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NETCONF Working Group                                          K. Watsen
Internet-Draft                                          Juniper Networks
Intended status: Standards Track                          M. Abrahamsson
Expires: September 17, 2016                                    T-Systems
                                                          March 16, 2016


    Zero Touch Provisioning for NETCONF or RESTCONF based Management
                    draft-ietf-netconf-zerotouch-06

Abstract

   This draft presents a secure technique for establishing a NETCONF or
   RESTCONF connection between a newly deployed device, configured with
   just its factory default settings, and its deployment specific
   network management system (NMS).

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 17, 2016.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.



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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.3.  Tree Diagrams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   2.  Guiding Principles  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.1.  Trust Anchors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.2.  Conveying Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.3.  Ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   3.  Information Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.1.  Redirect Information  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.2.  Bootstrap Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   4.  Sources for Bootstrapping Data  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.1.  Removable Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.2.  DNS Server  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.3.  DHCP Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.4.  Bootstrap Server  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   5.  Workflow Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.1.  Onboarding and Ordering Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     5.2.  Owner Stages the Network for Bootstrap  . . . . . . . . .  17
     5.3.  Device Powers On  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   6.  Device Details  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     6.1.  Factory Default State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     6.2.  Boot Sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     6.3.  Processing a Source of Boostrapping Data  . . . . . . . .  25
     6.4.  Validating Signed Data  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     6.5.  Processing Redirect Information . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
     6.6.  Processing Bootstrap Information  . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
   7.  YANG-defined API and Artifacts  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     7.1.  Module Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     7.2.  API Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
       7.2.1.  Unsigned Redirect Information . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
       7.2.2.  Signed Redirect Information . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
       7.2.3.  Unsigned Bootstrap Information  . . . . . . . . . . .  34
       7.2.4.  Signed Bootstrap Information  . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
       7.2.5.  Progress Notifications  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
     7.3.  Artifact Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
       7.3.1.  Signed Redirect Information . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
       7.3.2.  Signed Bootstrap Information  . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
       7.3.3.  Owner Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
       7.3.4.  Ownership Voucher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
     7.4.  YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
     8.1.  Immutable storage for trust anchors . . . . . . . . . . .  60
     8.2.  Clock Sensitivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
     8.3.  Blindly authenticating a bootstrap server . . . . . . . .  60
     8.4.  Entropy loss over time  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61



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     8.5.  Serial Numbers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
     9.1.  Zero Touch Redirect Information DHCP Options  . . . . . .  61
       9.1.1.  DHCP v4 Option  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
       9.1.2.  DHCP v6 Option  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
   10. Other Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
   11. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
   12. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  63
     12.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  63
     12.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  64
   Appendix A.  Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  66
     A.1.  Ownership Voucher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  66
   Appendix B.  Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  68
     B.1.  ID to 00  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  68
     B.2.  00 to 01  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69
     B.3.  01 to 02  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69
     B.4.  02 to 03  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69
     B.5.  03 to 04  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69
     B.6.  04 to 05  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  70
     B.7.  05 to 06  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  70
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  70

1.  Introduction

   A fundamental business requirement for any network operator is to
   reduce costs where possible.  For network operators, deploying
   devices to many locations can be a significant cost, as sending
   trained specialists to each site to do installations is both cost
   prohibitive and does not scale.

   This document defines bootstrapping strategies enabling devices to
   securely obtain bootstrapping data with no installer input, beyond
   physical placement and connecting network and power cables.  The
   ultimate goal of this document is to enable a secure NETCONF
   [RFC6241] or RESTCONF [draft-ietf-netconf-restconf] connection to the
   deployment specific network management system (NMS).

1.1.  Use Cases

   o  Connecting to a remotely administered network

         This use-case involves scenarios, such as a remote branch
         office or convenience store, whereby a device connects as an
         access gateway to an ISP's network.  Assuming it is not
         possible to customize the ISP's network to provide any
         bootstrapping support, and with no other nearby device to
         leverage, the device has no recourse but to reach out to an
         Internet-based bootstrap server to bootstrap off of.



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   o  Connecting to a locally administered network

         This use-case covers all other scenarios and differs only in
         that the device may additionally leverage nearby devices, which
         may direct it to use a local service to bootstrap off of.  If
         no such information is available, or the device is unable to
         use the information provided, it can then reach out to network
         just as it would for the remotely administered network use-
         case.

1.2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in the
   sections below are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119
   [RFC2119].

   This document uses the following terms:

   Artifact:  The term "artifact" is used throughout to represent the
       encoded form of any of Bootstrap Information, Redirect
       Information, Owner Certificate, and Ownership Voucher.  The
       Bootstrap Server defined in this document is purposed to provide
       these artifacts, but they can also be provided by any other
       mechanism (removable storage, DHCP server, etc.), secure or not,
       so long as the principles for when the bootstrapping data needs
       to be signed is enforced.

   Bootstrapping Data:  The term "bootstrapping data" is used throughout
       this document to refer to the collection of data that a device
       may obtain from any source of bootstrapping data, including a
       removable storage device, a DHCP server, a DNS server, a Redirect
       Server, and/or a Bootstrap Server.  This data includes both
       Redirect Information as well as Bootstrap Information.

   Bootstrap Information:  The term "bootstrap information" is used
       herein to refer to bootstrapping data that is used to guide a
       device to install a specific boot-image and commit a specific
       configuration.  This data is formally defined by the "bootstrap-
       information" container in the YANG module defined in Section 7.4.

   Bootstrap Server:  The term "bootstrap server" is used within this
       document to mean any RESTCONF server implementing the YANG module
       defined in Section 7.4.

   Device:  The term "device" is used throughout this document to refer
       to the network element that needs to be bootstrapped.  The device
       is the RESTCONF client to a Bootstrap Server (see above) and, at



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       the end of bootstrapping process, the device is the NETCONF or
       RESTCONF server to a deployment-specific NMS.  See Section 6 for
       more information about devices.

   Initial Secure Device Identifier (IDevID):  The term "IDevID" is
       defined in [Std-802.1AR-2009] as "the Secure Device Identifier
       (DevID) installed on the device by the manufacturer".  By
       example, an IDevID certificate, signed by the manufacturer may
       encode a manufacturer assigned unique identifier (e.g., serial
       number) and a public key matching a private key held within a TPM
       chip embedded within the device.

   Network Management System (NMS):  The acronym "NMS" is used
       throughout this document to refer to the deployment specific
       management system that the bootstrapping process is responsible
       for introducing devices to.  From a device's perspective, when
       the bootstrapping process has completed, the NMS is a NETCONF or
       RESTCONF client.

   Owner:  See Rightful Owner.

   Owner Certificate:  The term "owner certificate" is used in this
       document to represent an X.509 certificate, signed by the
       device's manufacturer or delegate, that binds an owner identity
       to the owner's private key, which the owner can subsequently use
       to sign artifacts.  The owner certificate is used by devices only
       when validating owner signatures on signed data.  This data is
       formally defined by the "owner-certificate" container in the YANG
       module defined in Section 7.4.

   Ownership Voucher:  The term "ownership voucher" is used in this
       document to represent manufacturer-specific artifact, signed by
       the device's manufacturer or delegate, binding an owner identity
       (same as in the Owner Certificate) to one or more device
       identities (e.g., serial numbers).  The ownership voucher is used
       by devices only when validating owner signatures on signed data.
       This data is formally defined by the "ownership-voucher"
       container in the YANG module defined in Section 7.4.

   Redirect Information:  The term "redirect information" is used herein
       to refer to bootstrapping data that redirects a device to connect
       to another Bootstrap Server.  This data is formally defined by
       the "redirect-information" container in the YANG module defined
       in Section 7.4.

   Redirect Server:  The term "redirect server" is used to refer to a
       Bootstrap Server that only returns Redirect Information.  A
       Redirect Server is particularly useful when hosted by a



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       manufacturer, to redirect devices to a deployment-specific
       bootstrap server.

   Rightful Owner:  The term "rightful owner" is used herein to refer to
       the person or organization that purchased a device.  Ownership is
       conveyed by a chain of trust established by a sequence of
       authenticated secure connections and/or Signed Data, as described
       in Section 2.3.

   Signed Data:  The term "signed data" is used throughout to mean
       either Redirect Information or Bootstrap Information that has
       been signed by a device's Rightful Owner's private key.  These
       artifacts MUST be signed whenever communicated using an unsecured
       mechanism.  Any time data is signed, it MUST be presented along
       with an Owner Certificate and Ownership Voucher, which themselves
       do not need to be signed by the Rightful Owner's private key, as
       they already are signed by the manufacturer.

   Unsigned Data:  The term "unsigned data" is used throughout to mean
       either Redirect Information or Bootstrap Information that has not
       been signed by a device's Rightful Owner's private key.  The
       option to use unsigned data MUST only be available only when the
       data is obtained over an authenticated secure connection, such as
       to a Bootstrap Server.

1.3.  Tree Diagrams

   A simplified graphical representation of the data models is used in
   this document.  The meaning of the symbols in these diagrams is as
   follows:

   o  Brackets "[" and "]" enclose list keys.

   o  Braces "{" and "}" enclose feature names, and indicate that the
      named feature must be present for the subtree to be present.

   o  Abbreviations before data node names: "rw" (read-write) represents
      configuration data and "ro" (read-only) represents state data.

   o  Symbols after data node names: "?" means an optional node, "!"
      means a presence container, and "*" denotes a list and leaf-list.

   o  Parentheses enclose choice and case nodes, and case nodes are also
      marked with a colon (":").

   o  Ellipsis ("...") stands for contents of subtrees that are not
      shown.




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2.  Guiding Principles

   This section provides overarching principles guiding the solution
   presented in this document.

2.1.  Trust Anchors

   A trust anchor is used in cryptography to represent an entity in
   which trust is implicit and not derived.  In public key
   infrastructure using X.509 certificates, a root certificate is the
   trust anchor from which the chain of trust is derived.  The solution
   presented in this document requires that all the entities involved
   possess specific trust anchors in order to ensure mutual
   authentication throughout the zero touch bootstrapping process.

2.2.  Conveying Trust

   A device in its factory default state possesses a limited set of
   manufacturer specified trust anchors.  In this document, there are
   two types of trust anchors of interest.  The first type of trust
   anchor is used to authenticate a secure connection to, for instance,
   a manufacturer-hosted Internet-based bootstrap server.  The second
   type of trust anchor is used to authenticate manufacturer-signed
   data, such as the owner certificate and ownership voucher described
   in this document.

   In the first case, trust is conveyed by the device first
   authenticating the secure connection to the server and then by the
   device trusting that the server would only provide data that its
   rightful owner staged for it to find.  For instance, the staged data
   may be redirect information that includes the IP address and another
   trust anchor certificate for the deployment-specific bootstrap
   server.  The device can then use the discovered trust anchor to
   authenticate a secure connection to the deployment-specific bootstrap
   server.

   In the second case, trust is conveyed by the device first
   authenticating the owner certificate and ownership voucher and then,
   using the public key in the owner certificate, authenticate a signed
   artifact, such as redirect information.  And again the device can use
   the discovered trust anchor to authenticate a secure connection to
   the deployment-specific bootstrap server.

2.3.  Ownership

   The goal of this document is to enable a device to connect with its
   rightful owner's NMS.  This entails the manufacturer being able to
   track who owns which devices (out of the scope of this document), as



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   well as an ability to convey that information to devices (in scope).
   Matching the two ways to convey trust, this document provides both a
   protocol oriented solution as well as an artifact based solution for
   conveying ownership.

   The protocol based solution conveys ownership by the device first
   authenticating a secure connection to a bootstrap server and then
   trusting that the server would only provide data that its rightful
   owner staged for it to find.  In the case of a manufacturer-hosted
   bootstrap server, the manufacturer takes the onus of ensuring that
   only data configured by the device's rightful owner is made available
   to the device.  With this approach, the assignment of a device to an
   owner is ephemeral, with the manufacturer being able is reassign the
   device at any time.

   The artifact based solution, which is ideal for when a secure
   connection cannot be established (e.g., loading data off a removable
   storage device), involves the manufacturer signing an owner
   certificate and then later, when the ownership for devices is
   established, the manufacturer signing a voucher that assigns those
   devices to the owner, and then the owner using their private key to
   sign the artifacts.  Thus, from the device's perspective, it can use
   the presented ownership voucher to validate the presented owner
   certificate, which it can then use to validate the signature over the
   presented artifact.  With this approach, the assignment of a device
   to an owner is somewhat permanent, as the ability for the
   manufacturer to reliably distribute CRLs to revoke assignments not
   possible when the devices do not contain a real time clock (see
   Section 8 for information about this).

3.  Information Types

   This document presumes there exists two types of zero touch
   information: redirect information and bootstrap information.

   Both information types MAY be signed or unsigned, though in some
   contexts, as described below, the bootstrap information type MUST be
   signed, as there is not otherwise possible for a device to process
   it, even in a degraded manner.

   Both information types MAY be encoded using various technologies.
   This document only tries to support the encodings supported by
   RESTCONF, namely XML and JSON, while leaving extensibility mechanisms
   in place to support future extensions.







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3.1.  Redirect Information

   Redirect information provides a list of bootstrap servers, where each
   list entry includes the bootstrap server's hostname or IP address, an
   optional port, and an optional trust anchor certificate.  The
   redirect information type is formally defined by the "redirect-
   information" grouping defined in Section 7.4.

   As its name suggests, redirect information guides the device to
   attempt to connect to the specified bootstrap servers, until finding
   one that it can bootstrap itself off of.  Redirect information is
   primarily distinguished from standard HTTP redirect by its optional
   inclusion of trust anchors, in which case it may be referred to as a
   "secure redirect".

   Redirect information may be signed or unsigned.  If the redirect
   information is not signed, then the device MUST NOT trust any
   included trust anchor certificates, equivalent to had they not been
   specified at all.

   When redirect information is signed, then the device MUST establish a
   secure connection to the specified bootstrap server using X.509
   certificate path validation ([RFC6125], Section 6) to the specified
   trust anchor, and MUST send its IDevID certificate in the form of a
   client certificate, and MUST POST notifications to the bootstrap
   server.  Furthermore, in this case, any data obtained from the
   bootstrap server MAY NOT be signed, as it is already trusted by
   virtue of the secure connection.

   When redirect information is unsigned, or doesn't specify a trust
   anchor certificate, and the device connects to the bootstrap server
   by blindly accepting the bootstrap server's TLS certificate, the
   device MUST NOT send its IDevID certificate in the form of a client
   certificate, and MUST NOT POST notifications to the bootstrap server.
   Furthermore, the device MUST assert that any data obtained from the
   bootstrap server is signed, much as it would assert bootstrap
   information loaded from a removable storage device is signed.

3.2.  Bootstrap Information

   Bootstrap information provides all the data neccessary for the device
   to bootstrap itself, in order to be considered ready to be managed.
   This data includes criteria about the boot image the device MUST be
   running, an initial configuration the device MUST commit, and an
   optional script that, if specified, the device MUST successfully
   execute.  Descriptions for these follow:





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   o  The boot image creteria is used to ensure the device is running a
      version of software that will be able to understand the
      configuration and script, if any.  The criteria is flexible in
      that it allows for both an absolute specification of the boot
      image a device MUST be running, or just a list of YANG modules
      that the device MUST be able to understand.

   o  The configuration can configure any aspect of the device but, in
      order to fulfill the goal of the zero touch bootstrapping process,
      to establish a NETCONF or RESTCONF connection to the device's
      deployment specific NMS, the configuration MUST minimally
      configure an administrator account (e.g., username, SSH public
      key) that the NMS can use to log into the device with, and
      configure the device to either listen for inbound NETCONF/RESTCONF
      connections, or for the device to initiate an outbound NETCONF/
      RESTCONF call home connection [draft-ietf-netconf-call-home].  The
      bootstrap information examples provided in Section 7.2.3,
      Section 7.2.4, and Section 7.3.2 all illustrate a minimal initial
      configuration.

   o  The script, if any, is used to perform non-configuration related
      activities deemed necessary.  The script format is manufacturer
      specific.  Requirements for scripts, such as exit status codes,
      are defined in the "script" node's description statement provided
      in the YANG module defined in Section 7.4.

   Bootstrap information may be signed or unsigned.  If the device is
   accessing the bootstrap server in an unsecured manner (e.g., from a
   removable storage device or from an untrusted server), then the
   bootstrap information MUST be signed, otherwise it MAY be signed.

   Devices MUST process bootstrap information as is specified in
   Section 6.6.

   The bootstrap information type is formally defined by the "bootstrap-
   information" grouping defined in Section 7.4.

4.  Sources for Bootstrapping Data

   Following are the sources of bootstrapping data that are referenced
   by the workflows presented in Section 5.3.  Other sources of
   bootstrapping data may be defined in future documents, so long as the
   principles for when the bootstrapping data needs to be signed are
   enforced.

   Each of the descriptions below show how the bootstrapping data needs
   to be handled in a manner consistent with the guiding principles in
   Section 2.



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   For devices supporting more than one source for bootstrapping data,
   no particular sequencing order has to be observed, as each source is
   equally secure, in that the chain of trust always goes back to the
   same root of trust, the manufacturer.  That said, from a privacy
   perspective, it is RECOMMENDED that a device try to leverage local
   sources before remote source.  For this reason, all the examples used
   in this document assume a removable storage device is accessed before
   a DHCP server, which itself is accessed before an Internet-based
   bootstrap server.

4.1.  Removable Storage

   A device MAY attempt to acquire bootstrapping data from a directly
   attached removable storage device.  The bootstrapping data MAY be
   either redirect information or bootstrap information.

   If redirect information is provided, it SHOULD be signed, as
   removable storage devices are not trustworthy.  However, if the
   redirect information is not signed, then the device MUST NOT trust
   any included trust anchor certificates, which means that the device
   would have to establish an unsecured connection to the specified
   bootstrap servers.  See Section 3.1 for more about this case.

   If bootstrap information is provided, it MUST be signed, as removable
   storage devices are not trustworthy and there is no option to process
   the data in a degraded manner, unlike as with redirect information.

   For the case when the signed bootstrap information is provided, it is
   notable that even the raw boot image file itself can be on the
   removable storage device, by letting the URL reference a local file
   (e.g., file:///path/to/file), making use of the removable storage
   device a fully self-standing bootstrapping solution.

   However, regardless if the boot image file resides on the local
   storage device or if the device must follow the URL to download it
   from a remote (and unsecured) server, the device MUST authenticate
   the validity of the boot image file, either by using the MD5 and SHA
   fingerprints supplied by the bootstrapping information, or by virtual
   of the boot image containing an embedded signature, if any.

4.2.  DNS Server

   A device MAY attempt to acquire bootstrapping data from a DNS server
   using DNS-based service discovery (DNS-SD) [RFC6763].  Due to DNS
   packet size limitations the bootstrapping data provided using DNS-SD
   can only be redirect information, no support for bootstrap
   information using DNS-SD is provided by this document.




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   The redirect information provided SHOULD be signed, as this document
   does not define a solution to secure the DNS records using DNSSEC
   [RFC6698].  However, if the redirect information is not signed, then
   the device MUST NOT trust any included trust anchor certificates,
   which means that the device would have to establish an unsecured
   connection to the specified bootstrap servers.  See Section 3.1 for
   more about this case.

   To use this approach, the device MAY perform DNS-SD via multicast DNS
   [RFC6762] searching for the service "_zerotouch._tcp.local.".
   Alternatively the device MAY perform DNS-SD via normal DNS operation,
   using the domain returned to it from the DHCP server, searching for
   the service "_zerotouch._tcp.example.com".

   The mapping of redirect information onto DNS SRV [RFC2782] and DNS
   TXT [RFC1035] records as follows: is as follows:

   o  The bootstrap server's hostname or IP address is returned by the
      "Target" component of the DNS SRV record.

   o  The bootstrap server's port is returned by the "Port" component of
      the DNS SRV record.

   o  The bootstrap server's trust anchor is returned using the key
      "anchor" in the DNS TXT record with the binary value being the
      `gzip` compression over the redirect-information's "trust-anchor"
      value.  To save additional space, it is RECOMMENDED that the trust
      anchor certificate uses an elliptical curve algorithm, rather than
      the seemingly ubiquitous RSA algorithm.

   o  The signature over the preceding three values is returned using
      the key "sig" in the DNS TXT record with the binary value being
      the `gzip` compression over the redirect-information's "signature"
      value.

   o  The owner certificate is returned using the key "cert" in the DNS
      TXT record with the binary value being the `gzip` compression over
      the redirect-information's "owner-certificate/certificate" value.
      There isn't enough space to support returning CRLs.  To save
      additional space, it is RECOMMENDED that the owner certificate
      uses an elliptical curve algorithm, rather than the seemingly
      ubiquitous RSA algorithm.

   o  The ownership voucher is returned using the key "voucher" in the
      DNS TXT record binary value being the `gzip` compression over the
      redirect-information's "ownership-voucher/voucher" value.  There
      isn't enough space to support returning CRLs.




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   The applicability of this approach across vendors is limited due to
   the ownership voucher being a manufacturer-specific format.  This
   limitation only impacts signed data, when the ownership voucher is
   used; there is no such limitation when unsigned data is communicated.

4.3.  DHCP Server

   A device MAY attempt to acquire bootstrapping data from a DHCP server
   (e.g., using one of the DHCP options defined in Section 9.1).  The
   bootstrapping data MAY be either redirect information or bootstrap
   information.

   If redirect information is provided, it SHOULD be signed, as the DHCP
   protocol is not a secure protocol.  However, if the redirect
   information is not signed, then the device MUST NOT trust any
   included trust anchor certificates, which means that the device would
   have to establish an unsecured connection to the specified bootstrap
   servers.  See Section 3.1 for more about this case.

   If bootstrap information is provided, it MUST be signed, as the DHCP
   protocol is not a secure protocol and there is no option to process
   the data in a degraded manner, unlike as with redirect information.

   For the case when the signed bootstrap information is provided, it is
   notable that the URL would have to point to another file server
   (e.g., http://, ftp://, etc.), as DHCP servers do not themselves
   distribute files.  In this case, the device MUST authenticate the
   validity of the boot image file, either by using the MD5 and SHA
   fingerprints supplied by the bootstrapping information, or by virtual
   of the boot image containing an embedded signature, if any.

   It is expected that DHCP servers will provide redirect information
   more often than bootstrap information, since redirect information is
   more generic, potentially applicable to a large number of devices,
   with the number limited only by the number of devices listed by the
   associated ownership voucher.  Still, because the ownership voucher
   is a manufacturer specific format, it is advisable for devices to
   send the Vendor Class Identifier (option 60) field in its DHCP lease
   request, so that the DHCP server doesn't accidentally hand it another
   manufacturer's voucher format.

   If it is desired for the DHCP server to return bootstrap information,
   care should be taken to ensure that bootstrap information is
   applicable to all the devices that might connect to the DHCP server.
   The device SHOULD again pass the Vendor Class Identifier (option 60)
   field in its DHCP lease request.  However, if it is desired to return
   device-specific bootstrap information, then the device SHOULD also
   send the Client Identifier (option 61) field in its DHCP lease



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   request so that the DHCP server can select the specific bootstrap
   information that has been staged for that one device.

4.4.  Bootstrap Server

   A device MAY attempt to acquire bootstrapping data from a trusted
   Internet-based bootstrap server, a server implementing the RESTCONF
   API defined by the YANG module provided in Section 7.4.  The
   bootstrapping data provided by the server MAY be either redirect
   information or bootstrap information.

   Actually, a bootstrap server is not only a source for bootstrapping
   data, but it is also the consumer of notification messages from
   devices.  These notification messages both enable visability into the
   bootstrapping process (e.g., reporting warnings and errors) and well
   as provide potentially useful completion status information (e.g.,
   the device's SSH host-keys).

   If the device is able to authenticate the bootstrap server, using
   X.509 certificate path validation ([RFC6125], Section 6) to a trust
   anchor the device was manufactured with, or it securely learned from
   another source of bootstrapping data, then the data the device
   obtains from the bootstrap server MAY NOT be signed.  Notably, this
   is the only mechanism defined in this document whereby unsigned
   bootstrap information (not redirect information) can be used.  When
   the device is able to authenticate the bootstrap server's TLS
   certificate, the device MUST send its IDevID certificate in the form
   of client-certificate and it MUST POST notifications to the bootstrap
   server.

   If the device is unable to authenticate the bootstrap server's TLS
   certificate, for any reason, then any data it receives from the
   bootstrap server MUST be signed in order for the device to be able to
   make use of it.  When the device is not able to authenticate the
   bootstrap server, the device MUST NOT send its IDevID in the form of
   a client-certificate and it MUST NOT POST any notifications to the
   bootstrap server.

5.  Workflow Overview

   The zero touch solution presented in this document is conceptualized
   to be composed of the workflows described in this section.
   Implementations MAY vary in details.  Each diagram is followed by a
   detailed description of the steps presented in the diagram, with
   further explanation on how implementations may vary.






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5.1.  Onboarding and Ordering Devices

   The following diagram illustrates key interactions that occur from
   when a prospective owner enrolls in a manufacturer's zero touch
   program to when the manufacturer ships devices for an order placed by
   the prospective owner.

                                  +-----------+
   +------------+                 |Prospective|                    +---+
   |Manufacturer|                 |   Owner   |                    |NMS|
   +------------+                 +-----------+                    +---+
         |                              |                            |
         |                              |                            |
         |  1. initiate enrollment      |                            |
         #<-----------------------------|                            |
         #                              |                            |
         #                              |                            |
         #  IDevID trust anchor         |                            |
         #----------------------------->#  set IDevID trust anchor   |
         #                              #--------------------------->|
         #                              |                            |
         # (optional) bootstrap server  |                            |
         # account credentials          |                            |
         #-----------------------------># (optional) set credentials |
         #                              #--------------------------->|
         #                              |                            |
         #                              |                            |
         # (optional) owner certificate |                            |
         #-----------------------------># (optional) set certificate |
         |                              #--------------------------->|
         |                              |                            |
         |                              |                            |
         |  2. place device order       |                            |
         |<-----------------------------# model devices              |
         |                              #--------------------------->|
         |                              |                            |
         |  3. ship devices and send    |                            |
         |     device identifiers and   |                            |
         |     ownership vouchers       |                            |
         |----------------------------->#  set device identifiers    |
         |                              #  and ownership vouchers    |
         |                              #--------------------------->|
         |                              |                            |
         |                              |                            |


   The interactions in the above diagram are described below.




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   1.  A prospective owner of a manufacturer's devices, or an existing
       owner that wishes to start using zero touch for future device
       orders, would initiate an enrollment process with the
       manufacturer, or the manufacturer's delegate.

   2.

          Regardless how the prospective owner intends to bootstrap
          their devices, they will always obtain from the manufacturer
          or delegate the trust anchor certificate needed to
          authenticate device IDevID certificates.  This certificate
          will need to be installed on the prospective owner's NMS so
          that the NMS can subsequently authenticate the device's IDevID
          certificates.

          If the manufacturer hosts an Internet based bootstrap server,
          such as described in Section 4.4, then credentials necessary
          to configure the bootstrap server would be provided to the
          prospective owner.  If the bootstrap server is configurable
          through an API (outside the scope of this document), then the
          credentials might be installed on the prospective owner's NMS
          so that the NMS can subsequently configure the manufacturer-
          hosted bootstrap server directly.

          If the manufacturer's devices are able to acquire
          bootstrapping data from sources other than a manufacturer-
          hosted Internet-based bootstrap server (e.g., removable
          storage, DHCP server, etc.), then the manufacturer would
          additionally provide an owner certificate to the prospective
          owner.  How the owner certificate is used to enable devices to
          validate signed bootstrapping data is described in
          Section 6.4.  Not depicted, the owner certificate is generated
          by the prospective owner previously sending a certificate
          signing request to the manufacturer for signing, thus
          resulting in the owner certificate.  Assuming the prospective
          owner's NMS is able to prepare and sign the bootstrapping
          data, the owner certificate would be installed on the NMS at
          this time.

   3.  Some time later, the prospective owner places an order with the
       manufacturer, perhaps with a special flag checked for zero touch
       handling.  At this time, or perhaps before placing the order, the
       owner may model the devices in their NMS.  That is, create
       virtual objects for the devices with no real-world device
       associations.  For instance the model can be used to simulate the
       device's location in the network and the configuration it should
       have when fully operational.




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   4.  When the manufacturer ships the devices for the order, the
       manufacturer notifies the owner of the devices' unique
       identifiers and shipping destinations, which the owner can use to
       stage the network for when the devices powers on.  Additionally,
       the manufacturer may send an ownership voucher, assigning
       ownership of those devices to the rightful owner.  The owner sets
       this information on their NMS, perhaps binding specific device
       identifiers and ownership vouchers (if supported) to specific
       modeled devices.

5.2.  Owner Stages the Network for Bootstrap

   The following diagram illustrates how an owner stages the network for
   bootstrapping devices.

                +----------+ +------------+
                |Deployment| |Manufacturer| +------+ +------+
                | Specific | |   Hosted   | |Local?| | Local| +---------+
          +---+ |Bootstrap | | Bootstrap  | |  DNS | | DHCP | |Removable|
          |NMS| |  Server  | |   Server   | |Server| |Server| | Storage |
          +---+ +----------+ +------------+ +------+ +------+ +---------+
            |        |             |            |        |         |
   activate |        |             |            |        |         |
   modeled  |        |             |            |        |         |
1. device   |        |             |            |        |         |
----------->|        |             |            |        |         |
            |        |             |            |        |         |
            | 2. (optional) configure           |        |         |
            |    bootstrap server  |            |        |         |
            |------->|             |            |        |         |
            |        |             |            |        |         |
            | 3. (optional) configure           |        |         |
            |    redirect server   |            |        |         |
            |--------------------->|            |        |         |
            |        |             |            |        |         |
            |        |             |            |        |         |
            | 4. (optional) configure DNS server|        |         |
            |---------------------------------->|        |         |
            |        |             |            |        |         |
            |        |             |            |        |         |
            | 4. (optional) configure DHCP server        |         |
            |------------------------------------------->|         |
            |        |             |            |        |         |
            |        |             |            |        |         |
            | 5. (optional) store bootstrapping artifacts on media |
            |----------------------------------------------------->|
            |        |             |            |        |         |
            |        |             |            |        |         |



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   The interactions in the above diagram are described below.

   1.  Having previously modeled the devices, including setting their
       fully operational configurations, associating device identifiers
       and ownership vouchers (if supported), the owner "activates" one
       or more modeled devices.  That is, tell the NMS to perform the
       steps necessary to prepare for when the real-world devices are
       powered up and initiate the bootstrapping process.  Note that, in
       some deployments, this step might be combined with the last step
       from the previous workflow.  Here it is depicted that an NMS
       performs the steps, but they may be performed manually or through
       some other mechanism.

   2.  If it is desired to use a deployment specific bootstrap server,
       it MUST be configured to provide the bootstrapping information
       for the specific devices.  Whenever a deployment specific
       bootstrap server is used, the NMS MUST also configure some other
       source of bootstrapping data (i.e. an Internet based redirect
       server, a local DHCP server, a removable storage device, etc.)
       with redirect information, so that the device can discover where
       the deployment specific server is located and how to establish a
       connection to it.  Configuring the bootstrap server MAY occur via
       a programmatic API not defined by this document.  Illustrated
       here as an external component, the bootstrap server MAY be
       implemented as an internal component of the NMS itself.

   3.  If it is desired to use a manufacturer or delegate hosted
       bootstrap server, it MUST be configured to provide the
       bootstrapping information for the specific devices.  The
       configuration MUST be either redirect or bootstrap information.
       That is, either the manufacturer hosted bootstrap server will
       redirect the device to another bootstrap server, or provide the
       device with its bootstrapping information itself.  The types of
       bootstrapping information the manufacturer hosted bootstrap
       server supports MAY vary by implementation; some implementations
       may only support redirect information, or only support bootstrap
       information, or support both redirect and bootstrap information.
       Configuring the bootstrap server MAY occur via a programmatic API
       not defined by this document.

   4.  If it is desired to use a DNS server to supply bootstrapping
       information, a DNS server needs to be configured.  If multicast
       DNS-SD is desired, then the server MUST reside on the local
       network, otherwise the MAY reside on a remote network.  Please
       see Section 4.2 for more information about how to configure DNS
       servers.  Configuring the DHCP server MAY occur via a
       programmatic API not defined by this document.




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   5.  If it is desired to use a DHCP server to supply bootstrapping
       data, the DHCP server MUST be accessible via the network the
       device is located, either direct or via a DHCP relay.  Please see
       Section 4.3 for more information about how to configure DHCP
       servers.  Configuring the DHCP server MAY occur via a
       programmatic API not defined by this document.

   6.  If it is desired to use a removable storage device (e.g., USB
       flash drive) to supply bootstrapping information, the information
       would need to be placed onto it.  Please see Section 4.1 for more
       information about how to configure a removable storage device.

5.3.  Device Powers On

   The following diagram illustrates how a device might behave when
   powered on.  Note that this is merely exemplary, subject to which
   bootstrapping strategies the device supports, which may be more or
   less than depicted below.

   This diagram sequences the sources of bootstrapping information (see
   Section 4) based on locality, or how "close" the data is to the
   device, which is RECOMMENDED.  Whether this sequence makes sense for
   a specific type of device needs to be determined by the manufacturer.


                                    +------------+   +----------+
                         +------+   |Manufacturer|   |Deployment|
           +---------+   | Local|   |   Hosted   |   | Specific |
+------+   |Removable|   | DHCP |   | Bootstrap  |   |Bootstrap |   +---+
|Device|   | Storage |   |Server|   |   Server   |   |  Server  |   |NMS|
+------+   +---------+   +------+   +------------+   +----------+   +---+
   |            |            |             |               |          |
   |            |            |             |               |          |
   | 1. if not factory default, then exit. |               |          |
   |            |            |             |               |          |
   |            |            |             |               |          |
   | 2. (optional) check     |             |               |          |
   #----------->|            |             |               |          |
   # if signed redirect information found  |               |          |
   #------------------------------------------------------># webhook  |
   #    either NMS-initiated NC or RC connection           #--------->#
   #<-----------------------------------------------------------------#
   #    or device-initiated NC or RC call home connection  |          |
   #----------------------------------------------------------------->|
   # else if signed bootstrap information found (call home)|          |
   #----------------------------------------------------------------->|
   # if bootstrapped then exit, else move to next step.    |          |
   |            |            |             |               |          |



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   |            |            |             |               |          |
   | 3. (optional) check     |             |               |          |
   #------------------------>|             |               |          |
   # if signed redirect information found  |               |          |
   #------------------------------------------------------># webhook  |
   #    either NMS-initiated NC or RC connection           #--------->#
   #<-----------------------------------------------------------------#
   #    or device-initiated NC or RC call home connection  |          |
   #----------------------------------------------------------------->|
   # else if signed bootstrap information found (call home)|          |
   #----------------------------------------------------------------->|
   # if bootstrapped then exit, else move to next step.    |          |
   |            |            |             |               |          |
   |            |            |             |               |          |
   | 4. (optional) check     |             |               |          |
   #-------------------------------------->|               |          |
   # if signed or unsigned redirect information found      |          |
   #------------------------------------------------------># webhook  |
   #    either NMS-initiated NC or RC connection           #--------->#
   #<-----------------------------------------------------------------#
   #    or device-initiated NC or RC call home connection  |          |
   #----------------------------------------------------------------->|
   # else if signed or unsigned bootstrap info found (call home)      |
   #----------------------------------------------------------------->|
   # if bootstrapped then exit, else move to next step.    |          |
   |            |            |             |               |          |
   |
   | 5. loop and/or wait for manual provisioning.
   |

   [Key: NC==NETCONF, RC==RESTCONF]

   The interactions in the above diagram are described below.

   1.  Upon power being applied, the device's bootstrapping logic first
       checks to see if it is running in its factory default state.  If
       it has a modified state, then the bootstrapping logic would exit
       and none to the following interactions would occur.

   2.  If the device is able to load bootstrapping data from a removable
       storage device (e.g., USB flash drive), it is RECOMMENDED that it
       try to do so first.  Details such as the format of filesystem and
       the naming of the files are left to the device's manufacturer to
       define.  Assuming a removable storage device is attached to the
       device, the device would check for bootstrapping data and, if
       found, validate that it has been signed using the procedure
       described in Section 6.4.  The bootstrapping data MAY either be




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       redirect information or bootstrap information.  How the device
       processes each is follows:

       *  In the case that redirect information is found (e.g., the
          example depicted in Section 7.3.1), the device would use the
          redirect information to establish a secure connection to a
          deployment-specific bootstrap server.  In theory this
          bootstrap server could return a response that redirected the
          device to yet another bootstrap server (e.g., the example
          depicted in Section 7.2.1), but in this example it is depicted
          that it returns bootstrap information (e.g., the example
          depicted in Section 7.2.3).  Using this bootstrap information,
          the device would set its boot image and its initial
          configuration.  If the bootstrap server supports notifying
          external systems (e.g., via a webhook) when a device has
          notified the bootstrap server that it is ready to be managed
          (e.g., the example depicted in Section 7.2.5), it might do so
          at this time, which could prompt the NMS to initiate a NETCONF
          or RESTCONF connection to the device at this time.
          Alternatively, the initial configuration the device installs
          could configure the device to initiate a NETCONF or RESTCONF
          call home [draft-ietf-netconf-call-home] connection to the
          deployment-specific NMS.  All of these sub-steps are depicted
          in the diagram above.

       *  In the case that bootstrap information is found (e.g., the
          example depicted in Section 7.2.2), the device would use the
          bootstrap information to install a boot image, which itself
          could be located on the same removable storage device, and set
          its initial configuration.  In this case, since there is no
          easy way to notify the NMS that the device is ready to be
          managed (e.g., via a webhook), it is RECOMMENDED that the
          initial configuration directs the device to proactively
          initiate a NETCONF or RESTCONF call home
          [draft-ietf-netconf-call-home] connection to the deployment-
          specific NMS.

       If the device is unable to bootstrap using any of the information
       on the removable storage device, it would proceed to the next
       source of bootstrapping information, if any.

   3.  If the device is able to load bootstrapping data from a DHCP
       server, when obtaining a DHCP assignment, it may receive a
       response that includes a Zero Touch Information DHCP option
       (Section 9.1).

       *  If the redirect information contained in the DHCP option is
          signed, then it is RECOMMENDED that the device establish a



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          secure TLS connection to the bootstrap server, by
          authenticating its TLS server certificate using the provided
          trust anchor, and download any data that has been staged for
          it there, which MAY not be signed, since the server's
          certificate could be trusted.

       *  On the other hand, if the redirect information contained in
          the DHCP option is unsigned, then it is RECOMMENDED that the
          device establish a unsecured TLS connection to the bootstrap
          server, by blindly accepting its TLS server certificate, and
          download any data that has been staged for it there, which
          then MUST be signed, since the server's certificate could not
          be trusted.

       In either case, the remainder of the device's logic is the same
       as described above for when using a removable storage device.  If
       the device is unable to bootstrap using information provided by a
       DHCP server, it would proceed to the next source of bootstrapping
       information, if any.

   4.  If the device is able to load bootstrapping data from a trusted
       Internet-based bootstrap server, as preconfigured in its factory
       default settings (Section 6.1), it is RECOMMENDED that the device
       attempts to establish a secure TLS connection to the bootstrap
       server, authenticating its TLS server certificate using the trust
       anchors set by its factory default state (Section 6.1), and
       download any data that has been staged for it there, which MAY
       not be signed, since the server's certificate could be trusted.
       In either case, the remainder of the device's logic is the same
       as described above for when using a removable storage device.  If
       the device is unable to bootstrap using information provided by a
       DHCP server, it would proceed to the next source of bootstrapping
       information, if any.

   5.  If no more sources of bootstrapping information are available,
       the device MAY retry again all sources of bootstrapping data and/
       or MAY provide manageability interfaces for manual configuration
       (e.g., CLI, HTTP, NETCONF, etc.).  If manual configuration is
       allowed, and such configuration is provided, the device MUST
       immediately cease trying to obtain bootstrapping data, as it
       would then no longer be in its factory default state.

6.  Device Details

   Devices supporting Zero Touch MUST have the preconfigured factory
   default state and bootstrapping logic described in the following
   sections.




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6.1.  Factory Default State

    +------------------------------------------------------------------+
    |                             <device>                             |
    |                                                                  |
    |   +----------------------------------------------------------+   |
    |   |                   <read-only storage>                    |   |
    |   |                                                          |   |
    |   | 1. list of trusted Internet based bootstrap servers      |   |
    |   | 2. list of trust anchor certs for bootstrap servers      |   |
    |   | 3. trust anchor cert for owner certificates              |   |
    |   | 4. trust anchor cert for device ownership vouchers       |   |
    |   | 5. IDevID cert & associated intermediate certificate(s)  |   |
    |   +----------------------------------------------------------+   |
    |                                                                  |
    |                    +----------------------+                      |
    |                    |   <secure storage>   |                      |
    |                    |                      |                      |
    |                    |  6. private key      |                      |
    |                    +----------------------+                      |
    |                                                                  |
    +------------------------------------------------------------------+

   Each numbered item below corresponds to a numbered item in the
   diagram above.

   1.  Devices that support loading bootstrapping data from an Internet-
       based bootstrap server (see Section 4) MUST be manufactured with
       a list of trusted bootstrap servers.  Each bootstrap server MAY
       be identified by just its hostname or IP address, and an optional
       port.  Note that it is not necessary to configure URLs, as the
       RESTCONF protocol defines how the bootstrap server API specified
       in Section 7.4 maps into URLs.

   2.  Devices that support loading bootstrapping data from an Internet-
       based bootstrap server (see Section 4) SHOULD be manufactured
       with a list of trust anchor certificates that can be for X.509
       certificate path validation [RFC6125], Section 6) on the
       bootstrap server's TLS server certificate.

   3.  Devices that support loading owner signed data (see Section 1.2)
       MUST be manufactured with the trust anchor certificate for the
       owner certificates that the manufacturer provides to prospective
       owners when they enroll in the manufacturer's Zero Touch program
       (see Section 5.1).

   4.  Devices that support loading owner signed data (see Section 1.2)
       MUST also be manufactured with the trust anchor certificate for



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       the device ownership vouchers that the manufacturer provides to
       prospective owners when it ships out an order of Zero Touch
       devices (see Section 5.1).

   5.  Devices MUST be manufactured with an initial device identifier
       (IDevID), as defined in [Std-802.1AR-2009].  The IDevID is an
       X.509 certificate, encoding a unique device identifier (e.g.,
       serial number).  The device MUST also possess any intermediate
       certificates between the IDevID certificate and the
       manufacturer's IDevID trust anchor certificate.

   6.  Device MUST be manufactured with a private key that corresponds
       to the public key encoded in the device's IDevID certificate.
       This private key SHOULD be securely stored, ideally by a
       cryptographic processor (e.g., a TPM).

6.2.  Boot Sequence

   A device claiming to support Zero Touch MUST support the boot
   sequence described in this section.

    Power On
        |
        v                        No
 1. Running default config?   -------->  Boot normally
        |
        | Yes
        v
 2. For each supported source for bootstrapping data,
    try to load bootstrapping data from the source
        |
        |
        v                               Yes
 3. Able to bootstrap off any source?  -----> Run with new configuration
        |
        | No
        v
 4. Loop or wait for manual provisioning.


   These interactions are described next.

   1.  When the device powers on, it first checks to see if it is
       running the factory default configuration.  If it is running a
       modified configuration, then it boots normally.






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   2.  The device iterates over its list of sources for bootstrapping
       data Section 4.  Details for how to processes a source of
       bootstrapping data are provided in Section 6.3.

   3.  If the device is able to bootstrap itself off any of the sources
       for bootstrapping data, it runs with the new bootstrapped
       configuration.

   4.  Otherwise the device MAY loop back through the list of
       bootstrapping sources again and/or wait for manual provisioning.

6.3.  Processing a Source of Boostrapping Data

   This section describes a recursive algorithm that a device claiming
   to support Zero Touch MUST use to authenticate bootstrapping data.  A
   device enters this algorithm for each new source of bootstrapping
   data.  The first time the device enters this algorithm, it MUST
   initialize a conceptual trust state variable, herein referred to as
   "trust-state", to FALSE.  The ultimate goal of this algorithm is for
   the device to process bootstrap information (not redirect
   information) while its trust-state is TRUE.

   If the data source is a bootstrap server, and the device is able to
   authenticate the server using X.509 certificate path validation
   ([RFC6125], Section 6) to one of the the device's preconfigured trust
   anchors, or to a trust anchor that it learned from a previous step,
   then the device MUST set trust-state to TRUE.  If trust-state is
   TRUE, when connecting to the bootstrap server, the device MUST use
   its IDevID certificate for a client-certificate based authentication
   and MUST POST progress notifications using the bootstrap server's
   "notification" action.  Otherwise, if trust-state is FALSE, when
   connecting to the bootstrap server, the device MUST NOT use its
   IDevID certificate for a client-certificate based authentication and
   MUST NOT POST progress notifications using the bootstrap server's
   "notification" action.  When accessing a bootstrap server, the device
   MUST only access its top-level resource, to obtain all the data
   staged for it in one GET request, so that it can determine if the
   data is signed or not, and thus act accordingly.

   For any data source, if the data is signed (i.e. the data includes a
   'signature' field) and the device is able to validate the signed data
   using the algorithm described in Section 6.4, then the device MUST
   set trust-state to TRUE, else the device MUST set trust-state to
   FALSE.  Note, this is worded to cover the special case when signed
   data is returned even from a trusted bootstrap server.

   If the data is bootstrap information (not redirect information), and
   trust-state is FALSE, the device MUST exit the recursive algorithm,



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   returning to the state machine described in Section 6.2.  Otherwise,
   the device MUST attempt to process the bootstrap information as
   described in Section 6.6.  In either case, success of failure, the
   device MUST exit the recursive algorithm, returning to the state
   machine described in Section 6.2, the only difference being in how it
   responds to the "Able to bootstrap off any source?" conditional
   described in that state machine.

   If the data is redirect information, the device MUST process the
   redirect information as described in Section 6.5.  This is the
   recursion step, it will cause to device to reenter this algorithm,
   but this time the data source will most definitely be a bootstrap
   server, as that is all redirect information is able to do, though
   it's interesting to note that the bootstrap server's response MAY be
   more redirect information.

6.4.  Validating Signed Data

   Whenever a device is presented signed data, it MUST validate the
   signed data as described in this section.

   Whenever there is signed data, the device MUST also be provided an
   ownership voucher and an owner certificate.  How all the needed
   records are provided for each source of bootstrapping data is defined
   in Section 4

   The device MUST first authenticate the ownership voucher by
   validating the signature on it to one of its preconfigured trust
   anchors (see Section 6.1) and verify that the voucher contains the
   device's unique identifier (e.g., serial number).  If the
   authentication of the voucher is successful, the device extracts the
   Rightful owner's identity from the voucher for use in the next step.

   Next the device MUST authenticate the owner certificate by performing
   X.509 certificate path validation on it to one of its preconfigured
   trust anchors (see Section 6.1) and by verifying that the Subject
   contained in the certificate matches the Rightful owner identity
   extracted from the voucher in the previous step.  If the
   authentication of the certificate is successful, the device extracts
   the owner's public key from the certificate for use in the next step.

   Finally the device MUST authenticate the signed data by verifying the
   signature on it was generated by the private key matching the public
   key extracted from the owner certificate in the previous step.

   If any of these steps fail, then the device MUST mark the data as
   invalid and not perform any of the subsequent steps.




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6.5.  Processing Redirect Information

   In order to process redirect information (Section 3.1), the device
   MUST follow the steps presented in this section.

   Processing redirect information is straightforward.  Essentially the
   device MUST immediately attempt to establish a RESTCONF connection to
   the provided bootstrap server IP address or hostname.

   If a hostname is provided, and its DNS resolution is to more than one
   IP address, the device MUST attempt to try to connect to all of them,
   sequentially, until it is able to successfully bootstrap off one of
   them.

   If the redirect information includes a trust anchor, and the redirect
   information can be trusted (e.g., trust-state is TRUE), then the
   device MUST authenticate the bootstrap server using X.509 certificate
   path validation ( [RFC6125], Section 6) using the specified trust
   anchor.

6.6.  Processing Bootstrap Information

   In order to process bootstrap information (Section 3.2), the device
   MUST follow the steps presented in this section.

   When processing bootstrap information, the device MUST first process
   the boot image information, then commit the initial configuration,
   and then execute the script, if any, in that order.  If the device
   encounters an error at any step, it MUST NOT proceed to the next
   step.

   First the device MUST determine if the image it is running satisfies
   the specified "boot-image" criteria.  If it does not, the device MUST
   download and install the specified boot image, and reboot.  Upon
   rebooting, the device MUST still be in its factory default state,
   causing the bootstrapping process to run again, which will eventually
   come to this very point, but this time the device's running image
   will satisfy the specified criteria, and thus the device moves to
   processing the next step.

   Next the device commits the provided initial configuration.  Assuming
   no errors, the device moves to processing the next step.

   Next, for devices that support executing scripts, if a script has
   been specified, the device executes the script, checking its exit
   status code to determine if it succeeded, had warning, or had errors.
   In the case of errors, the device MUST reset itself in such a way




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   that force the reinstallation of its boot image, thereby wiping out
   any bad state the script might have left behind.

   At this point, the device has completely processed the bootstrapping
   data and is ready to be managed.  If the configuration configured the
   device it initiate a call home connection, it should proceed to do so
   now.  Otherwise, the device should wait for a NETCONF or RESTCONF
   client to connect to it.

7.  YANG-defined API and Artifacts

   Central to the solution presented in this document is the use of a
   YANG module [RFC6020] to simultaneously define a RESTCONF based API
   for a bootstrap/redirect server as well as the encoding for signed
   artifacts that can be conveyed outside of the RESTCONF protocol
   (DHCP, FTP, TFTP, etc.).

   The module defined in this section makes extensive use of data types
   defined in [RFC2315], [RFC5280], [RFC6991], and [RFC5280].

7.1.  Module Overview

   The following tree diagram Section 1.3 provides an overview for both
   the API and artifacts that can be used outside of RESTCONF.



























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   module: ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server
      +--ro devices
         +--ro device* [unique-id]
            +--ro unique-id                string
            +--ro (type)?
            |  +--:(redirect-information)
            |  |  +--ro redirect-information
            |  |     +--ro bootstrap-server* [address]
            |  |        +--ro address         inet:host
            |  |        +--ro port?           inet:port-number
            |  |        +--ro trust-anchor    binary
            |  +--:(bootstrap-information)
            |     +--ro bootstrap-information
            |        +--ro boot-image
            |        |  +--ro modules
            |        |  |  +--ro module*
            |        |  |     +--ro name?       yang:yang-identifier
            |        |  |     +--ro revision?   string
            |        |  +--ro name       string
            |        |  +--ro md5        string
            |        |  +--ro sha1       string
            |        |  +--ro uri*       inet:uri
            |        +--ro configuration
            |        +--ro script?          string
            +--ro owner-certificate
            |  +--ro certificate    binary
            |  +--ro issuer-crl?    binary
            +--ro ownership-voucher
            |  +--ro voucher       binary
            |  +--ro issuer-vrl?   binary
            +--ro signature?               binary
            +---x notification
               +---w input
                  +---w notification-type    enumeration
                  +---w message?             string
                  +---w ssh-host-keys
                  |  +---w ssh-host-key*
                  |     +---w format      enumeration
                  |     +---w key-data    string
                  +---w trust-anchors
                     +---w trust-anchor*
                        +---w protocol*      enumeration
                        +---w certificate    binary

   In the above diagram, notice that all of the protocol accessible node
   are read-only, to assert that devices can only pull data from the
   bootstrap server.




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   Also notice that the module defines an action statement, which
   devices may use to provide progress notifications to the bootstrap
   server.

7.2.  API Examples

   This section presents some examples illustrating device interactions
   with a bootstrap server to access Redirect and Bootstrap information,
   both unsigned and signed, as well as to send a progress notification.
   These examples show the bootstrap information containing
   configuration defined by [RFC7317] and
   [draft-ietf-netconf-server-model].

7.2.1.  Unsigned Redirect Information

   The following example illustrates a device using the API to fetch its
   bootstrapping data.  In this example, the device receives unsigned
   redirect information.  This example is representative of a response a
   trusted redirect server might return.

 REQUEST
 -------
 ['\' line wrapping added for formatting only]

 GET https://example.com/restconf/data/ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server:\
 devices/device=123456 HTTP/1.1
 HOST: example.com
 Accept: application/yang.data+xml


 RESPONSE
 --------

 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
 Date: Sat, 31 Oct 2015 17:02:40 GMT
 Server: example-server
 Content-Type: application/yang.data+xml

 <!-- '\' line wrapping added for formatting purposes only -->

 <device
    xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server">
   <unique-id>123456789</unique-id>
   <redirect-information>
     <bootstrap-server>
       <address>phs1.example.com</address>
       <port>8443</port>
       <trust-anchor>



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         WmdsK2gyTTg3QmtGMjhWbW1CdFFVaWc3OEgrRkYyRTFwdSt4ZVRJbVFFM\
         lLQllsdWpOcjFTMnRLR05EMUc2OVJpK2FWNGw2NTdZNCtadVJMZgpRYjk\
         zSFNwSDdwVXBCYnA4dmtNanFtZjJma3RqZHBxeFppUUtTbndWZTF2Zwot\
         NGcEk3UE90cnNFVjRwTUNBd0VBQWFPQ0FSSXdnZ0VPCk1CMEdBMVVkRGd\
         VEJiZ0JTWEdlbUEKMnhpRHVOTVkvVHFLNWd4cFJBZ1ZOYUU0cERZd05ER\
         V6QVJCZ05WQkFNVENrTlNUQ0JKYzNOMVpYS0NDUUNVRHBNSll6UG8zREF\
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         Z05WSFI4RVlqQmdNRjZnSXFBZ2hoNW9kSFJ3T2k4dlpYaGgKYlhCc1pTN\
         WpiMjB2WlhoaGJYQnNaUzVqY215aU9LUTJNRFF4Q3pBSkJnTlZCQVlUQW\
         QmdOVkJBWVRBbFZUTVJBd0RnWURWUVFLRXdkbAplR0Z0Y0d4bE1RNHdEQ\
         MkF6a3hqUDlVQWtHR0dvS1U1eUc1SVR0Wm0vK3B0R2FieXVDMjBRd2kvZ\
         25PZnpZNEhONApXY0pTaUpZK2xtYWs3RTRORUZXZS9RdGp4NUlXZmdvN2\
         RJSUJQFRStS0Cg==
       </trust-anchor>
     </bootstrap-server>
     <bootstrap-server>
       <address>phs2.example.com</address>
       <port>8443</port>
       <trust-anchor>
         WmdsK2gyTTg3QmtGMjhWbW1CdFFVaWc3OEgrRkYyRTFwdSt4ZVRJbVFFM\
         lLQllsdWpOcjFTMnRLR05EMUc2OVJpK2FWNGw2NTdZNCtadVJMZgpRYjk\
         zSFNwSDdwVXBCYnA4dmtNanFtZjJma3RqZHBxeFppUUtTbndWZTF2Zwot\
         NGcEk3UE90cnNFVjRwTUNBd0VBQWFPQ0FSSXdnZ0VPCk1CMEdBMVVkRGd\
         VEJiZ0JTWEdlbUEKMnhpRHVOTVkvVHFLNWd4cFJBZ1ZOYUU0cERZd05ER\
         V6QVJCZ05WQkFNVENrTlNUQ0JKYzNOMVpYS0NDUUNVRHBNSll6UG8zREF\
         NQmdOVkhSTUJBZjhFCkFqQUFNQTRHQTFVZER3RUIvd1FFQXdJSGdEQnBC\
         Z05WSFI4RVlqQmdNRjZnSXFBZ2hoNW9kSFJ3T2k4dlpYaGgKYlhCc1pTN\
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         MkF6a3hqUDlVQWtHR0dvS1U1eUc1SVR0Wm0vK3B0R2FieXVDMjBRd2kvZ\
         25PZnpZNEhONApXY0pTaUpZK2xtYWs3RTRORUZXZS9RdGp4NUlXZmdvN2\
         RJSUJQFRStS0Cg==
       </trust-anchor>
     </bootstrap-server>
   </redirect-information>
 </device>

7.2.2.  Signed Redirect Information

   The following example illustrates a device using the API to fetch its
   bootstrapping data.  In this example, the device receives signed
   redirect information.  This example is representative of a response
   that redirect server might return if concerned the device might not
   be able to authenticate its TLS certificate.

 REQUEST
 -------
 ['\' line wrapping added for formatting only]



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 GET https://example.com/restconf/data/ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server:\
 devices/device=123456 HTTP/1.1
 HOST: example.com
 Accept: application/yang.data+xml


 RESPONSE
 --------

 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
 Date: Sat, 31 Oct 2015 17:02:40 GMT
 Server: example-server
 Content-Type: application/yang.data+xml

 <!-- '\' line wrapping added for formatting purposes only -->

 <device
    xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server">
   <unique-id>123456789</unique-id>
   <redirect-information>
     <bootstrap-server>
       <address>phs1.example.com</address>
       <port>8443</port>
       <trust-anchor>
         WmdsK2gyTTg3QmtGMjhWbW1CdFFVaWc3OEgrRkYyRTFwdSt4ZVRJbVFFM\
         lLQllsdWpOcjFTMnRLR05EMUc2OVJpK2FWNGw2NTdZNCtadVJMZgpRYjk\
         zSFNwSDdwVXBCYnA4dmtNanFtZjJma3RqZHBxeFppUUtTbndWZTF2Zwot\
         NGcEk3UE90cnNFVjRwTUNBd0VBQWFPQ0FSSXdnZ0VPCk1CMEdBMVVkRGd\
         VEJiZ0JTWEdlbUEKMnhpRHVOTVkvVHFLNWd4cFJBZ1ZOYUU0cERZd05ER\
         V6QVJCZ05WQkFNVENrTlNUQ0JKYzNOMVpYS0NDUUNVRHBNSll6UG8zREF\
         NQmdOVkhSTUJBZjhFCkFqQUFNQTRHQTFVZER3RUIvd1FFQXdJSGdEQnBC\
         Z05WSFI4RVlqQmdNRjZnSXFBZ2hoNW9kSFJ3T2k4dlpYaGgKYlhCc1pTN\
         WpiMjB2WlhoaGJYQnNaUzVqY215aU9LUTJNRFF4Q3pBSkJnTlZCQVlUQW\
         QmdOVkJBWVRBbFZUTVJBd0RnWURWUVFLRXdkbAplR0Z0Y0d4bE1RNHdEQ\
         MkF6a3hqUDlVQWtHR0dvS1U1eUc1SVR0Wm0vK3B0R2FieXVDMjBRd2kvZ\
         25PZnpZNEhONApXY0pTaUpZK2xtYWs3RTRORUZXZS9RdGp4NUlXZmdvN2\
         RJSUJQFRStS0Cg==
       </trust-anchor>
     </bootstrap-server>
     <bootstrap-server>
       <address>phs2.example.com</address>
       <port>8443</port>
       <trust-anchor>
         WmdsK2gyTTg3QmtGMjhWbW1CdFFVaWc3OEgrRkYyRTFwdSt4ZVRJbVFFM\
         lLQllsdWpOcjFTMnRLR05EMUc2OVJpK2FWNGw2NTdZNCtadVJMZgpRYjk\
         zSFNwSDdwVXBCYnA4dmtNanFtZjJma3RqZHBxeFppUUtTbndWZTF2Zwot\
         NGcEk3UE90cnNFVjRwTUNBd0VBQWFPQ0FSSXdnZ0VPCk1CMEdBMVVkRGd\
         VEJiZ0JTWEdlbUEKMnhpRHVOTVkvVHFLNWd4cFJBZ1ZOYUU0cERZd05ER\



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         V6QVJCZ05WQkFNVENrTlNUQ0JKYzNOMVpYS0NDUUNVRHBNSll6UG8zREF\
         NQmdOVkhSTUJBZjhFCkFqQUFNQTRHQTFVZER3RUIvd1FFQXdJSGdEQnBC\
         Z05WSFI4RVlqQmdNRjZnSXFBZ2hoNW9kSFJ3T2k4dlpYaGgKYlhCc1pTN\
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         MkF6a3hqUDlVQWtHR0dvS1U1eUc1SVR0Wm0vK3B0R2FieXVDMjBRd2kvZ\
         25PZnpZNEhONApXY0pTaUpZK2xtYWs3RTRORUZXZS9RdGp4NUlXZmdvN2\
         RJSUJQFRStS0Cg==
       </trust-anchor>
     </bootstrap-server>
   </redirect-information>
   <owner-certificate>
     <certificate>
       MIIExTCCA62gAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADCBqjELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMx\
       EzARBgNVBAgTCkNhbGlmb3JuaWExEjAQBgNVBAcTCVN1bm55dmFsZTEZMBcGA1UE\
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     </certificate>
     <issuer-crl>
       Y2UxGTAXBgNVBAMUEFRQTV9UcnVzdF9BbmNob3IxHTAbBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWDmNh\
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       GwYDVQQLFBRDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZV9Jc3N1YW5jZTEZMBcGA1UEAxQQVFBNX1RydXN0\



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       X0FuY2hvcjEdMBsGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYOY2FAanVuaXBlci5jb22CCQDUbsEdTn5v\
       MjAO==
     </issuer-crl>
   </owner-certificate>
   <ownership-voucher>
     <voucher>
       ChQQSnVuaXBlcl9OZXR3b3JrczEdMBsGA1UECxQUQ2VydGlmaWNhdGVfSXNzdWFu\
       Y2UxGTAXBgNVBAMUEFRQTV9UcnVzdF9BbmNob3IxHTAbBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWDmNh\
       MBEGA1UEChQKVFBNX1ZlbmRvcjEZMBcGA1UEAxQQSnVuaXBlcl9YWFhYWF9DQTCC\
       ASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBANL5Mk5qFsVuqo+JmXWLmFxI\
       yh/JaftWYf7m3KBzOdg2MIHfBgNVHSMEgdcwgdSAFDSljCNmTN5b+CDujJLlyDal\
       WFPaoYGwpIGtMIGqMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECBMKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTES\
       MBAGA1UEBxMJU3Vubnl2YWxlMRkwFwYDVQQKFBBKdW5pcGVyX05ldHdvcmtzMR0w\
       GwYDVQQLFBRDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZV9Jc3N1YW5jZTEZMBcGA1UEAxQQVFBNX1RydXN0\
       X0FuY2hvcjEdMBsGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYOY2FAanVuaXBlci5jb22CCQDUbsEdTn5v\
       MjAO
     </voucher>
     <issuer-crl>
       QGp1bmlwZXIuY29tMB4XDTE0MDIyNzE0MTM1MloXDTE1MDIyNzE0MTM1MlowMDET\
       MBEGA1UEChQKVFBNX1ZlbmRvcjEZMBcGA1UEAxQQSnVuaXBlcl9YWFhYWF9DQTCC\
       ASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBANL5Mk5qFsVuqo+JmXWLmFxI\
       RDEuRiZNRNLeJpgN9YWkXLAZX2rASwy041EMmZ6KAkWUd3ZmXucfoLpdRemfuPii\
       KQTpIM/rNrbrkuTmalezFoFS7mrxLXJAsfP1guVcD7sLCyjvegL8pRCCrU9xyKLF\
       8u/Qz4s0x0uzcGYh0sd3iWj21+AtigSLdMD76/j/VzftQL8B1yp3vc1EZiowOwq4\
       AwEAAaOCAW0wggFpMBIGA1UdEwEB/wQIMAYBAf8CAQAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFHppoyXF\
       WFPaoYGwpIGtMIGqMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECBMKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTES\
       NTOufhQsD2t4TYpEkzLEiZqSswdBOaPxPcJLQNW8Bw2xN+A9GX=
     </issuer-crl>
   </ownership-voucher>
   <signature>
     RDEuRiZNRNLeJpgN9YWkXLAZX2rASwy041EMmZ6KAkWUd3ZmXucfoLpdRemfuPii\
     QGp1bmlwZXIuY29tMB4XDTE0MDIyNzE0MTM1MloXDTE1MDIyNzE0MTM1MlowMDET\
     MBEGA1UEChQKVFBNX1ZlbmRvcjEZMBcGA1UEAxQQSnVuaXBlcl9YWFhYWF9DQTCC\
     NTOufhQsD2t4TYpEkzLEiZqSswdBOaPxPcJLQNW8Bw2xN+A9GX=
   </signature>
 </device>

7.2.3.  Unsigned Bootstrap Information

   The following example illustrates a device using the API to fetch its
   bootstrapping data.  In this example, the device receives unsigned
   bootstrapping information.  This example is representative of a
   response a locally deployed bootstrap server might return.

REQUEST
-------
['\' line wrapping added for formatting only]




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GET https://example.com/restconf/data/ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server:\
devices/device=123456 HTTP/1.1
HOST: example.com
Accept: application/yang.data+xml


RESPONSE
--------

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 31 Oct 2015 17:02:40 GMT
Server: example-server
Content-Type: application/yang.data+xml

<!-- '\' line wrapping added for formatting purposes only -->

<device
   xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server">
  <unique-id>123456789</unique-id>
  <bootstrap-information>
    <boot-image>
      <name>
        boot-image-v3.2R1.6.img
      </name>
      <md5>
        SomeMD5String
      </md5>
      <sha1>
        SomeSha1String
      </sha1>
      <uri>
        ftp://ftp.example.com/path/to/file
      </uri>
    </boot-image>
    <configuration>
      <!-- from ietf-system.yang -->
      <system xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-system">
        <authentication>
          <user>
            <name>admin</name>
            <ssh-key>
              <name>admin's rsa ssh host-key</name>
              <algorithm>ssh-rsa</algorithm>
              <key-data>AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQDeJMV8zrtsi8CgEsR\
              jCzfve2m6zD3awSBPrh7ICggLQvHVbPL89eHLuecStKL3HrEgXaI/O2Mw\
              E1lG9YxLzeS5p2ngzK61vikUSqfMukeBohFTrDZ8bUtrF+HMLlTRnoCVc\
              WAw1lOr9IDGDAuww6G45gLcHalHMmBtQxKnZdzU9kx/fL3ZS5G76Fy6sA\
              vg7SLqQFPjXXft2CAhin8xwYRZy6r/2N9PMJ2Dnepvq4H2DKqBIe340jW\



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              EIuA7LvEJYql4unq4Iog+/+CiumTkmQIWRgIoj4FCzYkO9NvRE6fOSLLf\
              gakWVOZZgQ8929uWjCWlGlqn2mPibp2Go1</key-data>
            </ssh-key>
          </user>
        </authentication>
      </system>
      <!-- from ietf-netconf-server.yang -->
      <netconf-server
        xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-server">
        <call-home>
          <application>
            <name>config-mgr</name>
            <ssh>
              <endpoints>
                <endpoint>
                  <name>east-data-center</name>
                  <address>11.22.33.44</address>
                </endpoint>
                <endpoint>
                  <name>west-data-center</name>
                  <address>55.66.77.88</address>
                </endpoint>
              </endpoints>
              <host-keys>
                <host-key>my-call-home-x509-key</host-key>
              </host-keys>
            </ssh>
          </application>
        </call-home>
      </netconf-server>
    </configuration>
  </bootstrap-information>
</device>

7.2.4.  Signed Bootstrap Information

   The following example illustrates a device using the API to fetch its
   bootstrapping data.  In this example, the device receives signed
   bootstrap information.  This example is representative of a response
   that bootstrap server might return if concerned the device might not
   be able to authenticate its TLS certificate.

REQUEST
-------

['\' line wrapping added for formatting only]

GET https://example.com/restconf/data/ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server:\



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devices/device=123456 HTTP/1.1
HOST: example.com
Accept: application/yang.data+xml


RESPONSE
--------

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 31 Oct 2015 17:02:40 GMT
Server: example-server
Content-Type: application/yang.data+xml

<!-- '\' line wrapping added for formatting purposes only -->

<device
   xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server">
  <unique-id>123456789</unique-id>
  <bootstrap-information>
    <boot-image>
      <name>
        boot-image-v3.2R1.6.img
      </name>
      <md5>
        SomeMD5String
      </md5>
      <sha1>
        SomeSha1String
      </sha1>
      <uri>
        /path/to/on/same/bootserver
      </uri>
    </boot-image>
    <configuration>
      <!-- from ietf-system.yang -->
      <system xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-system">
        <authentication>
          <user>
            <name>admin</name>
            <ssh-key>
              <name>admin's rsa ssh host-key</name>
              <algorithm>ssh-rsa</algorithm>
              <key-data>AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQDeJMV8zrtsi8CgEsR\
              jCzfve2m6zD3awSBPrh7ICggLQvHVbPL89eHLuecStKL3HrEgXaI/O2Mw\
              E1lG9YxLzeS5p2ngzK61vikUSqfMukeBohFTrDZ8bUtrF+HMLlTRnoCVc\
              WAw1lOr9IDGDAuww6G45gLcHalHMmBtQxKnZdzU9kx/fL3ZS5G76Fy6sA\
              vg7SLqQFPjXXft2CAhin8xwYRZy6r/2N9PMJ2Dnepvq4H2DKqBIe340jW\
              EIuA7LvEJYql4unq4Iog+/+CiumTkmQIWRgIoj4FCzYkO9NvRE6fOSLLf\



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              gakWVOZZgQ8929uWjCWlGlqn2mPibp2Go1</key-data>
            </ssh-key>
          </user>
        </authentication>
      </system>
      <!-- from ietf-netconf-server.yang -->
      <netconf-server
        xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-server">
        <call-home>
          <application>
            <name>config-mgr</name>
            <ssh>
              <endpoints>
                <endpoint>
                  <name>east-data-center</name>
                  <address>11.22.33.44</address>
                </endpoint>
                <endpoint>
                  <name>west-data-center</name>
                  <address>55.66.77.88</address>
                </endpoint>
              </endpoints>
              <host-keys>
                <host-key>my-call-home-x509-key</host-key>
              </host-keys>
            </ssh>
          </application>
        </call-home>
      </netconf-server>
    </configuration>
  </bootstrap-information>
  <owner-certificate>
    <certificate>
      MIIExTCCA62gAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADCBqjELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMx\
      EzARBgNVBAgTCkNhbGlmb3JuaWExEjAQBgNVBAcTCVN1bm55dmFsZTEZMBcGA1UE\
      ChQQSnVuaXBlcl9OZXR3b3JrczEdMBsGA1UECxQUQ2VydGlmaWNhdGVfSXNzdWFu\
      Y2UxGTAXBgNVBAMUEFRQTV9UcnVzdF9BbmNob3IxHTAbBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWDmNh\
      QGp1bmlwZXIuY29tMB4XDTE0MDIyNzE0MTM1MloXDTE1MDIyNzE0MTM1MlowMDET\
      MBEGA1UEChQKVFBNX1ZlbmRvcjEZMBcGA1UEAxQQSnVuaXBlcl9YWFhYWF9DQTCC\
      ASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBANL5Mk5qFsVuqo+JmXWLmFxI\
      RDEuRiZNRNLeJpgN9YWkXLAZX2rASwy041EMmZ6KAkWUd3ZmXucfoLpdRemfuPii\
      ap1DgmS3IaYl/s4OOF8yzcYJprm8O7NyZp+Y9H1U/7Qfp97/KbqwCgkHSzOlnt0X\
      KQTpIM/rNrbrkuTmalezFoFS7mrxLXJAsfP1guVcD7sLCyjvegL8pRCCrU9xyKLF\
      8u/Qz4s0x0uzcGYh0sd3iWj21+AtigSLdMD76/j/VzftQL8B1yp3vc1EZiowOwq4\
      KmORbiKU2GTGZkaCgCjmrWpvrYWLoXv/sf2nPLyK6YjiWsslOJtRO+KzRbs2B18C\
      AwEAAaOCAW0wggFpMBIGA1UdEwEB/wQIMAYBAf8CAQAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFHppoyXF\
      yh/JaftWYf7m3KBzOdg2MIHfBgNVHSMEgdcwgdSAFDSljCNmTN5b+CDujJLlyDal\
      WFPaoYGwpIGtMIGqMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECBMKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTES\



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      MBAGA1UEBxMJU3Vubnl2YWxlMRkwFwYDVQQKFBBKdW5pcGVyX05ldHdvcmtzMR0w\
      GwYDVQQLFBRDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZV9Jc3N1YW5jZTEZMBcGA1UEAxQQVFBNX1RydXN0\
      X0FuY2hvcjEdMBsGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYOY2FAanVuaXBlci5jb22CCQDUbsEdTn5v\
      MjAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAgQwQgYDVR0fBDswOTA3oDWgM4YxaHR0cDovL2NybC5q\
      dW5pcGVyLm5ldD9jYT1KdW5pcGVyX1RydXN0X0FuY2hvcl9DQTANBgkqhkiG9w0B\
      AQsFAAOCAQEAOuD7EBilqQcT3t2C4AXta1gGNNwdldLLw0jtk4BMiA9l//DZfskB\
      2AaJtiseLTXsMF6MQwDs1YKkiXKLu7gBZDlJ6NiDwy1UnXhi2BDG+MYXQrc6p76K\
      z3bsVwZlaJQCdF5sbggc1MyrsOu9QirnRZkIv3R8ndJH5K792ztLquulAcMfnK1Y\
      NTOufhQsD2t4TYpEkzLEiZqSswdBOaPxPcJLQNW8Bw2xN+A9GX7WJzEbT/G7MUfo\
      Sb+U2PVsQTDWEzUjVnG7vNWYxirnAOZ0OXEWWYxHUJntx6DsbXYuX7D1PkkNr7ir\
      96DpOPtX7h8pxxGSDPBXIyvg02aFMphstQ==
    </certificate>
    <issuer-crl>
      Y2UxGTAXBgNVBAMUEFRQTV9UcnVzdF9BbmNob3IxHTAbBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWDmNh\
      MBEGA1UEChQKVFBNX1ZlbmRvcjEZMBcGA1UEAxQQSnVuaXBlcl9YWFhYWF9DQTCC\
      ASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBANL5Mk5qFsVuqo+JmXWLmFxI\
      yh/JaftWYf7m3KBzOdg2MIHfBgNVHSMEgdcwgdSAFDSljCNmTN5b+CDujJLlyDal\
      WFPaoYGwpIGtMIGqMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECBMKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTES\
      MBAGA1UEBxMJU3Vubnl2YWxlMRkwFwYDVQQKFBBKdW5pcGVyX05ldHdvcmtzMR0w\
      GwYDVQQLFBRDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZV9Jc3N1YW5jZTEZMBcGA1UEAxQQVFBNX1RydXN0\
      X0FuY2hvcjEdMBsGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYOY2FAanVuaXBlci5jb22CCQDUbsEdTn5v\
      MjAO==
    </issuer-crl>
  </owner-certificate>
  <ownership-voucher>
    <voucher>
      ChQQSnVuaXBlcl9OZXR3b3JrczEdMBsGA1UECxQUQ2VydGlmaWNhdGVfSXNzdWFu\
      Y2UxGTAXBgNVBAMUEFRQTV9UcnVzdF9BbmNob3IxHTAbBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWDmNh\
      MBEGA1UEChQKVFBNX1ZlbmRvcjEZMBcGA1UEAxQQSnVuaXBlcl9YWFhYWF9DQTCC\
      ASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBANL5Mk5qFsVuqo+JmXWLmFxI\
      yh/JaftWYf7m3KBzOdg2MIHfBgNVHSMEgdcwgdSAFDSljCNmTN5b+CDujJLlyDal\
      WFPaoYGwpIGtMIGqMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECBMKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTES\
      MBAGA1UEBxMJU3Vubnl2YWxlMRkwFwYDVQQKFBBKdW5pcGVyX05ldHdvcmtzMR0w\
      GwYDVQQLFBRDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZV9Jc3N1YW5jZTEZMBcGA1UEAxQQVFBNX1RydXN0\
      X0FuY2hvcjEdMBsGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYOY2FAanVuaXBlci5jb22CCQDUbsEdTn5v\
      MjAO
    </voucher>
    <issuer-vrl>
      QGp1bmlwZXIuY29tMB4XDTE0MDIyNzE0MTM1MloXDTE1MDIyNzE0MTM1MlowMDET\
      MBEGA1UEChQKVFBNX1ZlbmRvcjEZMBcGA1UEAxQQSnVuaXBlcl9YWFhYWF9DQTCC\
      ASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBANL5Mk5qFsVuqo+JmXWLmFxI\
      RDEuRiZNRNLeJpgN9YWkXLAZX2rASwy041EMmZ6KAkWUd3ZmXucfoLpdRemfuPii\
      KQTpIM/rNrbrkuTmalezFoFS7mrxLXJAsfP1guVcD7sLCyjvegL8pRCCrU9xyKLF\
      8u/Qz4s0x0uzcGYh0sd3iWj21+AtigSLdMD76/j/VzftQL8B1yp3vc1EZiowOwq4\
      AwEAAaOCAW0wggFpMBIGA1UdEwEB/wQIMAYBAf8CAQAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFHppoyXF\
      WFPaoYGwpIGtMIGqMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECBMKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTES\
      NTOufhQsD2t4TYpEkzLEiZqSswdBOaPxPcJLQNW8Bw2xN+A9GX=
    </issuer-vrl>



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  </ownership-voucher>
  <signature>
    RDEuRiZNRNLeJpgN9YWkXLAZX2rASwy041EMmZ6KAkWUd3ZmXucfoLpdRemfuPii\
    QGp1bmlwZXIuY29tMB4XDTE0MDIyNzE0MTM1MloXDTE1MDIyNzE0MTM1MlowMDET\
    MBEGA1UEChQKVFBNX1ZlbmRvcjEZMBcGA1UEAxQQSnVuaXBlcl9YWFhYWF9DQTCC\
    NTOufhQsD2t4TYpEkzLEiZqSswdBOaPxPcJLQNW8Bw2xN+A9GX=
  </signature>
</device>

7.2.5.  Progress Notifications

   The following example illustrates a device using the API to post a
   notification to the server.  The device may send more than one
   notification to the server (e.g., to provide status updates).  The
   YANG module defines only one notification type, bootstrap-complete.
   Other notification types may be defined through YANG augmentation.

   The bootstrap server MUST NOT process a notification from a device
   without first authenticating the device.  This is in contrast to when
   a device is fetching data from the server, a read-only operation, in
   which case device authentication is not strictly required.

   In this example, the device sends a notification indicating that it
   has completed bootstrapping off the data provided by the server.
   This example also illustrates the device sending its SSH host keys to
   the bootstrap server, which it might, for example, forward onto a
   downstream NMS component, so that the NMS can subsequently
   authenticate the device when establishing a NETCONF over SSH
   connection to it.

   Note that the need for a device to provide its SSH host key (or TLS
   server certificate) in the "bootstrap-complete" message is
   unnecessary when the device is able to present its IDevID certificate
   [Std-802.1AR-2009] as its SSH host key or TLS server certificate,
   when subsequently establishing a NETCONF or RESTCONF connection with
   the deployment-specific NMS.

REQUEST
-------
['\' line wrapping added for formatting only]

POST https://example.com/restconf/data/ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server:\
devices/device=123456/notification HTTP/1.1
HOST: example.com
Content-Type: application/yang.data+xml

<!-- '\' line wrapping added for formatting purposes only -->




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<input
   xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server">
  <notification-type>bootstrap-complete</notification-type>
  <message>example message</message>
  <ssh-host-keys>
    <ssh-host-key>
      <format>ssh-rsa</format>
      <key-data>
       AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQDeJMV8zrtsi8CgEsRCjCzfve2m6\
       zD3awSBPrh7ICggLQvHVbPL89eHLuecStKL3HrEgXaI/O2MwjE1lG9YxL\
       zeS5p2ngzK61vikUSqfMukeBohFTrDZ8bUtrF+HMLlTRnoCVcCWAw1lOr\
       9IDGDAuww6G45gLcHalHMmBtQxKnZdzU9kx/fL3ZS5G76Fy6sA5vg7SLq\
       QFPjXXft2CAhin8xwYRZy6r/2N9PMJ2Dnepvq4H2DKqBIe340jWqEIuA7\
       LvEJYql4unq4Iog+/+CiumTkmQIWRgIoj4FCzYkO9NvRE6fOSLLf6gakW\
       VOZZgQ8929uWjCWlGlqn2mPibp2Go1
      </key-data>
    </ssh-host-key>
    <ssh-host-key>
      <format>ssh-dsa</format>
      <key-data>
       zD3awSBPrh7ICggLQvHVbPL89eHLuecStKL3HrEgXaI/O2MwjE1lG9YxL\
       zeS5p2ngzK61vikUSqfMukeBohFTrDZ8bUtrF+HMLlTRnoCVcCWAw1lOr\
       9IDGDAuww6G45gLcHalHMmBtQxKnZdzU9kx/fL3ZS5G76Fy6sA5vg7SLq\
       AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQDeJMV8zrtsi8CgEsRCjCzfve2m6\
       QFPjXXft2CAhin8xwYRZy6r/2N9PMJ2Dnepvq4H2DKqBIe340jWqEIuA7\
       LvEJYql4unq4Iog+/+CiumTkmQIWRgIoj4FCzYkO9NvRE6fOSLLf6gakW\
       VOZZgQ8929uWjCWlGlqn2mPibp2Go1
      </key-data>
    </ssh-host-key>
  </ssh-host-keys>
  <trust-anchors>
    <trust-anchor>
      <protocol>netconf-ssh</protocol>
      <protocol>netconf-tls</protocol>
      <protocol>restconf-tls</protocol>
      <protocol>netconf-ch-ssh</protocol>
      <protocol>netconf-ch-tls</protocol>
      <protocol>restconf-ch-tls</protocol>
      <certificate>
        WmdsK2gyTTg3QmtGMjhWbW1CdFFVaWc3OEgrRkYyRTFwdSt4ZVRJbVFFM\
        lLQllsdWpOcjFTMnRLR05EMUc2OVJpK2FWNGw2NTdZNCtadVJMZgpRYjk\
        zSFNwSDdwVXBCYnA4dmtNanFtZjJma3RqZHBxeFppUUtTbndWZTF2Zwot\
        NGcEk3UE90cnNFVjRwTUNBd0VBQWFPQ0FSSXdnZ0VPCk1CMEdBMVVkRGd\
        VEJiZ0JTWEdlbUEKMnhpRHVOTVkvVHFLNWd4cFJBZ1ZOYUU0cERZd05ER\
        V6QVJCZ05WQkFNVENrTlNUQ0JKYzNOMVpYS0NDUUNVRHBNSll6UG8zREF\
        NQmdOVkhSTUJBZjhFCkFqQUFNQTRHQTFVZER3RUIvd1FFQXdJSGdEQnBC\
        Z05WSFI4RVlqQmdNRjZnSXFBZ2hoNW9kSFJ3T2k4dlpYaGgKYlhCc1pTN\
        WpiMjB2WlhoaGJYQnNaUzVqY215aU9LUTJNRFF4Q3pBSkJnTlZCQVlUQW\



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        QmdOVkJBWVRBbFZUTVJBd0RnWURWUVFLRXdkbAplR0Z0Y0d4bE1RNHdEQ\
        MkF6a3hqUDlVQWtHR0dvS1U1eUc1SVR0Wm0vK3B0R2FieXVDMjBRd2kvZ\
        25PZnpZNEhONApXY0pTaUpZK2xtYWs3RTRORUZXZS9RdGp4NUlXZmdvN2\
        RJSUJQFRStS0Cg==
      </certificate>
    </trust-anchor>
  </trust-anchors>

</input>


RESPONSE
--------

HTTP/1.1 204 No Content
Date: Sat, 31 Oct 2015 17:02:40 GMT
Server: example-server

7.3.  Artifact Examples

   This section presents some examples for how the same information
   provided by the API can be packaged into stand alone artifacts.  The
   encoding for these artifacts is the same as if an HTTP GET request
   had been sent to the RESTCONF URL for the specific resource.  These
   examples show the bootstrap information containing configuration
   defined by [RFC7317] and [draft-ietf-netconf-server-model].

   Encoding these artifacts for use outside of the RESTCONF protocol
   extends their utility for other deployment scenarios, such as when a
   local DHCP server or a removable storage device is used.  By way of
   example, this may be done to address an inability for the device to
   access an Internet facing bootstrap/redirect server, or just for a
   preference to use locally deployed infrastructure.

7.3.1.  Signed Redirect Information

   The following example illustrates how a redirect can be encoded into
   an artifact for use outside of the RESTCONF protocol.  The redirect
   information is signed so that it is secure even when no transport-
   level security is provided.











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 <!-- '\' line wrapping added for formatting purposes only -->

 <redirect-information
    xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server">
   <bootstrap-server>
     <address>phs1.example.com</address>
     <port>8443</port>
     <trust-anchor>
       WmdsK2gyTTg3QmtGMjhWbW1CdFFVaWc3OEgrRkYyRTFwdSt4ZVRJbVFFM\
       lLQllsdWpOcjFTMnRLR05EMUc2OVJpK2FWNGw2NTdZNCtadVJMZgpRYjk\
       zSFNwSDdwVXBCYnA4dmtNanFtZjJma3RqZHBxeFppUUtTbndWZTF2Zwot\
       NGcEk3UE90cnNFVjRwTUNBd0VBQWFPQ0FSSXdnZ0VPCk1CMEdBMVVkRGd\
       VEJiZ0JTWEdlbUEKMnhpRHVOTVkvVHFLNWd4cFJBZ1ZOYUU0cERZd05ER\
       V6QVJCZ05WQkFNVENrTlNUQ0JKYzNOMVpYS0NDUUNVRHBNSll6UG8zREF\
       NQmdOVkhSTUJBZjhFCkFqQUFNQTRHQTFVZER3RUIvd1FFQXdJSGdEQnBC\
       Z05WSFI4RVlqQmdNRjZnSXFBZ2hoNW9kSFJ3T2k4dlpYaGgKYlhCc1pTN\
       WpiMjB2WlhoaGJYQnNaUzVqY215aU9LUTJNRFF4Q3pBSkJnTlZCQVlUQW\
       QmdOVkJBWVRBbFZUTVJBd0RnWURWUVFLRXdkbAplR0Z0Y0d4bE1RNHdEQ\
       MkF6a3hqUDlVQWtHR0dvS1U1eUc1SVR0Wm0vK3B0R2FieXVDMjBRd2kvZ\
       25PZnpZNEhONApXY0pTaUpZK2xtYWs3RTRORUZXZS9RdGp4NUlXZmdvN2\
       RJSUJQFRStS0Cg==
     </trust-anchor>
   </bootstrap-server>
   <bootstrap-server>
     <address>phs1.example.com</address>
     <port>8443</port>
     <trust-anchor>
       WmdsK2gyTTg3QmtGMjhWbW1CdFFVaWc3OEgrRkYyRTFwdSt4ZVRJbVFFM\
       lLQllsdWpOcjFTMnRLR05EMUc2OVJpK2FWNGw2NTdZNCtadVJMZgpRYjk\
       zSFNwSDdwVXBCYnA4dmtNanFtZjJma3RqZHBxeFppUUtTbndWZTF2Zwot\
       NGcEk3UE90cnNFVjRwTUNBd0VBQWFPQ0FSSXdnZ0VPCk1CMEdBMVVkRGd\
       VEJiZ0JTWEdlbUEKMnhpRHVOTVkvVHFLNWd4cFJBZ1ZOYUU0cERZd05ER\
       V6QVJCZ05WQkFNVENrTlNUQ0JKYzNOMVpYS0NDUUNVRHBNSll6UG8zREF\
       NQmdOVkhSTUJBZjhFCkFqQUFNQTRHQTFVZER3RUIvd1FFQXdJSGdEQnBC\
       Z05WSFI4RVlqQmdNRjZnSXFBZ2hoNW9kSFJ3T2k4dlpYaGgKYlhCc1pTN\
       WpiMjB2WlhoaGJYQnNaUzVqY215aU9LUTJNRFF4Q3pBSkJnTlZCQVlUQW\
       QmdOVkJBWVRBbFZUTVJBd0RnWURWUVFLRXdkbAplR0Z0Y0d4bE1RNHdEQ\
       MkF6a3hqUDlVQWtHR0dvS1U1eUc1SVR0Wm0vK3B0R2FieXVDMjBRd2kvZ\
       25PZnpZNEhONApXY0pTaUpZK2xtYWs3RTRORUZXZS9RdGp4NUlXZmdvN2\
   </bootstrap-server>
   <signature>
     RDEuRiZNRNLeJpgN9YWkXLAZX2rASwy041EMmZ6KAkWUd3ZmXucfoLpdRemfuPii\
     QGp1bmlwZXIuY29tMB4XDTE0MDIyNzE0MTM1MloXDTE1MDIyNzE0MTM1MlowMDET\
     MBEGA1UEChQKVFBNX1ZlbmRvcjEZMBcGA1UEAxQQSnVuaXBlcl9YWFhYWF9DQTCC\
     NTOufhQsD2t4TYpEkzLEiZqSswdBOaPxPcJLQNW8Bw2xN+A9GX=
   </signature>
 </redirect-information>




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7.3.2.  Signed Bootstrap Information

   The following example illustrates how bootstrapping data can be
   encoded into an artifact for use outside of the RESTCONF protocol.
   The bootstrap information is signed so that it is secure when no
   transport-level security is provided.

 <!-- '\' line wrapping added for formatting purposes only -->

 <bootstrap-information
    xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server">
   <boot-image>
     <name>
       boot-image-v3.2R1.6.img
     </name>
     <md5>
       SomeMD5String
     </md5>
     <sha1>
       SomeSha1String
     </sha1>
     <uri>
       file:///some/path/to/raw/file
     </uri>
   </boot-image>
   <configuration>
     <!-- from ietf-system.yang -->
     <system xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-system">
       <authentication>
         <user>
           <name>admin</name>
           <ssh-key>
             <name>admin's rsa ssh host-key</name>
             <algorithm>ssh-rsa</algorithm>
             <key-data>AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQDeJMV8zrtsi8CgEsRC\
             jCzfve2m6zD3awSBPrh7ICggLQvHVbPL89eHLuecStKL3HrEgXaI/O2Mwj\
             E1lG9YxLzeS5p2ngzK61vikUSqfMukeBohFTrDZ8bUtrF+HMLlTRnoCVcC\
             WAw1lOr9IDGDAuww6G45gLcHalHMmBtQxKnZdzU9kx/fL3ZS5G76Fy6sA5\
             vg7SLqQFPjXXft2CAhin8xwYRZy6r/2N9PMJ2Dnepvq4H2DKqBIe340jWq\
             EIuA7LvEJYql4unq4Iog+/+CiumTkmQIWRgIoj4FCzYkO9NvRE6fOSLLf6\
             gakWVOZZgQ8929uWjCWlGlqn2mPibp2Go1</key-data>
           </ssh-key>
         </user>
       </authentication>
     </system>
     <!-- from ietf-netconf-server.yang -->
     <netconf-server
       xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-server">



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       <call-home>
         <application>
           <name>config-mgr</name>
           <ssh>
             <endpoints>
               <endpoint>
                 <name>east-data-center</name>
                 <address>11.22.33.44</address>
               </endpoint>
               <endpoint>
                 <name>west-data-center</name>
                 <address>55.66.77.88</address>
               </endpoint>
             </endpoints>
             <host-keys>
               <host-key>my-call-home-x509-key</host-key>
             </host-keys>
           </ssh>
         </application>
       </call-home>
     </netconf-server>
   </configuration>
 </bootstrap-information>

7.3.3.  Owner Certificate

   The following example illustrates how the owner certificate, along
   with its CRL, can be encoded into an artifact for use outside of the
   RESTCONF protocol.  Note that the inclusion of the CLR is optional,
   and only present to support cases where the device is deployed on a
   private network, such that it would be unable to validate the
   revocation status of the certificate using an online lookup of the
   CRL or using OCSP.  As the owner certificate and CRL are already
   signed by the manufacturer, an additional owner signature is
   unnecessary.
















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 <!-- '\' line wrapping added for formatting purposes only -->

 <owner-certificate
    xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server">
   <certificate>
     MIIExTCCA62gAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADCBqjELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMx\
     EzARBgNVBAgTCkNhbGlmb3JuaWExEjAQBgNVBAcTCVN1bm55dmFsZTEZMBcGA1UE\
     ChQQSnVuaXBlcl9OZXR3b3JrczEdMBsGA1UECxQUQ2VydGlmaWNhdGVfSXNzdWFu\
     Y2UxGTAXBgNVBAMUEFRQTV9UcnVzdF9BbmNob3IxHTAbBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWDmNh\
     QGp1bmlwZXIuY29tMB4XDTE0MDIyNzE0MTM1MloXDTE1MDIyNzE0MTM1MlowMDET\
     MBEGA1UEChQKVFBNX1ZlbmRvcjEZMBcGA1UEAxQQSnVuaXBlcl9YWFhYWF9DQTCC\
     ASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBANL5Mk5qFsVuqo+JmXWLmFxI\
     RDEuRiZNRNLeJpgN9YWkXLAZX2rASwy041EMmZ6KAkWUd3ZmXucfoLpdRemfuPii\
     ap1DgmS3IaYl/s4OOF8yzcYJprm8O7NyZp+Y9H1U/7Qfp97/KbqwCgkHSzOlnt0X\
     KQTpIM/rNrbrkuTmalezFoFS7mrxLXJAsfP1guVcD7sLCyjvegL8pRCCrU9xyKLF\
     8u/Qz4s0x0uzcGYh0sd3iWj21+AtigSLdMD76/j/VzftQL8B1yp3vc1EZiowOwq4\
     KmORbiKU2GTGZkaCgCjmrWpvrYWLoXv/sf2nPLyK6YjiWsslOJtRO+KzRbs2B18C\
     AwEAAaOCAW0wggFpMBIGA1UdEwEB/wQIMAYBAf8CAQAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFHppoyXF\
     yh/JaftWYf7m3KBzOdg2MIHfBgNVHSMEgdcwgdSAFDSljCNmTN5b+CDujJLlyDal\
     WFPaoYGwpIGtMIGqMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECBMKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTES\
     MBAGA1UEBxMJU3Vubnl2YWxlMRkwFwYDVQQKFBBKdW5pcGVyX05ldHdvcmtzMR0w\
     GwYDVQQLFBRDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZV9Jc3N1YW5jZTEZMBcGA1UEAxQQVFBNX1RydXN0\
     X0FuY2hvcjEdMBsGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYOY2FAanVuaXBlci5jb22CCQDUbsEdTn5v\
     MjAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAgQwQgYDVR0fBDswOTA3oDWgM4YxaHR0cDovL2NybC5q\
     dW5pcGVyLm5ldD9jYT1KdW5pcGVyX1RydXN0X0FuY2hvcl9DQTANBgkqhkiG9w0B\
     AQsFAAOCAQEAOuD7EBilqQcT3t2C4AXta1gGNNwdldLLw0jtk4BMiA9l//DZfskB\
     2AaJtiseLTXsMF6MQwDs1YKkiXKLu7gBZDlJ6NiDwy1UnXhi2BDG+MYXQrc6p76K\
     z3bsVwZlaJQCdF5sbggc1MyrsOu9QirnRZkIv3R8ndJH5K792ztLquulAcMfnK1Y\
     NTOufhQsD2t4TYpEkzLEiZqSswdBOaPxPcJLQNW8Bw2xN+A9GX7WJzEbT/G7MUfo\
     Sb+U2PVsQTDWEzUjVnG7vNWYxirnAOZ0OXEWWYxHUJntx6DsbXYuX7D1PkkNr7ir\
     96DpOPtX7h8pxxGSDPBXIyvg02aFMphstQ==
   </certificate>
   <issuer-crl>
     Y2UxGTAXBgNVBAMUEFRQTV9UcnVzdF9BbmNob3IxHTAbBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWDmNh\
     MBEGA1UEChQKVFBNX1ZlbmRvcjEZMBcGA1UEAxQQSnVuaXBlcl9YWFhYWF9DQTCC\
     ASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBANL5Mk5qFsVuqo+JmXWLmFxI\
     yh/JaftWYf7m3KBzOdg2MIHfBgNVHSMEgdcwgdSAFDSljCNmTN5b+CDujJLlyDal\
     WFPaoYGwpIGtMIGqMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECBMKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTES\
     MBAGA1UEBxMJU3Vubnl2YWxlMRkwFwYDVQQKFBBKdW5pcGVyX05ldHdvcmtzMR0w\
     GwYDVQQLFBRDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZV9Jc3N1YW5jZTEZMBcGA1UEAxQQVFBNX1RydXN0\
     X0FuY2hvcjEdMBsGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYOY2FAanVuaXBlci5jb22CCQDUbsEdTn5v\
     MjAO==
   </issuer-crl>
 </owner-certificate>







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7.3.4.  Ownership Voucher

   The following example illustrates how the ownership voucher, along
   with its CRL, can be encoded into an artifact for use outside of the
   RESTCONF protocol.  Note that the inclusion of the CLR is optional,
   and only present to support cases where the device is deployed on a
   private network, such that it would be unable to validate the
   revocation status of the certificate using an online lookup of the
   CRL or using OCSP.  As the ownership voucher and CRL are already
   signed by the manufacturer, an additional owner signature is
   unnecessary.

 <!-- '\' line wrapping added for formatting purposes only -->

 <ownership-voucher
    xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server">
   <voucher>
     ChQQSnVuaXBlcl9OZXR3b3JrczEdMBsGA1UECxQUQ2VydGlmaWNhdGVfSXNzdWFu\
     Y2UxGTAXBgNVBAMUEFRQTV9UcnVzdF9BbmNob3IxHTAbBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWDmNh\
     MBEGA1UEChQKVFBNX1ZlbmRvcjEZMBcGA1UEAxQQSnVuaXBlcl9YWFhYWF9DQTCC\
     ASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBANL5Mk5qFsVuqo+JmXWLmFxI\
     yh/JaftWYf7m3KBzOdg2MIHfBgNVHSMEgdcwgdSAFDSljCNmTN5b+CDujJLlyDal\
     WFPaoYGwpIGtMIGqMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECBMKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTES\
     MBAGA1UEBxMJU3Vubnl2YWxlMRkwFwYDVQQKFBBKdW5pcGVyX05ldHdvcmtzMR0w\
     GwYDVQQLFBRDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZV9Jc3N1YW5jZTEZMBcGA1UEAxQQVFBNX1RydXN0\
     X0FuY2hvcjEdMBsGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYOY2FAanVuaXBlci5jb22CCQDUbsEdTn5v\
     MjAO
   </voucher>
   <issuer-crl>
     QGp1bmlwZXIuY29tMB4XDTE0MDIyNzE0MTM1MloXDTE1MDIyNzE0MTM1MlowMDET\
     MBEGA1UEChQKVFBNX1ZlbmRvcjEZMBcGA1UEAxQQSnVuaXBlcl9YWFhYWF9DQTCC\
     ASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBANL5Mk5qFsVuqo+JmXWLmFxI\
     RDEuRiZNRNLeJpgN9YWkXLAZX2rASwy041EMmZ6KAkWUd3ZmXucfoLpdRemfuPii\
     KQTpIM/rNrbrkuTmalezFoFS7mrxLXJAsfP1guVcD7sLCyjvegL8pRCCrU9xyKLF\
     8u/Qz4s0x0uzcGYh0sd3iWj21+AtigSLdMD76/j/VzftQL8B1yp3vc1EZiowOwq4\
     AwEAAaOCAW0wggFpMBIGA1UdEwEB/wQIMAYBAf8CAQAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFHppoyXF\
     WFPaoYGwpIGtMIGqMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECBMKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTES\
     NTOufhQsD2t4TYpEkzLEiZqSswdBOaPxPcJLQNW8Bw2xN+A9GX=
   </issuer-crl>
 </ownership-voucher>

7.4.  YANG Module

   The bootstrap server's device-facing interface is normatively defined
   by the following YANG module:

<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server@2016-03-16.yang"




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module ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server {
  yang-version "1.1";

  namespace
    "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server";
  prefix "ztbs";

  import ietf-yang-types {     // RFC 6991
    prefix yang;
  }

  import ietf-inet-types {     // RFC 6991
    prefix inet;
  }

  organization
   "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";

  contact
   "WG Web:   <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
    WG List:  <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
    WG Chair: Mehmet Ersue
              <mailto:mehmet.ersue@nsn.com>
    WG Chair: Mahesh Jethanandani
              <mailto:mjethanandani@gmail.com>
    Editor:   Kent Watsen
              <mailto:kwatsen@juniper.net>";

  description
   "This module defines the southbound interface for Zero Touch
    bootstrap servers.

    Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
    authors of the code. All rights reserved.

    Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
    without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
    to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD
    License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
    Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
    (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).

    This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
    the RFC itself for full legal notices.";

  revision "2016-03-16" {
    description
     "Initial version";



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    reference
     "RFC XXXX: Zero Touch Provisioning for NETCONF Call Home";
  }


  container devices {
    config false;
    description
      "This is the top-level container for a device-facing protocol.
       As such it is read-only, how this data is configured is outside
       the scope of this data-model.  Further, it is expected that
       devices would only be able to access their data and not the
       data for any other device.";
    list device {
      key unique-id;

      description
        "A device's record entry.  This is the only RESTCONF resource
         that a device is expected to GET.  Getting this just this
         top-level provides the device with all the data it needs in
         a single request, which is ideal from both a performance and
         a resiliency perspectives..";

      leaf unique-id {
        type string;
        description
          "A unique identifier for the device (e.g., serial number).
           Each device accesses its bootstrapping record by its unique
           identifier.";
      }

      choice type {
        description
          "This choice statement ensures the response only contains
           redirect-information or bootstrap-information.";

        container redirect-information {
          description
            "This is redirect information data.  Its purpose is to
             redirect the device to another bootstrap server.  It
             contains a list of bootstrap servers.";

          list bootstrap-server {
            key address;
            description
              "A bootstrap server entry.";

            leaf address {



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              type inet:host;
              description
               "The IP address or hostname of the bootstrap server
                the device should redirect to.";
            }
            leaf port {
              type inet:port-number;
              default 443;
              description
               "The port number the bootstrap server listens on.";
            }
            leaf trust-anchor {
              type binary;
              mandatory true;
              description
                "An X.509 v3 certificate structure as specified by RFC
                 5280, Section 4 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished
                 encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.  A
                 certificate that a device can use as a trust anchor to
                 authenticate the bootstrap server it is being redirected
                 to.";
              reference
                "RFC 5280:
                   Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
                   and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile.
                 ITU-T X.690:
                    Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
                    Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
                    Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
                    Encoding Rules (DER).";
            }
          }
        }

        container bootstrap-information {
          description
            "This is bootstrap information data.  Its purpose is to
             provide the device everything it needs to bootstrap
             itself.";

          container boot-image {
            description
              "Specifies criteria for the boot image the device MUST be
               running.";

            container modules {
              description
                "Specifies a list of YANG modules that the device MUST



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                 support.  This node is optional.  When this node is
                 specified, the remaining nodes MUST be processed only
                 in case the currently running image does not support
                 any of the YANG modules, as a means to obtain a valid
                 image.  When this node is not specified, then the
                 device MUST ensure it is running the exact image, as
                 specified by the remaining 'boot-image' nodes.";
              list module {
                description
                  "Specifies a specific YANG modules, by its name and
                   revision date.  The revision date is provided as a
                   minimal revision date, and supported revision
                   thereafter is considered sufficient";
                leaf name {
                  type yang:yang-identifier;
                  description
                    "The YANG module's name.";
                }
                leaf revision {
                  type string {
                    pattern '\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}';
                  }
                  description
                    "Represents a specific date in 2016-03-16 format.";
                }
              }
            }
            leaf name {
              type string;
              mandatory true;
              description
                "The name of a software image that either the device
                 MUST be running, or MUST install only if its currently
                 running image cannot support any of the required YANG
                 modules.";
            }
            leaf md5 {
              type string;
              mandatory true;
              description
                "The hex-encoded MD5 hash over the boot-image file.";
            }
            leaf sha1 {
              type string;
              mandatory true;
              description
                "The hex-encoded SHA-1 hash over the boot-image file.";
            }



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            leaf-list uri {
              type inet:uri;
              min-elements 1;
              description
                "An ordered list of URIs to where the boot-image file
                 may be obtained.  When the bootstrap information is
                 obtained from a bootstrap server, it is RECOMMENDED
                 that the list begins with absolute paths (e.g.,
                 beginning with '/') to the bootstrap server, so as
                 to leverage the existing secure connection.  If remote
                 URLs are also present in the list, deployments MUST
                 know in advance which URI schemes (https, http, ftp,
                 file, etc.) a device supports.  If a secure scheme
                 (e.g., https) is provided, devices MAY blindly accept
                 the server's credentials (e.g., TLS certificate).
                 Regardless how obtained, the device MUST ensure that
                 the boot-image is valid, either by leveraging a
                 signature embedded in the boot-image itself, if it
                 exists, or by first comparing the downloaded image to
                 both the MD5 and SHA1 fingerprints provided above.";
            }
          }

          anyxml configuration {   // pyang doesn't support anydata yet!
            description
              "Any configuration data model known to the device.  It may
               contain manufacturer-specific and/or standards-based data
               models.";
          }

          leaf script {
            type string;
            description
              "A device specific script that enables the execution of
               commands to perform actions not possible thru configuration
               alone.  The script SHOULD be executed with 'root' level
               permissions.

               If a script is erroneously provided to a device that
               does not support the execution of scripts, the device
               SHOULD send a 'script-warning' notification message,
               but otherwise continue processing the bootstrapping
               data as if the script had not been present.

               The script would return exit status code '0' on success
               and non-zero on error, with accompanying stderr/stdout
               for logging purposes.  In the case of an error, the exit
               status code will specify what the device should do.



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               If the exit status code is greater than zero, then the
               device should assume that the script had soft failure
               that the script believes does not affect manageability.
               If the device obtained the bootstrap information from
               a bootstrap server, it SHOULD send a 'script-warning'
               notification message.

               If the exit status code is less than zero, the device
               should assume the script had a hard error that the
               script believes will affect manageability.  In this
               case, the device should try to send a 'script-error'
               notification message followed by a reset that will
               force a new boot-image install (wiping out anything
               the script may have done) and restart the entire
               bootstrapping process again.";
          }
        }
      }

      container owner-certificate {
        when "../ownership-voucher" {
          description
            "The owner certificate is only configurable when there
             also exists an ownership voucher.";
        }
        description
          "It is intended that the device will fetch this container
           as a whole, as it contains values that need to be
           processed together.";

        leaf certificate {
          type binary;
          mandatory true;
          description
            "An X.509 v3 certificate structure as specified by RFC
             5280, Section 4 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished
             encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.
             This certificate, signed by a manufacturer or delegate,
             for an owner, must encode a manufacturer-assigned value
             identifying the organization. This identifier must match
             the owner identifier encoded in the ownership voucher.";
          reference
            "RFC 5280:
               Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
               and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile.
             ITU-T X.690:
                Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
                Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),



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                Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
                Encoding Rules (DER).";
        }

        leaf issuer-crl {
          type binary;
          description
            "An CRL structure as specified by RFC 5280, Section 5
             encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules
             (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.  The CRL for the
             CA that signed the owner certificate.  The CRL should
             be as up to date as possible.  This leaf is optional
             as it is only needed to support deployments where the
             device is unable to download the CRL from and of the
             distribution points listed in the owner certificate.";
          reference
            "RFC 5280:
               Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
               and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile.
             ITU-T X.690:
                Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
                Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
                Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
                Encoding Rules (DER).";
        }
      }

      container ownership-voucher {
        when "../signature" {
          description
            "An ownership voucher is only configurable when there
             also exists a signature.";
        }
        must "../owner-certificate" {
          description
            "An owner certificate must be present whenever an
             ownership voucher is present.";
        }
        description
          "This container contains the ownership voucher that the
           device uses to ascertain the identity of its rightful
           owner, as certified by its manufacturer.";

        leaf voucher {
          type binary;
          mandatory true;
          description
            "A manufacturer-specific encoding binding unique device



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             identifiers to an owner identifier value matching the
             value encoded in the owner-certificate below.";
        }

        leaf issuer-vrl {
          type binary;
          description
            "An manufacturer-specific encoding of a voucher revocation
             list (VRL) for the issuer used by the manufacturer or
             delegate to sign ownership vouchers.  The VRL should be
             as up to date as possible.  This leaf is optional as it
             is only needed to support deployments where the device
             is unable to download the VRL from the manufacturer or
             delegate using some manufacturer-specific mechanism.";
        }
      }

      leaf signature {
        type binary;
        must "../ownership-voucher" {
          description
            "An ownership voucher must be present whenever an
             signature is present.";
        }
        description
          "A PKCS #7 SignedData structure as specified by RFC
           2315, Section 9.1 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished
           encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.
           This signature is generated using the owner's private
           private key and an owner-selected digest algorithm over
           the redirect-information or the bootstrap-information
           fields, which ever is present, and in whatever encoding
           they are presented in (e.g., XML, JSON, etc.).";
        reference
          "RFC 2315:
              PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Version 1.5
           ITU-T X.690:
              Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
              Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
              Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
              Encoding Rules (DER).";
      }


      action notification {
        input {
          leaf notification-type {
            type enumeration {



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              enum bootstrap-initiated {
                description
                  "Indicates that the device has just accessed
                   the bootstrap server.  The 'message' field
                   below SHOULD contain any additional information
                   that the manufacturer thinks might be useful,
                   or omitted entirely.";
              }
              enum validation-error {
                description
                  "Indicates that the device had an issue validating
                   the response from the bootstrap server.  The
                   'message' field below SHOULD indicate the specific
                   error.  This message also indicates that the device
                   has abandoned trying to bootstrap off this bootstrap
                   server.";
              }
              enum signature-validation-error {
                description
                  "Indicates that the device had an issue validating
                   the bootstrapping data.  For instance, this could
                   be due to the device expecting signed data, but
                   only found unsigned data, or because the ownership
                   voucher didn't include its unique identifier, or
                   because the signature didn't match, or and other
                   relevant error.  This 'message' field below SHOULD
                   indicate the specific error.  This message also
                   indicates that the device has abandoned trying to
                   bootstrap off this bootstrap server.";
              }
              enum image-mismatch {
                description
                  "Indicates that the device has determined that
                   its running image does not meet the specified
                   criteria.  The 'message' field below SHOULD
                   indicate both what image the device is currently
                   running as well as the criteria that failed.";
              }
              enum image-download-error {
                description
                  "Indicates that the device had an issue downloading
                   the image, which could be anything from the file
                   server being unreachable to the downloaded file
                   being the incorrect file (signature mismatch). The
                   'message' field about SHOULD indicate the specific
                   error.  This message also indicates that the device
                   has abandoned trying to bootstrap off this bootstrap
                   server.";



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              }
              enum config-warning {
                description
                  "Indicates that the device obtained warning messages
                   when it committed the initial configuration.  The
                   'message' field below SHOULD indicate the warning
                   messages that were generated.";
              }
              enum config-error {
                description
                  "Indicates that the device obtained error messages
                   when it committed the initial configuration.  The
                   'message' field below SHOULD indicate the error
                   messages that were generated.  This message also
                   indicates that the device has abandoned trying to
                   bootstrap off this bootstrap server.";
              }
              enum script-warning {
                description
                  "Indicates that the device obtained a greater than
                   zero exit status code from the script when it was
                   executed.  The 'message' field below SHOULD indicate
                   both the resulting exit status code and well as
                   capture any stdout/stderr messages the script may
                   have produced.";
              }
              enum script-error {
                description
                  "Indicates that the device obtained a less than zero
                   exit status code from the script when it was executed.
                   The 'message' field below SHOULD indicate both the
                   resulting exit status code and well as capture any
                   stdout/stderr messages the script may have produced.
                   This message also indicates that the device has
                   abandoned trying to bootstrap off this bootstrap
                   server.";
              }
              enum bootstrap-complete {
                description
                  "Indicates that the device successfully processed the
                   all the bootstrapping data and that it is ready to
                   be managed.  The 'message' field below SHOULD contain
                   any additional information that the manufacturer
                   thinks might be useful, or omitted entirely.  At
                   this point, the device is not expected to access
                   the bootstrap server again.";
              }
              enum informational {



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                description
                  "Provided any additional information not captured by
                   any of the other notification-type.  The 'message'
                   field below SHOULD contain any additional information
                   that the manufacturer thinks might be useful, or
                   omitted entirely.";
              }
            }
            mandatory true;
            description
              "The type of notification provided.";
          }
          leaf message {
            type string;
            description
              "An optional human-readable value.";
          }
          container ssh-host-keys {
            description
              "A list of SSH host keys an NMS may use to authenticate
               a NETCONF connection to the device with.";
            list ssh-host-key {
              when "../type = bootstrap-complete" {
                description
                  "SSH host keys are only sent when the notification
                   type is 'bootstrap-complete'.";
              }
              description
                "An SSH host-key";
              leaf format {
                type enumeration {
                  enum ssh-dss { description "ssh-dss"; }
                  enum ssh-rsa { description "ssh-rsa"; }
                }
                mandatory true;
                description
                  "The format of the SSH host key.";
              }
              leaf key-data {
                type string;
                mandatory true;
                description
                  "The key data for the SSH host key";
              }
            }
          }
          container trust-anchors {
            description



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              "A list of trust anchor certificates an NMS may use to
               authenticate a NETCONF or RESTCONF connection to the
               device with.";
            list trust-anchor {
              when "../type = bootstrap-complete" {
                description
                  "Trust anchors are only sent when the notification
                   type is 'bootstrap-complete'.";
              }
              description
                "A list of trust anchor certificates an NMS may use to
                 authenticate a NETCONF or RESTCONF connection to the
                 device with.";
              leaf-list protocol {
                type enumeration {
                  enum netconf-ssh     { description "netconf-ssh"; }
                  enum netconf-tls     { description "netconf-tls"; }
                  enum restconf-tls    { description "restconf-tls"; }
                  enum netconf-ch-ssh  { description "netconf-ch-ssh"; }
                  enum netconf-ch-tls  { description "netconf-ch-tls"; }
                  enum restconf-ch-tls { description "restconf-ch-tls"; }
                }
                min-elements 1;
                description
                  "The protocols that this trust anchor secures.";
              }
              leaf certificate {
                type binary;
                mandatory true;
                description
                  "An X.509 v3 certificate structure as specified by RFC
                   5280, Section 4 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished
                   encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
                reference
                  "RFC 5280:
                     Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
                     and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile.
                   ITU-T X.690:
                      Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
                      Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
                      Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
                      Encoding Rules (DER).";
              }
            }
          }
        }
      } // end action




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    }
  }
}

<CODE ENDS>


8.  Security Considerations

8.1.  Immutable storage for trust anchors

   Devices MUST ensure that all their trust anchor certificates,
   including those for the owner certificate and ownership voucher, are
   protected from external modification.

   It may be necessary to update these certificates over time (e.g., the
   manufacturer wants to delegate trust to a new CA).  It is therefore
   expected that devices MAY update these trust anchors when needed
   through a verifiable process, such as a software upgrade using signed
   software images.

8.2.  Clock Sensitivity

   The solution in this document relies on TLS certificates, owner
   certificates, ownership vouchers, and CRLs, all of which require an
   accurate clock in order to be processed correctly.  Devices
   implementations should take care to ensure the devices have a
   reliable clock when processing signed data, ideally be using a built-
   in real time clock (RTC).  If a device does not have an RTC, then it
   SHOULD try to use NTP to initialize its clock before processing any
   time-sensitive bootstrapping data.  It is understood that NTP is
   itself unsecured, not enabling the client to authenticate the server,
   and therefore easily spoofed.  In the case that NTP is spoofed, it is
   possible for a replay attack to occur where an ownership voucher
   assignment from a previous owner is replayed on a device that has
   since been claimed by a new owner.  For this reason, for devices that
   do not contain an RTC, it is RECOMMENDED that manufacturers only
   issue a single ownership voucher for the lifetime of a device.

8.3.  Blindly authenticating a bootstrap server

   This document allows a device to blindly authenticate a bootstrap
   server's TLS certificate.  It does so to allow for cases where the
   redirect information may be obtained in an unsecured manner (e.g.,
   via a DNS service discovery lookup, where only a hostname or IP
   address is returned).





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   To compensate for this, this document requires that devices do not
   send their IDevID certificate for client authentication, and that
   they do not POST any progress notifications, and that they assert
   that data downloaded from the server is signed, just as bootstrapping
   data would need to be signed if read from a removable storage device.

8.4.  Entropy loss over time

   Section 7.2.7.2 of the IEEE Std 802.1AR-2009 standard says that
   IDevID certificate should never expire (i.e. having a notAfter
   99991231235959Z).  Given the long-lived nature of these certificates,
   it is paramount to use a strong key length (e.g., 512-bit ECC).

8.5.  Serial Numbers

   This draft suggests using the device's serial number as the unique
   identifier in its IDevID certificate.  This is because serial numbers
   are ubiquitous and prominently contained in invoices and on labels
   affixed to devices and their packaging.  That said, serial numbers
   many times encode revealing information, such as the device's model
   number, manufacture date, and/or sequence number.  Knowledge of this
   information may provide an adversary with details needed to launch an
   attack.

9.  IANA Considerations

   Editor Note: this section needs to be rewritten to use the redirect
   and bootstrap information types (see Section 3).

9.1.  Zero Touch Redirect Information DHCP Options

   The following registrations are in accordance to RFC 2939 [RFC2939]
   for "BOOTP Manufacturer Extensions and DHCP Options" registry
   maintained at http://www.iana.org/assignments/bootp-dhcp-parameters.

9.1.1.  DHCP v4 Option















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      Tag: XXX

      Name: Zero Touch Redirect Information

      Returns a YANG-defined redirect-information object, encoded in
      the encoding specified by 'encoding'.  Currently only "xml"
      and "json" are supported.

       Code   Len
      +-----+-----+----------+---------------------+
      | XXX |  n  | encoding |redirect-information |
      +-----+-----+----------+---------------------+

      Reference: RFC XXXX

9.1.2.  DHCP v6 Option

      Tag: YYY

      Name: Zero Touch Redirect Information

      Returns a YANG-defined redirect-information object, encoded in
      the encoding specified by 'encoding'.  Currently only "xml"
      and "json" are supported.

       Code   Len
      +-----+-----+----------+---------------------+
      | XXX |  n  | encoding |redirect-information |
      +-----+-----+----------+---------------------+

      Reference: RFC XXXX

10.  Other Considerations

   Both this document and [draft-pritikin-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]
   define bootstrapping mechanisms.  The authors have collaborated on
   both solutions and believe that each solution has merit and, in fact,
   can work together.  That is, it is possible for a device to support
   both solutions simultaneously.

11.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank for following for lively discussions
   on list and in the halls (ordered by last name): David Harrington,
   Michael Behringer, Dean Bogdanovic, Martin Bjorklund, Joe Clarke,
   Toerless Eckert, Stephen Farrell, Stephen Hanna, Wes Hardaker, Russ
   Mundy, Reinaldo Penno, Randy Presuhn, Max Pritikin, Michael
   Richardson, Juergen Schoenwaelder.



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   Special thanks goes to Steve Hanna, Russ Mundy, and Wes Hardaker for
   brainstorming the original I-D's solution during the IETF 87 meeting
   in Berlin.

12.  References

12.1.  Normative References

   [draft-ietf-netconf-call-home]
              Watsen, K., "NETCONF Call Home (work in progress)", draft-
              ieft-netconf-restconf-10 (work in progress), December
              2015, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-
              call-home-17>.

   [draft-ietf-netconf-restconf]
              Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
              Protocol", draft-ieft-netconf-restconf-10 (work in
              progress), 2016, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-
              netconf-restconf-10>.

   [draft-ietf-netconf-server-model]
              Watsen, K., "NETCONF Server Model (work in progress)",
              draft-ieft-netconf-server-model-09 (work in progress),
              March 2016, <http://tools.ietf.org/html/
              draft-ietf-netconf-call-home-17>.

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
              November 1987, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2315]  Kaliski, B., "PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax
              Version 1.5", RFC 2315, DOI 10.17487/RFC2315, March 1998,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2315>.

   [RFC2782]  Gulbrandsen, A., Vixie, P., and L. Esibov, "A DNS RR for
              specifying the location of services (DNS SRV)", RFC 2782,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2782, February 2000,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2782>.








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   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC6020]  Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
              the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>.

   [RFC6125]  Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
              Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
              within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
              (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
              Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
              2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.

   [RFC6762]  Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "Multicast DNS", RFC 6762,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6762, February 2013,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6762>.

   [RFC6763]  Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "DNS-Based Service
              Discovery", RFC 6763, DOI 10.17487/RFC6763, February 2013,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6763>.

   [RFC6991]  Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types",
              RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6991>.

   [Std-802.1AR-2009]
              IEEE SA-Standards Board, "IEEE Standard for Local and
              metropolitan area networks - Secure Device Identity",
              December 2009, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/
              standard/802.1AR-2009.html>.

12.2.  Informative References

   [draft-pritikin-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]
              Pritikin, M., Behringer, M., and S. Bjarnason,
              "Bootstrapping Key Infrastructures", draft-pritikin-anima-
              bootstrapping-keyinfra-03 (work in progress), 2016,
              <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-pritikin-anima-
              bootstrapping-keyinfra>.







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   [RFC2939]  Droms, R., "Procedures and IANA Guidelines for Definition
              of New DHCP Options and Message Types", BCP 43, RFC 2939,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2939, September 2000,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2939>.

   [RFC6241]  Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
              and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
              (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.

   [RFC6698]  Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication
              of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)
              Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, DOI 10.17487/RFC6698, August
              2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6698>.

   [RFC7317]  Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "A YANG Data Model for
              System Management", RFC 7317, DOI 10.17487/RFC7317, August
              2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7317>.

































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Appendix A.  Examples

A.1.  Ownership Voucher

   Following describes an example data-model for an ownership voucher.
   Real vouchers are expected to be encoded in a manufacturer-specific
   format outside the of scope for this draft.

   A tree diagram describing an ownership voucher:

   module: ietf-zerotouch-ownership-voucher
      +--rw voucher
         +--rw owner-id      string
         +--rw unique-id*    string
         +--rw created-on    yang:date-and-time
         +--rw expires-on?   yang:date-and-time
         +--rw signature     string

   The YANG module for this example voucher:

   <CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-zerotouch-ownership-voucher@2016-03-16.yang"

   module ietf-zerotouch-ownership-voucher {

     namespace
       "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-zerotouch-ownership-voucher";
     prefix "ztov";

     import ietf-yang-types { prefix yang; }

     organization
      "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";

     contact
      "WG Web:   <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
       WG List:  <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
       WG Chair: Mehmet Ersue
                 <mailto:mehmet.ersue@nsn.com>
       WG Chair: Mahesh Jethanandani
                 <mailto:mjethanandani@gmail.com>
       Editor:   Kent Watsen
                 <mailto:kwatsen@juniper.net>";


     description
      "This module defines the format for a ZeroTouch ownership voucher,
       which is produced by Vendors, relayed by Bootstrap Servers, and
       consumed by devices.  The purpose of the voucher is to enable a



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       device to ascertain the identity of its rightful owner, as
       certified by its Vendor.

       Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
       authors of the code. All rights reserved.

       Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
       without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
       to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD
       License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
       Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
       (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).

       This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
       the RFC itself for full legal notices.";

     revision "2016-03-16" {
       description
        "Initial version";
       reference
        "RFC XXXX: Zero Touch Provisioning for NETCONF Call Home";
     }

     // top-level container
     container voucher {
       description
         "A voucher, containing the owner's identifier, a list of
          device's unique identifiers, information on when the
          voucher was created, when it might expire, and the
          vendor's signature over the above values.";
       leaf owner-id {
         type string;
         mandatory true;
         description
           "A Vendor-assigned value for the rightful owner of the
            devices enumerated by this voucher.  The owner-id value
            must match the value in the owner-certificate below";
       }
       leaf-list unique-id {
         type string;
         min-elements 1;
         description
           "The unique identifier (e.g., serial-number) for a device.
            The value must match the value in the device's IDevID
            certificate.  A device uses this value to determine if
            the voucher applies to it.";
       }
       leaf created-on {



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         type yang:date-and-time;
         mandatory true;
         description
           "The date this voucher was created";
       }
       leaf expires-on {
         type yang:date-and-time;
         description
           "The date this voucher expires, if at all.  Use of this
            value requires that the device has access to a trusted
            real time clock";
       }
       leaf signature {
         type string;
         mandatory true;
         description
           "The signature over the concatenation of all the previous
            values";
       }
     }
   }

   <CODE ENDS>


Appendix B.  Change Log

B.1.  ID to 00

   o  Major structural update; the essence is the same.  Most every
      section was rewritten to some degree.

   o  Added a Use Cases section

   o  Added diagrams for "Actors and Roles" and "NMS Precondition"
      sections, and greatly improved the "Device Boot Sequence" diagram

   o  Removed support for physical presence or any ability for
      configlets to not be signed.

   o  Defined the Zero Touch Information DHCP option

   o  Added an ability for devices to also download images from
      configuration servers

   o  Added an ability for configlets to be encrypted





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   o  Now configuration servers only have to support HTTP/S - no other
      schemes possible

B.2.  00 to 01

   o  Added boot-image and validate-owner annotations to the "Actors and
      Roles" diagram.

   o  Fixed 2nd paragraph in section 7.1 to reflect current use of
      anyxml.

   o  Added encrypted and signed-encrypted examples

   o  Replaced YANG module with XSD schema

   o  Added IANA request for the Zero Touch Information DHCP Option

   o  Added IANA request for media types for boot-image and
      configuration

B.3.  01 to 02

   o  Replaced the need for a configuration signer with the ability for
      each NMS to be able to sign its own configurations, using
      manufacturer signed ownership vouchers and owner certificates.

   o  Renamed configuration server to bootstrap server, a more
      representative name given the information devices download from
      it.

   o  Replaced the concept of a configlet by defining a southbound
      interface for the bootstrap server using YANG.

   o  Removed the IANA request for the boot-image and configuration
      media types

B.4.  02 to 03

   o  Minor update, mostly just to add an Editor's Note to show how this
      draft might integrate with the draft-pritikin-anima-bootstrapping-
      keyinfra.

B.5.  03 to 04

   o  Major update formally introducing unsigned data and support for
      Internet-based redirect servers.

   o  Added many terms to Terminology section.



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   o  Added all new "Guiding Principles" section.

   o  Added all new "Sources for Bootstrapping Data" section.

   o  Rewrote the "Interactions" section and renamed it "Workflow
      Overview".

B.6.  04 to 05

   o  Semi-major update, refactoring the document into more logical
      parts

   o  Created new section for information types

   o  Added support for DNS servers

   o  Now allows provisional TLS connections

   o  Bootstrapping data now supports scripts

   o  Device Details section overhauled

   o  Security Considerations expanded

   o  Filled in enumerations for notification types

B.7.  05 to 06

   o  Minor update

   o  Added a bunch of references.

   o  Added new section Other Considerations.

Authors' Addresses

   Kent Watsen
   Juniper Networks

   EMail: kwatsen@juniper.net


   Mikael Abrahamsson
   T-Systems

   EMail: "mikael.abrahamsson@t-systems.se





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