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NETCONF Working Group                                          K. Watsen
Internet-Draft                                          Juniper Networks
Intended status: Standards Track                          M. Abrahamsson
Expires: May 4, 2017                                           T-Systems
                                                        October 31, 2016


    Zero Touch Provisioning for NETCONF or RESTCONF based Management
                    draft-ietf-netconf-zerotouch-10

Abstract

   This draft presents a secure technique for establishing a NETCONF or
   RESTCONF connection between a newly deployed device, configured with
   just its factory default settings, and its deployment specific
   network management system (NMS).

Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)

   This draft contains many placeholder values that need to be replaced
   with finalized values at the time of publication.  This note
   summarizes all of the substitutions that are needed.  Please note
   that no other RFC Editor instructions are specified anywhere else in
   this document.

   This document contains references to other drafts in progress, both
   in the Normative References section, as well as in body text
   throughout.  Please update the following references to reflect their
   final RFC assignments:

   o  draft-ietf-netconf-call-home

   o  draft-ietf-netconf-restconf

   o  draft-ieft-netconf-server-model

   o  draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra

   Artwork in this document contains shorthand references to drafts in
   progress.  Please apply the following replacements:

   o  "XXXX" --> the assigned RFC value for this draft

   Artwork in this document contains placeholder values for the date of
   publication of this draft.  Please apply the following replacement:

   o  "2016-10-31" --> the publication date of this draft




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   The following one Appendix section is to be removed prior to
   publication:

   o  Appendix A.  Change Log

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 4, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.1.  Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     1.3.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     1.4.  Tree Diagram Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   2.  Guiding Principles  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.1.  Trust Anchors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.2.  Conveying Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.3.  Conveying Ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8



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   3.  Types of Information  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.1.  Redirect Information  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.2.  Bootstrap Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   4.  Artifacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.1.  Information Type  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.2.  Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.3.  Ownership Voucher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.4.  Owner Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.5.  Voucher Revocation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.6.  Certificate Revocation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   5.  Artifact Groupings  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.1.  Unsigned Information  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.2.  Signed Information (without Revocations)  . . . . . . . .  15
     5.3.  Signed Information (with Revocations) . . . . . . . . . .  15
   6.  Sources of Bootstrapping Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     6.1.  Removable Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     6.2.  DNS Server  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     6.3.  DHCP Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     6.4.  Bootstrap Server  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   7.  Workflow Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     7.1.  Onboarding and Ordering Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     7.2.  Owner Stages the Network for Bootstrap  . . . . . . . . .  25
     7.3.  Device Powers On  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
   8.  Device Details  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
     8.1.  Factory Default State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
     8.2.  Boot Sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
     8.3.  Processing a Source of Bootstrapping Data . . . . . . . .  31
     8.4.  Validating Signed Data  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
     8.5.  Processing Redirect Information . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
     8.6.  Processing Bootstrap Information  . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
   9.  RESTCONF API for Bootstrap Servers  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
     9.1.  Tree Diagram  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
     9.2.  YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
   10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
     10.1.  Immutable storage for trust anchors  . . . . . . . . . .  49
     10.2.  Clock Sensitivity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
     10.3.  Blindly authenticating a bootstrap server  . . . . . . .  50
     10.4.  Entropy loss over time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
     10.5.  Serial Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
     10.6.  Sequencing Sources of Bootstrapping Data . . . . . . . .  51
   11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
     11.1.  The BOOTP Manufacturer Extensions and DHCP Options
            Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
       11.1.1.  DHCP v4 Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
       11.1.2.  DHCP v6 Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52
     11.2.  The IETF XML Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53
     11.3.  The YANG Module Names Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53
   12. Other Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53



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   13. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53
   14. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53
     14.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
     14.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55
   Appendix A.  API Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57
     A.1.  Unsigned Redirect Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57
     A.2.  Signed Redirect Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58
     A.3.  Unsigned Bootstrap Information  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
     A.4.  Signed Bootstrap Information  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  63
     A.5.  Progress Notifications  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  67
   Appendix B.  Artifact Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69
     B.1.  Redirect Information  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69
     B.2.  Bootstrap Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69
   Appendix C.  Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69
     C.1.  ID to 00  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69
     C.2.  00 to 01  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  70
     C.3.  01 to 02  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  70
     C.4.  02 to 03  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  71
     C.5.  03 to 04  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  71
     C.6.  04 to 05  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  71
     C.7.  05 to 06  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  71
     C.8.  06 to 07  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  72
     C.9.  07 to 08  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  72
     C.10. 08 to 09  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  72
     C.11. 09 to 10  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  72
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  73

1.  Introduction

   A fundamental business requirement for any network operator is to
   reduce costs where possible.  For network operators, deploying
   devices to many locations can be a significant cost, as sending
   trained specialists to each site to do installations is both cost
   prohibitive and does not scale.

   This document defines a bootstrapping strategy enabling devices to
   securely obtain bootstrapping data with no installer input, beyond
   physical placement and connecting network and power cables.  The
   ultimate goal of this document is to enable a secure NETCONF
   [RFC6241] or RESTCONF [draft-ietf-netconf-restconf] connection to the
   deployment specific network management system (NMS).

1.1.  Use Cases

   o  Connecting to a remotely administered network

         This use-case involves scenarios, such as a remote branch
         office or convenience store, whereby a device connects as an



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         access gateway to an ISP's network.  Assuming it is not
         possible to customize the ISP's network to provide any
         bootstrapping support, and with no other nearby device to
         leverage, the device has no recourse but to reach out to an
         Internet-based bootstrap server to bootstrap off of.

   o  Connecting to a locally administered network

         This use-case covers all other scenarios and differs only in
         that the device may additionally leverage nearby devices, which
         may direct it to use a local service to bootstrap off of.  If
         no such information is available, or the device is unable to
         use the information provided, it can then reach out to network
         just as it would for the remotely administered network use-
         case.

1.2.  Terminology

   This document uses the following terms:

   Artifact:  The term "artifact" is used throughout to represent the
       any of the six artifacts defined in Section 4.  These artifacts
       collectively provide all the bootstrapping data a device needs.

   Bootstrapping Data:  The term "bootstrapping data" is used throughout
       this document to refer to the collection of data that a device
       may obtain from any source of bootstrapping data.  Specifically,
       it refers to the artifacts defined in Section 4.

   Bootstrap Information:  The term "bootstrap information" is used
       herein to refer to one of the bootstrapping artifacts defined in
       Section 4.  Specifically, bootstrap information is the
       bootstrapping data that guides a device to, for instance, install
       a specific boot-image and commit a specific configuration.

   Bootstrap Server:  The term "bootstrap server" is used within this
       document to mean any RESTCONF server implementing the YANG module
       defined in Section 9.2.

   Device:  The term "device" is used throughout this document to refer
       to the network element that needs to be bootstrapped.  See
       Section 8 for more information about devices.

   Initial Secure Device Identifier (IDevID):  The term "IDevID" is
       defined in [Std-802.1AR-2009] as the secure device identifier
       (DevID) installed on the device by the manufacturer.  This
       identifier is used in this document to enable a Bootstrap Server
       to securely identify and authenticate a device.



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   Manufacturer:  The term "manufacturer is used herein to refer to the
       manufacturer of a device or a delegate of the manufacturer.

   Network Management System (NMS):  The acronym "NMS" is used
       throughout this document to refer to the deployment specific
       management system that the bootstrapping process is responsible
       for introducing devices to.  From a device's perspective, when
       the bootstrapping process has completed, the NMS is a NETCONF or
       RESTCONF client.

   Owner:  See Rightful Owner.

   Redirect Information:  The term "bootstrap information" is used
       herein to refer to one of the bootstrapping artifacts defined in
       Section 4.  Specifically, redirect information is the
       bootstrapping data that directs a device to connect to a
       bootstrap server.

   Redirect Server:  The term "redirect server" is used to refer to a
       subset of bootstrap servers that only returns redirect
       information.  A redirect server is particularly useful when
       hosted by a manufacturer, to redirect devices to deployment-
       specific bootstrap servers.

   Rightful Owner:  The term "rightful owner" is used herein to refer to
       the person or organization that purchased or otherwise owns a
       device.  Ownership is further described in Section 2.3.

   Signed Data:  The term "signed data" is used throughout to mean
       either redirect information or bootstrap information that has
       been signed by a device's rightful owner's private key.

   Unsigned Data:  The term "unsigned data" is used throughout to mean
       either redirect rnformation or bootstrap information that has not
       been signed by a device's rightful owner's private key.

1.3.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in the
   sections below are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119
   [RFC2119].

1.4.  Tree Diagram Notation

   A simplified graphical representation of the data models is used in
   this document.  The meaning of the symbols in these diagrams is as
   follows:



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   o  Brackets "[" and "]" enclose list keys.

   o  Braces "{" and "}" enclose feature names, and indicate that the
      named feature must be present for the subtree to be present.

   o  Abbreviations before data node names: "rw" (read-write) represents
      configuration data and "ro" (read-only) represents state data.

   o  Symbols after data node names: "?" means an optional node, "!"
      means a presence container, and "*" denotes a list and leaf-list.

   o  Parentheses enclose choice and case nodes, and case nodes are also
      marked with a colon (":").

   o  Ellipsis ("...") stands for contents of subtrees that are not
      shown.

2.  Guiding Principles

   This section provides overarching principles guiding the solution
   presented in this document.

2.1.  Trust Anchors

   A trust anchor is used in cryptography to represent an entity in
   which trust is implicit and not derived.  In public key
   infrastructure using X.509 certificates, a root certificate is the
   trust anchor, from which a chain of trust is derived.  The solution
   presented in this document requires that all the entities involved
   (e.g., devices, bootstrap servers, NMSs) possess specific trust
   anchors in order to ensure mutual authentication throughout the zero
   touch bootstrapping process.

2.2.  Conveying Trust

   A device in its factory default state possesses a limited set of
   manufacturer specified trust anchors.  In this document, there are
   two types of trust anchors of interest.  The first type of trust
   anchor is used to authenticate a secure (e.g., HTTPS) connection to,
   for instance, a manufacturer-hosted Internet-based bootstrap server.
   The second type of trust anchor is used to authenticate manufacturer-
   signed data, such as the ownership voucher artifact described in
   Section 4.3.

   Using the first type of trust anchor, trust is conveyed by the device
   first authenticating the server (e.g., a bootstrap server), and then
   by the device trusting that the server would only provide data that




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   its rightful owner staged for it to find.  Thereby the device can
   trust any information returned from the server.

   Using the second type of trust anchor, trust is conveyed by the
   device first authenticating that an artifact has been signed by its
   rightful owner, and thereby can trust any information held within the
   artifact.

   Notably, redirect information, as described in Section 3.1, may
   include more trust anchors, which illustrates another way in which
   trust can be conveyed.

2.3.  Conveying Ownership

   The ultimate goal of this document is to enable a device to establish
   a secure connection with its rightful owner's NMS.  This entails the
   manufacturer being able to track who is the rightful owner of a
   device (not defined in this document), as well as an ability to
   convey that information to devices (defined in this document).

   Matching the two ways to convey trust (Section 2.2), this document
   provides two ways to convey ownership, by using a trusted bootstrap
   server (Section 6.4) or by using an ownership voucher (Section 4.3).

   When a device connects to a trusted bootstrap server, one that was
   preconfigured into its factory default configuration, it implicitly
   trusts that the bootstrap server would only provide data that its
   rightful owner staged for it to find.  That is, ownership is conveyed
   by the administrator of the bootstrap server (e.g., a manufacturer)
   taking the onus of ensuring that only data configured by a device's
   rightful owner is made available to the device.  With this approach,
   the assignment of a device to an owner is ephemeral, as the
   administrator can reassign a device to another owner at any time.

   When a device is presented signed bootstrapping data, it can
   authenticate that its rightful owner provided the data by verifying
   the signature over the data using an additional artifact defined
   within this document, the ownership voucher.  With this approach,
   ownership is conveyed by the manufacturer (or delegate) taking the
   onus of ensuring that the ownership vouchers it issues are accurate
   and, in some cases, also ensuring timely voucher revocations
   (Section 4.5).

3.  Types of Information

   This document defines two types of information, redirect information
   and bootstrap information, that devices access during the




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   bootstrapping process.  These two types of information are described
   in this section.

3.1.  Redirect Information

   Redirect information provides information to redirect a device to a
   bootstrap server.  Redirect information encodes a list of bootstrap
   servers, each defined by its hostname or IP address, an optional
   port, and an optional trust anchor certificate.

   Redirect information is YANG modeled data formally defined by the
   "redirect-information" grouping in the YANG module presented in
   Section 9.2.  This grouping has the tree diagram shown below.  Please
   see Section 1.4 for tree diagram notation.

     +--:(redirect-information)
        +--ro redirect-information
           +--ro bootstrap-server* [address]
              +--ro address         inet:host
              +--ro port?           inet:port-number
              +--ro trust-anchor?   binary

   Redirect information MAY be trusted or untrusted.  The redirect
   information is trusted whenever it is obtained via a secure
   connection to a trusted bootstrap server, or whenever it is signed by
   the device's rightful owner.  In all other cases, the redirect
   information is untrusted.

   Trusted redirect information is useful for enabling a device to
   establish a secure connection to a bootstrap server, which is
   possible when the redirect information includes the bootstrap
   server's trust anchor certificate.  When a device is able to
   establish a secure connection to a bootstrap server, the
   bootstrapping data does not have to be signed in order to be trusted,
   as described in Section 2.2.

   Untrusted redirect information is useful for directing a device to a
   bootstrap server where signed data has been staged for it to obtain.
   When the redirect information is untrusted, the device MUST discard
   any potentially included trust anchor certificates.  When the
   redirect information is untrusted, a device MAY establish a
   provisional connection to any of the specified bootstrap servers.  A
   provisional connection is accomplished by the device blindly
   accepting the bootstrap server's TLS certificate.  In this case, the
   device MUST NOT trust the bootstrap server, and data provided by the
   bootstrap server MUST be signed for it to be of any use to the
   device.




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   How devices process redirect information is described more formally
   in Section 8.5.

3.2.  Bootstrap Information

   Bootstrap information provides all the data necessary for a device to
   bootstrap itself, in order to be considered ready to be managed
   (e.g., by an NMS).  As defined in this document, this data includes
   information about a boot image the device MUST be running, an initial
   configuration the device MUST commit, and optional scripts that, if
   specified, the device MUST successfully execute.

   Bootstrap information is YANG modeled data formally defined by the
   "bootstrap-information" grouping in the YANG module presented in
   Section 9.2.  This grouping has the tree diagram shown below.  Please
   see Section 1.4 for tree diagram notation.

     +--:(bootstrap-information)
        +--ro bootstrap-information
           +--ro boot-image
           |  +--ro name       string
           |  +--ro (hash-algorithm)
           |  |  +--:(sha256)
           |  |     +--ro sha256?    string
           |  +--ro uri*       inet:uri
           +--ro configuration-handling       enumeration
           +--ro pre-configuration-script?    script
           +--ro configuration?
           +--ro post-configuration-script?   script

   Bootstrap information MUST be trusted for it to be of any use to a
   device.  There is no option for a device to process untrusted
   bootstrap information.

   Bootstrap information is trusted whenever it is obtained via a secure
   connection to a trusted bootstrap server, or whenever it is signed by
   the device's rightful owner.  In all other cases, the bootstrap
   information is untrusted.

   How devices process bootstrap information is described more formally
   in Section 8.6.

4.  Artifacts

   This document defines six artifacts that can be made available to
   devices while they are bootstrapping.  As will be seen in Section 6,
   each source of bootstrapping information specifies a means for
   providing each of the artifacts defined in this section.



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4.1.  Information Type

   The information type artifact encodes the essential bootstrapping
   data for the device.  This artifact is used to encode the redirect
   information and bootstrap information types discussed in Section 3.

   The information type artifact is YANG modeled data formally defined
   by the "information-type" choice node in Section 9.2 and can be
   encoded using any standard YANG encoding (e.g., XML, JSON).

4.2.  Signature

   The signature artifact is used by a device to verify that an
   information type artifact was created by the device's rightful owner.
   The signature is generated using the owner's private key over the
   information-type artifact, in whatever encoding it is presented in
   (e.g., XML, JSON, etc.).  How signed data is validated is formally
   described in Section 8.4.

   The signature artifact is formally a PKCS#7 SignedData structure as
   specified by Section 9.1 of [RFC2315], containing just the signature
   (no content, certificates, or CRLs), encoded using ASN.1
   distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.

4.3.  Ownership Voucher

   The ownership voucher is used to securely identify a device's owner,
   as it is known to the manufacturer.  The ownership voucher is signed
   by the device's manufacturer or delegate.

   The ownership voucher is used by a device to verify the owner
   certificate (Section 4.4) that the device SHOULD have also received,
   as described in Section 5.  In particular, the device verifies that
   owner certificate's chain of trust includes the trusted certificate
   included in the voucher, and also verifies that the owner certificate
   contains an identifier matching the one specified in the voucher.

   In order to validate the voucher, a device MUST verify that the
   voucher was signed by the private key associated with a trusted
   certificate known to the device in its factory default state, as
   described in Section 8.1, and the device MUST verify that the
   voucher's expression for the devices that it applies to includes the
   device's unique identifier (e.g., serial number) and, for devices
   that insist on verifying voucher revocation status, the device MUST
   verify that the voucher has neither expired nor been revoked.

   The ownership voucher artifact, including its encoding, is formally
   defined in [draft-kwatsen-netconf-voucher].



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4.4.  Owner Certificate

   The owner certificate artifact is a certificate that is used to
   identify an 'owner' (e.g., an organization), as known to a trusted
   certificate authority.  The owner certificate is signed by the
   trusted certificate authority.

   The owner certificate is used by a device to verify the signature
   artifact (Section 4.2) that the device SHOULD have also received, as
   described in Section 5.  In particular, the device verifies signature
   using the public key in the owner certificate over the information
   type artifact (Section 4.1).

   In order to validate the owner certificate, a device MUST verify that
   the owner certificate's certificate chain includes the certificate
   specified by the ownership voucher (Section 4.3) that the device
   SHOULD have also received, as described in Section 5, and the device
   MUST verify that owner certificate contains an identifier matching
   the one specified in the voucher and, for devices that insist on
   verifying certificate revocation status, the device MUST verify that
   the certificate has neither expired nor been revoked.

   The owner certificate artifact is formally an unsigned PKCS #7
   SignedData structure as specified by RFC 2315 [RFC2315], Section 9.1,
   containing just certificates (no content, signatures, or CRLs),
   encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified
   in ITU-T X.690.

   The owner certificate artifact contains, in order, the owner
   certificate itself and all intermediate certificates leading up to a
   trust anchor certificate.  The owner certificate MAY optionally
   include the trust anchor certificate.

4.5.  Voucher Revocation

   The voucher revocation artifact is used to verify the revocation
   status of vouchers.  Voucher revocations are signed by the
   manufacturer or delegate (i.e. the issuer of the voucher).

   Voucher revocations are generally needed when it is critical for
   devices to know that assurances implied at the time the voucher was
   signed are still valid at the time the voucher is being processed.

   The need for devices to insist on verifying voucher revocation status
   is a decision for each manufacturer.  If voucher revocation status
   verification is not asserted, then the ownership vouchers are
   essentially forever, which may be acceptable for various kinds of
   devices.  If revocations are supported, then it becomes possible to



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   support various scenarios such as handling a key compromise or change
   in ownership.

   If voucher revocations are supported, devices MAY dynamically obtain
   the voucher revocation artifact (or equivalents) from an Internet
   based resource.  If the access to the Internet based resource is
   sufficiently reliable, then there may not be a need for the voucher
   revocation artifact to be supplied by any other means (e.g.,
   Section 6).  However, since the access may not be sufficiently
   reliable, support for this artifact is defined herein.

   The voucher revocation artifact is used by a device to verify the
   ownership voucher (Section 4.3) that the device SHOULD have also
   received, as described in Section 5.  In particular, the device
   verifies that the voucher revocation explicitly states either that
   the given voucher is valid or that it is not invalid.

   In order to validate a voucher revocation artifact, a device MUST
   verify that it was signed by a private key associated with a trusted
   certificate known to the device in its factory default state, as
   described in Section 8.1, and the device MUST verify that the voucher
   revocation hasn't expired, and the device SHOULD verify that the
   revocation is sufficiently fresh, per local policy.

   The voucher revocation artifact, including its encoding, is formally
   defined in [draft-kwatsen-netconf-voucher].

4.6.  Certificate Revocation

   The certificate revocation artifact is a list of CRLS used to verify
   the revocation status of owner certificates.  Certificate revocations
   are signed by the certificate authority (or delegate) that issued the
   owner certificate.

   Certificate revocations are generally needed when it is critical for
   devices to know that assurances implied at the time the certificate
   was signed are still valid at the time the certificate is being
   processed.

   The need for devices to insist on verifying certificate revocation
   status is a decision for each manufacturer.  If certificate
   revocation status verification is not asserted, then the owner
   certificates are essentially forever, which may be acceptable for
   various kinds of devices.  If revocations are supported, then it
   becomes possible to support various scenarios such as handling a key
   compromise or expiration.





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   If certificate revocations are supported, devices MAY dynamically
   obtain the certificate revocation artifact from an Internet based
   resource (using a CRL distribution point or an OCSP responder).  If
   the access to the Internet based resource is sufficiently reliable,
   then there may not be a need for the certificate revocation artifact
   to be supplied by any other means (e.g., Section 6).  However, since
   the access may not be sufficiently reliable, support for this
   artifact is defined herein, so that the voucher revocation artifact
   can be distributed by any source of bootstrapping data.

   The certificate revocation artifact is used by a device to verify the
   owner certificate (Section 4.4) that the device SHOULD have also
   received, as described in Section 5.  In particular, the device
   verifies that the certificate revocation explicitly states either
   that the given certificate is valid or that it is not invalid.

   In order to validate the CRLs contained with the certificate
   revocation artifact, a device MUST verify that the CRL was signed by
   a private key associated certificate's issuer (or delegate), and the
   device MUST verify that the CRL hasn't expired, and the device SHOULD
   verify that the revocation is sufficiently fresh, per local policy.

   The certificate revocation artifact is formally an unsigned PKCS #7
   SignedData structure as specified by RFC 2315 [RFC2315], Section 9.1,
   containing just CRLs (no content, signatures, or certificates),
   encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified
   in ITU-T X.690.

   The certificate revocation artifact contains, in order, the CRL for
   the owner certificate itself and the CRLs for all intermediate
   certificates leading up to but not including a trust anchor
   certificate.

5.  Artifact Groupings

   Section 4 lists all the possible bootstrapping artifacts, but only
   certain groupings of these artifacts make sense to return in the
   various bootstrapping situations described in this document.  The
   remainder of this section identifies these groupings to further
   clarify how the artifacts are used.

5.1.  Unsigned Information

   The first grouping of artifacts is for unsigned information.  That
   is, when the information type artifact (Section 4.1) has not been
   signed.





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   Unsigned information is useful for cases when transport level
   security can be used to convey trust (e.g., HTTPS), or when the
   information can be processed in a provisional manner (i.e. unsigned
   redirect information).

   Conveying unsigned information entails communicating just one of the
   six artifacts listed in Section 4, namely the information type
   artifact.

   List of artifacts included in this grouping:
     - information type

5.2.  Signed Information (without Revocations)

   The second grouping of artifacts is for when the information type
   artifact (Section 4.1) has been signed, without any revocation
   information.

   Signed information is needed when the information is obtained from an
   untrusted source of bootstrapping data (Section 6) and yet it is
   desired that the device be able to trust the information (i.e. no
   provisional processing).

   Revocation information may not need to be provided because, for
   instance, the device only uses revocation information obtained
   dynamically from Internet based resources.  Another possible reason
   may be because the device does not have a reliable clock, and
   therefore the manufacturer decides to never revoke information (e.g.,
   ownership assignments are forever).

   Conveying signed information without revocation information entails
   communicating four of the six artifacts listed in Section 4.

   List of artifacts included in this grouping:
     - information type
     - signature
     - ownership voucher
     - owner certificate

5.3.  Signed Information (with Revocations)

   The third grouping of artifacts is for when the information type
   artifact (Section 4.1) has been signed and also includes revocation
   information.

   Signed information, as described above, is needed when the
   information is obtained from an untrusted source of bootstrapping




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   data (Section 6) and yet it is desired that the device be able to
   trust the information (i.e. no provisional processing).

   Revocation information may need to be provided because, for instance,
   the device insists on being able to verify revocations and the device
   is deployed on a private network and therefore unable to obtain the
   revocation information from Internet based resources.

   Conveying signed information with revocation information entails
   communicating all six of the artifacts listed in Section 4.

   List of artifacts included in this grouping:
     - information type
     - signature
     - ownership voucher
     - owner certificate
     - voucher revocations
     - certificate revocations

6.  Sources of Bootstrapping Data

   This section defines some sources for zero touch bootstrapping data
   that a device can access.  The list of sources defined here is not
   meant to be exhaustive.  It is left to future documents to define
   additional sources for obtaining zero touch bootstrapping data.

   For each source defined in this section, details are given for how
   each of the six artifacts listed in Section 4 is provided.

6.1.  Removable Storage

   A directly attached removable storage device (e.g., a USB flash
   drive) MAY be used as a source of zero touch bootstrapping data.

   To use a removable storage device as a source of bootstrapping data,
   a device need only detect if the removable storage device is plugged
   in and mount its filesystem.

   Use of a removable storage device is compelling, as it doesn't
   require any external infrastructure to work.  It is also compelling
   that the raw boot image file can be located on the removable storage
   device, enabling a removable storage device to be a fully self-
   standing bootstrapping solution.

   A removable storage device is an untrusted source of bootstrapping
   data.  This means that the information stored on the removable
   storage device either MUST be signed, or it MUST be information that
   can be processed provisionally (e.g., unsigned redirect information).



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   From an artifact perspective, since a removable storage device
   presents itself as a file-system, the bootstrapping artifacts need to
   be presented as files.  The six artifacts defined in Section 4 are
   mapped to files below.

   Artifact to File Mapping:

      Information Type:  Mapped to a file containing a standard YANG
         encoding for the YANG modeled data described in Section 4.1.  A
         filenaming convention SHOULD be used to indicate data encoding
         (e.g., boot-info.[xml|json]).

      Signature:  Mapped to a file containing the binary artifact
         described in Section 4.2.

      Ownership Voucher:  Mapped to a file containing the binary
         artifact described in Section 4.3.

      Owner Certificate:  Mapped to a file containing the binary
         artifact described in Section 4.4.

      Voucher Revocation:  Mapped to a file containing the binary
         artifact described in Section 4.5.

      Certificate Revocation:  Mapped to a file containing binary
         artifact described in Section 4.6.

   The format of the removable storage device's filesystem and the
   naming of the files are outside the scope of this document.  However,
   in order to facilitate interoperability, it is RECOMMENDED devices
   support open and/or standards based filesystems.  It is also
   RECOMMENDED that devices assume a filenaming convention that enables
   more than one instance of bootstrapping data to exist on a removable
   storage device.  The filenaming convention SHOULD be unique to the
   manufacturer, in order to enable bootstrapping data from multiple
   manufacturers to exist on a removable storage device.

6.2.  DNS Server

   A DNS server MAY be used as a source of zero touch bootstrapping
   data.

   Using a DNS server may be a compelling option for deployments having
   existing DNS infrastructure, as it enables a touchless bootstrapping
   option that does not entail utilizing an Internet based resource
   hosted by a 3rd-party.





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   To use a DNS server as a source of bootstrapping data, a device MAY
   perform a multicast DNS [RFC6762] query searching for the service
   "_zerotouch._tcp.local.".  Alternatively the device MAY perform DNS-
   SD [RFC6763] via normal DNS operation, using the domain returned to
   it from the DHCP server; for example, searching for the service
   "_zerotouch._tcp.example.com".

   Unsigned DNS records (not using DNSSEC as described in [RFC6698]) are
   an untrusted source of bootstrapping data.  This means that the
   information stored in the DNS records either MUST be signed, or it
   MUST be information that can be processed provisionally (e.g.,
   unsigned redirect information).

   From an artifact perspective, since a DNS server presents resource
   records (Section 3.2.1 of [RFC1035]), the bootstrapping artifacts
   need to be presented as resource records.  The six artifacts defined
   in Section 4 are mapped to resource records below.

   Artifact to Resource Record Mapping:

      Information Type:  Mapped to a TXT record called "info-type"
         containing a standard YANG encoding for the YANG modeled data
         described in Section 4.1.  Note: no additional field is
         provided to specify the encoding.

      Signature:  Mapped to a TXT record called "sig" containing the
         base64-encoding of the binary artifact described in
         Section 4.2.

      Ownership Voucher:  Mapped to a TXT record called "voucher"
         containing the base64-encoding of the binary artifact described
         in Section 4.3.

      Owner Certificate:  Mapped to a TXT record called "cert"
         containing the base64-encoding of the binary artifact described
         in Section 4.4.

      Voucher Revocation:  Mapped to a TXT record called "vouch-rev"
         containing the base64-encoding of the binary artifact described
         in Section 4.5.

      Certificate Revocation:  Mapped to a TXT record called "cert-rev"
         that containing the base64-encoding of the binary artifact
         described in Section 4.6.

   TXT records have an upper size limit of 65535 bytes (Section 3.2.1 in
   RFC1035), since 'RDLENGTH' is a 16-bit field.  Please see
   Section 3.1.3 in RFC4408 for how a TXT record can achieve this size.



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   Due to this size limitation, some information type artifacts may not
   fit.  In particular, the bootstrap information artifact could hit
   this upper bound, depending on the size of the included configuration
   and scripts.

   When bootstrap information is provided, it is notable that the URL
   for the boot-image the device can download would have to point to
   another server (e.g., http://, ftp://, etc.), as DNS servers do not
   themselves distribute files.

6.3.  DHCP Server

   A DHCP server MAY be used as a source of zero touch bootstrapping
   data.

   To use a DHCP server as a source of bootstrapping data, a device need
   only send a DHCP lease request to a DHCP server.  However, the device
   SHOULD pass the Vendor Class Identifier (option 60) field in its DHCP
   lease request, so the DHCP server can return bootstrap information
   shared by devices from the same vendor.  However, if it is desired to
   return device-specific bootstrap information, then the device SHOULD
   also send the Client Identifier (option 61) field in its DHCP lease
   request, so the DHCP server can select the specific bootstrap
   information that has been staged for that one device.

   Using a DHCP server may be a compelling option for deployments having
   existing DHCP infrastructure, as it enables a touchless bootstrapping
   option that does not entail utilizing an Internet based resource
   hosted by a 3rd-party.

   A DHCP server is an untrusted source of bootstrapping data.  This
   means that the information returned by the DHCP server either MUST be
   signed, or it MUST be information that can be processed provisionally
   (e.g., unsigned redirect information).

   From an artifact perspective, since a DHCP server presents data as
   DHCP options , the bootstrapping artifacts need to be presented as
   DHCP options, specifically the ones specified in Section 11.1.  The
   six artifacts defined in Section 4 are mapped to the DHCP options
   specified in Section 11.1 below.

   Artifact to DHCP Option Field Mapping:

      Information Type:  Mapped to the DHCP option field "information-
         type" containing the YANG modeled data described in
         Section 4.1.  The additional field "encoding" is provided to
         specify the encoding used, taking the values "xml" or "json".




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      Signature:  Mapped to the DHCP option field "signature" containing
         the binary artifact described in Section 4.2.

      Ownership Voucher:  Mapped to the DHCP option field "ownership-
         voucher" containing the binary artifact described in
         Section 4.3.

      Owner Certificate:  Mapped to the DHCP option field "owner-
         certificate" containing the binary artifact described in
         Section 4.4.

      Voucher Revocation:  Mapped to the DHCP option field "voucher-
         revocations" containing the binary artifact described in
         Section 4.5.

      Certificate Revocation:  Mapped to the DHCP option field
         "certificate-revocations" containing the binary artifact
         described in Section 4.6.

   When bootstrap information is provided, it is notable that the URL
   for the boot-image the device can download would have to point to
   another server (e.g., http://, ftp://, etc.), as DHCP servers do not
   themselves distribute files.

6.4.  Bootstrap Server

   A bootstrap server MAY be used as a source of zero touch
   bootstrapping data.  A bootstrap server is defined as a RESTCONF
   ([draft-ietf-netconf-restconf]) server implementing the YANG module
   provided in Section 9.

   Unlike any other source of bootstrap data described in this document,
   a bootstrap server is not only a source of data, but it can also
   receive data from devices using the YANG-defined "notification"
   action statement defined in the YANG module (Section 9.2).  The data
   sent from devices both enables visibility into the bootstrapping
   process (e.g., warnings and errors) as well as provides potentially
   useful completion status information (e.g., the device's SSH host-
   keys).

   To use a bootstrap server as a source of bootstrapping data, a device
   MUST use the RESTCONF protocol to access the YANG container node
   /device/, passing its own serial number in the URL as the key to the
   'device' list.

   Using a bootstrap server as a source of bootstrapping data is a
   compelling option as it uses transport-level security in lieu of
   signed data, which may be easier to deploy in some situations.



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   Additionally, the bootstrap server is able to receive notifications
   from devices, which may be critical to some deployments (e.g., the
   passing of the device's SSH host keys).

   A bootstrap server may be trusted or an untrusted source of
   bootstrapping data, depending on how the device learned about the
   bootstrap server's trust anchor from a trusted source.  When a
   bootstrap server is trusted, the information returned from it MAY be
   signed.  However, when the server is untrusted, in order for its
   information to be of any use to the device, the information MUST
   either be signed or be information that can be processed
   provisionally (e.g., unsigned redirect information).

   When a device is able to trust a bootstrap server, it MUST send its
   IDevID certificate in the form of a TLS client certificate, and it
   MUST send notifications to the bootstrap server.  When a device is
   not able to trust a bootstrap server, it MUST NOT send its IDevID
   certificate in the form of a TLS client certificate, and it MUST NOT
   send any notifications to the bootstrap server.

   From an artifact perspective, since a bootstrap server presents data
   as a YANG-modeled data, the bootstrapping artifacts need to be mapped
   to nodes in the YANG module.  The six artifacts defined in Section 4
   are mapped to bootstrap server nodes defined in Section 9.2 below.

   Artifact to Bootstrap Server Node Mapping:

      Information Type:  Mapped to the choice node /device/information-
         type.

      Signature:  Mapped to the leaf node /device/signature.

      Ownership Voucher:  Mapped to the leaf node /device/ownership-
         voucher.

      Owner Certificate:  Mapped to the leaf node /device/owner-
         certificate.

      Voucher Revocations:  Mapped to the leaf node /device/voucher-
         revocation.

      Certificate Revocations:  Mapped to the leaf-list node /device/
         certificate-revocation.

   While RESTCONF servers typically support a nested hierarchy of
   resources, zero touch bootstrap servers only need to support the
   paths /device and /device/notification.  The processing instructions
   provided in Section 8.3 only uses these two URLs.



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7.  Workflow Overview

   The zero touch solution presented in this document is conceptualized
   to be composed of the workflows described in this section.
   Implementations MAY vary in details.  Each diagram is followed by a
   detailed description of the steps presented in the diagram, with
   further explanation on how implementations may vary.

7.1.  Onboarding and Ordering Devices

   The following diagram illustrates key interactions that may occur
   from when a prospective owner enrolls in a manufacturer's zero touch
   program to when the manufacturer ships devices for an order placed by
   the prospective owner.





































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                                  +-----------+
   +------------+                 |Prospective|                    +---+
   |Manufacturer|                 |   Owner   |                    |NMS|
   +------------+                 +-----------+                    +---+
         |                              |                            |
         |                              |                            |
         |  1. initiate enrollment      |                            |
         #<-----------------------------|                            |
         #                              |                            |
         #                              |                            |
         #  IDevID trust anchor         |                            |
         #----------------------------->#  set IDevID trust anchor   |
         #                              #--------------------------->|
         #                              |                            |
         #  bootstrap server            |                            |
         #  account credentials         |                            |
         #----------------------------->#  set credentials           |
         #                              #--------------------------->|
         #                              |                            |
         #                              |                            |
         #  owner certificate           |                            |
         #----------------------------->#  set certificate           |
         |                              #--------------------------->|
         |                              |                            |
         |                              |                            |
         |  2. place device order       |                            |
         |<-----------------------------#  model devices             |
         |                              #--------------------------->|
         |                              |                            |
         |  3. ship devices and send    |                            |
         |     device identifiers and   |                            |
         |     ownership vouchers       |                            |
         |----------------------------->#  set device identifiers    |
         |                              #  and ownership vouchers    |
         |                              #--------------------------->|
         |                              |                            |

   Each numbered item below corresponds to a numbered item in the
   diagram above.

   1.  A prospective owner of a manufacturer's devices, or an existing
       owner that wishes to start using zero touch for future device
       orders, initiates an enrollment process with the manufacturer or
       delegate.  This process includes the following:

       *  Regardless how the prospective owner intends to bootstrap
          their devices, they will always obtain from the manufacturer
          or delegate the trust anchor certificate for its device's



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          IDevID certificates.  This certificate will need to be
          installed on the prospective owner's NMS so that the NMS can
          subsequently authenticate the device's IDevID certificates.

       *  If the manufacturer hosts an Internet based bootstrap server
          (e.g., a redirect server) such as described in Section 6.4,
          then credentials necessary to configure the bootstrap server
          would be provided to the prospective owner.  If the bootstrap
          server is configurable through an API (outside the scope of
          this document), then the credentials might be installed on the
          prospective owner's NMS so that the NMS can subsequently
          configure the manufacturer-hosted bootstrap server directly.

       *  If the manufacturer's devices are able to validate signed data
          (Section 8.4), then the manufacturer, acting as a certificate
          authority, may additionally sign an owner certificate for the
          prospective owner.  Alternatively, and not depicted, the owner
          may obtain an owner certificate from a manufacturer-trusted
          3rd-party certificate authority, and report that certificate
          to the manufacturer.  How the owner certificate is used to
          enable devices to validate signed bootstrapping data is
          described in Section 8.4.  Assuming the prospective owner's
          NMS is able to prepare and sign the bootstrapping data, the
          owner certificate would be installed on the NMS at this time.

   2.  Some time later, the prospective owner places an order with the
       manufacturer (or delegate), perhaps with a special flag checked
       for zero touch handling.  At this time, or perhaps before placing
       the order, the owner may model the devices in their NMS, creating
       virtual objects for the devices with no real-world device
       associations.  For instance the model can be used to simulate the
       device's location in the network and the configuration it should
       have when fully operational.

   3.  When the manufacturer or delegate fulfills the order, shipping
       the devices to their intended locations, they may notify the
       owner of the devices's unique identifiers (e.g., serial numbers)
       and shipping destinations, which the owner may use to stage the
       network for when the devices power on.  Additionally, the
       manufacturer may send one or more ownership vouchers,
       cryptographically assigning ownership of those devices to the
       rightful owner.  The owner may set this information on their NMS,
       perhaps binding specific modeled devices to the unique
       identifiers and ownership vouchers.







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7.2.  Owner Stages the Network for Bootstrap

   The following diagram illustrates how an owner might stage the
   network for bootstrapping devices.

                +----------+ +------------+
                |Deployment| |Manufacturer| +------+ +------+
                | Specific | |   Hosted   | | Local| | Local| +---------+
          +---+ |Bootstrap | | Bootstrap  | |  DNS | | DHCP | |Removable|
          |NMS| |  Server  | |   Server   | |Server| |Server| | Storage |
          +---+ +----------+ +------------+ +------+ +------+ +---------+
            |        |             |            |        |         |
   activate |        |             |            |        |         |
   modeled  |        |             |            |        |         |
1. device   |        |             |            |        |         |
----------->|        |             |            |        |         |
            | 2. (optional)        |            |        |         |
            |    configure         |            |        |         |
            |    bootstrap         |            |        |         |
            |    server            |            |        |         |
            |------->|             |            |        |         |
            |        |             |            |        |         |
            | 3. (optional) configure           |        |         |
            |    bootstrap server  |            |        |         |
            |--------------------->|            |        |         |
            |        |             |            |        |         |
            |        |             |            |        |         |
            | 4. (optional) configure DNS server|        |         |
            |---------------------------------->|        |         |
            |        |             |            |        |         |
            |        |             |            |        |         |
            | 5. (optional) configure DHCP server        |         |
            |------------------------------------------->|         |
            |        |             |            |        |         |
            |        |             |            |        |         |
            | 6. (optional) store bootstrapping artifacts on media |
            |----------------------------------------------------->|
            |        |             |            |        |         |
            |        |             |            |        |         |

   Each numbered item below corresponds to a numbered item in the
   diagram above.

   1.  Having previously modeled the devices, including setting their
       fully operational configurations and associating both device
       identifiers (e.g., serial numbers) and ownership vouchers, the
       owner "activates" one or more modeled devices.  That is, the
       owner tells the NMS to perform the steps necessary to prepare for



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       when the real-world devices power up and initiate the
       bootstrapping process.  Note that, in some deployments, this step
       might be combined with the last step from the previous workflow.
       Here it is depicted that an NMS performs the steps, but they may
       be performed manually or through some other mechanism.

   2.  If it is desired to use a deployment specific bootstrap server,
       it MUST be configured to provide the bootstrapping information
       for the specific devices.  Configuring the bootstrap server MAY
       occur via a programmatic API not defined by this document.
       Illustrated here as an external component, the bootstrap server
       MAY be implemented as an internal component of the NMS itself.

   3.  If it is desired to use a manufacturer (or delegate) hosted
       bootstrap server, it MUST be configured to provide the
       bootstrapping information for the specific devices.  The
       configuration MUST be either redirect or bootstrap information.
       That is, either the manufacturer hosted bootstrap server will
       redirect the device to another bootstrap server, or provide the
       device with its bootstrapping information itself.  The types of
       bootstrapping information the manufacturer hosted bootstrap
       server supports MAY vary by implementation; some implementations
       may only support redirect information, or only support bootstrap
       information, or support both redirect and bootstrap information.
       Configuring the bootstrap server MAY occur via a programmatic API
       not defined by this document.

   4.  If it is desired to use a DNS server to supply bootstrapping
       information, a DNS server needs to be configured.  If multicast
       DNS-SD is desired, then the server MUST reside on the local
       network, otherwise the DNS server MAY reside on a remote network.
       Please see Section 6.2 for more information about how to
       configure DNS servers.  Configuring the DNS server MAY occur via
       a programmatic API not defined by this document.

   5.  If it is desired to use a DHCP server to supply bootstrapping
       data, a DHCP server needs to be configured.  The DHCP server may
       be accessed directly or via a DHCP relay.  Please see Section 6.3
       for more information about how to configure DHCP servers.
       Configuring the DHCP server MAY occur via a programmatic API not
       defined by this document.

   6.  If it is desired to use a removable storage device (e.g., USB
       flash drive) to supply bootstrapping information, the information
       would need to be placed onto it.  Please see Section 6.1 for more
       information about how to configure a removable storage device.





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7.3.  Device Powers On

   The following diagram illustrates the sequence of activities that
   occur when a device powers on.

                                                     +----------+
                                      +-----------+  |Deployment|
                                      | Source of |  | Specific |
  +------+                            | Bootstrap |  |Bootstrap |  +---+
  |Device|                            |   Data    |  |  Server  |  |NMS|
  +------+                            +-----------+  +----------+  +---+
     |                                      |              |         |
     |                                      |              |         |
     | 1. if running a modified (not        |              |         |
     |    factory default) configuration,   |              |         |
     |    then exit.                        |              |         |
     |                                      |              |         |
     | 2. for each source supported, check  |              |         |
     |------------------------------------->|              |         |
     |                                      |              |         |
     | 3. if bootstrap-information found,   |              |         |
     |    initialize self and, only if      |              |         |
     |    source is a bootstrap server,     |              |         |
     |    send notifications                |              |         |
     |------------------------------------->#              |         |
     |                                      # webhook      |         |
     |                                      #----------------------->|
     |                                                     |         |
     | 4. else if redirect-information found, for          |         |
     |    each bootstrap server specified, check           |         |
     |-+-------------------------------------------------->|         |
     | |                                                   |         |
     | |  if more redirect-information is found, recurse   |         |
     | |  (not depicted), else if bootstrap-information    |         |
     | |  found, initialize self and post notifications    |         |
     | +-------------------------------------------------->#         |
     |                                                     # webhook |
     |                                                     #-------->|
     |
     | 5. retry sources and/or wait for manual provisioning.
     |

   The interactions in the above diagram are described below.

   1.  Upon power being applied, the device's bootstrapping logic first
       checks to see if it is running in its factory default state.  If
       it is in a modified state, then the bootstrapping logic exits and
       none of the following interactions occur.



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   2.  For each source of bootstrapping data the device supports,
       preferably in order of closeness to the device (e.g., removable
       storage before Internet based servers), the device checks to see
       if there is any bootstrapping data for it there.

   3.  If bootstrap-information is found, the device initializes itself
       accordingly (e.g., installing a boot-image and committing an
       initial configuration).  If the source is a bootstrap server, and
       the bootstrap server can be trusted (i.e., TLS-level
       authentication), the device also sends progress notifications to
       the bootstrap server.

       *  The contents of the initial configuration SHOULD configure an
          administrator account on the device (e.g., username, ssh-rsa
          key, etc.) and SHOULD configure the device either to listen
          for NETCONF or RESTCONF connections or to initiate call home
          connections ([draft-ietf-netconf-call-home]).

       *  If the bootstrap server supports forwarding device
          notifications to external systems (e.g., via a webhook), the
          "bootstrap-complete" notification (Section 9.2) informs the
          external system to know when it can, for instance, initiate a
          connection to the device (assuming it knows the device's
          address and the device was configured to listen for
          connections).  To support this further, the bootstrap-complete
          notification also relays the device's SSH host keys and/or TLS
          certificates, with which the external system can use to
          authenticate subsequent connections to the device.

       If the device is ever able to complete the bootstrapping process
       successfully (i.e., no longer running its factory default
       configuration), it exits the bootstrapping logic without
       considering any additional sources of bootstrapping data.

   4.  Otherwise, if redirect-information is found, the device iterates
       through the list of specified bootstrap servers, checking to see
       if there is any bootstrapping data for it on them.  If the
       bootstrap server returns more redirect-information, then the
       device processes it recursively.  Otherwise, if the bootstrap
       server returns bootstrap-information, the device processes it
       following the description provided in (3) above.

   5.  After having tried all supported sources of bootstrapping data,
       the device MAY retry again all the sources and/or provide
       manageability interfaces for manual configuration (e.g., CLI,
       HTTP, NETCONF, etc.).  If manual configuration is allowed, and
       such configuration is provided, the device MUST immediately cease




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       trying to obtain bootstrapping data, as it would then no longer
       be in running its factory default configuration.

8.  Device Details

   Devices supporting the bootstrapping strategy described in this
   document MUST have the preconfigured factory default state and
   bootstrapping logic described in the following sections.

8.1.  Factory Default State

    +------------------------------------------------------------------+
    |                             <device>                             |
    |                                                                  |
    |   +----------------------------------------------------------+   |
    |   |                   <read-only storage>                    |   |
    |   |                                                          |   |
    |   | 1. IDevID cert & associated intermediate certificate(s)  |   |
    |   | 2. list of trusted Internet based bootstrap servers      |   |
    |   | 3. list of trust anchor certs for bootstrap servers      |   |
    |   | 4. trust anchor cert for ownership vouchers              |   |
    |   +----------------------------------------------------------+   |
    |                                                                  |
    |                    +----------------------+                      |
    |                    |   <secure storage>   |                      |
    |                    |                      |                      |
    |                    |  5. private key      |                      |
    |                    +----------------------+                      |
    |                                                                  |
    +------------------------------------------------------------------+

   Each numbered item below corresponds to a numbered item in the
   diagram above.

   1.  Devices MUST be manufactured with an initial device identifier
       (IDevID), as defined in [Std-802.1AR-2009].  The IDevID is an
       X.509 certificate, encoding the device's unique device identifier
       (e.g., serial number).  The device MUST also possess any
       intermediate certificates between the IDevID certificate and the
       manufacturer's IDevID trust anchor certificate, which is provided
       to prospective owners separately (e.g., Section 7.1).

   2.  Devices that support loading bootstrapping data from an Internet-
       based bootstrap server (see Section 6.4) MUST be manufactured
       with a configured list of trusted bootstrap servers.  Consistent
       with redirect information (Section 3.1, each bootstrap server MAY
       be identified by its hostname or IP address, and an optional
       port.



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   3.  Devices that support loading bootstrapping data from an Internet-
       based bootstrap server (see Section 6.4) MUST also be
       manufactured with a list of trust anchor certificates that can be
       used for X.509 certificate path validation ([RFC6125], Section 6)
       on the bootstrap server's TLS server certificate.

   4.  Devices that support loading owner signed data (see Section 1.2)
       MUST also be manufactured with the trust anchor certificate for
       the ownership vouchers.

   5.  Device MUST be manufactured with a private key that corresponds
       to the public key encoded in the device's IDevID certificate.
       This private key SHOULD be securely stored, ideally by a
       cryptographic processor (e.g., a TPM).

8.2.  Boot Sequence

   A device claiming to support the bootstrapping strategy defined in
   this document MUST support the boot sequence described in this
   section.

    Power On
        |
        v                        No
 1. Running default config?   -------->  Boot normally
        |
        | Yes
        v
 2. For each supported source of bootstrapping data,
    try to load bootstrapping data from the source
        |
        |
        v                               Yes
 3. Able to bootstrap off any source?  -----> Run with new configuration
        |
        | No
        v
 4. Loop and/or wait for manual provisioning.


   Each numbered item below corresponds to a numbered item in the
   diagram above.

   1.  When the device powers on, it first checks to see if it is
       running the factory default configuration.  If it is running a
       modified configuration, then it boots normally.





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   2.  The device iterates over its list of sources for bootstrapping
       data (Section 6).  Details for how to processes a source of
       bootstrapping data are provided in Section 8.3.

   3.  If the device is able to bootstrap itself off any of the sources
       of bootstrapping data, it runs with the new bootstrapped
       configuration.

   4.  Otherwise the device MAY loop back through the list of
       bootstrapping sources again and/or wait for manual provisioning.

8.3.  Processing a Source of Bootstrapping Data

   This section describes a recursive algorithm that a device claiming
   to support the bootstrapping strategy defined in this document MUST
   use to authenticate bootstrapping data.  A device enters this
   algorithm for each new source of bootstrapping data.  The first time
   the device enters this algorithm, it MUST initialize a conceptual
   trust state variable, herein referred to as "trust-state", to FALSE.
   The ultimate goal of this algorithm is for the device to process
   bootstrap information (Section 3.2) while the trust-state variable is
   TRUE.

   If the data source is a bootstrap server, and the device is able to
   authenticate the server using X.509 certificate path validation
   ([RFC6125], Section 6) to one of the device's preconfigured trust
   anchors, or to a trust anchor that it learned from a previous step,
   then the device MUST set trust-state to TRUE.

   If trust-state is TRUE, when connecting to the bootstrap server, the
   device MUST use its IDevID certificate for client certificate based
   authentication and MUST POST progress notifications using the
   bootstrap server's "notification" action.  Otherwise, if trust-state
   is FALSE, when connecting to the bootstrap server, the device MUST
   NOT use its IDevID certificate for a client certificate based
   authentication and MUST NOT POST progress notifications using the
   bootstrap server's "notification" action.

   When accessing a bootstrap server, the device MUST only access its
   top-level resource, to obtain all the data staged for it in one GET
   request, so that it can determine if the data is signed or not, and
   thus act accordingly.  If trust-state is TRUE, then the device MAY
   also accesses the bootstrap servers 'notification' resource for the
   device.

   For any source of bootstrapping data (e.g., Section 6), if the data
   is signed and the device is able to validate the signed data using
   the algorithm described in Section 8.4, then the device MUST set



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   trust-state to TRUE, else the device MUST set trust-state to FALSE.
   Note, this is worded to cover the special case when signed data is
   returned even from a trusted bootstrap server.

   If the data is bootstrap information (not redirect information), and
   trust-state is FALSE, the device MUST exit the recursive algorithm,
   returning to the state machine described in Section 8.2.  Otherwise,
   the device MUST attempt to process the bootstrap information as
   described in Section 8.6.  In either case, success or failure, the
   device MUST exit the recursive algorithm, returning to the state
   machine described in Section 8.2, the only difference being in how it
   responds to the "Able to bootstrap off any source?" conditional
   described in that state machine.

   If the data is redirect information, the device MUST process the
   redirect information as described in Section 8.5.  This is the
   recursion step, it will cause to device to reenter this algorithm,
   but this time the data source will most definitely be a bootstrap
   server, as that is all redirect information is able to do.

8.4.  Validating Signed Data

   Whenever a device is presented signed data from an untrusted source,
   it MUST validate the signed data as described in this section.  If
   the signed data is provided by a trusted source, a redundant trust
   case, the device MAY skip verifying the signature.

   Whenever there is signed data, the device MUST also be provided an
   ownership voucher and an owner certificate.  Depending on
   circumstances, the device MAY also be provided certificate and
   voucher revocations.  How all the needed artifacts are provided for
   each source of bootstrapping data is defined in Section 6.

   The device MUST first authenticate the ownership voucher by
   validating the signature on it to one of its preconfigured trust
   anchors (see Section 8.1) and verify that the voucher contains the
   device's unique identifier (e.g., serial number).  If the device
   insists on verifying revocation status, it MUST also verify that the
   voucher isn't expired or has been revoked.  If the authentication of
   the voucher is successful, the device extracts the rightful owner's
   identity from the voucher for use in the next step.

   Next the device MUST authenticate the owner certificate by performing
   X.509 certificate path validation on it, and by verifying that the
   certificate is both identified by the voucher and also has in its
   chain of trust the certificate identified by the voucher.  If the
   device insists on verifying revocation status, it MUST also verify
   that none of the certificates in the chain of certificates have been



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   revoked or expired.  If the authentication of the certificate is
   successful, the device extracts the owner's public key from the
   certificate for use in the next step.

   Finally the device MUST verify the signature over 'information type'
   artifact was generated by the private key matching the public key
   extracted from the owner certificate in the previous step.

   When the device receives the signed data from a bootstrap server, the
   device MUST use text-level operations to extract the 'information-
   type' node from the parent 'device' node in the response in order to
   verify the signature.  It is not important if the extracted text is a
   valid YANG encoding in order to verify the signature.

   If any of these steps fail, then the device MUST mark the data as
   invalid and not perform any of the subsequent steps.

8.5.  Processing Redirect Information

   In order to process redirect information (Section 3.1), the device
   MUST follow the steps presented in this section.

   Processing redirect information is straightforward.  The device
   sequentially steps through the list of provided bootstrap servers
   until it can find one it can bootstrap off of.

   If a hostname is provided, and the hostname's DNS resolution is to
   more than one IP address, the device MUST attempt to connect to all
   of the DNS resolved addresses at least once, before moving on to the
   next bootstrap server.  If the device is able to obtain bootstrapping
   data from any of the DNS resolved addresses, it MUST immediately
   process that data, without attempting to connect to any of the other
   DNS resolved addresses.

   If the redirect information is trusted (e.g., trust-state is TRUE),
   and the bootstrap server entry contains a trust anchor certificate,
   then the device MUST authenticate the bootstrap server using X.509
   certificate path validation ([RFC6125], Section 6) to the specified
   trust anchor.  If the device is unable to authenticate the bootstrap
   server to the specified trust anchor, the device MUST NOT attempt a
   provisional connection to the bootstrap server (i.e., by blindly
   accepting its server certificate).

   If the redirect information is untrusted (e.g., trust-state is
   FALSE), the device MUST discard any trust anchors provided by the
   redirect information and establish a provisional connection to the
   bootstrap server (i.e., by blindly accepting its TLS server
   certificate).



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8.6.  Processing Bootstrap Information

   In order to process bootstrap information (Section 3.2), the device
   MUST follow the steps presented in this section.

   When processing bootstrap information, the device MUST first process
   the boot image information, then execute the pre-configuration script
   (if any), then commit the initial configuration, and then execute the
   script (if any), in that order.  If the device encounters an error at
   any step, it MUST NOT proceed to the next step.

   First the device MUST determine if the image it is running satisfies
   the specified boot image criteria (e.g., name or fingerprint match).
   If it does not, the device MUST download, verify, and install the
   specified boot image, and then reboot.  To verify the boot image, the
   device MUST check that the boot image file matches the fingerprint
   (e.g., sha256) supplied by the bootstrapping information.  Upon
   rebooting, the device MUST still be in its factory default state,
   causing the bootstrapping process to run again, which will eventually
   come to this very point, but this time the device's running image
   will satisfy the specified criteria, and thus the device will move to
   processing the next step.

   Next, for devices that support executing scripts, if a pre-
   configuration script has been specified, the device MUST execute the
   script and check its exit status code to determine if had any
   warnings or errors.  In the case of errors, the device MUST reset
   itself in such a way that force the reinstallation of its boot image,
   thereby wiping out any bad state the script might have left behind.

   Next the device commits the provided initial configuration.  Assuming
   no errors, the device moves to processing the next step.

   Again, for devices that support executing scripts, if a post-
   configuration script has been specified, the device MUST execute the
   script and check its exit status code to determine if it had any
   warnings or errors.  In the case of errors, the device MUST reset
   itself in such a way that force the reinstallation of its boot image,
   thereby wiping out any bad state the script might have left behind.

   At this point, the device has completely processed the bootstrapping
   data and is ready to be managed.  If the device obtained the
   bootstrap information from a trusted bootstrap server, the device
   MUST send the 'bootstrap-complete' notification now.

   At this point the device is configured and no longer running its
   factory default configuration.  Notably, if the bootstrap information




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   configured the device it initiate a call home connection, the device
   would proceed to do so now.

9.  RESTCONF API for Bootstrap Servers

   This section defines a YANG ([RFC6020]) module that is used to define
   the RESTCONF ([draft-ietf-netconf-restconf]) API used by the
   bootstrap server defined in Section 6.4.  Examples illustrating this
   API in use are provided in Appendix A.

9.1.  Tree Diagram

   The following tree diagram provides an overview for the bootstrap
   server RESTCONF API.  The syntax used for this tree diagram is
   described in Section 1.4.




































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   module: ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server
       +--rw device* [unique-id]
          +--rw unique-id                 string
          +--rw (information-type)
          |  +--:(redirect-information)
          |  |  +--rw redirect-information
          |  |     +--rw bootstrap-server* [address]
          |  |        +--rw address         inet:host
          |  |        +--rw port?           inet:port-number
          |  |        +--rw trust-anchor?   binary
          |  +--:(bootstrap-information)
          |     +--rw bootstrap-information
          |        +--rw boot-image
          |        |  +--rw name      string
          |        |  +--rw (hash-algorithm)
          |        |  |  +--:(sha256)
          |        |  |     +--rw sha256?   string
          |        |  +--rw uri*      inet:uri
          |        +--rw configuration-handling?      enumeration
          |        +--rw pre-configuration-script?    script
          |        +--rw configuration?
          |        +--rw post-configuration-script?   script
          +--rw signature?                binary
          +--rw ownership-voucher?        binary
          +--rw owner-certificate?        binary
          +--rw voucher-revocation?       binary
          +--rw certificate-revocation?   binary
          +---x notification
             +---w input
                +---w notification-type    enumeration
                +---w message?             string
                +---w ssh-host-keys
                |  +---w ssh-host-key*
                |     +---w format      enumeration
                |     +---w key-data    string
                +---w trust-anchors
                   +---w trust-anchor*
                      +---w protocol*      enumeration
                      +---w certificate    binary

   In the above diagram, notice that all of the protocol accessible
   nodes are read-only, to assert that devices can only pull data from
   the bootstrap server.

   Also notice that the module defines an action statement, which
   devices use to provide progress notifications to the bootstrap
   server.




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9.2.  YANG Module

   The bootstrap server's device-facing API is normatively defined by
   the YANG module defined in this section.

   Note: the module defined herein uses data types defined in [RFC2315],
   [RFC5280], [RFC6234], [RFC6991], and [draft-kwatsen-netconf-voucher].

<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server@2016-10-31.yang"

module ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server {
  yang-version "1.1";

  namespace
    "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server";
  prefix "ztbs";

  import ietf-inet-types {
    prefix inet;
    reference "RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types";
  }

  organization
   "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";

  contact
   "WG Web:   <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
    WG List:  <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
    Author:   Kent Watsen
              <mailto:kwatsen@juniper.net>";

  description
   "This module defines an interface for bootstrap servers, as defined
    by RFC XXXX: Zero Touch Provisioning for NETCONF or RESTCONF based
    Management.

    Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
    authors of the code. All rights reserved.

    Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
    modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to the license
    terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License set forth in Section
    4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
    (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).

    This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see the RFC
    itself for full legal notices.";




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  revision "2016-10-31" {
    description
     "Initial version";
    reference
     "RFC XXXX: Zero Touch Provisioning for NETCONF or RESTCONF based
      Management";
  }


  list device {
    key unique-id;

    description
      "A device's record entry.  This is the only RESTCONF resource
       that a device will GET, as described in Section 8.2 in RFC XXXX.
       Getting just this top-level node provides a device with all the
       data it needs in a single request.";
    reference
      "RFC XXXX: Zero Touch Provisioning for NETCONF or
       RESTCONF based Management";

    leaf unique-id {
      type string;
      description
        "A unique identifier for the device (e.g., serial number).
         Each device accesses its bootstrapping record by its unique
         identifier.";
    }

    choice information-type {
      mandatory true;
      description
        "This choice statement ensures the response only contains
         redirect-information or bootstrap-information.  Note that
         this is the only mandatory true node, as the other nodes
         are not needed when the device trusts the bootstrap server,
         in which case the data does not need to be signed.";

      container redirect-information {
        description
          "This is redirect information, as described in Section 3.1
           in RFC XXXX.  Its purpose is to redirect a device to another
           bootstrap server.";
        reference
          "RFC XXXX: Zero Touch Provisioning for NETCONF or RESTCONF
           based Management";

        list bootstrap-server {



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          key address;
          description
            "A bootstrap server entry.";

          leaf address {
            type inet:host;
            mandatory true;
            description
             "The IP address or hostname of the bootstrap server the
              device should redirect to.";
          }
          leaf port {
            type inet:port-number;
            default 443;
            description
             "The port number the bootstrap server listens on.";
          }
          leaf trust-anchor { //should there be two fields like voucher?
            type binary;
            description
              "An X.509 v3 certificate structure as specified by RFC
               5280, Section 4, encoded using ASN.1 distinguished
               encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.  A
               certificate that a device can use as a trust anchor
               to authenticate the bootstrap server it is being
               redirected to.";
            reference
              "RFC 5280:
                 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
                 and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile.
               ITU-T X.690:
                  Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
                  Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
                  Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
                  Encoding Rules (DER).";
          }
        }
      }

      container bootstrap-information {

        description
          "This is bootstrap information, as described in Section 3.2 in
           RFC XXXX.  Its purpose is to provide the device everything it
           needs to bootstrap itself.";
        reference
          "RFC XXXX: Zero Touch Provisioning for NETCONF or RESTCONF
           based Management";



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        container boot-image {
          description
            "Specifies criteria for the boot image the device MUST
             be running.";

          leaf name {  // maybe this should be a regex?
            type string;
            mandatory true;
            description
              "The name of a software image that the device MUST
               be running in order to process the remaining nodes.";
          }
          choice hash-algorithm {
             mandatory true;
             description
               "Identifies the hash algorithm used.";
             leaf sha256 {
                type string;
                description
                  "The hex-encoded SHA-256 hash over the boot
                   image file.  This is used by the device to
                   verify a downloaded boot image file.";
                reference
                  "RFC 6234: US Secure Hash Algorithms.";
             }
          }
          leaf-list uri {
            type inet:uri;
            min-elements 1;
            description
              "An ordered list of URIs to where the boot-image file MAY
               be obtained.  Deployments MUST know in which URI schemes
               (http, ftp, etc.) a device supports.  If a secure scheme
               (e.g., https) is provided, a device MAY establish a
               provisional connection to the server, by blindly
               accepting the server's credentials (e.g., its TLS
               certificate)";
          }
        }

        leaf configuration-handling {
          type enumeration {
            enum merge {
              description
               "Merge configuration into existing running configuration.";
            }
            enum replace {
              description



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                "Replace existing running configuration with the passed
                 configuration.";
            }
          }
          description
            "This enumeration indicates how the server should process
             the provided configuration.  When not specified, the device
             MAY determine how to process the configuration using other
             means (e.g., vendor-specific metadata).";
        }

        leaf pre-configuration-script {
          type script;
          description
            "A script that, when present, is executed before the
             configuration has been processed.";
        }

        anydata configuration {
          must "../configuration-handling";
          description
            "Any configuration data model known to the device.  It may
             contain manufacturer-specific and/or standards-based data
             models.";
        }

        leaf post-configuration-script {
          type script;
          description
            "A script that, when present, is executed after the
             configuration has been processed.";
        }
      }
    }

    leaf signature {
      type binary;
      must "../information-type" {
        description
          "An information type must be present whenever an
           signature is present.";
      }
      description
        "A PKCS#7 SignedData structure, as specified by Section 9.1
         of RFC 2315, containing just the signature (no content,
         certificates, or CRLs), encoded using ASN.1 distinguished
         encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.




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         This signature is generated by the device's owner using
         the private key associated with the owner certificate
         over the information-type node, exactly as it's presented
         to the device.  The device MUST use text-level operations
         to extract the information-type node from the larger
         'device' response in order to verify it.  It is not
         important if the extracted text is itself a valid
         encoding (e.g., XML or JSON).";
      reference
        "RFC 2315:
            PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Version 1.5
         ITU-T X.690:
            Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
            Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
            Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
            Encoding Rules (DER).";
    }

    leaf ownership-voucher {
      type binary;
      must "../signature" {
        description
          "A signature must be present whenever an ownership voucher
           is presented.";
      }
      must "../owner-certificate" {
        description
          "An owner certificate must be present whenever an ownership
           voucher is presented.";
      }
      description
        "A 'voucher' structure, per draft-kwatsen-netconf-voucher.
        The voucher needs to reference the device's unique identifier
        and also specify the owner certificate's identity and a CA
        certificate in the owner certificate's chain of trust.";
      reference
        "draft-kwatsen-netconf-voucher:
           Voucher and Voucher Revocation Profiles for Bootstrapping
           Protocols";
    }

    leaf owner-certificate {
      type binary;
      must "../signature" {
        description
          "A signature must be present whenever an owner certificate
           is presented.";
      }



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      must "../ownership-voucher" {
        description
          "An ownership voucher must be present whenever an owner
           certificate is presented.";
      }
      description
        "An unsigned PKCS #7 SignedData structure, as specified
         by Section 9.1 in RFC 2315, containing just certificates
         (no content, signatures, or CRLs), encoded using ASN.1
         distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in
         ITU-T X.690.

         This structure contains, in order, the owner certificate
         itself and all intermediate certificates leading up to a
         trust anchor certificate.  The owner certificate MAY
         optionally include the trust anchor certificate.";
       reference
         "RFC 2315:
            PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Version 1.5.
          ITU-T X.690:
            Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
            Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
            Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
            Encoding Rules (DER).";
    }

    leaf voucher-revocation {
      type binary;
      must "../ownership-voucher" {
        description
          "An ownership voucher must be present whenever a voucher
           revocation is presented.";
      }
      description
        "A 'voucher-revocation' structure, as defined in
        draft-kwatsen-netconf-voucher.  The voucher revocation
        definitively states whether a voucher is valid or not.";
      reference
        "draft-kwatsen-netconf-voucher:
           Voucher and Voucher Revocation Profiles for Bootstrapping
           Protocols";
    }

    leaf certificate-revocation {
      type binary;
      must "../owner-certificate" {
        description
          "An owner certificate must be present whenever an voucher



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           revocation is presented.";
      }
      description
         "An unsigned PKCS #7 SignedData structure, as specified by
          Section 9.1 in RFC 2315, containing just CRLs (no content,
          signatures, or certificates), encoded using ASN.1
          distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in
          ITU-T X.690.

          This structure contains, in order, the CRL for the owner
          certificate itself and the CRLs for all intermediate
          certificates leading up to but not including a trust
          anchor certificate.";
      reference
        "RFC 5280:
           Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
           and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile.
         ITU-T X.690:
            Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
            Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
            Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
            Encoding Rules (DER).";
    }

    action notification {
      input {
        leaf notification-type {
          type enumeration {
            enum bootstrap-initiated {
              description
                "Indicates that the device has just accessed the
                 bootstrap server.  The 'message' field below MAY
                 contain any additional information that the
                 manufacturer thinks might be useful.";
            }
            enum validation-error {
              description
                "Indicates that the device had an issue validating
                 the response from the bootstrap server.  The
                 'message' field below SHOULD indicate the specific
                 error.  This message also indicates that the device
                 has abandoned trying to bootstrap off this bootstrap
                 server.";
            }
            enum signature-validation-error {
              description
                "Indicates that the device had an issue validating the
                 bootstrapping data.  For instance, this could be due



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                 to the device expecting signed data, but only found
                 unsigned data, or because the ownership voucher didn't
                 include the device's unique identifier, or because the
                 signature didn't match.  The 'message' field below
                 SHOULD indicate the specific error.  This message also
                 indicates that the device has abandoned trying to
                 bootstrap off this bootstrap server.";
            }
            enum image-mismatch {
              description
                "Indicates that the device has determined that its
                 running image does not match the specified criteria.
                 The 'message' field below SHOULD indicate both what
                 image the device is currently running.";
            }
            enum image-download-error {
              description
                "Indicates that the device had an issue downloading
                 the image, which could be for reasons such as a file
                 server being unreachable to the downloaded file
                 being the incorrect file (signature mismatch).  The
                 'message' field about SHOULD indicate the specific
                 error.  This message also indicates that the device
                 has abandoned trying to bootstrap off this bootstrap
                 server.";
            }
            enum pre-script-warning {
              description
                "Indicates that the device obtained a greater than
                 zero exit status code from the script when it was
                 executed.  The 'message' field below SHOULD indicate
                 both the resulting exit status code, as well as
                 capture any stdout/stderr messages the script may
                 have produced.";
            }
            enum pre-script-error {
              description
                "Indicates that the device obtained a less than zero
                 exit status code from the script when it was executed.
                 The 'message' field below SHOULD indicate both the
                 resulting exit status code, as well as capture any
                 stdout/stderr messages the script may have produced.
                 This message also indicates that the device has
                 abandoned trying to bootstrap off this bootstrap
                 server.";
            }
            enum config-warning {
              description



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                "Indicates that the device obtained warning messages
                 when it committed the initial configuration.  The
                 'message' field below SHOULD indicate the warning
                 messages that were generated.";
            }
            enum config-error {
              description
                "Indicates that the device obtained error messages
                 when it committed the initial configuration.  The
                 'message' field below SHOULD indicate the error
                 messages that were generated.  This message also
                 indicates that the device has abandoned trying to
                 bootstrap off this bootstrap server.";
            }
            enum post-script-warning {
              description
                "Indicates that the device obtained a greater than
                 zero exit status code from the script when it was
                 executed.  The 'message' field below SHOULD indicate
                 both the resulting exit status code, as well as
                 capture any stdout/stderr messages the script may
                 have produced.";
            }
            enum post-script-error {
              description
                "Indicates that the device obtained a less than zero
                 exit status code from the script when it was executed.
                 The 'message' field below SHOULD indicate both the
                 resulting exit status code, as well as capture any
                 stdout/stderr messages the script may have produced.
                 This message also indicates that the device has
                 abandoned trying to bootstrap off this bootstrap
                 server.";
            }
            enum bootstrap-complete {
              description
                "Indicates that the device successfully processed the
                 all the bootstrapping data and that it is ready to
                 be managed.  The 'message' field below MAY contain
                 any additional information that the manufacturer
                 thinks might be useful.  After sending this message,
                 the device is not expected to access the bootstrap
                 server again.";
            }
            enum informational {
              description
                "Indicates any additional information not captured by
                 any of the other notification-type.  The 'message'



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                 field below SHOULD contain any additional information
                 that the manufacturer thinks might be useful.";
            }
          }
          mandatory true;
          description
            "The type of notification provided.";
        }
        leaf message {
          type string;
          description
            "An optional human-readable value.";
        }
        container ssh-host-keys {
          description
            "A list of SSH host keys an NMS may use to authenticate
             a NETCONF connection to the device with.";
          list ssh-host-key {
            when "../type = bootstrap-complete" {
              description
                "SSH host keys are only sent when the notification
                 type is 'bootstrap-complete'.";
            }
            description
              "An SSH host-key";
            leaf format {
              type enumeration {
                enum ssh-dss { description "ssh-dss"; }
                enum ssh-rsa { description "ssh-rsa"; }
              }
              mandatory true;
              description
                "The format of the SSH host key.";
            }
            leaf key-data {
              type string;
              mandatory true;
              description
                "The key data for the SSH host key";
            }
          }
        }
        container trust-anchors {
          description
            "A list of trust anchor certificates an NMS may use to
             authenticate a NETCONF or RESTCONF connection to the
             device with.";
          list trust-anchor {



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            when "../type = bootstrap-complete" {
              description
                "Trust anchors are only sent when the notification
                 type is 'bootstrap-complete'.";
            }
            description
              "A list of trust anchor certificates an NMS may use to
               authenticate a NETCONF or RESTCONF connection to the
               device with.";
            leaf-list protocol {
              type enumeration {
                enum netconf-ssh     { description "netconf-ssh"; }
                enum netconf-tls     { description "netconf-tls"; }
                enum restconf-tls    { description "restconf-tls"; }
                enum netconf-ch-ssh  { description "netconf-ch-ssh"; }
                enum netconf-ch-tls  { description "netconf-ch-tls"; }
                enum restconf-ch-tls { description "restconf-ch-tls"; }
              }
              min-elements 1;
              description
                "The protocols that this trust anchor secures.";
            }
            leaf certificate {
              type binary;
              mandatory true;
              description
                "An X.509 v3 certificate structure, as specified by
                 Section 4 in RFC5280, encoded using ASN.1 distinguished
                 encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
              reference
                "RFC 5280:
                   Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
                   and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile.
                 ITU-T X.690:
                    Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
                    Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
                    Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
                    Encoding Rules (DER).";
            }
          }
        }
      }
    } // end action

  } // end device

  typedef script {
    type binary;



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    description
      "A device specific script that enables the execution of commands
       to perform actions not possible thru configuration alone.

       No attempt is made to standardize the contents, running context,
       or programming language of the script.  The contents of the
       script are considered specific to the vendor, product line,
       and/or model of the device.

       If a script is erroneously provided to a device that does not
       support the execution of scripts, the device SHOULD send a
       'script-warning' notification message, but otherwise continue
       processing the bootstrapping data as if the script had not
       been present.

       The script returns exit status code '0' on success and non-zero
       on error, with accompanying stderr/stdout for logging purposes.
       In the case of an error, the exit status code will specify what
       the device should do.

       If the exit status code is greater than zero, then the device
       should assume that the script had a soft error, which the
       script believes does not affect manageability.  If the device
       obtained the bootstrap information from a bootstrap server,
       it SHOULD send a 'script-warning' notification message.

       If the exit status code is less than zero, the device should
       assume the script had a hard error, which the script believes
       will affect manageability.  In this case, the device SHOULD
       send a 'script-error' notification message followed by a
       reset that will force a new boot-image install (wiping out
       anything the script may have done) and restart the entire
       bootstrapping process again.";
  }

}

<CODE ENDS>


10.  Security Considerations

10.1.  Immutable storage for trust anchors

   Devices MUST ensure that all their trust anchor certificates,
   including those for connecting to bootstrap servers and verifying
   ownership vouchers, are protected from external modification.




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   It may be necessary to update these certificates over time (e.g., the
   manufacturer wants to delegate trust to a new CA).  It is therefore
   expected that devices MAY update these trust anchors when needed
   through a verifiable process, such as a software upgrade using signed
   software images.

10.2.  Clock Sensitivity

   The solution in this document relies on TLS certificates, owner
   certificates, and ownership vouchers, all of which require an
   accurate clock in order to be processed correctly (e.g., to test
   validity dates and revocation status).  Implementations MUST ensure
   devices have an accurate clock when shipped from manufacturing
   facilities, and take steps to prevent clock tampering.

   If it is not possible to ensure clock accuracy, it is RECOMMENDED
   that implementations disable the aspects of the solution having clock
   sensitivity.  In particular, such implementations should assume that
   TLS certificates, owner certificates, and ownership vouchers are not
   revokable, In real-world terms, this means that manufacturers SHOULD
   only issue a single ownership voucher for the lifetime of some
   devices.

   It is important to note that implementations SHOULD NOT rely on NTP
   for time, as it is not a secure protocol.

10.3.  Blindly authenticating a bootstrap server

   This document allows a device to blindly authenticate a bootstrap
   server's TLS certificate.  It does so to allow for cases where the
   redirect information may be obtained in an unsecured manner, which is
   desirable to support in some cases.

   To compensate for this, this document requires that devices, when
   connected to an untrusted bootstrap server, do not send their IDevID
   certificate for client authentication, and they do not POST any
   progress notifications, and they assert that data downloaded from the
   server is signed.

10.4.  Entropy loss over time

   Section 7.2.7.2 of the IEEE Std 802.1AR-2009 standard says that
   IDevID certificate should never expire (i.e. having the notAfter
   value 99991231235959Z).  Given the long-lived nature of these
   certificates, it is paramount to use a strong key length (e.g.,
   512-bit ECC).





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10.5.  Serial Numbers

   This draft suggests using the device's serial number as the unique
   identifier in its IDevID certificate.  This is because serial numbers
   are ubiquitous and prominently contained in invoices and on labels
   affixed to devices and their packaging.  That said, serial numbers
   many times encode revealing information, such as the device's model
   number, manufacture date, and/or sequence number.  Knowledge of this
   information may provide an adversary with details needed to launch an
   attack.

10.6.  Sequencing Sources of Bootstrapping Data

   For devices supporting more than one source for bootstrapping data,
   no particular sequencing order has to be observed for security
   reasons, as the solution for each source is considered equally
   secure.  However, from a privacy perspective, it is RECOMMENDED that
   devices access local sources before accessing remote sources.

11.  IANA Considerations

11.1.  The BOOTP Manufacturer Extensions and DHCP Options Registry

   The following registrations are in accordance to RFC 2939 [RFC2939]
   for "BOOTP Manufacturer Extensions and DHCP Options" registry
   maintained at http://www.iana.org/assignments/bootp-dhcp-parameters.

11.1.1.  DHCP v4 Option























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     Tag: XXX

     Name: Zero Touch Information

     Returns up to six zero touch bootstrapping artifacts.

      Code   Len
     +-----+-----+----------+------------------+-----------+
     | XXX |  n  | encoding | information-type | signature |
     +-----+-----+----------+------------------+-----------+

     +-------------------+-------------------+-------------------------+
     | owner-certificate | ownership-voucher | certificate-revocations |
     +-------------------+-------------------+-------------------------+

     +---------------------+
     | voucher-revocations |
     +---------------------+

     Reference: RFC XXXX

11.1.2.  DHCP v6 Option

     Tag: YYY

     Name: Zero Touch Information

     Returns up to six zero touch bootstrapping artifacts.

      Code   Len
     +-----+-----+----------+------------------+-----------+
     | XXX |  n  | encoding | information-type | signature |
     +-----+-----+----------+------------------+-----------+

     +-------------------+-------------------+-------------------------+
     | owner-certificate | ownership-voucher | certificate-revocations |
     +-------------------+-------------------+-------------------------+

     +---------------------+
     | voucher-revocations |
     +---------------------+

     Reference: RFC XXXX








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11.2.  The IETF XML Registry

   This document registers one URI in the IETF XML registry [RFC3688].
   Following the format in [RFC3688], the following registration is
   requested:

      URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server
      Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF.
      XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.

11.3.  The YANG Module Names Registry

   This document registers one YANG module in the YANG Module Names
   registry [RFC6020].  Following the format defined in [RFC6020], the
   the following registration is requested:

   name:         ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server
   namespace:    urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server
   prefix:       ztbs
   reference:    RFC XXXX

12.  Other Considerations

   Both this document and [draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]
   define bootstrapping mechanisms.  The authors have collaborated on
   both solutions and believe that each solution has merit and, in fact,
   can work together.  That is, it is possible for a device to support
   both solutions simultaneously.

13.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank for following for lively discussions
   on list and in the halls (ordered by last name): David Harrington,
   Michael Behringer, Dean Bogdanovic, Martin Bjorklund, Joe Clarke,
   Toerless Eckert, Stephen Farrell, Stephen Hanna, Wes Hardaker, Russ
   Mundy, Reinaldo Penno, Randy Presuhn, Max Pritikin, Michael
   Richardson, Phil Shafer, Juergen Schoenwaelder.

   Special thanks goes to Steve Hanna, Russ Mundy, and Wes Hardaker for
   brainstorming the original I-D's solution during the IETF 87 meeting
   in Berlin.

14.  References








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14.1.  Normative References

   [draft-ietf-netconf-restconf]
              Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
              Protocol", draft-ieft-netconf-restconf-10 (work in
              progress), 2016, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/html/draft-
              ietf-netconf-restconf-10>.

   [draft-kwatsen-netconf-voucher]
              Watsen, K., Richardson, M., Pritikin, M., and T. Eckert,
              "Voucher and Voucher Revocation Profiles for Bootstrapping
              Protocols", draft-kwatsen-netconf-voucher-00 (work in
              progress), 2016, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/html/draft-
              kwatsen-netconf-voucher>.

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
              November 1987, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2315]  Kaliski, B., "PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax
              Version 1.5", RFC 2315, DOI 10.17487/RFC2315, March 1998,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2315>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC6020]  Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
              the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>.

   [RFC6125]  Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
              Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
              within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
              (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
              Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
              2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.






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   [RFC6234]  Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
              (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6234>.

   [RFC6762]  Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "Multicast DNS", RFC 6762,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6762, February 2013,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6762>.

   [RFC6763]  Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "DNS-Based Service
              Discovery", RFC 6763, DOI 10.17487/RFC6763, February 2013,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6763>.

   [RFC6991]  Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types",
              RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6991>.

   [RFC7468]  Josefsson, S. and S. Leonard, "Textual Encodings of PKIX,
              PKCS, and CMS Structures", RFC 7468, DOI 10.17487/RFC7468,
              April 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7468>.

   [Std-802.1AR-2009]
              IEEE SA-Standards Board, "IEEE Standard for Local and
              metropolitan area networks - Secure Device Identity",
              December 2009, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/
              standard/802.1AR-2009.html>.

14.2.  Informative References

   [draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]
              Pritikin, M., Behringer, M., and S. Bjarnason,
              "Bootstrapping Key Infrastructures", draft-ietf-anima-
              bootstrapping-keyinfra-03 (work in progress), 2016,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-anima-
              bootstrapping-keyinfra>.

   [draft-ietf-netconf-call-home]
              Watsen, K., "NETCONF Call Home (work in progress)", draft-
              ieft-netconf-restconf-10 (work in progress), December
              2015, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-
              netconf-call-home-17>.

   [draft-ietf-netconf-server-model]
              Watsen, K., "NETCONF Server Model (work in progress)",
              draft-ieft-netconf-server-model-09 (work in progress),
              March 2016, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-
              netconf-call-home-17>.




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   [RFC2939]  Droms, R., "Procedures and IANA Guidelines for Definition
              of New DHCP Options and Message Types", BCP 43, RFC 2939,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2939, September 2000,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2939>.

   [RFC3688]  Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.

   [RFC6241]  Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
              and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
              (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.

   [RFC6698]  Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication
              of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)
              Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, DOI 10.17487/RFC6698, August
              2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6698>.

   [RFC7317]  Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "A YANG Data Model for
              System Management", RFC 7317, DOI 10.17487/RFC7317, August
              2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7317>.





























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Appendix A.  API Examples

   This section presents some examples illustrating device interactions
   with a bootstrap server to access Redirect and Bootstrap information,
   both unsigned and signed, as well as to send a progress notification.
   These examples show the bootstrap information containing
   configuration from the YANG modules in [RFC7317] and
   [draft-ietf-netconf-server-model].

A.1.  Unsigned Redirect Information

   The following example illustrates a device using the API to fetch its
   bootstrapping data.  In this example, the device receives unsigned
   redirect information.  This example is representative of a response a
   trusted redirect server might return.

 REQUEST
 -------
 ['\' line wrapping added for formatting only]

 GET https://example.com/restconf/data/ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server:\
 device=123456 HTTP/1.1
 HOST: example.com
 Accept: application/yang.data+xml


 RESPONSE
 --------

 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
 Date: Sat, 31 Oct 2015 17:02:40 GMT
 Server: example-server
 Content-Type: application/yang.data+xml

 <!-- '\' line wrapping added for formatting purposes only -->

 <device
    xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server">
   <unique-id>123456789</unique-id>
   <redirect-information>
     <bootstrap-server>
       <address>phs1.example.com</address>
       <port>8443</port>
       <trust-anchor>
         WmdsK2gyTTg3QmtGMjhWbW1CdFFVaWc3OEgrRkYyRTFwdSt4ZVRJbVFFM\
         lLQllsdWpOcjFTMnRLR05EMUc2OVJpK2FWNGw2NTdZNCtadVJMZgpRYjk\
         zSFNwSDdwVXBCYnA4dmtNanFtZjJma3RqZHBxeFppUUtTbndWZTF2Zwot\
         NGcEk3UE90cnNFVjRwTUNBd0VBQWFPQ0FSSXdnZ0VPCk1CMEdBMVVkRGd\



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         VEJiZ0JTWEdlbUEKMnhpRHVOTVkvVHFLNWd4cFJBZ1ZOYUU0cERZd05ER\
         V6QVJCZ05WQkFNVENrTlNUQ0JKYzNOMVpYS0NDUUNVRHBNSll6UG8zREF\
         NQmdOVkhSTUJBZjhFCkFqQUFNQTRHQTFVZER3RUIvd1FFQXdJSGdEQnBC\
         Z05WSFI4RVlqQmdNRjZnSXFBZ2hoNW9kSFJ3T2k4dlpYaGgKYlhCc1pTN\
         WpiMjB2WlhoaGJYQnNaUzVqY215aU9LUTJNRFF4Q3pBSkJnTlZCQVlUQW\
         QmdOVkJBWVRBbFZUTVJBd0RnWURWUVFLRXdkbAplR0Z0Y0d4bE1RNHdEQ\
         MkF6a3hqUDlVQWtHR0dvS1U1eUc1SVR0Wm0vK3B0R2FieXVDMjBRd2kvZ\
         25PZnpZNEhONApXY0pTaUpZK2xtYWs3RTRORUZXZS9RdGp4NUlXZmdvN2\
         RJSUJQFRStS0Cg==
       </trust-anchor>
     </bootstrap-server>
     <bootstrap-server>
       <address>phs2.example.com</address>
       <port>8443</port>
       <trust-anchor>
         WmdsK2gyTTg3QmtGMjhWbW1CdFFVaWc3OEgrRkYyRTFwdSt4ZVRJbVFFM\
         lLQllsdWpOcjFTMnRLR05EMUc2OVJpK2FWNGw2NTdZNCtadVJMZgpRYjk\
         zSFNwSDdwVXBCYnA4dmtNanFtZjJma3RqZHBxeFppUUtTbndWZTF2Zwot\
         NGcEk3UE90cnNFVjRwTUNBd0VBQWFPQ0FSSXdnZ0VPCk1CMEdBMVVkRGd\
         VEJiZ0JTWEdlbUEKMnhpRHVOTVkvVHFLNWd4cFJBZ1ZOYUU0cERZd05ER\
         V6QVJCZ05WQkFNVENrTlNUQ0JKYzNOMVpYS0NDUUNVRHBNSll6UG8zREF\
         NQmdOVkhSTUJBZjhFCkFqQUFNQTRHQTFVZER3RUIvd1FFQXdJSGdEQnBC\
         Z05WSFI4RVlqQmdNRjZnSXFBZ2hoNW9kSFJ3T2k4dlpYaGgKYlhCc1pTN\
         WpiMjB2WlhoaGJYQnNaUzVqY215aU9LUTJNRFF4Q3pBSkJnTlZCQVlUQW\
         QmdOVkJBWVRBbFZUTVJBd0RnWURWUVFLRXdkbAplR0Z0Y0d4bE1RNHdEQ\
         MkF6a3hqUDlVQWtHR0dvS1U1eUc1SVR0Wm0vK3B0R2FieXVDMjBRd2kvZ\
         25PZnpZNEhONApXY0pTaUpZK2xtYWs3RTRORUZXZS9RdGp4NUlXZmdvN2\
         RJSUJQFRStS0Cg==
       </trust-anchor>
     </bootstrap-server>
   </redirect-information>
 </device>

A.2.  Signed Redirect Information

   The following example illustrates a device using the API to fetch its
   bootstrapping data.  In this example, the device receives signed
   redirect information.  This example is representative of a response
   that redirect server might return if concerned the device might not
   be able to authenticate its TLS certificate.

 REQUEST
 -------
 ['\' line wrapping added for formatting only]

 GET https://example.com/restconf/data/ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server:\
 device=123456 HTTP/1.1
 HOST: example.com



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 Accept: application/yang.data+xml


 RESPONSE
 --------

 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
 Date: Sat, 31 Oct 2015 17:02:40 GMT
 Server: example-server
 Content-Type: application/yang.data+xml

 <!-- '\' line wrapping added for formatting purposes only -->

 <device
    xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server">
   <unique-id>123456789</unique-id>
   <redirect-information>
     <bootstrap-server>
       <address>phs1.example.com</address>
       <port>8443</port>
       <trust-anchor>
         WmdsK2gyTTg3QmtGMjhWbW1CdFFVaWc3OEgrRkYyRTFwdSt4ZVRJbVFFM\
         lLQllsdWpOcjFTMnRLR05EMUc2OVJpK2FWNGw2NTdZNCtadVJMZgpRYjk\
         zSFNwSDdwVXBCYnA4dmtNanFtZjJma3RqZHBxeFppUUtTbndWZTF2Zwot\
         NGcEk3UE90cnNFVjRwTUNBd0VBQWFPQ0FSSXdnZ0VPCk1CMEdBMVVkRGd\
         VEJiZ0JTWEdlbUEKMnhpRHVOTVkvVHFLNWd4cFJBZ1ZOYUU0cERZd05ER\
         V6QVJCZ05WQkFNVENrTlNUQ0JKYzNOMVpYS0NDUUNVRHBNSll6UG8zREF\
         NQmdOVkhSTUJBZjhFCkFqQUFNQTRHQTFVZER3RUIvd1FFQXdJSGdEQnBC\
         Z05WSFI4RVlqQmdNRjZnSXFBZ2hoNW9kSFJ3T2k4dlpYaGgKYlhCc1pTN\
         WpiMjB2WlhoaGJYQnNaUzVqY215aU9LUTJNRFF4Q3pBSkJnTlZCQVlUQW\
         QmdOVkJBWVRBbFZUTVJBd0RnWURWUVFLRXdkbAplR0Z0Y0d4bE1RNHdEQ\
         MkF6a3hqUDlVQWtHR0dvS1U1eUc1SVR0Wm0vK3B0R2FieXVDMjBRd2kvZ\
         25PZnpZNEhONApXY0pTaUpZK2xtYWs3RTRORUZXZS9RdGp4NUlXZmdvN2\
         RJSUJQFRStS0Cg==
       </trust-anchor>
     </bootstrap-server>
     <bootstrap-server>
       <address>phs2.example.com</address>
       <port>8443</port>
       <trust-anchor>
         WmdsK2gyTTg3QmtGMjhWbW1CdFFVaWc3OEgrRkYyRTFwdSt4ZVRJbVFFM\
         lLQllsdWpOcjFTMnRLR05EMUc2OVJpK2FWNGw2NTdZNCtadVJMZgpRYjk\
         zSFNwSDdwVXBCYnA4dmtNanFtZjJma3RqZHBxeFppUUtTbndWZTF2Zwot\
         NGcEk3UE90cnNFVjRwTUNBd0VBQWFPQ0FSSXdnZ0VPCk1CMEdBMVVkRGd\
         VEJiZ0JTWEdlbUEKMnhpRHVOTVkvVHFLNWd4cFJBZ1ZOYUU0cERZd05ER\
         V6QVJCZ05WQkFNVENrTlNUQ0JKYzNOMVpYS0NDUUNVRHBNSll6UG8zREF\
         NQmdOVkhSTUJBZjhFCkFqQUFNQTRHQTFVZER3RUIvd1FFQXdJSGdEQnBC\
         Z05WSFI4RVlqQmdNRjZnSXFBZ2hoNW9kSFJ3T2k4dlpYaGgKYlhCc1pTN\



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         WpiMjB2WlhoaGJYQnNaUzVqY215aU9LUTJNRFF4Q3pBSkJnTlZCQVlUQW\
         QmdOVkJBWVRBbFZUTVJBd0RnWURWUVFLRXdkbAplR0Z0Y0d4bE1RNHdEQ\
         MkF6a3hqUDlVQWtHR0dvS1U1eUc1SVR0Wm0vK3B0R2FieXVDMjBRd2kvZ\
         25PZnpZNEhONApXY0pTaUpZK2xtYWs3RTRORUZXZS9RdGp4NUlXZmdvN2\
         RJSUJQFRStS0Cg==
       </trust-anchor>
     </bootstrap-server>
   </redirect-information>
   <signature>
     RDEuRiZNRNLeJpgN9YWkXLAZX2rASwy041EMmZ6KAkWUd3ZmXucfoLpdRemfuPii\
     QGp1bmlwZXIuY29tMB4XDTE0MDIyNzE0MTM1MloXDTE1MDIyNzE0MTM1MlowMDET\
     MBEGA1UEChQKVFBNX1ZlbmRvcjEZMBcGA1UEAxQQSnVuaXBlcl9YWFhYWF9DQTCC\
     NTOufhQsD2t4TYpEkzLEiZqSswdBOaPxPcJLQNW8Bw2xN+A9GX=
   </signature>
   <ownership-voucher>
     ChQQSnVuaXBlcl9OZXR3b3JrczEdMBsGA1UECxQUQ2VydGlmaWNhdGVfSXNzdWFu\
     Y2UxGTAXBgNVBAMUEFRQTV9UcnVzdF9BbmNob3IxHTAbBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWDmNh\
     MBEGA1UEChQKVFBNX1ZlbmRvcjEZMBcGA1UEAxQQSnVuaXBlcl9YWFhYWF9DQTCC\
     ASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBANL5Mk5qFsVuqo+JmXWLmFxI\
     yh/JaftWYf7m3KBzOdg2MIHfBgNVHSMEgdcwgdSAFDSljCNmTN5b+CDujJLlyDal\
     WFPaoYGwpIGtMIGqMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECBMKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTES\
     MBAGA1UEBxMJU3Vubnl2YWxlMRkwFwYDVQQKFBBKdW5pcGVyX05ldHdvcmtzMR0w\
     GwYDVQQLFBRDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZV9Jc3N1YW5jZTEZMBcGA1UEAxQQVFBNX1RydXN0\
     X0FuY2hvcjEdMBsGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYOY2FAanVuaXBlci5jb22CCQDUbsEdTn5v\
     MjAO
   </ownership-voucher>
   <owner-certificate>
     MIIExTCCA62gAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADCBqjELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMx\
     EzARBgNVBAgTCkNhbGlmb3JuaWExEjAQBgNVBAcTCVN1bm55dmFsZTEZMBcGA1UE\
     ChQQSnVuaXBlcl9OZXR3b3JrczEdMBsGA1UECxQUQ2VydGlmaWNhdGVfSXNzdWFu\
     Y2UxGTAXBgNVBAMUEFRQTV9UcnVzdF9BbmNob3IxHTAbBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWDmNh\
     QGp1bmlwZXIuY29tMB4XDTE0MDIyNzE0MTM1MloXDTE1MDIyNzE0MTM1MlowMDET\
     MBEGA1UEChQKVFBNX1ZlbmRvcjEZMBcGA1UEAxQQSnVuaXBlcl9YWFhYWF9DQTCC\
     ASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBANL5Mk5qFsVuqo+JmXWLmFxI\
     RDEuRiZNRNLeJpgN9YWkXLAZX2rASwy041EMmZ6KAkWUd3ZmXucfoLpdRemfuPii\
     ap1DgmS3IaYl/s4OOF8yzcYJprm8O7NyZp+Y9H1U/7Qfp97/KbqwCgkHSzOlnt0X\
     KQTpIM/rNrbrkuTmalezFoFS7mrxLXJAsfP1guVcD7sLCyjvegL8pRCCrU9xyKLF\
     8u/Qz4s0x0uzcGYh0sd3iWj21+AtigSLdMD76/j/VzftQL8B1yp3vc1EZiowOwq4\
     KmORbiKU2GTGZkaCgCjmrWpvrYWLoXv/sf2nPLyK6YjiWsslOJtRO+KzRbs2B18C\
     AwEAAaOCAW0wggFpMBIGA1UdEwEB/wQIMAYBAf8CAQAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFHppoyXF\
     yh/JaftWYf7m3KBzOdg2MIHfBgNVHSMEgdcwgdSAFDSljCNmTN5b+CDujJLlyDal\
     WFPaoYGwpIGtMIGqMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECBMKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTES\
     MBAGA1UEBxMJU3Vubnl2YWxlMRkwFwYDVQQKFBBKdW5pcGVyX05ldHdvcmtzMR0w\
     GwYDVQQLFBRDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZV9Jc3N1YW5jZTEZMBcGA1UEAxQQVFBNX1RydXN0\
     X0FuY2hvcjEdMBsGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYOY2FAanVuaXBlci5jb22CCQDUbsEdTn5v\
     MjAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAgQwQgYDVR0fBDswOTA3oDWgM4YxaHR0cDovL2NybC5q\
     dW5pcGVyLm5ldD9jYT1KdW5pcGVyX1RydXN0X0FuY2hvcl9DQTANBgkqhkiG9w0B\
     AQsFAAOCAQEAOuD7EBilqQcT3t2C4AXta1gGNNwdldLLw0jtk4BMiA9l//DZfskB\



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     2AaJtiseLTXsMF6MQwDs1YKkiXKLu7gBZDlJ6NiDwy1UnXhi2BDG+MYXQrc6p76K\
     z3bsVwZlaJQCdF5sbggc1MyrsOu9QirnRZkIv3R8ndJH5K792ztLquulAcMfnK1Y\
     NTOufhQsD2t4TYpEkzLEiZqSswdBOaPxPcJLQNW8Bw2xN+A9GX7WJzEbT/G7MUfo\
     Sb+U2PVsQTDWEzUjVnG7vNWYxirnAOZ0OXEWWYxHUJntx6DsbXYuX7D1PkkNr7ir\
     96DpOPtX7h8pxxGSDPBXIyvg02aFMphstQ==
   </owner-certificate>
   <voucher-revocation>
     QGp1bmlwZXIuY29tMB4XDTE0MDIyNzE0MTM1MloXDTE1MDIyNzE0MTM1MlowMDET\
     MBEGA1UEChQKVFBNX1ZlbmRvcjEZMBcGA1UEAxQQSnVuaXBlcl9YWFhYWF9DQTCC\
     ASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBANL5Mk5qFsVuqo+JmXWLmFxI\
     RDEuRiZNRNLeJpgN9YWkXLAZX2rASwy041EMmZ6KAkWUd3ZmXucfoLpdRemfuPii\
     KQTpIM/rNrbrkuTmalezFoFS7mrxLXJAsfP1guVcD7sLCyjvegL8pRCCrU9xyKLF\
     8u/Qz4s0x0uzcGYh0sd3iWj21+AtigSLdMD76/j/VzftQL8B1yp3vc1EZiowOwq4\
     AwEAAaOCAW0wggFpMBIGA1UdEwEB/wQIMAYBAf8CAQAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFHppoyXF\
     WFPaoYGwpIGtMIGqMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECBMKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTES\
     NTOufhQsD2t4TYpEkzLEiZqSswdBOaPxPcJLQNW8Bw2xN+A9GX=
   </voucher-revocation>
   <certificate-revocation>
     Y2UxGTAXBgNVBAMUEFRQTV9UcnVzdF9BbmNob3IxHTAbBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWDmNh\
     MBEGA1UEChQKVFBNX1ZlbmRvcjEZMBcGA1UEAxQQSnVuaXBlcl9YWFhYWF9DQTCC\
     ASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBANL5Mk5qFsVuqo+JmXWLmFxI\
     yh/JaftWYf7m3KBzOdg2MIHfBgNVHSMEgdcwgdSAFDSljCNmTN5b+CDujJLlyDal\
     WFPaoYGwpIGtMIGqMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECBMKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTES\
     MBAGA1UEBxMJU3Vubnl2YWxlMRkwFwYDVQQKFBBKdW5pcGVyX05ldHdvcmtzMR0w\
     GwYDVQQLFBRDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZV9Jc3N1YW5jZTEZMBcGA1UEAxQQVFBNX1RydXN0\
     X0FuY2hvcjEdMBsGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYOY2FAanVuaXBlci5jb22CCQDUbsEdTn5v\
     MjAO==
   </certificate-revocation>
 </device>

A.3.  Unsigned Bootstrap Information

   The following example illustrates a device using the API to fetch its
   bootstrapping data.  In this example, the device receives unsigned
   bootstrapping information.  This example is representative of a
   response a locally deployed bootstrap server might return.

REQUEST
-------
['\' line wrapping added for formatting only]

GET https://example.com/restconf/data/ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server:\
device=123456 HTTP/1.1
HOST: example.com
Accept: application/yang.data+xml


RESPONSE



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--------

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 31 Oct 2015 17:02:40 GMT
Server: example-server
Content-Type: application/yang.data+xml

<!-- '\' line wrapping added for formatting purposes only -->

<device
   xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server">
  <unique-id>123456789</unique-id>
  <bootstrap-information>
    <boot-image>
      <name>
        boot-image-v3.2R1.6.img
      </name>
      <md5>
        SomeMD5String
      </md5>
      <sha1>
        SomeSha1String
      </sha1>
      <uri>
        ftp://ftp.example.com/path/to/file
      </uri>
    </boot-image>
    <configuration-handling>merge</configuration-handling>
    <configuration>
      <!-- from ietf-system.yang -->
      <system xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-system">
        <authentication>
          <user>
            <name>admin</name>
            <authorized-key>
              <name>admin's rsa ssh host-key</name>
              <algorithm>ssh-rsa</algorithm>
              <key-data>AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQDeJMV8zrtsi8CgEsR\
              jCzfve2m6zD3awSBPrh7ICggLQvHVbPL89eHLuecStKL3HrEgXaI/O2Mw\
              E1lG9YxLzeS5p2ngzK61vikUSqfMukeBohFTrDZ8bUtrF+HMLlTRnoCVc\
              WAw1lOr9IDGDAuww6G45gLcHalHMmBtQxKnZdzU9kx/fL3ZS5G76Fy6sA\
              vg7SLqQFPjXXft2CAhin8xwYRZy6r/2N9PMJ2Dnepvq4H2DKqBIe340jW\
              EIuA7LvEJYql4unq4Iog+/+CiumTkmQIWRgIoj4FCzYkO9NvRE6fOSLLf\
              gakWVOZZgQ8929uWjCWlGlqn2mPibp2Go1</key-data>
            </authorized-key>
          </user>
        </authentication>
      </system>



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      <!-- from ietf-netconf-server.yang -->
      <netconf-server
        xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-server">
        <call-home>
          <application>
            <name>config-mgr</name>
            <ssh>
              <endpoints>
                <endpoint>
                  <name>east-data-center</name>
                  <address>11.22.33.44</address>
                </endpoint>
                <endpoint>
                  <name>west-data-center</name>
                  <address>55.66.77.88</address>
                </endpoint>
              </endpoints>
              <host-keys>
                <host-key>my-call-home-x509-key</host-key>
              </host-keys>
            </ssh>
          </application>
        </call-home>
      </netconf-server>
    </configuration>
  </bootstrap-information>
</device>

A.4.  Signed Bootstrap Information

   The following example illustrates a device using the API to fetch its
   bootstrapping data.  In this example, the device receives signed
   bootstrap information.  This example is representative of a response
   that bootstrap server might return if concerned the device might not
   be able to authenticate its TLS certificate.

REQUEST
-------

['\' line wrapping added for formatting only]

GET https://example.com/restconf/data/ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server:\
device=123456 HTTP/1.1
HOST: example.com
Accept: application/yang.data+xml


RESPONSE



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--------

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 31 Oct 2015 17:02:40 GMT
Server: example-server
Content-Type: application/yang.data+xml

<!-- '\' line wrapping added for formatting purposes only -->

<device
   xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server">
  <unique-id>123456789</unique-id>
  <bootstrap-information>
    <boot-image>
      <name>
        boot-image-v3.2R1.6.img
      </name>
      <md5>
        SomeMD5String
      </md5>
      <sha1>
        SomeSha1String
      </sha1>
      <uri>
        /path/to/on/same/bootserver
      </uri>
    </boot-image>
    <configuration>
      <!-- from ietf-system.yang -->
      <system xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-system">
        <authentication>
          <user>
            <name>admin</name>
            <authorized-key>
              <name>admin's rsa ssh host-key</name>
              <algorithm>ssh-rsa</algorithm>
              <key-data>AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQDeJMV8zrtsi8CgEsR\
              jCzfve2m6zD3awSBPrh7ICggLQvHVbPL89eHLuecStKL3HrEgXaI/O2Mw\
              E1lG9YxLzeS5p2ngzK61vikUSqfMukeBohFTrDZ8bUtrF+HMLlTRnoCVc\
              WAw1lOr9IDGDAuww6G45gLcHalHMmBtQxKnZdzU9kx/fL3ZS5G76Fy6sA\
              vg7SLqQFPjXXft2CAhin8xwYRZy6r/2N9PMJ2Dnepvq4H2DKqBIe340jW\
              EIuA7LvEJYql4unq4Iog+/+CiumTkmQIWRgIoj4FCzYkO9NvRE6fOSLLf\
              gakWVOZZgQ8929uWjCWlGlqn2mPibp2Go1</key-data>
            </authorized-key>
          </user>
        </authentication>
      </system>
      <!-- from ietf-netconf-server.yang -->



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      <netconf-server
        xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-server">
        <call-home>
          <application>
            <name>config-mgr</name>
            <ssh>
              <endpoints>
                <endpoint>
                  <name>east-data-center</name>
                  <address>11.22.33.44</address>
                </endpoint>
                <endpoint>
                  <name>west-data-center</name>
                  <address>55.66.77.88</address>
                </endpoint>
              </endpoints>
              <host-keys>
                <host-key>my-call-home-x509-key</host-key>
              </host-keys>
            </ssh>
          </application>
        </call-home>
      </netconf-server>
    </configuration>
  </bootstrap-information>
  <signature>
    RDEuRiZNRNLeJpgN9YWkXLAZX2rASwy041EMmZ6KAkWUd3ZmXucfoLpdRemfuPii\
    QGp1bmlwZXIuY29tMB4XDTE0MDIyNzE0MTM1MloXDTE1MDIyNzE0MTM1MlowMDET\
    MBEGA1UEChQKVFBNX1ZlbmRvcjEZMBcGA1UEAxQQSnVuaXBlcl9YWFhYWF9DQTCC\
    NTOufhQsD2t4TYpEkzLEiZqSswdBOaPxPcJLQNW8Bw2xN+A9GX=
  </signature>
  <ownership-voucher>
    ChQQSnVuaXBlcl9OZXR3b3JrczEdMBsGA1UECxQUQ2VydGlmaWNhdGVfSXNzdWFu\
    Y2UxGTAXBgNVBAMUEFRQTV9UcnVzdF9BbmNob3IxHTAbBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWDmNh\
    MBEGA1UEChQKVFBNX1ZlbmRvcjEZMBcGA1UEAxQQSnVuaXBlcl9YWFhYWF9DQTCC\
    ASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBANL5Mk5qFsVuqo+JmXWLmFxI\
    yh/JaftWYf7m3KBzOdg2MIHfBgNVHSMEgdcwgdSAFDSljCNmTN5b+CDujJLlyDal\
    WFPaoYGwpIGtMIGqMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECBMKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTES\
    MBAGA1UEBxMJU3Vubnl2YWxlMRkwFwYDVQQKFBBKdW5pcGVyX05ldHdvcmtzMR0w\
    GwYDVQQLFBRDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZV9Jc3N1YW5jZTEZMBcGA1UEAxQQVFBNX1RydXN0\
    X0FuY2hvcjEdMBsGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYOY2FAanVuaXBlci5jb22CCQDUbsEdTn5v\
    MjAO
  </ownership-voucher>
  <owner-certificate>
    MIIExTCCA62gAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADCBqjELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMx\
    EzARBgNVBAgTCkNhbGlmb3JuaWExEjAQBgNVBAcTCVN1bm55dmFsZTEZMBcGA1UE\
    ChQQSnVuaXBlcl9OZXR3b3JrczEdMBsGA1UECxQUQ2VydGlmaWNhdGVfSXNzdWFu\
    Y2UxGTAXBgNVBAMUEFRQTV9UcnVzdF9BbmNob3IxHTAbBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWDmNh\



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    QGp1bmlwZXIuY29tMB4XDTE0MDIyNzE0MTM1MloXDTE1MDIyNzE0MTM1MlowMDET\
    MBEGA1UEChQKVFBNX1ZlbmRvcjEZMBcGA1UEAxQQSnVuaXBlcl9YWFhYWF9DQTCC\
    ASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBANL5Mk5qFsVuqo+JmXWLmFxI\
    RDEuRiZNRNLeJpgN9YWkXLAZX2rASwy041EMmZ6KAkWUd3ZmXucfoLpdRemfuPii\
    ap1DgmS3IaYl/s4OOF8yzcYJprm8O7NyZp+Y9H1U/7Qfp97/KbqwCgkHSzOlnt0X\
    KQTpIM/rNrbrkuTmalezFoFS7mrxLXJAsfP1guVcD7sLCyjvegL8pRCCrU9xyKLF\
    8u/Qz4s0x0uzcGYh0sd3iWj21+AtigSLdMD76/j/VzftQL8B1yp3vc1EZiowOwq4\
    KmORbiKU2GTGZkaCgCjmrWpvrYWLoXv/sf2nPLyK6YjiWsslOJtRO+KzRbs2B18C\
    AwEAAaOCAW0wggFpMBIGA1UdEwEB/wQIMAYBAf8CAQAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFHppoyXF\
    yh/JaftWYf7m3KBzOdg2MIHfBgNVHSMEgdcwgdSAFDSljCNmTN5b+CDujJLlyDal\
    WFPaoYGwpIGtMIGqMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECBMKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTES\
    MBAGA1UEBxMJU3Vubnl2YWxlMRkwFwYDVQQKFBBKdW5pcGVyX05ldHdvcmtzMR0w\
    GwYDVQQLFBRDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZV9Jc3N1YW5jZTEZMBcGA1UEAxQQVFBNX1RydXN0\
    X0FuY2hvcjEdMBsGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYOY2FAanVuaXBlci5jb22CCQDUbsEdTn5v\
    MjAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAgQwQgYDVR0fBDswOTA3oDWgM4YxaHR0cDovL2NybC5q\
    dW5pcGVyLm5ldD9jYT1KdW5pcGVyX1RydXN0X0FuY2hvcl9DQTANBgkqhkiG9w0B\
    AQsFAAOCAQEAOuD7EBilqQcT3t2C4AXta1gGNNwdldLLw0jtk4BMiA9l//DZfskB\
    2AaJtiseLTXsMF6MQwDs1YKkiXKLu7gBZDlJ6NiDwy1UnXhi2BDG+MYXQrc6p76K\
    z3bsVwZlaJQCdF5sbggc1MyrsOu9QirnRZkIv3R8ndJH5K792ztLquulAcMfnK1Y\
    NTOufhQsD2t4TYpEkzLEiZqSswdBOaPxPcJLQNW8Bw2xN+A9GX7WJzEbT/G7MUfo\
    Sb+U2PVsQTDWEzUjVnG7vNWYxirnAOZ0OXEWWYxHUJntx6DsbXYuX7D1PkkNr7ir\
    96DpOPtX7h8pxxGSDPBXIyvg02aFMphstQ==
  </owner-certificate>
  <voucher-revocation>
    QGp1bmlwZXIuY29tMB4XDTE0MDIyNzE0MTM1MloXDTE1MDIyNzE0MTM1MlowMDET\
    MBEGA1UEChQKVFBNX1ZlbmRvcjEZMBcGA1UEAxQQSnVuaXBlcl9YWFhYWF9DQTCC\
    ASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBANL5Mk5qFsVuqo+JmXWLmFxI\
    RDEuRiZNRNLeJpgN9YWkXLAZX2rASwy041EMmZ6KAkWUd3ZmXucfoLpdRemfuPii\
    KQTpIM/rNrbrkuTmalezFoFS7mrxLXJAsfP1guVcD7sLCyjvegL8pRCCrU9xyKLF\
    8u/Qz4s0x0uzcGYh0sd3iWj21+AtigSLdMD76/j/VzftQL8B1yp3vc1EZiowOwq4\
    AwEAAaOCAW0wggFpMBIGA1UdEwEB/wQIMAYBAf8CAQAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFHppoyXF\
    WFPaoYGwpIGtMIGqMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECBMKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTES\
    NTOufhQsD2t4TYpEkzLEiZqSswdBOaPxPcJLQNW8Bw2xN+A9GX=
  </voucher-revocation>
  <certificate-revocation>
    Y2UxGTAXBgNVBAMUEFRQTV9UcnVzdF9BbmNob3IxHTAbBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWDmNh\
    MBEGA1UEChQKVFBNX1ZlbmRvcjEZMBcGA1UEAxQQSnVuaXBlcl9YWFhYWF9DQTCC\
    ASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBANL5Mk5qFsVuqo+JmXWLmFxI\
    yh/JaftWYf7m3KBzOdg2MIHfBgNVHSMEgdcwgdSAFDSljCNmTN5b+CDujJLlyDal\
    WFPaoYGwpIGtMIGqMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECBMKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTES\
    MBAGA1UEBxMJU3Vubnl2YWxlMRkwFwYDVQQKFBBKdW5pcGVyX05ldHdvcmtzMR0w\
    GwYDVQQLFBRDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZV9Jc3N1YW5jZTEZMBcGA1UEAxQQVFBNX1RydXN0\
    X0FuY2hvcjEdMBsGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYOY2FAanVuaXBlci5jb22CCQDUbsEdTn5v\
    MjAO==
  </certificate-revocation>
</device>





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A.5.  Progress Notifications

   The following example illustrates a device using the API to post a
   notification to a trusted bootstrap server.  Illustrated below is the
   'bootstrap-complete' message, but the device may send other
   notifications to the server while bootstrapping (e.g., to provide
   status updates).

   The bootstrap server MUST NOT process a notification from a device
   without first authenticating the device.  This is in contrast to when
   a device is fetching data from the server, a read-only operation, in
   which case device authentication is not strictly required (e.g., when
   sending signed information).

   In this example, the device sends a notification indicating that it
   has completed bootstrapping off the data provided by the server.
   This example illustrates the device sending both its SSH host keys
   and TLS server certificate to the bootstrap server, which the
   bootstrap server may, for example, pass to an NMS, as discussed in
   Section 7.3.

   Note that devices that are able to present an IDevID certificate
   [Std-802.1AR-2009], when establishing SSH or TLS connections, do not
   need to include its DevID certificate in the bootstrap-complete
   message.  It is unnecessary to send the DevID certificate in this
   case because the IDevID certificate does not need to be pinned by an
   NMS in order to be trusted.

REQUEST
-------
['\' line wrapping added for formatting only]

POST https://example.com/restconf/data/ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server:\
device=123456/notification HTTP/1.1
HOST: example.com
Content-Type: application/yang.data+xml

<!-- '\' line wrapping added for formatting purposes only -->

<input
   xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-zerotouch-bootstrap-server">
  <notification-type>bootstrap-complete</notification-type>
  <message>example message</message>
  <ssh-host-keys>
    <ssh-host-key>
      <format>ssh-rsa</format>
      <key-data>
       AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQDeJMV8zrtsi8CgEsRCjCzfve2m6\



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       zD3awSBPrh7ICggLQvHVbPL89eHLuecStKL3HrEgXaI/O2MwjE1lG9YxL\
       zeS5p2ngzK61vikUSqfMukeBohFTrDZ8bUtrF+HMLlTRnoCVcCWAw1lOr\
       9IDGDAuww6G45gLcHalHMmBtQxKnZdzU9kx/fL3ZS5G76Fy6sA5vg7SLq\
       QFPjXXft2CAhin8xwYRZy6r/2N9PMJ2Dnepvq4H2DKqBIe340jWqEIuA7\
       LvEJYql4unq4Iog+/+CiumTkmQIWRgIoj4FCzYkO9NvRE6fOSLLf6gakW\
       VOZZgQ8929uWjCWlGlqn2mPibp2Go1
      </key-data>
    </ssh-host-key>
    <ssh-host-key>
      <format>ssh-dsa</format>
      <key-data>
       zD3awSBPrh7ICggLQvHVbPL89eHLuecStKL3HrEgXaI/O2MwjE1lG9YxL\
       zeS5p2ngzK61vikUSqfMukeBohFTrDZ8bUtrF+HMLlTRnoCVcCWAw1lOr\
       9IDGDAuww6G45gLcHalHMmBtQxKnZdzU9kx/fL3ZS5G76Fy6sA5vg7SLq\
       AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQDeJMV8zrtsi8CgEsRCjCzfve2m6\
       QFPjXXft2CAhin8xwYRZy6r/2N9PMJ2Dnepvq4H2DKqBIe340jWqEIuA7\
       LvEJYql4unq4Iog+/+CiumTkmQIWRgIoj4FCzYkO9NvRE6fOSLLf6gakW\
       VOZZgQ8929uWjCWlGlqn2mPibp2Go1
      </key-data>
    </ssh-host-key>
  </ssh-host-keys>
  <trust-anchors>
    <trust-anchor>
      <protocol>netconf-ssh</protocol>
      <protocol>netconf-tls</protocol>
      <protocol>restconf-tls</protocol>
      <protocol>netconf-ch-ssh</protocol>
      <protocol>netconf-ch-tls</protocol>
      <protocol>restconf-ch-tls</protocol>
      <certificate>
        WmdsK2gyTTg3QmtGMjhWbW1CdFFVaWc3OEgrRkYyRTFwdSt4ZVRJbVFFM\
        lLQllsdWpOcjFTMnRLR05EMUc2OVJpK2FWNGw2NTdZNCtadVJMZgpRYjk\
        zSFNwSDdwVXBCYnA4dmtNanFtZjJma3RqZHBxeFppUUtTbndWZTF2Zwot\
        NGcEk3UE90cnNFVjRwTUNBd0VBQWFPQ0FSSXdnZ0VPCk1CMEdBMVVkRGd\
        VEJiZ0JTWEdlbUEKMnhpRHVOTVkvVHFLNWd4cFJBZ1ZOYUU0cERZd05ER\
        V6QVJCZ05WQkFNVENrTlNUQ0JKYzNOMVpYS0NDUUNVRHBNSll6UG8zREF\
        NQmdOVkhSTUJBZjhFCkFqQUFNQTRHQTFVZER3RUIvd1FFQXdJSGdEQnBC\
        Z05WSFI4RVlqQmdNRjZnSXFBZ2hoNW9kSFJ3T2k4dlpYaGgKYlhCc1pTN\
        WpiMjB2WlhoaGJYQnNaUzVqY215aU9LUTJNRFF4Q3pBSkJnTlZCQVlUQW\
        QmdOVkJBWVRBbFZUTVJBd0RnWURWUVFLRXdkbAplR0Z0Y0d4bE1RNHdEQ\
        MkF6a3hqUDlVQWtHR0dvS1U1eUc1SVR0Wm0vK3B0R2FieXVDMjBRd2kvZ\
        25PZnpZNEhONApXY0pTaUpZK2xtYWs3RTRORUZXZS9RdGp4NUlXZmdvN2\
        RJSUJQFRStS0Cg==
      </certificate>
    </trust-anchor>
  </trust-anchors>

</input>



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RESPONSE
--------

HTTP/1.1 204 No Content
Date: Sat, 31 Oct 2015 17:02:40 GMT
Server: example-server

Appendix B.  Artifact Examples

   This section presents examples for how the 'information type'
   artifact (Section 4.1) can be encoded into a document that can be
   distributed outside the bootstrap server's RESETCONF API.  The
   encoding for these artifacts is the same as if an HTTP GET request
   had been sent to the RESTCONF URL for the specific resource.

   These examples show the bootstrap information containing
   configuration from the YANG modules in [RFC7317] and
   [draft-ietf-netconf-server-model].

   Only examples for information type artifact are provided as the other
   five artifacts in Section 4 have their own encodings.

B.1.  Redirect Information

   The following example illustrates how redirect information can be
   encoded into an artifact.

   INSERT  _TEXT_FROM_FILE(refs/ex-file-redirect-information.xml)

B.2.  Bootstrap Information

   The following example illustrates how bootstrap information can be
   encoded into an artifact.

   INSERT  _TEXT_FROM_FILE(refs/ex-file-bootstrap-information.xml)

Appendix C.  Change Log

C.1.  ID to 00

   o  Major structural update; the essence is the same.  Most every
      section was rewritten to some degree.

   o  Added a Use Cases section

   o  Added diagrams for "Actors and Roles" and "NMS Precondition"
      sections, and greatly improved the "Device Boot Sequence" diagram




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   o  Removed support for physical presence or any ability for
      configlets to not be signed.

   o  Defined the Zero Touch Information DHCP option

   o  Added an ability for devices to also download images from
      configuration servers

   o  Added an ability for configlets to be encrypted

   o  Now configuration servers only have to support HTTP/S - no other
      schemes possible

C.2.  00 to 01

   o  Added boot-image and validate-owner annotations to the "Actors and
      Roles" diagram.

   o  Fixed 2nd paragraph in section 7.1 to reflect current use of
      anyxml.

   o  Added encrypted and signed-encrypted examples

   o  Replaced YANG module with XSD schema

   o  Added IANA request for the Zero Touch Information DHCP Option

   o  Added IANA request for media types for boot-image and
      configuration

C.3.  01 to 02

   o  Replaced the need for a configuration signer with the ability for
      each NMS to be able to sign its own configurations, using
      manufacturer signed ownership vouchers and owner certificates.

   o  Renamed configuration server to bootstrap server, a more
      representative name given the information devices download from
      it.

   o  Replaced the concept of a configlet by defining a southbound
      interface for the bootstrap server using YANG.

   o  Removed the IANA request for the boot-image and configuration
      media types






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C.4.  02 to 03

   o  Minor update, mostly just to add an Editor's Note to show how this
      draft might integrate with the draft-pritikin-anima-bootstrapping-
      keyinfra.

C.5.  03 to 04

   o  Major update formally introducing unsigned data and support for
      Internet-based redirect servers.

   o  Added many terms to Terminology section.

   o  Added all new "Guiding Principles" section.

   o  Added all new "Sources for Bootstrapping Data" section.

   o  Rewrote the "Interactions" section and renamed it "Workflow
      Overview".

C.6.  04 to 05

   o  Semi-major update, refactoring the document into more logical
      parts

   o  Created new section for information types

   o  Added support for DNS servers

   o  Now allows provisional TLS connections

   o  Bootstrapping data now supports scripts

   o  Device Details section overhauled

   o  Security Considerations expanded

   o  Filled in enumerations for notification types

C.7.  05 to 06

   o  Minor update

   o  Added many Normative and Informative references.

   o  Added new section Other Considerations.





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C.8.  06 to 07

   o  Minor update

   o  Added an Editorial Note section for RFC Editor.

   o  Updated the IANA Considerations section.

C.9.  07 to 08

   o  Minor update

   o  Updated to reflect review from Michael Richardson.

C.10.  08 to 09

   o  Added in missing "Signature" artifact example.

   o  Added recommendation for manufacturers to use interoperable
      formats and file naming conventions for removable storage devices.

   o  Added configuration-handling leaf to guide if config should be
      merged, replaced, or processed like an edit-config/yang-patch
      document.

   o  Added a pre-configuration script, in addition to the post-
      configuration script from -05 (issue #15).

C.11.  09 to 10

   o  Factored ownership vocher and voucher revocation to a separate
      document: draft-kwatsen-netconf-voucher. (issue #11)

   o  Removed <configuration-handling> options 'edit-config' and yang-
      patch'. (issue #12)

   o  Defined how a signature over signed-data returned from a bootstrap
      server is processed. (issue #13)

   o  Added recommendation for removable storage devices to use open/
      standard file systems when possible.  (issue #14)

   o  Replaced notifications "script-[warning/error]" with "[pre/post]-
      script-[warning/error]". (goes with issue #15)

   o  switched owner-certificate to be encoded using the pkcs#7 format.
      (issue #16)




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   o  Replaced md5/sha1 with sha256 inside a choice statement, for
      future extensibility. (issue #17)

   o  A ton of editorial changes, as I went thru the entire draft with a
      fine-toothed comb.

Authors' Addresses

   Kent Watsen
   Juniper Networks

   EMail: kwatsen@juniper.net


   Mikael Abrahamsson
   T-Systems

   EMail: "mikael.abrahamsson@t-systems.se

































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