which the client does not have read access are silently
   omitted from the <rpc-reply> message.  This is done to allow NETCONF
   filters for <get> and <get-config> to function properly, instead of
   causing an "access-denied" error because the filter criteria would
   otherwise include unauthorized read access to some data nodes.  For
   NETCONF filtering purposes, the selection criteria is applied to the
   subset of nodes that the user is authorized to read, not the entire
   datastore.

3.2.5.  <edit-config> Operation

   The NACM access rights are not directly coupled to the <edit-config>
   "operation" attribute, although they are similar.  Instead, a NACM
   access right applies to all protocol operations that would result in
   a particular access operation to the target datastore.  This section
   describes how these access rights apply to the specific access
   operations supported by the <edit-config> protocol operation.

   If the effective access operation is "none" (i.e., default-
   operation="none") for a particular data node, then no access control
   is applied to that data node.  This is required to allow access to a
   subtree within a larger data structure.  For example, a user may be



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   authorized to create a new "/interfaces/interface" list entry but not
   be authorized to create or delete its parent container
   ("/interfaces").  If the "/interfaces" container already exists in
   the target datastore, then the effective operation will be "none" for
   the "/interfaces" node if an "/interfaces/interface" list entry is
   edited.

   If the protocol operation would result in the creation of a datastore
   node and the user does not have "create" access permission for that
   node, the protocol operation is rejected with an "access-denied"
   error.

   If the protocol operation would result in the deletion of a datastore
   node and the user does not have "delete" access permission for that
   node, the protocol operation is rejected with an "access-denied"
   error.

   If the protocol operation would result in the modification of a
   datastore node and the user does not have "update" access permission
   for that node, the protocol operation is rejected with an "access-
   denied" error.

   A "merge" or "replace" <edit-config> operation may include data nodes
   that do not alter portions of the existing datastore.  For example, a
   container or list node may be present for naming purposes but does
   not actually alter the corresponding datastore node.  These unaltered
   data nodes are ignored by the server and do not require any access
   rights by the client.

   A "merge" <edit-config> operation may include data nodes but not
   include particular child data nodes that are present in the
   datastore.  These missing data nodes within the scope of a "merge"
   <edit-config> operation are ignored by the server and do not require
   any access rights by the client.

   The contents of specific restricted datastore nodes MUST NOT be
   exposed in any <rpc-error> elements within the reply.

3.2.6.  <copy-config> Operation

   Access control for the <copy-config> protocol operation requires
   special consideration because the administrator may be replacing the
   entire target datastore.

   If the source of the <copy-config> protocol operation is the running
   configuration datastore and the target is the startup configuration
   datastore, the client is only required to have permission to execute
   the <copy-config> protocol operation.



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   Otherwise:

   o  If the source of the <copy-config> operation is a datastore, then
      data nodes to which the client does not have read access are
      silently omitted.

   o  If the target of the <copy-config> operation is a datastore, the
      client needs access to the modified nodes, specifically:

      *  If the protocol operation would result in the creation of a
         datastore node and the user does not have "create" access
         permission for that node, the protocol operation is rejected
         with an "access-denied" error.

      *  If the protocol operation would result in the deletion of a
         datastore node and the user does not have "delete" access
         permission for that node, the protocol operation is rejected
         with an "access-denied" error.

      *  If the protocol operation would result in the modification of a
         datastore node and the user does not have "update" access
         permission for that node, the protocol operation is rejected
         with an "access-denied" error.

3.2.7.  <delete-config> Operation

   Access to the <delete-config> protocol operation is denied by
   default.  The "exec-default" leaf does not apply to this protocol
   operation.  Access control rules must be explicitly configured to
   allow invocation by a non-recovery session.

3.2.8.  <commit> Operation

   The server MUST determine the exact nodes in the running
   configuration datastore that are actually different and only check
   "create", "update", and "delete" access permissions for this set of
   nodes, which could be empty.

   For example, if a session can read the entire datastore but only
   change one leaf, that session needs to be able to edit and commit
   that one leaf.

3.2.9.  <discard-changes> Operation

   The client is only required to have permission to execute the
   <discard-changes> protocol operation.  No datastore permissions are
   needed.




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3.2.10.  <kill-session> Operation

   The <kill-session> operation does not directly alter a datastore.
   However, it allows one session to disrupt another session that is
   editing a datastore.

   Access to the <kill-session> protocol operation is denied by default.
   The "exec-default" leaf does not apply to this protocol operation.
   Access control rules must be explicitly configured to allow
   invocation by a non-recovery session.

3.3.  Model Components

   This section defines the conceptual components related to the access
   control model.

3.3.1.  Users

   A "user" is the conceptual entity that is associated with the access
   permissions granted to a particular session.  A user is identified by
   a string that is unique within the server.

   As described in [RFC6241], the username string is derived from the
   transport layer during session establishment.  If the transport layer
   cannot authenticate the user, the session is terminated.

3.3.2.  Groups

   Access to a specific NETCONF protocol operation is granted to a
   session, associated with a group, not a user.

   A group is identified by its name.  All group names are unique within
   the server.

   A group member is identified by a username string.

   The same user can be a member of multiple groups.

3.3.3.  Emergency Recovery Session

   The server MAY support a recovery session mechanism, which will
   bypass all access control enforcement.  This is useful for
   restricting initial access and repairing a broken access control
   configuration.







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3.3.4.  Global Enforcement Controls

   There are five global controls that are used to help control how
   access control is enforced.

3.3.4.1.  enable-nacm Switch

   A global "enable-nacm" on/off switch is provided to enable or disable
   all access control enforcement.  When this global switch is set to
   "true", then all requests are checked against the access control
   rules and only permitted if configured to allow the specific access
   request.  When this global switch is set to "false", then all access
   requested are permitted.

3.3.4.2.  read-default Switch

   An on/off "read-default" switch is provided to enable or disable
   default access to receive data in replies and notifications.  When
   the "enable-nacm" global switch is set to "true", then this global
   switch is relevant if no matching access control rule is found to
   explicitly permit or deny read access to the requested datastore data
   or notification event type.

   When this global switch is set to "permit" and no matching access
   control rule is found for the datastore read or notification event
   requested, then access is permitted.

   When this global switch is set to "deny" and no matching access
   control rule is found for the datastore read or notification event
   requested, then access is denied.

3.3.4.3.  write-default Switch

   An on/off "write-default" switch is provided to enable or disable
   default access to alter configuration data.  When the "enable-nacm"
   global switch is set to "true", then this global switch is relevant
   if no matching access control rule is found to explicitly permit or
   deny write access to the requested datastore data.

   When this global switch is set to "permit" and no matching access
   control rule is found for the datastore write requested, then access
   is permitted.

   When this global switch is set to "deny" and no matching access
   control rule is found for the datastore write requested, then access
   is denied.





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3.3.4.4.  exec-default Switch

   An on/off "exec-default" switch is provided to enable or disable
   default access to execute protocol operations.  When the "enable-
   nacm" global switch is set to "true", then this global switch is
   relevant if no matching access control rule is found to explicitly
   permit or deny access to the requested NETCONF protocol operation.

   When this global switch is set to "permit" and no matching access
   control rule is found for the NETCONF protocol operation requested,
   then access is permitted.

   When this global switch is set to "deny" and no matching access
   control rule is found for the NETCONF protocol operation requested,
   then access is denied.

3.3.4.5.  enable-external-groups Switch

   When this global switch is set to "true", the group names reported by
   the transport layer for a session are used together with the locally
   configured group names to determine the access control rules for the
   session.

   When this switch is set to "false", the group names reported by the
   transport layer are ignored by NACM.

3.3.5.  Access Control Rules

   There are four types of rules available in NACM:

   module rule:  controls access for definitions in a specific YANG
      module, identified by its name.

   protocol operation rule:  controls access for a specific protocol
      operation, identified by its YANG module and name.

   data node rule:  controls access for a specific data node, identified
      by its path location within the conceptual XML document for the
      data node.

   notification rule:  controls access for a specific notification event
      type, identified by its YANG module and name.

3.4.  Access Control Enforcement Procedures

   There are seven separate phases that need to be addressed, four of
   which are related to the NETCONF message processing model
   (Section 3.1.3).  In addition, the initial startup mode for a NETCONF



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   server, session establishment, and "access-denied" error-handling
   procedures also need to be considered.

   The server MUST use the access control rules in effect at the time it
   starts processing the message.  The same access control rules MUST
   stay in effect for the processing of the entire message.

3.4.1.  Initial Operation

   Upon the very first startup of the NETCONF server, the access control
   configuration will probably not be present.  If it isn't, a server
   MUST NOT allow any write access to any session role except a recovery
   session.

   Access rules are enforced any time a request is initiated from a user
   session.  Access control is not enforced for server-initiated access
   requests, such as the initial load of the running configuration
   datastore, during bootup.

3.4.2.  Session Establishment

   The access control model applies specifically to the well-formed XML
   content transferred between a client and a server after session
   establishment has been completed and after the <hello> exchange has
   been successfully completed.

   Once session establishment is completed and a user has been
   authenticated, the transport layer reports the username and a
   possibly empty set of group names associated with the user to the
   NETCONF server.  The NETCONF server will enforce the access control
   rules, based on the supplied username, group names, and the
   configuration data stored on the server.

3.4.3.  "access-denied" Error Handling

   The "access-denied" error-tag is generated when the access control
   system denies access to either a request to invoke a protocol
   operation or a request to perform a particular access operation on
   the configuration datastore.

   A server MUST NOT include any information the client is not allowed
   to read in any <error-info> elements within the <rpc-error> response.

3.4.4.  Incoming RPC Message Validation

   The diagram below shows the basic conceptual structure of the access
   control processing model for incoming NETCONF <rpc> messages within a
   server.



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                   NETCONF server
                  +------------+
                  |    XML     |
                  |   message  |
                  | dispatcher |
                  +------------+
                         |
                         |
                         V
                  +------------+
                  | NC-base NS |
                  |   <rpc>    |
                  +------------+
                    |   |  |
                    |   |  +-------------------------+
                    |   +------------+               |
                    V                V               V
               +-----------+ +---------------+ +------------+
               | Vendor NS | | NC-base NS    | | NC-base NS |
               | <my-edit> | | <edit-config> | | <unlock>   |
               +-----------+ +---------------+ +------------+
                      |               |
                      |               |
                      V               V
                    +----------------------+
                    |                      |
                    |    configuration     |
                    |      datastore       |
                    +----------------------+

                                 Figure 3

   Access control begins with the message dispatcher.

   After the server validates the <rpc> element and determines the
   namespace URI and the element name of the protocol operation being
   requested, the server verifies that the user is authorized to invoke
   the protocol operation.

   The server MUST separately authorize every protocol operation by
   following these steps:

   1.   If the "enable-nacm" leaf is set to "false", then the protocol
        operation is permitted.

   2.   If the requesting session is identified as a recovery session,
        then the protocol operation is permitted.




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   3.   If the requested operation is the NETCONF <close-session>
        protocol operation, then the protocol operation is permitted.

   4.   Check all the "group" entries for ones that contain a "user-
        name" entry that equals the username for the session making the
        request.  If the "enable-external-groups" leaf is "true", add to
        these groups the set of groups provided by the transport layer.

   5.   If no groups are found, continue with step 10.

   6.   Process all rule-list entries, in the order they appear in the
        configuration.  If a rule-list's "group" leaf-list does not
        match any of the user's groups, proceed to the next rule-list
        entry.

   7.   For each rule-list entry found, process all rules, in order,
        until a rule that matches the requested access operation is
        found.  A rule matches if all of the following criteria are met:

        *  The rule's "module-name" leaf is "*" or equals the name of
           the YANG module where the protocol operation is defined.

        *  The rule does not have a "rule-type" defined or the "rule-
           type" is "protocol-operation" and the "rpc-name" is "*" or
           equals the name of the requested protocol operation.

        *  The rule's "access-operations" leaf has the "exec" bit set or
           has the special value "*".

   8.   If a matching rule is found, then the "action" leaf is checked.
        If it is equal to "permit", then the protocol operation is
        permitted; otherwise, it is denied.

   9.   At this point, no matching rule was found in any rule-list
        entry.

   10.  If the requested protocol operation is defined in a YANG module
        advertised in the server capabilities and the "rpc" statement
        contains a "nacm:default-deny-all" statement, then the protocol
        operation is denied.

   11.  If the requested protocol operation is the NETCONF <kill-
        session> or <delete-config>, then the protocol operation is
        denied.

   12.  If the "exec-default" leaf is set to "permit", then permit the
        protocol operation; otherwise, deny the request.




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   If the user is not authorized to invoke the protocol operation, then
   an <rpc-error> is generated with the following information:

   error-tag:  access-denied

   error-path:  Identifies the requested protocol operation.  The
      following example represents the <edit-config> protocol operation
      in the NETCONF base namespace:

         <error-path
           xmlns:nc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
             /nc:rpc/nc:edit-config
         </error-path>

   If a datastore is accessed, either directly or as a side effect of
   the protocol operation, then the server MUST intercept the access
   operation and make sure the user is authorized to perform the
   requested access operation on the specified data, as defined in
   Section 3.4.5.

3.4.5.  Data Node Access Validation

   If a data node within a datastore is accessed, or an action or
   notification tied to a data node, then the server MUST ensure that
   the user is authorized to perform the requested "read", "create",
   "update", "delete", or "execute" access operation on the specified
   data node.

   If an action is requested to be executed, the server MUST ensure that
   the user is authorized to perform the "execute" access operation on
   the requested action.

   If a notification tied to a data node is generated, the server MUST
   ensure that the user is authorized to perform the "read" access
   operation on the requested notification.

   The data node access request is authorized by following these steps:

   1.   If the "enable-nacm" leaf is set to "false", then the access
        operation is permitted.

   2.   If the requesting session is identified as a recovery session,
        then the access operation is permitted.

   3.   Check all the "group" entries for ones that contain a "user-
        name" entry that equals the username for the session making the
        request.  If the "enable-external-groups" leaf is "true", add to
        these groups the set of groups provided by the transport layer.



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   4.   If no groups are found, continue with step 9.

   5.   Process all rule-list entries, in the order they appear in the
        configuration.  If a rule-list's "group" leaf-list does not
        match any of the user's groups, proceed to the next rule-list
        entry.

   6.   For each rule-list entry found, process all rules, in order,
        until a rule that matches the requested access operation is
        found.  A rule matches if all of the following criteria are met:

        *  The rule's "module-name" leaf is "*" or equals the name of
           the YANG module where the requested data node is defined.

        *  The rule does not have a "rule-type" defined or the "rule-
           type" is "data-node" and the "path" matches the requested
           data node, action node, or notification node.

        *  For a "read" access operation, the rule's "access-operations"
           leaf has the "read" bit set or has the special value "*".

        *  For a "create" access operation, the rule's "access-
           operations" leaf has the "create" bit set or has the special
           value "*".

        *  For a "delete" access operation, the rule's "access-
           operations" leaf has the "delete" bit set or has the special
           value "*".

        *  For an "update" access operation, the rule's "access-
           operations" leaf has the "update" bit set or has the special
           value "*".

        *  For an "execute" access operation, the rule's "access-
           operations" leaf has the "exec" bit set or has the special
           value "*".

   7.   If a matching rule is found, then the "action" leaf is checked.
        If it is equal to "permit", then the data node access is
        permitted; otherwise, it is denied.  For a "read" access
        operation, "denied" means that the requested data is not
        returned in the reply.

   8.   At this point, no matching rule was found in any rule-list
        entry.

   9.   For a "read" access operation, if the requested data node is
        defined in a YANG module advertised in the server capabilities



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        and the data definition statement contains a "nacm:default-deny-
        all" statement, then the requested data node is not included in
        the reply.

   10.  For a "write" access operation, if the requested data node is
        defined in a YANG module advertised in the server capabilities
        and the data definition statement contains a "nacm:default-deny-
        write" or a "nacm:default-deny-all" statement, then the data
        node access request is denied.

   11.  For a "read" access operation, if the "read-default" leaf is set
        to "permit", then include the requested data node in the reply;
        otherwise, do not include the requested data node in the reply.

   12.  For a "write" access operation, if the "write-default" leaf is
        set to "permit", then permit the data node access request;
        otherwise, deny the request.

   13.  For an "execute" access operation, if the "exec-default" leaf is
        set to "permit", then permit the request; otherwise, deny the
        request.

3.4.6.  Outgoing <notification> Authorization

   Configuration of access control rules specifically for descendant
   nodes of the notification event type element are outside the scope of
   this document.  If the user is authorized to receive the notification
   event type, then it is also authorized to receive any data it
   contains.

   If the notification is specified within a data subtree, as specified
   in [RFC7950], then read access to the notification is required.
   Processing continues as described in Section 3.4.5.

   The following figure shows the conceptual message processing model
   for outgoing <notification> messages.















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                   NETCONF server
                  +------------+
                  |    XML     |
                  |   message  |
                  | generator  |
                  +------------+
                        ^
                        |
                +----------------+
                | <notification> |
                |  generator     |
                +----------------+
                        ^
                        |
               +=================+
               | <notification>  |
               |  access control |
               |  <eventType>    |
               +=================+
                        ^
                        |
            +------------------------+
            | server instrumentation |
            +------------------------+
                      |     ^
                      V     |
             +----------------------+
             |    configuration     |
             |      datastore       |
             +----------------------+


                                 Figure 4

   The generation of a notification for a specific subscription
   [RFC5277] is authorized by following these steps:

   1.   If the "enable-nacm" leaf is set to "false", then the
        notification is permitted.

   2.   If the session is identified as a recovery session, then the
        notification is permitted.

   3.   If the notification is the NETCONF <replayComplete> or
        <notificationComplete> event type [RFC5277], then the
        notification is permitted.





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   4.   Check all the "group" entries for ones that contain a "user-
        name" entry that equals the username for the session making the
        request.  If the "enable-external-groups" leaf is "true", add to
        these groups the set of groups provided by the transport layer.

   5.   If no groups are found, continue with step 10.

   6.   Process all rule-list entries, in the order they appear in the
        configuration.  If a rule-list's "group" leaf-list does not
        match any of the user's groups, proceed to the next rule-list
        entry.

   7.   For each rule-list entry found, process all rules, in order,
        until a rule that matches the requested access operation is
        found.  A rule matches if all of the following criteria are met:

        *  The rule's "module-name" leaf is "*" or equals the name of
           the YANG module where the notification is defined.

        *  The rule does not have a "rule-type" defined or the "rule-
           type" is "notification" and the "notification-name" is "*" or
           equals the name of the notification.

        *  The rule's "access-operations" leaf has the "read" bit set or
           has the special value "*".

   8.   If a matching rule is found, then the "action" leaf is checked.
        If it is equal to "permit", then permit the notification;
        otherwise, drop the notification for the associated
        subscription.

   9.   Otherwise, no matching rule was found in any rule-list entry.

   10.  If the requested notification is defined in a YANG module
        advertised in the server capabilities and the "notification"
        statement contains a "nacm:default-deny-all" statement, then the
        notification is dropped for the associated subscription.

   11.  If the "read-default" leaf is set to "permit", then permit the
        notification; otherwise, drop the notification for the
        associated subscription.

3.5.  Data Model Definitions








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3.5.1.  Data Organization

   The following diagram highlights the contents and structure of the
   NACM YANG module.

  module: ietf-netconf-acm
      +--rw nacm
         +--rw enable-nacm?              boolean
         +--rw read-default?             action-type
         +--rw write-default?            action-type
         +--rw exec-default?             action-type
         +--rw enable-external-groups?   boolean
         +--ro denied-operations         yang:zero-based-counter32
         +--ro denied-data-writes        yang:zero-based-counter32
         +--ro denied-notifications      yang:zero-based-counter32
         +--rw groups
         |  +--rw group* [name]
         |     +--rw name         group-name-type
         |     +--rw user-name*   user-name-type
         +--rw rule-list* [name]
            +--rw name     string
            +--rw group*   union
            +--rw rule* [name]
               +--rw name                 string
               +--rw module-name?         union
               +--rw (rule-type)?
               |  +--:(protocol-operation)
               |  |  +--rw rpc-name?            union
               |  +--:(notification)
               |  |  +--rw notification-name?   union
               |  +--:(data-node)
               |     +--rw path                 node-instance-identifier
               +--rw access-operations?   union
               +--rw action               action-type
               +--rw comment?             string


3.5.2.  YANG Module

   The following YANG module specifies the normative NETCONF content
   that MUST by supported by the server.

   The "ietf-netconf-acm" YANG module imports typedefs from [RFC6991].

 <CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-netconf-acm@2017-10-10.yang"
 module ietf-netconf-acm {

   namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-acm";



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   prefix "nacm";

   import ietf-yang-types {
     prefix yang;
   }

   organization
     "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";


   contact
     "WG Web:   <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
      WG List:  <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>

      Author:   Andy Bierman
                <mailto:andy@yumaworks.com>

      Author:   Martin Bjorklund
                <mailto:mbj@tail-f.com>";

   description
     "Network Configuration Access Control Model.

      Copyright (c) 2012, 2017 IETF Trust and the persons
      identified as authors of the code. All rights reserved.

      Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
      without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
      to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD
      License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
      Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
      (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).

      This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
      the RFC itself for full legal notices.";

   revision "2017-10-10" {
     description
       "Added support for YANG 1.1 actions and notifications tied to
        data nodes. Clarify how NACM extensions can be used by other
        data models.";
     reference
       "RFC XXXX: Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)
                  Access Control Model";
   }

   revision "2012-02-22" {
     description



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       "Initial version";
     reference
       "RFC 6536: Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)
                  Access Control Model";
   }

   /*
    * Extension statements
    */

   extension default-deny-write {
     description
       "Used to indicate that the data model node
        represents a sensitive security system parameter.

        If present, the NETCONF server will only allow the designated
        'recovery session' to have write access to the node.  An
        explicit access control rule is required for all other users.

        If the NACM module is used, then it must be enabled (i.e.,
        /nacm/enable-nacm object equals 'true'), or this extension
        is ignored.

        The 'default-deny-write' extension MAY appear within a data
        definition statement.  It is ignored otherwise.";
   }

   extension default-deny-all {
     description
       "Used to indicate that the data model node
        controls a very sensitive security system parameter.

        If present, the NETCONF server will only allow the designated
        'recovery session' to have read, write, or execute access to the
        node.  An explicit access control rule is required for all other
        users.

        If the NACM module is used, then it must be enabled (i.e.,
        /nacm/enable-nacm object equals 'true'), or this extension
        is ignored.

        The 'default-deny-all' extension MAY appear within a data
        definition statement, 'rpc' statement, or 'notification'
        statement.  It is ignored otherwise.";
   }

   /*
    * Derived types



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    */

   typedef user-name-type {
     type string {
       length "1..max";
     }
     description
       "General Purpose Username string.";
   }

   typedef matchall-string-type {
     type string {
       pattern '\*';
     }
     description
       "The string containing a single asterisk '*' is used
        to conceptually represent all possible values
        for the particular leaf using this data type.";
   }

   typedef access-operations-type {
     type bits {
       bit create {
         description
           "Any protocol operation that creates a
            new data node.";
       }
       bit read {
         description
           "Any protocol operation or notification that
            returns the value of a data node.";
       }
       bit update {
         description
           "Any protocol operation that alters an existing
            data node.";
       }
       bit delete {
         description
           "Any protocol operation that removes a data node.";
       }
       bit exec {
         description
           "Execution access to the specified protocol operation.";
       }
     }
     description
       "Access Operation.";



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   }

   typedef group-name-type {
     type string {
       length "1..max";
       pattern '[^\*].*';
     }
     description
       "Name of administrative group to which
        users can be assigned.";
   }

   typedef action-type {
     type enumeration {
       enum permit {
         description
           "Requested action is permitted.";
       }
       enum deny {
         description
           "Requested action is denied.";
       }
     }
     description
       "Action taken by the server when a particular
        rule matches.";
   }

   typedef node-instance-identifier {
     type yang:xpath1.0;
     description
       "Path expression used to represent a special
        data node, action, or notification instance identifier
        string.

        A node-instance-identifier value is an
        unrestricted YANG instance-identifier expression.
        All the same rules as an instance-identifier apply
        except predicates for keys are optional.  If a key
        predicate is missing, then the node-instance-identifier
        represents all possible server instances for that key.

        This XPath expression is evaluated in the following context:

         o  The set of namespace declarations are those in scope on
            the leaf element where this type is used.

         o  The set of variable bindings contains one variable,



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            'USER', which contains the name of the user of the current
             session.

         o  The function library is the core function library, but
            note that due to the syntax restrictions of an
            instance-identifier, no functions are allowed.

         o  The context node is the root node in the data tree.

         The accessible tree includes actions and notifications tied
         to data nodes.";
   }

   /*
    * Data definition statements
    */

   container nacm {
     nacm:default-deny-all;

     description
       "Parameters for NETCONF Access Control Model.";

     leaf enable-nacm {
       type boolean;
       default true;
       description
         "Enables or disables all NETCONF access control
          enforcement.  If 'true', then enforcement
          is enabled.  If 'false', then enforcement
          is disabled.";
     }

     leaf read-default {
       type action-type;
       default "permit";
       description
         "Controls whether read access is granted if
          no appropriate rule is found for a
          particular read request.";
     }

     leaf write-default {
       type action-type;
       default "deny";
       description
         "Controls whether create, update, or delete access
          is granted if no appropriate rule is found for a



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          particular write request.";
     }

     leaf exec-default {
       type action-type;
       default "permit";
       description
         "Controls whether exec access is granted if no appropriate
          rule is found for a particular protocol operation request.";
     }

     leaf enable-external-groups {
       type boolean;
       default true;
       description
         "Controls whether the server uses the groups reported by the
          NETCONF transport layer when it assigns the user to a set of
          NACM groups.  If this leaf has the value 'false', any group
          names reported by the transport layer are ignored by the
          server.";
     }

     leaf denied-operations {
       type yang:zero-based-counter32;
       config false;
       mandatory true;
       description
         "Number of times since the server last restarted that a
          protocol operation request was denied.";
     }

     leaf denied-data-writes {
       type yang:zero-based-counter32;
       config false;
       mandatory true;
       description
         "Number of times since the server last restarted that a
          protocol operation request to alter
          a configuration datastore was denied.";
     }

     leaf denied-notifications {
       type yang:zero-based-counter32;
       config false;
       mandatory true;
       description
         "Number of times since the server last restarted that
          a notification was dropped for a subscription because



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          access to the event type was denied.";
     }

     container groups {
       description
         "NETCONF Access Control Groups.";

       list group {
         key name;

         description
           "One NACM Group Entry.  This list will only contain
            configured entries, not any entries learned from
            any transport protocols.";

         leaf name {
           type group-name-type;
           description
             "Group name associated with this entry.";
         }

         leaf-list user-name {
           type user-name-type;
           description
             "Each entry identifies the username of
              a member of the group associated with
              this entry.";
         }
       }
     }

     list rule-list {
       key "name";
       ordered-by user;
       description
         "An ordered collection of access control rules.";

       leaf name {
         type string {
           length "1..max";
         }
         description
           "Arbitrary name assigned to the rule-list.";
       }
       leaf-list group {
         type union {
           type matchall-string-type;
           type group-name-type;



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         }
         description
           "List of administrative groups that will be
            assigned the associated access rights
            defined by the 'rule' list.

            The string '*' indicates that all groups apply to the
            entry.";
       }

       list rule {
         key "name";
         ordered-by user;
         description
           "One access control rule.

            Rules are processed in user-defined order until a match is
            found.  A rule matches if 'module-name', 'rule-type', and
            'access-operations' match the request.  If a rule
            matches, the 'action' leaf determines if access is granted
            or not.";

         leaf name {
           type string {
             length "1..max";
           }
           description
             "Arbitrary name assigned to the rule.";
         }

         leaf module-name {
           type union {
             type matchall-string-type;
             type string;
           }
           default "*";
           description
             "Name of the module associated with this rule.

              This leaf matches if it has the value '*' or if the
              object being accessed is defined in the module with the
              specified module name.";
         }
         choice rule-type {
           description
             "This choice matches if all leafs present in the rule
              match the request.  If no leafs are present, the
              choice matches all requests.";



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           case protocol-operation {
             leaf rpc-name {
               type union {
                 type matchall-string-type;
                 type string;
               }
               description
                 "This leaf matches if it has the value '*' or if
                  its value equals the requested protocol operation
                  name.";
             }
           }
           case notification {
             leaf notification-name {
               type union {
                 type matchall-string-type;
                 type string;
               }
               description
                 "This leaf matches if it has the value '*' or if its
                  value equals the requested notification name.";
             }
           }
           case data-node {
             leaf path {
               type node-instance-identifier;
               mandatory true;
               description
                 "Data Node Instance Identifier associated with the
                  data node, action, or notification controlled by
                  this rule.

                  Configuration data or state data instance
                  identifiers start with a top-level data node.  A
                  complete instance identifier is required for this
                  type of path value.

                  The special value '/' refers to all possible
                  datastore contents.";
             }
           }
         }

         leaf access-operations {
           type union {
             type matchall-string-type;
             type access-operations-type;
           }



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           default "*";
           description
             "Access operations associated with this rule.

              This leaf matches if it has the value '*' or if the
              bit corresponding to the requested operation is set.";
         }

         leaf action {
           type action-type;
           mandatory true;
           description
             "The access control action associated with the
              rule.  If a rule is determined to match a
              particular request, then this object is used
              to determine whether to permit or deny the
              request.";
         }

         leaf comment {
           type string;
           description
             "A textual description of the access rule.";
         }
       }
     }
   }
 }

 <CODE ENDS>

                                 Figure 5

3.6.  IANA Considerations

   This document reuses the URI for "ietf-netconf-acm" in "The IETF XML
   Registry".

   This document updates the module registration in the "YANG Module
   Names" registry to reference this RFC instead of RFC 6536.  Following
   the format in [RFC6020], the following has been registered.

        Name: ietf-netconf-acm
        Namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-acm
        Prefix: nacm
        reference: RFC XXXX





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3.7.  Security Considerations

   The YANG module defined in this document is designed to be accessed
   via network management protocols such as NETCONF [RFC6241] or
   RESTCONF [RFC8040].  The lowest NETCONF layer is the secure transport
   layer, and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport is Secure
   Shell (SSH) [RFC6242].  The lowest RESTCONF layer is HTTPS, and the
   mandatory-to-implement secure transport is TLS [RFC5246].

   The NETCONF access control model [RFCXXXX] provides the means to
   restrict access for particular NETCONF or RESTCONF users to a
   preconfigured subset of all available NETCONF or RESTCONF protocol
   operations and content.

   There are a number of data nodes defined in this YANG module that are
   writable/creatable/deletable (i.e., config true, which is the
   default).  These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable
   in some network environments.  Write operations (e.g., edit-config)
   to these data nodes without proper protection can have a negative
   effect on network operations.  These are the subtrees and data nodes
   and their sensitivity/vulnerability:

   o  /nacm : the entire /nacm subtree is related to security.  Refer to
      the following sections for more details.

   This section highlights the issues for an administrator to consider
   when configuring a NETCONF server with NACM.

3.7.1.  NACM Configuration and Monitoring Considerations

   Configuration of the access control system is highly sensitive to
   system security.  A server may choose not to allow any user
   configuration to some portions of it, such as the global security
   level or the groups that allowed access to system resources.

   By default, NACM enforcement is enabled.  By default, "read" access
   to all datastore contents is enabled (unless "nacm:default-deny-all"
   is specified for the data definition), and "exec" access is enabled
   for safe protocol operations.  An administrator needs to ensure that
   NACM is enabled and also decide if the default access parameters are
   set appropriately.  Make sure the following data nodes are properly
   configured:

   o  /nacm/enable-nacm (default "true")

   o  /nacm/read-default (default "permit")

   o  /nacm/write-default (default "deny")



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   o  /nacm/exec-default (default "permit")

   An administrator needs to restrict write access to all configurable
   objects within this data model.

   If write access is allowed for configuration of access control rules,
   then care needs to be taken not to disrupt the access control
   enforcement.  For example, if the NACM access control rules are
   edited directly within the running configuration datastore (i.e.,
   :writable-running capability is supported and used), then care needs
   to be taken not to allow unintended access while the edits are being
   done.

   An administrator needs to make sure that the translation from a
   transport- or implementation-dependent user identity to a NACM
   username is unique and correct.  This requirement is specified in
   detail in Section 2.2 of [RFC6241].

   An administrator needs to be aware that the YANG data structures
   representing access control rules (/nacm/rule-list and /nacm/rule-
   list/rule) are ordered by the client.  The server will evaluate the
   access control rules according to their relative conceptual order
   within the running configuration datastore.

   Note that the /nacm/groups data structure contains the administrative
   group names used by the server.  These group names may be configured
   locally and/or provided through an external protocol, such as RADIUS
   [RFC2865][RFC5607].

   An administrator needs to be aware of the security properties of any
   external protocol used by the transport layer to determine group
   names.  For example, if this protocol does not protect against man-
   in-the-middle attacks, an attacker might be able to inject group
   names that are configured in NACM, so that a user gets more
   permissions than it should.  In such cases, the administrator may
   wish to disable the usage of such group names, by setting /nacm/
   enable-external-groups to "false".

   An administrator needs to restrict read access to the following
   objects within this data model, as they reveal access control
   configuration that could be considered sensitive.

   o  /nacm/enable-nacm

   o  /nacm/read-default

   o  /nacm/write-default




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   o  /nacm/exec-default

   o  /nacm/enable-external-groups

   o  /nacm/groups

   o  /nacm/rule-list

3.7.2.  General Configuration Issues

   There is a risk that invocation of non-standard protocol operations
   will have undocumented side effects.  An administrator needs to
   construct access control rules such that the configuration datastore
   is protected from such side effects.

   It is possible for a session with some write access (e.g., allowed to
   invoke <edit-config>), but without any access to a particular
   datastore subtree containing sensitive data, to determine the
   presence or non-presence of that data.  This can be done by
   repeatedly issuing some sort of edit request (create, update, or
   delete) and possibly receiving "access-denied" errors in response.
   These "fishing" attacks can identify the presence or non-presence of
   specific sensitive data even without the "error-path" field being
   present within the <rpc-error> response.

   It may be possible for the set of NETCONF capabilities on the server
   to change over time.  If so, then there is a risk that new protocol
   operations, notifications, and/or datastore content have been added
   to the device.  An administrator needs to be sure the access control
   rules are correct for the new content in this case.  Mechanisms to
   detect NETCONF capability changes on a specific device are outside
   the scope of this document.

   It is possible that the data model definition itself (e.g., YANG
   when-stmt) will help an unauthorized session determine the presence
   or even value of sensitive data nodes by examining the presence and
   values of different data nodes.

   There is a risk that non-standard protocol operations, or even the
   standard <get> protocol operation, may return data that "aliases" or
   "copies" sensitive data from a different data object.  There may
   simply be multiple data model definitions that expose or even
   configure the same underlying system instrumentation.

   A data model may contain external keys (e.g., YANG leafref), which
   expose values from a different data structure.  An administrator
   needs to be aware of sensitive data models that contain leafref
   nodes.  This entails finding all the leafref objects that "point" at



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   the sensitive data (i.e., "path-stmt" values) that implicitly or
   explicitly include the sensitive data node.

   It is beyond the scope of this document to define access control
   enforcement procedures for underlying device instrumentation that may
   exist to support the NETCONF server operation.  An administrator can
   identify each protocol operation that the server provides and decide
   if it needs any access control applied to it.

   This document incorporates the optional use of a recovery session
   mechanism, which can be used to bypass access control enforcement in
   emergencies, such as NACM configuration errors that disable all
   access to the server.  The configuration and identification of such a
   recovery session mechanism are implementation-specific and outside
   the scope of this document.  An administrator needs to be aware of
   any recovery session mechanisms available on the device and make sure
   they are used appropriately.

   It is possible for a session to disrupt configuration management,
   even without any write access to the configuration, by locking the
   datastore.  This may be done to ensure all or part of the
   configuration remains stable while it is being retrieved, or it may
   be done as a "denial-of-service" attack.  There is no way for the
   server to know the difference.  An administrator may wish to restrict
   "exec" access to the following protocol operations:

   o  <lock>

   o  <unlock>

   o  <partial-lock>

   o  <partial-unlock>

3.7.3.  Data Model Design Considerations

   Designers need to clearly identify any sensitive data, notifications,
   or protocol operations defined within a YANG module.  For such
   definitions, a "nacm:default-deny-write" or "nacm:default-deny-all"
   statement ought to be present, in addition to a clear description of
   the security risks.

   Protocol operations need to be properly documented by the data model
   designer, so it is clear to administrators what data nodes (if any)
   are affected by the protocol operation and what information (if any)
   is returned in the <rpc-reply> message.





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   Data models ought to be designed so that different access levels for
   input parameters to protocol operations are not required.  Use of
   generic protocol operations should be avoided, and if different
   access levels are needed, separate protocol operations should be
   defined instead.

4.  References

4.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-netmod-revised-datastores]
              Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., Shafer, P., Watsen, K.,
              and R. Wilton, "Network Management Datastore
              Architecture", draft-ietf-netmod-revised-datastores-02
              (work in progress), May 2017.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008, <https://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc5246>.

   [RFC5277]  Chisholm, S. and H. Trevino, "NETCONF Event
              Notifications", RFC 5277, DOI 10.17487/RFC5277, July 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5277>.

   [RFC6020]  Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
              the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010, <https://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc6020>.

   [RFC6241]  Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
              and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
              (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.

   [RFC6242]  Wasserman, M., "Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure
              Shell (SSH)", RFC 6242, DOI 10.17487/RFC6242, June 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6242>.

   [RFC6991]  Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types",
              RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6991>.




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   [RFC7230]  Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
              Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
              RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.

   [RFC7950]  Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
              RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.

   [RFC8040]  Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
              Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>.

4.2.  Informative References

   [RFC2865]  Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
              "Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)",
              RFC 2865, DOI 10.17487/RFC2865, June 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2865>.

   [RFC5607]  Nelson, D. and G. Weber, "Remote Authentication Dial-In
              User Service (RADIUS) Authorization for Network Access
              Server (NAS) Management", RFC 5607, DOI 10.17487/RFC5607,
              July 2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5607>.



























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Appendix A.  Change Log


       -- RFC Ed.: remove this section before publication.

   The NACM issue tracker can be found here: https://github.com/netconf-
   wg/rfc6536bis/issues

A.1.  v05 to v06

   o  Change title to remove the word NETCONF

   o  Clarify data rule case in YANG module

   o  Update security considerations section

A.2.  v04 to v05

   o  Clarify NETCONF protocol operation vs added operation via
      additional YANG modules

   o  Change term 'NETCONF transport layer' to 'transport layer'

   o  Clarify that read access operations are not coupled to specific
      protocol operations

   o  Update date of YANG module so it matches new revision date

A.3.  v03 to v04

   o  Fix revision date mismatch for extracting YANG module

A.4.  v02 to v03

   o  Clarify NACM YANG extensions for use outside NACM

A.5.  v01 to v02

   o  Corrected section title for changes since RFC 6536.

   o  Added section 'Mapping New Datastores to NACM'.

   o  Changed term NETCONF datastore to datastore/

   o  Removed text about RESTCONF and a conceptual datastore.






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A.6.  v00 to v01

   o  Updated RESTCONF reference

A.7.  v00

   o  Renamed document from draft-bierman-netconf-rfc6536bis-01 to
      draft-ietf-netconf-rfc6536bis-00.

Appendix B.  Usage Examples

   The following XML snippets are provided as examples only, to
   demonstrate how NACM can be configured to perform some access control
   tasks.

B.1.  <groups> Example

   There needs to be at least one <group> entry in order for any of the
   access control rules to be useful.

   The following XML shows arbitrary groups and is not intended to
   represent any particular use case.

   <nacm xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-acm">
     <groups>
       <group>
         <name>admin</name>
         <user-name>admin</user-name>
         <user-name>andy</user-name>
       </group>

       <group>
         <name>limited</name>
         <user-name>wilma</user-name>
         <user-name>bam-bam</user-name>
       </group>

       <group>
         <name>guest</name>
         <user-name>guest</user-name>
         <user-name>guest@example.com</user-name>
       </group>
     </groups>
   </nacm>







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   This example shows three groups:

   admin:  The "admin" group contains two users named "admin" and
      "andy".

   limited:  The "limited" group contains two users named "wilma" and
      "bam-bam".

   guest:  The "guest" group contains two users named "guest" and
      "guest@example.com".

B.2.  Module Rule Example

   Module rules are used to control access to all the content defined in
   a specific module.  A module rule has the <module-name> leaf set, but
   no case in the "rule-type" choice.

   <nacm xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-acm">
     <rule-list>
       <name>guest-acl</name>
       <group>guest</group>

       <rule>
         <name>deny-ncm</name>
         <module-name>ietf-netconf-monitoring</module-name>
         <access-operations>*</access-operations>
         <action>deny</action>
         <comment>
             Do not allow guests any access to the NETCONF
             monitoring information.
         </comment>
       </rule>
     </rule-list>

     <rule-list>
       <name>limited-acl</name>
       <group>limited</group>

       <rule>
         <name>permit-ncm</name>
         <module-name>ietf-netconf-monitoring</module-name>
         <access-operations>read</access-operations>
         <action>permit</action>
         <comment>
             Allow read access to the NETCONF
             monitoring information.
         </comment>
       </rule>



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       <rule>
         <name>permit-exec</name>
         <module-name>*</module-name>
         <access-operations>exec</access-operations>
         <action>permit</action>
         <comment>
             Allow invocation of the
             supported server operations.
         </comment>
       </rule>
     </rule-list>

     <rule-list>
       <name>admin-acl</name>
       <group>admin</group>

       <rule>
         <name>permit-all</name>
         <module-name>*</module-name>
         <access-operations>*</access-operations>
         <action>permit</action>
         <comment>
             Allow the admin group complete access to all
             operations and data.
         </comment>
       </rule>
     </rule-list>
   </nacm>




   This example shows four module rules:

   deny-ncm:  This rule prevents the "guest" group from reading any
      monitoring information in the "ietf-netconf-monitoring" YANG
      module.

   permit-ncm:  This rule allows the "limited" group to read the "ietf-
      netconf-monitoring" YANG module.

   permit-exec:  This rule allows the "limited" group to invoke any
      protocol operation supported by the server.

   permit-all:  This rule allows the "admin" group complete access to
      all content in the server.  No subsequent rule will match for the
      "admin" group because of this module rule.




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B.3.  Protocol Operation Rule Example

   Protocol operation rules are used to control access to a specific
   protocol operation.

   <nacm xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-acm">
     <rule-list>
       <name>guest-limited-acl</name>
       <group>limited</group>
       <group>guest</group>

       <rule>
         <name>deny-kill-session</name>
         <module-name>ietf-netconf</module-name>
         <rpc-name>kill-session</rpc-name>
         <access-operations>exec</access-operations>
         <action>deny</action>
         <comment>
           Do not allow the limited or guest group
           to kill another session.
         </comment>
       </rule>
       <rule>
         <name>deny-delete-config</name>
         <module-name>ietf-netconf</module-name>
         <rpc-name>delete-config</rpc-name>
         <access-operations>exec</access-operations>
         <action>deny</action>
         <comment>
           Do not allow limited or guest group
           to delete any configurations.
         </comment>
       </rule>
     </rule-list>

     <rule-list>
       <name>limited-acl</name>
       <group>limited</group>

       <rule>
         <name>permit-edit-config</name>
         <module-name>ietf-netconf</module-name>
         <rpc-name>edit-config</rpc-name>
         <access-operations>exec</access-operations>
         <action>permit</action>
         <comment>
           Allow the limited group to edit the configuration.
         </comment>



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       </rule>
     </rule-list>

   </nacm>



   This example shows three protocol operation rules:

   deny-kill-session:  This rule prevents the "limited" or "guest"
      groups from invoking the NETCONF <kill-session> protocol
      operation.

   deny-delete-config:  This rule prevents the "limited" or "guest"
      groups from invoking the NETCONF <delete-config> protocol
      operation.

   permit-edit-config:  This rule allows the "limited" group to invoke
      the NETCONF <edit-config> protocol operation.  This rule will have
      no real effect unless the "exec-default" leaf is set to "deny".

B.4.  Data Node Rule Example

   Data node rules are used to control access to specific (config and
   non-config) data nodes within the NETCONF content provided by the
   server.

   <nacm xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-acm">
     <rule-list>
       <name>guest-acl</name>
       <group>guest</group>

       <rule>
         <name>deny-nacm</name>
         <path xmlns:n="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-acm">
           /n:nacm
         </path>
         <access-operations>*</access-operations>
         <action>deny</action>
         <comment>
           Deny the guest group any access to the /nacm data.
         </comment>
       </rule>
     </rule-list>

     <rule-list>
       <name>limited-acl</name>
       <group>limited</group>



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       <rule>
         <name>permit-acme-config</name>
         <path xmlns:acme="http://example.com/ns/netconf">
           /acme:acme-netconf/acme:config-parameters
         </path>
         <access-operations>
           read create update delete
         </access-operations>
         <action>permit</action>
         <comment>
           Allow the limited group complete access to the acme
           NETCONF configuration parameters.  Showing long form
           of 'access-operations' instead of shorthand.
         </comment>
       </rule>
     </rule-list>

     <rule-list>
       <name>guest-limited-acl</name>
       <group>guest</group>
       <group>limited</group>

       <rule>
         <name>permit-dummy-interface</name>
         <path xmlns:acme="http://example.com/ns/itf">
           /acme:interfaces/acme:interface[acme:name='dummy']
         </path>
         <access-operations>read update</access-operations>
         <action>permit</action>
         <comment>
           Allow the limited and guest groups read
           and update access to the dummy interface.
         </comment>
       </rule>
     </rule-list>

     <rule-list>
       <name>admin-acl</name>
       <group>admin</group>
       <rule>
         <name>permit-interface</name>
         <path xmlns:acme="http://example.com/ns/itf">
           /acme:interfaces/acme:interface
         </path>
         <access-operations>*</access-operations>
         <action>permit</action>
         <comment>
           Allow admin full access to all acme interfaces.



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         </comment>
       </rule>
     </rule-list>
   </nacm>



   This example shows four data node rules:

   deny-nacm:  This rule denies the "guest" group any access to the
      <nacm> subtree.  Note that the default namespace is only
      applicable because this subtree is defined in the same namespace
      as the <data-rule> element.

   permit-acme-config:  This rule gives the "limited" group read-write
      access to the acme <config-parameters>.

   permit-dummy-interface:  This rule gives the "limited" and "guest"
      groups read-update access to the acme <interface> entry named
      "dummy".  This entry cannot be created or deleted by these groups,
      just altered.

   permit-interface:  This rule gives the "admin" group read-write
      access to all acme <interface> entries.

B.5.  Notification Rule Example

   Notification rules are used to control access to a specific
   notification event type.






















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   <nacm xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-acm">
     <rule-list>
       <name>sys-acl</name>
       <group>limited</group>
       <group>guest</group>

       <rule>
         <name>deny-config-change</name>
         <module-name>acme-system</module-name>
         <notification-name>sys-config-change</notification-name>
         <access-operations>read</access-operations>
         <action>deny</action>
         <comment>
           Do not allow the guest or limited groups
           to receive config change events.
         </comment>
       </rule>
     </rule-list>
   </nacm>



   This example shows one notification rule:

   deny-config-change:  This rule prevents the "limited" or "guest"
      groups from receiving the acme <sys-config-change> event type.

Authors' Addresses

   Andy Bierman
   YumaWorks
   685 Cochran St.
   Suite #160
   Simi Valley, CA  93065
   USA

   EMail: andy@yumaworks.com


   Martin Bjorklund
   Tail-f Systems

   EMail: mbj@tail-f.com








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