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Versions: (draft-kwatsen-netconf-zerotouch) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

NETCONF Working Group                                          K. Watsen
Internet-Draft                                                  S. Hanna
Intended status: Standards Track                        Juniper Networks
Expires: January 02, 2015                                      J. Clarke
                                                           Cisco Systems
                                                          M. Abrahamsson
                                                               T-Systems
                                                            July 1, 2014


       Zero Touch Provisioning for NETCONF Call Home (ZeroTouch)
                    draft-ietf-netconf-zerotouch-00

Abstract

   This draft presents a technique for establishing a secure NETCONF
   connection between a newly deployed IP-based device, configured with
   just its factory default settings, and the new owner's Network
   Management System (NMS).

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 02, 2015.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must



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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Objectives  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.3.  Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.4.  Actors and Roles  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   2.  Configuration Server  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.1.  Service Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.2.  Interactive Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.3.  Transport Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.4.  Expiration Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.5.  Troubleshooting and Auditing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   3.  Configuration Signer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.1.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.2.  Signing Configurations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.3.  Optional Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.4.  Delegation of Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.5.  Delegation to a Specific Customer . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   4.  Device  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.1.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.2.  Factory Default State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.3.  Boot Sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   5.  Network Management System (NMS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     5.1.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     5.2.  Precondition  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     5.3.  Connection Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   6.  Vendor  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     6.1.  Order Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     6.2.  Ownership Validation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   7.  Configlet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     7.1.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     7.2.  Data Model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     7.3.  Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     7.4.  Encryption (optional) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     7.5.  YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     8.1.  Immutable storage for trust anchors . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     8.2.  Substitutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     8.3.  Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     8.4.  Entropy loss over time  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     8.5.  Serial Numbers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     9.1.  ZeroTouch Information DHCP Option . . . . . . . . . . . .  23



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     9.2.  Media Types for Images and Configurations . . . . . . . .  23
   10. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   Appendix A.  Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     A.1.  Signed Configlet  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     A.2.  Signed Encypted Configlet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
   Appendix B.  Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     B.1.  ID to 00  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     B.2.  00 to 01  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28

1.  Introduction

1.1.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

1.2.  Objectives

   A fundamental business requirement is to reduce operational costs
   where possible.  Deploying new IP-based devices is many times one of
   the largest costs in running a network, as sending trained
   specialists to each site to do an installation is both cost
   prohibitive and does not scale.

   Both networking vendors and standard bodies have tried to address
   this issue, with varying levels of success.  For instance, the
   Broadband Forum TR-069 specification [TR069] relies solely on DHCP
   for NMS discovery, but this can only work in environments where the
   DHCP server is locally administered, which is not the case when the
   device is connected to an ISP's network.  In another example, some
   network vendors have enabled their devices to load an initial
   configuration from removable storage media (e.g., a USB flash drive),
   but not all devices have such ports.

   The solution presented herein, ZeroTouch, enables a device to
   securely obtain an initial configuration from the network without any
   operator intervention.  The discovered configuration initiates the
   device to "call home" using either the SSH or TLS, as described in
   [NETCONF-REVERSE-SSH] and [RFC5539bis] respectively.








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1.3.  Use Cases

   o  Connecting to a remotely administered network

         This use-case involves scenarios, such as a remote branch
         office or convenience store, whereby the device connects to an
         ISP's network.  In this case, the device receives only generic
         networking settings (address, netmask, gateway, DNS servers,
         etc.) provided by the ISP, with no site-specific
         customizations, such that the device has no recourse but to
         reach out to the presumably insecure network for its initial
         configuration.

   o  Connecting to a locally administered network

         This use-case covers all other scenarios and differs only in
         that the device may additionally receive some site-specific
         information to guide its call home process, which could then
         direct it to a local server for its initial configuration.  If
         no site-specific information is provided, or the device is
         unable to use the information provided, it can then reach out
         to network just as it would for a remotely administered
         network.




























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1.4.  Actors and Roles


                     +----------+  fetches Configlet
             +-------|  Device  |-------------------+
             |       +----------+                   |
             |            ^                         |
             |            |                         V
             | call home  |                    +----------+
             |            |                    |  Config  |
             |            |                    |  Server  |<----+
             |            | produces           +----------+     |
             |            |                                     |
             |            |                                     |
             |       +----------+  delegates trust              |
             |       |  Vendor  |-------------------+           |
             |       +----------+                   |           |
             |            ^                         |           |
             |            |                         V           |
             |            |                    +----------+     |
             |            | imports            |  Config  |     |
             |            | trust              |  Signer  |     |
             |            | anchor             +----------+     |
             |            |                         ^           |
             |            |                         |           |
             |       +---------+  requests signing  |           |
             +------>|   NMS   |--------------------+           |
                     +---------+                                |
                          |        places signed Configlet onto |
                          +-------------------------------------+

   Though not represented as a box in the diagram, the Configlet is also
   a first-class object in the solution.

   o  Configlet

         A Configlet is an XML document that, when loaded onto a device,
         configures the device to initiate a call home connection to a
         deployment specific NMS, as well as set a local administrator
         account for the NMS to log into.  The Configlet is signed and
         optionally encrypted.  More information about Configlets is in
         Section 7.

   o  Configuration Server

         A Configuration Server hosts configurations to be downloaded
         over a network.  Configuration Servers can be deployed either
         on the locally administered network or on some external network



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         (e.g., the Internet).  Configuration Servers are known to
         devices in the form of a URI, which can be either preconfigured
         or dynamically discovered.  More information about
         Configuration Servers is in Section 2.

   o  Configuration Signer

         A Configuration Signer is an entity that the device's vendor
         has delegated the signing function to.  A Configuration Signer
         only needs to ensure that the requestor is the rightful owner
         of the device to which a configuration is destined.  A
         Configuration Signer may be site-specific or an external
         entity.  More information about Configuration Signers is in
         Section 3.

   o  Device

         The device is the networking entity that initiates ZeroTouch,
         whenever booting with its factory default settings.  The device
         is preconfigured with a secure device identity, for
         Configuration Servers URIs, and certificates for Configuration
         Signers and Configuration Servers it trusts by default.  A
         device may dynamically discover additional URIs and
         certificates from a locally-administered network.  More
         information about Devices is in Section 4.

   o  Network Management System

         The NMS is the deployment-specific system that devices initiate
         their call home connections to.  The NMS must be configured
         with vendor-specific trust anchors and unique device
         identifiers.  The administrators of the NMS system interact
         with Configuration Signer and Configuration Server systems to
         stage the the device configurations.  More information about
         Network Management Systems is in Section 5.

   o  Vendor

         Vendors manufacture the devices with secure device identities
         and preconfigured Configuration URIs, and Configuration Signer
         certificates.  Vendors are the de facto Configuration Signer
         for the devices it manufactures, but may delegate that role to
         external Configuration Signers.  More information about Vendors
         is in Section 6.







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2.  Configuration Server

   A Configuration Server is the entity hosting configurations that can
   be downloaded over a network.  This section describes the service
   interface a Configuration Server must implement as well as what's
   needed for transport security.

2.1.  Service Interface

   Configuration Servers are known to devices in the form of a URI.
   Configuration Servers MUST support the URI schemes "https" and
   "http".  Other URI schemes are not supported.

   When accessing a Configuration Server, the device appends its unique
   device identifier (UID) to the URI.  The unique identifies MUST be
   the same as the identifier stored within the device's IDevID
   certificate.

   For instance, if the URI were:

      http://example.com/zerotouch/devices/
      https://example.com/zerotouch?id=

   then the device would try to access:

      http://example.com/zerotouch/devices/<uid>
      https://example.com/zerotouch?id=<uid>

   When accessing the Configuration Server, the HTTP Accept-Type MUST be
   set to either "application/zerotouch-config" or "application/
   zerotouch-bootimage".  Please see Section 9.2.  A wildcard Accept-
   Type (e.g., */*) SHOULD default to "application/zerotouch-config".

2.2.  Interactive Interface

   The Configuration server SHOULD to provide some user-facing interface
   to enable to the end-user to provide a Configlet and, optionally, an
   bootimage file.  How the Configlet and bootimage file are provided to
   the Configuration Server is outside the scope of this document.












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2.3.  Transport Security

   As described in Section 3, configurations MUST be signed and MAY be
   encrypted.  As such, transport-level security is not needed to assure
   authenticity or confidentiality of the configuration itself.
   However, transport-level security enables devices to authenticate the
   Configuration Server and also extends confidentiality to the
   application-level protocol.  Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED for
   Configuration Servers to support transport-level encryption.

   If a Configuration Server uses X.509-based encryption, then its X.509
   certificate MUST have a chain of trust to a trust anchor known to
   devices (see Section 4.2.  More specifically, the Configuration
   Server MUST possess all the intermediate certificates leading to the
   trust anchor.

   When a Configuration Server negotiates encryption with the device, it
   provides the chain of certificates, from its own to, but not
   including, the trust anchor.  Including the trust anchor's
   certificate is unnecessary since the device MUST be pre-provisioned
   with it.  Devices need the chain of certificates to be passed so they
   can validate the server using only a list of Configuration Server
   trust anchors.

2.4.  Expiration Policy

   An expiration policy is needed to limit how long a Configuration
   Server needs to retain a configuration and, in turn, how many
   configurations it might need to retain at a given time.

   It is expected that Configuration Servers will enable retention
   information to be given at the same time as when the configuration is
   provided to it.  Options should be temporal in nature, not based on
   access counts, so as to thwart a DoS attack whereby the configuration
   is accessed by an entity other than the device.  Configuration
   Servers SHOULD put a limit on the maximum amount of time it will hold
   onto a configuration before purging it, even if the configuration had
   never been accessed.

2.5.  Troubleshooting and Auditing

   In order to facilitate troubleshooting and auditing, the
   Configuration Server SHOULD record into a log a record of the various
   Configlet download requests.  This draft does not define what
   information should be kept or for how long.






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3.  Configuration Signer

3.1.  Overview

   A Configuration Signer MUST be able to sign configurations.  This
   function requires the Configuration Signer be able to authenticate
   that the requestor is the true owner of the device, as identified
   within the contents of the configuration being signed.

   The user interface a Configuration Signer provides to perform its
   role is outside the scope of this document.  However, in order to
   meet operational expectations, the time it takes to respond to a
   request should be as expeditious as possible.

   A Configuration Signer does not need to retain a configuration after
   signing it.  The Configuration Signer SHOULD retain an audit log for
   indemnification purposes.

3.2.  Signing Configurations

   A Configlet Signer MUST have an X.509 certificate with Key Usage
   capable of signing data (digitalSignature) and be signed by a
   certificate authority having a chain of trust leading to a trust
   anchor known to the devices loading its Configlets.  The Configlet
   Signer MUST possess all intermediate certificates leading to its
   trust anchor.

   When a Configlet Signer signs a Configlet, it attaches both the
   signature and the chain of X.509 certificates, including its own, but
   not necessarily including the trust anchor's certificate.  This chain
   of certificates is needed so a device can validate a Configlet using
   only the Configlet Signer trust anchors known to it.

3.3.  Optional Encryption

   A Configuration Signer MAY optionally encrypt configurations prior to
   signing them.  This function requires the Configuration Signer know
   the device's unique public key, as encoded within its secure device
   identity certificate.

3.4.  Delegation of Trust

   A device's vendor is the root of trust for all of its devices.  That
   is, the vendor's devices implicitly trust the vendor for such things
   as software images, subscription updates, and licenses.  As such, the
   vendor is the ultimate Configuration Signer for its devices.





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   However, both vendors and its customers may prefer a this role be
   performed by another entity.  For instance, a vendor may not want
   this role due to it being outside its primary business function, and
   customers may not want the vendor to have this role for privacy
   reasons.

   It is therefore provided that a vendor MAY delegate the Configuration
   Signer role to other entities.  Using X.509 certificates, the Vendor
   need only sign the delegate's certificate signing request (CSR),
   providing back to the delegate a signed X.509 certificate
   authenticating its ability to perform the signing function.

   In order enable a delegate to fulfill its operational role, as
   described in Section 3.1, the vendor MUST provide a mechanism that
   can be used to authenticate if a given requestor is the true owner of
   a specific device.  Additionally, to support Configuration Signers
   that want to encrypt configurations, the vendor MUST also provide a
   means for the Configuration Signer to know the public key for a given
   device.  How the vendor provides this information to Configuration
   Signers is outside the scope of this document.

3.5.  Delegation to a Specific Customer

   The general expectation is that the Configuration Signer is an
   impartial 3rd-party.  However, certain deployments may want to be
   able to perform the function for themselves.  Yet without
   constraints, that deployment could sign configurations for devices
   that do not belong to it.

   Resolving this concern is possible when 1) the deployment specific
   Configuration Signer's certificate is annotated with a customer
   identifier and 2) the devices sold to that customer have that same
   identifier encoded into their secure device identifier.

   This entails the vendor augmenting its manufacturing process for
   these special devices, which would likely be sold directly to the
   customer, as opposed to through a sales channel.  This takes
   extraordinary effort and likely only implemented for the most
   important customers, if at all.

4.  Device

4.1.  Overview

   While the wholistic solution, ZeroTouch, involves a number of
   entities, a device being powered-on is the essential event that sets
   things in motion.




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   Whenever a device boots with its factory default settings, it
   initiates ZeroTouch with the goal of finding a configuration to
   initialize itself with.  Once a configuration is found, the device
   initializes its running datastore with it and then enters normal
   operation.  Since the configuration initializes the device to call
   home upon entering its normal operating mode, the device immediately
   begins trying to establish a secure connection with the deployment
   specific NMS.

4.2.  Factory Default State

   +------------------------------------------------------------------+
   |                            <device>                              |
   |                                                                  |
   |     +------------------------------------------------------+     |
   |     |                <immutable storage>                   |     |
   |     |                                                      |     |
   |     |  list of Configlet Signer trust anchor certificates  |     |
   |     |  list of Configuration Server trust anchor certs     |     |
   |     +------------------------------------------------------+     |
   |                                                                  |
   |   +----------------------------------------------------------+   |
   |   |                    <other storage>                       |   |
   |   |                                                          |   |
   |   |  two sets of Configuration Server URIs                   |   |
   |   |  IDevID entity & associated intermediate certificate(s)  |   |
   |   +----------------------------------------------------------+   |
   |                                                                  |
   |                    +----------------------+                      |
   |                    |   <secure storage>   |                      |
   |                    |                      |                      |
   |                    |  IDevID private key  |                      |
   |                    +----------------------+                      |
   |                                                                  |
   +------------------------------------------------------------------+

   Devices supporting ZeroTouch MUST have a manufacturer-provisioned
   secure device identifier, as defined in [Std-802.1AR-2009].  This
   identifier is known by the IEEE standard as the Initial Device
   Identifier (IDevID).  The IDevID includes both an X.509 certificate,
   encoding a globally unique per-device identifier, and a chain of
   X.509 certificates leading to the manufacturer's well-known trust
   anchor.  The IDevID is needed in order for the NMS to positively
   authenticate a device.  For NETCONF over SSH Call Home
   ([NETCONF-REVERSE-SSH]), this certificate requirement constrains the
   SSH host key algorithms the device is allowed to advertise to those
   defined in [RFC6187].




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   Devices supporting ZeroTouch MUST be pre-provisioned with one or more
   URIs for Internet-based Configuration Servers.  These URIs SHOULD be
   partitioned into one set that contains secure schemes (e.g. https://)
   and another set that contains insecure schemes (e.g., http://).  The
   reason for partitioning the URIs is so all the secure schemes can
   attempted before any of the insecure schemes (see Section 4.3).  When
   using a secure scheme, the Configuration Server MUST be authenticated
   using a trust anchor the device possesses.  As each Configuration
   Server may use a different trust anchor, this generalizes to a list
   of Configuration Server trust anchor certificates.

   In order to verify the signature on retrieved configurations, devices
   supporting ZeroTouch MUST also possess the trust anchor for the
   Configuration Signer that signed the configuration.  Generally, only
   the manufacturer's trust anchor is needed, as it can then delegate
   trust for 3rd-party Configuration Signers (see Section 3.4).
   However, for various reasons, there may be a need for more than one
   root anchor and therefore this generalizes to a list of Configuration
   Signer trust anchor certificates.

   Devices SHOULD ensure that the certificates for its trust anchors are
   protected from external modification.  It is for this reason that the
   diagram shows the Configuration Signer and Configuration Server
   certificates in immutable storage.  Similarly, per
   [Std-802.1AR-2009], the IDevID private key shall be stored
   confidentially and not available outside the DevID module, hence the
   diagram shows it is held within secure storage.

4.3.  Boot Sequence

       DEVICE           DHCP                         CONFIGURATION   NMS
         |          SERVER/RELAY                        SERVERS       |
         |                |                                |          |
     +-->|                |                                |          |
     |   |                |                                |          |
     |   |--[if running config != factory default, boot normally]--+  |
     |   |                |                                |       |  |
   <---------------------------------------------------------------+  |
     |   |                |                                |          |
     |   |                |                                |          |
     |   |                |                                |          |
     |   |--(discovery)-->| [if no dhcp server found, boot normally]  |
     |   |                |                                |          |
     |   |  +---(offer)---|                                |          |
     |   |  |             |                                |          |
     |   |  +--[add any listed config servers to built-in list]--+    |
     |   |                |                                |     |    |
     |   |<------------------------------------------------------+    |



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     |   |                |                                |          |
     |   |                |                                |          |
     |   |                |                                |          |
     |   | (iterate until match, else boot normally)       |          |
     |   |------------------------------------------------>|          |
     |   |                |                                |          |
     |   |<------------------------------(zerotouch info)--|          |
     |   |                |                                |          |
     |   |                |                                |          |
     |   |                |                                |          |
     |   |--[if current image != expected, get image]----->|          |
     |   |                |                                |          |
     |   |  +-------------------------------------(image)--|          |
     |   |  |             |                                |          |
     |   |  +--[if image valid, install & reboot]--+       |          |
     |   |                |                        |       |          |
     +---------------------------------------------+       |          |
         |                |                                |          |
         |                |                                |          |
         |                |                                |          |
         |--[get config]---------------------------------->|          |
         |                |                                |          |
         |  +------------------------------------(config)--|          |
         |  |             |                                |          |
         |  +--[if config valid, merge into running]--+    |          |
         |                |                           |    |          |
         |     +--------------------------------------+    |          |
         |     |          |                                |          |
         |     +--[per new configuration, call home]----------------->|
         |                |                                |          |
         |                |                                |          |

   Whenever a device boots with its factory default settings, it
   initiates ZeroTouch with the goal of finding a configuration that
   will enable it to call home to its deployment-specific NMS.

   The process begins with the device using the DHCP protocol to obtain
   a dynamic assignment for its networking stack.  When broadcasting the
   DISCOVERY request, the device may provide any DHCP options to
   identify itself or the type of device it is (e.g. IPV4 options 60 or
   61).

   If the DHCP servers reside on a locally administered network (see
   Section 1.3), then their OFFER responses MAY include the ZeroTouch
   Information DHCP option defined in Section 9.1, as well as the legacy
   DHCP options for TFTP server name, bootfile name, and/or vendor
   specific information (e.g. IPv4 options 43, 66, 67).




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   If a DHCP server provides both the ZeroTouch Information and the
   vendor specific information DHCP options, then the ZeroTouch
   Information option MUST be processed first.  After exhausting all
   ZeroTouch options without being able to call home, a device MAY then
   process the information provided by the legacy DHCP options.

   The ZeroTouch Information option Section 9.1 provides a set of
   Configuration Server URIs.  If returned by the DHCP server, the
   device MUST append each URI to the end of one of its two sets of
   Configuration Server URIs, depending on if the URI's scheme is secure
   or not.  URIs added this way MUST remain distinguishable from those
   URIs the device was shipped with, for reasons discussed next.

   The device then iterates over its two sets of Configuration Server
   URIs.  The device MUST first try all the URIs from the set having
   secure schemes before trying any of the URIs from the set having
   insecure schemes.  For each URI, until a match is found and
   successfully loaded, the device attempts to initialize itself from
   the URI.  If the URI uses a secure scheme (e.g., https), the device
   MUST validate the Configuration Server's certificate using one of its
   Configuration Server trust anchors.  If the device is unable to
   verify the server's certificate, the device MUST skip that URI.  If
   the device reaches the end of all its URIs without finding a usable
   match, it SHOULD continue its normal boot sequence using its factory
   default configuration.

   When the device is accessing a Configuration Server URI that it was
   shipped with (i.e. not discovered while initializing its networking),
   it MUST do so by appending its GUID to the URI string and using the
   Accept-Type "application/zerotouch-config", as described in
   Section 2.  For URIs discovered via the ZeroTouch Information option,
   the device MAY also try the raw URI after trying the permutation
   using its GUID.

   If the Configuration Server returns a configuration, the device MUST
   first verify it before use.  Configuration verification entails both
   verifying the configuration's signature using the device's list of
   Configuration Signer trust anchors, and also verifying that the
   unique identifier within the Configlet matches the device's unique
   identifier.

   Once the configuration is authenticated, the device MUST compare its
   software image version with the expected version specified within the
   configuration.  If there is a mismatch, the device MUST download the
   correct image version from the Configuration Server, by appending its
   GUID to the Configuration Server's URI string and using the Accept-
   Type "application/zerotouch-bootimage", as described in Section 2.
   For URIs discovered via the ZeroTouch Information option, the device



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   MAY also try both the raw URI after trying the permutation using its
   GUID.  Once the image has been downloaded, the device MUST install it
   and reboot, still with the factory default settings configured, so
   that ZeroTouch restarts when the device comes back up.

   If the device is running the correct software image version, it
   merges the Configlet's contents into its running configuration.  This
   step effectively modifies the device so that it is no longer having
   its factory default setting.  However, since the Configlet configured
   the device to "call home," upon entering its normal operating mode,
   the device immediately begins trying to establish a call home
   connection, as specified by the Configlet.

   If configured to establish a SSH connection, the the device MUST use
   its IDevID and associated intermediate X.509 certificates as its host
   key per RFC 6187 [RFC6187].  If configured to establish a TLS
   connection, the device MUST use its IDevID and associated
   intermediate X.509 certificates as its server-side certificate for
   the TLS connection.

   In order to facilitate troubleshooting, the device SHOULD record into
   a log information relating to its stepping through the ZeroTouch
   sequence of steps.  This draft does not define any specific log
   messages, for instance, for Syslog or SNMP.

5.  Network Management System (NMS)

5.1.  Overview

   The NMS is the ultimate destination of ZeroTouch for a device.  It is
   the NMS's network address configured in the Configlet.  The device
   will initiate a call home connection to the NMS, using either a SSH
   or TLS, as configured by the Configlet loaded.


















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5.2.  Precondition

   +------------------------------------------------------------------+
   |                              <nsm>                               |
   |                                                                  |
   |     +------------------------------------------------------+     |
   |     |                <immutable storage>                   |     |
   |     |                                                      |     |
   |     |  list of Configuration Signer trust anchor certs     |     |
   |     |  list of expected device unique identifiers          |     |
   |     +------------------------------------------------------+     |
   |                                                                  |
   |       +--------------------------------------------------+       |
   |       |                 <secure storage>                 |       |
   |       |                                                  |       |
   |       |  map of device identifiers to login credentials  |       |
   |       +--------------------------------------------------+       |
   |                                                                  |
   +------------------------------------------------------------------+

   In order to authenticate the device, the NMS MUST possess the X.509
   certificate for the trust anchor leading to the device's entity
   certificate.  The NMS uses this certificate to validate the server-
   certificate the device presents during SSH or TLS transport
   negotiation.  Because an NMS may interoperate with multiple vendors,
   and a vendor may have more than one trust anchor for signing its
   devices IDevID certificates, this generalizes into the NMS needing a
   list of trust anchor certificates.  This certificates SHOULD be
   stored in a way that prevents tampering, which is why they are shown
   in immutable storage in the diagram.

   In order for the NMS to validate that the specific device connecting
   to it is expected, the MUST have a list of unique device identifiers
   that it can use to validate the device's IDevID certificate with.
   The list SHOULD be protected from external modification, which is why
   it is shown in immutable storage in the diagram.  In order for the
   NMS to know the unique identifiers, device manufacturers will need to
   provide a mechanism to convey this information to its customers.
   This draft not specify a format for this information exchange.

   In addition to authenticating the device, the NMS must also
   authenticate itself to the device.  How this is done is deployment
   specific, but generalizes to the NMS needing to have login
   credentials for each device.  These credentials will entail knowing a
   secret (e.g., password, private key).  For this reason the diagram
   shows the NMS storing a map of device credentials in secure storage.





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5.3.  Connection Handling

   When receiving a NETCONF call home connection from a device, the NSM
   completes the connection as specified in the SSH
   [NETCONF-REVERSE-SSH] and TLS [RFC5539bis] drafts.

6.  Vendor

6.1.  Order Information

   In order for a Vendor's customers to preconfigure their NMSs with
   what devices are expected, as well as to know how to set the "unique-
   identifier" field within a Configlet when requesting a signing,
   Vendors need to provide a mechanism for customers to obtain the
   unique identifier value for the devices they have ordered.  For
   instance, customers could receive emails containing shipping
   information for their devices.

   Additionally, to facilitate workflows where the devices are initially
   received by a customer-specific warehouse, or moved after having been
   unboxed, it is ideal for the unique identifier to be easily tracked
   through labels affixed to the device as well as the box it is
   packaged in.  A device's serial number is commonly treated this way
   and would be suitable for this purpose, so long as it is directly
   related to its IDevID identity.

6.2.  Ownership Validation

   In order for Configuration Signers to validate that a requestor is
   the true owner of a device (i.e. its IDevID identity), Vendors need
   to provide a mechanism enabling a near real-time lookup.  The
   interface used to implement this lookup is outside the scope of this
   document.

7.  Configlet

7.1.  Overview

   A Configlet is an XML file, containing specific YANG-defined
   configuration, that has been signed by a trusted signer known to the
   device (e.g., the device's manufacturer).










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   The Configlet data-model, defined by the YANG module in this document
   (see Section 7), is just enough to configure a local user account and
   either reverse-SSH or reverse-TLS.  More specifically, this data-
   model is a subset of what's defined in ietf-system and ietf-netconf-
   server YANG models.  This focused data-model is consistent with the
   common use-case of having the NMS push a full configuration to a
   device when it calls home.

   The signature on the Configlet is enveloped, meaning that the
   signature is contained inside the XML file itself.  The signature
   block also contains the X.509 certificate of the Configlet Signer and
   its chain of trust.

   Once a device authenticates the signature on a Configlet and matches
   the unique identifier (e.g., serial number) within the Configlet, it
   merges the configuration contained in the Configlet into its running
   datastore.

7.2.  Data Model

   module: ietf-netconf-zerotouch
      +--rw configlet
         +--rw target-requirements
         |  +--rw unique-identifier    string
         |  +--rw software-version     string
         +--rw configuration

   The Configlet's data model is no more than a wrapper around a header
   (i.e. <target-requirements>) and a payload (i.e. <configuration>).

   The <target-requirements> element contains information that MUST be
   validated by the device prior to processing the <configuration>
   element.  Specifically, it contains:

   o  unique-identifier

         The unique-identifier field is used to ensure that the
         Configlet is loaded onto the targeted device and no other.
         This field is also used by the Configuration Signer, when
         ensuring the requestor is the true owner of the device.  The
         value MUST be the same as the 'subject' field in the device's
         DevID credential, as specified by section 7.2.8 in IEEE Std
         802.1AR-2009.

   o  software-version

         The software-version field is used to ensure the device is
         running the right software version prior to loading the



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         configuration (e.g., 14.1R2.5).  If the device finds that it is
         not running the correct version of software, it can pull the
         correct version from the Configuration Server.

   The <configuration> element contains the configuration that is to be
   committed to the device's running datastore.  This element uses the
   "anyxml" type, enabling it to contain either vendor-specific or
   standards-based data models.  When using standard models, in order to
   complete a call home connection, only the following is needed:

   o  The "authentication" subtree from "ietf-system", defined in draft-
      ietf-netmod-system.

   o  If TLS is supported, everything from "ietf-system-tls-auth",
      defined in draft-ietf-netconf-server-model.

   o  The "call-home" subtree from "ietf-netconf-server", defined in
      draft-ietf-netconf-server-model.

7.3.  Signature

   All Configlets MUST be signed by a Configuration Signer in order to
   be authentic.  Devices MUST reject any Configlet that is either
   unsigned or having an invalid signature.  Configlets are signed using
   the W3C standard "XML Signature Syntax and Processing" [XMLSIG].  The
   entire contents of the Configlet MUST be signed.  The signature block
   must also include the Configlet Signer's certificate and any
   intermediate certificates leading to a Configlet Signer trust anchor.
   A signed Configlet example is in section Appendix A.1.

7.4.  Encryption (optional)

   Configlets MAY optionally be encrypted prior to being signed.
   Encrypting the Configlet provides confidentiality for the Configlet's
   contents without relying on transport-level security.  Configlets are
   encrypted using the W3C standard "XML Encryption Syntax and
   Processing" [XMLENC].  The entire contents of the Configlet MUST be
   encrypted.  An encrypted Configlet example is in section
   Appendix A.2.

7.5.  YANG Module

   Following is the YANG module for the Configlet:

   module ietf-netconf-zerotouch {

     namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-zerotouch";
     prefix "zerotouch";



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     organization
      "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";

     contact
      "WG Web:   <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
       WG List:  <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>

       WG Chair: Mehmet Ersue
                 <mailto:mehmet.ersue@nsn.com>

       WG Chair: Bert Wijnen
                 <mailto:bertietf@bwijnen.net>

       Editor:   Kent Watsen
                 <mailto:kwatsen@juniper.net>";

     description
      "This module contains a collection of YANG definitions for
       configuring NETCONF zerotouch.

       Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
       authors of the code. All rights reserved.

       Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
       without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
       to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD
       License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
       Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
       (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).

       This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
       the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
     // RFC Ed.: replace XXXX with actual RFC number and
     // remove this note

     // RFC Ed.: please update the date to the date of publication

     revision "2014-07-01" {
       description
        "Initial version";
       reference
        "RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for NETCONF ZeroTouch Configlet";
     }

     container configlet {
       description
        "Top-level container for ZeroTouch configuration objects.";




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       container target-requirements {
         description
           "Specifies requirements for device this is loaded onto";
         leaf unique-identifier {
           type string;
           mandatory true;
           description
             "The device MUST have this unique identifier.  The value
              MUST be the same as the 'subject' field in the device's
              DevID credential, as specified by section 7.2.8 in
              IEEE Std 802.1AR-2009.";
         }
         leaf software-version {
           type string;
           mandatory true;
           description
             "The device MUST must be running this version of software.
              The value for this field is device-specific, but it MUST
              be an exact match (e.g., 14.1R2.5)";
         }
       }
       anyxml configuration {
           mandatory true;
           description
             "The configuration to be committed to the device's running
              datastore.  The configuration MUST be valid for the target
              device.  Device's supporting ZeroTouch SHOULD at least
              support both the following standard data-models:

                ietf-system             // the authentication container
                ietf-system-tls-auth    // everything, if TLS supported
                ietf-netconf-server     // the call-home container

              These three data models contain everything needed to
              support NETCONF call home using either SSH or TLS.";
       }
     }

   }


8.  Security Considerations









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8.1.  Immutable storage for trust anchors

   Devices SHOULD ensure that all its trust anchor certificates,
   including those for the Configuration Signer and Configuration
   Server, are protected from external modification.  It is for this
   reason that the diagram in Section 4.2 shows them in immutable
   storage.

   However, it may be necessary to update these certificates over time
   (e.g., the vendor wants to delegate trust to a new CA).  It is
   therefore expected that devices MAY update these trust anchors when
   needed through a verifiable process, such as a software upgrade using
   signed software images.

8.2.  Substitutions

   It is generally not possible to substitute a Configlet created for a
   different device, since devices assert that the Configlet contains
   their unique identifier (e.g., serial number).

   However, it is possible to substitute a Configlet created for a
   device with a different Configlet created for the same device.
   Generally, unless imposed by the Configuration Signers, there is no
   limit to the number of Configlets that may be generated for a given
   device.  This could be resolved, in part, by placing a timestamp into
   the Configlet and ensuring devices do not load Configlets older than
   some amount, but this requires the devices have an accurate clock
   when validating a Configlet and for Configuration Signers to not sign
   a Configlet when another Configlet is still active.

8.3.  Confidentiality

   This draft allows devices to use insecure schemes when doing a
   Configuration Server lookup.  This is deemed acceptable because the
   Configlet is tamper-proof, since it MUST be signed, only
   confidentiality is lost.

   Confidentiality of a Configlet's contents is assured when either the
   Configlet is encrypted or when the a secure scheme is used when
   accessing the Configuration Server.

   Some confidentiality is lost when an insecure scheme is used to
   access a Configuration Server, as then the device's unique identifier
   is in the clear.







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   Given the fairly regular format for unique identifiers, it is
   possible that an adversary to guess unique identifiers and access a
   device's Configlet.  Configlets that have been encrypted do not
   disclose any confidential information.

8.4.  Entropy loss over time

   Section 7.2.7.2 of the IEEE Std 802.1AR-2009 standard says that
   IDevID certificate should never expire (i.e. having a notAfter
   99991231235959Z).  Given the long-lived nature of these certificates,
   it is paramount to use a strong key length (e.g., 512-bit ECC).
   Vendors SHOULD deploy Online Certificate State Protocol (OCSP)
   responders or CRL Distribution Points (CDP) to revoke certificates in
   case necessary.

8.5.  Serial Numbers

   This draft mentions using the device's serial number as its unique
   identifier in its IDevID certificate.  This is because serial numbers
   are ubiquitous and prominently contained in invoices and on labels
   affixed to devices and their packaging.  That said, serial numbers
   many times encode revealing information, such as the device's model
   number, manufacture date, and/or sequence number.  Knowledge of this
   information may provide an adversary with details needed to launch an
   attack.  To address this concern, the certificate could contain the
   hash of the serial number instead, which the NMS could also compute,
   but doing so is much less intuitive and raises questions if it is
   just security through obscurity.

9.  IANA Considerations

9.1.  ZeroTouch Information DHCP Option

   TBD, but it essentially returns a list of URIs.

9.2.  Media Types for Images and Configurations

   TBD, but in accordance with RFC 6838, the draft registers:
   application/zerotouch-configlet and application/zerotouch-bootimage

10.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank for following for lively discussions
   on list and in the halls (ordered by last name): David Harrington,
   Dean Bogdanovic, Martin Bjorklund, Wes Hardaker, Russ Mundy, Reinaldo
   Penno, Randy Presuhn, Juergen Schoenwaelder.





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   Special thanks goes to Russ Mundy and Wes Hardaker for brainstorming
   the original I-D's solution during the IETF 87 meeting in Berlin.

11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels ", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3365]  Schiller, J., "Strong Security Requirements for Internet
              Engineering Task Force Standard Protocols ", RFC 3365,
              August 2002.

   [RFC4252]  Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
              Authentication Protocol ", RFC 4252, January 2006.

   [RFC5539bis]
              Badra, M. and A. Luchuk, "Using the NETCONF Protocol over
              Transport Layer Security (TLS) ", RFC 5539, March 2011.

   [RFC6187]  Igoe, K. and D. Stebila, "X.509v3 Certificates for Secure
              Shell Authentication ", RFC 6187, March 2011.

   [RFC6241]  Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
              and A. Bierman, Ed., "NETCONF Configuration Protocol", RFC
              6241, June 2011.

   [NETCONF-REVERSE-SSH]
              Watsen, K., "NETCONF over SSH Call Home", April 2014.

   [Std-802.1AR-2009]
              IEEE SA-Standards Board, "IEEE Standard for Local and
              metropolitan area networks - Secure Device Identity",
              December 2009.

   [XMLSIG]   , "XML Signature Syntax and Processing", April 2013.

   [XMLENC]   , "XML Encryption Syntax and Processing", April 2013.

11.2.  Informative References

   [TR069]    The Broadband Forum, ., "TR-069 Amendment 3, CPE WAN
              Management Protocol ", November 2010.

Appendix A.  Examples





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A.1.  Signed Configlet

   This example illustrates a Configlet configuring both a local user
   account and call home using SSH.  This Configlet includes both the
   Configuration Signer's certificate as well as an Intermediate
   certificate.  Note that '\' characters have been added for formatting
   reasons.

   <?xml version="1.0"?>
   <configlet xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-zerotouch">

     <target-requirements>
       <unique-identifier>0123456789</unique-identifier>
       <software-version>14.1R3.5</software-version>
     </target-requirements>

     <configuration>

       <!-- from ietf-system.yang -->
       <system xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-system">
         <authentication>
           <user>
             <name>admin</name>
             <ssh-key>
               <name>admin's rsa ssh host-key</name>
               <algorithm>ssh-rsa</algorithm>
               <key-data>AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQDeJMV8zrtsi8CgEsRC
               jCzfve2m6zD3awSBPrh7ICggLQvHVbPL89eHLuecStKL3HrEgXaI/O2Mwj
               E1lG9YxLzeS5p2ngzK61vikUSqfMukeBohFTrDZ8bUtrF+HMLlTRnoCVcC
               WAw1lOr9IDGDAuww6G45gLcHalHMmBtQxKnZdzU9kx/fL3ZS5G76Fy6sA5
               vg7SLqQFPjXXft2CAhin8xwYRZy6r/2N9PMJ2Dnepvq4H2DKqBIe340jWq
               EIuA7LvEJYql4unq4Iog+/+CiumTkmQIWRgIoj4FCzYkO9NvRE6fOSLLf6
               gakWVOZZgQ8929uWjCWlGlqn2mPibp2Go1</key-data>
             </ssh-key>
             <!--<password>$1$salt$hash</password>-->
           </user>
         </authentication>
       </system>

       <!-- from ietf-netconf-server.yang -->
       <netconf-server xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-server">
        <ssh>
         <call-home>
           <applications>
             <application>
               <name>config-mgr</name>
               <description>
                  This entry requests the device to periodically



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                  connect to the Configuration Manager application
               </description>
               <servers>
                  <server>
                     <address>config-mgr1.example.com</address>
                  </server>
                  <server>
                     <address>config-mgr2.example.com</address>
                  </server>
               </servers>
               <connection-type>
                 <periodic>
                   <timeout-mins>5</timeout-mins>
                   <linger-secs>10</linger-secs>
                 </periodic>
               </connection-type>
               <reconnect-strategy>
                  <start-with>last-connected</start-with>
                  <interval-secs>10</interval-secs>
                  <count-max>3</count-max>
               </reconnect-strategy>
               <host-keys>
                  <host-key>
                     <name>ssh_host_key_cert</name>
                  </host-key>
                  <host-key>
                     <name>ssh_host_key_cert2</name>
                  </host-key>
               </host-keys>
             </application>
           </applications>
         </call-home>
        </ssh>
       </netconf-server>

     </configuration>
     <Signature xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
       <SignedInfo>
         <CanonicalizationMethod
           Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
         <SignatureMethod
           Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1"/>
         <Reference>
           <Transforms>
             <Transform
               Algorithm=\
               "http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature"/>
           </Transforms>



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           <DigestMethod
             Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
           <DigestValue>2xlFdlVifb1snGBLJuEZYrLjSUQ=</DigestValue>
         </Reference>
       </SignedInfo>
       <SignatureValue>\
   HUx3S7TZXGJGUhazWGRSB9CBMZ0T+tTrB1fOnTcKi9wU4UOnSw5KMWDvOVwc6ldM
   UIOJIuJigWhSkn+VvWSWz6qy7LTYIywNcxDyghMvmMXfoRXETpL+qCDxribMi4VW
   mVhEw1oe83kJt7W/0DJUE7FFKRUhPjy9EgxpQX/7WdKSK+4f2uYkSpq2UumW3DIU
   LeK9vNRVQBbhmcF3zZWANmwKH5V4WeQimwWE497AeSYWgSImSetADI0NvvXfBZjx
   JqzFEaYLNz8IB0ZVY+w14s1RZbN7YmxhN1R3q52wWvHjR2SylR/Z5BpIhYoDeKoD
   HMQMf3HZL06Hm5S8r8rgGg==</SignatureValue>
       <KeyInfo>
         <X509Data>
           <X509Certificate>\
   MIIFKjCCBBKgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAwMRMwEQYDVQQKFApUUE1f
   VmVuZG9yMRkwFwYDVQQDFBBKdW5pcGVyX1hYWFhYX0NBMB4XDTEzMTAyMDE2MjIx
   MFoXDTE0MTAyMDE2MjIxMFowKzETMBEGA1UEChQKVFBNX1ZlbmRvcjEUMBIGA1UE
   AxQLY2hpcF8wMDAwMDEwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDf
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Internet-Draft                  ZeroTouch                      July 2014


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         </X509Data>
       </KeyInfo>
     </Signature>
   </configlet>

A.2.  Signed Encypted Configlet

   This example is the same as to previous example (section
   Appendix A.1) except that the Configlet was encrypted using the
   device's public key prior to being signed using the Configuration
   Server's private key.  Note that '\' characters have been added for
   formatting reasons.

   // This example is currently missing

Appendix B.  Change Log

B.1.  ID to 00

      Complete re-write.  Switched from using signed DNS records using
      DNSSEC to using signed YANG-defined XML files using XML Signature.
      This update took into a lot a feedback from both operators and
      vendors.

B.2.  00 to 01




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      Major structural update; the essence is the same.  Most every
      section was rewritten to some degree.

      Added a Use Cases section

      Added diagrams for "Actors and Roles" and "NMS Precondition"
      sections, and greatly improved the "Device Boot Sequence" diagram

      Removed support for physical presence or any ability for
      Configlets to not be signed.

      Defined the ZeroTouch Information DHCP option

      Added an ability for devices to also download images from
      Configuration Servers

      Added an ability for Configlets to be encrypted

      Now Configuration Servers only have to support HTTP/S - no other
      schemes possible

Authors' Addresses

   Kent Watsen
   Juniper Networks

   EMail: kwatsen@juniper.net


   Stephen Hanna
   Juniper Networks

   EMail: shanna@juniper.net


   Joe Marcus Clarke
   Cisco Systems

   EMail: jclarke@cisco.com


   Mikael Abrahamsson
   T-Systems

   EMail: "mikael.abrahamsson@t-systems.se






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